Nuclear weapons of the DPRK. In Kim's bosom: what is known about the DPRK's nuclear missile program. "North Korean Nuclear Crisis"

North Korea claims to have nuclear weapons, but arsenal estimates vary widely by source. Thus, Pyongyang has repeatedly announced that it has 50 nuclear weapons, the power of which is enough to destroy South Korea, Japan and USA. Researchers from the reputable American-Korean Institute at Johns Hopkins University (USA) report that the DPRK is armed with from 10 to 16 nuclear warheads and bombs. The Brookings Institution (USA) also reports that North Korea has only 8 charges.

Is North Korea capable of launching a nuclear strike?

Is North Korea capable of producing nuclear weapons on its own?

Yes, she is capable. The country possesses not only technology, but also the necessary infrastructure: the nuclear complex in Yongbyon. True, there is no free access to accurate information on the amount of weapons-grade plutonium that this complex is capable of producing. The fact is that the North Korean authorities do not allow IAEA* specialists to enter the nuclear facility.

On June 7, 2015, the US State Department accused North Korea of ​​building a new underground nuclear complex, the purpose of which is the production of weapons-grade plutonium for nuclear warheads and bombs.

What is North Korea's nuclear doctrine?

North Korea's nuclear doctrine says that "nuclear weapons serve to deter the enemy and strike back in the event of aggression." Pyongyang also notes that it needs a nuclear program to develop a system nuclear power plants(NPP).

Can the international community somehow influence the course of the North Korean nuclear program?

International Agency for atomic energy(IAEA) (eng. IAEA, abbr. International Atomic Energy Agency) - international organization for the development of cooperation in the field of the peaceful use of atomic energy. Founded in 1957. The headquarters is located in Vienna.

The beginning of research in the field of nuclear energy in North Korea was established in 1956, when an agreement was signed between the DPRK and the USSR on cooperation in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In 1964, also with the assistance of the USSR, a research center was founded in Yongben, and a little later a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor was put into operation. Around the same time, according to a number of experts, the DPRK began work on the use of nuclear energy for military purposes.

Over the next few decades, an extensive nuclear infrastructure was formed in the DPRK, including, in particular, the College of Nuclear Physics at the University. Kim Il Sung and the College of Nuclear Physics as part of University of Technology them. Kim Chek in Pyongyang, Atomic Energy Research Centre, Pakchon Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant, Atomic Energy Research Center and Pyeongsong Science University. Also, a number of uranium mines were discovered and put into operation on the territory of the DPRK.

At the same time, in 1985, the DPRK signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in 1991 - with the Republic of Korea - an agreement on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula, and in 1992 - with the IAEA - an agreement on access to nuclear facilities of agency employees. According to the results of the ensuing verification, the DPRK was indeed working on the production of weapons-grade plutonium necessary for the production of warheads. In the same year, 1992, the country's leadership refused to conduct inspections by the IAEA at spent nuclear fuel storage sites, and the following year, it even made a statement about its intention to withdraw from the NPT.

On June 11, 1993, a joint statement was issued by the DPRK and the United States. The document, in particular, indicated that the DPRK was suspending its withdrawal from the NPT, and the United States was creating the International Consortium for the Development of Energy on the Korean Peninsula (KEDO) to replace North Korean gas-graphite reactors with light water ones (which significantly reduce the possibility of using the plutonium produced in them for military purposes).

On September 1-3, 1993, negotiations were held in the DPRK with an IAEA delegation on the "partiality" of the latter's inspections.

On March 1, 1994, a group of IAEA experts arrived in the DPRK to check the agency's monitoring equipment installed at nuclear facilities.

On May 15, 1994, the DPRK issued a statement about the beginning of the replacement of graphite rods in the Yongbyon reactor.

On October 21, 1994, the framework agreement between the DPRK and the United States was published on the decision nuclear issue and settlement of bilateral relations. The document, in particular, obliged the United States to take measures to build a nuclear power plant in the DPRK at two light-water nuclear reactors. total power 2 million kW, and also - even before the completion of the construction of the first reactor by 2003 - to ensure the supply to the DPRK liquid fuel in the amount of 500 thousand tons per year. An obligation was received from the DPRK to freeze and dismantle the existing gas-graphite reactor. In addition, according to the document, he guaranteed the preservation of the DPRK as a party to the NPT.

On November 1, 1994, the DPRK announced the suspension of the construction of graphite-moderated reactors with a capacity of 50,000 kW and 200,000 kW.

In March 1995, the International Consortium for the Development of Energy on the Korean Peninsula (KEDO) was officially approved.

On August 31, 1998, the DPRK carried out a test launch of a three-stage ballistic missile that flew over the territory of Japan and then fell into the Pacific Ocean.

In 1999, the DPRK agreed to establish a moratorium on such launches until 2003.

In 2001, the US administration put North Korea on the list of countries suspected of violating the ban on research into biological weapons.

On January 29, 2002, US President George W. Bush, in a message to Congress, described the countries of the DPRK as an integral part of the "axis of evil" along with Iraq and Iran. In response, the North Korean leadership stated that such a statement was equivalent to a declaration of war.

In March 2002, in New York, the Permanent Representative of the DPRK to the UN held two meetings with the US Special Representative for the Korean Peace Talks, Jack Pritchard. The latter, in particular, was informed that the issue of resuming negotiations between the two countries was "considered in a benevolent light."

On August 7, 2002, in the DPRK, KEDO began building the foundation for one of the light water reactors. At the same time, construction work funded by the Republic of Korea and Japan was limited to the construction of a reinforced concrete frame of the reactor (which was facilitated to a certain extent by the change in US policy towards the DPRK after the change of presidents).

In October 2002, the DPRK notified the United States that it no longer intended to adhere to the agreement to resolve the nuclear issue. In addition, the long-term covert implementation of the program was recognized by North Korea in violation of the said agreement.

On October 3-5, 2002, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly paid a visit to the DPRK, during which evidence was presented of North Korea continuing its own nuclear program. The DPRK was recognized as the resumption of development due to the failure of the United States to build light water reactors.

On October 17, 2002, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il made a statement about allowing IAEA inspectors to inspect the country's nuclear facilities.

On October 21, 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell made a statement that the agreement on the re-equipment of the DPRK's nuclear program had become invalid due to violations of the terms of the document by this country.

On October 21-25, 2002, the DPRK announced its own right to develop nuclear weapons, but at the same time announced its readiness to curtail its nuclear programs in exchange for assistance and a "non-aggression" pact with the United States.

On December 13, 2002, the DPRK announced the resumption of its nuclear program and its intention to return to the construction of a nuclear reactor. The North Korean leadership emphasized the forced nature of such a step due to the cessation of fuel oil supplies from the United States.

On December 25, 2002, the DPRK proceeded to remove the seals from one of the fuel rod factories.

On January 6, 2003, the IAEA issued an ultimatum to the DPRK to curtail its nuclear program.

On January 7, 2003, the United States announced its consent to negotiate with the DPRK, but only on the condition that North Korea fulfills its international obligations.

On March 12, 2003, the IAEA submitted to the UN Security Council for consideration materials on the violation by the DPRK of its obligations to halt work on the creation of nuclear weapons.

March 13, 2003 official representative The DPRK Foreign Ministry, Lee Kwang Hook, made a statement that Pyongyang "is able to deal a crushing blow to American interests around the world," and also has ballistic missiles, "capable of hitting enemy targets at any distance."

On April 5, 2003, US President George W. Bush promised to seek a solution to the complex of problems associated with the DPRK's nuclear program through peaceful and diplomatic means. At the same time, North Korea issued a warning that it did not intend to recognize the legality of any UN Security Council resolutions adopted in connection with Pyongyang's nuclear program.

On April 12, 2003, the DPRK announced its consent to negotiations with the United States in a multilateral format if Washington abandons its hostile approach.

On April 18, 2003, the DPRK announced that in the country "at the final stage, work on the nuclear program is being successfully carried out, up to the processing of 8,000 used reactor rods."

On May 12, 2003, the DPRK unilaterally withdrew from the agreement on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula (concluded in 1992 with the Republic of Korea).

In June 2003, the United States seeks a complete cessation of work within the framework of KEDO on the construction of a light water reactor, referring to the DPRK's refusal to sign a protocol on compensation in case of incidents at a future nuclear power plant.

On July 9, 2003, the state intelligence agency of the Republic of Korea presented data to the country's parliament on the conduct by the DPRK of about 70 tests of "devices for nuclear explosions"at a test site located 40 km northwest of Yongbyon. In addition, according to the agency, the DPRK completed the processing of 8,000 used rods from a nuclear reactor in Yongbyon (and, thus, Pyongyang received weapons-grade plutonium for the production of warheads ).

July 14, 2003 Minister of Foreign Affairs and foreign trade Republic of Korea, Yun Yong Gwan stated that South Korea has no credible evidence that North Korea has completed the processing of used nuclear reactor rods in Yongbyon.

On September 3, 2003, the DPRK parliament adopted a resolution stating that the country had no other choice but to "actively build up nuclear forces containment to protect against possible nuclear strikes by the United States". In addition, the resolution noted that, given the "extremely hostility Washington, North Korea "sees no point in continuing the Six-Party Talks until the US reconsiders its position."

On September 23, 2003, the DPRK rejected the resolution of the 47th IAEA General Conference on curtailing its nuclear programs and refused to return to fulfilling its obligations under the NPT.

On October 2, 2003, the DPRK announced the successful completion of the processing of 8,000 used rods from a nuclear reactor and the direction of the weapons-grade plutonium extracted from them to strengthen its own "nuclear deterrence forces." According to some experts, the resulting plutonium is enough to make 4-6 warheads.

On October 20, 2003, during the APEC forum summit in Bangkok, US President George W. Bush put forward a proposal to the DPRK to abandon the nuclear program in exchange for the provision of security guarantees by the United States and other states, but the possibility of signing an agreement with North Korea "on non-aggression".

February 13, 2004 by US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, based on Pakistani scholar Abdul Khan's confession of the latter's transfer nuclear technology DPRK, made a statement that "North Korea's nuclear program has existed longer and is more developed than the United States believed."

On May 22, 2004, the American newspaper The New York Times published an article according to which, in 2001, the DPRK sold uranium used in weapons to Libya (and the IAEA, in turn, has evidence that this uranium was supplied from DPRK).

On June 7, 2004, the DPRK announced its intention to build up its own "nuclear deterrence force", the reason for which was an underground experiment using a subcritical mass of plutonium, conducted by the United States on May 25, 2004 at a test site in Nevada.

On June 30, 2004, the Secretary General of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, Shinzo Abe, at a meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, stated that Japan was ready to compensate the DPRK for the missing part of its energy resources in exchange for specific steps to freeze its nuclear program as part of a general plan to provide North Korea humanitarian aid.

On July 24, 2004, the DPRK media published materials characterizing the US proposal to curtail the country's nuclear program in exchange for economic assistance to "fictitious" ones. "The US proposals are not worthy of further consideration," the North Korean leadership says.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the six-party talks (with the participation of Russia, the United States, the Republic of Korea, China and Japan) on overcoming the crisis that has developed around its nuclear program, and for the first time recognized the existence of its own nuclear weapons. According to the DPRK Foreign Ministry, nuclear weapons countries are "entirely defensive" and will remain a "nuclear deterrent".

site studied the opinions of experts on how much nuclear missiles and who they might threaten.

The attention of the whole world is riveted to the confrontation between North Korea and the United States. North Korea has planned to test another ballistic missile; however, the launch, apparently, failed, but the main evidence of this is only the silence of the North Korean media about an important event timed to coincide with the 105th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung.

The US President continues to demonstrate that he intends to act decisively in the international arena: following the bombing of Syria on suspicion of being used by government forces chemical weapons he gave the order to send warships to the shores of North Korea. In response, Pyongyang said that if they suspect the United States of being ready to attack, they reserve the right to a pre-emptive strike.

In January 2003, the DPRK withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement, which it joined in 1985. Shortly before this official authorities countries admitted that, in violation of agreements with the United States, they continued the uncontrolled use of nuclear technologies.

One of the organizations that regularly monitor news about the DPRK nuclear program (and analyze, among other things, satellite observation data) is the American Institute of Science and international security. In the summer of 2016, its experts assessed the amount of material for nuclear weapons at the disposal of Pyongyang as sufficient to create

13 to 21 nuclear warheads.

Institute experts believe that over the past two years nuclear arsenal North Korea has increased by four to six equivalents of one warhead - and decreased by one, as the country conducted another underground nuclear test in early 2016.

The main question is whether Pyongyang has a means of delivering nuclear warheads, and if so, which ones. It is the test of a ballistic missile medium range, allegedly failed and now hushed up by the state media of North Korea, was the reason for the aggravation of relations between the United States and the DPRK.

Earlier, sources in North Korea told the South Korean press that the missile, which Pyongyang planned to test the other day, has a range of up to 10,000 kilometers.

Dennis Wilder, a former adviser to US President George W. Bush, assures in a Daily Express comment that, according to intelligence, North Korea can test and field ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear weapon to the US within the next four years. Another expert is Professor Siegfried S. Hacker of Stanford University - in

On January 10, 2003, the DPRK, which today is, although not recognized by anyone, but in fact a nuclear power, announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), slamming the door loudly. The authorities of the country (then ruled by Kim Jong Il, the father of the current leader Kim Jong Un) said they were doing this in protest against the violation of the country's sovereignty.

At that time, the United States really took up the regime in the DPRK quite harshly - North Korea, along with Iran and Iraq, was ranked by the then US president as an "axis of evil", and the US military seriously considered solving the DPRK problem by military means.

True, Pyongyang claimed at that time that it was not going to develop nuclear weapons, but would focus only on the peaceful atom. However, these statements were not very believed, but it was difficult to make sure that the DPRK was not developing nuclear weapons.

Withdrawal from the NPT was not the first for the DPRK. She joined the treaty in 1985, but withdrew after 8 years. Playing cat and mouse with the international community, North Korea, represented by its ambitious leadership, has long dreamed of acquiring nuclear weapons, however, at a time cold war it was impossible. The allies - the USSR and China - although they were in hostile relations with each other, did not want the emergence of another nuclear power.

By the beginning of 1994, the first nuclear crisis had matured on the Korean Peninsula. conducted several inspections of the DPRK's nuclear facilities, the results of which gave grounds to suspect the country of concealing a certain amount of plutonium.

The IAEA demanded that North Korea grant access to inspect two special nuclear fuel storage facilities, to which Pyongyang refused. Then the organization threatened to raise this issue in, but this did not change the position of the DPRK, which continued to evade inspections, motivating its refusal by the resumption of US-South Korean military exercises in the region and the beginning of a paramilitary situation in this country.

However, the administration of the then US President, after lengthy negotiations, managed to convince the DPRK to abandon the non-peaceful atom.

The wise position of the head of William, who was able to persuade the president to use not only the stick, but also the "carrot", had an effect.

A brilliant mathematician and former university professor, Perry convinced the president that if North Korea were attacked, the consequences could be unpredictable for the entire Korean peninsula. In October 1994, an agreement was signed between the United States and the DPRK, which boils down to the fact that in exchange for curtailing its nuclear program, Pyongyang will receive large-scale assistance from Washington, and South Korea has pledged to build two light water reactors in this country. The United States was also able to convince the DPRK to rejoin the NPT.

However, all these initiatives were subsequently curtailed when Republican George W. Bush came to power. His secretary of defense was not distinguished by the prudence of Perry and was a supporter of tough decisions.

True, the DPRK also did not sit idly by and carried out missile tests while working on military atom programs.

Visiting Pyongyang in the fall of 2002, the US Deputy Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs announced that the White House had information about North Korea's uranium enrichment program to create nuclear weapons, to which Pyongyang answered in the affirmative. North Korea has announced its final withdrawal from the NPT.

Since then, the genie has not been put back in the bottle, despite numerous attempts to influence the DPRK by the United States, as well as other players such as Russia and China. And quite intensive tests of nuclear weapons, which began even under, continued under his son -.

It was under his rule that the DPRK conducted a series of ballistic missile tests from a submarine, and in December 2015, the head of the country announced that the DPRK now has hydrogen weapons. He noted that “a powerful nuclear power is ready to blow up the nuclear and hydrogen bomb to securely defend their independence."

At the same time, despite the caricature of a typical dictator from an American action movie, Kim Jong-un is a completely pragmatic politician.

According to the expert International Foundation Carnegie James Acton, "nothing indicates that Kim Jong-un is insane" and the main motivator of his behavior is the preservation of power. “In the event of a nuclear attack on the United States, a retaliatory strike will follow, aimed at changing political regime North Korea is what Kim Jong-un does not want, ”the expert said in an interview with New Scientist magazine.

A similar point of view is shared by Tina Park, professor at the Munk School of Global Affairs in Canada. “Preservation of the regime is the main driving force. This brutal dictatorial regime, which is doing everything to survive, despite serious economic difficulties. North Korea wants to be sure that it will not be attacked by the US, Japan and South Korea. South Korea and the US support strong union and there are a lot of military forces on the Korean peninsula,” Park said in an interview with Global News.

Experts believe that North Korea is unlikely to return to the NPT in the near future and will only develop its nuclear program. At the same time, Kim Jong-un also offers his own "carrots" to South Korea. During talks this week, the parties agreed that the DPRK would participate in Olympic Games in Pyeongchang. It seems that Kim Jong-un has learned the principle that the famous weapons designer Samuel Colt once said: "A kind word and a gun do much more than just a kind word."

The beginning of research in the field of nuclear energy in North Korea was laid in 1956, when an agreement was signed between the DPRK and the USSR on cooperation in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In 1964, also with the assistance of the USSR, a research center was founded in Yongben, and a little later a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor was put into operation. Around the same time, according to a number of experts, the DPRK began work on the use of nuclear energy for military purposes.

Over the next few decades, an extensive nuclear infrastructure was formed in the DPRK, including, in particular, the College of Nuclear Physics at the University. Kim Il Sung and the College of Nuclear Physics at the Technological University. Kim Chek in Pyongyang, Atomic Energy Research Centre, Pakchon Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant, Atomic Energy Research Center and Pyeongsong Science University. Also, a number of uranium mines were discovered and put into operation on the territory of the DPRK.

At the same time, in 1985, the DPRK signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in 1991 - with the Republic of Korea - an agreement on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula, and in 1992 - with the IAEA - an agreement on access to nuclear facilities of agency employees. According to the results of the ensuing verification, the DPRK was indeed working on the production of weapons-grade plutonium necessary for the production of warheads. In the same year, 1992, the country's leadership refused to conduct inspections by the IAEA at spent nuclear fuel storage sites, and the following year, it even made a statement about its intention to withdraw from the NPT.

On June 11, 1993, a joint statement was issued by the DPRK and the United States. The document, in particular, indicated that the DPRK was suspending its withdrawal from the NPT, and the United States was creating the International Consortium for the Development of Energy on the Korean Peninsula (KEDO) to replace North Korean gas-graphite reactors with light water ones (which significantly reduce the possibility of using the plutonium produced in them for military purposes).

On September 1-3, 1993, negotiations were held in the DPRK with an IAEA delegation on the "partiality" of the latter's inspections.

On March 1, 1994, a group of IAEA experts arrived in the DPRK to check the agency's monitoring equipment installed at nuclear facilities.

On May 15, 1994, the DPRK issued a statement about the beginning of the replacement of graphite rods in the Yongbyon reactor.

On October 21, 1994, a framework agreement between the DPRK and the United States was published to resolve the nuclear problem and normalize bilateral relations. The document, in particular, obligated the United States to take measures to build a nuclear power plant in the DPRK on two light-water nuclear reactors with a total capacity of 2 million kW, and also - even before the completion of the construction of the first reactor by 2003 - to ensure the supply of liquid fuel to the DPRK in the amount of 500 thousand tons. t per year. An obligation was received from the DPRK to freeze and dismantle the existing gas-graphite reactor. In addition, according to the document, he guaranteed the preservation of the DPRK as a party to the NPT.

On November 1, 1994, the DPRK announced the suspension of the construction of graphite-moderated reactors with a capacity of 50,000 kW and 200,000 kW.

In March 1995, the International Consortium for the Development of Energy on the Korean Peninsula (KEDO) was officially approved.

On August 31, 1998, the DPRK carried out a test launch of a three-stage ballistic missile that flew over the territory of Japan and then fell into the Pacific Ocean.

In 1999, the DPRK agreed to establish a moratorium on such launches until 2003.

In 2001, the US administration put North Korea on the list of countries suspected of violating the ban on research into biological weapons.

On January 29, 2002, US President George W. Bush, in a message to Congress, described the countries of the DPRK as an integral part of the "axis of evil" along with Iraq and Iran. In response, the North Korean leadership stated that such a statement was equivalent to a declaration of war.

In March 2002, in New York, the Permanent Representative of the DPRK to the UN held two meetings with the US Special Representative for the Korean Peace Talks, Jack Pritchard. The latter, in particular, was informed that the issue of resuming negotiations between the two countries was "considered in a benevolent light."

On August 7, 2002, in the DPRK, KEDO began building the foundation for one of the light water reactors. At the same time, construction work funded by the Republic of Korea and Japan was limited to the construction of a reinforced concrete frame of the reactor (which was facilitated to a certain extent by the change in US policy towards the DPRK after the change of presidents).

In October 2002, the DPRK notified the United States that it no longer intended to adhere to the agreement to resolve the nuclear issue. In addition, the long-term covert implementation of the program was recognized by North Korea in violation of the said agreement.

On October 3-5, 2002, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly paid a visit to the DPRK, during which evidence was presented of North Korea's continuation of its own nuclear program. The DPRK was recognized as the resumption of development due to the failure of the United States to build light water reactors.

On October 17, 2002, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il made a statement about allowing IAEA inspectors to inspect the country's nuclear facilities.

On October 21, 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell made a statement that the agreement on the re-equipment of the DPRK's nuclear program had become invalid due to violations of the terms of the document by this country.

On October 21-25, 2002, the DPRK announced its own right to develop nuclear weapons, but at the same time announced its readiness to curtail its nuclear programs in exchange for assistance and a "non-aggression" pact with the United States.

On December 13, 2002, the DPRK announced the resumption of its nuclear program and its intention to return to the construction of a nuclear reactor. The North Korean leadership emphasized the forced nature of such a step due to the cessation of fuel oil supplies from the United States.

On December 25, 2002, the DPRK proceeded to remove the seals from one of the fuel rod factories.

On January 6, 2003, the IAEA issued an ultimatum to the DPRK to curtail its nuclear program.

On January 7, 2003, the United States announced its consent to negotiate with the DPRK, but only on the condition that North Korea fulfills its international obligations.

On March 12, 2003, the IAEA submitted to the UN Security Council for consideration materials on the violation by the DPRK of its obligations to halt work on the creation of nuclear weapons.

On March 13, 2003, the official representative of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, Lee Kwan Hook, made a statement that Pyongyang "is capable of inflicting a crushing blow on American interests throughout the world," and also possesses ballistic missiles "capable of hitting enemy targets at any distance."

On April 5, 2003, US President George W. Bush promised to seek a solution to the complex of problems associated with the DPRK's nuclear program through peaceful and diplomatic means. At the same time, North Korea issued a warning that it did not intend to recognize the legality of any UN Security Council resolutions adopted in connection with Pyongyang's nuclear program.

On April 12, 2003, the DPRK announced its consent to negotiations with the United States in a multilateral format if Washington abandons its hostile approach.

On April 18, 2003, the DPRK announced that in the country "at the final stage, work on the nuclear program is being successfully carried out, up to the processing of 8,000 used reactor rods."

On May 12, 2003, the DPRK unilaterally withdrew from the agreement on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula (concluded in 1992 with the Republic of Korea).

In June 2003, the United States seeks a complete cessation of work within the framework of KEDO on the construction of a light water reactor, referring to the DPRK's refusal to sign a protocol on compensation in case of incidents at a future nuclear power plant.

On July 9, 2003, the state intelligence agency of the Republic of Korea presented to the country's parliament data on the conduct by the DPRK of about 70 tests of "devices for nuclear explosions" at a test site located 40 km northwest of Yongbyon. In addition, according to the agency, the DPRK has completed the processing of 8,000 used rods from the Yongbyon nuclear reactor (and, thus, Pyongyang received weapons-grade plutonium for the production of warheads).

On July 14, 2003, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade of the Republic of Korea, Yoon Yong Gwan, stated that South Korea had no reliable evidence that North Korea had completed the processing of used nuclear reactor rods in Yongbyon.

On September 3, 2003, the DPRK parliament adopted a resolution stating that the country has no choice but to "actively build up nuclear deterrence forces to protect against possible nuclear strikes from the United States." In addition, the resolution noted that, given the "extremely hostile attitude of Washington," North Korea "does not see the point in continuing the six-party talks until the US reconsiders its position."

On September 23, 2003, the DPRK rejected the resolution of the 47th IAEA General Conference on curtailing its nuclear programs and refused to return to fulfilling its obligations under the NPT.

On October 2, 2003, the DPRK announced the successful completion of the processing of 8,000 used rods from a nuclear reactor and the direction of the weapons-grade plutonium extracted from them to strengthen its own "nuclear deterrence forces." According to some experts, the resulting plutonium is enough to make 4-6 warheads.

On October 20, 2003, during the APEC forum summit in Bangkok, US President George W. Bush put forward a proposal to the DPRK to abandon the nuclear program in exchange for the provision of security guarantees by the United States and other states, but the possibility of signing an agreement with North Korea "on non-aggression".

On February 13, 2004, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, based on Pakistani scientist Abdul Khan's admission of the latter's transfer of nuclear technology to the DPRK, stated that "North Korea's nuclear program has existed longer and is more developed than the United States believed."

On May 22, 2004, the American newspaper The New York Times published an article according to which, in 2001, the DPRK sold uranium used in weapons to Libya (and the IAEA, in turn, has evidence that this uranium was supplied from DPRK).

On June 7, 2004, the DPRK announced its intention to build up its own "nuclear deterrence force", the reason for which was an underground experiment using a subcritical mass of plutonium, conducted by the United States on May 25, 2004 at a test site in Nevada.

On June 30, 2004, the Secretary General of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, Shinzo Abe, at a meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, stated that Japan was ready to compensate the DPRK for the missing part of its energy resources in exchange for specific steps to freeze its nuclear program as part of a general plan to provide North Korea humanitarian aid.

On July 24, 2004, the DPRK media published materials characterizing the US proposal to curtail the country's nuclear program in exchange for economic assistance to "fictitious" ones. "The US proposals are not worthy of further consideration," the North Korean leadership says.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the six-party talks (with the participation of Russia, the United States, the Republic of Korea, China and Japan) on overcoming the crisis that has developed around its nuclear program, and for the first time recognized the existence of its own nuclear weapons. According to the DPRK Foreign Ministry, the country's nuclear weapons are "entirely defensive" and will remain a "nuclear deterrent."