Soviet troops in Vietnam - What was their task? Vietnamese nightmares of American soldiers The life of American soldiers after the Vietnam War

It became one of the largest local conflicts of the Cold War period. According to the Geneva Accords of 1954, which ended the Indochina War, Vietnam was divided along the 17th parallel into northern and southern parts. On July 16, 1955, the Prime Minister of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, announced that he would not comply with the Geneva Accords, and an anti-communist state would be created in South Vietnam. In 1957, the first detachments of the anti-Ziem underground appeared in South Vietnam, which began a guerrilla war against the government. In 1959, the support of the South Vietnamese partisans was announced by the North Vietnamese communists and their allies, and in December 1960, all underground groups merged into the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF), which in Western countries was often called the "Viet Cong".

The weapons used by the South Vietnamese guerrillas were very diverse. It had to be obtained in battles, by introducing secret agents into the enemy camp, as well as by deliveries from communist countries through Laos and Cambodia. As a result, the Viet Cong was armed with many samples of both Western and Soviet weapons.

Echoes of the previous war

During the Indochina War, which lasted from 1946 to 1954, the French army, which fought to preserve the French colonial possessions in Indochina, enjoyed the support of Great Britain and the United States, and the Viet Minh national liberation movement - the support of communist China. Thanks to this, the arsenal of the Vietnamese partisans in the early 60s was rich and varied in composition. The Viet Cong had MAT-49 submachine guns (France), STEN (Great Britain), PPSh-41 (China), PPS-43 (China), Mosin carbines and rifles (USSR), Kar98k carbines (Germany), MAS-36 rifles (France), Browning machine guns (USA), DP-28 (USSR), MG-42 (Germany). The most popular Viet Cong small arms were MAT-49, Kar98k, Mosin and PPSh rifles.

Viet Cong fighters with small arms
Source: vignette2.wikia.nocookie.net

American machine guns

Since the US entry into the conflict, American material support for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARV) has increased. Thompson and M3 submachine guns, M1 and BAR carbines began to enter the country. Some of these weapons immediately fell into the hands of the Viet Cong guerrillas, since many ARV servicemen were disloyal to the current government and willingly supplied their friends from « Viet Cong » . It is worth noting that after the AK-47 fell into the hands of the Vietnamese partisans, they happily abandoned American and British weapons, since Soviet machine guns outnumbered the enemy’s small arms. The only exception was the M3, which was very effective in close combat.

American soldier with an M3 assault rifle, Vietnam, 1967
Source: gunsbase.com

From factory to jungle

With the advent of the new American M-16 rifle in 1967-68, it also appeared in the arsenal of the Viet Cong. The "Black Rifle" (as the soldiers dubbed it) showed low efficiency during the fighting in the Vietnamese jungle. The barrel and action group of the emka supplied to Vietnam were not chrome plated, and there were no cleaning kits. All this led to the fact that the machine quickly clogged with soot and failed. For this reason, the M16 was not particularly popular with the Viet Cong guerrillas either. The new modification M16A1 was finalized taking into account the feedback received from the soldiers who fought in Vietnam, and in 1967 began to enter service with the American army. Unlike its predecessor, the M16A1 was readily used by both the Americans and the Viet Cong. The advantage of the modified emka was that it had a bayonet-knife, but it was significantly inferior to the AK-47 in hand-to-hand combat, since its butt often split after impact, which did not happen with the butt of a Soviet machine gun.

Partisan girl with M-16
Source: historicalmoments2.com

The controversial symbol of the "Viet Cong"

The M-1 carbine and the M3 submachine gun are considered symbols of the early guerrilla warfare in Vietnam - this primarily refers to units of local forces that did not enjoy sufficient support from North Vietnam. The light but powerful M-1 carbine was easy to operate and repair, and the M3 submachine gun was indispensable in close combat. You can find quite conflicting reviews about the M1 carbine. In the Vietnamese museum exhibitions dedicated to the guerrilla war in the jungle, it is presented as the main weapon of the Viet Cong at the initial stage of the war. At the same time, a number of experts point out that the M1 is more correctly called the best among the weapons available to the guerrillas, and with the advent of other types of small arms, the Vietnamese began to abandon the M1.

Partisan girl with M-1 carbine
Source: pinterest.com

"Red" weapons

The third stage in the development of the Viet Cong weapons base falls on the period of the Tet offensive of 1968. During the offensive, the guerrillas suffered heavy losses, and to make up for them, the People's Army of North Vietnam sent some of their soldiers with weapons to the south. The North Vietnamese soldiers were armed with the new SKS carbines, AK-47 assault rifles, and RPD machine guns made in China. The downside of this weapon was the high aiming range (for the AK-47 it was 800 meters, for the RPD and SKS - 1 kilometer) - excessive in Vietnam, where most of the shots were fired point-blank or from a very short distance. At the same time, the SKS proved to be excellent when firing from unprepared positions, which was very important for the Viet Cong fighters. The RPD used in Vietnam was significantly lighter than its predecessors, making it easy to carry. And the AK-47 became the most effective small arms of the Vietnam War in terms of the totality of its characteristics.

Vietnamese partisan with SKS carbine. Wax figure at the Vietnam Partisan Movement Museum
Source: en.wikipedia.org

Partisan air defense

The main weapon of the Vietnamese partisan air defense was the DShK heavy machine gun, which extremely poorly coped with the task of shooting down American aircraft. Partisan air defense worked more effectively against helicopters, but this efficiency was achieved more due to good camouflage. The Viet Cong machine gunners managed, without being noticed, to let the American helicopter into close range and release the first round. After that, the partisans lost their advantage and became a good target for helicopter pilots.

North Vietnamese soldiers with DShK. With the same machine guns that came to South Vietnam, the Viet Cong partisans tried to shoot down American helicopters

For all the prevalence of drugs, soldiers rarely used them during combat operations, it was obvious to everyone the need to have a sober head in battle.
Thus, the American military machine as a whole suffered little from the corrupting action of drugs and alcohol, which cannot be said about its living components - soldiers and officers.
Marijuana was widespread in Vietnam by the time the Americans arrived. A study conducted by the American command in 1966 identified 29 marijuana outlets in the vicinity of Saigon alone.
For the manufacture of "jambs" used original American cigarettes, such as "Craven A". Marijuana was smoked by all sides of the conflict: the Americans, and the South Vietnamese army, and the communist North Vietnamese, and the "Viet Cong" supporting the communists.
Availability and cheapness made its use commonplace. Street vendors were constantly selling weed to passing American patrols.

The command tried to fight drugs with the methods of punishment and propaganda. But until 1968, there was no laboratory in Vietnam that could determine the presence of cannabinoids and other substances in urine and blood.
The analyzes were sent to Japan, and the whole process took 45 days. Only in the Marine Corps were they tried for the use of marijuana, in simple army units they turned a blind eye to the problem - those who took "hard" drugs were put on trial.
However, after a series of publications in the press, drastic measures were taken. Compulsory conversations were held with the soldiers about the dangers of drugs.
Arrests began, with up to 1,000 arrests a week for selling and drinking in 1968. Under pressure from the US authorities, South Vietnam banned the cultivation of hemp, the fields were destroyed by South Vietnamese units.
But, despite all the prohibitions, there was mutual responsibility in the units, which, in the conditions of low trust in the command, and the frequent change of junior officers, made the struggle unproductive.

Alcohol, as well as marijuana and hashish, became widespread. However, opioids have become the biggest problem.
In 1967, opium in Vietnam could be obtained for a dollar, and morphine for $5. Binoctal tablets cost between $1 and $5 for a pack of 20.
Demand among American soldiers gave rise to supply, already in 1970 the underground laboratories of the Golden Triangle launched the production of high-quality heroin. Moreover, its use grew like a snowball, gradually replacing lighter drugs and alcohol.
At this time, the Americans were trying to get out of the Vietnamese trap with all their might, and there was no end in sight to the war, which further undermined the morale of the troops. In 1971, the number of arrests for the use and sale of hard drugs increased 7 times compared with the previous year.
In 1971, the medical service estimated that between 10 and 15 percent of military personnel were heroin addicts. Approximately one third got hooked on it in the first month in Vietnam. Heroin was mostly smoked or snorted, and syringes were used much less frequently.

When the command was faced with a heroin problem, all that remained was to remember marijuana as childish pranks.
Here are the words of one officer: "If it helped my guys get off hard drugs, I would buy up all the marijuana and hashish in the Mekong Delta."
It is very interesting to compare data on heroin use by US troops in Thailand (1%) and Vietnam (10-15%) in the same period. Which eloquently speaks of the brutal nature of that war. The peak of heroin use occurred in 1973, then in Vietnam there were units covering the departure of the main forces.
Just over a third of American soldiers used heroin that year. It is safe to say that the drug traffickers were the losers from the end of the war. That's who exactly cried during Operation Gusty Wind.

After returning home, "G.I's" again found themselves in a relatively healthy social environment, however, they could no longer get off heroin, thus replenishing the army of drug addicts in their homeland. This gave rise to various social problems in the already troubled American society of the 60s and 70s.

Source: Article by Peter Brush "U.S. Forces in Vietnam Drug Use".

From an article by V.A. Gavrilov - retired colonel, leading researcher at the Research Institute (military history) of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, candidate of psychological sciences.

Some time ago, George Lepre's book Why American Soldiers Blowed Up Their Officers in Vietnam with Grenades was published in the United States.
The book is interesting in that it is the only complete study of the phenomenon of attempts by American soldiers to undermine their commanders with grenades during the Vietnam War.
The author attempts to explain the very phenomenon of attacks using hand grenades, the motivation for such attacks and the measures taken by the army to stop them or at least reduce the public outcry that accompanied them.

One of the conclusions of this book is that the cases of killing or threatening officers and sergeants of the US Army and Marine Corps with grenades or other weapons, in most cases, did not occur during combat operations, but while in the rear.
In addition, the author of the book refutes the claims of activists who protested against the Vietnam War, and some researchers and historians, that anti-war sentiment and political opposition to the American presence in Southeast Asia had a direct impact on these attempts to attack officers and NCOs.

The author admits at the outset that soldiers attacked or killed "unpopular comrades from the very beginning of the armed conflict".
As American military involvement in Southeast Asia escalated, such incidents became so frequent that the New York Times and Newsweek informed their readers that attacks with hand grenades were far from isolated, and "averaged up to 20 such cases per month."

It should be said that the author contradicts himself from the very beginning when he claims that anti-war sentiments had no effect on the armed attacks by American military personnel on their comrades and commanders.
The book begins with a general explanation of how the draft system, a strong anti-war movement, student protests, and strife in American society led to the fact that by the 1970s the US Army and Marine Corps were unable to recruit the best part of the youth.
As a result, they had to reduce the high standards of discipline that five years ago existed in both branches of the United States Armed Forces.

The author, based on a thorough study of archival materials of the military police and the courts of the military tribunal, shows that virtually all explosions or attempts to undermine took place not in a combat situation, but in rear areas.
But then what were the motives of those ordinary soldiers who tried to kill or intimidate their commanders? Several reasons emerge here.
First, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed the "Project 100,000", which made it possible to recruit young people who had not previously been selected for the level of intellectual development and, accordingly, were less able to adapt to military conditions, as well as having mental problems.

Secondly, the degradation of junior sergeants caused a crisis in the ability to lead small units - inexperienced sergeants were too "kind", sought popularity with their subordinates and, accordingly, could not deal with violations of discipline.
Third, drug use (a 1971 US Department of Defense study found that 50.9% of US Army personnel in Vietnam smoked marijuana).
Alcohol abuse (beer was cheap and hard liquor readily available) also played a role, as it reduced the soldiers' ability to comprehend their actions, which in turn led to attacks on fellow soldiers.

In fairness, those who served in Vietnam are still arguing about whether the use of drugs and alcohol was a cause or a consequence of a general decline in discipline. However, no one argues that this factor played a role in cases of attacks using hand grenades.
An additional motivating factor was dissatisfaction with those officers and sergeants who demanded vigorous combat, although President Richard Nixon had already announced the withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia. And the motive was simple: "No one wanted to die on the last day of the war."

Finally, according to the author, racial animosity has been the cause of some hand grenade attacks involving black soldiers and white enlisted men and sergeants.
Black soldiers became increasingly annoyed by what they saw as unfair treatment and racial discrimination, especially after the shocking assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., and this annoyance sometimes led to attacks on senior commanders.

The racial strife in Vietnam was no doubt spurred on by statements by high-profile black activists such as Black Panther member Eldridge Cleaver.
In his January 4, 1970 message entitled "To My Black Brothers in Vietnam," for example, Cleaver called for "start killing the racist pigs that give you orders. Kill General Abrams and all his officers. Destroy food and equipment or give them to the Vietnamese."
Although no attempt was made to assassinate Abrams or other officers of the US Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, Cleaver's calls alarmed many white officers in Saigon.
After all, the attacks with hand grenades show that they were the result of many causes, and Lepres carefully examines these causes.
Based on an analysis of military tribunal records, he concludes that "the main reason for most attacks using hand grenades was harassment and abusive attitude towards subordinates by superiors."

A separate section of the book is devoted to "attacks and anti-war activities." The author makes an attempt to prove that there was no direct connection between anti-war sentiments and these attacks.
In the study of archival materials, Lepr found only two cases where there were "anti-war and anti-government statements."
While acknowledging that the Vietnam War was unpopular among many US military personnel, as well as in American society in general, and that anti-war sentiment certainly affected conscripts (and therefore those who attacked senior commanders), the author nevertheless concludes that there is no evidence that these attacks were part of a widespread "riot by the rank and file or part of a larger political struggle against immoral US policies at home and abroad."

This conclusion raises serious doubts, since it is known that, while in custody, undoubtedly under pressure from the judicial authorities and in the face of the gravity of the charges and the severity of the punishment, the accused often try in every way to alleviate their situation.
And under these conditions, anti-war statements could only aggravate the guilt and lead to an even more severe sentence.
Therefore, the anti-war sentiments that underlay the motivation for armed attacks on superiors were most likely hidden, and the attacks themselves were motivated by completely different reasons.

It is interesting to note that, according to American experts, although hand grenade attacks rarely occur in the current American professional army, they nevertheless happen today.
Evidence of this is the trial of Staff Sergeant Alberto Martinez on charges of killing two officers with a mine planted outside their office window in Tikrit, Iraq, in 2005. Martinez was acquitted by a military jury at Fort Bragg in 2008.
In another case, Sergeant Joseph Bocisiewicz was convicted of killing two fellow soldiers after they criticized him for a series of blunders in combat in Iraq in 2008.
He was convicted by a Fort Stewart jury of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to life in prison without parole.
Both of these cases show that the phenomenon of hand grenade attacks in the US military is not a thing of the past.

On the whole, George Lepre's book is a fairly complete and professional study of such a phenomenon as armed attacks by colleagues on their comrades in a combat situation.
However, the author lacked, perhaps, the courage, and perhaps the depth of penetration into the essence of the phenomenon under consideration.
Hence the contradictory conclusions and ignorance of the obvious and long recognized fact that the unjust and inhumane nature of the United States aggression in Vietnam contributed to the growth of anti-war sentiment in American society and underlay both conscious and unconscious motives for armed attacks by American military personnel on their comrades and commanders.
And it is quite understandable that this happened more often not in battle, but in the rear, where discipline was weakened and alcohol and drugs began to play their role.

It became one of the most important events of the Cold War period. Its course and results largely predetermined the further development of events throughout Southeast Asia.

The armed struggle in Indochina lasted more than 14 years, from the end of 1960 to April 30, 1975. Direct US military intervention in the affairs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam continued for more than eight years. Military operations also took place in a number of regions of Laos and Cambodia.

In March 1965, 3,500 marines were landed in Da Nang, and in February 1968, US troops in Vietnam already numbered 543,000 people and a large number of military equipment, which accounted for 30% of the combat strength of the US Army, 30% of army aviation helicopters, about 40% of tactical aircraft, almost 13% of attack aircraft carriers and 66% of marines. After the conference in Honolulu in February 1966, the heads of the US allies in the SEATO bloc sent troops to South Vietnam: South Korea - 49 thousand people, Thailand - 13.5 thousand, Australia - 8 thousand, the Philippines - 2 thousand and New Zealand - 350 people.

The USSR and China took the side of North Vietnam, providing it with extensive economic, technical and military assistance. By 1965 alone, the DRV received 340 million rubles from the Soviet Union free of charge or in the form of loans. Weapons, ammunition and other materiel were supplied to the VNA. Soviet military specialists helped VNA soldiers to master military equipment.

In 1965-1666, the American-Saigon troops (over 650 thousand people) launched a major offensive with the aim of capturing the cities of Pleiku, Kontum, dissecting the forces of the NLF, pressing them to the borders of Laos and Cambodia and destroying them. At the same time, they widely used incendiary means, chemical and biological weapons. However, SE AO thwarted the enemy offensive by launching active operations in various regions of South Vietnam, including those adjacent to Saigon.

With the beginning of the dry season of 1966-1967, the American command launched a second major offensive. Parts of the SA SE, skillfully maneuvering, escaped from blows, suddenly attacked the enemy from the flanks and rear, making extensive use of night operations, underground tunnels, communications and shelters. Under the blows of the SA SE, the American-Saigon troops were forced to go on the defensive, although by the end of 1967 their total number already exceeded 1.3 million people. At the end of January 1968, the NLF armed forces themselves went on the general offensive. It involved 10 infantry divisions, several separate regiments, a large number of battalions and companies of regular troops, partisan detachments (up to 300 thousand people), as well as the local population - about one million fighters in total. Attacks were simultaneously made on 43 of the largest cities in South Vietnam, including Saigon (Ho Chi Minh), 30 of the most important air bases and airfields. As a result of the 45-day offensive, the enemy lost more than 150 thousand people, 2,200 aircraft and helicopters, 5,250 military vehicles, 233 ships were sunk and damaged.

In the same period, the American command launched a large-scale "air war" against the DRV. Up to 1,000 warplanes delivered massive strikes against DRV targets. In 1964-1973, over two million sorties were made over its territory, 7.7 million tons of bombs were dropped. But the bet on the "air war" failed. The government of the DRV carried out a mass evacuation of the population of cities into the jungle and shelters created in the mountains. The Armed Forces of the DRV, having mastered supersonic fighters, anti-aircraft missile systems, radio equipment received from the USSR, created a reliable air defense system of the country, which destroyed up to four thousand American aircraft by the end of 1972.

In June 1969, the People's Congress of South Vietnam proclaimed the formation of the Republic of South Vietnam (RSV). The SE Defense Army in February 1968 was transformed into the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NVSO SE).

Major defeats in South Vietnam and the failure of the "air war" forced the US government in May 1968 to start negotiations on a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese problem and to agree to a cessation of bombing and shelling of the territory of the Republic of South Vietnam.

Since the summer of 1969, the US administration has set a course for "Vietnamization", or "de-Americanization", of the war in South Vietnam. By the end of 1970, 210,000 American soldiers and officers were withdrawn from South Vietnam, and the size of the Saigon army was increased to 1.1 million people. The United States transferred almost all the heavy weapons of the withdrawn American troops to it.

In January 1973, the US government signed an agreement to end the war in Vietnam (the Paris Agreement), which provided for the complete withdrawal of US troops and military personnel from South Vietnam, the dismantling of US military bases, and the mutual return of prisoners of war and detained foreign civilians.

Up to 2.6 million American soldiers and officers participated in the Vietnam War, equipped with a large amount of the most modern military equipment. US spending on the war reached $352 billion. During its course, the American army lost 60,000 people killed and over 300,000 wounded, about 9,000 aircraft and helicopters, and a large amount of other military equipment. After the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, over 10,000 American military advisers remained in Saigon under the guise of "civilians". US military assistance to the Saigon regime in 1974-1975 amounted to more than four billion dollars.

In 1973-1974, the Saigon army intensified the fighting. Its troops regularly carried out a large number of so-called "pacification operations", the Air Force systematically bombarded areas in the zone of control of the government of the Republic of South Ossetia. At the end of March 1975, the command of the army of the Republic of Vietnam concentrated all remaining forces for the defense of Saigon. In April 1975, as a result of the lightning operation "Ho Chi Minh", North Vietnamese troops defeated the South Vietnamese army, which was left without allies, and captured all of South Vietnam.

The successful completion of the war in Vietnam made it possible in 1976 to unite the DRV and the RSE into a single state - the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

(Additional

The Vietnam War was one of the largest military conflicts in military history. Today there are a lot of polar opinions about it. In our review, there are several facts about the Vietnam War that will allow you to learn about the unknown sides of that terrible war.

1 The CIA Hired Hmong During The Secret War

In 1965, the CIA, with the help of Air America (which it secretly owned), began the operation that would become known as the "Secret War". By 1961, 9,000 Hmong guerrillas in Laos had been recruited. During the Vietnam War, Laos was neutral, but the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) had a strong influence in that country. In 1965, the number of Hmong partisans increased to 20,000 and then the true cause of the "Secret War" was revealed.

The Hmong were to destroy NVA supply depots, ambush cargo convoys, disrupt supply lines, and generally cause any possible damage to the NVA. When America began withdrawing troops from Vietnam, Air America was forced to leave Laos. On June 3, 1974, the airline's last plane left Laos, leaving the Hmong to fend for themselves.

Shortly after the Lao government began arresting the Hmong for their collaboration with the CIA, many guerrillas fled to the jungle, where they have lived since the end of the Vietnam War. Many of these Hmong guerrillas still hope today that the US will one day come to rescue them from the jungle.

2. Most of the soldiers were volunteers

According to official figures, three-quarters of all American soldiers volunteered for the army. More specifically, during the entire war, 9,087,000 people served in the army, and only 1,728,344 of them were called up. This is a very low number of conscripts compared to other wars. For example, during World War II, 8,895,135 Americans were drafted into the army, which was two-thirds of the total number of all Americans involved in the war.

3. Unfair call

Another controversial issue regarding the war is social inequality in conscription. In America, it was said that the racial and social status of people were guided by the call to the war in Vietnam. But 88.4 percent of the men who served in the Vietnam War are Caucasians. So, the myth that racial minorities were "cannon fodder" is simply not true. 79 percent of military personnel received higher education, and the wealth of three-quarters of all soldiers was above the poverty line, which refutes the theory of social inequality.

4. Payments to spies

The South Vietnamese spies were very important to the United States, but their work was dangerous. The problem with recruiting these spies was that many of them lived in communities where money simply didn't exist and where barter was accepted. This led to the use of rice and other goods as payment. This scheme worked for some time, after which it turned out that the "agents" did not need more rice, and they did not need other goods.

The decision was made to provide the spies with Sears catalogs from which they could choose the goods they would be paid with. The first order was for six red velvet blazers with copper buttons, each paid for 20 days' work. The spies also ordered other items of clothing, such as oversized bras, which they used to... harvest fruit.

5. Age of soldiers

The Vietnam War caused numerous protests in American society also because young people were dying. And it was true: the average age of a soldier is 22 years old, and that of an officer is 28 years old. And the oldest person to die in Vietnam was 63-year-old Kenna Clyde Taylor.

6. Super glue

War is always death and terrible wounds. And today it seems incredible that wounded American soldiers used superglue to get a chance at salvation. The wound, filled with glue, provided invaluable time for the soldiers to get to the medical unit and wait for the operation.

7. Life after the war

At one time, it was much said that in the United States, society treated Vietnam veterans very negatively after they returned home. Allegedly, crowds of protesters met the soldiers at the airport. But in most cases, none of this happened.

8. Seeding Clouds

The United States Army did not hesitate to use sabotage and sabotage to their advantage. One of the most interesting ways that the Americans used against the North Vietnamese army was Operation Popeye. As part of this operation, the Americans conducted 50 sorties of aircraft, during which silver iodide was dispersed in rain clouds, which led to heavy precipitation in 82 percent of cases. These rains were supposed to stop the military advance of the Vietnamese in certain areas. It was also supposed, by changing the weather, to flood specific areas, causing damage to crops, which should have left the Vietnamese army without provisions.

9. US Allies in the Vietnam War

Usually, when it comes to the Vietnam War, they mostly talk about the Americans. Although the United States had the largest number of soldiers in Vietnam, it also had troops from South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand fighting on its side. South Korea alone sent 312,853 troops to Vietnam between September 1963 and April 1975.

South Korean soldiers killed 41,000 North Vietnamese soldiers and 5,000 civilians. At the same time, only 4,687 South Koreans were killed during the war. 60,000 troops came from Australia and 3,000 from New Zealand.

10. Death card

It is likely that, thanks to Hollywood films, many have begun to associate Vietnam with the ace of spades. At the same time, many do not have the slightest idea about the true history of this famous symbol. The ace of spades was left on the bodies of dead soldiers as a warning. The Vietnamese were very superstitious people, and when the American troops found themselves intimidated by maps, the practice became widespread.

Fortunately, many years have passed since that terrible time, and Vietnam has become a flourishing and actively developing country. One of the attractions that attract the attention of tourists is. He is really wonderful.

The Vietnam War became an infantry war. American infantry operated everywhere, from wooded mountains to swampy river valleys. 81 infantry battalions of various types took part in the fighting.
Hundreds of thousands of American guys passed through Vietnam as part of infantry units. Soldiers of the military specialty IIB (I - combat operations, I - infantry, B - light infantry) bore the brunt of the Vietnam War.
Not all foot soldiers climbed the jungle, at least not always. Many infantrymen fought in armored vehicles and even as part of air cavalry crews - helicopters.
Infantrymen also acted on the rivers in the crews of monitors and armored boats, they fell down on the enemy from the sky with parachutes over their shoulders. But still, the bulk of the infantry, like centuries ago, measured distances with their feet ...
In 1965, when the American military presence in Vietnam began to grow sharply, only a third of the army was recruited. Of the 9,087,000 people who served in 1964-1973. 2,594,000 went to Vietnam, of which there were only 1,766,910 conscripts in the army, and just under 42,700 in the Marine Corps.
There were no conscripts in the Navy and Air Force at all (at least in Vietnam).
Each soldier received personal tokens - "Dog Tag" (dog tag). The token was a rectangle with rounded corners, which was made of stainless steel. Each was supposed to have two identification tokens, which were worn around the neck on a chain.
It was allowed to wear religious amulets around the neck, but not jewelry. In the event of the death of a soldier, the token on the long chain remained on the body, and the second, on the short chain, which was attached to the long one, was torn off for reporting.

"Dog Tag" was part of uniforms and was supposed to be worn all the time.
The surname, first name and initials were stamped on the tag, personal number, blood type, Rh factor, religion were stamped below the first name.
To prevent the tokens from ringing when colliding with each other, they were enclosed in plastic frames.
For most soldiers, the seven-digit personal number was preceded by the letters RA - Regular Army (three-year volunteer contract soldiers), US - United States (conscripts), ER - Enlisted Reserve, NG - National Guard.
From January 1968, the letters were canceled, and instead of a personal number, they began to apply the social card number.

Casual or work a uniform olive green, better known as "fatiques", was meant to be worn daily. Spacious a uniform consisted of a shirt that tucked into trousers. Trousers tucked into boots.
A uniform khaki color was sewn from 100% cotton. She needed to starch strongly and carefully iron the folds. Three pleats at the back: one in the center and two parallel to the center from the shoulders. The ironed uniform looked only a few hours, after which it looked as if they had slept in it.
Tropical later appeared a uniform made of woolen fabric (TW), much more practical than a cotton uniform. The winter set was sewn from 100% woolen fabric and was loved by the soldiers.
The helmet - "steel pot", "piss pot", "brain dome" (steel pot, urine pot, brain dome) - was worn on a liner. During basic training, camouflage covers were not worn on helmets, just "bald" helmets of olive green color. During the course of advanced training, reversible camouflage covers were worn on helmets.
The helmet with accessories weighed 3.5 pounds, but the soldiers got used to such weight in just a week.
Unpopular field caps or "baseball caps" were worn out of formation. The headgear was supposed to be removed indoors.

A uniform and the equipment of infantrymen in Vietnam was very different from the charter.
The recruit was issued three sets of tropical combat uniforms, two pairs of tropical combat boots, five olive green T-shirts and shorts, and two towels.
Baseball cap at will, you could buy yourself in the military store.
Spacious with many pockets a uniform for the jungle, "fatikees" was probably the most popular uniform in the army. Comfortable, lightweight, it was easy to wash and had a practical design.
Lightweight, with a fabric top, tropical boots had good ventilation and were also popular among soldiers.
Until 1968, chevrons were used as insignia, then stamped insignia appeared, which were worn in buttonholes. Also in 1968, shoulder straps were introduced.
Until 1970, while the transition period lasted, there were insignia of both the old and the new type, sometimes in a mixture.
Wearing regulations in Vietnam uniforms were not strictly observed. The reason for this was the climate, primitive living conditions and war.
Sleeves of shirts were often rolled up above the elbows, and around the neck, so that sweat from the head did not flow onto the body, a towel or scarf was tied. T-shirts were not worn at all under shirts.
Wearing a steel helmet in the field eventually became almost an inborn habit. The camouflage cover was usually worn with the green side facing out. On the covers of helmets, soldiers wrote all sorts of things with fountain pens, from the names of their units, the names of girlfriends to outright obscenity. In general, covers sometimes completely covered with graffiti. Elastic nets were used to fix branches and grass on helmets for camouflage purposes. More precisely, the nets were supposed to be used for this, but the soldiers stuffed cigarettes, matches, lighters, newspapers, marijuana and other useful little things into the nets.
There were local variants of the Vietnamese production of the standard military tropical panama with a brim. Panamas were often worn in the field, even in reconnaissance.
The use of parachute slings was considered practical as boot laces. One of the identification tokens was tied to the shoelace, sometimes both, one on the left boot, the second on the right.
A pair of universal bandoliers (ammo punch) was attached to the waist pistol belt in front, a first aid kit and a plastic flask on one side and a small combat kit (bull or ass pack) in the back.
A pair of belts were thrown over the shoulders, they were attached to the waist belt. On each shoulder strap were attached two pouches for 20 natrons each for an M14 rifle and small pouches for grenades.

The lid of the flask served as a glass for coffee or cocoa, and was also used for shaving - water was poured into it. If necessary, a sapper shovel was worn on the left thigh, more precisely, a “trench tool”.
This "tool" was taught not only to dig trenches, but also to kill the enemy. The possibility of attaching a bayonet-knife was provided for the shoulder blade.
The M1956 kit was the base kit for Vietnam. Even the nylon kit that appeared in 1967 repeated the M1956 kit in design.
Three things distinguished "Vietnamese" equipment from "authorized" equipment in the first place:
1) the soldiers took dry rations for several days;
2) according to the charter, the standard ammunition load for the M14 rifle consisted of five 20-round magazines, and nine 20-round magazines were supposed to be for the M16 rifle (modern 30-round magazines were not used at that time).
This ammunition was not enough to conduct an intense battle, and usually the soldiers tried to take two to three times more cartridges.
3) Water is another vital necessity. Under normal conditions, it was supposed to have one flask, but in Vietnam it was typical to have four to six flasks.
Officially, due to the high temperature, the soldier's load was limited to 65 pounds and was supposed to have only one C-ration (lunch ration).
Most unnecessary things in Vietnam were excluded from the wearable equipment (sleeping bag, gas mask, bayonet, fork), but absolutely necessary things were included: additional flasks of water, dry rations, ammunition, grenades, mosquito nets. We often slept on air mattresses.
Small backpacks in Vietnam turned out to be impractical, everything you need did not fit into them. Instead, they began to use tropical backpacks on lightweight aluminum frames.
The rucksack was loaded with rations for at least three days, at least a gallon of water in large flasks, ammunition, including Claymore mines.
Cartridges for the M16 rifle were placed in canvas bandoliers for seven magazines each. Usually each took two bandoliers. All pistol accessories turned out to be superfluous, a pistol belt was not taken at all, and flasks were placed in a backpack.
Also, on the field trip, the soldier took with him personal hygiene items (a toothbrush with toothpaste, soap, a towel, a razor, a shaving brush), several pairs of socks.
The soldiers went home in brand new uniform class A in green with all awards and distinctions.
The army paid for travel home, including airfare.