04.03.2020

Is North Korea ready to use nuclear weapons? Will North Korea unleash a nuclear war with the United States With delivery to the White House

The beginning of research in the field of nuclear energy in North Korea was laid in 1956, when an agreement was signed between the DPRK and the USSR on cooperation in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In 1964, also with the assistance of the USSR, a research center was founded in Yongben, and a little later a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor was put into operation. Around the same time, according to a number of experts, the DPRK began work on the use of nuclear energy for military purposes.

Over the next few decades, an extensive nuclear infrastructure was formed in the DPRK, including, in particular, the College of Nuclear Physics at the University. Kim Il Sung and the College of Nuclear Physics at the Technological University. Kim Chek in Pyongyang, Atomic Energy Research Centre, Pakchon Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant, Atomic Energy Research Center and Pyeongsong Science University. Also, a number of uranium mines were discovered and put into operation on the territory of the DPRK.

At the same time, in 1985, the DPRK signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in 1991 - with the Republic of Korea - an agreement on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula, and in 1992 - with the IAEA - an agreement on admission to nuclear facilities of the agency's employees. According to the results of the ensuing verification, the DPRK was indeed working on the production of weapons-grade plutonium necessary for the production of warheads. In the same year, 1992, the country's leadership refused to conduct inspections by the IAEA at spent nuclear fuel storage sites, and the following year, it even made a statement about its intention to withdraw from the NPT.

On June 11, 1993, a joint statement was issued by the DPRK and the United States. The document, in particular, indicated that the DPRK was suspending its withdrawal from the NPT, and the United States was creating the International Consortium for the Development of Energy on the Korean Peninsula (KEDO) to replace North Korean gas-graphite reactors with light water ones (which significantly reduce the possibility of using the plutonium produced in them for military purposes).

On September 1-3, 1993, negotiations were held in the DPRK with an IAEA delegation on the "partiality" of the latter's inspections.

On March 1, 1994, a group of IAEA experts arrived in the DPRK to check the agency's monitoring equipment installed at nuclear facilities.

On May 15, 1994, the DPRK issued a statement about the beginning of the replacement of graphite rods in the Yongbyon reactor.

On October 21, 1994, a framework agreement between the DPRK and the United States was published to resolve the nuclear problem and normalize bilateral relations. The document, in particular, obligated the United States to take measures to build a nuclear power plant in the DPRK on two light-water nuclear reactors with a total capacity of 2 million kW, and also - even before the completion of the construction of the first reactor by 2003 - to ensure the supply of liquid fuel to the DPRK in the amount of 500 thousand tons per year. An obligation was received from the DPRK to freeze and dismantle the existing gas-graphite reactor. In addition, according to the document, he guaranteed the preservation of the DPRK as a party to the NPT.

On November 1, 1994, the DPRK announced the suspension of the construction of graphite-moderated reactors with a capacity of 50,000 kW and 200,000 kW.

In March 1995, the International Consortium for the Development of Energy on the Korean Peninsula (KEDO) was officially approved.

On August 31, 1998, the DPRK carried out a test launch of a three-stage ballistic missile that flew over the territory of Japan and then fell into the Pacific Ocean.

In 1999, the DPRK agreed to establish a moratorium on such launches until 2003.

In 2001, the US administration put North Korea on the list of countries suspected of violating the ban on research into biological weapons.

On January 29, 2002, US President George W. Bush, in a message to Congress, described the countries of the DPRK as an integral part of the "axis of evil" along with Iraq and Iran. In response, the North Korean leadership stated that such a statement was equivalent to a declaration of war.

In March 2002, in New York, the Permanent Representative of the DPRK to the UN held two meetings with the US Special Representative for the Korean Peace Talks, Jack Pritchard. The latter, in particular, was informed that the issue of resuming negotiations between the two countries was "considered in a benevolent light."

On August 7, 2002, in the DPRK, KEDO began building the foundation for one of the light water reactors. At the same time, construction work funded by the Republic of Korea and Japan was limited to the construction of a reinforced concrete frame of the reactor (which was facilitated to a certain extent by the change in US policy towards the DPRK after the change of presidents).

In October 2002, the DPRK notified the United States that it no longer intended to adhere to the agreement to resolve the nuclear issue. In addition, the long-term covert implementation of the program was recognized by North Korea in violation of the said agreement.

On October 3-5, 2002, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly paid a visit to the DPRK, during which evidence was presented of North Korea continuing its own nuclear program. The DPRK was recognized as the resumption of development due to the failure of the United States to build light water reactors.

On October 17, 2002, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il made a statement about allowing IAEA inspectors to inspect the country's nuclear facilities.

On October 21, 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell made a statement that the agreement on the re-equipment of the DPRK's nuclear program had become invalid due to violations of the terms of the document by this country.

On October 21-25, 2002, the DPRK announced its own right to develop nuclear weapons, but at the same time announced its readiness to curtail its nuclear programs in exchange for assistance and a "non-aggression" pact with the United States.

On December 13, 2002, the DPRK announced the resumption of its nuclear program and its intention to return to the construction of a nuclear reactor. The North Korean leadership emphasized the forced nature of such a step due to the cessation of fuel oil supplies from the United States.

On December 25, 2002, the DPRK proceeded to remove the seals from one of the fuel rod factories.

On January 6, 2003, the IAEA issued an ultimatum to the DPRK to curtail its nuclear program.

On January 7, 2003, the United States announced its consent to negotiate with the DPRK, but only on the condition that North Korea fulfills its international obligations.

On March 12, 2003, the IAEA submitted to the UN Security Council for consideration materials on the violation by the DPRK of its obligations to halt work on the creation of nuclear weapons.

On March 13, 2003, the official representative of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, Lee Kwan Hook, made a statement that Pyongyang "is capable of inflicting a crushing blow on American interests throughout the world," and also possesses ballistic missiles "capable of hitting enemy targets at any distance."

On April 5, 2003, US President George W. Bush promised to seek a solution to the complex of problems associated with the DPRK's nuclear program through peaceful and diplomatic means. At the same time, North Korea issued a warning that it did not intend to recognize the legality of any UN Security Council resolutions adopted in connection with Pyongyang's nuclear program.

On April 12, 2003, the DPRK announced its consent to negotiations with the United States in a multilateral format if Washington abandons its hostile approach.

On April 18, 2003, the DPRK announced that in the country "at the final stage, work on the nuclear program is being successfully carried out, up to the processing of 8,000 used reactor rods."

On May 12, 2003, the DPRK unilaterally withdrew from the agreement on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula (concluded in 1992 with the Republic of Korea).

In June 2003, the United States seeks a complete cessation of work within the framework of KEDO on the construction of a light water reactor, referring to the DPRK's refusal to sign a protocol on compensation in case of incidents at a future nuclear power plant.

On July 9, 2003, the state intelligence agency of the Republic of Korea presented data to the country's parliament on the conduct by the DPRK of about 70 tests of "devices for nuclear explosions"at a test site located 40 km northwest of Yongbyon. In addition, according to the agency, the DPRK has completed the processing of 8,000 used rods from a nuclear reactor in Yongbyon (and, thus, Pyongyang received weapons-grade plutonium for the production of warheads).

July 14, 2003 Minister of Foreign Affairs and foreign trade Republic of Korea, Yun Yong Gwan stated that South Korea has no credible evidence that North Korea has completed the processing of used nuclear reactor rods in Yongbyon.

On September 3, 2003, the DPRK parliament adopted a resolution stating that the country had no other choice but to "actively build up nuclear forces deterrence to protect against possible nuclear strikes by the United States". In addition, the resolution noted that, given the "extreme hostility Washington, North Korea "sees no point in continuing the Six-Party Talks until the US reconsiders its position."

On September 23, 2003, the DPRK rejected the resolution of the 47th IAEA General Conference on curtailing its nuclear programs and refused to return to fulfilling its obligations under the NPT.

On October 2, 2003, the DPRK announced the successful completion of the processing of 8,000 used rods from a nuclear reactor and the direction of the weapons-grade plutonium extracted from them to strengthen its own "nuclear deterrence forces." According to some experts, the resulting plutonium is enough to make 4-6 warheads.

On October 20, 2003, during the APEC forum summit in Bangkok, US President George W. Bush put forward a proposal to the DPRK to give up its nuclear program in exchange for the provision of security guarantees by the United States and other states, but the possibility of signing a "non-aggression" pact with North Korea was rejected.

February 13, 2004 by US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, based on Pakistani scholar Abdul Khan's confession of the latter's transfer nuclear technology DPRK, made a statement that "North Korea's nuclear program has existed longer and is more developed than the United States believed."

On May 22, 2004, the American newspaper The New York Times published an article according to which in 2001 the DPRK sold uranium used in weapons to Libya (and the IAEA, in turn, has evidence that this uranium was supplied from the DPRK).

On June 7, 2004, the DPRK announced its intention to build up its own "nuclear deterrence force", the reason for which was an underground experiment using a subcritical mass of plutonium, conducted by the United States on May 25, 2004 at a test site in Nevada.

On June 30, 2004, the General Secretary of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, Shinzo Abe, at a meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, stated that Japan was ready to compensate the DPRK for the missing part of its energy resources in exchange for concrete steps to freeze the nuclear program as part of the overall plan for providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea.

On July 24, 2004, the DPRK media published materials characterizing the US proposal to curtail the country's nuclear program in exchange for economic assistance to "fictitious" ones. "The US proposals are not worthy of further consideration," the North Korean leadership says.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the six-party talks (with the participation of Russia, the United States, the Republic of Korea, China and Japan) on overcoming the crisis that has developed around its nuclear program, and for the first time recognized the existence of its own nuclear weapons. According to the DPRK Foreign Ministry, the country's nuclear weapons are "entirely defensive" and will remain a "nuclear deterrent."

Facilities mass media The United States and a number of other Western European countries, apparently at the suggestion of the US intelligence services, began to draw the attention of the world community to the state and potential consequences of the development of the nuclear program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea).

During the scientific and technical cooperation of the USSR with the DPRK in the field of nuclear production, the Soviet side trained a significant number of North Korean specialists. True, it should be noted that they were prepared exclusively for work in the field of the nuclear industry. In addition, in 1965, the Soviet Union delivered to North Korea a small pool-type IRT-2000 uranium research reactor with a capacity of 2 MW. After being put into operation in 1966, at the insistence of the USSR, it was placed under the guarantees of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Again, at the insistence of the USSR, the DPRK had to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), signed on December 12, 1985. In response to this "concession", the Soviet Union supplied North Korea with a 5 MW gas-graphite uranium research reactor (installed in Nengbyon and put into operation in 1986 after becoming under IAEA safeguards), and also signed an agreement on the construction in North Korea of a nuclear power plant with four VVER-440 type light water reactors. By the way, in 1992 this agreement was clarified - instead of four VVER-440 reactors, it was decided to put three, but more powerful VVER-640 reactors, which were considered the safest.

In addition, in 1991, a contract was signed for the supply by the Soviet Union to the DPRK of fuel assemblies (TV elements) for a total of $185,000. Such assistance Soviet Union contributed to a significant advancement of the North Korean nuclear program.

However, unexpectedly, Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy course underwent cardinal changes. And the subsequent rapprochement between the USSR and the United States since 1987, and in particular the establishment of diplomatic relations by the Soviet Union with South Korea in 1990, dealt a serious blow to Pyongyang's nuclear plans. In addition, the USSR began to transfer relations with the DPRK into an economic channel. As a result, Pyongyang's plan to receive nuclear reactors from the USSR free of charge failed. At the same time, the strategic alliance between Pyongyang and Beijing cracked.

In the late 1980s, Kim Il Sung's regime, deprived of traditional allies and seemingly no room for further maneuver, was driven into a corner. But, according to an ancient Chinese proverb, a "frightened cat" can "turn into a tiger."

Does North Korea have nuclear weapons?

Back in the early 1970s, Kim Il Sung made a political decision to start work on the creation of nuclear weapons - largely based on information that South Korea had a military nuclear program obtained by North Korean intelligence. And also on the basis of Pyongyang's confidence that the economic war against Seoul is lost, and the diplomatic war is also fraught with defeat.

Indeed, as is now known, in the 1970s South Korea conducted independent and quite successful developments on the creation of nuclear weapons, by the way, being a member of the NPT (she signed this treaty on June 1, 1968, and ratified it on April 23, 1975). Nuclear weapon South Korea was supposed to have appeared in 1981. The project was close to completion, but was thwarted by the assassination of South Korean President Park Jong-hee (October 1979) and strong pressure from the United States.

The CIA received the first confirmation of Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions in 1982. It was then that the United States put before the USSR the question of the need to develop joint approaches to the nuclear plans of the DPRK. But Soviet leadership did not share American concerns and intensified joint activities with the DPRK in the field of nuclear energy. Gorbachev's fatal mistake was the agreement to supply the DPRK with a 5 MW graphite reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium.

In 1989, the Americans expressed their suspicion that the North Koreans had refueled the Nengbyon nuclear reactor, then reprocessed the nuclear fuel and most likely obtained up to 12 kg of weapons-grade plutonium, enough to make two nuclear explosive devices. On March 12, 1993, the North Korean side sent a letter to the depository countries of the NPT about the decision to withdraw from this treaty - this is how the first crisis around the North Korean nuclear program began.

After a round of negotiations with the United States, the DPRK suspended its withdrawal from the NPT in June 1993 (one day before the expiration of the 90-day period established by paragraph I of Article X of this treaty). But at the same time, the DPRK stated that it does not consider itself a full member of the IAEA and does not recognize its right to carry out inspections of its nuclear facilities. On October 21, 1994, a framework agreement was concluded in Geneva between the United States and the DPRK, according to which Pyongyang first "frozen" and then dismantled its graphite uranium reactors. The United States, in turn, undertook to provide KEDR with modern power light water reactors with a total capacity of 2000 MW, and until they were put into operation (in 2003) - to supply oil for heating and power generation in the amount of 500 thousand tons annually.

According to experts, the total amount of weapons-grade plutonium in the DPRK at the end of 2002 could be 15-20 kg, which is enough to manufacture 3-4 nuclear warheads. Some experts do not exclude the possibility that high-tech methods of uranium enrichment are being developed in the DPRK. In particular, US experts show increased attention to the activities of the Laser Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the DPRK in Pyongyang, believing that the appropriate technology for uranium enrichment is being developed here.

However, based on the available information, it is not possible to draw an unambiguous conclusion not only about the possible scale North Korean program on uranium enrichment, but also on the location of enterprises engaged in uranium enrichment. If we assume that these enterprises are designed to meet the fuel needs of the two light-water nuclear reactors under construction at Sinpo, then their capacity will be enough to produce weapons-grade uranium in an amount sufficient to produce six nuclear warheads annually.

North Korean missile program on the brink of crisis

The military nuclear program of the DPRK turned out to be not the only headache for the world community. The development of the DPRK missile program in conjunction with the nuclear one created a threat to national security countries of the Asia-Pacific region and for a number of other states. North Korea was one of the first among the countries of this region to launch work on mastering missile technologies. In the 1960s, the DPRK purchased from the USSR unguided tactical solid-fuel rockets with conventional warheads "Luna" and "Luna-M" (North Korean designation "Frog-5" and "Frog-7"). Their range did not exceed 50-70 km, and the weight of the warhead was 400-420 kg.

Not possessing the necessary scientific and technical potential, the DPRK tried to use the opportunities for fairly close cooperation with China. In the second half of the 1990s, North Korean specialists took an active part in the Chinese program to create a ballistic missile with a range of up to 600 km and a payload of about 600 kg.

In 1980, three operational-tactical missile systems with the 8K14 (Scud-B) missile were purchased from Egypt. In doing so, a twofold problem was solved. In 1984, the first flight tests of North Korean-made Scud-B missiles were carried out, and a year later they began to enter service with the army. This single-stage liquid-propellant rocket with a non-detachable warhead has a launch weight of 5.9 tons, a length of 11.25 m, a maximum diameter of 0.88 m and delivers a payload of 1000 kg to a range of up to 300 km with an accuracy of about 450 m.

A new impetus to expand missile production was given shortly after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, when Iran offered to finance the development of an upgraded Scud-B missile to North Korea on the condition of supplying it with 100 missiles of this type. Financial injections helped to quickly solve the problem of modifying the Scud-B rocket. Its range was increased to 340 km, and the payload increased by 15%. However, it was not possible to overcome the traditional disadvantage of North Korean missiles - low accuracy.

Another attempt to modernize the Scud-B missile was made after Iran handed over the wreckage of the Iraqi al-Hussein ballistic missile to North Korea. Using Iraqi technology, the DPRK defense industry, with the help of China, created in 1989 an improved model of an operational-tactical missile, called the Scud-C. Her tests were carried out in 1990, and after that she was put into service. This single-stage liquid-propellant rocket has a launch weight of 6.4 tons, a length of 12 m, a maximum diameter of 0.88 m, a payload of 750 kg and a range of 600-650 km. In this case, the hitting accuracy is 700-1000 m. North Korea began developing its own missile in 1988-1989. aim new program was the creation of BR medium range(BRSD) with a detachable warhead. In implementing this rocket project, called "Nodon-I", Iran and Libya participated. These countries, through intermediaries, purchased various necessary materials and technical means from Western countries.

The first successful test launch of the Nodon-I IRBM was carried out in May 1993 at the Taipoteng test site at east coast DPRK. This missile was put into service in 1997. "BRSD Nodon-I" is a single-stage liquid-propellant rocket with a detachable warhead and an inertial control system. Its launch weight is ~ 16 tons, length - 16 m, maximum diameter - 1.34 m. Maximum range - 1300-1500 km with a payload of 700-1000 kg. The firing accuracy is 2000-3000 m. When creating the Nodon-I MRBM, Scud missile technology was used. Its propulsion system is a combination of 4 Scud-B liquid propellant rocket engines. The energy capabilities of the Nodon-I IRBM make it possible to hit targets in Japan, East China (including Beijing) and the Russian Far East(including Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Chita).

Three separate missile brigades have been formed in the North Korean army, armed with missile systems with Scud-B, Scud-C and Nodong-I missiles. A total of 54 launchers. Assessing the capabilities of the North Korean missile industry, it can be argued that the North Korean army does not experience a shortage of missiles. Concerning missile systems with tactical missiles, their number can be 60-90 units.

North Korea is currently developing new extended-range missiles (over 2,000 km). In the design of the two-stage Nodon-2 IRBM, the Nodon-I rocket sustainer stage is used as the first stage, and the Scud-C rocket sustainer stage is used as the second stage. It is assumed that this rocket will have a launch weight of 21-22 tons, a length of 27 m, a maximum diameter of 1.34 m. Its range should be 2200-2300 km with a payload of 1000 kg or 3000 km with a payload of 500 kg. Firing accuracy - 3700 m. This "BRSD" will be able to hit targets in Japan (including the islands of Okinawa), China, Mongolia, Russia (including the territory to Krasnoyarsk).

A three-stage version of this rocket, called the Taepodong-I, uses a solid rocket engine as the third stage. This missile can have a launch weight of 24 tons, a length of 30 m, and a maximum diameter of 1.34 m. Its range will be 3,200 km with a payload of 1,000 kg or 5,700 km with a payload of 500 kg. The firing accuracy is 3700-3800 m. The Tephodon-I missile is capable of hitting targets in Japan, China, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Russia (up to the Urals), as well as on the islands of Guam and Hawaii, and reaching Alaska.

Adoption of the Nodong-2 IRBM and its three-stage modification, Taekhodong-I, was expected in 2003-2004. However, only one test has been carried out to date. The Taekhodon-2 ICBM will be capable of hitting targets in Japan, China, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Russia (up to Moscow), as well as on the islands of Guam and Hawaii and reach not only Alaska, but also California.

At the present stage, the pause taken by Pyongyang in the development of long-range ballistic missiles indicates a certain crisis in the North Korean missile program. Industry has come up against a number of objective difficulties, primarily related to the lack of qualified scientists and engineers. Therefore, the moratorium on missile tests announced by North Korea should be regarded as a forced measure, and not the goodwill of Pyongyang.

Security interests

The second crisis around North Korea's nuclear program erupted in October 2002. During a visit to Pyongyang, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, at a meeting on October 4, 2002, with the head of the DPRK parliament, Kim Yong Nam, presented to the North Koreans intelligence information that he had, which indicated that North Korea was carrying out secret program obtaining highly enriched uranium for the creation of nuclear weapons. According to James Kelly, the North Korean side did not even try to refute his information, but, on the contrary, calmly admitted that it was enriching uranium.

Further events developed on the rise. At the end of October 2002, the DPRK officially announced its right to have "nuclear and more powerful weapon"for self-defense. In response, the United States and its partners in November 2002 stopped deliveries of fuel oil to North Korea. On December 12, 2002, Pyongyang published a statement on the resumption of its nuclear program, and at the end of the same month removed IAEA inspectors from all "frozen" nuclear facilities and to de-mothball the gas-graphite uranium reactor in Nengben. These actions had no effect, and on January 10, 2003 2009, the leadership of the DPRK made an official statement about the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and the termination of cooperation with the IAEA.

On April 18, 2003, Pyongyang announced that the processing of 8,000 rods containing irradiated nuclear fuel from the Nengbyon reactor was in the final stages. This meant the official recognition of the fact that the DPRK had a significant amount of weapons-grade plutonium, which was not placed under IAEA safeguards. The consultations held on April 23-25, 2003 in Beijing (China) in the China-DPRK-USA trilateral format did not lead to any agreements. According to American delegation, the North Koreans at this meeting acknowledged the intention to create nuclear weapons. On May 12, 2003, Pyongyang announced its unilateral withdrawal from the agreement on declaring the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone, concluded in January 1992 with South Korea.

In the summer of 2003, thanks primarily to the active work of China and Russia with North Korea and the United States, Pyongyang was able to agree to start negotiations in a six-party format (China, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, the United States, and Japan). The talks, which began in August 2003, were held in Beijing. The first two rounds of negotiations ended without any significant results.

The United States demanded that North Korea agree to a "complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of all nuclear programs." North Korea rejected this approach and agreed only to "freeze" its military nuclear programs. Pyongyang also demanded an immediate "reward" for freezing military nuclear projects in the form of large-scale economic assistance, primarily energy supplies (up to 2.7 million tons of heating oil annually), as well as security guarantees from the US. The latter presuppose the establishment of US diplomatic relations with North Korea, the conclusion of a bilateral non-aggression pact between them, and the exclusion of the DPRK from the US list of states that support terrorism.

The situation changed slightly for the better after the third round of negotiations, held in June 2004. Great hopes for further progress were pinned on the fourth round of negotiations (end of 2004). However, the planned plan was thwarted.

Three scenarios

At the moment, there are three possible scenarios for the development of the Korean crisis. Scenario one- "Reconciliation". The implementation of this scenario is the real goal of the leadership of the DPRK in the current crisis. The North Koreans "opened their cards" and indicated both their product and the expected price for it. Nothing less than the national security of the DPRK is now up for sale, and it is proposed to pay for it with something no less adequate - guarantees of non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs and recognition of the DPRK by the United States. At the same time, the unconditional elimination of all components of the military nuclear program of the DPRK remains a condition. The question of a peaceful nuclear program under the control of the IAEA is still open.

So that the US would not have illusions that Pyongyang would "surrender without a fight," the North Koreans played their main trump card - they declared Pyongyang's possession of nuclear weapons.

The main outcome of the three rounds of the six-party talks underway in Beijing should be considered that they have shown the possibility of resolving the crisis through negotiations, and that this is now more likely than before. But for the implementation of the "Tease" scenario, a political decision by the US administration is required that the DPRK, in the event of a complete and verifiable renunciation of nuclear weapons (or all types of weapons of mass destruction), will not be considered as a state whose existence is contrary to American interests.

If the George W. Bush team has the political will to make such a decision, then the Conciliation scenario has a hope of being realized. True, for this it will be necessary for the "five" (USA, China, Russia, South Korea, Japan) to offer the DPRK a price that it could not refuse. At the same time, it is not at all necessary that the United States bear the main costs. Rather the opposite.

Scenario two- increased tension with continued limited political dialogue. This scenario means that the United States refuses to carry out an armed action against the DPRK, but firmly insists on the set conditions for resolving the crisis and does not make concessions to the North Korean leadership. At the same time, it is possible to strengthen the American military presence on the territory of South Korea, and under certain conditions for the development of the situation, the return of US tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea.

North Korea, for its part, will carry out actions demonstrating the seriousness of its intentions to resist American diktat. For example, it will resume testing of ballistic missiles. It is also impossible to rule out a nuclear test with the detonation of a nuclear explosive device.

That is, the situation is "frozen" until the moment when the foreign policy situation changes, as well as the situation in the United States itself. It is quite probable that the "unfreezing" of the situation will take place only after the departure of the George W. Bush team from the scene.

This scenario seems to be quite dangerous. On the one hand, it enables the DPRK to conduct military nuclear research, completely withdrawing its nuclear program from international monitoring. On the other hand, the United States, within the framework of achieving its goals, will increase pressure on the DPRK, seeking complete political and economic isolation of the republic. Taken together, such actions on the part of the DPRK and the United States may become a transitional phase to the start of real hostilities.

Scenario three- US military action. This option is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Although it is likely that the political legitimization of such an operation may be less difficult than in the case of Iraq.

The main problem of implementing this scenario is that, unlike S. Hussein, the North Korean leadership, both from a military point of view and from the point of view of having political will, is quite ready for a preventive invasion of South Korea in order to prevent the formation of an "invading army" of the United States and its allies on its territory. Although it seems obvious that Pyongyang is not unambiguously aimed at the use of force. With all the obvious preference for the first scenario, unfortunately, the likelihood of events developing under it today is lower than under the second scenario. And the main reason for this lies in the stubbornly demonstrated by the team of George W. Bush Jr. intolerance towards the regime of Kim Jong Il.

How to prevent global consequences?

The question of possible consequences acquiring the status of a state that actually possesses nuclear weapons.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement saying: "We have already taken decisive action to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and have manufactured our own self-defense nuclear weapons in response to the policy of the US President George W. Bush administration, which makes no secret of its desire to isolate and strangle the DPRK." It also states that "North Korean nuclear weapons will remain a deterrent under any circumstances."

It should be noted that earlier some representatives of the DPRK stated that their country possesses "nuclear deterrence forces." Quite recently, on January 24, 2005, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the DPRK, Kim Ge Gwan, at a meeting with US Congressman Curt Weldon, said that Pyongyang possesses nuclear weapons, but will use them "exclusively for defense purposes." However, this time the recognition of the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons sounded like an official position.

Can this statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry be trusted? The North Koreans did not provide evidence of the possession of nuclear weapons. Siegfried Hacker, former head of the US Los Alamos laboratory, who visited North Korea's nuclear facilities in early 2004, doubts Pyongyang's ability to create nuclear weapons in the near future. In his opinion, the North Koreans failed to solve a number of technical problems connected primarily with the creation of effective detonators for actuating the main warhead.

But, on the other hand, one cannot ignore the already mentioned confession of the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb A.K. Khan that the North Korean uranium program is much more advanced than it suggests global community. In addition, this program, unlike plutonium, was in no way controlled by the IAEA. Therefore, it can be assumed that under the guise of a plutonium weapons project, which, although dosed, was still monitored by IAEA inspectors until December 2002, Pyongyang was able to implement a uranium weapons project.

In view of the foregoing, it would be reckless to agree with the assessments of a number of Russian and foreign experts that the DPRK Foreign Ministry's statement of February 10, 2005 is yet another manifestation of a policy of blackmail with elements of bluff. A more balanced assessment seems to be the following: it is unlikely that the North Koreans have made nuclear weapons, but such a scenario cannot be ruled out.

At the same time, it is clear that work is underway to create nuclear weapons in the DPRK, and if the world community does not take coordinated measures that take into account the security interests of the DPRK, sooner or later this country may nevertheless appear (if it has not already appeared). And this event, in the event of strong evidence of its accomplishment, will have far-reaching consequences for security not only in Northeast Asia, but also on a global scale.

Firstly, the likelihood of attempts to resolve the Korean "nuclear crisis" by force is increasing, including due to the growing threat of uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons - Pyongyang is trading in ballistic missiles, why shouldn't it also trade in nuclear munitions and technologies for their manufacture? Secondly, crisis stability on the Korean Peninsula will decrease significantly. The United States cannot ignore the possibility of North Korea using nuclear weapons, albeit against the territories of South Korea and Japan, and therefore, in the event of an aggravation of the crisis, they can launch a preventive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities. In Pyongyang, in turn, in this situation, they can act on the principle of "to use or to lose."

Third, the process of "nuclear domino" will begin in the North-Eastern region. Within a short time, literally in 4-6 months, Japan will create its own nuclear weapons. This country has all the necessary technologies for this, and its plutonium reserves in the amount of 5.6 tons are suitable for creating 1000-1200 nuclear weapons. Along with this, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan will certainly intensify their efforts to create missile defense in cooperation with the USA. The United States itself will increase its efforts to protect both its territory and the territory of its allies from nuclear missiles, including by deploying ships with anti-missile weapons in the waters adjacent to North Korea. Under these conditions, both China and Russia will be forced, in turn, to step up their own efforts in the nuclear missile field. brewing new race in the field of nuclear missiles.

Fourth, the acquisition by the DPRK of nuclear weapons and the process of "nuclear domino" that has begun in the Northeast region will lead to the actual collapse of the NPT, moreover, the nuclear nonproliferation regime as a whole. Those states parties to the NPT that, for one reason or another, would like to acquire nuclear weapons, will be convinced that a demonstrative withdrawal from this treaty remains virtually unpunished, and the leading states of the world cannot or do not want to reason with a country that challenges the world community.

What conclusions should be drawn from the analysis of the DPRK's policy in the nuclear and missile fields? There are four of them. First, despite all the rhetoric about the possibility of North Korea inflicting an "all-destroying" blow on the territories of countries unfriendly to it, Kim Jong Il clearly understands that as a result of retaliatory actions, he will lose everything at once. The presence of nuclear missile weapons for him is extremely important factor maintaining its regime in the face of the predicted actions of the international coalition led by the United States in terms of forceful pressure on totalitarian states. This refers to the announcement by Washington crusade against countries enlisted by the United States in the "axis of evil".

Secondly, it is impossible to reliably state that the DPRK possesses nuclear weapons. Yes, it probably has everything necessary to create a nuclear weapon, primarily based on highly enriched uranium (the design of this type of nuclear charge is much simpler than that based on weapons-grade plutonium). Only one thing can be stated with certainty - the DPRK has not yet carried out nuclear explosions, although it has not assumed obligations not to carry them out (it has not signed the CTBT).

Thirdly, North Korea is ready to curtail its military nuclear program if the US, in turn, abandons its hostile policy towards it. Whether Pyongyang will have a peaceful nuclear program, which, in fact, does not exist now, is a matter of future agreements. There is a wide choice of possible solutions, up to the construction of nuclear power plants on the territory of other states with a share of North Korean ownership and the participation of North Korean specialists in the operation of such nuclear power plants.

Fourth, the development (or curtailment) of the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs will be determined by the outcome of the six-party talks, including whether they will be continued after the pause in mid-2004.

13 years ago, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea officially announced the creation of its own nuclear weapons.

“The negotiation process has stalled due to the anti-Korean hostile policy of the United States. As long as America brandishes a nuclear baton, intending to destroy our system at any cost, we will expand our stocks of nuclear weapons in order to protect the historical choice of our people, freedom and socialism, ”said the DPRK Foreign Ministry on February 10, 2005.

The grin of the "paper tiger"

Potential nuclear threat in different years was estimated by the leaders of the DPRK in different ways. At one time, the country's leadership did not attach much importance to this. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung believed that a nuclear bomb was a "paper tiger".

The beginning of work on the creation of a nuclear infrastructure in North Korea began shortly after Kim Il Sung learned that the United States during the Korean War of 1950-1953 was going to drop seven nuclear bombs on the capital of the republic. Already in 1956, cooperation began between the USSR and the DPRK in this area, at first consisting in the training of specialists.

“Nuclear weapons in North Korea appeared almost immediately after the end of the Korean War. Even then, it became obvious that North Korea needed to maximize its defense capabilities, ”said Irina Lantsova, an expert on North and South Korea, an associate professor at the Department of American Studies at St. Petersburg State University, in an interview with RT.

Statues of North Korea's founder Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il during a military parade
Reuters
Damir Sagolj

According to professor Russian University Friendship of the peoples of Yuri Tavrovsky, the main reason for the start of nuclear development in the DPRK was "a deep sense of threat from traditional opponents of Korea, such as Japan and the United States, as well as the desire to rely on their own forces, the Juche policy."

The Koreans decided not to rely on the nuclear umbrella of the Soviet Union and China, Tavrovsky believes. In addition, in his opinion, at that time the memory of a destructive and bloody war was still fresh.

"They (North Korean authorities - RT) came to the conclusion that only nuclear weapons can be a guarantee of non-repetition of war by conventional methods, which are extremely destructive, and they obviously believed that nuclear weapons would not be used, but would be a good defense, ”the expert believes.

Gradually, North Korea acquired the necessary infrastructure and already in 1974 joined the IAEA. At the same time, work began on the creation of Pyongyang's own nuclear weapons. Significant assistance in this was provided, in particular, by China, which allowed North Korean scientists to their facilities.

According to Tavrovsky, two main factors contributed to the success of the DPRK: "the overstrain of the economic, technical, scientific forces of North Korea itself", as well as "conscious and unconscious transfers of technology by other countries, such as the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and, possibly, Pakistan." On last stage, already in our time, the Koreans bought out technologies or specialists from Ukraine, from Dnepropetrovsk, where the Yuzhmash plant is located, which produced the heaviest liquid rockets for the Soviet Union, which are known in the West as Satan.

In 1985, counting on the assistance of the USSR in the construction of nuclear power plants, Pyongyang, under pressure from Moscow, signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the early 1990s, IAEA inspectors frequented the country, and the results of their checks were ambiguous.

In the spring of 1993, the DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty, and in the summer of 1994 the country left the IAEA. Subsequently, it became known that it was in 1994 that the United States almost attacked the Yongbyon reactor, North Korea's largest nuclear facility. However, after analyzing the inevitable victims, Clinton abandoned this idea.

After a visit to the DPRK by former US President Jimmy Carter, the countries managed to sign the so-called Framework Agreement at the end of 1994. According to this document, North Korea, in particular, took upon itself the obligation to stop building, as well as use the infrastructure for uranium enrichment and extract plutonium from reactors, remove enriched nuclear fuel from the DPRK and dismantle all facilities, one way or another related to nuclear weapons.

The US was to supply fuel oil to North Korea under the agreement and build two much larger light water reactors to replace the Yongbyon reactor, which was shut down. They could not be used to produce nuclear fuel.

Dashing zero

In 2001, George W. Bush came to power in the United States, who included the DPRK in the list of "rogue states". Under him, the promised reactors were not built, but the requirements for North Korea became more and more. As early as 2002, the US announced Pyongyang's failure to comply with the Framework Agreement and accused the DPRK of continuing to enrich uranium. At the end of the year, North Korea expelled IAEA employees from its territory and announced the continuation of work on the nuclear program.

The result of a new round of confrontation between the United States and the DPRK in January 2003 was Pyongyang's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The six-party talks between North Korea, China, the United States, Russia, South Korea, and Japan that began in the summer of 2003 also came to nothing. In 2004, North Korea refused to participate, demanding clarification about South Korea's nuclear program, which, as it turned out, had been going on for four years.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK announced the creation of nuclear weapons, but the first test was carried out only in October 2006. Several tests of new weapons by North Korea are known from 2006 to 2017.

Kim Jong Un watches a rocket launch
Reuters

In 2017, Pyongyang announced a test of a thermonuclear charge, the so-called hydrogen bomb.

Experts note that the development of the North Korean nuclear program was a forced measure.

“Already after Iraq, and then after Libya and Syria, it became clear that there are no other ways to defend sovereignty. If North Korea did not have a nuclear program, it is likely that it would have already been bombed, ”Konstantin Asmolov, an employee of the Center for Korean Studies at the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, emphasized in an interview with RT.

According to the expert, North Korea exists in an unfriendly environment, for example, from the point of view of South Korea, the DPRK as a state does not exist. Formally, the South Korean Constitution also applies to the northern territories.

Delivered to the White House

North Korea began developing a nuclear delivery vehicle in 1988. It took ten years to create the Taepodong-1 medium-range ballistic missile - the first launch was made in 1998.

From 1999 to 2005, the DPRK observed a unilateral moratorium on missile testing, introduced following negotiations with the Clinton administration in exchange for food aid.

“Dialogue with the United States ended in 2001 with the coming to power of the Bush administration, which means that we have the right to resume missile testing,” read the text of a statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry, which was published on March 3, 2005.

In subsequent years, Pyongyang continued to launch rockets, and at the end of 2012, North Korea became a space power, successfully launching the Gwangmyeongsong-3 satellite into orbit.

In 2017, which fell in the Sea of Japan, became the reason for the convening of the UN Security Council. Soon another one was produced, which fell into the Pacific Ocean, flying over the Japanese island of Hokkaido.

The United States is of particular concern latest version"Hwaseong" - "Hwaseong-15", which, according to experts, can hit any target in the United States.

Today, North Korea is also an exporter of missiles. Among its largest buyers are the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Pakistan and Yemen. In addition, the Iranian carriers were presumably made on the basis of the North Korean Taekhodong-2.

Sanction pressure

The DPRK developed its nuclear program under harsh conditions, by Japan and South Korea, and by the European Union, and even by Australia. The UN was established in relation to the DPRK. Each nuclear test was followed by packages of sanctions that touched almost every area of life - from cultural exchanges and remittances until the ban on the supply of various raw materials and goods.

According to Lantsova, North Korea has achieved a very good result under tough sanctions: significant progress has been made in the work on the nuclear missile program - this applies to both delivery vehicles and the nuclear weapons themselves.

From the side of the United States, pressure on North Korea intensified with the coming to power of Donald Trump, who had already managed to threaten the DPRK with complete annihilation.

“The United States has a lot of strength and patience, but if we have to defend ourselves, then we will have no choice but to completely destroy the DPRK. Rocket Man (- RT) embarked on a suicide mission, ”said the head of the White House, speaking at the UN.

However, the real danger posed by the DPRK raises serious doubts among experts. According to Tavrovsky, the likelihood that North Korea will be the first to launch a nuclear strike is minimal.

“The North Koreans have achieved all their goals. They have achieved what they have been malnourished for many years, overworked. They practically created a nuclear missile shield, this has already been recognized by all the opponents of the DPRK, ”the expert is sure.

Meanwhile, Asmolov admits the possibility that North Korea could act first if provoked.

“If the North Korean leadership is confident that there are no peaceful alternatives and that they are already going to be killed, they will naturally act on the “hit first” principle,” the expert emphasized.

The North Korean leadership demonstrated a decisive attitude and independence of its policy on the eve of the launch Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang. On February 8, 2018, a military parade was held in the capital of the DPRK, Pyongyang, in honor of the 70th anniversary of the People's Democratic Republic. Traditionally, the celebrations take place in April. However, the country's authorities decided to hold the event in February, timed to coincide with the anniversary of the founding of the regular army of North Korea. At the parade, a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile "Hwaseong-15".

"As long as the hostile policy of the United States persists, the mission of the people's army, acting as a powerful sword for the defense of the country, will continue," said North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, speaking at the parade in front of the military.