“In October 2012, Iran began deploying personnel to a military base in North Korea, in a mountainous area near the border with China. There were reports that Iranians from the Ministry of Defense and its contractors were working on missiles and other types of nuclear weapons there. Ahmad Wahidi, then Iranian defense minister, denied sending anyone to North Korea, but the anecdotal evidence makes sense in light of the fact that the two states announced a technical cooperation pact last month," writes The Daily Beast columnist Gordon G. Chang.

The 5+1 group seems determined to sign an agreement with Iran regarding its nuclear power program, which, in the opinion of the author of the article, is without a doubt a front for a wide-ranging nuclear weapons effort. The international community wants the framework agreement currently under discussion to ensure that Pyongyang will not be able to produce for at least a year. nuclear weapon, reminds Chang.

Negotiators from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China are trying to force Tehran to comply with an additional protocol that allows the IAEA to conduct dawn raids on any nuclear facilities, the article says.

"But no inspections Iranian objects will not solve the fundamental problem: as can be seen from the North Korean base that hosts Tehran's nuclear weapons experts, Iran is only integral part nuclear program covering the Asian continent," the journalist believes.

“Relations between the two regimes have a long history. Hundreds of North Koreans worked at about 10 nuclear and missile facilities in Iran. There were so many scientists, specialists and laboratory workers working in the field of nuclear weapons and missiles that they were given their own seaside resort, according to Henry Sokolsky, an expert on nuclear proliferation who wrote about it in 2003.

"Even if Iran now agrees to comply with the additional protocol, it can still continue to work on a bomb in North Korea, conducting research there or buying North Korean technologies and projects," Chang said.

"In other words, he will be one day away from building a bomb - the time of the flight from Pyongyang to Tehran - and not one year, as politicians in the United States and other countries hope," he believes.

"His contribution to the creation of the Iranian atomic bomb It's not just North Koreans who contribute. Iran received its first centrifuges from Pakistan, and the Pakistani program was a subsidiary project of China,” the author writes, arguing that China has provided serious assistance to Iran in its work on the creation of nuclear weapons, supplying the necessary equipment and materials for this.

"In the past few years, there has been a clear decline in Chinese supplies to Iran," Chan said. According to him, the reason, perhaps, is that China, firstly, has already supplied Iran with most of the weapons necessary for the creation, and secondly, it is transferring to Pyongyang leading role in the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"Theoretically, there is nothing wrong with signing an agreement with the Islamic Republic on nuclear weapons, but it makes no sense to make a deal with only one branch international program on its creation. That is why the 5+1 team needs to know what is going on at the isolated military base in the mountains of North Korea. And, perhaps, not only on this base," the journalist concludes.

Negotiations completed successfully in Lausanneunder a framework agreement with Iran. "Six" of international mediators composed ofUSA, UK, France, Germany, China, Russiasigned a document with Tehran restricting the development of Iran's nuclear programs in exchange for the lifting of fundamental sanctions. At the same time, Iran retains the right to a peaceful atom, including uranium enrichment. GIranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said that Tehran has set itself the task of entering the world nuclear fuel market. To this end, it is planned to introduce a number of new technological developments already available to Iran.

According to EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Federica Mogherini, the negotiators have reached basic agreements that form the basis for reaching a final agreement with Iran, scheduled for the end of June. Representatives of the "six" hope that this agreement will prevent the creation of an Iranian atomic bomb under the guise of a civilian nuclear program, and put an end to the international crisis, which has been going on for 12 years.

Iran has agreed to make its nuclear program as transparent as possible, not to develop new nuclear projects, and to abandon uranium enrichment at all facilities except one - at Natanz. If the International Energy Agency confirms that Tehran has complied with all the key terms of the agreement, the US and EU sanctions imposed on Iran will be suspended. If there is even the slightest suspicion that Iran is playing a dishonest game, comprehensive checks will be carried out.

Despite the fact that the United States and other countries regard the agreements reached with Iran as a great victory, the French side commented on the event very reservedly. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius noted that although the agreement is undoubtedly a step towards positive developments in the issue of Iran's nuclear program, "there is still work to be done." He advised Iran not to violate the agreement reached, the implementation of which France takes control of.

The only one who did not rejoice at the success of the negotiations with Iran was Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In his opinion, the agreement threatens the existence of Israel. Interestingly, at the same time, Israel is the only state in the Middle East that has long had its own nuclear weapons, their means of delivery, and, in general, a much more powerful scientific and technological base in the nuclear field than Iran. And, unlike Iran, Israel has not yet acceded to the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).

A costly path to compromise

Difficulties in relations between Iran and the world community arose in 2003. Then it turned out that Iran has been engaged in nuclear activities and developments for 18 years, despite the fact that it is an official member of the IAEA. The Iranian government was "surrendered" by the opposition party of the country, and then the information was confirmed by Western intelligence. The reason for accusations of Tehran's desire to obtain its own nuclear weapons was centrifuges for uranium enrichment, not registered by the IAEA, discovered in 2004. Later, the accusatory line of the West was based on the information that Iran began work on enriching its uranium to the level of 20%.
All attempts to organize fruitful negotiations with Iran on the termination of nuclear activities did not lead to anything, and with the coming to power of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, discussions on this issue ceased altogether.

In 2006, a dossier on Iran's nuclear program was submitted to the UN. Every year, from 2006 to 2010, the organization's Security Union adopted new sanctions, but they were not successful. The situation has moved from dead center when the EU and the US imposed their sanctions against Iran's nuclear program three years ago, which hit the country's economy very painfully. The two most critical sanctions are: a ban on oil and gas imports to the EU and the US and an exclusion from the SWIFT interbank system.

Analysts have calculated that from 2012 to 2013, Iranian oil exports fell by a million barrels a day, which in monetary terms amounted to $40 billion a year. During the same period, about $100 billion of Iranian petrodollars were blocked in Western banks. Since the Iranian banking system was cut off from the rest of the world during the process of sanctions, this led to a decrease in foreign trade by about a third, equivalently increasing the cost of imports. As a result, Iran's GDP in 2013 fell by 6.6%.

As soon as Hassan Rouhani came to power, an agreement was reached in Geneva, which became the first step towards the Iranian nuclear compromise. Meetings between Iran and the Six began to take place every month, but the deadlines for the final agreement were constantly shifted due to ideological and political differences, as well as certain technological difficulties. And finally, on April 2, a basic agreement was reached between Iran and the mediators. So the road to this event was really long and difficult.

The agreement with Iran, first of all, is beneficial for the EU and the US, because they suffer significant losses from anti-Iranian sanctions. From 1995 to 2012, according to official data from American experts, the US lost about $175 billion in potential export earnings from trade with Iran. In addition, America and Europe are planning to forge new relations with the Middle East in order to reduce gas dependence on Russia. Iran, by the way, understands well. According to President Hassan Rouhani, "Iran has a unique status in the energy sector, so it can be a reliable source of energy for Europe."

Nuclear reserves

According to Barack Obama, after the April agreement reached, the world can sleep peacefully without fear of the Iranian nuclear threat. But is it really that scary nuclear capability Iran? Interestingly, Iran was one of the first states to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signing it in 1969 and ratifying it in 1970. Four years later, Tehran signed a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, which provides for regular inspections on Iranian territory.

The beginning of the development of the Iranian nuclear program was laid back in the 60s, and, surprisingly, with the active support of the United States and Europe. The first nuclear reactor with a capacity of 5 MW, using more than 5.5 kg of highly enriched uranium as fuel, was presented by Washington to the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. In parallel, France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, and Germany took part in the nuclear power development program in Iran, participating in the construction of two nuclear power plants in Bushehr and Ahvaz, supplying equipment and nuclear fuel, training specialists.

The overthrow of the Shah's regime and the establishment of a republican form of government in Iran led to a break in relations with the West. It was possible to continue the nuclear program only in the 90s, with new partners in the person of China and Russia. The latter, in particular, was completing the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr. With the coming to power of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the pace of development of the nuclear industry, including uranium enrichment technologies, has increased dramatically. To this end, a plant for the production of heavy water was built in Arak, a uranium enrichment plant in Natanz, and a nuclear research reactor in Keredzh.

Currently, Iran has seven centers for the development and production of missile technology that can be used for the potential delivery of nuclear weapons. According to experts, the Iranian armed forces have ballistic missiles smaller and medium range up to 1.600 km. At the same time, it is planned to create ballistic missiles with a much greater flight range (including Shehab-5 and Shehab-6) and a firing range of 3,000 to 6,000 km. In the coming years, there will also be a Sajil-2 ballistic missile with an estimated range of at least 2,000 km. Potentially, these missiles can be used against Israeli as well as American military bases located in the zone Persian Gulf. In 2011, Iran announced its intention to produce carbon-fiber composite materials, which, according to experts, indicates the country's readiness to create ballistic missiles intercontinental range.

Iran's production volumes of low-enriched and medium-enriched uranium (up to 5% and 20%, respectively) and the existing research and production nuclear base indicate that Iran has a really real potential for creating nuclear weapons. And if he decides to create it, he will find a way to do it, bypassing all the agreements: after all, it was not for nothing that for many years no one knew that Tehran had secret nuclear programs.

Therefore, the world can hardly sleep peacefully, especially since there is e also Israel, whose assets are no longer supposed, but quite real nuclear weapons, aviation and missile means of their delivery, covered by modern national anti-missile systems. Obviously, without a comprehensive settlement of the Iranian and Israeli nuclear problems, as well as the elimination chemical weapons Israel, the creation of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East is simply impossible.

The problem of the possibility of Iran's creation of nuclear weapons has long been among the first topics of world politics. In recent months and days, she has become one of the main ones. Especially after the last week Iranian President M. Ahmadinejad, speaking at the youth conference "A World Without Zionism", stated the following: "Imam Khomeini said that the Zionist regime should be wiped off the face of the earth and with the help of divine power the world will live without the United States and Israel." Although the president only quoted the words of the late ayatollah, his words, perceived by many as an unofficial declaration of war on Israel, were condemned with varying degrees of harshness throughout the non-Muslim world, including Russia. The Palestinian leader openly distanced himself from the words of the Iranian president. Some figures in Iran, including those in the ruling circles, pointed out that the statement is contrary to Iranian interests and exacerbates the country's foreign policy positions.

There were rumors that higher spiritual guidance country, which has most of the real power, intends to limit the powers of the president in the field foreign policy. Most of the leaders of Muslim countries remained silent.

But the statement sharply aggravated the discussion around the problem of Iran and nuclear weapons. Now it will no longer fade into the background and may, in the coming months, lead to a sharp aggravation of the international situation. Russia faces a difficult problem.

I will try to give my own, of course, as far as possible an objectivist interpretation of this most complicated situation.

Iran, with its more than sixty million people, has managed to make significant progress in recent decades. Unlike all other Muslim countries in the wider Middle East, the country managed to curb population growth even before the start of the oil boom, showed growth in GNP per capita. Its elite, both spiritual and secular, are not only highly educated. Iran by the standards of the region is a relatively democratic state. There is an opposition press, regularly closed, opposition parties, whose representatives are often not allowed before the elections. This "democracy" is "over-managed", even by our standards, but much more developed than in many CIS countries. Elections are being held in Iran. The current president, considered a radical conservative, won the election of a more moderate former president Rafsanjani, head of the Expediency Council, one of two supreme bodies through which the religious elite actually governs the country.

The Iranian elite believes that the country is in a strategic environment and does not trust or fear most of its neighbors. She has reasons for this. No one helped Iran in the war with Iraq, even when Hussein used chemical weapons.

The United States, which has not been able to forget the humiliation associated with the overthrow of the Shah and the taking of hostages in the American embassy for three decades, and suspecting Tehran of supporting a number of terrorist movements, is pursuing an openly hostile policy towards Iran. Only recently have there been signs of readiness for dialogue. The Americans dominate neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq and are very influential in a nuclear-armed Pakistan. The Iranian elite, which feels like the heir to the great Persia, treats its Arab neighbors with suspicion, if not contempt. Nearby is not officially, but really nuclear Israel, to which Tehran treats with undisguised hostility and suspicion. The feeling is mutual. The country feels wounded, seeks to break out of international semi-isolation and ensure the country's security. The view from Tehran suffers from a "besieged fortress" complex, strikingly reminiscent of the worldview Soviet leadership late 70s - early 80s.

It is against this background that Iran's nuclear program is developing. Officially, Iran, a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), says it does not build such weapons. But few people believe him, although he has not yet formally violated the Treaty.

With all due respect to the leadership of Iran, I do not believe his assurances either. Any country in the geopolitical situation of Iran, which has neither allies nor security guarantees, seeking to improve its political status, would strive to create weapons, or at least to get the opportunity to create them. Especially with India, Pakistan, Israel in front of our eyes, who created nuclear weapons without losing their political status.

But understanding is not the same as accepting. Obtaining weapons by Iran threatens to seriously undermine regional and global security. An almost fatal blow to the NPT will be dealt, neighboring Arab countries(Saudi Arabia, Egypt) will receive a powerful incentive to build their own bomb. The race may turn nuclear weapons in the most explosive region of the world. We will have to forget about the "strategic stability" formula. We will have to think about how to manage strategic instability. No one can rule out preemptive strikes. The possession of nuclear weapons by an ideological regime that fears everyone and develops delivery systems of great antiquity cannot but create a sense of danger in many countries - from Europe to Russia and China. Nor will it enhance Iran's security. He will automatically become a target for arsenals nuclear powers including, I think, Russia.

What to do. After the Iranian president's statement, it is unlikely that anyone will veto the imposition of new sanctions against Iran if the issue of its nuclear weapons does come to the Security Council. But these sanctions will be obviously ineffective, like most sanctions, and will only strengthen the radical elements in Iran.

Whether there is still an opportunity to stop Iran's nuclear program, which looks like a military one, will largely depend on the leadership of Iran. But also from the skillful diplomacy of other countries. First of all the USA. A few months ago, after decades of hostile ignorance, they seemed to hint at the possibility of direct negotiations, and the "European troika", which played the role of "good cop" but achieved little from Tehran, could do something. The latter, it seems, even managed to use negotiations with her to gain time.

Russia will have to get involved more actively, as it secretly plays the role of yet another intermediary. We have almost completed the construction of Bushehr, despite severe pressure, and have proved to all potential customers of nuclear reactors that we are a reliable partner.

But we didn't build Bushehr for a power that violates the NPT.

I think that we should try to solve the problem of Iran's nuclearization in a broader context. Russia hinted at it, and now it must openly and clearly offer it. The main driving force behind Iran's suspected nuclear program is the Iranian elite's sense of insecurity, the widespread distrust of each other in the wider Middle East region.

It is high time to propose the creation of a security system for this region, guaranteed by the great powers, including India and China. It is necessary to initiate the Helsinki process for the region with the participation of these powers. Otherwise, even if we Once again and solve the "Iranian crisis", he and others like him will arise again and again.

IRAN AND ITS OPPONENTS.

How is the game played around Iranian nuclear weapons and what is its meaning?

Vladimir Novikov – Lead Analyst MOF-ETC

The issue of the Iranian nuclear program is one of the most pressing issues in world politics. This issue attracts the special attention of diplomats, special services, experts, and the media.

The focus of the expert community is the nature of the Iranian nuclear program, the possible timing for Tehran to receive both the nuclear bomb itself and its means of delivery, the possible consequences of Iran's nuclear status, and so on. All this, of course, deserves the most careful discussion.

However, this study is about something else. The fact that the Iranian nuclear program cannot be considered separately from Tehran's missile development. It is not enough to learn how to make nuclear warheads. We also need delivery vehicles for these warheads. And these can either be strategic aviation or missiles. And if so, then the discussion of the issue of the presence in Iran of missiles that make it possible to deliver a nuclear warhead to the desired point is absolutely necessary. The question of whether Iran has missiles of the required type is no less important than the questions of how close the Iranian side is to the technology of uranium enrichment, how much nuclear raw materials it has already managed to enrich, and so on.

An analysis of some transactions for the sale of missile technology to Iran allows us to clarify a lot about Iran's military capabilities, its real strategy, the nature of its international policy, the ratio of rhetoric and real actions in this policy.

Supply chains to Iran will be discussed below military equipment, weapons, materials and "sensitive technologies". The goal is not to clarify the military-technical details, but to reveal the paradoxicality of both the Iranian nuclear plots that attract sharp attention, and Iranian policy in general. Reveal the discrepancy between the "officially accepted" version of events in the world community and the real state of affairs. And, moving from the particular to the general, to prove that the generally accepted scheme - "fundamentalist Iran against Western civilization" - contains very significant flaws, that this scheme cannot be adopted as soon as we want to adequately discuss and solve the key problems of the 21st century.

Any major military program in third world countries, which certainly includes Iran, cannot be discussed without answering the question of who is the specific sponsor of this program. And if we are talking about nuclear programs - the program for the manufacture of warheads, the program for the creation of means of delivery of warheads - then the answer to the question about the sponsor (sponsors) of these programs is of paramount importance. Moreover, we are talking about different programs, as well as about different types sponsorship (political, technological, financial, and so on). For without reference to specific sponsors specific programs the discussion of the Iranian nuclear problem becomes too rhetorical and pointless.

After all, there is convincing evidence that Iran in its current state is not capable of independently developing and creating either its own nuclear weapons or their means of delivery. Without in any way wishing to belittle the scientific and technical capabilities of the "third world" countries in general and Iran in particular, we nevertheless consider it necessary to stipulate that in order to solve the nuclear problem on our own, it is necessary to have not only the appropriate personnel (scientists, engineers, workers) , but also the corresponding industrial modules: a diverse high-quality industry of the corresponding profile, a resource base, and not only the base for the extraction of raw materials, but also the base for processing this raw material (in relation to uranium raw materials, we are talking about very complex processing), and much more. So-called "hot chambers", reactor equipment, etc. Calculations show that even having thrown all its intellectual and industrial potential to the creation of nuclear weapons, Iran in the form in which it exists cannot solve this problem on its own.

As for attracting the opportunities of others, more developed countries, there are many obstacles along the way. Iran's access to the means of implementing the nuclear program, which the world community has, is formally limited by numerous harsh sanctions that the United States and its allies imposed on official Tehran after the 1979 Islamic revolution.

Thus, Tehran can obtain nuclear capabilities only from the wrong hands and only through the so-called "closed channels". Those who have what Iran needs will not use their opportunities and their closed channels in its interests, guided solely by philanthropy. Or even elementary considerations of primitive economic benefit. They will decide on the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran only if it can provide them with something extremely significant in return. What exactly?

The answer to such a question requires consideration of the phenomenon of the so-called Great Game. For only within its framework are certain options for exchanging some kind of Iranian "offer" for Iranian nuclear "demand" possible.

What kind of "proposal" are we talking about? And can there be any kind of “offer” at all? In search of an answer, we turn to the history of the issue. Iranian nuclear project - background

When people talk about the Iranian nuclear program, they usually mean the research in the nuclear sphere that modern Iran is conducting. That is, the state that emerged after the Islamic revolution of 1979 during the Khomeini regime and post-Khomeinist transformations. However, historical data speak of an earlier stage of work on both the peaceful nuclear program and the military components of nuclear research.

As is known, the shah's regime stood at the origins of Iran's nuclear program, and on March 5, 1957, it signed an agreement with the United States on the beginning of cooperation in the field of nuclear research of an exclusively peaceful nature 1 .

Ten years later, in 1967, Tehran bought a 5 MW reactor from the US. In the same year, the Americans supplied the Tehran Nuclear Science and Technology Center with several grams of plutonium for research purposes and "hot chambers" capable of processing up to 600 grams of plutonium per year 2 .

The Shah's Iran had extensive plans to develop research in the nuclear field. According to the plan of the Pahlavi administration up to 2000, up to 30 billion dollars were to be spent on nuclear problems 3 . The program itself provided for the construction of 23 nuclear reactors 4 . To implement all these large-scale undertakings, the Organization was created atomic energy Iran (UAEI). The main activity of this structure was the import of equipment and the creation of infrastructure for the implementation of the nuclear program 5 .

Technological assistance to the Shah's regime in atomic matters was provided in the 1970s by Germany and France. Agreements were reached with them on the construction of several nuclear power plants in Iran 6 .

In 1974, Iran purchased two nuclear reactors from France and West Germany. And in 1977, four more were added to them, all purchased in the same Germany. Moreover, nuclear scientists from Bonn immediately take on another important project - the construction of two nuclear power units in Bushehr 7 .

In 1970, Iran joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). And the Shah's regime declared the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program. However, was this true?

Russian military experts (for example, V. Yaremenko, a leading researcher at the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation) claim that another shah has begun to work on the military component of the Iranian nuclear program. And the American administration indulged him in this (apparently, quite consciously). As evidence, the recently declassified State Department Memorandum No. 292 "On cooperation between the US and Iran in the field of nuclear research" of 1975, signed personally by Henry Kissinger 8 , is cited.

According to this document, the United States offered Iran assistance in developing full cycle uranium enrichment. And these technologies can already be used for military purposes. Interestingly, the future "anti-Iranian hawks" - D. Cheney, D. Rumsfeld, P. Wolfowitz, who held various positions in the administration of D. Ford 9 - were in favor of nuclear cooperation with Iran at that time.

The following year, 1976, President Ford personally issued a directive, according to which the Shah's regime was offered to buy the technology for obtaining plutonium from uranium raw materials. Washington intended to supply Iran with 6-8 nuclear reactors worth $6.4 billion. In addition, Washington offered Tehran to buy a 20% stake in a nuclear fuel plant for $1 billion.

In fact, the Ford administration offered the Shah's regime unprecedented assistance in the peaceful and, in the future, in the military development of atomic energy - gaining access to plutonium production technology. To a large extent, Washington, assisting the Iranian nuclear program, destabilized the situation not only in the Middle East, but also in the world.

Of course, the Shah's Iran is not the Iran of Khomeini, Ahmadinejad or even Rafsanjani. However, Iran is a state that, for certain reasons, will always be perceived with caution by its neighbors. Iran is the bearer of a different, non-Arab ethnic (Persian) and religious (Shiite) principles. And its nuclear program, combined with the then US-Israeli orientation, could not but worry both the Sunni Arab neighbors and Turkey, whose wariness towards the Persian neighbor has a long historical tradition. And in the era of the Shah, all this was supplemented by the fact that Tehran was actually the main ally of the United States and Israel in the Middle East, with all the ensuing consequences.

If so, then the United States of the Ford era, providing Iran with ever greater nuclear preferences, simply could not fail to understand all the consequences of Iran's "nuclear pumping". Moreover, among the significant consequences of the transfer of nuclear technologies (including double ones) to Iran was the loss of the monopoly by the pool of nuclear players that existed at that time. Even then, non-proliferation problems were extremely acute. And the expansion of the circle of nuclear players bore costs, including for the United States, giving rise to all the global risks associated with the so-called spread of nuclear weapons.

In addition, Iran has not been as stable an ally of the US as Israel. And giving Iran nuclear technology dual-use turned into a super-risky undertaking. After all, the instability of Shah Iran became obvious long before 1979!

And yet, the United States and the collective West took the risk of a potential nuclear armament of the Shah's Iran. Available now in open access The documentary base actually leaves no doubt about this.

Let us emphasize that such a policy of the United States differed to a serious extent from the policy of their then main opponent, the USSR. Let's bring specific example. At about the same time, in the 1950s and 1970s, Iraq began to carry out its nuclear program. Without going into the details of the Iraqi plots, we will only point out that the USSR, the USA, and France took part in the Iraqi nuclear program. And let us single out here what interests us most, the Soviet position.

And it consisted in promoting exclusively peaceful nuclear initiatives, hindering the military components of the Iraqi nuclear program.

Thus, in particular, when the Soviet-Iraqi intergovernmental agreement on assistance in the implementation of the nuclear program was signed in 1959, its exclusively peaceful nature was specifically stipulated. This position was a reflection of the personal position of the then Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who was categorically in favor of refusing to transfer nuclear weapons secrets to "third countries" - from the PRC to the states of the Middle East 11 .

But even in post-Khrushchev times, in 1975, in response to the request of the then Vice President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, to transfer a more advanced nuclear reactor, the Soviet leaders demanded that their Iraqi counterpart cooperate in the nuclear sphere with the IAEA 12 . As you know, Hussein eventually received nuclear technologies for military purposes, but not from the USSR, but from France.

Back to Iranian nuclear issues, we point out that after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, nuclear research was frozen. The fact is that the leader of the Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, considered nuclear weapons "anti-Islamic", which determined the position of the Iranian authorities in relation to this problem for many years 13 .

However, already in the first post-revolutionary generation of the Iranian regime, there were people who considered it necessary to continue the nuclear program (including its military component).

Among these people was a prominent associate of Khomeini, the general secretary of the Islamic Republican Party, Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti. He told Khomeini in one of the discussions of the early 1980s: “Your duty is, first of all, to create an atomic bomb for the Islamic Republican Party. Our civilization is on the verge of destruction, and if we want to protect it, we need nuclear weapons.” 14 .

But Beheshti was killed in a terrorist attack on June 28, 1981. And supporters of a new deployment of the Iranian nuclear program have long postponed the implementation of their plans.

Iranian resuscitation nuclear project in the late 1980s

Iran's nuclear research was resumed only in 1987. By this time, Khomeini, who was still a religious leader, had changed his position on the nuclear issue and authorized the resumption of the Iranian nuclear program. when Iraq actively used weapons of mass destruction (chemical, for example) during hostilities, and also launched rocket attacks on major Iranian cities (including Tehran) and strategic facilities (including shelling in 1987 and 1988 of blocks of the mothballed Bushehr nuclear power plant) 16 .

However, Khomeini has by no means become a particular zealot for Iran's nuclear program. He simply succumbed to both reality and the political pressure of his associates, who were gaining political power. The resuscitation of the Iranian nuclear program was essentially due to the strengthening of the positions of H.A. Rafsanjani and the success of his political course. H.A. Rafsanjani, being a representative of the reformist wing of the Iranian leadership, considered it absolutely necessary to turn Iran into a superpower, albeit under the slogans of an Islamic revolution. And the nuclear program was for him and his associates one of the tools for such a transformation 17 .

It should be noted that at present, the current Iranian President M. Ahmadinejad is considered to be the most ardent "atomic radical". And this is largely true. Ahmadinejad himself makes no secret of his commitment to the "atomic choice".

However, a careful analysis of the problem shows that the Iranian nuclear program was carried out under the Shah, under the late Khomeini, and in post-Khomeinist Iran. As we can see, it is more likely that a representative of a certain part of Iranian fundamentalists will abandon the nuclear program because of their religious attitudes than this or that rational politician oriented towards Westernization, like the Shah, or Iranian Islamic superpower, like Rafsanjani.

It is unlikely that the change of a specific leader in Tehran (for example, Ahmadinejad to Rafsanjani or another reformer Mousavi) will change anything in the attitude of Iranian leaders towards Iran's nuclear program.

It is known, for example, that the main candidate from the "reformist forces" in the Iranian presidential elections in 2009, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, spoke during the election campaign about the need to continue the Iranian nuclear program. True, he stipulated that he would strive to ensure that Iran's nuclear program was not of a military nature. But from time to time something similar can be heard from the lips of Ahmadinejad. And it is absolutely clear that all the talk about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program is just a tribute to the conjuncture. And that, in fact, Iranian politicians are striving not for peaceful, but for military atom.

Mousavi's statement is dated April 2009 18 . His reservation that he will seek exclusively the peaceful use of the Iranian atom is, of course, important. But only as an illustration of the game that the Iranian elites are playing around the nuclear project. Within the framework of this game, different rhetoric is acceptable. But only insofar as it provides a solution main task- the task of bringing Iran to new, regional-superpower frontiers. Moreover, Iran is not India and not China. He does not need to make up for the shortage of gas and oil with the help of peaceful nuclear reactors. It has no shortage of these strategically important minerals.

Real assistance to Iran in the resumption of its nuclear program was provided, firstly, by China and, secondly, by Pakistan.

The Chinese side delivered a small reactor 19 to the research center in Isfahan. In addition, in 1993, Beijing promised to assist Tehran in completing the nuclear power plant in Bushehr by providing labor and technology, as well as in building a new nuclear power plant in southwestern Iran (the capacity of the facility is 300 MW). In 1995, another agreement was reached - on the construction of a uranium enrichment plant near Isfahan 20 . Also back in 1990, an agreement was signed between China and Iran for a period of 10 years on the training of Iranian specialists in the nuclear field 21 .

Such active cooperation between Tehran and Beijing in the nuclear field caused a negative reaction from the United States. And in 1999, Iranian-Chinese cooperation was officially curtailed. But only officially. This is evidenced by the fact that already in 2002, the US authorities imposed sanctions against three firms from China that supplied Iran with substances and materials that could be used for the production of weapons. mass destruction 22 .

As regards Iranian-Pakistani contacts in the nuclear sphere, it is known that in 1987 Islamabad and Tehran concluded a secret agreement on cooperation in the field of nuclear research 23 . We will cover the subject of Pakistani-Iranian cooperation in detail below. Here we simply record that such cooperation took place.

Russia, most often accused of condoning and sponsoring the Iranian nuclear project, only joined in 1992. And it should be noted that the Russian share in the Iranian project is the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr, which is under the strict control of the IAEA and is of an exclusively peaceful nature. China, Pakistan and North Korea as actors in the Iranian nuclear game

An analysis of existing data suggests that the various components of the Iranian nuclear missile program most often have their source in the chain North Korea - Iran - Pakistan. With the explicit technological sponsorship of China.

In March, Republicans in the US Senate sent a bizarre open letter Iranian leaders, telling them that any nuclear deal they make with President Obama will be blown to smithereens by Congress. At first glance it might seem that the Republicans want for Iran to develop nuclear weapons. But it's not. With this letter, they make it clear that they do not want Obama to make a deal that will allow Iran to get away with it. In addition, the heating of passions and tension - good way insure that he still can not do it.

But why is everyone so afraid of it? Can Iran become the second North Korea? Will they one day be able to press the red button and strike at the very heart of Tel Aviv? Will they use this argument to intimidate us into denying us access to foreign oil? Or, despite all our fears, will Iran become a responsible member of the international community, albeit with a nuclear arsenal?

To figure out what the world might be like if the Islamic Republic of Iran started producing nuclear weapons, I asked for clarification from two experts: William H. Middle East and South Asia in Stratfor.

VICE: Before we move on to discussing hypothetical scenarios, what is the likelihood that Iran can develop a nuclear weapon?

William H. Tobey: They took some steps that caused some pretty serious action on the part of International agency on nuclear energy and the United Nations Security Council, so I don't think it's possible. But everything can change at any moment.

Kamran Bokhari: The main question is: do they want to have nuclear weapons or do they want to have geopolitical influence. What is more important for them? Maintaining influence in Syria. Is cooperation with ISIS a threat to get tough retaliatory steps from the US? To be sure that the Shiites will keep power in Iraq? Does Hezbollah remain the dominant force in Lebanon? To be sure that the Houthis continue to dominate Yemen? These questions interest Iran more than nuclear weapons.

Well, okay, let's say they got the guns. What can happen? Bohari: They would quietly develop the technology and not test it until the coast was cleared. Or not experience it at all. If I were Iranian, then why would I test the technology, knowing that it would provoke the wrath of the international community? I'm already under sanctions. I'm already negotiating to get rid of the sanctions and now I'm doing something that can only make the sanctions worse. This would mean the leveling of all the concessions they have won, especially in negotiations with the United States over the past two years.

Toby: This completely changes the calculation of the risk for Iran. This will give Iran the opportunity to destabilize the situation in the region. This may lead to escalation of conflicts with their neighbors. They would have known that Iran could go to extreme measures and this could cause, for example, a wave of terrorist attacks in the region.

Is Israel afraid of this?Bohari: If you look at the size of Israel, you can understand that the existence of an enemy state that could potentially use nuclear weapons against Israel is tantamount to the end of the world for the latter, and they will not survive even one blow. The fact is that countries like Israel cannot afford to build several scenarios for the development of events, whether the enemy will do something or not. Usually, the military-strategic doctrines of such countries are built on the basis of only the worst-case scenarios.

Toby: They hear people in Iran saying "Israel is a one-bomb country" and they fear that a slightly more extreme government than the current one with certain religious beliefs might find the apocalypse beneficial from some point of theirs. vision. So think the people who are now in power in Israel, for them it is a matter of existence. And if nuclear weapons appear in Israel, people will not want to live there. This weapon causes massive destruction.

What will happen to Israel in the event of a nuclear strike? Toby: First of all, people discuss political and economic effect. For the remaining people, this would mean the realization that they are no longer safe. One bomb will not literally destroy the whole country. One nuclear strike cannot destroy Israel, but if the economic and political viability of the country is undermined, in effect removing the sense of security, Israel can fall apart as a state. This, of course, is difficult to imagine, but, unfortunately, there are people who want this. The biggest impact will not be the bomb itself, but the secondary effects.

Bohari: For many years, there has been the idea "that the Israelis are going to attack Iranian nuclear facilities." Let's talk about what this might entail: this operation requires a certain number of aircraft, fuel, aerial refueling capability, a calculated flight path to penetrate god knows how many meters of concrete under which Iranian nuclear facilities are buried, which, moreover, dispersed over many kilometers. Not to mention that Iran is physically located 1200 km from Israel. If you do some simple calculations, you will see that there are certain physical and technical difficulties that must be taken into account before conclusions can be drawn about whether Israel can successfully strike at nuclear facilities.

Toby: I think the real threat will be that this will give Tehran the opportunity to be more active in its support for groups like Hezbollah, and the fear of a backlash from the United States or Israel will decrease, because nuclear weapons reduce the chances of action against the forces of them possessing. Hezbollah is now present in both Lebanon and Syria. In terms of a [non-nuclear] attack on Israel, the attack could start from the north.

Bukhari A: The United States won't go for it because - and again, you can never be sure - but by negotiating with Iran, you're keeping Iran in the bad guy role. You do not want to attack him, which will turn into sympathy for him around the world. The Chinese and Russians will then refuse to negotiate. I'm sure the Europeans would be shocked as well.

Toby: Iranians will make arguments that for like 300 years or so their borders have remained virtually unchanged, and that Iran does not wage wars of conquest, and if you analyze the history over the past few centuries, it turns out that in essence, such a statement is true . But what Iran has been doing is using groups or governments it controls in other countries to spread its influence. Thus, in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, Iranian influence is very strong, and this is carried out at the expense of other countries in the region, namely the Sunni countries. The spread of Shiism is Iran's strategic goal, [although] probably not only that. I am sure that it is much more profitable for Tehran to have a friendly government in Baghdad than, for example, Saddam's government, which waged a very difficult and long war against Iran.

Will it economic influence to other countries, such as the USA?Bukhari: I think the biggest economic impact will be felt by Iran itself. This will lead to new sanctions.

Toby: Fairly long lasting cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. If the Cold War heats up, this could affect oil flows because oil production or refining capacity in Saudi Arabia could be damaged, which could affect oil prices and our economic interests. We are not so sensitive to this development of the situation, because now we produce enough oil at home, and China is the largest buyer of Saudi oil. But global economic flows are so interdependent that a recession in China could affect the United States.

Does Iran know how to deal with nuclear weapons, or can they do something stupid? Toby: If you put into service a nuclear weapon, the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch increases. A whole new country possessing nuclear weapons. You don't know what their launch rules are, for example, American systems have special locks that prevent unauthorized launch. Will Iranian weapons be equipped with such mechanisms? And even if they had them, what would their command and control structure look like? Who is responsible? Supreme leader? The president? Can one person give the order for the use of nuclear weapons.

Bukhari: You can miscalculate, but you are not going to intentionally do something stupid. [For example, when the Islamic State militants] burned the pilot, which was an act of barbarism, I'm sure there was a certain logic behind it. It doesn't happen like this: “You know, I want to cut off my leg today. Can I go burn another Jordanian pilot?” This is not an intentional error. Behind the madness is a purpose.

Is it possible for Iran to transfer nuclear warheads groups like Hezbollah or Hamas? Toby: There are people who are worried about this, and there are people who object that this is unlikely, given that such weapons will put Iran on the trail, and the consequences will be so serious, up to a military operation against Iran, so I think they are from refrain from such. But I think it's a difficult question. We know that Iran has supported terrorist attacks against civilians. Can such a policy be continued in the form of the transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists? I don't know.

Bukhari: You can't find a nuclear weapon lying on a shelf somewhere, take it and go use it. It is not so easy. They are in a deactivated state, unless a situation has occurred in which the weapon must be brought to full combat readiness. We at Stratfor considered this issue in 2006. We have done a lot of research on missile-based chemical, biological, and radiation weapons that could be in the possession of non-state actors, and frankly, we have come to the conclusion that, given the infrastructure required for such weapons, possession of such weapons by non-state actors is virtually impossible. You need territory, resources, technical know-how and capabilities, so it's just not possible. It's like that horror story that the Taliban tribes in Pakistan could get their hands on a nuclear bomb, which sounds absolutely fantastic.

Could the acquisition of such weapons by Iran turn out in any way that is not terrible? Bukhari: One cannot rule out the possibility of working with Iran to counter the Deschamps and the jihadists. The idea that the United States and Iran might share some ideas is not beyond decency. We have done this in the past. The United States has a history of dealing with dubious subjects. Washington worked with Stalin to defeat Nazi Germany. He worked with communist China, dealt with Soviet Union. We toppled the Taliban regime by cooperating with the Iranians, and coordinated and cooperated to bring down Saddam's regime. These actions are not black, but not white either.

Toby: I just do not know. I hope this can be avoided.