WASHINGTON, Oct 2- RIA News. The IAEA's Incident and Trafficking Database program is "under threat" from Russia because of the Litvinenko affair. This statement was made by US Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford, who is responsible for international security and non-proliferation.

This is a program to track incidents and illegal trafficking of nuclear materials - "the only one in the world that tries to keep a record of radioactive and nuclear materials that are not under control," he said.

According to the official, information about "the Kremlin's use of radioactive polonium to poison Alexander Litvinenko in 2006" has recently entered the database of this program. At the same time, Ford did not explain exactly how Russia threatens the IAEA.

The politician also said that in the territory former USSR there have been several cases of smuggling of radioactive materials, including in Georgia and Moldova in the 2000s.

“There have been at least a couple of cases with Chechen groups in Russia where terrorists have tried to use dirty bombs (using radioactive materials. — Approx. ed.), albeit without success. Partly due to decades of weak security measures in Russia and In other parts of the post-Cold War former Soviet Union — problems that US aid programs were able to help fix for a while — we can't be sure how much radioactive and nuclear material is already on the black market," the assistant secretary of state said.

Litvinenko case

Former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko fled to the UK, where he died in November 2006 shortly after receiving British citizenship. This happened after a joint tea party with entrepreneurs Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitry Kovtun.

An examination revealed a significant amount of radioactive polonium-210 in his body. The main suspect is Lugovoi. He denies the accusations and calls the trial a "theatrical farce".

Moscow stated that the case was politicized, and the investigation was not transparent.

What's going on with Russian nuclear material protection programs? Can Minatom be controlled and how closed is it from Russian society?

Question: How big is the Russian black market for radioactive materials and what are the latest trends in this illegal business? Who are the sellers and who are the potential buyers in this black market?

Answer. Elena Sokova: Let's first define what we mean by the "black market for radioactive materials." Very often the concepts of nuclear and radioactive materials are used interchangeably, which is not correct. In fact, radioactive materials are a very broad category that includes fissile materials (used both for military purposes and for the production of nuclear fuel); and radioactive isotopes, mainly used in industry and medicine; and, finally, radioactive waste generated from various fissile material operations. The first category of materials is usually referred to as nuclear materials. Among them, weapons-grade nuclear materials are especially singled out, that is, those materials that can be used to produce a nuclear bomb with little or no additional processing. Such materials include plutonium-239 and highly enriched uranium with more than 90 percent uranium-235. Uranium of lower enrichment, but with a uranium-235 content of at least 20 percent, can also be used to create weapons, but in this case, the amount of uranium to create a bomb increases many times over. For example, if 90% uranium needs only 8 kg, then 20% uranium will require at least about 60 kg.

As far as the "black market" is concerned, until recently it was mainly about the "black market" of nuclear materials that can be used for the production of weapons. The possibility of leakage of such nuclear materials caused and causes the greatest concern, since it is precisely the complexity of their production that is the main obstacle for countries or terrorist organizations seeking to create nuclear weapons. Potential buyers may include states, terrorists, international organized crime groups, separatist ethnic or religious groups, and so on.

Low enriched uranium and other elements of the uranium group, as well as isotopes, unlike the previous category, are available on the commercial market. Of course, nuclear fuel will not be sold to everyone. On the other hand, none nuclear power plant will not buy nuclear fuel cheaply from an unknown dealer. It's the same story with isotopes. "Black market nuclear waste seems unlikely, although Lately aggravated concerns about the creation of the so-called. a "dirty" or radiation bomb in which conventional explosives are used to disperse radioactive material. It should be borne in mind, however, that the degree of contamination of the area caused by the use of a "dirty bomb" is greatly exaggerated - the danger to the life and health of the population is many orders of magnitude less, and only a relatively small area can be contaminated.

Therefore, let's limit ourselves to the consideration of the black market for nuclear materials. Like any market, it is determined by the presence of supply and demand and their relationship. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was found that the system of control and protection of nuclear materials was closely related to a certain political and economic system, including the absence of private enterprise, the monopoly of foreign trade, strict control of border crossings, etc. The system, designed to counter an external enemy (foreign spies or armies), was not designed for the fact that any employee of a nuclear enterprise, accustomed to relative financial well-being and prestige in the Soviet era and suddenly found himself in a deplorable financial situation, could take out of the gates of the enterprise a couple of kilograms of uranium in the hope of selling it. In Soviet times, even if this happened, such an employee, firstly, would not find a buyer, and secondly, he would quickly find himself "under the hood" of the KGB. I had to urgently rebuild the system of control over nuclear materials, adapting it to the market and democracy, especially since the market, especially at first, was wild, and democracy was boundless; under such conditions, the control systems existing in the West could not withstand. Moreover, articles periodically appeared in the press about the fabulous sums that could be obtained for nuclear materials. In addition Soviet system control was not designed for the emergence of such a threat as nuclear terrorism. Who at that time could have imagined the emergence of the Chechen problem, al-Qaeda, etc.?

But back to supply and demand. The years 1992-1995 accounted for the largest number of known and later confirmed cases of theft of nuclear materials from Russian facilities. The most serious cases include the theft of 1.5 kg of 90% enriched uranium in Podolsk from the Luch enterprise in 1992, the theft of 1.8 kg of 36% enriched uranium from the naval base in Andreeva Bay in 1993, confiscation in 1995 in Moscow of 1.7 kg of 21% enriched uranium, previously stolen from the Elektrostal plant. In all cases, the theft was carried out by the direct employees of the facilities or with their help. Characteristically, the above cases and a number of other less significant incidents lead to the conclusion that most often the materials were stolen from enterprises associated with the production of nuclear fuel, or from naval bases where nuclear submarines are stationed. Moreover, the loss of materials was most often discovered after the criminals were caught. Another characteristic feature of these cases is that the thieves did not have a pre-order for materials and stole them on the basis of finding a buyer on their own. Apparently, it was not so easy to find a buyer, and inept attempts to sell the goods were prevented even before the nuclear materials crossed the border.

A whole series of incidents with highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Western Europe stands apart, primarily the so-called "Munich" and "Prague" cases of 1994-1995. Both refer to the special operations of the police, who ordered the material. The West claims that the nuclear materials in both cases were of Russian origin. Russia rejects these claims. So far, the point in determining the source of materials has not been set.

In the majority of black market transactions, as it turns out during the investigation, criminals pass off low-enriched uranium or radioactive isotopes as weapons-grade materials, or even substances that have nothing to do with nuclear materials. This was the case in the most recent case in December 2001, when six members of the Balashikha criminal gang were arrested for attempting to pass off low-enrichment uranium fuel pellets as highly enriched uranium. By the way, this is almost the first case in Russia in which organized crime appears. Apparently, the trade in nuclear materials is too dangerous and not very profitable. Atomic Energy Minister Rumyantsev stated in an interview some time after the incident that the uranium pellets had been stolen from the Elektrostal plant long before the criminals were apprehended and that the security services had been spying on the Balashikha group for years. Among the detainees was an FSB officer, but whether he was infiltrated into the group or was a member of it on his own initiative remained unclear.

After 1995 and until 2000, there were virtually no reports of theft or loss of nuclear materials in Russia. If there were any cases, they concerned rather radioactive materials. A major role in the decline in such cases was played by the measures taken by the Russian government with financial and technical assistance from the West to strengthen both the physical protection of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials, and to introduce an adequate accounting and control system. True, some attribute the decrease in activity on the black market for nuclear materials to the fact that criminals have become more professional, or to the fact that there have been tighter restrictions on this kind of information. It is difficult to assess the validity of such assessments - the lack of information can support both one and the other point of view.

The only high-profile case of the period 1995-2000 is connected with the report of the head of the FSB of the Chelyabinsk region in 1998 about the successful suppression of the theft of 18.5 kg of material that could be used to create nuclear weapons by a group of employees of one of the region's nuclear enterprises. This is the only report that mentions the amount of material sufficient to make a nuclear warhead. In most other cases where weapons-grade nuclear materials appear, it was about grams, a maximum of one or two kilograms. However, this case is not completely clear. Some experts assess it rather skeptically and talk about the desire of the local FSB to curry favor (especially since, at least, no further information appeared in the open press, and, apparently, the case was not submitted to the court). Others, on the contrary, argue that the reliability of this report was confirmed through unofficial channels in the Ministry of Atomic Energy. This case was also cited in a recent CIA report, but for some reason it was already presented not as an attempt, but as a theft, although with the proviso that the case was not officially confirmed.

In general, evaluating all reports related to the theft or illegal trade in nuclear or radioactive materials is not an easy task. The IAEA has been keeping a record of such cases since 1993, including sending requests to the countries appearing in the reports to confirm or refute the information. However, there are no mechanisms to force such data to be reported or to be verified. Therefore, even the most complete and official databases of transactions on the black market of nuclear and radioactive materials cannot claim to accurately reflect absolutely all cases. However, general trends in these data can be traced. Including - where and where the materials came from, who is the performer, who is the customer. Unfortunately, Russia and the former republics of the Union occupy the "honorable" first place in the IAEA database.

One of the trends of recent years is an increase in cases, compared with the beginning and mid-1990s, of illegal trade in nuclear or materials masquerading as nuclear materials in Asia and a decrease in the number of cases in Europe. What is it, a change in the direction of material transport flows? Strengthening radiation control and the capabilities of intelligence agencies in Asian countries, which have finally begun to catch dealers in the nuclear business? Moving the market closer to potential buyers, be it countries or terrorist organizations?

As I said above, very often people try to pass off radioactive materials and isotopes as nuclear materials. However, one should not take comfort in the fact that it is impossible to make a nuclear bomb out of them. Many of them are dangerous in themselves and can cause serious illness or even death. If you remember, in 1995, on the instructions of Basayev, a container with the radioactive isotope cesium-137 was buried in Izmailovsky Park. There was also a case where radioactive substances were used to eliminate business rivals. Recently in Georgia, several hunters found old, Soviet-era batteries using cesium isotope in the forest and got very a high degree infection, up to skin burns.

Of course, the number of victims will not be comparable with the losses from the explosion of a nuclear bomb, and, as noted above, often (especially in the press) one can come across greatly inflated estimates. For example, at the end of last year and the beginning of this year, a firm tried to sell the New York City Hall a program for calculating damage from a "dirty bomb," which, according to experts, overestimated the damage by two or three times. Still, it should be borne in mind that if the damage is multiplied by the psychological effect, then the result can be significant. Even if no one dies from radiation, then a lot of people can simply be trampled upon while fleeing.

Despite the fact that the picture seems to be relatively favorable, it should be borne in mind that we know only successfully suppressed operations or discovered losses. There are no guarantees that some of the illegal transactions ended in the transfer of nuclear materials. It is impossible to determine whether there were such transactions and what is the ratio between solved and unsolved cases.

Question: What are the main dangers in the security system around Russian nuclear facilities?

Answer. Elena Sokova: The most urgent measures to ensure the protection of nuclear materials in Russia were taken back in the mid-1990s. They mainly concerned those facilities where nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials are stored or produced. Even according to the CIA, this category, if not perfect, is quite well protected. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of work left to do until the situation is brought to an optimum. Physical protection and accounting and control of other nuclear materials are still on the agenda. According to the US Department of Energy, the share of buildings and businesses that have been supplied with the necessary security systems (including even fences) is only 37 percent of the total number of facilities in need of increased security levels according to international standards. Much remains to be done before it can be said that the technical and organizational conditions are in place to prevent the leakage of materials and to protect against attack on nuclear facilities.

Among the most important tasks for the near future is the consolidation of nuclear materials at a limited number of facilities. It is clear that the fewer objects, the faster and more effectively you can bring the protection of each of them to the required level.

It is also necessary to strive for the speedy introduction and strict implementation of a modern system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials. Precisely due to the lack of accurate inventory data on the amount of nuclear materials at enterprises in Soviet times, we cannot say for sure whether all cases of theft were detected and whether stocks seized in the early and mid-90s were hidden somewhere in the garage.

Unfortunately, violations of the rules for accounting and control of nuclear materials still take place. At the end of last year, a letter from the head of Gosatomnadzor became known, where he describes a case of incorrect indication in the accompanying documents of the amount and condition of spent fuel from submarines sent for processing to Mayak in the Chelyabinsk region. It turned out that the nuclear fuel sent, unlike that indicated in the documents, was from a damaged reactor, moreover, some elements lacked up to half of the fuel. Mayak's personnel were put at risk, searches for the "missing" fuel were urgently organized.

Concern is also caused by the huge amount of accumulated spent nuclear fuel, both from nuclear power plants and from submarine reactors. Close attention deserves research institutes conducting experiments with nuclear materials, where control and protection is often much weaker than in the fuel cycle and military industries. And, finally, strict and strict control over radioactive isotopes in industry and medicine must be established.

It is necessary to put things in order with the reception of metals. Precious and non-ferrous metals from nuclear facilities, including submarines, are often targeted for theft. The loss of a small platinum record could endanger the safety of the entire crew and cause disaster. The theft of a bucket from a special excavator clearing radioactive debris not only causes material losses, but also stops the already slow work on cleaning up radioactive sites. Last autumn in the city of Ozersk, where the Mayak plant is located, enterprising metal assemblers dismantled 100 meters railway tracks, on one of the branches of the access roads to the plant.

Question: Do you agree with the assertion that Minatom is much more closed off from Russian society than from Western donors (in particular, there is sometimes more classified information on the tables of US Department of Energy officials than in the Russian parliament)?

Answer. Elena Sokova: Minatom is closed both from its own and from strangers. As far as the military program is concerned, secrecy is justified and practiced by all countries with nuclear weapons. Another thing is the accountability of the activities of nuclear enterprises and Minatom itself to the government, including the Duma, and to society. The possibilities of independent state control are unjustifiably limited and curtailed. GosAtomnadzor has lost a significant number of its supervisory rights compared to what it had in the early 1990s. Even what is left is not fully applied.

The financial transparency of Minatom's activities is minimal. For so many years now, they have been trying to get Minatom to be transparent about the use of funds from the Megatons-for-megawatts deal with the United States. The case of spent fuel from Kozloduy (Bulgaria), when Minatom was forced to disclose both the amount of the transaction and the price per kilogram, and even provided information on how much money was transferred to the Krasnoyarsk Territory, proves that it is possible to achieve transparency in principle. So far, these are isolated cases. The information openness of Minatom towards the public, to put it mildly, leaves much to be desired. The other day, Minister Rumyantsev himself admitted this at a meeting with environmental organizations.

I don't think Minatom is more open to the West. Another thing is that there is an exchange of information between Russian and American departments, which, in principle, is not subject to disclosure. Paradoxically, it is not uncommon for governments to share information that they are hiding from their public. This happens quite often - for example, one of the annexes to the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms is classified, since the data contained in it could be used by terrorists. From this point of view, indeed, the United States sometimes knows more about the Russian nuclear industry than Russian citizens.

Question: In the West, Russia is increasingly being called a big radioactive hole both in official circles and in the press. What do you think?

Answer. Elena Sokova: Hole, perhaps, is not the right word. One meaning of the word "hole" is associated with a pit where everything falls down. In this sense, such a name is quite applicable, especially when it comes to radioactive waste and even more so about plans to import spent nuclear fuel. There are already plenty of such pits-dumps in Russia. A recent report on the construction of a repository for nuclear waste, including foreign waste, on one of the Kuril Islands is particularly alarming.

Another meaning of the word "hole" is a hole through which everything leaks. So far, most of the stolen nuclear materials have been identified and intercepted before they left Russian territory. To ensure both Russian and international security, it is necessary to close even the smallest holes in Russian nuclear facilities and ensure reliable protection of nuclear materials, their accounting and control. As the reports of recent months show, there are still many holes, including in the barriers of closed cities. One of these holes was freely used by Duma deputy Mitrokhin with a group of environmentalists and cameramen to penetrate the territory of the closed city of Zheleznogorsk. One of the Chechens arrested in Sverdlovsk, who sold weapons and explosives, had a valid pass to the territory of the city of Lesnoy, where nuclear warheads are assembled.

In recent years, according to Minatom reports, the financial condition of the industry has improved. But has funding for work in this area increased? The increased attention to these issues in Russia after the events of 9/11, as well as renewed cooperation in this area between the US and Russia, is encouraging. However, the scale of the problem is so great that it takes years and significant amounts of money. It is unlikely to do without constant control at the highest political level and concentration of efforts and resources.

The developments of the past few years in the field of nuclear proliferation have caused particular concern international community for the fate of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. These events have added urgency to calls for new measures to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to strengthen its main legal framework, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). led by leading Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the so-called Khan affair. This network provided sensitive nuclear technology and expertise to Iran, Libya and possibly other countries. This has heightened concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons potential among both states and non-state actors, and has encouraged new initiatives to prevent the illicit transfer of nuclear technology and materials.

In this regard, a series of facts uncovered in 2004 confirmed the long-circulating rumors that Pakistan's leading nuclear physicist dr. A.K. Khan was behind the network that was involved in illegal nuclear smuggling. Dr. A.K. Khan for two decades served as director of the Research Laboratory. Khan (Khan Research Laboratories - KRL) in the Pakistani city of Kahuta. At this enterprise in 1998, Pakistan's first nuclear explosive device was created. Dr. Khan enjoyed considerable autonomy in the implementation of the Pakistani nuclear program and is referred to in Pakistan as the "father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb". He is considered a national hero of Pakistan.

The origins of the "Khan case" date back to the beginning of 2002, when Pakistani President P. Musharraf began a campaign to oust from the army and intelligence services that segment, which in the 1990s. contributed to the formation of the Afghan Taliban movement, a Pakistani nuclear physicist was sentenced by a Dutch court to four years in prison. On December 16, 2005, a court in the Dutch city of Alkmaar sentenced businessman Henk Slebos to a year in prison for selling to Pakistan nuclear technology he had stolen while working at YURENCO in the 1970s. .

On this, the investigation into the activities of the YURENKO consortium, in fact, ceased. In the press, however, there were reports of the existence of close contacts between Dr. A.K. Khan and European business. The authors of these publications recalled that the Pakistani scientist was educated at the Polytechnic Institute West Berlin, and subsequently - at the University of the Dutch city of Delft. However, the governments and law enforcement agencies of Britain, Germany and Holland had no complaints about the activities of YURENKO.

As the activities of the nuclear network expanded (and only about 50 people were involved in it), A.K. Khan started selling nuclear technology. Despite claims by Pakistani officials that the government of that country is not involved in the activities of the Khan network, US experts believe that there is evidence that senior Pakistani political and military leaders were also involved in the export of nuclear technology from Pakistan. This was despite the fact that Islamabad provided written assurances to the US government (first by President Zia-ul-Haq in November 1984, then in October 1990 by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan) and countless official statements by Pakistani authorities that achievement list Pakistan is impeccable in the field of non-proliferation.

Thus, the nuclear network of A.K. Khana was not a "Wal-Mart" (a popular cheap American supermarket), as IAEA director general Mohammed ElBaradei mislabeled it, but rather an "export-import enterprise." Since the mid-1980s, parallel to the original import-oriented network under the leadership of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) chief Munir Ahmad Khan, an export-oriented branch of the nuclear network has emerged and developed under the leadership of Dr. A.K. Khan. In the late 1990s Khan's network has become more decentralized as A.K. Khan found that he was under surveillance. Its network became a "privatized subsidiary" of the Nuclear Technology Import Network.

After clarifying the activities of the YURENKO consortium, investigations into the activities of other companies began. In March 2004, the US accused Dubai-based SMB Computers of illegal transit of Pakistani nuclear technology. As a result of a PSI operation by Customs in Dubai, a ship carrying a cargo of sensitive nuclear materials destined for illegal export was intercepted. The partners of SMB Computers were Epson, Palm, Aser and Samsung. However, the question of whether they were connected with the activities of the A.K. Khan (and if so, to what extent) remained unclear.

On February 20, 2004, representatives of the IAEA presented the leadership of Switzerland with a list of two companies and 15 individuals, suspected of participating in the network of A.K. Khan. On October 13, 2004, Swiss businessman Urs Tinner was detained in Germany on suspicion of supplying nuclear technology to Libya. The Malaysian police accused W. Tinner of involvement in an order for the production of component parts for centrifuges received by local Malaysian companies. To date, the "Tinner case" remains unfinished, although in 2008 the Swiss authorities announced the end of the prosecution of this businessman.

As A.V. Fenenko, “South African companies also fell under the scope of the international investigation. In January 2004, a retired officer was detained in the United States Israeli army Asher Karney, who lived in South Africa, who sold goods through his firm in Cape Town dual purpose Pakistan and possibly India. On September 3, 2004, South African businessman Johan Meyer was charged with involvement in Khan's nuclear network. In the warehouses of Meyer's engineering plant in the South African town of Vanderbijlpark (60 km south of Johannesburg), 11 containers were found containing components and documentation for enrichment centrifuges. On September 8, 2004, German citizens Gerhard Visser and Daniel Geigs, also accused of collaborating with A.K., were arrested in South Africa. Khan. However, the question of the involvement of South African businesses in the Khan case remains open: on August 22, 2005, the court session was postponed indefinitely due to newly discovered circumstances.

In June 2004, IAEA Director General M. al-Baradei visited the city of Dubai, the main transit center for illegal supplies of nuclear technologies to Iran and Libya. But the UAE authorities did not provide specific data on the contacts of their business with representatives of Pakistan.

In 2004-2005 American and Western European researchers have tried to summarize the disparate data on the nuclear network of A.K. Khan. SIPRI experts analyzed in detail the problem of deliveries of Pakistani nuclear technologies. According to this analysis, it is assumed that in the late 1980s. Khan began to order more centrifuge components from foreign suppliers than was required for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, and then secretly sold the surplus to third countries. This allowed him to sell the components of the R-1 centrifuge to Iran. He subsequently sold the assembled P-1s when Pakistan's uranium enrichment program switched to the more advanced P-2 centrifuges. He also provided Iran with data on the design of R-2 centrifuges.

As for the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Khan began selling nuclear technology to Libya in the mid-1990s. and continued to do so until 2003. The shipments included centrifuge components and assemblies for the undeclared Libyan uranium enrichment program. According to the IAEA, Libya also received a detailed engineering description of nuclear weapons from a "foreign source". It has not been publicly confirmed that the description came from Pakistan, but US officials have noted that it was a design for an implosion-type uranium munition developed by China in the 1960s. and rumored to have been handed over to Pakistan. According to the US government, Khan's network could receive up to $100 million from sales of Libya alone. According to American experts, M. al-Baradei's expression "nuclear Wall-Mart" is applicable precisely to the case with the supply of nuclear technologies to Libya from Pakistan.

As for the DPRK, deliveries to this country apparently amounted to the transfer to Pyongyang of centrifuge components (P-1 or P-2), data on its design, as well as gaseous uranium hexafluoride. Perhaps it was about the supply of a nuclear warhead design suitable for delivery using a ballistic missile. In exchange, North Korea gave Pakistan the secrets of developing missile technologies based on the Scud (P-17) system.

At the same time, as the Russian expert A.V. Fenenko, “until now there are a number of questions that do not allow us to put a final end to the Khan case. First, it is puzzling why Western countries easily believed the information coming from the representatives of Iran and Libya, states whose regimes have been assessed as "authoritarian" in the US and Western Europe for decades. At the end of 2003, Tehran and Tripoli were objectively interested in exposing the transnational network of nuclear technology suppliers. At that time, the IAEA accused Iran and Libya of carrying out illegal nuclear activities, and in such a situation, the Libyan and Iranian governments naturally tried to prove that nuclear technologies came to these countries from abroad, and were not produced in Iran and Libya.

Secondly, it is not clear why international observers were not allowed to see A.K. Khan and other Pakistani scientists. Perhaps the Pakistani leadership feared that classified information about the Pakistani nuclear potential would be leaked. Opposition parties opposed to the regime of President P. Musharraf insisted that official Islamabad was involved in the sale of nuclear materials and technologies. A third option cannot be ruled out: an international investigation could show how far the links of A.K. Khana extended beyond Pakistan. The international community (including the United States) did not persist in forcing the Pakistani leadership to allow independent investigators to A.K. Khan.

Thirdly, it is difficult to unequivocally answer the question whether the case of A.K. Khan with internal political conflicts in Pakistan. The Pakistani military is traditionally in difficult relationship with the state apparatus - suffice it to recall the anti-government conspiracy of General Abbasi in 1995 or the assassination attempt on President P. Musharraf in December 2003 and in 2004-2005. By the way, now ex-president P. Musharraf came to power as a result of a military coup on October 12, 1999. It cannot be ruled out that A.K. Khana is connected with the "purges" that official Islamabad carried out in the army and law enforcement agencies in 2002-2004, and this casts doubt on some sources of information.

Fourth, the activities of the A.K. Khan also touches on the issue of sensitive nuclear technology falling into the hands of international terrorists such as al-Qaeda. On October 23, 2001, two nuclear physicists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmud (former director of KAEP) and Chowdhry Abdul Masjid (former director of the Pakistani military enterprise New Labs), were detained in Pakistan, who were charged that during their repeated trips to Afghanistan, they personally met with the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and could give him the secrets of manufacturing nuclear weapons, which this international terrorist organization seeks to acquire.

Thus, exposing the activities of A.K. Khan was heightened by the international community's concerns about the risk of proliferation posed by individuals or non-state suppliers of nuclear material and technology, acting either independently or in collusion with government officials. Of particular concern was the scope, nature and scale of the A.K. Khan on the "black market" of nuclear technology. It has been argued that Khan's network is a small part of this market. As a source of illicit supplies, Khan's network has successfully overcome many of the legal and regulatory measures designed to prevent states from spreading nuclear weapons technology. These facts, in turn, led to the fact that the impetus was given to new initiatives in the field of non-proliferation. First of all, such as the US initiative - PSI, as well as the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution No. 1540, aimed at strengthening the nonproliferation regime by requiring states to criminalize the activities of the private sector on the "black market", the creation of a strict system of export controls and ensuring security of all sensitive materials within its boundaries.

Unfortunately, we have to admit that, despite the exposure of A.K. Khan and the adoption by the international community, including within the UN, of a number of measures aimed at preventing the emergence of new "illegal nuclear networks", such a threat, apparently, still exists. It comes primarily from non-state actors, as well as from states - the so-called nuclear pariahs (for example, Iran, North Korea). In this regard, the international community needs to intensify further actions to strengthen the systems of national control over nuclear exports in key States - suppliers of sensitive nuclear technology. In addition, within the IAEA, it is necessary to insist that all states carrying out nuclear activities comply with the standards stipulated by the IAEA Additional Protocol. The danger of the emergence of new illegal "nuclear networks" can be avoided only through comprehensive control over the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies.

Looking ahead, it seems that if the international community does not take the urgent measures described above, then the cause of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will suffer another irreparable blow. And in this regard, it is symptomatic that Pakistan, the country from which the underground "nuclear network" of A.K. Khan appeared, today represents the main, if not the main danger in terms of hitting sensitive nuclear technology or even weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ) into the hands of international terrorists and Islamist-minded radicals, in the event of the collapse of state power in Pakistan and Islamist radicals coming to control the country. But this is possible, in our opinion, only on the condition that the Islamist radicals are supported by the Pakistani army, which, by the way, did not play a role. last role in the supply of sensitive nuclear technology, in particular to Iran. (This short article does not describe the role of Pakistani General Mirza Aslam Beg in the early 1990s in nuclear cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), but Western primary sources used by the author of this article provide enough eloquently.) Of course, the seizure of Islamabad's nuclear assets by Islamists is a hypothetical scenario for the development of the situation around Pakistan's nuclear weapons, but it has every right to exist. This is possible only if Pakistan becomes a so-called “failed state”, which cannot be ruled out in the context of a new crisis of power in this country. And the topic of control (both internal and external) over Islamabad's nuclear assets is a separate topic that requires writing a separate article, which is being prepared by the author for publication.

"Die Welt": There is a lot of talk about nuclear weapons falling into the hands of international terrorism. How real is this danger?

Mohammed Al Baradei: In this moment such danger is potential. However, there is a real danger that radioactive material could fall into the hands of terrorists. With it, they can make a "dirty bomb". Of course, it would be impossible to destroy many people with such a weapon, but it is able to cause great panic and fear.

"Die Welt": How big is the risk that certain nuclear powers could hand over the "bomb" to terrorists?

Baradei: I don't know a single state that would be ready to supply terrorists with nuclear weapons.

"Die Welt": An American delegation that recently visited North Korea reported that 800 nuclear fuel rods were missing. Can you assume that Pyongyang is building nuclear weapons?

Baradei: North Korea has long had the capability to produce nuclear weapons. But the likelihood that the regime is engaged in the regeneration of spent fuel rods is very high today. North Korea believes it is under threat, under siege. This sense of threat, coupled with Pyongyang's technological capabilities, poses an acute problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"Die Welt": If Pyongyang has indeed decided to use fuel rods to create a "bomb", then how long will it take?

Baradei: It depends on whether the regime has full documentation and whether the production process itself has already begun, which we do not know. North Korea has many engineers and scientists specializing in nuclear power. It cannot be ruled out that they have been working on this for some time. In any case, we can talk about a few months, but not years.

"Die Welt": What conclusions did you draw from the fact that Libya recently opened its nuclear program? Can it be considered that there is an international network through which states and terrorist organizations can support themselves necessary funds to make weapons?

Baradei: Libya has confirmed our assumptions that there is a well-developed black market that offers nuclear materials and necessary equipment. However, it turned out to be larger than expected. In addition, we were scared by how well-established this network is. It looks like a network of organized crime and drug cartels.

"Die Welt": Some observers say that the center of this network is in Pakistan.

Baradei: I can't say anything about that. The Pakistani government is investigating a case in which some scientists allegedly performed prohibited services in the nuclear field. It further states that it deprives all knowledge smugglers of the right to study in the field of atomic engineering.

"Die Welt": Iran recently gave the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) consent to conduct an inspection. In this regard, the country admitted that it had already made great progress in creating an atomic bomb. For hawks in the US, this is proof of the "inefficiency" of the IAEA.

Baradei: This is nonsense. It is not possible to inspect enrichment equipment if it is used at the laboratory level. No controlling system in the world is able to do this. This does not in any way mean that Iran used the non-proliferation treaty, which allows the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, as a front. The country is able to carry out its military program both within and outside the treaty, and no one will know about it. It is crucial to have a system capable of revealing nuclear programs that are in production. Here we need any information.

"Die Welt": Are you worried about the safety of the old Soviet nuclear arsenal?

Baradei: Yes. This dangerous legacy. From this one arsenal you can steal a large number of uranium or plutonium and, God forbid, real weapons. The protection of these arsenals of weapons is a matter of funds, and they are not enough.

"Die Welt": The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty allows the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, but it allows countries to easily reach the threshold of possessing atomic weapons. Can the treaty somehow be adapted to the current realities?

Baradei: In dealing with Iran, Iraq and Libya, we have found that the treaty has a number of shortcomings and loopholes. They must be eliminated. Here I have in mind, first of all, four points: first, we must limit the right to enrich uranium and plutonium in the framework of nuclear programs implemented for peaceful purposes. Second, we must fundamentally revise our export control rules to impose stricter restrictions on the sale of hardware and fissile materials. Third, the IAEA needs more powers to exercise control. Fourth, we must revise the clause allowing a state to withdraw from the treaty within three months. In my opinion, the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be despised in the same way as slavery or genocide. There should be no right to transfer nuclear equipment.

"Die Welt": Iran can be forced to open its nuclear program, but Israel cannot?

Baradei: No. As for large states, this also applies to small countries. Absolute security for one country means, perhaps for another, absolute danger. It cannot be demanded that Libya and Iran give up nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons and allow Israel to keep all the weapons it now possesses.

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.

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1. Introduction

5. Strengthening the NPT

7. Iranian problem

9. Conclusion

List of sources

1. Introduction

The first prerequisites for the emergence of nuclear weapons appeared in the 19th century, and already in the middle of the 20th century, the first tests of the newest type of weapon - a nuclear bomb - were carried out in the United States. The first bomb was detonated in the USA in July 1945. in order of testing. The second and third were dropped by the Americans in August of the same year on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - this is the first and only case of the combat use of nuclear weapons in the history of mankind. In 1949, nuclear weapons appeared in the USSR, in 1952 in Great Britain, and in 1960 in France. The presence of a country with nuclear weapons gave it the status of a superpower and guaranteed a certain military security and stability. In subsequent years, China joined the ranks of the countries possessing nuclear weapons. Grade possible consequences The use of nuclear weapons during an armed conflict led the UN member states to agree on the need to ban free access to nuclear weapons and the need for international control over nuclear technology and the use of nuclear energy.

2. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The military use of atomic energy began in 1945, when the Americans first tested in the Alamogordo desert, and then used nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From this moment began the countdown of the history of development atomic weapons. In 1954, the world's first nuclear power plant was opened in Obninsk. A balance emerged between the military use of atomic energy and the peaceful use. The international community was faced with the question of how not to allow the proliferation of nuclear weapons, since this could cause deepening instability in the world, and at the same time open the way to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It was from that time that work began on the development of international norms for the limitation of nuclear weapons, which in their final form were called the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty".

All states of the world participate in it, except for India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan. Thus, in terms of scope, it represents the most comprehensive arms control agreement. The treaty divides the states-participants into two categories - nuclear and non-nuclear. Nuclear states include countries that have tested a nuclear explosive device by the time the Treaty was signed: Russia, the United States, China, Great Britain and France. All of them are simultaneously permanent members of the UN Security Council. Non-nuclear countries do not have the right to develop nuclear weapons.

The NPT entered into force in 1970 and initially had a duration of 25 years. In 1995, the NPT Review and Extension Conference extended the Treaty indefinitely, making it indefinite.

3. Main provisions of the contract

The treaty establishes that a nuclear-weapon state is one that produced and detonated such a weapon or device before January 1, 1967 (ie the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France and China).

Under the Treaty, each of the States Parties to the Treaty possessing nuclear weapons undertakes not to transfer to anyone these weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as control over them, either directly or indirectly; nor in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture, otherwise acquire or control nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Each of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty undertakes not to accept from anyone nuclear weapons and/or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over them either directly or indirectly; as well as not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or accept any assistance in their production.

The Treaty establishes the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in accordance with the Treaty. The treaty obliges its participants to exchange equipment, materials, scientific and technical information for this purpose, and to assist non-nuclear states in obtaining benefits from any peaceful use of nuclear explosions.

An important addition to the treaty is the resolution of the UN Security Council of June 19, 1968 and identical statements by three nuclear powers-- USSR, USA and Great Britain on the issue of security guarantees for non-nuclear states-participants of the treaty. The resolution provides that in the event of a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear state or the threat of such an attack, the Security Council and, above all, its permanent members possessing nuclear weapons, will have to act immediately in accordance with the UN Charter to repel aggression; it also reaffirms the right of states to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter until the Security Council takes the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. The statements made by each of the three Powers at the adoption of this resolution indicate that any State that has committed aggression with the use of nuclear weapons or threatened such aggression should know that its actions will be effectively repelled by measures taken in accordance with the UN Charter; they also proclaim the intention of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain to render assistance to that non-nuclear party to the treaty who is subjected to a nuclear attack.

The five states possessing nuclear weapons have committed themselves not to use them against states not possessing such weapons, except in the situation when they respond to nuclear strike or a conventional attack carried out in alliance with a nuclear state. These obligations, however, were not included in the text of the Treaty itself, and the specific form of such obligations may have changed over time. The United States, for example, indicated that it could use nuclear weapons in response to an attack using non-nuclear "weapons of mass destruction" such as biological or chemical weapon, since the United States cannot respond with either. British Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon indirectly pointed to the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to an attack with conventional weapons carried out by any of the "rogue states".

Article VI and the preamble of the Treaty state that the nuclear states will strive to reduce and destroy their nuclear stockpiles. However, in more than 30 years of the existence of the Treaty, little has been done in this direction. Article I commits the nuclear-weapon states not to "encourage any non-nuclear-weapon state ... to acquire nuclear weapons" -- but the adoption by a nuclear-weapon state of military doctrine based on the possibility of pre-emptive strike, as well as other threats of the use of armed force, can be in principle be regarded as such an incentive. Article X states that any state may withdraw from the Treaty if it considers that it is compelled to do so due to some "extraordinary event" - for example, due to a perceived threat.

The Treaty itself does not establish a mechanism for verifying compliance with it, as well as an international body monitoring its implementation. Such monitoring is carried out by review conferences convened every five years. As a rule, review conferences are held in New York in May. In between them, by decision of the 1995 conference, sessions of the preparatory committee are held - two sessions between conferences.

In practice, the functions of verifying compliance with the NPT are performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with which each party to the Treaty that does not possess nuclear weapons is obliged to conclude an appropriate agreement.

4. International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) was established in 1957 in accordance with the UN decision of December 4, 1954 and is part of the UN system, with which it is connected by a special agreement. It annually submits a report on its activities to the UN General Assembly and, if necessary, to the UN Security Council. The main field of activity is the peaceful use of atomic energy. The IAEA convenes international scientific forums to discuss the development of nuclear energy, sends specialists to various countries to assist in research work, and provides mediation interstate services for the transfer of nuclear equipment and materials. Much attention in the activities of the IAEA is paid to the issues of ensuring the safety of nuclear energy, especially after the accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986. However, one of the most important functions is control over the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular, with control over compliance with the NPT. Each party to the Treaty that does not possess nuclear weapons is obliged to conclude an appropriate agreement with the IAEA, which is the world's only international inspector for nuclear safeguards and control over security measures in the field of civilian nuclear programs.

According to agreements signed with states, IAEA inspectors regularly visit nuclear facilities to verify reports on the location of nuclear materials, check instruments installed by the IAEA and observation equipment, and inventory of nuclear materials. Together, these and other verification measures provide independent international evidence that states are adhering to their commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To monitor the implementation of existing safeguards agreements signed by the Agency with 145 IAEA Member States (plus Taiwan), 250 IAEA experts conduct daily on-site inspections in all parts of the world to verify the validity of safeguards agreements. The purpose of inspections is to make sure that nuclear materials are being used for legitimate peaceful purposes and not being used for military purposes. In doing so, the IAEA contributes to international security and multiplies efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons and move towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

Various types of safeguards agreements may be entered into with the IAEA, such as the Safeguards Agreement relating to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These agreements require non-nuclear states to submit to the IAEA for verification all their activities related to the complete nuclear fuel cycle. Other types of agreements relate to guarantees in single enterprises. IAEA safeguards under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are an integral part of the international non-proliferation regime and are indispensable in ensuring the implementation of the Treaty.

There are currently 146 states in the IAEA. The governing bodies are the annual General Conference (General Conference) of all member countries, the Board of Governors (Board of Governors) of 35 people, which manages the practical activities of the Agency, and the Secretariat, which carries out current work (headed by CEO). The headquarters of the IAEA is located in the International Vienna Centre. In addition, the IAEA maintains regional offices in Canada, Geneva, New York and Tokyo, laboratories in Austria and Monaco, and a research center in Trieste (Italy), which is managed by UNESCO. Since 2005, the organization has been headed by Mohammed ElBaradei.

Speaking at the 2005 conference, ElBaradei presented proposals for strengthening and tightening the nonproliferation regime. In particular, he proposed to toughen the actions of the UN Security Council in relation to any country that withdraws from the NPT; toughen investigations and prosecutions of any illegal trade in nuclear materials and technologies; speed up the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT; take measures to address existing security gaps in regions like the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula.

He explains the tightening of requirements by the fact that currently about 40 countries in the world have the potential to create nuclear weapons. There is a real “black market” in the world for nuclear materials, more and more countries are trying to acquire technologies for the production of materials suitable for use in nuclear weapons. There is also a clearly expressed desire of terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

This is the main disadvantage of this mode. The participating countries themselves determined which objects to put under IAEA safeguards. This opened up the possibility of violating the Treaty, since any state could hide the presence of its infrastructure for the creation of nuclear weapons, and the IAEA did not have the right to check it. However, even such limited checks have revealed some evidence of illegal activity. First of all, in the early 1990s, during inspections conducted by the IAEA at North Korean facilities, Pyongyang's implementation of a secret and very large-scale nuclear program was revealed.

This shortcoming of the inspection regime became particularly evident after the first war in the zone Persian Gulf 1990-91 Iraq was found to be very active in a clandestine nuclear program. As a result, in 1996, within the framework of the IAEA, an agreement was reached on a model additional protocol to safeguards agreements. Such protocols were proposed to be signed by all states, including nuclear ones. IAEA inspectors received the right to visit facilities that were not declared by the host country as nuclear. This significantly expanded the Agency's ability to verify compliance with the NPT.

To control the supply of hazardous nuclear materials, the participating states with nuclear technologies back in the 1970s. created two informal "clubs" - the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee. Although the decisions of these structures are not legally binding, the participating countries have voluntarily committed themselves to comply with them. At meetings of "clubs" uniting several dozen countries each, control lists of materials and technologies are agreed upon, the export of which is subject to control by the competent authorities of the participating states. In addition, political decisions are also considered there. In particular, in 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers Group decided to ban the transfer of any nuclear technology (including peaceful use) to countries that have not placed all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, of course, with the exception of the five nuclear powers that are part of NPT.

5. Strengthening the NPT

nonproliferation nuclear weapons iranian

Discussions about revising or strengthening a number of provisions of the NPT have intensified recently. However, the document reflects a carefully adjusted global balance of interests and compromises between almost two hundred countries of the world. Under these conditions, the introduction of amendments and additions to it contains the risk that the “opening” of the package may lead to an avalanche-like growth of proposals and demands from many states. As a result, the current Treaty itself may be buried under the weight of these requests. Therefore, most states are not yet ready to "open" the document for new negotiations on its improvement.

Nevertheless, discussions are ongoing. The DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT in 2004 and its subsequent nuclear test drew attention to article 10 of the document governing withdrawal. This article allows any state party to withdraw from the NPT if supreme interests its national security is at risk. Such a state must send a notice of withdrawal to the depositary states and the UN, and after 6 months. it may consider itself free from obligations under the Treaty.

The DPRK exercised this right twice - in 1994 and 2004. The precedent set by Pyongyang showed that states can be within the framework of the NPT, it is quite legal to develop nuclear technologies (hiding the military components of nuclear programs), and, if necessary, withdraw from the Treaty and not suffer any punishment for this. Awareness of the unacceptability of such a situation began to grow.

A number of proposals were put forward. First, to ban withdrawal from the NPT altogether. This radical idea has not met with any serious support, since it contradicts the sovereignty of states and runs counter to the established general international legal practice. Another suggestion is to oblige states withdrawing from the NPT to waive the benefits they have received as a result of membership in the Treaty. They would have to return nuclear equipment, materials and technologies to suppliers. They would also be deprived of the right to continue such deliveries. But even such a proposal, which does not require mandatory amendments to the document itself, was negatively received by most developing countries. These states pointed out that in practice it would be extremely difficult to return the materials and technologies received by the withdrawn state by peaceful means and indirectly such a provision would actually legalize the use of military force against countries that have withdrawn from the Treaty.

A lively debate is also being held around Article 4, which recognizes the right of all participating States to the peaceful use of atomic energy and obliges states possessing nuclear technologies to assist in this those countries that do not possess such technologies. At the same time, there are technological similarities between peaceful and military nuclear programs. So, if the state acquires technology for enriching uranium to the levels required for the production of fuel for nuclear power plants (a few percent in terms of the content of the uranium-235 isotope), it will, in principle, have almost all the necessary knowledge and technologies for its further enrichment to weapons-grade levels (over 80 % for uranium-235). In addition, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from nuclear power plant reactors is a raw material for obtaining another weapon-grade material - plutonium. Of course, the production of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel requires the creation of radiochemical enterprises, but the very availability of high-tech raw materials for such production is milestone implementation of a possible weapons program. Under these conditions, the production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium suitable for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device becomes only a matter of time and political will.

Since there is no direct ban on the creation of national facilities for uranium enrichment and SNF processing in the Treaty, a number of countries put forward the following proposal. Countries that do not yet have such production could voluntarily abandon it. In exchange for this, states that already have these technologies would guarantee them the supply of nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants and research reactors at a fair price. To make such safeguards more reliable, international production centers, joint ventures with the participation of interested states, as well as a "fuel bank" under the auspices of the IAEA could be created for the production of reactor fuel. Of course, the suppliers would repatriate the spent nuclear fuel, which would remove concerns about its possible use for the production of weapons-grade plutonium.

This initiative also did not arouse enthusiasm among developing countries. They fear that if it is adopted, the countries of the world will be divided into those who have the right to science-intensive production of nuclear materials and those who are deprived of such a right. There is also concern that not expanding such capacity geographically would put existing producers in a privileged position and allow them to monopolize the fast-growing civilian nuclear energy market. As a result, prices will rise even more, and this will hit the least developed countries. It is no exception that producer countries will be able to manipulate supplies to achieve political goals and put pressure on recipient states.

In general, the issue of the discriminatory nature of the NPT is very acute. As mentioned above, this document divides the countries of the world into those who have the right to possess nuclear weapons (nuclear "five"), and those who do not have such a right (all the rest - more than 180 countries). During the NPT negotiations, the non-nuclear countries agreed to such a solution in exchange for two conditions: firstly, the acquisition of access to nuclear energy (recorded in Article 4, see above) and, secondly, the promise of the nuclear powers to strive for nuclear disarmament (Article 6).

In the opinion of many non-nuclear states, and not only developing ones, nuclear powers do not fulfill their obligations under Article 6. The main dissatisfaction is the fact that four of them (the United States, Russia, Great Britain and France) are in principle not ready to talk about a general and complete nuclear disarmament. Some nuclear powers are trying to respond to such criticism. Thus, the British government conducted a study of the conditions under which one can speak of complete nuclear disarmament. China declares its commitment to general and complete nuclear disarmament, but refuses to take any disarmament steps until other nuclear powers disarm to the relatively low level of China's nuclear potential. Probably, it would also be useful for Russia, which bears the main burden of nuclear disarmament, to put forward some kind of positive initiative regarding general and complete nuclear disarmament.

The refusal of the same four nuclear powers to take the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons provokes criticism. China claims adherence to this principle, although this promise cannot be verified and is clearly propaganda. The non-nuclear countries are also dissatisfied with the unwillingness of the nuclear powers to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in their national security concepts.

Many non-nuclear countries, primarily developing countries, demand the conclusion of a Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, similar to the already signed conventions banning other types of WMD - chemical and biological. Although it is clear that such a Convention has no prospects in the foreseeable future, this issue is constantly raised at the review conferences of the States Parties to the NPT and meetings of the preparatory committees.

Recently, the United States and Great Britain have been criticized for embarking on modernization programs for their nuclear forces. Concern is expressed about the fate of the Russian-American process of reducing strategic offensive arms after the expiration of the START Treaty in 2009 and the Russian-American Moscow Treaty (SORT Treaty) in 2012. Demands are regularly put forward, primarily to Russia and the United States, to start a negotiation process to reduce tactical nuclear weapons. In particular, they are required to submit a report on the implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992, according to which a significant part of the tactical nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation and the United States were removed from combat duty, and later either eliminated or placed in central storage facilities. To the best of our knowledge, Russia has not fully complied with these non-legally binding decisions.

6. Unrecognized nuclear states

Another difficult issue is the universalization of the NPT. Four states remain outside it - India, Israel, Pakistan and the DPRK. All these countries are nuclear, although this is not recognized by the Treaty, since three of them carried out nuclear tests after the document entered into force, and Israel does not recognize (but does not reject) the presence of nuclear weapons at all. Accession of these states to the NPT is possible only as non-nuclear, i.e. in the event that, following the example of South Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they agree to destroy their nuclear potential. Otherwise, it would be necessary to revise the relevant provisions of the document, which the participating States are clearly not ready to do.

North Korea agreed in 2006 to dismantle its nuclear program in exchange for assistance from the United States, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia, and in return for political concessions from Washington. At present, Pyongyang is starting to implement its obligations. Therefore, in the future, the return of the DPRK to the NPT is not ruled out.

Israel officially supports the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, but only after achieving sustainable peace in the region. Given the uncertain prospects for a lasting Arab-Israeli settlement, the prospects for Israel's denuclearization remain vague. Officially, Israel also did not test nuclear weapons. At the same time, there is reason to believe that such a test was carried out jointly with South Africa in the late 1970s.

Unlike Israel, India and Pakistan are ready to return to a nuclear-free status only together with recognized nuclear powers. India first tested a nuclear explosive device in 1974, claiming to have carried it out for "peaceful" purposes. After that, she refrained from conducting such tests until 1997, although she had the necessary technologies and materials. Such restraint was explained, most likely, by the unwillingness to provoke Islamabad. In terms of conventional armaments and military forces, India is vastly superior to Pakistan and therefore does not need a nuclear deterrent.

However, in 1997, Delhi nevertheless decided to conduct nuclear tests. This provoked Pakistan to retaliate. As a result, India has largely lost its military advantages. Most likely, Delhi decided to conduct nuclear tests in order to test several types of nuclear warheads created after 1974 before the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

At present, the international community has actually come to terms with the nuclear status of India and Pakistan. The sanctions imposed by a number of countries against these states after their nuclear tests in 1997 have been largely lifted. The emphasis is on ensuring that Delhi and Islamabad do not become sources of proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. They are not members of either the NSG or the Zangger Committee and therefore have no export control obligations.

In this case, Pakistan poses a particular danger. While India unilaterally created an effective national export control mechanism, Pakistan, on the contrary, has become the main source of illegal supplies of nuclear materials and technologies. At the beginning of the current decade, the activities of an underground international network led by the "father" of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, A.K. Khan. There is reason to believe that this network supplied technologies and materials for the implementation of the nuclear programs of the DPRK, Iran and Libya. Of particular concern is the fact that A.K. Khan apparently had a "cover" in the government of Pakistan. In the conditions of this country, it is extremely unlikely that such deliveries were made bypassing the security forces. Indirectly, this information is confirmed by the fact that after the disclosure of the underground network of A.K. Khan has been pardoned by the President of Pakistan and is under house arrest. However, there is no guarantee that Khan's associates and his backers in the Pakistani security forces will not continue to supply the emerging international nuclear black market.

In addition, there are concerns about the security of storage of Pakistani nuclear weapons and the possibility of their unauthorized use. They are believed to be undocked from the delivery vehicles for security reasons and are located at one of the most heavily guarded military bases, where the actual residence of President Musharraf is located. However, the risk remains that they could fall into the wrong hands as a result of a coup d'état. It was reported that tracking Pakistani nuclear warheads is a priority for US and Israeli intelligence agencies. The United States is also behind the scenes helping Islamabad to implement some technical measures to improve nuclear security.

With regard to India, a course was taken for its gradual withdrawal from international "nuclear" isolation. According to the decision of the NSG from 1992, it is forbidden to supply any nuclear materials and technologies to this country. This creates serious problems for the development of Indian nuclear power, since Delhi cannot import nuclear reactors and fuel for them. Russia built a reactor for the nuclear power plant at Kudankulam, referring to the fact that the relevant agreement was reached even before the decision of the NSG (the completion of existing contracts in 1992 was allowed). However, the Russian Federation and India faced serious problems in the supply of fuel for this nuclear power plant, which the NSG refused to resolve. According to available information, the fuel was still delivered.

In 2005, India and the US signed a nuclear deal. In accordance with it, Washington removes restrictions on the supply of materials and technologies to India in exchange for a number of concessions from the Indian side. Among them is the separation of civil and military nuclear facilities and the placement of the former under IAEA safeguards. According to the Americans, such a decision would fix the size of the Indian military nuclear complex and limit the buildup of the country's nuclear potential. When concluding the nuclear deal, Washington took into account the fact that India takes a responsible attitude to the fight against the illegal export of nuclear materials and technologies and has never been a source of supplies to the nuclear "black market".

The implementation of the deal requires sanction from the NSG, since it contradicts its decision of 1992. The United States officially applied to this organization with a request to grant India "as an exception" a special status. This request caused dissatisfaction with a number of non-nuclear states, primarily those that have the technical capabilities to create nuclear weapons, but made a political decision to refuse to acquire nuclear status. Among such countries are Japan, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Norway. At one time, they refused to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for a number of privileges, including those related to obtaining unhindered access to the international market for peaceful nuclear technologies. Therefore, from their point of view, granting similar privileges to India, which has not signed the NPT and developed nuclear weapons, undermines their status and creates an incentive for other countries to follow the Indian example in violation of their non-proliferation obligations. Opposition in the NSG was unexpectedly strong, and so far the US request has not been granted.

Thus, through various measures of pressure and cooperation, the international community encourages the unrecognized nuclear states to voluntarily take measures at the national level to effectively control the export of nuclear materials and technologies. At the same time, they are drawn into international regimes capable of limiting their nuclear potentials. Thus, joining the CTBT, or at least observing a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, hinders the modernization of the nuclear forces of the unrecognized nuclear powers, which do not have effective means of computer simulation of such tests. If a Fissile Materials Test Ban Treaty is concluded, they will also not be able to produce weapons-grade nuclear materials and, consequently, build up their nuclear potential.

7. Iranian problem

The shortcomings of the NPT regime are very clearly shown by the situation around the Iranian nuclear program. There are two aspects to this situation. The first is the Iranian uranium enrichment program, the second is the solution of issues related to Tehran's compliance with the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which was signed back in 1974. Doubts that Iran is fulfilling its obligations under the agreement arose long ago. However, it was only in 2002 that satellite imagery data were published showing nuclear objects. Contrary to its obligations, Tehran did not inform the IAEA about the creation of these facilities and about its other activities in the nuclear field. The IAEA demanded that all information on Iran's undeclared activities be provided. However, for several years, the Iranian leadership failed to meet the requirements of the Agency.

If the situation around the 1974 agreement is a violation of the international nonproliferation regime, then the issue of Iran's uranium program is more complicated. In accordance with Article 4 of the NPT, Iran, like any other non-nuclear state party to the Treaty, has the right to develop peaceful nuclear energy. Tehran says it is seeking to acquire uranium enrichment capabilities solely for the purpose of producing its own fuel for nuclear power plants. So far, there is no reason to believe that Iran has managed to produce highly enriched uranium, let alone weapons-grade uranium. However, once it has the capacity to enrich uranium to a level that allows it to be used as a fuel, it will be able to apply the same technology to further enrich it to weapons grade. But these are only concerns, and they are not codified in any way in the text of the NPT and other international legal documents.

The US and its allies are insisting that Iran must end its uranium program. In their opinion, it can exercise its rights under Article 4 of the NPT only if all other provisions of the Treaty are complied with. This reasoning is controversial. Therefore, Washington undertook serious international efforts to delegitimize the Iranian program. At the same time, he took full advantage of Tehran's unwillingness to adequately resolve issues with the IAEA. Endless delays in providing the necessary documentation, constant problems with the admission of international inspectors, aggressive rhetoric forced all the major powers to agree that the issue of Iran be put before the UN Security Council. But even then, the Iranian leadership did not make any concessions, which opened the way for the adoption of several Security Council resolutions requiring Tehran to resolve issues with the IAEA and stop the uranium enrichment program. Iran defiantly rejected these resolutions, thereby violating its obligations as a member of the UN. This allowed the Americans to legally reinforce their position.

At the same time, requirements for Iran's uranium program were included in the texts of the UN Security Council resolutions, which are unlikely to be consistent with the current international legal nonproliferation regime. Why Russia and China agreed to this is unclear. This position was of great assistance to Washington and made it difficult to find a diplomatic solution to the problem. Even if Iran settles the issues with the IAEA, which it finally promised to do, Moscow and Beijing will still be subjected to strong pressure from the West in order to impose new, tougher sanctions at the UN Security Council level against Tehran.

8. Other elements of the international legal regime complementary to the NPT

There are a number of international legal documents supplementing the NPT. Some of them were signed even before the conclusion of this Treaty. These documents prohibit or restrict the deployment of nuclear weapons in certain geographic zones and spatial environments, as well as impose limits on certain types of nuclear weapons activities. International legal instruments are supplemented by voluntary measures taken by states unilaterally.

There are four regional treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibits such deployments in Latin America and countries Caribbean, Treaty of Rarotonga - in the southern part Pacific Ocean, Treaty of Pelindaba - in Africa and Treaty of Bangkok - in South-East Asia. Back in the late 1950s. Antarctica was declared nuclear-free. In addition, Mongolia declared itself a nuclear-free zone. The creation of such a zone in Central Asia is being discussed, but so far this idea has not been implemented. The initiative to create a nuclear-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe was rejected by the Central European states. They feared that the creation of such a zone would prevent them from being accepted into NATO.

As a result, the entire Southern Hemisphere and a small part of the Northern Hemisphere were formally declared free from nuclear weapons. However, the jurisdiction of these documents is limited to the national territory of the signatory countries, as well as their territorial waters. International waters remain open for navigation by ships of nuclear states with nuclear weapons on board. A number of states do not prevent the entry of ships likely carrying nuclear weapons into their territorial waters and ports, as well as the passage of military aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons through their airspace.

Two documents prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons in two natural environments- on the seabed and in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. But these documents are also not free from shortcomings. First of all, they do not contain a verification mode, which allows covert deployment there.

In 1963, the USSR, the USA and Great Britain signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in three environments - in the atmosphere, on the surface and under water. Other nuclear powers have not acceded to this treaty. France continued to carry out nuclear tests under water at the Mururoa Atoll, China - land-based nuclear tests at the Lop Nor test site in Xinjiang province. South Africa, probably jointly with Israel, conducted an underwater nuclear test.

In 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature. It was to enter into force after it had been ratified by 44 states with nuclear technology. Among them are all the unrecognized nuclear powers. Most of the 44 countries, including Russia, France and the UK, have already ratified this Treaty. China and the US signed it but did not ratify it. However, the prospects for the entry into force of this document remain uncertain due to the obstructionist policy of the US administration, which has announced that it will not put this treaty for ratification.

Nevertheless, all the official nuclear powers have so far voluntarily refrained from conducting nuclear tests: Russia, the United States and Great Britain since the late 1980s, and France and China since the mid-1990s. India, Pakistan and North Korea have conducted underground nuclear tests in an apparent effort to limit international criticism of their actions. At the same time, since 1997, India and Pakistan have also adhered to a voluntary moratorium. The CTBT Organization, which is called upon to ensure compliance with this Treaty, continues to function. It is curious that the United States also makes contributions to this organization.

Within the framework of the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, multilateral preliminary negotiations are underway to conclude an international convention on the prohibition of the production of weapons-grade fissile materials. Such a convention would become an additional barrier to the emergence of new nuclear states, and would also limit the material base for building up the nuclear potential of countries with nuclear weapons. However, these negotiations have stalled. Initially, they were blocked by China, demanding that the United States agree to a treaty banning the deployment of weapons in space. Washington then announced that it saw no point in such a treaty, since, from its point of view, its observance was not verifiable.

The current international legal regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which has developed around the NPT, has managed to slow down the spread of nuclear weapons in the world. More than a dozen states that have the technical capabilities to create nuclear weapons have voluntarily renounced their nuclear status. There is a precedent when one of the countries, South Africa, went to eliminate the already created nuclear potential. This regime has also had a deterrent effect on states that have not acceded to the NPT. They were forced to take self-restraint in conducting nuclear tests, as well as to take measures to prevent leaks of their nuclear technology. Even the most problematic case of the DPRK, which created nuclear weapons in violation of its obligations under the Treaty, still indicates that the fact of violation mobilized the international community for active actions aimed at eliminating the nuclear program of this country and its return to the NPT. At the same time, the inspection regime established within the framework of the IAEA revealed facts of violations and was again activated in order to monitor the implementation of the denuclearization of this country.

However, it was developed in the 1960s. the document needs to be adapted to new realities. The spread of scientific and technical knowledge allows more and more countries to develop nuclear technologies and, using loopholes in the Treaty, come close to creating nuclear weapons. Another problem is the risk of nuclear proliferation among non-state groups, which the current regime practically does not regulate.

All this requires the international community to make intensive efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime - both within the framework of the existing set of measures and through the development of new solutions.

9. Conclusion

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is aimed at ensuring stability and security in the world. In 1963, when only four states had nuclear arsenals, the United States government predicted that there would be 15 to 25 states with nuclear weapons over the coming decade; other states predicted that the number might even rise to 50. Fears about the emergence of nuclear weapons in a politically unstable state led to the formation of a closed "Nuclear Club" of the first five countries developing nuclear weapons. The rest of the countries could only use the "peaceful atom" under international control. These initiatives did not cause controversy in the world community, most of the countries signed the Treaty, voluntarily refusing to obtain nuclear weapons, moreover, in subsequent years, agreements were concluded prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in a number of regions of the world. These regions received the status of nuclear-free zones. A number of conventions banned any testing of nuclear weapons, not only on earth, but also in space.

However, now a number of countries are expressing their desire to join the Nuclear Club, arguing that their possession of nuclear weapons is due to the requirements of their national security. These countries include India and Pakistan. However, their official recognition as nuclear powers is hampered not only by the opposition of the member countries of the Treaty, but also by the very nature of the Treaty. Israel does not officially confirm the possession of nuclear weapons, but does not accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear country. A very special situation is developing with North Korea. Having ratified the NPT, North Korea was developing peaceful nuclear programs under the control of the IAEA, but in 2003 North Korea officially withdrew from the NPT and closed access to IAEA inspectors from its nuclear laboratories. Later, the first successful tests were officially announced. The world community, led by the UN, made a number of attempts to persuade North Korea to curtail its nuclear program, but this did not lead to anything. As a result, it was decided to convene the UN Security Council to resolve the issue of sanctions against North Korea. Iran is also suspected of secretly developing nuclear weapons.

The case of North Korea sets a dangerous precedent for the development of nuclear weapons beyond international control. There is a danger that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of terrorist organizations. To prevent these dangers, the IAEA demands tougher sanctions against countries that violate the treaty and tighten control over nuclear fuel and equipment.

All these issues were raised at the next conference in 2005, but then the countries could not reach a consensus on these issues.

Among the most striking trends in the area under consideration are the following. The world does not have the necessary conditions to ensure the maintenance of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: individual states are actively preventing the creation of an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence on the basis of generally recognized principles and norms of international law; there has been no progress in disarmament forums and negotiations for many years; attempts are being made to replace legal non-proliferation measures with unilateral actions and various political initiatives.

The UN General Assembly is concerned about the state of affairs in the field of education on non-proliferation and disarmament issues. In its resolution adopted at the 55th session in 2000, this principal organ of the United Nations requested the Secretary-General to prepare a study on the nature modern education in the designated area, its current state and ways of developing L and encouraging. The prepared study was highly appreciated General Assembly, who in 2002 expressed her belief that "the need for education in these areas is greater than ever."

The issues of restricting the import of materials and sensitive technologies should not be decided only by a limited number of importing countries. It is preferable that decisions on such issues be made within the framework of coordinating the positions of all interested states, including especially states exporting peaceful nuclear energy products.

This position is based, firstly, on the conciliatory nature of international law, the main regulator international relations. Secondly, a stable balance of interests is necessary for the successful functioning of the nuclear nonproliferation regime as a whole. On the one hand, the interests of free access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, on the other hand, the interests of non-switching from peaceful to military nuclear programs.

The preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 (paragraph 6) enshrined the principle of accessibility to all states of the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Article IV of the Treaty expressly provides for the right of all its participants to develop research into the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, which reflects the freedom of states to own, build, use, etc. nuclear installations to generate electricity and for other non-military needs.

A sufficient basis for the widest access of non-nuclear states to world achievements of scientific and technical thought in the nuclear field should be the adoption of maximum obligations in the field of international control.

However, it is necessary to further improve the institution of international control and expand its scope. The existing practice of implementing the norms of this institution requires the settlement of many issues.

So, for example, there is a need for scientific study in order to create new international legal norms of such an aspect as the responsibility of employees international organizations and other persons who are responsible for the implementation of international control measures. Determining the legal nature of such responsibility, its existence and adequacy is just an example of issues that require scientific consideration.

In order to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime in all its aspects, incl. for the successful functioning of international control, the improvement of the domestic legislation of states is required.

The efforts of states in the field of national rule-making should be focused on the following areas:

1) Recognition as crimes and the establishment of criminal liability for acts, the consequences of which will be the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Even a superficial analysis of the sources of criminal legislation in some foreign countries shows that, despite the presence in the criminal law of many countries of the elements of crimes related to nuclear proliferation, far from all possible acts are criminalized. There is no uniformity in fixing the elements of the crimes.

The question arises. Is it not advisable to develop and adopt international level convention, which would list in detail the acts that must be recognized as criminal and punished? It seems expedient for a number of reasons, among which: the agreement will establish the legal obligation of states to introduce criminal prosecution for specific crimes, the list of which will be formulated; issues of legal cooperation in the fight against these offenses, including issues of legal assistance, etc., will be resolved.

The recognition of the mentioned acts as crimes will allow using the capabilities of national law enforcement agencies, which will become an additional obstacle to nuclear proliferation.

2) Formation of a reliable system of export control. Effective regulation of legislation on the export of proliferation-sensitive materials and technologies would eliminate any cross-border movement of exports that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapons.

There are at least two aspects to this. First. International law should establish legal obligations for states to establish national export control systems. Secondly, models of such systems, which have been deeply developed at the international level, will help states to form effective export control mechanisms.

3) Regulation of measures to ensure nuclear safety, the content of which is now interpreted more broadly. Along with the task of neutralizing the danger from nuclear materials (prevention of a spontaneous chain reaction, protection against radiation contamination, etc.), it is required to reliably protect such materials from illegal capture, use, etc., i.e. from their illicit trafficking.

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