Nuclear program of the DPRK. Nuclear weapons of North Korea. Background Nuclear potential of North Korea

Since the opening in 1965 of the first nuclear reactor on the territory of the DPRK, disputes have not ceased in the world about how dangerous the policy of Korea is. Pyongyang regularly makes statements that weapons of mass destruction are being developed and tested in the republic, which will be used in the event of a threat to the ranks. However, experts do not agree on how great the power really is. North Korea. Questions also arise as to whether the country is receiving outside help - and if so, who has become an ally in the development of a weapon capable of causing incalculable casualties.

The military potential of the DPRK

North Korea is one of the twenty poorest countries in the world. There are many reasons for this, and one of them is the Juche political system, aimed at militarizing the country.

The needs of the army are in economic terms in the first place, and this is bearing fruit: the North Korean army is the most numerous in the world.

But the number of soldiers is no guarantee of success.. Insufficient funding leads to the fact that the army uses outdated equipment and weapons.

At the same time, the North Korean government has been claiming since 1974 that the country has been continuously working on the creation of nuclear weapons. Since 2004, Pyongyang has been conducting tests, and this is becoming an additional reason for the discontent of countries trying to resolve the conflict. The DPRK claims that the weapons are created solely for defensive purposes, but confirming the veracity of the claims is difficult.

At a military parade in 2015 in Pyongyang, a thermonuclear weapon was demonstrated - a hydrogen bomb. The fact that it exists, the government claimed for ten years, but the world community was skeptical about the information. In January 2017, a powerful earthquake was recorded in China near the border with North Korea. The Pyongyang authorities explained this by testing a hydrogen bomb, and then its presence was confirmed by foreign intelligence data.

Sources of financing

The question of how the DPRK got nuclear weapons is closely related to the country's economic condition. The test requires money, with the help of which it would be possible to solve most of the humanitarian and energy problems of the peninsula. This raises thoughts of financial assistance from the outside. Official partner North Korea is considered to be China, but during the reign of Kim Jong-un, relations between the countries deteriorated. The PRC does not approve of nuclear experiments conducted by Pyongyang.

It is assumed that a new alliance will enter the world political arena - the DPRK and Russia, but there are no solid grounds for this. Kim Jong-un shows respect to President Putin, but there are no more “courtesies” from Moscow in return. This means that funding comes from domestic sources.

Experts suggest that the money for the development of nuclear weapons is received from the following industries:

• social;
• agricultural;
• energy;
• heavy industrial.

There are statements in the media that North Korea is in an energy crisis. Electricity in residential buildings is turned on only for 3-4 hours a day, the rest of the time people are forced to do without electricity. Night pictures of the DPRK from space confirm this information. Next to the electrified territory of China and South Korea, the North looks like a solid dark spot. The beginning of this phenomenon coincided with the start of the nuclear program.

Allegations that the inhabitants of the DPRK are starving are not substantiated. In the last decade, the country's economic growth has been observed, which has also affected the food situation. The government has canceled the cards, which previously issued the norm of products. So the information that the missiles are being created at the expense of hungry Koreans is not confirmed.

Nuclear potential of North Korea

Gone are the days when threats of weapons of mass destruction were considered bluff. Availability powerful weapon the DPRK has a confirmed fact. Moreover, analysts claim that Korea has enough materials to create from 6 to 12 new missiles.

However, their production is associated with a number of difficulties:

• materials required for assembly nuclear warheads, are not produced in North Korea, they must be imported into the country;
• even when creating new charges, there remains a problem with the construction of carriers for them;
• wastes obtained during the production of nuclear fuel are not exported from the country, and the conditions for their safe storage can only be met with small volumes.

However, all these difficulties do not deter the DPRK from continuing the experiments. To date, at least six explosions have been confirmed in different parts countries, mainly on the border with Russia, China and South Korea. Pyongyang claims there are more. The government's official line is defensive. Threatened by the United States, North Korea can afford only one position: balancing power. To Washington's latest aggressive statement, Kim Jong-un replied that the DPRK would strike if necessary.

On September 9, 2016, North Korea marked the 68th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with another nuclear test.

First, several countries at once on the territory of North Korea, which could mean the explosion of a nuclear charge.

Then the fact of conducting nuclear tests was officially confirmed by Pyongyang. “The DPRK will continue to take measures to strengthen national nuclear forces quantitatively and qualitatively, in order to ensure the dignity and right to exist of the country in the face of a growing nuclear threat from the United States, ”says a message released by the official North Korean news agency KCNA.

South Korea, the US and Japan have initiated an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, which is expected to raise the issue of tightening sanctions against Pyongyang.

The problem, however, is that the sanctions on the DPRK are practically non-existent. Furthermore North Korea's nuclear missile program is making significant progress.

How it all began

Back in the years of the Korean War, the US command considered the possibility of launching nuclear strikes on the North. Although these plans were not realized, the North Korean leadership was interested in gaining access to technologies that would allow the creation of weapons of this type.

The USSR and China, acting as allies of the DPRK, were cool about these plans.

Nevertheless, in 1965, with the help of Soviet and Chinese specialists, a nuclear research center was founded in Yongbyon, where the Soviet nuclear reactor IRT-2000 was installed. Initially, it was assumed that the reactor would be used for work exclusively on peaceful programs.

In the 1970s, Pyongyang, relying on the support of China, began the first work on the creation of nuclear weapons.

In 1985, the Soviet Union got the DPRK to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In exchange for this, the USSR supplied Korea with a gas-graphite research reactor with a capacity of 5 MW. An agreement was also signed on the construction of a nuclear power plant in North Korea with four light water reactors of the VVER-440 type.

President Clinton's failed war

Decay Soviet Union changed the situation in the world. The West and South Korea expected the imminent fall of the North Korean regime, while at the same time conducting peace negotiations with it, counting on the liberalization of the political system and its dismantling according to the version of Eastern Europe.

The United States, in exchange for abandoning its nuclear program, promised Pyongyang economic and technical assistance in the development of the peaceful atom. North Korea responded by agreeing to allow IAEA inspectors into its nuclear facilities.

Relations began to deteriorate sharply after IAEA inspectors suspected of concealing a certain amount of plutonium. Based on this, the IAEA demanded a special inspection of two spent nuclear fuel storage facilities, which were not declared, but was refused, motivated by the fact that the facilities have nothing to do with the nuclear program and are of a military nature.

As a result, in March 1993, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Negotiations with the United States made it possible to slow down this process, but on June 13, 1994, North Korea not only abandoned the treaty, but also withdrew from the IAEA.

During this period, as Newsweek magazine argued in 2006, the administration US President Bill Clinton issued an order to study the issue of conducting military operation against North Korea. The military report stated that the operation would cost $100 billion, and the forces of South Korea and the United States would lose about a million people, and the loss of the US army would be at least 100,000 people killed.

As a result, the United States again returned to the tactics of negotiations.

Threats and promises

At the end of 1994, with the assistance of the former head of the United States Jimmy Carter a "framework agreement" was reached, under which North Korea pledged to abandon the nuclear weapons program in exchange for the supply of fuel oil and the creation of two new nuclear reactors at light water, which cannot be used for work on nuclear weapons.

For several years, stability was established. Both sides, however, fulfilled their obligations only partially, but the internal difficulties in the DPRK and the distraction of the United States on other problems ensured a stable situation.

A new escalation began in 2002, when the United States came to power President George W. Bush.

In January 2002, in his speech, Bush included the DPRK in the so-called "axis of evil." Together with the intention to create a global missile defense system, this caused serious concern in Pyongyang. The North Korean leadership did not want to share the fate of Iraq.

In 2003, negotiations began on the nuclear program of the DPRK with the participation of China, the United States, Russia, South Korea and Japan.

No real progress has been made on them. The aggressive policy of the United States gave rise to the confidence in the DPRK that it was possible to ensure its own security only if it had its own atomic bomb.

In North Korea, they did not particularly hide the fact that research work on nuclear issues continue.

Bomb: Birth

Exactly 12 years ago, on September 9, 2004, a strong explosion was recorded by a South Korean reconnaissance satellite in a remote area of ​​the DPRK (Yangando Province), not far from the border with China. A crater visible from space remained at the site of the explosion, and a huge mushroom cloud with a diameter of about four kilometers grew over the scene.

On September 13, the DPRK authorities explained the appearance of a cloud similar to a nuclear mushroom by explosive work during the construction of the Samsu hydroelectric power station.

Neither South Korean nor American experts have confirmed that it really was a nuclear explosion.

Western experts believed that the DPRK did not have the necessary resources and technologies to create a full-fledged atomic bomb, and we were talking about a potential rather than an immediate danger.

On September 28, 2004, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK stated at a session of the UN General Assembly that North Korea had already turned enriched uranium obtained from 8,000 reprocessed fuel rods from its nuclear reactor into a nuclear weapon. He stressed that the DPRK had no other choice in creating a nuclear deterrence force at a time when the United States declared its goal the destruction of the DPRK and threatened with preventive nuclear strikes.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK Foreign Ministry for the first time officially announced the creation of atomic weapons in the country. The world treated this statement as another Pyongyang bluff.

A year and a half later, on October 9, 2006, the DPRK announced for the first time that it had successfully tested a nuclear charge, and its preparation was publicly announced before that. The low power of the charge (0.5 kilotons) raised doubts that it was a nuclear device, and not ordinary TNT.

Speed ​​up in North Korean

On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted another nuclear test. The power of the underground nuclear explosion, according to the Russian military, ranged from 10 to 20 kilotons.

Four years later, on February 12, 2013, North Korea conducted another atomic bomb test.

Despite the adoption of new sanctions against the DPRK, the opinion remained that Pyongyang was far from creating powerful devices that can be used as real weapons.

December 10, 2015 North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared that his country had a hydrogen bomb, which meant new step in the development of nuclear weapons. On January 6, 2016, another test explosion was carried out, which the DPRK announced as a test of a hydrogen bomb.

South Korean sources call the current test the most powerful in the entire nuclear program of the DPRK. It is also noteworthy that the interval between tests turned out to be the shortest in all the years, which indicates that Pyongyang has made serious progress in terms of improving technology.

More importantly, North Korea said the test was part of the development of nuclear warheads that could be placed on ballistic missiles.

If this is true, then official Pyongyang has come close to creating a real combat nuclear weapon, which is fundamentally changing the situation in the region.

Rockets fly farther

Media reports about the situation in the DPRK, often coming from South Korean sources, give the wrong impression of North Korea. Despite the poverty of the population and other problems, this country is not backward. There are quite enough specialists in advanced industries, including nuclear and missile technologies.

The inhabitants talk about the tests of North Korean missiles with a chuckle - it exploded again, again it did not fly, it fell again.

Military experts monitoring the situation say that North Korean specialists have made a powerful technological breakthrough in recent years.

By 2016, the DPRK created a mobile single-stage liquid ballistic missile"Hwaseong-10" with a range of about three thousand kilometers.

In the summer of this year, the Pukkykson-1 rocket was successfully tested. This solid rocket is designed to arm submarines. Its successful launch was made from a submarine of the DPRK Navy.

This does not fit in with the idea of ​​North Korea as a country with rusty old Soviet aircraft and Chinese tanks.

Experts pay attention - the number of tests in the DPRK in recent years has been rapidly increasing, and the technique is becoming more and more complicated.

Within a few years, North Korea is able to create a missile with a range of up to 5000 km, and then a full-fledged intercontinental ballistic missile. Moreover, it will be equipped with a real nuclear warhead.

What to do with North Korea?

There is little doubt that sanctions against the DPRK will be tightened. But previous experience says that this does not affect Pyongyang in any way.

Moreover, Comrade Kim Jong-un, unlike his relatives and predecessors, does not at all blackmail the world with nuclear developments, but creates a real nuclear missile arsenal.

Moreover, even the frank irritation of the main ally, Beijing, which is not interested in escalating the situation in the region, does not stop him.

The question arises: what can be done with North Korea? Even those who perceive Comrade Kim's regime extremely negatively are convinced that it will not be possible to stir up the situation from within. Neither friend nor foe can convince Pyongyang to "behave well".

A military operation against North Korea today will cost the United States much more than it did in the early 1990s, when the Clinton administration made similar plans. In addition, neither Russia nor China will allow a war near their borders, which has every prospect of turning into the Third World War.

Theoretically, Pyongyang could satisfy the guarantees that ensure the preservation of the regime and the absence of attempts to dismantle it.

But recent history teaches that the only such guarantee in the modern world is the "nuclear baton" that North Korea is working on.

On January 10, 2003, the DPRK, which today is, although not recognized by anyone, but in fact a nuclear power, announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), slamming the door loudly. The authorities of the country (then ruled by Kim Jong Il, the father of the current leader Kim Jong Un) said they were doing this in protest against the violation of the country's sovereignty.

At that time, the United States really took up the regime in the DPRK quite harshly - North Korea, along with Iran and Iraq, was ranked by the then US president as an "axis of evil", and the US military seriously considered solving the DPRK problem by military means.

True, Pyongyang claimed at that time that it was not going to develop nuclear weapons, but would focus only on the peaceful atom. However, these statements were not very believed, but it was difficult to make sure that the DPRK was not developing nuclear weapons.

Withdrawal from the NPT was not the first for the DPRK. She joined the treaty in 1985, but withdrew after 8 years. Playing cat and mouse with the international community, North Korea, represented by its ambitious leadership, has long dreamed of acquiring nuclear weapons, however, at a time cold war it was impossible. Allies - the USSR and China - although they were in hostile relations with each other, did not want the emergence of another nuclear power.

By the beginning of 1994, the first nuclear crisis had matured on the Korean Peninsula. conducted several inspections of the DPRK's nuclear facilities, the results of which gave grounds to suspect the country of concealing a certain amount of plutonium.

The IAEA demanded that North Korea grant access to inspect two special nuclear fuel storage facilities, to which Pyongyang refused. Then the organization threatened to raise this issue in, but this did not change the position of the DPRK, which continued to evade inspections, motivating its refusal by the resumption of US-South Korean military exercises in the region and the beginning of a paramilitary situation in this country.

However, the administration of the then US President, after lengthy negotiations, managed to convince the DPRK to abandon the non-peaceful atom.

The wise position of the head of William, who was able to persuade the president to use not only the stick, but also the "carrot", had an effect.

A brilliant mathematician and former university professor, Perry convinced the president that if North Korea were attacked, the consequences could be unpredictable for the entire Korean peninsula. In October 1994, an agreement was signed between the United States and the DPRK, which boils down to the fact that in exchange for curtailing its nuclear program, Pyongyang will receive large-scale assistance from Washington, and South Korea has pledged to build two light water reactors in this country. The United States was also able to convince the DPRK to rejoin the NPT.

However, all these initiatives were subsequently curtailed when Republican George W. Bush came to power. His secretary of defense was not distinguished by the prudence of Perry and was a supporter of tough decisions.

True, the DPRK also did not sit idly by and carried out missile tests while working on military atom programs.

Visiting Pyongyang in the fall of 2002, the US Deputy Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs announced that the White House had information about North Korea's uranium enrichment program to create nuclear weapons, to which Pyongyang answered in the affirmative. North Korea has announced its final withdrawal from the NPT.

Since then, the genie has not been put back in the bottle, despite numerous attempts to influence the DPRK by the United States, as well as other players such as Russia and China. And quite intensive tests of nuclear weapons, which began even under, continued under his son -.

It was under his rule that the DPRK conducted a series of ballistic missile tests from a submarine, and in December 2015, the head of the country announced that the DPRK now has hydrogen weapons. He noted that “a powerful nuclear power is ready to blow up the nuclear and hydrogen bomb to securely defend their independence."

At the same time, despite the caricature of a typical dictator from an American action movie, Kim Jong-un is a completely pragmatic politician.

According to the expert International Foundation Carnegie James Acton, "nothing indicates that Kim Jong-un is insane" and the main motivator of his behavior is the preservation of power. "When nuclear attack the United States will be hit back, aimed at changing political regime North Korea is what Kim Jong-un does not want, ”the expert said in an interview with New Scientist magazine.

A similar point of view is shared by Tina Park, professor at the Munk School of Global Affairs in Canada. “Preservation of the regime is the main driving force. This brutal dictatorial regime, which is doing everything to survive, despite serious economic difficulties. North Korea wants to be sure that it will not be attacked by the US, Japan and South Korea. South Korea and the US support strong alliance and there are a lot of military forces on the Korean peninsula,” Park said in an interview with Global News.

Experts believe that North Korea is unlikely to return to the NPT in the near future and will only develop its nuclear program. At the same time, Kim Jong-un also offers his own "carrots" to South Korea. During talks this week, the parties agreed that the DPRK would participate in Olympic Games in Pyeongchang. It seems that Kim Jong-un has learned the principle that the famous weapons designer Samuel Colt once said: "A kind word and a gun do much more than just a kind word."

PEACE AND SECURITY

NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF THE DPRK

Park Sang Hoon

Institute of Foreign Policy and National Security (Republic of Korea) Republic of Korea, Seoul, Seocho-gu Seocho-dong, 13-76-2, 137-863

The article analyzes modern aspects of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the example of international approaches to the nuclear program of the DPRK, as well as the efforts of the world community to resolve it, especially through the Six-Party Talks.

Key words: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), IAEA, North Korea, nuclear program, nuclear issue, Six-Party Talks.

After the Caribbean crisis of 1962, which almost led to a world nuclear missile war, the USSR and the USA, as the leading nuclear powers, came to the conclusion that, firstly, the arms race should be limited to some extent, and secondly, that the access of new members to the "nuclear club" should be closed. As a result, in 1968, the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, as well as about fifty other countries that had already determined for themselves that they did not need their own nuclear weapons, signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 After France and the People's Republic of China joined it in 1992, all five nuclear powers - permanent members of the UN Security Council - became its members. However, unfortunately, this did not stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Back in the 1970s. Israel created its first nuclear devices, and cooperated in this area with the apartheid regime in the Republic of South Africa. A few years would have been enough for Shah Iran to acquire the potential to create nuclear weapons, but this was prevented by the 1979 revolution. At the same time, all these countries categorically denied even the existence of such intentions.

The situation changed in 1998, when India and Pakistan, which are not members of the NPT, joined the "nuclear club" on a whim. The situation was further exacerbated when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) first withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and then officially announced that it had conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, followed by another in 2009.

but there were also suspicions about the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

From a formal legal point of view, India and Pakistan cannot be condemned for violating the provisions of the NPT, since they are not members of it. Both countries argue that they need nuclear weapons solely in self-defense against each other, but could join the NPT - provided the other side joins. But this is unlikely, because India has another potential adversary that "legitimately" possesses nuclear weapons - China. Iran, in fact, is suspected only of striving to become a "threshold state", which the NPT does not prohibit being.

The situation with North Korea is completely different. It openly declares that it has carried out nuclear tests and that it has nuclear weapons. At the same time, in addition to the border with the Republic of Korea, it also has common borders with two nuclear, but not hostile powers - the PRC and Russia, and also deals with the nuclear-armed forces of the United States of America based in the region, which it considers as its own. most dangerous enemy. Therefore, it is understandable that the possibility of North Korea giving up nuclear weapons on a reciprocal basis with any or all three regional nuclear powers completely absent - it is possible only unilaterally. This makes the North Korean nuclear issue particularly complex and complex, and it has many dimensions or levels. It seems appropriate to comprehend it at three levels - global, regional and national.

At the global level, this problem is a serious threat to the nonproliferation regime as a negative example for other countries. This fact obvious to any unprejudiced investigator.

At the regional level, conflict over this issue is at the heart of a broader security problem in Northeast Asia. It seems reasonable to fear that if, with the appearance of a nuclear potential in North Korea, there are doubts about the readiness of the United States to fulfill its obligations to protect allies, then the latter, most likely, will also rush to possess nuclear weapons.

At the national level, North Korea's military nuclear program is the main obstacle to the economic development of the North and South of Korea, to inter-Korean reconciliation and, ultimately, to the reunification of the country. This level includes factors and processes at the level of individual states involved in the conflict and their governments. At this level, the steps taken by the Republic of Korea (RK), the United States, China, Russia and Japan are most influential in the development of the situation.

It should be recalled that in response to the US withdrawal of its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in September 1991, the ROK and the DPRK signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation in December of the same year, and in January of the following year, the Joint Declaration of North and South on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, already in 1993, the first nuclear crisis broke out, when the DPRK suspended its participation in the NPT for a very short time. And then the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kim Yong Sam, closely linked the nuclear issue with progress in the

ronnih relations. In 1994, the mediation of former US President John Carter helped the parties to agree to a summit, but sudden death DPRK leader Kim Il Sung eliminated the prospects for negotiations.

Nevertheless, the DPRK remained in the NPT, and in 1998 the new South Korean President Kim Dae-jung began to actively pursue a fundamentally new policy of comprehensive and active interaction with the North, which continued throughout the presidency of his successor Roh Moo-hyun. However, this policy of "sunshine heat" symbolized by the "Kim-Kim" summits, i.e. Kim Dae-chung and the new leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong Il (2000) and the No-Kim summit, i.e. No Moo Hyun with Kim Jong Il (2007), has spread mainly to economic and humanitarian exchanges. It was never able to launch the peace process because the North refused to discuss security issues, including the nuclear issue.

Thanks to the signing of the Framework Agreement, reached through a series of bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea in 1994, the first nuclear crisis ended, but the prerequisites for it remained. With the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis in 2003, the Six-Party Talks with the participation of both Korean states, the United States, China, Russia and Japan became a new platform for discussing the problem. However, such important breakthroughs as the Joint Declaration of September 19, 2003 and the Agreement of February 13, took place only thanks to bilateral US-North Korean negotiations.

Part of the reason why the North Korean nuclear issue has not been seriously discussed at the inter-Korean level is the lack of will on the part of the former South Korean governments. They tended to deal only with simpler issues, retreating without serious objection to Pyongyang's refusal to discuss the nuclear issue. Second, the characteristics of the North Korean nuclear crisis have changed over the years and have gone beyond the North-South relationship. The framework of the Six-Party Talks provided for the participation of the ROK in the discussion of the nuclear problem, but in this way they themselves limited the possibility of resolving it on an inter-Korean basis. Therefore, the dropping of the nuclear issue from the agenda of inter-Korean meetings was partly due to the lack of will on the part of Seoul, but the main reason is the characteristics of the problem that have changed over the past twenty years.

After the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak in South Korea in February 2008, inter-Korean relations remain tense, especially in terms of opposing views on the implementation of agreements reached as a result of two inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2007. From point of view new administration, the ten-year policy of "solar heat", inter-Korean dialogues and exchanges, cooperation and assistance from the South to the North failed to push North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.

The new South Korean administration began to pay more attention to the problem of denuclearization. At the same time, she made it clear that if the North demonstrates its determination to abandon nuclear weapons, then the South is ready to implement a comprehensive program for the development of inter-Korean economic cooperation. Pyongyang was extremely dissatisfied with such changes and began

express this by building up hostile propaganda and real physical measures against the Republic of Kazakhstan. This was also reflected in the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2009, for which the ROK, the United States, and Japan laid the blame on Pyongyang, although the DPRK did not admit its involvement, and Russia and China took the position of supporters of the presumption of innocence and in shelling the North Korean artillery of the South Korean island for the next year, and in other actions.

Regarding the United States, it can be noted that, in contrast to the Clinton administration, which supported the policy of "solar heat", the initial approach of the George W. Bush administration to the problem was vague. Secretary of State C. Powell announced continuity, that the Republican administration "will pick up what President Clinton left behind." In June 2001, the Bush administration announced its strategy for North Korea, which it defined as stepping up implementation of the Framework Agreement while taking a more comprehensive approach to negotiations. However, the Bush administration's "sunshine" policy soon became an irritant in US-South Korea relations. Under Bush, the US has taken a more reserved stance on bringing the DPRK into cooperation. With North Korea pushing hard for bilateral talks with the US, the US has opted for multilateral talks involving the ROK, China, Japan, and Russia to share responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation. This is especially true for the period after September 11, 2001, when the United States announced a new strategy to prevent international terrorism and the use of WMD, justifying this by saying that political and military deterrence strategies based on a response to what has already happened are no longer adequate.

The Bush administration quickly lost confidence in the Six-Party Talks. Differences between core interests, negotiating styles and domestic priorities of each participating country complicated this process. The remaining five participants in the talks managed to bring the DPRK back to the negotiating table and work out agreements on the implementation of the Joint Statement. But the talks came up against Pyongyang's unwillingness to agree to mandatory clear verification.

Critics of George W. Bush's policy in the United States accused it of inadequacy, that it caused an increase in confrontation with North Korea, led to the inaction of the Framework Agreement and forced the formation of the mechanism of the Six-Party Talks without a clear understanding of how these steps were supposed to ensure the curtailment of the North Korean nuclear program . It further noted that the administration was overly busy with the invasion of Iraq, where no nuclear weapons were found, while the real and urgent nuclear threat on the Korean Peninsula was allowed to spiral out of control. When the outcome of the Iraq war turned out to be problematic, the Bush administration failed to secure an end to internal debate, and this severely limited its ability to shift to a policy of engaging North Korea in constructive cooperation with some major, attractive proposal.

By the time the Obama administration came to power, North Korea reportedly possessed enough plutonium to produce six to eight nuclear weapons and showed little interest in taking steps to build on its earlier commitments. The Obama administration has declared its commitment to diplomatic methods. However, North Korea rejected these approaches and, in 2009, denounced the 1992 Joint Inter-Korean Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from its newly commissioned nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, left - perhaps temporarily - The Six-Party Talks, saying it "would no longer participate in such negotiations" and conducted a second nuclear test. In response, the US stated that its vital interest was the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea's military nuclear program.

People's Republic of China since the early 1990s avoided an active role during the first North Korean nuclear crisis. At the time, China emphasized its principle of non-intervention and emphasized that this problem should be decided by the parties directly involved. However, when the second crisis broke out, he abandoned the role of a cautious observer and took more active position. After North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003, China organized the Tripartite Talks in April 2003 between the United States and North Korea as a prologue to the Six-Party, and in August 2003 all six parties met for the first time. , and, remarkably, in Beijing.

China's approach is driven by its need to maintain domestic stability and promote economic development. The driving force behind China's resistance to the harsh international response to the actions of the DPRK is the fear that the collapse of the North Korean regime or the economic crisis caused by severe sanctions could generate a huge flow of North Korean refugees across the common border. At the same time, Beijing sometimes makes a constructive contribution to the development and application of tough UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea. He wants to improve his image in the world and build a more positive relationship with the United States, and his role as chairman of the Six-Party Talks and, in fact, the lead mediator between the parties, was designed to help achieve these goals.

Considering China's close relationship with the DPRK and its incomparable influence on it, China, in the event of a deeper involvement in the solution of the North Korean nuclear problem, would play a key role in any resolution of it. North Korea's dependence on China for economic ties and political patronage makes it a powerful and authoritative force. The PRC's approach to the DPRK apparently reflects at the same time a genuine desire to prevent international sanctions that could destabilize that country, and an equally genuine desire to keep Pyongyang from taking any rash steps.

Since North Korea's second nuclear test in May 2009, China has become more receptive to the idea of ​​new UN sanctions.

But it did not find a real embodiment. The reason is that while the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is desirable for China, a more immediate priority for Beijing is to keep North Korea on the peninsula as a viable ally. In theory, China could use its position as a major source of energy, food and other vital goods to force Pyongyang to abandon its military nuclear program. However, in reality, Beijing is very afraid possible consequences use of such a powerful "lever". Most of all, Beijing is concerned about the possibility of hostilities on the peninsula, the collapse of the state in the North, the flow of North Korean refugees to China, and, even more so, such a reunification of Korea that would lead to a US military presence north of the 38th parallel. Therefore, although China is in favor of resuming the negotiation process, its value to Beijing should not be exaggerated. Compared to keeping the DPRK, it ranks much lower on the priority scale of Chinese diplomacy.

The participation of the Russian Federation in the Six-Party Talks all this time remained cautious, but principled and based on two principles, namely, a "nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula" and a "peaceful resolution of the conflict." Russia's position is fully consistent with its consistent commitment to the NPT. It was the USSR that persuaded the DPRK to sign the NPT and ensure the possibility of the work of IAEA inspectors as a condition for its long-term cooperation with Pyongyang. Only after that did Moscow agree to supply the DPRK with four light-water nuclear reactors.

Russia is concerned not only that North Korean nuclear weapons will jeopardize the overall balance of power in Northeast Asia, pushing Japan and South Korea to create such weapons and, accordingly, accelerating the Chinese nuclear buildup, but also that North Korea has them will harm global non-proliferation efforts. The costs associated with an arms race in the region would be very high, and the chain reaction of nuclear proliferation in the world would be very serious. Russia is also directly concerned to avoid armed conflict or any unexpected changes on the Korean Peninsula. Due to its geographical proximity to North Korea, the sudden collapse of the regime or the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would be detrimental to the Russian Far East, because, as you know, both radiation and refugees do not recognize state borders.

These considerations have led Russia to resist any proposal for the use of force or any other scheme aimed at abrupt regime change in the DPRK. Russia takes the view that a negotiated solution to the current nuclear crisis can be found and believes that threats, sanctions and accusations against North Korea could be counterproductive. At the same time, information messages about contacts have long been Russian diplomats with North Korean colleagues contain the same statement that Russia hopes for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

As for Japan, as a country that survived Hiroshima and is experiencing Fukushima, it is also extremely concerned about the North Korean nuclear issue. Stability in Northeast Asia is critical to the economic well-being of this country, and the military nuclear program of the DPRK (like the missile program) is perceived by Japan as a direct threat to national security. The main goal of Japan's policy towards the DPRK is to normalize, in cooperation with the US and the ROK, relations with it by resolving the North Korean nuclear problem.

At the same time, the Japanese side regularly raises the issue of abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents in the past. Tokyo's position on the issue of these abductions is delicately criticized by the rest of the Six-Party Talks, who believe that progress on denuclearization should not be held hostage to this important, but much more specific issue. However, without his decision, Tokyo refuses to provide any energy assistance or other positive incentives to North Korea. In September 2002, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il apologized to Prime Minister D. Koizumi for the kidnappings, apparently believing that this would remove or at least soften the issue. However, on the contrary, the very recognition of the fact of abductions sharply worsened the attitude of Japanese public opinion towards the DPRK. Of course, this issue definitely needs a final resolution, but it is more likely only in an atmosphere of improving bilateral relations. In principle, it can be stated that of all five of Pyongyang's counterparties in the negotiations, Tokyo apparently took the toughest position, thereby exposing cracks in the regional multilateral system and provoking sharp disagreements about procedural issues and principles regarding the development of the negotiation process.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provided a fundamental, though not 100% effective, legal framework for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. In April 2010, the US and Russia signed a new START treaty, ratified eight months later, and then at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, 47 world leaders unanimously agreed to work to reduce the vulnerability of nuclear materials to terrorists.

In the context global problem non-proliferation solution of the North Korean nuclear problem is not only an issue concerning inter-Korean relations, even if it causes the greatest concern among the ROK, but also an important regional and global task. However, tougher regulations and better institutions alone are unlikely to solve the North Korean nuclear problem, as it has grown out of a lack of internal and international security this country, as well as its unique history and the worldview of its leaders.

The experience of studying the foreign policy of the DPRK shows that it is very consistent in its own way. If any changes occur in it, then they are due to changes in the internal situation and external influences. As for the former, for all the apparent immutability of the inner life

nor, it differs in some respects from what it was thirty years ago. The influence of external factors - for example, sanctions - is limited by the balance of power and by far from the coinciding interests of the states present in the region, all of which would like changes to one degree or another, but none - catastrophic upheavals. Because of this, the significance of the change of leaders in North Korea should not be exaggerated. Of course foreign policy Kim Jong Il differed in some details from the line of his father Kim Il Sung, but no one will undertake to determine under which of them she was more rigid or, on the contrary, prone to compromise.

Likewise, it is difficult to speculate whether the DPRK will return to negotiations and, if so, in what format. After the death of Kim Jong Il, there was a reasonable impression that in the conditions of providing humanitarian aid and compensation for the freezing of the nuclear program, including through the promotion of a peaceful nuclear program, as well as through the "sunshine" policy pursued by the administration of Kim Dae-jung, this country will gradually open outside world and move to a more peaceful position. However, in the new century these hopes were almost not justified.

By taking into account this experience in relation to the new leader Kim Jong-un, one can only assume that Pyongyang's positions on foreign policy issues, including the problem of denuclearization, are likely and most likely to be formed as the resultant positions of various informal groups in the ruling elite, which, in turn, will be determined to an increasing extent not so much by ideological attitudes as by real material interests. It can be assumed that the DPRK, in essence, although without declaring it, will also seek to solve its problems primarily through contacts with the United States and China as the main geopolitical actors in the region, and only secondarily with their regional allies and partners.

LITERATURE

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NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF THE DPRK

Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (Republic of Korea) Republic of Korea, Seoul, Seocho-dong, Seocho-gu, 137-8631, 3-76-2

The article analyzes the contemporary aspects of the nuclear weapon nonproliferation issue as exemplified by the international approaches to the DPRK nuclear weapons program, as well as the international community efforts to resolve it, in particular via the Six-Party Talks.

Key words: Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), IAEA, North Korea, nuclear program, nuclear problem, Six-Party Talks.

On February 10, 2005, North Korea officially announced the creation of nuclear weapons. This caused concern in the United States and Japan and became the reason for the introduction of tough sanctions against the republic. Restrictive measures did not stop the leadership of the DPRK, and in 2017 the country got a ballistic missile, according to experts, capable of delivering a deadly charge to the territory of the United States. However, according to experts, the likelihood that North Korea will strike first is minimal. How the DPRK created a nuclear missile shield - in the material RT. 13 years ago, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea officially announced the creation of its own nuclear weapons.

“The negotiation process has stalled due to the anti-Korean hostile policy of the United States. As long as America brandishes a nuclear baton, intending to destroy our system at any cost, we will expand our stocks of nuclear weapons in order to protect the historical choice of our people, freedom and socialism," the DPRK Foreign Ministry said on February 10, 2005.

The grin of the "paper tiger"

Potential nuclear threat in different years was assessed by the leaders of the DPRK in different ways. At one time, the country's leadership did not attach any importance to this of great importance. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung believed that a nuclear bomb was a "paper tiger".

The beginning of work on the creation of the nuclear infrastructure of North Korea began shortly after Kim Il Sung learned that the United States during the Korean War of 1950-1953 was going to drop seven nuclear bombs on the capital of the republic. Already in 1956, cooperation began between the USSR and the DPRK in this area, at first consisting in the training of specialists.

“Nuclear weapons in North Korea appeared almost immediately after the end of the Korean War. Even then, it became obvious that North Korea needed to maximize its defense capabilities, ”said Irina Lantsova, an expert on North and South Korea, an associate professor at the Department of American Studies at St. Petersburg State University, in an interview with RT.

According to professor Russian University friendship of the peoples of Yuri Tavrovsky, main reason start nuclear development The DPRK became "a deep sense of threat from Korea's traditional adversaries such as Japan and the United States, as well as a desire to be self-reliant, the Juche policy."

The Koreans decided not to rely on the nuclear umbrella of the Soviet Union and China, Tavrovsky believes. In addition, in his opinion, at that time the memory of a destructive and bloody war was still fresh.

“They (the North Korean authorities - RT ) came to the conclusion that only nuclear weapons can be a guarantee of non-repetition of war by conventional methods, which are extremely destructive, and they obviously believed that nuclear weapons would not be used, but would be a good defense,” the expert believes .

Gradually, North Korea acquired the necessary infrastructure and already in 1974 joined the IAEA. At the same time, work began on the creation of Pyongyang's own nuclear weapons. Significant assistance in this was provided, in particular, by China, which allowed North Korean scientists to their facilities.

According to Tavrovsky, two main factors contributed to the success of the DPRK: "the overstrain of the economic, technical, scientific forces of North Korea itself", as well as "conscious and unconscious transfers of technology by other countries, such as the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and, possibly, Pakistan" . On last stage, already in our time, the Koreans bought out technologies or specialists from Ukraine, from Dnepropetrovsk, where the Yuzhmash plant is located, which produced the heaviest liquid rockets for the Soviet Union, which are known in the West as Satan.

In 1985, counting on the assistance of the USSR in the construction of nuclear power plants, Pyongyang, under pressure from Moscow, signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the early 1990s, IAEA inspectors frequented the country, and the results of their checks were ambiguous.

In the spring of 1993, the DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty, and in the summer of 1994 the country left the IAEA. Subsequently, it became known that it was in 1994 that the United States almost attacked the Yongbyon reactor, North Korea's largest nuclear facility. However, after analyzing the inevitable victims, Clinton abandoned this venture.

After a visit to the DPRK by former US President Jimmy Carter, the countries managed to sign the so-called Framework Agreement at the end of 1994. According to this document, North Korea, in particular, took upon itself the obligation to stop building, as well as use the infrastructure for uranium enrichment and extract plutonium from reactors, remove enriched nuclear fuel from the DPRK and dismantle all facilities, one way or another related to nuclear weapons.

The US was to supply fuel oil to North Korea under the agreement and build two much larger light water reactors to replace the Yongbyon reactor, which was shut down. They could not be used to produce nuclear fuel.

Dashing zero

In 2001, George W. Bush came to power in the United States, who included the DPRK in the list of "rogue states". Under him, the promised reactors were not built, but the requirements for North Korea became more and more. As early as 2002, the US announced Pyongyang's failure to comply with the Framework Agreement and accused the DPRK of continuing to enrich uranium. At the end of the year, North Korea expelled IAEA employees from its territory and announced the continuation of work on the nuclear program.

The result of a new round of confrontation between the United States and the DPRK in January 2003 was Pyongyang's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The six-party talks between North Korea, China, the United States, Russia, South Korea, and Japan that began in the summer of 2003 also came to nothing. In 2004, North Korea refused to participate, demanding clarification about South Korea's nuclear program, which, as it turned out, had been going on for four years.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK announced the creation of nuclear weapons, but the first test was carried out only in October 2006. Several tests of new weapons by North Korea are known from 2006 to 2017.

In 2017, Pyongyang announced the test of a thermonuclear charge, the so-called hydrogen bomb.

Experts note that the development of the North Korean nuclear program was a forced measure.

“Already after Iraq, and then after Libya and Syria, it became clear that there are no other ways to defend sovereignty. If North Korea did not have a nuclear program, it is likely that it would have already been bombed, ”said Konstantin Asmolov, an employee of the Center for Korean Studies at the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in an interview with RT.

According to the expert, North Korea exists in an unfriendly environment, for example, from the point of view of South Korea, the DPRK as a state does not exist. Formally, the South Korean Constitution also applies to the northern territories.

Delivered to the White House

North Korea began developing a nuclear delivery vehicle in 1988. It took ten years to create the Taekhodong-1 medium-range ballistic missile - the first launch was made in 1998.

From 1999 to 2005, the DPRK observed a unilateral moratorium on missile testing, introduced following negotiations with the Clinton administration in exchange for food aid.

"Dialogue with the United States ended in 2001 with the coming to power of the Bush administration, which means that we have the right to resume missile testing," read the text of a statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry, which was published on March 3, 2005.

In subsequent years, Pyongyang continued to launch rockets, and at the end of 2012, North Korea became a space power, successfully launching the Gwangmyeongsong-3 satellite into orbit.

In 2017, the launch of the Hwaseong-14 rocket, which fell into the Sea of ​​Japan, became the reason for the convening of the UN Security Council. Soon, another North Korean Hwaseong-12 missile was fired, which fell into the Pacific Ocean, flying over the Japanese island of Hokkaido.

The United States is of particular concern latest version"Hwaseong" - "Hwaseong-15", which, according to experts, can hit any target in the United States.

Today, North Korea is also an exporter of missiles. Among its largest buyers are the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Pakistan and Yemen. In addition, the Iranian carriers were presumably made on the basis of the North Korean Taekhodong-2.

Sanction pressure

The DPRK developed its nuclear program under severe sanctions imposed by both the United States, Japan and South Korea, as well as the European Union, and even Australia. The UN Security Council committee on sanctions against the DPRK was created. Each nuclear test was followed by packages of sanctions that touched almost every area of ​​life - from cultural exchanges and remittances until the ban on the supply of various raw materials and goods.

According to Lantsova, North Korea has achieved a very good result under tough sanctions: in working on nuclear missile program Significant progress has been made, both in the means of delivery and in the nuclear weapons themselves.

From the US side, pressure on North Korea intensified with the coming to power of Donald Trump, who had already managed to threaten the DPRK with complete destruction.

“The United States has a lot of strength and patience, but if we have to defend ourselves, then we will have no choice but to completely destroy the DPRK. Rocket Man (Kim Jong-un - RT ) has embarked on a suicide mission," the head of the White House said, speaking at the UN.

However, the real danger posed by the DPRK raises serious doubts among experts. According to Tavrovsky, the likelihood that North Korea will be the first to inflict nuclear strike, is minimal.

“The North Koreans have achieved all their goals. They have achieved what they have been malnourished for many years, overworked. They practically created a nuclear missile shield, this is already recognized by all the opponents of the DPRK,” the expert is sure.

Meanwhile, Asmolov admits the possibility that North Korea could act first if provoked.

“If the North Korean leadership is confident that there are no peaceful alternatives and that they are already going to be killed, they will naturally act on the principle of “hit first,” the expert emphasized.

The North Korean leadership demonstrated a decisive attitude and independence of its policy on the eve of the launch Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang. On February 8, 2018, a military parade was held in the capital of the DPRK, Pyongyang, in honor of the 70th anniversary of the People's Democratic Republic. Traditionally, the celebrations take place in April. However, the country's authorities decided to hold the event in February, timed to coincide with the anniversary of the founding of the regular army of North Korea. A new type of intercontinental ballistic missile Hwaseong-15 was demonstrated at the parade.

"As long as the hostile policy of the United States persists, the mission of the people's army, acting as a powerful sword to protect the country, will continue," North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said, speaking at a parade in front of the military.