Today, as it was half a century ago, this agency, subordinate to the Pentagon, is responsible for maintaining the world's technological superiority. armed forces USA. Among the concerns of DARPA is the development of new technologies for use in the armed forces.

In February 2013, the agency's specialists began to actively prepare for a nuclear war. Was project launched on protection against radiation damage, including with the help of techniques that directly affect human DNA. We are talking about new methods of treatment, devices and systems that can mitigate the effects of radiation exposure. The main goal of the agency's project is to develop technologies that will radically reduce the susceptibility of the human body to high doses of radiation. Those who are treated with the latest technology have a high chance of survival.

Today, the efforts of scientists are directed in three directions: a) prevention and treatment after exposure to radiation; b) decrease in level negative consequences and prevention lethal outcome and development of oncological complications; c) modeling the impact of radiation on the human body through research at the molecular and systemic levels.

The agency took up a new project because the level of nuclear threat did not decrease. Today, any country may face the threat of nuclear terrorism, a catastrophe at a nuclear power plant or a local conflict with the use of nuclear weapons.

This project, of course, did not come out of nowhere. It is known that Barack Obama positions himself as a peacemaker. Atomic bombs, like Truman, he did not drop on foreign countries. And in general, he constantly talks about reductions in nuclear arsenals - not only Russian, but also native, American.

It was his peacemaking that reached the point where very influential misters turned to him with a written petition, in which they tearfully asked not to reduce the nuclear weapons of the long-suffering homeland of the Republicans and Democrats.

The appeal to the president was signed by 18 people: former CIA director James Woolsey, former US representative to the UN John Bolton, former corps commander marines General Carl Mundy and others. International Analyst Kirill Belyaninov ("Kommersant" ) believes that such an appeal was a confirmation that the White House is indeed working on plans to reduce nuclear arsenals.

According to some secret report, among the authors of which are individuals from the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, intelligence services and the US strategic command (in a word, a complete military secret set), the number of nuclear warheads in service with the country today "far exceeds the number needed to ensure nuclear deterrence", while in modern conditions an arsenal of 1-1.1 thousand warheads is quite enough. But a group of influential politicians who, of course, know these data, still demand that Obama abandon the "rash step."

What were the 18 misters afraid of?

The authors of the petition are confident that "the growing cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran" can lead to "catastrophic changes." And the aspirations of Iran and North Korea can be restrained by "the American nuclear triad, which guarantees strategic stability," and only that, and nothing else.

The signatories of the document believe that the threshold set by the new START treaty is critical: by 2018, the Russian Federation and the United States must leave no more than 1,550 warheads on combat duty.

However, the Obama administration intends to continue talks with Moscow to reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons.

The concern of eighteen people is based more on the interests of the US military-industrial complex than on the real situation. What "catastrophic changes" can Iran cause in the world? It is absurd to assume that gentlemen American politicians and military men, who signed the letter to their president, were frightened by Ahmadinejad's recent words that Iran is a "nuclear power." Or is 1550 warheads not enough to defeat the DPRK?

The reduction in stockpiles of nuclear weapons, which Obama is sure to enforce this time, is by no means a "debriefing" Nobel Prize peace. The President of the United States is facing the fact of the collapse of the national economy: a huge public debt is also complemented by a large budget deficit, the issue of which is being solved through sequestration, cuts, layoffs, cuts in military programs and an extremely unpopular tax increase among any class of the population. Reducing nuclear stockpiles is a road to savings: after all, maintaining arsenals costs a lot of money.

Tom Vanden Brook (USA Today) ) recalls that the US military budget will be reduced by $ 500 billion over 10 years through sequestration - the so-called "automatic reduction". The Pentagon assumes that before the end of the current fiscal year (September 30), it will have to "cut off" spending by $46 billion. former minister Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said the cuts would make America a minor military power.

The cuts will also affect military contractors. For example, the economic losses of Texas will amount to a gigantic sum of $2.4 billion. A whole army of civil servants - 30,000 people - will lose their jobs. Their personal financial loss in earnings will be $180 million.

In terms of maintenance, those states with large warehouses will suffer here, as they will be closed in the coming months due to upcoming budget cuts. Pennsylvania, for example, has two main maintenance depots where complex weapon systems are upgraded, including, for example, the Patriot. Texas and Alabama will be hit hard. The closure of the depot here will stop the repair of weapons, communication devices and Vehicle. The reduction in the flow of orders will affect 3,000 companies. Another 1,100 companies will face the threat of bankruptcy.

The latest data on the estimated losses of contractors directly for nuclear services are not yet available. But that they will be is beyond doubt. Obama will look for any reserves in order to cut budget spending.

As for calls to Russia, everything is clear here: to reduce atomic weapon alone, America is somehow not out of hand. That's why we started talking about negotiations with the Russians. Moreover, Obama swung at a large reduction: either by a third, or by half. However, these are only rumors, albeit coming from the United States.

Vladimir Kozin ("Red Star") recalls what about information on further reductions in strategic offensive arms official representative The White House's Jay Carney said he doesn't expect more announcements about this in the next presidential address to Congress. Indeed, in his message on February 13, the American president only indicated Washington's readiness to involve Russia in the reduction of "nuclear weapons", without specifying any quantitative parameters. Nevertheless, the fact remains: the reduction is planned. Another thing is how and in what ways.

V. Kozin believes that the United States “still intends to follow the path of selective reduction of nuclear weapons, focusing only on the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons. But at the same time, they completely exclude from the negotiation process such important types of non-nuclear weapons as anti-missile systems, anti-satellite weapons and high-precision means of delivering a "lightning strike" at any point. the globe... "According to the analyst, the United States" is trying to obscure its far-reaching plans for the deployment of forward-based means in the form of tactical nuclear weapons and missile defense, destabilizing the global military-political situation and undermining the fragile military- strategic parity between Moscow and Washington, which has been established over the course of several decades.”

That is, nuclear weapons will be reduced selectively, and in parallel, the European missile defense system will be created, and the first will serve as a distraction for the second. And at the same time, it will probably free up money for this very second one. With budgetary sequestration, this is a very hot topic.

It is useless to accuse Americans of slyness or double standards: politics is politics. Sergey Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Founder of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Chairman of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs magazine, speaks that "the idea of ​​freeing the world from nuclear weapons is slowly fading away."

“Moreover,” he continues, “if we trace the dynamics of the views of such famous people like Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, Sam Nunn and William Perry, who played a role in launching the idea of ​​nuclear zero, you will find that these famous four in the second article, published two years after their first article, already talked about the reduction and even the destruction of nuclear weapons as a good goal, but really required an increase in efficiency and strengthening of the existing US military nuclear complex. They realized that the United States of America could not ensure its security without nuclear weapons. Understanding perfectly well this whole situation, our leadership, both Putin and Medvedev, announced without batting an eyelid that they are also in favor of complete nuclear disarmament. To say otherwise would be to admit to bloodlust. But at the same time, we are building up and modernizing our nuclear potential.”

“Once I studied the history of the arms race, and since then I sincerely believe that nuclear weapons are something sent to us by the Almighty in order to save humanity. Because, otherwise, if there were no nuclear weapons, the deepest ideological and military-political confrontation in the history of mankind, the Cold War, would have ended with World War III.

Russians should be thankful for their current sense of security, says Karaganov, Sakharov, Korolev, Kurchatov and their associates.

Let's go back to the USA. Under the 2010 nuclear doctrine, America retained the right to launch a nuclear strike first. True, it narrowed down the list of situations that lead to such use of the nuclear arsenal. In 2010, Obama announced the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against states that do not possess such weapons - on one condition: these countries must comply with the nonproliferation regime. Also in the strategic document it was stated: "... the United States is not ready to pursue a policy according to which the deterrence of a nuclear strike is the only goal of nuclear weapons." This speaks of a possible preventive use of nuclear weapons, albeit with the reservations cited above.

And during the cold war”, and after its conditional end, the United States and NATO did not rule out the option of using nuclear weapons against their opponents - moreover, using them first. The 2010 doctrine narrowed the list, but did not change the right of application.

Meanwhile, China almost half a century ago announced on a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. Then India took the same position. Even North Korea— and she takes a similar position. One of the main objections to adopting the no-first-use doctrine, writes the American Foreign Policy magazine, is that the enemy can "act dishonestly" and strike first. However, there is no answer to the simple question of retribution. Why would an enemy arrange a nuclear catastrophe for himself? After all, the threat of guaranteed retaliatory destruction remains a very strong deterrent.

One can, of course, call Obama's policy logical. The same doctrine of 2010 was adopted at a time of growing concerns about terrorism. Well, if nuclear bombs fall into the hands of terrorists? President of the United States in 2010 said : “The Concept recognizes that the greatest threat to the United States and global security is no longer nuclear war between states, but nuclear terrorism carried out by extremists and the process of nuclear proliferation…”

Therefore, the current proposed reduction in nuclear arsenals is logically combined with the "taming" of what was called 3 years ago "the greatest threat to the United States and global security." The fewer nuclear weapons, as Foreign Policy magazine rightly notes, the less likely they are to fall into the hands of terrorists.

To create a perfectly clear logical picture, the White House lacks only one point. By declaring its right to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the United States is likening its artificially nurtured enemy, Al-Qaeda. The latter does not declare nuclear rights for obvious reasons. But, for even more understandable reasons, in case of "need" and with the appropriate opportunity, it will be the first to explode (it is not necessarily about a bomb: there is also a nuclear power plant). The right to the first, albeit "preventive", nuclear strike puts America precisely in the ranks of those who threaten the world. Like Al Qaeda.

On May 26, 1972, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed agreements to limit strategic weapons(OSV). In connection with the anniversary of this event, the newspaper Le Figaro brings to your attention an overview of the main Russian-American bilateral agreements.

Disarmament or limiting the buildup of strategic arms? The policy of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War led to a frenzied arms race between the two superpowers that could have led to disaster. That is why 45 years ago the US and the USSR signed the first strategic arms reduction treaty.

Treaty 1: the first bilateral arms reduction agreement

On May 26, 1972, US President Richard Nixon and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev signed an agreement on the limitation of strategic arms. The signing took place in front of television cameras in the Vladimir Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow. This event was the result of negotiations that began in November 1969.

The treaty limited the number ballistic missiles and launchers, their location and composition. An addendum to the treaty in 1974 reduced the number of missile defense areas deployed by each side to one. However, one of the clauses of the agreement allowed the parties to terminate the agreement unilaterally. This is exactly what the United States did in 2001 in order to start deploying a missile defense system on its territory after 2004-2005. The final date for US withdrawal from this agreement was June 13, 2002.

The 1972 treaty includes a 20-year temporary agreement that bans the production of land-based ICBM launchers and limits submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers. Also, according to this agreement, the parties undertake to continue active and comprehensive negotiations.

This "historic" agreement was to be especially helpful in restoring the balance of the forces of deterrence. And this does not apply to the production of offensive weapons and restrictions on the number of warheads and strategic bombers. The striking forces of both countries are still very large. First of all, this treaty allows both countries to moderate costs while maintaining the ability of mass destruction. This prompted André Frossard to write in a newspaper on May 29, 1972: “To be able to arrange about 27 ends of the world - I don't know the exact number - gives them a fair sense of security and allows them to spare us many additional ways of destruction. For this we need to thank their good heart.”

Treaty 2: easing tensions between the two countries

After 6 years of negotiations, a new treaty between the USSR and the USA on the limitation of strategic offensive arms was signed by American President Jimmy Carter and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. This complex document includes 19 articles, 43 pages of definitions, 3 pages listing the stockpiles of military arsenals of the two countries, 3 pages of a protocol that will enter into force in 1981 and, finally, a declaration of principles that will form the basis of negotiations on SALT-3 .

The treaty limited the number of strategic nuclear weapons of both countries. After the signing of the treaty, Jimmy Carter stated in his speech: "These negotiations, which have been going on continuously for ten years now, give rise to the feeling that nuclear competition, if it is not limited by common rules and restrictions, can only lead to disaster." At the same time, the American president clarified that "this treaty does not take away the need for both countries to maintain their military power." But this treaty was never ratified by the United States due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles

On December 8, 1987 in Washington, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan signed the indefinite Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which came into force in May 1988. This "historic" treaty for the first time provided for the elimination of armaments. It was about medium and short-range missiles with a range of 500 to 5.5 thousand km. They represented from 3 to 4% of the entire arsenal. In accordance with the agreement, the parties, during three years from the moment it came into force, were to destroy all medium and short-range missiles. The treaty also provided for procedures for mutual inspections "on the spot".

During the signing of the treaty, Reagan emphasized: "For the first time in history, we have moved from a discussion of arms control to a discussion of their reduction." Both presidents have been particularly pushful of cutting 50% of their strategic arsenals. They focused on the future START treaty, the signing of which was originally scheduled for the spring of 1988.

START-1: the beginning of real disarmament

On July 31, 1991, US President George W. Bush and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Moscow. This agreement was the first real reduction in the strategic arsenals of the two superpowers. According to its terms, the countries had to reduce the number of the most dangerous species weapons: intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles.

The number of warheads was to be reduced to 7,000 for the USSR and 9,000 for the United States. A privileged position in the new arsenal was assigned to bombers: the number of bombs was to increase from 2.5 to 4 thousand for the United States and from 450 to 2.2 thousand for the USSR. In addition, the treaty provided for various control measures and finally entered into force in 1994. According to Gorbachev, it was a blow to the "infrastructure of fear."

START II: radical cuts

Context

End of the INF Treaty?

Is the INF Treaty dead?

START-3 and Russia's nuclear breakthrough

US to discuss nuclear disarmament with Russia

Another important point was spelled out in the agreement: the elimination of missiles with multiple warheads. Russia has abandoned precision weapons, which formed the basis of its deterrence force, while the US removed half of the missiles installed on submarines (virtually undetectable). START II was ratified by the US in 1996 and by Russia in 2000.

Boris Yeltsin saw him as a source of hope, and George W. Bush saw him as a symbol of "the end of the Cold War" and "a better future free from fear for our parents and children." Be that as it may, the reality is not so idyllic: both countries can still destroy the entire planet several times.

SNP: Point in the Cold War

On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SOR) in the Kremlin. It was about reducing the arsenals by two-thirds in ten years.

However, this small bilateral agreement (five short articles) was not precise and did not contain any screening measures. Its role in terms of the image of the parties was more important than its content: it was not the first time that the reduction was discussed. Be that as it may, it nevertheless became a turning point, the end of military-strategic parity: lacking the economic capabilities necessary for this, Russia abandoned its claims to the status of a superpower. In addition, the treaty opened the door to " new era because it was accompanied by a statement about a “new strategic partnership”. The United States relied on conventional military forces and understood the uselessness of most of its nuclear arsenal. Bush noted that the signing of the SNP allows to get rid of the "legacy of the Cold War" and hostility between the two countries.

START-3: protection of national interests

On April 8, 2010, US President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev signed another agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive arms (START-3) in the Spanish drawing room of the Prague castle. It was intended to fill the legal vacuum that arose after START I expired in December 2009. According to it, a new ceiling was set for the nuclear arsenals of the two countries: reduction of nuclear warheads to 1.55 thousand units, intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles submarines and heavy bombers - up to 700 units.

In addition, the agreement provides for verification of the figures by a joint team of inspectors seven years after its entry into force. It is worth noting here that the installed slats are not too different from those that were indicated in 2002. It also does not talk about tactical nuclear weapons, thousands of deactivated warheads in warehouses and bombs. strategic aviation. The US Senate ratified it in 2010.

START-3 was the last Russian-American agreement in the field of nuclear weapons control. Days after taking office in January 2017, US President Donald Trump announced that he would offer Vladimir Putin the lifting of sanctions on Russia (imposed in response to the annexation of Crimea) in exchange for a treaty to reduce nuclear weapons. According to the latest data from the US State Department, the US has 1,367 warheads (bombers and missiles), while the Russian arsenal reaches 1,096.

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.

July 31, 1991 Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev And US President George W. Bush The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1) was signed. Despite the considerable efforts that have been made by the countries in this direction, the problem of mutual nuclear threat has not yet been resolved and is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. According to Russian military experts, this is due to the actions of the United States, which are pushing the world towards a new arms race.

On the brink of war

The nuclear race between the USSR and the USA has become a true attribute of the Cold War, which began in the late 50s. The world powers fiercely competed in military power, sparing neither money nor human resources on it. It is a paradox, but, perhaps, it was the super-efforts in this race that did not allow any of the countries to unambiguously surpass the “potential adversary” in terms of armament, which means they maintained parity. But in the end, both superpowers were armed even beyond measure. At some point, the talk turned to the reduction of strategic arms - but also on a parity basis.

The first talks to limit nuclear stocks were held in Helsinki in 1969. This period includes the signing of the SALT-1 treaty by the leaders of the countries. It limited the number of ballistic missiles and launchers on both sides to the level at which they were at that moment, and also provided for the adoption of new ballistic missiles strictly in the amount in which obsolete ground-based missiles were previously decommissioned. The second agreement - SALT-2 (essentially continuing the first one) - was signed 10 years later. It introduced a restriction on the deployment of nuclear weapons in space (R-36orb orbital missiles) and although it was not ratified by the US Senate, nevertheless, according to experts, it was carried out by both sides.

The next stage of negotiations on the need to reduce strategic weapons took place in 1982, but did not lead to anything. Negotiations were repeatedly suspended and resumed again.

In October 1986, at the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik, the USSR put forward a proposal for a 50% reduction in strategic forces and agreed not to take into account the strategic weapons available to US NATO allies. However, proposals Soviet Union were linked to the obligation not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty signed in 1972. Perhaps that is why these proposals remained unanswered.

In September 1989, the USSR decided not to link the issue of missile defense with the conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of strategic arms, and also not to include sea-based cruise missiles in the scope of the new treaty. It took about two years to finalize the text. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine recognized themselves as his successors under the treaty, on whose territory nuclear weapons were deployed. By signing the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine pledged to eliminate or transfer nuclear weapons under Russian control. Soon, as non-nuclear states, they acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1) was signed on July 31, 1991 in Moscow by the presidents of the USSR and the USA, Mikhail Gorbachev and George W. Bush. It forbade the development and deployment of air-launched ballistic missiles, heavy ballistic missiles, underwater launchers of ballistic and cruise missiles, means of high-speed reloading of launchers, increasing the number of charges on existing missiles, and converting "conventional" nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. True, the document entered into force only on December 5, 1994, becoming the first (ratified) arms control treaty that provided a real reduction in deployed strategic weapons and established a strict regime for verifying its implementation.

How much was and how much became

The system for monitoring the implementation of the START-1 treaty included conducting mutual checks at the base sites, notification of the production, testing, movement, deployment and destruction of strategic offensive weapons. At the time of the signing of START-1, as of September 1990, the USSR had 2,500 "strategic" carriers, on which 10,271 warheads were deployed. The US had 2,246 carriers with 10,563 warheads.

In December 2001, Russia and the United States announced that they had fulfilled their obligations: Russia had 1,136 carriers and 5,518 warheads left, while the United States had 1,237 and 5,948, respectively. Moscow on January 3, 1993. In many respects, he relied on the basis of the START-1 treaty, but assumed a sharp reduction in the number of ground-based missiles with multiple warheads. However, the document did not enter into force, since the United States did not complete the ratification process, in 2002 withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty, to which START-2 was linked.

Proposals for the development of START-3 began to be discussed in March 1997 during consultations Russian and US Presidents Boris Yeltsin And Bill Clinton in Helsinki. This treaty was planned to establish "ceilings" at the level of 2000-2500 strategic nuclear warheads, there was also an intention to give the treaty an indefinite character. However, at that time the document was not signed. The initiative to restart a new negotiation process in June 2006 was made by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

But the development of the document began in April 2009 immediately after the meeting President Dmitry Medvedev And Barack Obama in London as part of the G20 summit. Negotiations began in May 2009, and ended 11 months later with the signing of an agreement by the presidents of Russia and the United States on April 8, 2010 in Prague (START-3, the "Prague Treaty"). Its official name is the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on measures to further reduce and limit strategic offensive arms. In February 2011, it entered into force and will be valid for 10 years.

During the development of the document, Russia was armed with 3897 nuclear warheads and 809 deployed carriers and launchers, while the United States was armed with 5916 nuclear warheads and 1188 carriers and launchers. As of June 2011, when Russia and the United States first exchanged data under START-3, Russia had 1,537 warheads, 521 deployed carriers, and, together with non-deployed ones, 865 warheads. The United States has 1,800 warheads, 882 deployed carriers, with a total number of 1,124. Thus, even then Russia did not violate the threshold established by the treaty for deployed carriers of 700 units and lagged behind the United States in all respects.

“I can hardly evaluate the signing of the disarmament treaty, because the parity was violated by the United States, which is now headed by the fighter for peace, the Nobel laureate comrade Obama. In fact, then the Americans deceived us. They never told us the truth. When the USSR collapsed, they clapped their hands. They promised that NATO would not expand, but it has already approached the borders of Russia to such an extent that it is within easy reach, ”says Head of the State Duma Defense Committee Vladimir Komoyedov, hinting at the unreliability of partnership with America.

Military expert Igor Korotchenko I agree that the termination of the military race of the USSR was the right decision, but at the same time it was completely uneven.

“Nuclear weapons in the days of the USSR were redundant with us. In the same way as it was redundant among the Americans. Therefore, it was necessary to reduce objectively. But we just got really into it. We first began to reduce nuclear forces, then agreed to the elimination of the Warsaw Pact without any clear compensation from the West. After that, everything happened notable events associated with the collapse of the USSR, ”Igor Korotchenko explained to AiF.ru.

Not quantity, but quality

IN this moment experts say that parity has been restored.

“It was achieved a very long time ago. But the quality was up to the US, which has about two-thirds of its nuclear-tipped missiles in submarines that are constantly on the move. And we have them all on stationary launchers, which are easier to hit. Therefore, the Americans came up with the concept of a lightning strike and, plus, today they are building an additional missile defense system, but in fact this is a surveillance system, and fire support, and the line itself. Plus, they installed a ship line in the English Channel and strengthened the continental industrial region of New York, ”Komoedov explained to AiF.ru.

According to him, the United States today wants to intimidate Russia and dictate its terms to it, but “they need to hide these emotions and ambitions somewhere” and instead start negotiating.

In 2014 Russia for the first time since early XXI century, it caught up with the United States both in the number of deployed and non-deployed carriers, and in the number of warheads (including in connection with the adoption of nuclear submarines of the new project 955, equipped with Bulava missiles with several warheads; in addition, to replace intercontinental ballistic Topol-M missiles with one warhead came with Yars missiles with three warheads). So, as of September 1, 2014, the United States had 794 deployed carriers, and Russia - only 528. At the same time, the number of warheads on deployed carriers in the United States is 1642, in Russia - 1643, while the number of deployed and non-deployed installations in the United States - 912, Russia has 911.

According to the data of the US Department of State on the implementation of START-3 dated January 1, 2016, the United States has 762 deployed carriers of nuclear warheads, Russia has 526. and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and HBs in the USA - 898, in Russia - 877.

According to Korotchenko, first of all, the parity is based on the implementation of the existing restrictions under the START-3 treaty, which is a strategic further step in reducing nuclear weapons.

“Today, the renewal of the Russian strategic nuclear forces is taking place, primarily due to the arrival of new solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missiles RS 24 Yars, silo-based and mobile-based, which will form the basis of the group of missile forces. strategic purpose for a period of 30 years. A decision was also made to start developing a combat railway missile system, plus a new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile is being developed on liquid fuel. These are the main directions associated with maintaining parity in terms of the Strategic Missile Forces ( Rocket troops strategic purposes). With regard to our naval nuclear forces, Borey-class submarine missile cruisers with Bulava sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles are now being serially built and handed over to the fleet. That is, there is parity for sea nuclear forces", - says Korotchenko, noting that Russia can respond to the United States in the airspace.

But as for the proposals that come from the United States on further reduction of nuclear weapons or on nuclear zero in general, Russia, the expert believes, will not respond to these proposals.

“For the United States, the role of nuclear weapons is declining every year, due to the fact that they develop conventional strike precision weapons that achieve the same effect as with the use of nuclear weapons. Russia, on the other hand, stakes on nuclear forces as the basis of our military power and maintaining balance in the world. Therefore, we will not give up nuclear weapons, ”the expert says, emphasizing the inexpediency of further reductions in nuclear weapons.

According to him, America is now pushing the world with all its actions to resume the arms race, but this should not be succumbed to.

“We need to maintain a self-sufficient defense balance,” Korotchenko said.

In 1991 and 1992 the presidents of the United States and the USSR/Russia put forward unilateral parallel initiatives to decommission a significant part of the tactical nuclear weapons of both countries and their partial elimination. In Western literature, these proposals are known as "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives" (PNI). These initiatives were of a voluntary, non-legally binding nature and were not formally linked to the response steps of the other side.

As it seemed then, on the one hand, this made it possible to fulfill them fairly quickly, without getting bogged down in a complex and lengthy negotiation process. Some of the initiatives were drafted by experts in Voronezh on the basis of a research institute, which required employees to rent a one-room apartment in Voronezh for several months. On the other hand, the absence of a legal framework made it easier, if necessary, to withdraw from unilateral obligations without legal procedures for the denunciation of international treaty. On September 27, 1991, US President Bush nominated the first UNT. Soviet President Gorbachev announced "reciprocal steps and counter-proposals" on 5 October. His initiatives were further developed and concretized in the proposals of Russian President Yeltsin dated January 29, 1992.

The decisions of the President of the United States provided for: the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear warheads intended to arm ground-based delivery vehicles (nuclear artillery shells and warheads for tactical Lance missiles) to the United States, including from Europe and South Korea, for subsequent dismantling and destruction; the decommissioning of surface warships and submarines of all tactical nuclear weapons, as well as naval aviation depth charges, their storage in the United States and the subsequent destruction of approximately half of their number; termination of the program for the development of a short-range missile of the Sram-T type, designed to arm tactical strike aviation. The reciprocal steps on the part of the Soviet Union, and then Russia, were as follows: all tactical nuclear weapons in service with the Ground Forces and Air Defense will be redeployed to the pre-factory bases of the enterprise for assembling nuclear warheads and to centralized storage warehouses;

all warheads intended for ground-based assets are subject to elimination; a third of warheads intended for sea-based tactical carriers will be destroyed; it is planned to eliminate half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles; it is planned to halve the stocks of aviation tactical nuclear munitions by liquidation; On a reciprocal basis, it was proposed to remove nuclear munitions intended for strike aircraft together with the United States from combat units of front-line aviation and place them in centralized storage depots 5 . It is very difficult to quantify these reductions, because, unlike information on strategic nuclear forces, Russia and the United States have not published official data on their stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons.

According to unofficial published estimates, the United States was to eliminate at least about 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons (1,300 artillery shells, more than 800 Lance missile warheads, and about 900 naval weapons, mainly depth charges). They were armed with free-fall bombs intended for the Air Force. Their total number in the early 1990s was estimated at 2,000 units, including about 500-600 air bombs in warehouses in Europe 6 . The overall assessment of US tactical nuclear arsenals is currently given above.

According to a Russian authoritative study, Russia had to reduce 13,700 tactical nuclear warheads under the UNP, including 4,000 warheads for tactical missiles, 2,000 artillery shells, 700 engineer munitions (nuclear land mines), 1,500 warheads for anti-aircraft missiles, 3,500 warheads for frontline aviation, 1,000 warheads intended for ships and submarines of the Navy, and 1,000 warheads for naval aviation. This amounted to almost two-thirds of the tactical nuclear warheads in service with former USSR in 1991. 7 The scale of UNTs cannot be overestimated. First, for the first time, a decision was made to dismantle and dispose of nuclear warheads, and not just their delivery vehicles, as was done in accordance with agreements on strategic offensive arms reductions. Several classes of tactical nuclear weapons were subject to complete liquidation: nuclear projectiles and mines, nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, and nuclear bombs. Second, the scale of the cuts far exceeded the indirect limits laid down in the START agreements. Thus, under the current START Treaty of 1991, Russia and the United States were to decommission 4-5 thousand nuclear warheads each, or 8-10 thousand units together. The reductions within the framework of the UNT opened up prospects for the elimination of more than 16,000 warheads in total.

However, the implementation of the UNT encountered serious difficulties from the very beginning. At the first stage, in 1992, they were associated with the withdrawal of tactical nuclear warheads by Russia from the territory of a number of former Soviet republics. The withdrawal of this type of weapon was agreed in founding documents on the termination of the existence of the USSR, signed by the leaders of the new independent states in 1991. However, some former Soviet republics began to obstruct these measures. In particular, in February 1992, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk banned the export of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. Only the joint demarches of Russia and the United States forced him to resume the transportation of this type of weapon. In the spring of 1992, all tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn. The redeployment of nuclear weapons for strategic delivery vehicles was completed only in 1996.

Another difficulty was that in the extremely difficult economic situation of the 1990s, Russia experienced serious difficulties in financing the disposal of nuclear weapons. Disarmament activities have been hampered by the lack of adequate storage facilities. This led to the overflow of warehouses, violations of the adopted safety regulations. The risks associated with unauthorized access to nuclear warheads during their transportation and storage forced Moscow to accept international assistance to ensure nuclear security. It was provided mainly by the US under the well-known Nunn-Lugar program, but also by other countries including France and the UK. For reasons of state secrecy, Russia refused to accept assistance directly in the dismantling of nuclear weapons. However, foreign assistance was provided in other, less sensitive areas, for example, through the provision of containers and wagons for the safe transportation of nuclear warheads, protective equipment for nuclear storage facilities, etc. This freed up the funds needed for the destruction of ammunition.

The provision of foreign aid provided a partial one-sided transparency not envisaged by the PNR. The donor states, primarily the United States, insisted on their right to access the facilities they provided assistance in order to verify the intended use of the supplied equipment. As a result of long and difficult negotiations, mutually acceptable solutions were found, on the one hand, guaranteeing the observance of state secrets, and on the other hand, required level access. Such limited transparency measures have also extended to critical facilities such as nuclear disassembly and assembly facilities run by Rosatom, as well as nuclear weapons storage facilities run by the Ministry of Defense. The latest officially published information on the implementation of UNTs in Russia was presented in the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Ivanov at the Conference to Review the Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on April 25, 2000.

According to him, “Russia ... continues to consistently implement unilateral initiatives in the field of tactical nuclear weapons. Such weapons have been completely removed from surface ships and multi-purpose submarines, as well as land-based naval aviation and placed in centralized storage areas. One third of the total number of nuclear munitions for sea-based tactical missiles and naval aviation has been eliminated. The destruction of nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, artillery shells, as well as nuclear mines. Half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and half of the nuclear air bombs have been destroyed” 10 . Assessments of Russia's implementation of UNTs are given in Table. 9. Thus, as of the year 2000, Russia has largely complied with the UNT. As planned, all naval munitions were withdrawn to centralized storage facilities, and a third of them were destroyed (however, significant ambiguity remains regarding the withdrawal of all such items from naval bases to centralized storage facilities due to inconsistencies in official wording). A certain number of tactical nuclear warheads still remained in service with the Ground Forces, Air Force and Air Defense. In the case of the Air Force, this did not contradict the PNR, since, according to the January 1992 initiatives of President Yeltsin, it was envisaged to withdraw tactical ammunition from combat strength and destroy it, together with the United States, which did not. As regards the liquidation of the Air Force warheads, by 2000 Russia's obligations had been fulfilled. By means of air defense, UNTs were carried out in terms of liquidation, but not in the sphere of complete withdrawal from the anti-aircraft missile forces.

Thus, during the 1990s, Russia carried out UNTs in the field of warheads for the Air Force and, possibly, the Navy, as well as partly for air defense. IN ground forces part of the tactical nuclear weapons remained in service and was not eliminated, although the UNTs provided for their complete withdrawal to centralized storage facilities and complete liquidation. The latter was attributed to financial and technical difficulties. Fulfillment of UNTs became one of the requirements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Their implementation became an integral part of the 13-Step Plan for the fulfillment of commitments nuclear powers in accordance with Art. VI Treaty. The 13 Steps plan was adopted at the Review Conference by consensus, i.e., both representatives of Russia and the United States voted for its adoption. However, 19 months later, Washington announced a unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Russian-American Treaty on the Limitation of Systems missile defense, considered the cornerstone of strategic stability. This decision was taken contrary to the obligations of the United States under the 13 Step Plan, which required compliance with this treaty.

The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 upset the very delicate balance of mutual obligations between Russia and the United States in the field of nuclear disarmament, including in relation to TNW. Obviously, the violation by one of the NPT members of its obligations on a number of points of the decisions adopted by the 2000 Review Conference (including the 13 Steps Plan) made it unlikely that the other parties would fully comply with these decisions. During the work of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, no provisions on the 13 Steps Plan were adopted, which in fact indicates that it has ceased to be valid. This could not but affect the implementation of the UNT. Thus, on April 28, 2003, in a speech by the head of the Russian delegation at the session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, the following was stated: “The Russian side proceeds from the fact that consideration of issues of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be carried out in isolation from other types of weapons. It is for this reason that the well-known unilateral Russian disarmament initiatives of 1991-1992 are of a complex nature and, in addition, affect tactical nuclear weapons and other important issues that have a significant impact on strategic stability.

Russia's official reference to the fact that, in addition to tactical nuclear weapons, UNTs also touch upon other important issues affecting strategic stability is clearly based on the idea of ​​the interconnection between the implementation of the 1991-1992 initiatives. with the fate of the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability. In addition, the assertion that the issue of TNW cannot be considered in isolation from other types of weapons is obviously an allusion to the situation that has developed with the entry into force of the adapted version of the CFE Treaty. This treaty was signed back in 1990 and provided for maintaining the balance of power in Europe on a bloc basis in five types of conventional weapons (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters and aircraft). After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR itself, with the expansion of NATO to the east, it is completely outdated.

In order to preserve the system of limiting conventional arms, the parties held negotiations on its adaptation, which culminated in the signing in Istanbul in 1999 of an adapted version of the CFE Treaty. This option to a greater extent took into account the military-political realities that had developed in Europe after the end of the Cold War and contained certain security guarantees for Russia, limiting the possibility of deploying NATO troops near its borders. However, the NATO countries refused to ratify the adapted CFE under very far-fetched pretexts. In the context of the admission of the Baltic states to NATO, an increase in the imbalance in conventional weapons to the detriment of Russia, and in the absence of ratification of the adapted Treaty by the West, Russia in December 2007 announced a unilateral suspension of compliance with the basic CFE Treaty (despite the fact that the adapted Treaty, as an add-on to the basic one, did not enter into force ).

In addition, Russia faced with new urgency the question of the role of nuclear weapons, primarily tactical ones, as a means of neutralizing such an imbalance. Obviously, the fears associated with the advancement of NATO to the East in the absence of adequate international legal security guarantees, in the eyes of Russia, cast doubt on the expediency of implementing the UNT in full, especially given the political and legally non-binding nature of these obligations. As far as one can judge from the absence of further official statements about the fate of UNTs, they have not been fully implemented.

This fact illustrates both the advantages and disadvantages of informal arms control regimes. On the one hand, within the framework of the UNT, significant reductions in tactical nuclear weapons were carried out, including the destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons. However, the absence of verification measures does not allow the parties to assume with certainty which reductions actually took place. The lack of a legally binding status made it easier for the parties to effectively back out of the initiatives without announcing it at all.

In other words, the advantages of an "informal" approach to disarmament are tactical, but in the long run it does not have sufficient stability to serve as a stabilizer for the changing political and military relations of the parties. Moreover, such initiatives themselves become easy victims of such changes and can turn into a source of additional distrust and tension. Another thing is that after the end of the Cold War, former adversaries could afford much more radical, faster, less technically complex and less burdensome economic disarmament agreements.

According to the United States interpretation, the strategic arms reduction treaty reduces the number of deployed warheads that are mounted on launch vehicles and ready to launch. The common arsenal of nuclear weapons in Russia and the United States contains other types of weapons. In addition to deployed strategic nuclear weapons, both countries use tactical nuclear weapons, which are designed for use in ground military operations, have a smaller yield and a shorter range.

At present, the total stockpile of US nuclear weapons is about 11,000 warheads, including nearly 7,000 deployed strategic warheads; more than 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons and nearly 3,000 strategic and tactical warheads that are not mounted on delivery systems. (The US also possesses thousands of nuclear warhead components that can be assembled into full-fledged weapons.)

Currently Russian nuclear arsenal includes about 5,000 deployed nuclear weapons, about 3,500 operational tactical nuclear weapons, and more than 11,000 strategic and tactical warheads in stock. All this makes up a total stockpile of 19,500 nuclear warheads. Unlike the United States, Russia only partially owns these stocks, as dismantling warheads is very expensive. Also unlike the US, Russia continues to produce a limited number of new nuclear warheads, mainly because its warheads have a much shorter lifespan and must be replaced more frequently.

Treaties on the control of strategic nuclear weapons

OSV-1

Starting in November 1969, negotiations on limiting strategic offensive weapons led in 1972 to a treaty on the limitation of anti-missile defense systems (ABM), which prohibits the creation of an anti-missile defense of the country's territory. An Interim Agreement was also signed, according to which the parties undertake not to start building additional stationary launchers of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The parties also undertake to limit the number of ballistic missile launchers of submarines (SBMs) and the number of modern ballistic missile submarines to the number in service and under construction at the date of signing the agreement. This agreement does not touch upon the topic of strategic bombers and warheads and allows both countries to make their own decisions about increasing the number of weapons used by adding warheads to ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Under this treaty, the United States may not have more than 1,054 ICBM silo launchers and 656 submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers. The Soviet Union was limited to 1607 silo ICBMs and 740 submarine launchers.

OSV-2

In November 1972, Washington and Moscow agreed to conclude a treaty, which is a continuation of SALT 1. The SALT-2 treaty, signed in June 1979, initially limited the number of Soviet and American launchers of ICBMs, submarine submarines, and heavy bombers to 2,400.

Various restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces were also outlined. (In 1981, the treaty proposed to reduce the number of launch vehicles to 2250). The terms of this treaty required the Soviet Union to reduce the number of launch vehicles by 270 units. At the same time, the amount of US military capacity was below the established norm and could be increased.

President Jimmy Carter withdrew the Treaty from the Senate, where it was under ratification after Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in December 1979. This Treaty has not yet entered into force. Nevertheless, since the parties did not declare their intention to refuse to ratify the Treaty, Washington and Moscow continued to generally comply with its provisions. However, on May 2, 1986, President Ronald Reagan said that future decisions on strategic nuclear weapons would be based on the emerging threat, not on the terms of the SALT treaty.

START-1

The Strategic Weapons Reduction Treaty was first proposed in the early 1980s by President Reagan and finally signed in July 1991. The main provisions of the START-1 Treaty are to reduce the number of strategic delivery vehicles to the level of 1,600 units and the number of warheads deployed on these delivery vehicles to 6,000 units. The treaty obligated to destroy the rest of the carriers. Their destruction was confirmed through site inspections and regular exchange of information, as well as through the use of technical means (eg satellites). The entry into force of the treaty was delayed for several years due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and efforts to concentrate nuclear weapons from Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan on Russian territory. Armament reductions under the terms of the START-1 treaty were carried out in 2001. This agreement is valid until 2009, unless the parties renew it.

START-2

In July 1992, Presidents George W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin agreed to amend the START I treaty. The START-2 treaty, signed in January 1993, obliged the parties to reduce their strategic arsenals to the level of 3,000-3,500 warheads and banned the use of land-based missiles with multiple warheads. START 2 worked with warheads on the same principle as START-1, and also, like the previous treaty, required the destruction of launch vehicles, but not warheads. Initially, January 2003 was set as the contract execution date. In 1997, the date was moved to December 2007 because Russia was unsure of its ability to meet the original deadline. The treaty never entered into force, since Russia linked its ratification with the approval of the New York Protocols to the START-2 and ABM treaties, signed in 1997. In 2001, the Bush administration took a firm course in deploying a massive anti-missile defense system in the United States and abandoning the ABM Treaty.

The structure of the START-3 treaty

In March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on the structure of the START-3 treaty for subsequent negotiations, the terms of which included the reduction of strategic warheads to the level of 2000-2500 units. The essential point is that this treaty stipulated the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads to ensure the irreversibility of the arms reduction process, including the prerequisites for preventing a sharp increase in the number of warheads. Negotiations were supposed to start after START II came into force, which never happened.

Moscow Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (SORT).

On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed an agreement under which the United States and Russia are to reduce their strategic arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads. While the parties did not agree on rules for counting warheads, the Bush administration made it clear that the US would only reduce warheads deployed on launch vehicles and would not count warheads retired from active service and stored as reduced. Russia did not agree with this approach to interpreting the treaty and hopes for negotiations on the rules for counting reduced warheads. The restrictions under the treaty are the same as under START III, but SORT does not require the destruction of launch vehicles, unlike START I and START II, ​​or the destruction of warheads, as prescribed in START III. This treaty has yet to be approved by the Senate and the Duma.

Measures to control non-strategic nuclear weapons

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

Signed on December 8, 1987, this Treaty requires the United States and Russia to accountably destroy all ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Distinguished by its unprecedented verification regime, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty formed the basis of the verification component of the subsequent START I treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988, and both sides completed reductions by June 1, 1992, when total 2692 missiles remained. The Treaty became multilateral after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and today the parties to the Treaty are the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are also parties to the agreements, but do not participate in Treaty meetings and site inspections. The effect of the ban on medium-range missiles is unlimited.

Presidential Nuclear Security Initiatives

On September 27, 1991, President Bush announced the US intention to phase out almost all US tactical nuclear weapons so that Russia would do the same, thereby reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation when the Soviet Union collapsed. Bush specifically stated that the US would destroy all artillery shells and short-range nuclear ballistic warheads and remove all non-strategic nuclear warheads from the surface of ships, submarines and land-based naval aircraft. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev retaliated on October 5 by promising to destroy all nuclear weapons. artillery equipment, nuclear warheads for tactical missiles and all nuclear explosives. He also promised to phase out all Soviet tactical naval nuclear weapons. However, serious questions remain about the fulfillment of these promises by the Russian side, and there is great uncertainty about current state Russian tactical nuclear forces.