Rocket weapon. One of my favorite topics. About medium-range missiles

Ballistic missile medium range The Jupiter is little known and had a short lifespan. Despite this, she made a great contribution to the development of rocket technology in the United States.

After the development of the Redstone short-range missile, in 1954 research group armies in the Redstone arsenal began working on more powerful rocket, which was supposed to be able to deliver a nuclear warhead to a distance of 1600 km or put an artificial satellite into orbit. On February 14, 1955, the Killian report was released, which called for the development of medium-range missiles along with ICBMs. This report, as well as tests of the IRBM in the USSR, prompted US Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson to approve the development of the Thor missile on November 8, 1955. That same day, he ordered development of the Jupiter sea-based IRBM as a secondary alternative to the Thor.

Initially, cooperation with the fleet had a positive effect on the Jupiter program. In order to meet the requirements of the fleet, the length of the rocket was reduced, and a rotary nozzle engine was used instead of control surfaces. However, regardless of these improvements, the rocket engine on liquid fuel did not meet the requirements of the Navy at all. Since the engine had already been tested since November 1955, the army did not agree to switch to using a solid fuel engine. As a result, the Navy began development of its own solid-fuel version of the Jupiter called the Jupiter S.

Although the Navy stopped development of the liquid rocket, it was still involved in the Jupiter program. As a result, work continued and on May 14, 1956, flight tests of rocket components were carried out using a modified version of Redstone called Jupiter "A". Three months later, the Army signed a Jupiter missile manufacturing contract with Chrysler Corporation. In the same month, the first three engines were delivered to Cape Canaveral for test launches. The big event came on September 20, 1956, when the Army launched a Jupiter "A" with a special payload section. This missile, named Jupiter C, reached an altitude of 1045 km and a range of 5470 km, setting three records for ballistic missiles developed in Western countries.

This Jupiter C launch was very important both for the army and for national prestige. It also became the last chord in the rivalry between the Air Force and the Army. The Air Force, which was in charge of two ICBM development programs and the Thor IRBM program, considered army research to be an infringement of its interests. Since it was a matter of jurisdiction, it could only be decided by the Secretary of Defense. On November 28, 1956, Wilson issued his famous "Roles and Mission" directive, which gave the Air Force control of all missile development programs with a range of more than 320 km.

As a result, Jupiter was taken over by the Air Force. However, all research work continued to be carried out at the Army's Redstone Arsenal. Then, the first rocket launch, made in March 1957 from Cape Canaveral, was also carried out by army personnel. Although unsuccessful, the next launch, on 31 May, was successful. The range was 2400 km. As it happened four months before Thor's first successful launch, Jupiter became the first successfully launched medium-range ballistic missile in the United States.

Although Jupiter outperformed Thor in range, the program progressed very sluggishly compared to its competitor. For example, Jupiter test launches were performed with engineering samples, while Thor tests involved mass-produced missiles. In addition, Thor's launch and maintenance equipment was developed at the same time as the rocket, while development for the Jupiter did not begin until after the rocket's first successful launch. These delays were further exacerbated by the Air Force's requirement to use modified Thor equipment for the Jupiter. This task turned out to be impossible.

Since October 9, 1957, after the appointment of Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy, attitudes towards the Jupiter program have changed. It was announced that both Thor and Jupiter would be deployed. As part of the new plan, the first units were to be ready by December 1958.

On January 2, 1958, approval was received for the use of equipment developed by the Army to service the Jupiter. Two days later, Chrysler received a $51.8 million contract to build the Jupiter. Jupiter Squadron 1 (864) was formed on 15 January 1958. In February, training began, then two more squadrons (865th and 866th) were formed. The first serial Jupiter was delivered in August, and the first launch by the Air Force took place on October 15, 1958. However, at this time the first Thor had already been delivered to the UK. Despite the deployment of the Thor, the Air Force realized that the Jupiter was a much more effective medium-range missile. Since it was mobile, this made it very difficult for the enemy to deliver a preventive nuclear missile strike. In addition, since the design of the rocket was originally designed for its transportation, it was more durable and resistant to conventional weapons.

Unlike Thor, which launched only from pre-prepared positions, Jupiter was launched from a mobile launcher. The battery of Jupiter missiles included three combat missiles and consisted of about 20 heavy trucks, including tanks of kerosene and liquid oxygen.

The rocket was transported horizontally in a special vehicle. Arriving at the deployment site, the battery installed the missiles vertically and erected a "canopy" of aluminum sheets around the base of each missile, sheltering personnel working on preparing for the launch and allowing the missiles to be serviced at any weather conditions. Once installed, the rocket took approximately 15 minutes to refuel and was ready to launch.

Another Jupiter advantage was the ablative warhead. Unlike the Mk-II head section for Thor, it re-entered the atmosphere on more speed. As a result, it was harder to intercept, moreover, it was less sensitive to crosswinds and, as a result, had significantly greater accuracy. As a result, the Air Force made the decision to abandon the Mk-II and use ablative warheads on both missiles.

In 1959, an agreement was reached with the Italian government on the deployment of two squadrons in the country - the 865th and 866th, previously based at the Redstone Arsenal military base (Huntsville, USA). The Gioia del Colle airbase in southern Italy was chosen to host the missiles. Two squadrons, each with 15 missiles, were sent to Italy in 1959.

Each squadron consisted of 15 combat missiles, divided into five launch batteries - approximately 500 personnel and 20 equipment vehicles for each missile. Ten batteries were deployed 50 km apart in 1961. The missiles were under the official jurisdiction of the Italian Air Force and operated by Italian personnel, although the nuclear warheads were controlled and equipped by American officers. Rocket batteries regularly changed their locations. For each of them, warehouses of fuel and liquid oxygen were prepared in 10 nearby villages, regularly replenished and serviced.

15 missiles were located at 5 positions around Izmir in Turkey in 1961. As in Italy, Turkish personnel maintained the missiles, but the nuclear charges were controlled and equipped by US officers.

The first combat training launch of the IRBM by Italian personnel was carried out in April 1961. The first combat training launch of the IRBM by Turkish personnel was carried out in April 1962.

R-5M rocket launch

In this he was encouraged by the highest Ukrainian state and party leaders, many of whom soon moved to the Kremlin, in particular, Leonid Brezhnev. In their opinion, the work of OKB-586 could contribute to the growth of Ukraine's prestige in the face of the supreme power, which gave the republic new opportunities. In addition, in the future, Yangel could compete with Korolev himself by creating ICBMs on long-term fuel. However, at first, the operational design of the first own IRBM became an urgent task. The transition to new components required the solution of a number of problems associated with increasing the resistance of structural materials in an aggressive environment, maintaining the stability of the fuel components during their long stay in the rocket tanks. Taking as a basis the initial project prepared under the guidance of V.S. In order to make the advantages of the Dnepropetrovsk offspring look more distinct, the project was revised and an IRBM was proposed with a range of about 2000 km (66% more than that of the R-5M), capable of carrying a more powerful warhead. The missile received the designation R-12.

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Scheme of missiles R-5M, R-12 prototype and R-12 series

On August 13, 1955, the Decree of the Council of Ministers “On the creation and manufacture of the R-12 (8K63) rocket” was adopted with access to the LKI in April 1957, and in October 1955 it was possible to release a corrected preliminary design. The range and throwable weight increased, which led to an increase in the relative fuel reserve. As a result, the starting mass of the “product” became significantly larger. The thrust of the RD-211 engine was insufficient. However, M.K. Yangel did not see this as a particular problem - he felt the powerful support of V.P. Glushko behind him, who promised him to rapidly develop and commission all the necessary rocket engines based on new components. It must be said that work on the RD-211 engine began in 1953. Knowing from previous experience that the combustion chamber, determining such important characteristics of the LRE as thrust and specific thrust impulse (specific thrust impulse is a parameter characterizing the efficiency of the engine; measured in kgf /kg s. Physical meaning - thrust developed by the engine at a fuel consumption of 1 kg per second. Further in the text, for brevity, simply "specific impulse" - ed.), is the most capricious element of the engine in refinement, Valentin Petrovich suggested make LRE multi-chamber. He believed that it would be easier to work out one relatively small chamber of a multi-chamber engine than to bring a rocket engine with a single high-thrust chamber. The original nitric acid RD-211 was originally made four-chamber - the thrust of each of its chambers was almost two times less than that of the first RD-100 - an analogue of the German A-4 engine. Experimental-finishing tests of a nitric acid combustion chamber with displacement fuel supply, started at the stand in the same 1953, gave very good results.

A-4 rocket engine

By this time, the OKB V.P. Glushko, in addition to creating an engine for OKB-586, participated in work on a liquid-propellant rocket engine for two intercontinental missiles at once - for both stages of the Korolev R-7 ICBM (on oxygen and kerosene) and for launch boosters of the Soviet supersonic intercontinental missile cruise missile (MKR) "Buran", designed in OKB-23 V.M. Myasishchev. RD-212 on nitric acid and kerosene for Buran was made on the basis of RD-211. A.M. Isaev, who a little earlier created a liquid-propellant rocket engine for launch boosters of the first Soviet MCR "Storm" developed by OKB S.A. Lavochkin, encountered an unpleasant phenomenon - explosions of the fuel mixture in closed cavities of nozzle heads. Kerosene turned out to be far from the best fuel for a pair with nitric acid - it did not provide self-ignition and gave too “hard” combustion in the chambers. “Having drunk enough” with him, Isaev, in all his next engines on long-term fuel, abandoned the use of kerosene in favor of self-igniting fuel - first amines, and then combustibles based on hydrazine. V.P. Glushko got out of this situation by using hydrocarbon fuel TM-185 of the turpentine type, which had smooth characteristics during ignition and provided more stable combustion with nitric acid than conventional kerosene or rocket fuel RG-1. In any case, there were no mentions of difficulties with fine-tuning the LRE due to the fault of the fuel in the reports of OKB-456. Bench testing of the RD-212 was not completed due to changes in the tactical and technical requirements for the Buran MCR - it was necessary to increase the thrust of the launch boosters by 22%, in connection with which the development of the RD-213 began, completed in 1956 by official bench tests and delivery batch of engines to the customer. However, in the same year, the customer realized that he did not need two MKRs (Storm and Buran), so work on the latter was stopped. Using the groundwork obtained, V.P. Glushko quickly managed to create a powerful and very reliable engine for the R-12 rocket, called RD-214.

Engine RD-214

RD-214 (beginning of development - 1955) became the most advanced LRE from the entire family of OKB-254 engines running on nitric acid and kerosene and the only one of them that received practical application. In 1957, fire finishing tests began, which were carried out in two stages. LRE was tested immediately in a complete four-chamber configuration. At the first stage, the launch was practiced and the engine performance was checked for a specified operating time. Numerous features of start-up and shutdown transients have been identified. In particular, it turned out that a slow exit to the nominal thrust mode leads to the appearance of high-frequency pulsations in the combustion chambers. As a result, the first series of finishing tests and finishing finishing tests were successfully completed. The control and technological firing tests of a batch of commercial engines were also successfully passed. In March 1957, bench tests of the RD-214 as part of the R-12 rocket began at the NII-229 stand in Zagorsk. By the beginning of the LCI, four rocket engines had passed such tests. Engines for the LKI of the R-12 rocket were selected from the same batch. The second stage of fire tests would be aimed at reducing the spread of the aftereffect impulse, as well as at collecting the necessary statistics on engine reliability. It became clear that the best way to reduce the aftereffect impulse is to switch to the mode of the final thrust stage before it is turned off. However, tests have shown that when the pressure in the chambers drops below a certain value, low-frequency oscillations occur in them, which can lead to the destruction of the rocket engine. As a result, we determined the mode of reaching the final stage and the amount of thrust before shutdown.

Undercarriage of the R-12 rocket (end view)
You can see the plugs in the critical sections of the nozzles and the control levers of the gas rudders

By 1959, already during the LCI of the R-12 rocket, the RD-214 successfully passed the entire volume of finishing finishing and flight tests, was put into serial production and adopted by the Soviet Army. Inspired by the success of the R-211 / R-214 family, V.P. Glushko decided to reconfigure the engines for the "seven" from a single-chamber to a four-chamber, when it was necessary to increase thrust due to an increase in the launch mass of the rocket. After that, the multi-chamber LRE layout with a single turbopump unit began to be widely used by the Khimki Design Bureau.

Layout of R-5M and R-12 missiles on transport trolleys

The use of RD-214 affected the appearance of the R-12 rocket: the tail compartment had to be significantly changed by introducing a conical fairing skirt. However, when blowing rocket models in wind tunnels, it turned out that such a skirt has a positive effect on the stability of the rocket. Speaking about the appearance of the R-12, we can say that it differed significantly from the appearance of the R-5M: the former elegance of smooth contours was replaced by chopped straightness of simple contours formed by pairing the cylindrical compartment of the tanks with the cones of the head and tail skirt. S.P. Korolev, seeing for the first time the drawing of this rocket, did not fail to remark: “This “pencil” will not fly ...” Another debatable issue in which M.K. Yangel tried to defend an independent position was the missile guidance system. Old gyroscopic devices - the heirs of the "gyrohorizons" and "gyroverticants" of the German A-4 - gave too much dispersion of warheads at long ranges. To increase accuracy, some experts at that time proposed introducing a radio correction system on the active part of the trajectory. S.P. Korolev was positive about such proposals - all of his missiles, starting with the R-2, had (some as the main, others as an auxiliary) a radio channel for lateral trajectory correction. M.K. Yangel believed that it was necessary to develop purely autonomous, inertial guidance systems based on the improvement of gyro devices. This gave the ballistic missile greater invulnerability - such a system cannot be “hammered” with radio interference. In accordance with these requirements, an inertial and fully autonomous control system was developed for the R-12. Time has shown that for combat missiles this approach was absolutely justified. It is interesting to note that the tests of the control system for the R-12 were carried out using the R-5M rocket.

Scheme of missiles R-12, R-14 and R-16

Flight tests of the R-12 began on June 22, 1957 with GTsP No. 4 Kapustin Yar and continued until December 1958. They were carried out in three stages; a total of 25 rockets were launched. All work on this missile, including the production of an experimental R-12 series, its LCI at the test site and preparation for serial production, was completed in 1959. On March 4 of the same year, the ground-based R-12 complex was put into service, and plant No. 586 and OKB-586 were awarded the Orders of Lenin. M.K. Yangel, L.V. Smirnov (factory director) and V.S. Budnik were awarded the title of Heroes of Socialist Labor. In July 1959, N.S. Khrushchev visited the plant to present government awards. Practically in parallel with the LCI of this rocket, the OKB-586 team carried out new developments. By September 1957, a draft design of the R-15 missile for arming Navy submarines was drawn up, issued in accordance with the Decree of the Council of Ministers of August 17, 1956, and by November 1957, the designers, in accordance with the Decree of the Council of Ministers of December 17, 1956 g. "On the creation of an intercontinental ballistic missile R-16 (8K64)", prepared a draft design of their own ICBM. It was supposed to reach its LCI by June 1961. To speed up the verification of some design solutions, the Dnepropetrovsk residents simultaneously developed a missile project to replace the R-12 - a more advanced IRBM with a doubled range compared to the previous one. On July 2, 1958, the Decree of the Council of Ministers was issued on the development of the R-14 (8K65) ballistic missile with a flight range of 4000 km in order to reach the LKI in April 1960. By December 1958, the preliminary design was ready. In the meantime, mass production of the R-12 was being actively established, not only in Dnepropetrovsk, but also in Omsk. Since the RVGK engineering brigades were equipped with R-5M and R-12 missiles, their combat capabilities and firepower have increased significantly. In addition to the brigades, which by that time were subordinate to the Headquarters of the reactive units, on the basis of aviation units in 1956-1959. long-range aviation missile units were formed. On December 17, 1959, the Decree of the Council of Ministers was issued on the merger of these units into a single Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) under the command of Marshal of Artillery Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin. R-12 became the base for creating a group of medium-range missiles. The first regiments of the Strategic Missile Forces with ground-based R-12 missiles were deployed on May 15-16, 1960 in the settlements of Slonim, Novogrudok and Pinsk in Belarus, Gezgaly in the Caucasus and Plunge in the Baltic states. The pace of development and subsequent deployment of missiles cannot but impress. However, the time was such, and the main slogan remained “Overtake America! » It was not an abstract race - NATO's arsenals were by no means fictional. Already on December 01, 1955, the program for the creation of an air-to-air missile system was declared a priority by President Eisenhower, and from that moment on, the Americans literally went head to head with us, practically keeping up with the deadlines, and sometimes breaking ahead in terms of certain characteristics of the missiles. As a result of the developments carried out, the United States created two systems at once, which in many respects are analogues of the R-12 and R-14. On March 14, 1956, tests of the Jupiter missile, designed for the US Army Ballistic Missile Directorate by the "German team" of the Redstone arsenal under the leadership of V. von Braun, began. (In fact, Wernher von Braun was the chief engineer of the project and director of the Jupiter program. William Mrazek was engaged in the direct design of mechanical systems, Walter Hössermann developed the guidance and control system, Hans Heuter, ground equipment, Kurt Debus, launch equipment. Coordination of work and overall layout of the system were led by Haynes Coelle and Harry Ruppe.) On its third launch, on May 31, 1957, the rocket reached an estimated range of 2,780 km. Until July 1958, 38 launches were carried out, of which 29 were recognized as successful. Since the summer of the same year, the SM-78 Jupiter system was put into service with the 864th and 865th strategic missile squadrons of the US Army stationed in Italy and Turkey. Each squadron has 30 missiles. Several Jupiters were handed over to the Royal Air Force of Great Britain.

Preparations for the launch of the IRBM "Jupiter"

Less than ten months after the start of the Jupiter LCT, on January 25, 1957, the Thor rocket, developed by Douglas Aircraft for the United States Air Force Ballistic Missile Division, launched for the first time. The first launch took place just 13 months after the signing of the contract for the creation of this rocket. Already on September 20, 1957, with a simplified control system, it reached a range of 2400 km. In the eighth and fourth successful flight, on December 19, 1957, the warhead of the Thor, equipped with a standard control system, “hit” the target range with high accuracy. Until January 28, 1959, 31 launches of this rocket were carried out, of which 15 were completely successful, 12 were partially successful, and four ended in failure. The first Thor was handed over to the British Air Force Bomber Command on September 19, 1958 and entered service with the 77th Strategic Missile Squadron stationed near Foltwell (Norfolk County). In addition to Great Britain, the SM-75 "Thor" system was in service with two squadrons of 15 missiles each, based in Italy and Turkey.

Installation of the upper stages on the Tor-Able launch vehicle, created on the basis of the Tor IRBM

"Jupiter" and "Thor" were designed by different companies and differed quite significantly in appearance (initially, von Braun wanted to offer "Jupiter" to the Navy for use from submarines, and this missile turned out to be short and "thick"). At the same time, they had a lot in common. In particular, liquid oxygen and kerosene were used as fuel components, single-chamber liquid-propellant rocket engines were used to control the flight, swinging in a gimbal suspension and differing from each other only in layout, since they were created by one company - Rocketdine. Both of these missiles were considered mobile, since they were transported on a wheeled conveyor, and the Jupiter was generally launched from a mobile launcher. The targets of the missiles were objects in the European part of the USSR. "Thor" and "Jupiter" were built in a small series. Their total number in the Air Force and the US Army reached 105 units.

RS-27A - a modern modification of the rocket engine, which was installed on the IRBM "Jupiter" and "Thor"

However, let us return to the R-12 and its role in the formation of the Strategic Missile Forces. By 1960, a very difficult situation was taking shape in the world. Despite the fact that the USSR had already adopted the R-7 ICBM and the R-12 IRBM, the priority in the number of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles remained on the side of the United States. The first Soviet ICBMs based on the "seven" due to their small number and restrictions on use could not really compete with American missiles and bombers. Another thing is the Dnepropetrovsk IRBM - due to their relative simplicity, low cost and high combat readiness, they could be quickly and widely deployed in units. In accordance with the new opportunities, a new military doctrine of the USSR was created, the main provisions of which were formulated on January 14, 1960 by N.S. Khrushchev in a speech in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR entitled "Disarmament for lasting peace and friendship." Ballistic missiles occupied a central place in military strategy, which became a decisive factor in influencing the enemy in both European and global wars. In accordance with this doctrine, possible scenarios for future wars were also built, which now had to begin with a massive nuclear strike. The Strategic Missile Forces became the most important part of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Here is what is written about the R-12 rocket in the collection "Soviet nuclear weapon”: “With the deployment in 1958 of the SS-4 Sandal (the name of the R-12 missile in NATO terminology - ed.), the USSR gained the ability to deliver operational nuclear strikes, regardless of long-range strategic forces. SS-4 was soon supplemented by an intermediate-range ballistic missile SS-5 (P-14 - approx. ed.), which entered service in 1961. The number of deployed SS-3 (P-5M - approx. ed.), SS-4 and SS-5 peaked in the mid-1960s when they numbered over 700, with all but 100 sent to sites in Western Europe." Despite the fact that the ground complex with R-12 missiles was considered highly automated at that time, many procedures related to the preparation of the rocket for launch and its refueling were carried out manually. The complexity of operating the complex in parts and connections was revealed, in particular, during complex classes for refueling training rockets with rocket fuel components, which were carried out from the second half of 1963. The rockets were repeatedly refueled, and then sent to the arsenal. Particularly intense was the work of the personnel of the regiments and formations of the RSD during their trips to the GTsP No. 4 Kapustin Yar for training and combat firing.

Scheme of installing the R-12 rocket on the launch pad

Here is how one of the veteran rocket launchers, retired colonel-general Yu.P. During the refueling of the rocket, the air does not move at the position; up to about a height of 1-1.5 meters above the ground, there is a yellow cloud of oxidizer vapors coming out of the tankers' drainage system. The staff of the battery works in gas masks and protective clothing, dressed on a naked body, otherwise they cannot stand even a minute; every 4-5 minutes, soldiers, sergeants and officers run up to the water cart, throw back the hood of the protective suit and pour 1-2 buckets out of the hose. cold water. Wet body dries in 5 minutes under protective clothing. So they saved themselves from overheating ... ”Yes, in such conditions it was possible not only to check what our warrior is capable of even in peacetime, but also to understand that serious measures must be taken to reduce manual operations at the starting position. In addition, despite the fact that the R-12 missiles were stored in arched concrete structures, the launch complex itself, which was built on almost the same principles as its prototypes for missiles from A-4 / R-1 to R-5M inclusive , due to the abundance of service equipment (which included transporters, tractors, tankers, command posts, communication centers, etc.) and an unprotected ground launch, it was a vulnerable target for air attack. It was necessary to provide for a new way of basing, which was the installation of a rocket in special mines.

An artist's drawing describing the operation of the Atlas ICBM silo launcher

In his memoirs, Sergei Nikitovich Khrushchev claims that the silo-based missiles were proposed by his father, which we leave without comment. "Technically" the Americans were the first to come up with the mine, but they only intended to store a rocket in it (first - "Atlas", then "Titan-1"), protecting it from damage during an air attack. Before launch, the rocket, together with the launch pad, had to be lifted from the shaft to the surface by an elevator and launched from there. Later it was decided to start directly from the mine. The first full-fledged silo launchers (silos) were the silos for the Titan-2 missiles.

Scheduled maintenance of ICBM "Titan-2" in the mine

From the very beginning, our specialists considered it expedient to launch from the mine. Of all the possible designs, the one that provided for the free exit of the rocket installed on the launch pad, located at the bottom of the mine, was chosen. The gases escaping from the rocket engine were supposed to exit through the annular gas duct between the inner wall of the shaft and the protective metal cup enclosing the rocket. To test the new basing method, it was planned to conduct a full-scale experiment with the R-12 rocket. Here is what Nikolai Fedorovich Shlykov, a participant in those long-standing events, said about the creation of the first mine installations for R-12 missiles: “When creating the first two silos at the test site, builders encountered a quicksand at a depth of about 20 m. Since at that time the methods of passing quicksands had not yet been worked out, they decided to increase the shaft upwards, pouring soil ... in the form of a mound about seven meters high. In this case, the rocket was completely immersed in the mine shaft. On the flat terrain, these mounds were visible from about 10–15 km away. Often they served as landmarks when moving around the range and therefore were nicknamed "beacons". Ground service equipment was located approximately 150 m from the mine. The rocket was installed in the mine using a 25-ton crane, refueling was carried out by means located at the zero mark. All solutions formed the basis of the technical developments of the experimental silo. The detailed design was carried out by the V.P. Barmin Design Bureau and the Design Institute of the Ministry of Defense (TsPI-31 MO). It was from one such “beacon” that the first rocket launch took place in September 1959. Eyewitness memories of the first R-12 launch from the mine are ambiguous: some argue that, after flying about 100 km, the rocket deviated from the course and fell: an emergency shutdown of the rocket engine occurred - during the operation of the engine in the mine, off-design vibrations occurred, which led to damage to one of the four steering gears. Others say that the accident occurred for a more prosaic reason - the gases escaping from the engine in the mine, when interacting with the injected air, squeezed out the metal strip of its shell inside the “glass”, which cut off the third rocket stabilizer. The flight was controlled until the 57th second, then, during the passage of the zone of maximum aerodynamic loads, due to the asymmetry of the configuration with three stabilizers, the rocket lost stability and fell. Upon inspection of the silo, a deformation of the protective glass was revealed, and the cut stabilizer was lying near the mine. On the one hand, it was a failure, on the other hand, a great victory - for the first time in the USSR, a rocket was launched from a mine. On May 30, 1960, the Decree of the Council of Ministers was issued, and on June 14, 1960, an order was signed by the State Committee for Defense Equipment (GKOT) on the development of combat silos with the code names Dvina (for the R-12 missile), Chusovaya (for the R -14), "Sheksna" (for R-16) and "Desna" (for ICBM R-9A developed by OKB-1).

Rocket R-12U in the mine

After a number of improvements (in particular, the modernization of the control system and the removal of aerodynamic stabilizers), on December 30, 1961, the first launch of the upgraded rocket, called R-12U, was carried out. Its tests at GTsP No. 4 continued until October 1963. The first combat mines for the R-12U were built by January 01, 1963 in Plunga (Baltic), and a year later, on January 05, 1964, a combat missile system with the R-12U missile was adopted by the Strategic Missile Forces.

Routine check of the R-12 missile launch support equipment

In the initial period of adoption and deployment of these complexes, the P-12 quite often revealed malfunctions and shortcomings that prevented their safe use. In particular, flange connections of pipelines flowed. In addition, high-frequency pressure pulsations in the chambers were observed during fire tests of the liquid-propellant rocket engines of serial rockets. The analysis showed that serial pumps had greater efficiency than experienced ones, and the gas generator was equipped with a smaller supply of catalyst. Subsequent technological measures completely ruled out engine accidents. From the beginning of 1957, LRE control tests were carried out, the analysis of the results of which showed high reliability of engines, and the use of more advanced methods of control flow of a number of RD-214 units made it possible from 1963 to completely abandon the control and technological tests of engines. In June 1961, the first launches of the R-12 were carried out with combat warheads equipped with nuclear warheads (“Operation Rose”). From a field position east of Vorkuta, it was planned to carry out three R-12 launches at the test site on the island of Novaya Zemlya (the first launch - with a "blank" warhead, the next two - with warheads different power). During practical exercises at the launch site to prepare the first missile for launch, due to an error by the combat crew, the electrical circuit of one missile was “burned”. Only operational actions of the launch management, the chief designer of OKB-586 M.K. Yangel and the director of the serial plant Ya.V. Kolupaev made it possible to quickly deliver a new rocket from Omsk and successfully complete the "Operation" Rose ".

Mine head R-12Sh

In July 1962, during the "Operation K-1 and K-2", R-12 rocket launches and high-altitude nuclear explosions were carried out in order to study their effect on radio communications, radars, aviation and rocket technology. During flight tests and the beginning of the deployment of the R-12, numerous experiments were carried out with the help of these missiles in the interests of various military and scientific programs. In particular, two launches were carried out to test a model of a rocket plane developed in OKB-52 under the leadership of V.N. Chelomey - in 1961 and 1963. In the second half of the 1960s - early 1970s models of the reusable aerospace aircraft "BOR-1" and "BOR-2" (BOR - unmanned orbital rocket plane), created according to the "Spiral" project in OKB A.I. Mikoyan. Numerous R-12 launches can be noted for testing missile defense systems (ABM) of the OKB G.V. Kisunko.

BOR-2 apparatus launched by R-12 rocket

In 1962, these missiles almost blew up the whole world. Due to the crisis resulting from the negative political and military situation in Caribbean After the Cuban Revolution, there was a real threat of American intervention in Cuba. The USSR hurried to help the new ally. open military aid would be too obvious a counter to the efforts of the United States to return the former regime to Cuba. N.S. Khrushchev took a step that, in his opinion, could cut the Gordian knot of problems with one blow: he instructed to deploy Soviet IRBMs with Soviet personnel in Cuba. The arguments for this decision were that the American "Jupiters" and "Torahs" from the territory of Turkey and Italy could reach the important centers of the Soviet Union in just 10 minutes, and for us to retaliate against American territory using an ICBM will take more than 25 minutes. Cuba was supposed to become a launching pad and threaten the very “underbelly of America” with Soviet missiles. The Americans, according to N.S. Khrushchev, would not dare to attack the starting positions served by Soviet crews. The plan of the operation, called Anadyr, provided for the deployment of three R-12 regiments (24 launchers) and two ground-based R-14 regiments (16 launchers) on Cuban territory. To carry out this operation in the Baltic, in Odessa and Sevastopol, transports were allocated (mainly dry cargo ships with a displacement of 17 thousand tons each), which, in strict secrecy, were loaded with equipment and units, and the personnel were transported in specially converted holds of dry cargo ships. Part of the command staff was delivered to Cuba by the passenger ships Admiral Nakhimov, Latvia, and others. American intelligence was able to detect three Soviet missile regiments in Cuba only a month later, filming the launch equipment from a U-2 aircraft. It is easy to imagine what began after that in Washington! On October 17, 1962, Life magazine published a map of the location of Soviet missile systems in Cuba and arcs - the range of missiles and possible areas of destruction on American territory. Panic arose in these zones and people began to evacuate to safe areas. Apparently, for the first time in the history of America as a state, its inhabitants felt a real threat. From that day on, US attack aircraft began a continuous round-the-clock overflight of Cuban territory. The planes passed at low altitude over the missile positions, threatening, but fortunately not using weapons. By the end of October, half of the 36 R-12s delivered to Cuba were ready for launch operations. Due to the naval blockade, R-14s did not arrive on the island. Any next incautious move on either side could turn into a disaster. The world is on the brink nuclear war. Only realizing this, N.S. Khrushchev and J.F. Kennedy came to the conclusion that the conflict must be resolved peacefully. During the negotiations, we agreed that we would remove the missiles from Cuba, and the Americans from Turkey and Italy. These events forced the missilemen to take a completely different look at operations of this type: instead of including the Cuban Brigade in the Strategic Missile Forces, they had to rapidly curtail weapons and equipment and send personnel to the USSR. The Caribbean crisis influenced not only the entire subsequent course of history, but also the development strategic weapons in particular. The Soviet military realized what kind of power (military and political) such types of weapons as the IRBM represent. It is interesting to note here that the R-12, which became a stage in the life of the Dnepropetrovsk Design Bureau, a stepping stone "to new achievements", turned out to be the most massive medium-range missile in service (according to American data, about 2300 units of R- were manufactured during the entire period of serial production). 12). By the end of the 1960s. more than 600 R-12 missiles and about 100 R-14 missiles were deployed in the USSR. The life cycle of the R-12 lasted until 1990, until the elimination of the entire class of IRMs in accordance with the Treaty between the USSR and the USA.

Rocket R-12 before the parade on Red Square

© V.BOBKOV, 1997

Prior to the start in 1977 of the large-scale adoption of the SS-20 Pioneer mobile missile systems developed by A.D. Nadiradze Design Bureau, the number of deployed complexes with R-12 and R-14 missiles remained relatively constant. On October 27, 1983, Yu.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, announced that all SS-5 (R-14) missiles were decommissioned. So, after the removal of the newer R-14 rocket from service, a certain number of older R-12s still remained in the "service" in the Strategic Missile Forces. By the beginning of the Soviet-American negotiations on the elimination of medium and short-range missiles (INF missiles), R-12s were deployed at the Aluksne, Viru, Gusev, Karmevala, Kolomyia, Malorita, Ostrov, Pinsk, Skala-Podolskaya, Sovetsk, and Stryi bases. After the signing on December 8, 1987 of the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on complete elimination missiles of medium (from 1000 to 5500 km) and shorter (from 500 to 1000 km) range, within three years, starting from June 1, 1988, all similar American and Soviet medium and shorter range missiles were destroyed as a class. Together with the well-known SS-20 Pioneer IRBM, under this agreement, complexes with R-12 missiles were also liquidated, of which by October 1985 there were only 112 units. By the end of 1987, there were only 65 of them, by June 1988 - 60. In June 1989, all P-12s were withdrawn from service. According to the annual bulletin "Soviet military power”(Soviet Military Power) for 1989, “... in April 1988, 52 SS-4 launchers with 170 combat missiles (65 deployed and 105 non-deployed), 142 blank training missiles were in service. The number of missiles dropped sharply from 608 in 1964-1966, although from the end of 1985 to 1987, 112 missiles were deployed on 81 launchers (79 deployed and 2 non-deployed).” At the birth of the R-12 rocket, its creators looked at it with pride, although they predicted that it would quickly disappear from the scene. Even cadets of military schools were told (and there were reasons for that) that by the end of their training, the R-12 would be removed from combat duty and they would serve on the latest missile systems. However, new missiles appeared, but the R-12 systems continued to "guard the Motherland." And only when yesterday's cadets themselves were already finishing their service, the missiles began to be withdrawn from service, and then only because of the INF Treaty. According to the stories of army specialists who participated in the work on the disposal of R-12 missiles, the Soviet and American sides conducted mutual launches in the presence of inspectors. “When the first Soviet rocket, the second, went into the sky, the Americans applauded in admiration. And when the fifth, tenth ones soared into the sky ... and everything was in a timely manner, clearly, moreover, right on target, they stopped applause. The fact is that during the launches of their missiles, failures began almost at the first launches ... ".

June 1989 Meeting of unit veterans on the last day before the destruction of R-12 missiles in accordance with the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of the INF

© O.K. ROSLOV, 1997

December 1989 Officers of the missile unit at the last training camp in the formation of the missile forces near one of the last combat training R-12 IRBMs

The variety of land-based combat ballistic missiles is so great that we will only talk about intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with a range of more than 5,500 kilometers - and only China, Russia and the United States have such (Great Britain and France abandoned land-based ICBMs, placing them only on submarines). But the two main former opponents in the Cold War have had no shortage of ballistics for the past half century.

Ballistic missiles did not appear from scratch - they quickly grew out of the trophy "legacy". The first Allied launches of captured V-2s were carried out by the British in Cuxhaven by German personnel in the autumn of 1945. But it was only a demonstration launch. Then one captured rocket was put on display in Trafalgar Square in London.

And the Department of Arms of the US Department of the Army in the same year gave the task of conducting detailed experiments with captured V-2s. The Americans, who were the first to enter Nordhausen, took out more than 100 ready-made missiles, sets of parts, and equipment. The first launch was carried out at the White Sands test site (New Mexico) on April 16, 1946, the last, 69th, on October 19, 1951. But a much more valuable "trophy" for the Americans was tons of technical documentation and over 490 German specialists, led by von Braun and Dornberger. The latter did everything to get to the Americans, and they were badly needed. The Cold War began, the United States, already having nuclear weapons, was in a hurry to acquire missiles, and its specialists did not make much progress in this matter. In any case, the projects of large missiles MX-770 and MX-774 ended in nothing.

ICBM R-7/R-7A (SS-6 Sapwood). THE USSR. Was in service in 1961-1968.
1. Head part
2. Instrument compartment
3. Oxidizer tanks
4. Tunnel pipe oxidizer pipeline
5. Propulsion engine of the central block
6. Aerodynamic handlebar
7. Marching engine of the side block
8. Central block
9. Side block

What is especially interesting is that former GALCIT employee Qian Xuesen was the first of the American rocket scientists to communicate with von Braun. Later, he will move to China, become the founder of the Chinese rocket and space industry, and start ... by copying the Soviet R-2 and R-5.

Von Braun, who had already proven himself to be an excellent engineer and organizer, became the technical director of the design office at the Redstone arsenal in Huntsville. The backbone of the bureau was made up of its former Peenemünde employees and other specialists. Previously, they were selected according to the "reliability" of the Gestapo, now the Americans - according to the same criteria.

In 1956, the SSM-A-14 Redstone ballistic missile, created under the leadership of von Braun, appeared, in which a number of design solutions of the A-4 were guessed, and a year later - the SM-78 Jupiter with a flight range of up to 2,780 kilometers.

Work on the first "real" ICBMs here and overseas began almost simultaneously. On May 20, 1954, the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the creation of an intercontinental-range ballistic missile was issued (the work was entrusted to the "royal" OKB-1), and in the United States the first contract for the Atlas ICBM was issued to the Conveyor company from the General Dynamics Corporation in January 1955. The status of the highest priority for the program was assigned by Washington a year earlier.

"Seven" (KB Koroleva) went into the sky on August 21, 1957, yet becoming the first ICBM in the world, and on October 4 it launched the world's first satellite into low Earth orbit. However, as a combat missile system, the R-7 turned out to be too bulky, vulnerable, expensive and difficult to operate. The launch preparation time was about 2 hours, and to replenish the oxygen supply to the ICBMs on duty, a whole plant was needed nearby (which made it impossible to use it as a retaliatory weapon).

ICBM RS-20A "Voevoda" (SS-18 Satan). THE USSR. In service since 1975

The American Atlas ICBM successfully flew only in November 1958, but its launch weight was only 120 tons, while the P-7 had 283 tons. This rocket took about 15 minutes to prepare for launch (and it did not need liquid oxygen for refueling).

But gradually the USSR began to close the gap with the Americans. In April 1954, on the basis of the design department of the Southern Machine-Building Plant, an independent Special Design Bureau No. 586 (OKB-586) was formed, headed by M.K. Yangel. Soon, under his leadership, medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) R-12 and R-14 were created - the culprits of the Caribbean crisis, and then the first Soviet ICBM on high-boiling R-16 fuel components. The decision to create it was made on May 13, 1959 and initially provided for the production of only ground launchers (PU). However, later the R-16 underwent a revision of the design and control system (CS) and became the first Soviet ICBM, the launch of which was carried out from a mine launcher (silo). Moreover, the silo of this missile ( rare case) ensured the movement of the rocket along the guides - on the body of the BR, platforms were made for installing yokes that fix its position in the guides.

ICBM R-16/R-16U (SS-7 Saddler). THE USSR. Was in service in 1963-1979.

By the way, if the range of the R-7 did not exceed 8,000 kilometers, then the "Yangel" R-16 could "fly away" already at 13,000 kilometers. At the same time, its starting weight was 130 tons less.

True, the “flying” career of the R-16 nevertheless began with a tragedy: on October 24, 1960, an explosion occurred at Baikonur in preparation for the first rocket launch. As a result, a large number of people who were at the starting position, headed by the chairman of the state commission, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Chief Marshal of Artillery M.I., died. Nedelin.

In 1955, the US Air Force approved the terms of reference for a heavy liquid ICBM with a thermonuclear warhead with a yield of more than 3 megatons; it was designed to defeat large administrative and industrial centers of the USSR. However, the Martin-Marietta company was able to issue an experimental series of HGM-25A Titan-1 missiles for flight tests only in the summer of 1959. The rocket was born "in pain", and most of the first launches were unsuccessful.

ICBM R-36 (SS-9 Scarp). THE USSR. Withdrawn from service

On September 29, 1960, a new ICBM was launched at maximum range with the equivalent of a warhead weighing 550 kilograms. From Cape Canaveral to an area 1,600 kilometers southeast of the island of Madagascar, the rocket traveled 16,000 kilometers. It was a welcome success. Initially, it was supposed to deploy 108 Titan-1 ICBMs, but due to the huge high cost and a number of shortcomings, they limited themselves to half. They served from the beginning of 1960 to April 1965, and they were replaced (until 1987) by more modern heavy two-stage ICBMs LGM-25C "Titan-2" with increased hit accuracy (until the appearance in the USSR of the heavy ICBM R-36 itself the most powerful ICBM in the world was the Titan-2 ICBM).

The time for preparing and conducting a remote launch of the R-36 was about 5 minutes. Moreover, the rocket could already be in a refueled state for a long time using special compensation devices. The R-36 possessed unique combat capabilities and significantly surpassed the American Titan-2, primarily in terms of thermonuclear charge power, firing accuracy and security. We finally “almost” caught up with America.

In 1966, an operation of particular importance was carried out at the Baikonur training ground, codenamed "Palma-2": the leaders of sixteen friendly countries were shown in action three models of the Soviet "weapon of retaliation": missile systems with the Temp-S IRBM ( chief designer HELL. Nadiradze), as well as with the R-36 ICBM (M.K. Yangel) and UR-100 (V.N. Chelomey). The allies were amazed by what they saw and decided to "be friends" with us further, realizing that this "nuclear umbrella" was opened over them as well.

Try, find

With the increase in the accuracy of nuclear missiles and, most importantly, reconnaissance and surveillance equipment, it became clear that any stationary launchers can be relatively quickly detected and destroyed (damaged) during the first nuclear strike. And although the USSR and the USA had submarines, the Soviet Union "uselessly" lost vast expanses of territory. So the idea literally hovered in the air and in the end was framed in a proposal - to create mobile missile systems that can, lost in the vast expanses of their homeland, survive the first enemy strike and strike back.

Work on the first mobile ground-based missile system (PGRK) with the Temp-2S ICBM began with us “semi-underground”: the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (former NII-1), headed by A.D. Nadiradze by that time was subordinated to the Ministry of Defense Industry, "working" for the Ground Forces, and the topic of strategic missiles for the Strategic Missile Forces was given to organizations of the Ministry of General Engineering. But the Minister of Defense Industry Zverev did not want to part with the "major" strategic topic and on April 15, 1965 instructed his subordinates to start developing a mobile complex with ICBMs, "disguising" it as the creation of an "improved complex with a medium-range missile" Temp-S ". Later, the code was changed to "Temp-2S", and on March 6, 1966, they began to work openly, as the corresponding Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued, which "legalized" work on the topic.

Academician Pilyugin said in one of the conversations: “Chelomei and Yangel are arguing over whose rocket is better. And Nadiradze and I are not making a rocket, but a new weapon system. There have been proposals for mobile missiles before, but it is interesting to work with Nadiradze, because he has an integrated approach, which many of our military men lack.” And this was the real truth - they were creating a new "subspecies" of nuclear missile weapons.

The basis of the Temp-2S complex is a three-stage solid-propellant missile with a monoblock warhead with a nuclear charge and a firing range of about 9,000 kilometers. The launch of the rocket could be carried out with the minimum possible duration of pre-launch preparation - from any point on the patrol route, so to speak, "on the move."

Considering that the missile’s firing accuracy was (depending on the range) from 450 to 1,640 meters, this complex was a serious “claim for success” in the war and, if adopted by the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces, would represent a serious threat to NATO, which the West could counter could do nothing.

However, an unpredictable lady named "politics" intervened in the matter - in the form of the SALT-2 Treaty, according to the provisions of which the production and deployment of "Temp-2S" were prohibited. Therefore, the world's first serial PGRK (mobile ground missile system) with ICBMs was Topol (RS-12M / RT-2PM, according to Western classification - SS-25 Sickle), created again by MIT.

In February 1993, the active phase of work began on the modernization program to the Topol-M variant, which in the mine and mobile version of the base will become the basis of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces in the first quarter of the 21st century. Compared to its predecessor, the new RK has more capabilities to overcome existing and future missile defense systems, and is more effective when used against planned and unplanned targets. New rocket after a small additional equipment, it is placed in mine launchers released from RS-18 and RS-20 missiles. At the same time, material-intensive and expensive protective devices, roofs, equipment compartments, and a number of supporting systems are preserved.

"Militia" and "dwarfs"

Perhaps the brightest trace in world missile history was left by the family of American ICBMs "Minuteman" ("Minuteman" - that was once called the soldiers of the people's militia, or militia). They became the first solid-propellant ICBMs in the United States, the first in the world with multiple independently targetable warheads, and the first with a fully autonomous inertial control system. Their further development stopped only after the onset of detente, the cessation of " cold war and the collapse of the USSR.

It is curious that on initial stage it was planned to place part of the ICBMs (from 50 to 150 missiles) on mobile railway platforms. On June 20, 1960, a specially converted experimental train, located at the VVB Hill in Utah, began to run through the western and central parts of the United States. He returned from his last trip on August 27, 1960, and the US Air Force announced "the successful completion of a program to test the concept of a mobile missile system"Minuteman". Thus, the idea of ​​using the railroad to base ICBMs was first born in the USA, but was practically implemented only in the USSR. But the mobile Minuteman was not lucky, the Air Force chose to focus all efforts on mine modification, and on December 7, 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara closed work on the mobile Minuteman.

The continuation of the "popular" family was the Minuteman-IIIG ICBM (LGM-30G). On January 26, 1975, Boeing Aerospace placed the last detachment of these ICBMs on combat duty at the Warren VVB in Wyoming. The most important advantage of this ICBM was the presence of a multiple warhead. From March 31, 2006, the warheads removed from the MX missiles began to be placed on the part of the Minuteman-IIIG ICBMs remaining on combat duty. Moreover, in 2004, the Americans, frightened by the threat of international terrorism, began to study the issue of placing a warhead in conventional, non-nuclear equipment on the Minuteman ICBM.

In the mid-80s of the last century, the US Air Force, who were haunted by Soviet PGRKs, announced their desire to have at their disposal the same systems with light ICBMs that could move at a fairly high speed along highways and dirt roads.

According to the plan of the Americans, in the event of an aggravation of the situation and a threat of a nuclear strike against the United States, the Midgetman PGRK (Midgetman, “dwarf”) with a small-sized and light ICBM was supposed to leave its bases and go to freeways and country roads, “spreading”, as if centipedes, throughout the country. After receiving the command, the car stopped, unloaded the trailer from the launcher to the ground, then the tractor pulled it forward, and thanks to the presence of a special plow-like device, it self-digged, providing additional protection from damaging factors nuclear explosion. A mobile launcher could “get lost” in an area of ​​up to 200 thousand km2 within just 10 minutes, and then, together with the surviving silo-based ICBMs and strategic submarine missile carriers, deliver a retaliatory nuclear strike.

At the end of 1986, Martin-Marietta received a contract to design the MGM-134A Midgetman mobile rocket launcher and assemble the first prototype.

Structurally, the MGM-134A Midgetman ICBM is a three-stage solid-propellant missile. The type of start is "cold": gases under strong pressure ejected the rocket from the TPK, and the ICBM's own engine turned on only when it finally left the "container".

Despite its "dwarf" name, the new ICBM had a completely "not childish" launch range - about 11 thousand kilometers - and carried a thermonuclear warhead with a capacity of 475 kilotons. Unlike the Soviet Temp-2S and Topol complexes, the American PU had a trailer-type chassis: a four-axle tractor vehicle carried a container with one ICBM on a three-axle trailer. In tests, the mobile launcher showed a speed of 48 km / h on rough terrain and 97 km / h on the highway.

However, in 1991, President George W. Bush (senior) announced the cessation of work on mobile launchers - they continued to create only a "mine" version. Initial operational readiness "Midgetman" was supposed to reach in 1997 (originally - 1992), but in January 1992, the program "Midgetman" was closed completely. The only launcher of the Midgetman PGRK was transferred to the Wright-Patterson VVB - for the museum located there, where it is now.

In the Soviet Union, they also created their own "dwarf" - on June 21, 1983, the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued, which instructed MIT to create the Kurier PGRK with a small-sized ICBM. The initiative for its development belonged to the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces V.F. Tolubko.

The ICBM "Courier" in terms of its weight and dimensions was approximately similar to the American missile "Midgetman" and was several times lighter than any of the previous types of Soviet ICBMs.

A.A. Ryazhsky later recalled: “Our work, as always, went after them. The development of this original complex did not go very smoothly. There were many opponents, including in the leadership of the Strategic Missile Forces and, in my opinion, among the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. Some of them took it skeptically - as exotic.

"Kurier" (RSS-40 /SS-X-26) is the first and only domestic small-sized solid-propellant ICBM of a wheeled mobile soil complex. She also became the most "miniature" ICBM in the world.

The complex was unique. It easily fit in the back of a car trailer of the Sovavtotrans type, in any railway wagons, could be transported on barges, and even entered the plane. He, of course, would not have given a clear increase in efficiency, but he could have taken part in a retaliatory strike, since it was almost impossible to detect him.

The draft design was completed in 1984, and full-scale flight tests were to begin in 1992. But they did not take place due to political reasons - within the framework of the START-1 Treaty: further work on the Courier and Midgetman was stopped.

"Satan" vs. "keeper of the world"

The period of the second half of the 70s of the last century became a special drama in the history of the development of land-based ICBMs. It was then that the evolution of these missiles reached almost its climax. As a result, the two superpowers have created real "planet shakers" that, in the event of a volley, can wipe out not only cities, but entire countries from the face of the Earth. And only thanks to the efforts of the leadership of the United States and the USSR, the powerful roar of "nuclear monsters" did not herald the onset of the "doomsday of mankind."

We are talking here about heavy ICBMs with a multiple reentry vehicle with individually targetable warheads. The first ICBMs of this class were again created by the Americans. The reason for their development was the rapid growth of the "quality" and accuracy of Soviet ICBMs. At the same time, a heated debate unfolded in Washington about the future of silo-based missile defense systems in general - many generals expressed concern about their vulnerability to new Soviet ICBMs.

As a result, a program was launched to develop a promising missile - the “X missile”. The original - "Missile-X" was then transformed into "M-X", and we already know this rocket as "MX". Although its official designation is LGM-118A "Peacekeeper" (Peacekeeper, translated from English - "Keeper of the World"). The main requirements for the new ICBM were as follows: increased range, high accuracy, the presence of an MIRV with the ability to change its power, as well as the presence of a mine with a high degree of protection. However, Ronald Reagan, who replaced Carter in the presidency, wishing to accelerate the deployment of MX ICBMs, on October 2, 1981, canceled the development of "super shelters" and decided to place missiles in mines from the Minuteman or Titan.

A) ICBM LGM-118A "Peskyper" (MX). USA. In service from 1986 to 2005. The cost of one ICBM is $ 70 million
B) ICBM MGM-134A "Midgetman". USA
C) ICBM LGM-30G "Minuteman-IIIG". USA. Is in service. Production ended December 1978
D) Heavy ICBM LGM-25C "Titan-2". USA. Was in service in 1963-1987.

June 17, 1983 "Keeper of the World" for the first time soared into the sky from the VVB "Vandenberg". Having traveled 6,704 kilometers, the missile "scattered" six unloaded warheads on targets within the Kwajalein range.

For the first time, the Americans managed to implement the “mortar launch” method in a heavy ICBM: the rocket was placed in the TPK installed in the mine, and the solid fuel gas generator (located in the lower part of the TPK) when triggered, threw the rocket to a height of 30 meters from the level of the silo protective device, and only then turned on propulsion engine of the first stage. In addition to the mine version, it was also planned to place 50 railway-based MX in 25 “rocket trains” with two ICBMs each; even in the START-1 Treaty, the MX missile was already registered as "mobile-based".

However, then came the "detente" and the program was "covered" - in September 1991, President George W. Bush announced the cessation of work on the railway MX (later the deployment of the silo-based MX was also stopped). The Americans chose to "forget" about their " rocket train”, which has already spent about $ 400 million, in exchange for Moscow's promise to reduce the number of its “wonder weapons”, heavy ICBMs, among which the RS-20, nicknamed “Satan” in the West for its power, has received the most fame.

Despite the shortcomings and high cost of construction, mines still remained the dominant type of basing for ICBMs in the world. In the 1970s, the third-generation Soviet ICBMs RS-16 (SS-17 Spanker), RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) and RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) were born one after another. The RS-16 and RS-20 missiles and complexes based on them were developed, as it is now fashionable to say, by a “consortium” headed by the Yuzhnoye design bureau (M.K. Yangel was replaced by V.F. Utkin), and the RS-18 was created by the bureau V.N. Chelomey. All of them were two-stage liquid BR with a sequential arrangement of stages and for the first time in domestic practice were equipped with a split warhead.

The systems with these missiles were put into service in the USSR in the period 1975-1981, but then they were modernized. Moreover, it was thanks to these "monsters" that the USSR managed to achieve reliable parity with the United States in terms of the number of warheads on combat duty: by 1991, the Strategic Missile Forces had 47 RS-16A / B type ICBMs, 300 - RS-18A / B type and 308 - RS type -20A / B / V, the number of warheads ready for action on which exceeded 5,000.

When, in the course of preparing for the signing of the START-2 Treaty, we presented the Americans with data on the total mass of these missiles, they simply fell into a stupor. It amounted to 4135.25 tons! For comparison, the entire ground grouping of ICBMs among the Americans was only 1132.5 tons. Even if Russia had simply blown them up over the North Pole, mankind would have shuddered from the nuclear Apocalypse.

The Yankees were especially frightened by our Satan, which had a MIRV with 10 warheads and a throwable weight of 7.2 (RS-20A) or 8.8 (RS-20B / V) tons.

The RS-20A was developed on the basis of the solutions of the "Yangel" R-36, but was significantly modified. The most advanced modification was the RS-20V, the high combat effectiveness of which is ensured by the increased resistance of the missile in flight to damaging factors nuclear explosion and hit accuracy. The missile also received more advanced means of overcoming missile defense.

Information about the creation by the Americans of a new generation of MX ICBMs so excited the Soviet leadership that it initiated the development of several new ICBMs and accelerated work on a number of projects already underway. Thus, Yuzhnoye Design Bureau was supposed to create a powerful ICBM, while at the same time not going beyond the limits of the signed agreements.

After a preliminary assessment, it was decided to create a rocket on solid fuel. It was instructed to create three options: railway, mobile unpaved "Tselina-2" (almost immediately canceled) and mine. Flight design tests of the RS-22V ICBM (RT-23UTTKh) for the combat railway missile system (BZHRK) began at the Plesetsk training ground on February 27, 1985 and ended on December 22, 1987.

Flight design tests of the missile for silos began on July 31, 1986 and were successfully completed on September 23, 1987. In our country, the rocket was called "Good job", and in the West it was given the designation SS-24 Scalpel ("Scalpel").

The first train was put into trial operation in Kostroma, and later three dozen more ICBMs of this type were deployed. "On vacation" the trains were in stationary structures at a distance of about 4 kilometers from each other. As for silo missiles, from August 19, 1988, the first missile regiment took up combat duty, and until July 1991, the entire Strategic Missile Forces received 56 mines with ICBMs. Moreover, only 10 of them were located on the territory of the RSFSR, and after the collapse of the USSR, only they remained with Russia. The remaining 46 ended up on the territory of Ukraine and were liquidated due to the latter's announcement of its non-nuclear status.

This rocket also launches in a “mortar” way, tilts in the air with the help of a powder charge, and only then the main engine is started. Shooting could be carried out from anywhere on the patrol route, including from electrified railways. In the latter case, special devices for shorting and tapping the contact network were used.

"Molodets" was equipped with 10 warheads with a capacity of 500 (550) kilotons. The breeding stage was made according to the standard scheme, and the head part was covered with a variable geometry fairing.

Each "special train" was equated to a missile regiment and included three M62 diesel locomotives, three seemingly ordinary railway refrigerated cars ( hallmark- eight wheelsets), a command car, cars with autonomous power supply and life support systems and for accommodating personnel on duty. In total - 12 wagons. Each of the "refrigerators" could launch a rocket both as part of a train and offline. Today, one such car can be seen in the Museum of the Ministry of Railways in St. Petersburg.

Those who served in such "armored trains" recall that often the train with the inscription on the cars "For the transport of light goods" after passing so spoiled the path that then it had to be thoroughly repaired. I wonder if the railroad workers had any idea what kind of “monster” was driving around here at night?

Maybe they guessed, but kept quiet. But the fact that it was thanks to these special trains that the Ministry of Railways was forced to reconstruct many thousands of kilometers of railway lines throughout the country in a fairly short time is the absolute truth. So "Well done" on wheels not only increased the country's defense capability, but also assisted in the development National economy, increasing the reliability and service life of part of the railway lines.

Scheme of the flight of ICBMs RS-22

Orbital warheads

After October 4, 1957, the world's first artificial satellite was launched into low-Earth orbit by a Soviet launch vehicle (in fact, the R-7 combat missile), the leading American media burst into a wave of publications, the main core of which was a very fantastic at that time threat of the appearance of soon in Earth orbits a huge swarm of Soviet "orbital warheads". To combat them, the United States even began to create a multi-layered anti-missile and anti-satellite defense system consisting of interceptor missiles, anti-satellite missiles, satellites - orbital inspectors and combat satellites, the so-called "space fighters". And already in 1959, the Americans made at least two attempts to shoot down satellites in near-Earth orbit.

Fear, as they say, has big eyes. But who would have thought then that science fiction in the near future, through the efforts of Soviet designers, would become a reality and the most “deadly threat” for the United States and NATO.

In the mid-60s of the last century, the idea of ​​creating some kind of “global missile” and “orbital warhead” began to be worked out in the USSR. The latter provided for partial orbital bombardment of objects on enemy territory: nuclear warhead on a launch vehicle (ICBM) it is launched into space, into near-Earth orbit, and there it turns into a kind of artificial mini-satellite, which is waiting for a command to attack. Having received one, the “orbital warhead” turned on the engine and left orbit, starting a dive towards its assigned target. It was almost impossible to intercept such a "cunning" warhead.

The program for creating an “orbital warhead” reached its peak on November 19, 1968, when the R-36orb ICBM entered service with the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces. Its test was successful and "in full" carried out on December 16, 1965, the rocket launched from Baikonur and did everything it was supposed to. Well, except that the warheads did not fall on the territory of the United States. The program for the creation of the "Global Rocket" (GR-1) was closed for technical reasons, as well as the project of the R-46 rocket.

R-36orb provided the launch of the warhead into orbit artificial satellite Earth orbital warhead (ORB) and its descent from orbit to a target that is beyond the reach of ICBMs or from directions not protected by enemy missile defense systems.

In the United States, the Russian OGCh received the designation FOBS - Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (partial orbital bombardment system).

Stopped Russian engineers only signed in 1968 with the approval of the UN well-known Treaty on Outer Space. According to it, the USSR and the USA pledged not to place weapons of mass destruction in outer space. And the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Arms (SALT-2) already "black and white" forbade the presence or development of such complexes. By 1984, the R-36orb were finally withdrawn from the mines.

Well, what could actually happen if the two superpowers did not sign an agreement on peaceful space, anyone can see by watching the American adventure film "Space Cowboys" with Clint Eastwood in one of the main roles. There, of course, a combat missile-carrying satellite is shown, and not "orbital warheads." But still…

wonder weapon

Having closed the topic of "orbital warheads", the Soviet military switched to conventional warheads - ideas arose about how to make them more accurate and less vulnerable to by American means PRO.

For a long time these works were shrouded in the darkness of mystery and speculation. Therefore, the statement made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 18, 2004 at a press conference in Plesetsk on the occasion of the completion of the large-scale exercise "Safety 2004" sounded like a bolt from the blue and plunged our Western "partners" into a state described in medicine as shock.

The fact is that Putin uttered an unexpected phrase: they say, over time, the Russian Armed Forces will receive “the latest technical complexes, which are able to hit targets at intercontinental depths with hypersonic speed, high accuracy and the possibility of deep maneuvering in altitude and course. And then he added, as if he had made a “control shot in the head”: there are no random words in his message, each of them matters!

Only later, the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Yuri Baluyevsky, reported that two ICBMs, Topol-M and RS-18, had been launched during the exercise. It was on the latter that the “experimental apparatus” stood, which “can bypass regional systems ABM, bypass certain means that can control it, and, by and large, the device can solve the problem of overcoming missile defense systems, including promising ones.

It turns out that instead of a typical warhead that flies along an unchanging ballistic trajectory, we create a kind of device that can change both direction and flight altitude. According to our military leaders, such a system will be put into service before 2010.

Most likely, such a device is equipped with ramjet engines of a special design, which allow the warhead to maneuver in the atmosphere at hypersonic speeds. In the words of the head of our state, these are very "serious complexes that are not a response to the missile defense system, but for which it is indifferent whether there is a missile defense system or not."

So, ICBMs not only do not go into reserve or retire, but, on the contrary, they continue to improve, gain a “second youth”.

Vladimir Shcherbakov | Illustrations by Mikhail Dmitriev

The content of the article

ROCKET WEAPONS, guided missiles and missiles - unmanned weapons, the trajectories of which from the starting point to the target being struck are implemented using rocket or jet engines and guidance means. Missiles usually have the latest electronic equipment and are manufactured using the most advanced technology.

Historical reference.

Already in the 14th century. missiles were used in China for military purposes. However, it was only in the 1920s and 1930s that technologies appeared that made it possible to equip a rocket with instruments and controls capable of guiding it from the starting point to the target. First of all, gyroscopes and electronic equipment made it possible to do this.

The Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, stripped Germany of its most important weapons and forbade it from rearming. However, missiles were not mentioned in this agreement, since their development was considered unpromising. As a result, the German military department showed interest in missiles and guided missiles, which opened a new era in the field of weapons. Ultimately, it turned out that Nazi Germany was developing 138 projects for guided projectiles of various types. The most famous of these are two types of "retaliatory weapons": the V-1 cruise missile and the V-2 ballistic missile with an inertial guidance system. They inflicted heavy damage on Britain and Allied forces during World War II.

TECHNICAL FEATURES

There are many different types of combat missiles, but each of them is characterized by the use of the latest technologies in the field of control and guidance, engines, warheads, electronic jamming, etc.

Guidance.

If the missile is launched and does not lose stability in flight, it is still necessary to bring it to the target. Developed Various types guidance systems.

inertial guidance.

For the first ballistic missiles, it was considered acceptable if the inertial system brought the missile to a point located several kilometers from the target: with a payload in the form of a nuclear charge, the destruction of the target in this case is quite possible. However, this forced both sides to additionally protect the most important objects by placing them in shelters or concrete shafts. In turn, rocket designers have improved inertial guidance systems, ensuring the correction of the rocket trajectory by means of astronavigation and tracking the earth's horizon. Advances in gyroscopy also played a significant role. By the 1980s, ICBM guidance errors were less than 1 km.

Homing.

Most missiles carrying conventional explosives require some sort of homing system. With active homing, the missile is equipped with its own radar and electronic equipment that guides it to a meeting with the target.

With semi-active homing, the target is irradiated by a radar located on or near the launch pad. The missile is guided by a signal reflected from the target. Semi-active homing saves a lot of expensive equipment on the launch pad, but gives the operator control over target selection.

Laser designators, which have been used since the early 1970s, proved to be highly effective in the Vietnam War: they reduced the time during which the aircrew remained exposed to enemy fire and the number of missiles needed to hit the target. The guidance system of such a missile does not actually perceive any radiation other than that emitted by the laser. Since the scattering of the laser beam is small, it can irradiate an area that does not exceed the dimensions of the target.

Passive homing is reduced to detecting radiation that is emitted or reflected by the target, and then calculating the course that brings the missile to the target. These can be radar signals emitted by enemy air defense systems, light and thermal radiation from the engines of an aircraft or other object.

Communication by wire and fiber optic communication.

The commonly used control technique is based on a wired or fiber optic link between the missile and the launch platform. Such a connection reduces the cost of the rocket, since the most expensive components remain in the launch complex and can be reused. The rocket retains only a small control unit, which is necessary to ensure the stability of the initial movement of the rocket launched from the launcher.

Engines.

The movement of combat missiles is provided, as a rule, by solid propellant rocket engines (RDTT); some rockets use liquid propellants, while jet engines are preferred for cruise missiles. The rocket engine is autonomous, and its operation is not connected with the intake of air from the outside (like the operation of piston or jet engines). The fuel and solid fuel oxidizer are crushed to a powder and mixed with a liquid binder. The mixture is poured into the engine housing and cured. After that, no preparations are needed to bring the engine into action in combat conditions. Although most tactical guided missiles operate in the atmosphere, they are propelled by rockets rather than jets because solid rocket motors are quicker to launch, have few moving parts, and are more energy efficient. Jet engines are used in guided projectiles with a long active flight time, when the use of atmospheric air gives a significant gain. Liquid propellant rocket engines (LPREs) were widely used in the 1950s–1960s.

Improvement in the technology of manufacturing solid propellant has made it possible to begin the production of solid propellant rocket engines with controlled combustion characteristics, excluding the formation of cracks in the charge, which could lead to an accident. Rocket engines, especially solid propellant engines, age as their constituent substances gradually enter into chemical bonds and change composition, so control fire tests should be carried out periodically. If the accepted expiration date of any of the test samples is not confirmed, the entire lot is replaced.

Warhead.

With fragmentation warheads, metal fragments (usually thousands of steel or tungsten cubes) are sent at the target at the time of the explosion. Such shrapnel is most effective at hitting aircraft, communications equipment, air defense radars and people who are out of cover. The warhead is triggered by a fuse that detonates on impact or at some distance from the target. In the latter case, with the so-called non-contact initiation, the fuse is triggered when the signal from the target (a reflected radar beam, thermal radiation, or a signal from small onboard lasers or photosensitive sensors) reaches a certain threshold.

To destroy tanks and armored vehicles sheltering soldiers, shaped charges are used to ensure the self-organizing formation of the directed movement of warhead fragments.

Achievements in the field of guidance systems have allowed designers to create kinetic weapons - missiles, the striking effect of which is determined by an extremely high speed of movement, which, upon impact, leads to the release of enormous kinetic energy. Such missiles are commonly used for missile defense.

Electronic interference.

The use of combat missiles is closely related to the creation of electronic interference and means of combating them. The purpose of such jamming is to create signals or noise that will "trick" the missile into following the decoy. Early methods of creating electronic interference were to eject strips of aluminum foil. On locator screens, the presence of ribbons turns into a visual display of noise. Modern systems electronic jammers analyze received radar signals and transmit false ones to mislead the enemy, or simply generate radio frequency interference sufficient to jam the enemy system. Computers have become an important part of military electronics. Non-electronic interference includes the creation of flashes, i.e. decoys for enemy heat-seeking missiles, as well as specially designed jet turbines that mix atmospheric air with exhaust gases to reduce the infrared "visibility" of the aircraft.

Electronic interference suppression systems use techniques such as changing operating frequencies and the use of polarized electromagnetic waves.

Early assembly and testing.

The requirement for minimal maintenance and high readiness of missile weapons led to the development of the so-called. "certified" missiles. The assembled and tested missiles are sealed at the factory in a container and then delivered to the warehouse, where they are stored until they are requested by military units. At the same time, assembly in the field (practiced for the first missiles) becomes redundant, and electronic equipment does not require inspection and troubleshooting.

TYPES OF BATTLE ROCKETS

Ballistic missiles.

Ballistic missiles are designed to transport thermonuclear charges to the target. They can be classified as follows: 1) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with a range of 5,600–24,000 km; 2) intermediate-range (above average) missiles of 2,400–5,600 km; 9200 km), launched from submarines, 4) medium-range missiles (800-2400 km). Intercontinental and naval missiles, together with strategic bombers, form the so-called. "nuclear triad".

A ballistic missile spends only a matter of minutes moving its warhead along a parabolic trajectory ending at the target. Most of the time the warhead moves is spent flying and descending through outer space. Heavy ballistic missiles usually carry several individually targetable warheads directed at the same target or having "their" targets (usually within a radius of several hundred kilometers from the main target). To ensure the desired aerodynamic characteristics, the warhead is given a lenticular or conical shape when entering the atmosphere. The device is equipped with a heat-shielding coating, which sublimates, passing from a solid state immediately into a gaseous one, and thereby ensures the removal of heat from aerodynamic heating. The warhead is equipped with a small navigation system of its own to compensate for the inevitable trajectory deviations that can change the rendezvous point.

V-2.

The first successful flight of the V-2 took place in October 1942. In total, more than 5,700 of these rockets were manufactured. 85% of them successfully launched, but only 20% hit the target, while the rest exploded on approach. 1259 missiles hit London and its environs. However, the Belgian port of Antwerp suffered the most.

Ballistic missiles with an above-average range.

As part of a large-scale research program using German missile specialists and V-2 rockets captured in the defeat of Germany, US Army specialists designed and tested short-range Corporal and medium-range Redstone missiles. The Corporal rocket was soon replaced by the solid-propellant Sargent, and the Redstone was replaced by the Jupiter, a larger liquid-fueled rocket with an above-average range.

ICBM.

The development of ICBMs in the United States began in 1947. The Atlas, the first US ICBM, entered service in 1960.

The Soviet Union around this time began to develop larger missiles. His "Sapwood" (SS-6), the world's first intercontinental rocket, became a reality after the launch of the first satellite (1957).

The US rockets Atlas and Titan-1 (the latter was put into service in 1962), like the Soviet SS-6, used cryogenic liquid fuel, and therefore the time of their preparation for launch was measured in hours. "Atlas" and "Titan-1" were originally placed in high-strength hangars and only before launch were brought to combat state. However, after some time, the Titan-2 rocket appeared, located in a concrete shaft and having an underground control center. "Titan-2" worked on self-igniting liquid fuel of long storage. In 1962, the Minuteman, a three-stage solid-propellant ICBM, entered service, delivering a single 1 Mt charge to a target 13,000 km away.