Combat railway missile system. Successful launch of the Barguzin nuclear reactor (4 photos) Barguzin nuclear train

On the progress of the development of a new combat railway missile system (BZHRK). As follows from the latest reports, the work is proceeding in full accordance with schedule and will allow the construction of new systems to begin in the foreseeable future.

Last Thursday, reports appeared in the domestic media about the latest statements by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. As Rossiyskaya Gazeta reports with reference to Interfax, Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov spoke about ongoing work on the creation of a BZHRK project codenamed “Barguzin”. According to the Deputy Minister, the development of the project is going according to plan. The authors of the project do not face any difficulties. On this moment The Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, which is responsible for creating the new complex, has completed the development of a preliminary design.

Yu. Borisov also revealed some details of plans for the construction and deployment of new equipment. By the end of this decade, it is planned to begin the full construction of new BZHRKs. Thus, by 2020, one of the divisions of the strategic missile forces should receive up to five regiments armed with Barguzin complexes. More precise figures have not yet been announced.

The Deputy Minister of Defense indirectly confirmed that new BZHRK“Barguzin” will be seriously different from the previously operated “Molodets” complexes of a similar purpose. According to Yu. Borisov, the new BZHRK will be no different from conventional trains. It is expected that this will improve the secrecy of the transfer of “missile trains” and significantly reduce the likelihood of their detection on the patrol route.

According to earlier press reports, the development of the new BZHRK project began in 2012 and is being carried out by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering. As follows from latest news, the creation of a preliminary design has now been completed. Thus, the project has achieved certain successes and completed important stage design. Over the next few years, a technical design should be developed, and pilot systems should be built and tested. As a result of all this work, by 2020 the Strategic Missile Forces should receive the first production Barguzin complexes.

Until recently there was topical issue missile planned for use. Various assumptions have been made in this regard. According to various versions, the Barguzin BZHRK was supposed to be equipped with RS-24 Yars, RS-26 Rubezh missiles or products based on them. In addition, the use of the R-30 Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile for submarines was not ruled out. In December last year, it was announced that the main armament of the new BZHRK would be the Yars or Yars-M missile. Thanks to this, it is expected that it will be possible to ensure the highest possible degree of unification with existing missile systems and, as a result, to simplify the development and construction of new systems.

Other features of the promising railway missile system are still the subject of controversy due to the lack of official information. It is obvious that in terms of the general architecture of the Barguzin BZHRK, it will resemble the Molodets complex with the RT-23UTTH missile, which was previously in service. This complex will include one or more locomotives (depending on the total weight of the train), carriages for combat crews, life support systems, as well as carriages with launchers.

The experience of the “Molodets” complex allows us to speak with confidence about the design of the launch car. Apparently, this element of the complex will be made in the form of a freight car or a refrigerator car, with minimal differences from similar products for civilian use. The internal volume of the car will contain the missile transport and launch container and the system for attaching it to the lifting boom. Thus, before launch, the roof of the car will open, and the task of the boom will be to lift the rocket container into a vertical position. A different launcher structure seems impractical or technically impossible.

Presumable composition of the Barguzin BZHRK. Infographics of the "Rossiyskaya Gazeta"

Of great interest are the words of Yu. Borisov about the camouflage of the new BZHRK. According to him, the “rocket train” of the new model will have the minimum possible differences from conventional trains. It should be recalled that the Molodets complex had several noticeable differences from other trains. In particular, due to the large launch weight of the rocket and launcher, the cars had to be equipped with reinforced chassis, which distinguished them from other rolling stock. There were also other differences. All this to a certain extent unmasked the Molodets BZHRK, although in general the stealth of the complex received good marks.

Apparently, the key to solving the stealth problem was the use of new missiles. According to open data, the RS-24 Yars missile is more than two times lighter than the RT-23RTTH product. Among other things, this makes it possible to simplify the design of the launch vehicle and, as a result, not to use special equipment and various elements that can unmask it.

The Deputy Minister of Defense claims that the first combat railway missile systems of the new model will be transferred to the Strategic Missile Forces before the end of the current decade. Such information may be cause for optimism. According to information from 2012-13, by the end of the decade it was planned to complete development work and begin preparations for testing the complex. Deliveries of serial equipment were scheduled for the next decade. According to updated data, the OCD will be completed much earlier, which will allow everything to be completed necessary work over the next five years. Thanks to this, the production of serial Barguzin complexes and the transfer of such equipment to the troops will begin in a few years.

Based on materials from sites:
http://rg.ru/
http://interfax.ru/
http://ria.ru/
http://lenta.ru/
http://tass.ru/

MOSCOW. August 28 - RIA Novosti, Andrey Kots. Thirty years ago, the Soviet Union completed a testing program for a unique strategic weapons- combat railway missile system (BZHRK) RT-23 UTTH "Molodets", known in the West under the name "Scalpel". This train, capable of bringing down probable enemy three intercontinental ballistic missiles, “rewarded” Western intelligence leaders with an ongoing headache. Considering the enormous length of the USSR railways and the number of trains plying on them, it was impossible to detect a launcher disguised as an ordinary carriage among them.

By the time the USSR collapsed, our country had three missile divisions - 12 trains with 36 launchers. However, in 1993, Russia agreed to sign the START II Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which provided for the disposal of all RT-23 missiles. Between 2003 and 2007, all "Molodtsy" were disposed of, except for two, which were left as museum exhibits. Then it seemed that there was no need for them. The BZHRK was remembered again in the current decade, when relations between Russia and the West began to deteriorate sharply. In December 2013, information appeared in the press about the revival of these complexes in Russia on a new technological basis. And in July 2017, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin announced that Russia is ready to create new BZHRKs under the Barguzin project.

Composition with a "surprise"

The BZHRK is a mobile railway-based strategic missile system, externally indistinguishable from an ordinary freight train. Its carriages are equipped with fully equipped ICBMs, command posts, technological and technical systems, communications equipment and personnel - missile officers. In case of threat nuclear war BZHRKs go out on patrol routes and merge with the flow of other trains. If an order for combat use comes from “from above,” the train stops and prepares to launch an attack. The doors on the roofs of three cars move apart, and mechanisms hidden inside bring the missile launch containers into a vertical position. Another couple of minutes - and three missiles are launched from a mortar towards the aggressor, carrying a total of 30 individually targeted warheads with a capacity of 550 kilotons each.

In the USSR, the development of the BZHRK was carried out by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau. The chief designers were academicians Vladimir and Alexey Utkin. The brothers faced a non-trivial task: to “shove” a rocket with a launcher with a total weight of more than 150 tons into an ordinary railway car. At the same time, the BZHRK was supposed to accelerate on rails to 120 kilometers per hour. This issue was resolved by creating reinforced carriage bogies and special unloading devices for the complex, which redistributed part of the weight to neighboring carriages. The BZHRK was able to move along the tracks without the risk of “breaking” them. Ultimately, "Molodets" looked like an ordinary train of refrigerated, mail, luggage and passenger cars. Fourteen cars had eight wheel pairs, and three had four. Thanks to all the necessary reserves, the BZHRK could operate autonomously for up to 28 days.

Flight tests of the missiles of the complex were carried out in 1985-1987 at the Plesetsk cosmodrome, in total there were 32 launches and 18 exits of the BZHRK to the country's railways. As part of trial operation, they covered more than 400 thousand kilometers across all climatic zones of the country - from the tundra to deserts. All this time, the existence of the complexes remained a secret to Western intelligence services. The BZHRKs were properly camouflaged. The only unmasking factor was the unusual configuration of the train - it was pulled by three diesel locomotives at once. Nevertheless, there were cases when even experienced railway workers could not understand point-blank what was “wrong” with this train.
The Molodets was officially adopted into service in 1989. By that time, five missile regiments had already been deployed - four in Kostroma region and one in Perm.

In the 2000s, BZHRK, in accordance with international agreements, began to be disposed of. The command of the Strategic Missile Forces decided to rely on the Topol-M mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRS) as the basis of the mobile component of the nuclear deterrent forces. However, over time, it became clear that PGRK, although difficult to track, is still easier than BZHRK, which can “get lost in the crowd.” And in 2012, the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT) began work on a new strategic train.

Guaranteed answer

There is little information about the promising BZHRK in open sources, but it is known that one train will already carry six intercontinental ballistic missiles - most likely, three-stage solid fuel RS-24 Yars, also developed by MIT specialists. One such ICBM is capable of throwing from three to six warheads with a capacity of about 300 kilotons each over a distance of 12 thousand kilometers. Smaller than the RT-23 UTTH, however, the Yars weighs half as much, which simplifies its installation and transportation in a standard carriage. In addition, only one locomotive will be used for traction, which makes the operation of the complex easier and better camouflages it. It is assumed that the new BZHRK will be able to move throughout the country, covering a thousand kilometers per day.

© Ministry of Defense of the Russian FederationLoading RS-24 Yars ballistic missiles into a launcher. Personnel of the Ministry of Defense

© Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

In November 2016, successful throw tests of a rocket modification specifically for the BZHRK took place at the Plesetsk cosmodrome. It is known that one Barguzin will be equivalent to a missile regiment, and the missile division of the Strategic Missile Forces should include five missile regiments - 30 launchers. Most likely, work on the BZHRK will receive funding within the framework of the State Armament Program for 2018-2025 and may go on combat duty as early as 2020-2021.

"In the context of the US deployment of new weapons precision weapons, including in America, the presence of a BZHRK will be our trump card,” RIA Novosti told Chief Editor magazine "National Defense" Igor Korotchenko. — These complexes create a factor of uncertainty. BZHRK, along with mobile PGRK, is a response to the American concept of a global disarming strike by non-nuclear means, mainly cruise missiles. This doctrine implies the destruction of the country's military-political leadership, military command centers, and silo launchers with one powerful blow. But if the enemy does not have the exact coordinates of all the launchers, this concept no longer works."

Moreover, even having completely destroyed our “nuclear triad” with a massive missile strike, a potential enemy will not be able to deprive the Strategic Missile Forces of the ability to launch a retaliatory strike. Many kilometers of railway tracks in Russia pass through rock tunnels, which can be used as shelter for BZHRK. And there is no guarantee that when the explosions die down, one single ghost train will not fire all its ammunition at the aggressor from somewhere Ural mountains.

© Photo: provided by the press service of the Strategic Missile Forces

© Photo: provided by the press service of the Strategic Missile Forces

Russia is preparing for the final stage of testing a new nuclear weapon– combat railway missile system (BZHRK) “Barguzin”, created on the basis of its predecessor, BZHRK “Molodets” (SS-24 Scalpel), which was on combat duty from 1987 to 2005 and was withdrawn from service by agreement with the United States in 1993 of the year. What forced Russia to return to the creation of these weapons again? When in Once again In 2012, the Americans confirmed the deployment of their missile defense facilities in Europe; Russian President Vladimir Putin quite harshly formulated Russia’s response to this. He officially stated that the creation of an American missile defense system actually “nullifies our nuclear missile potential“, and announced that our answer would be “the development of strike nuclear missile systems.” One of such complexes was the Barguzin BZHRK, which the American military especially did not like, causing them serious concern, since its adoption into service makes the presence of US missile defense as such. Predecessor of "Bargruzin" "Well done" The BZHRK was already in service with the Strategic Missile Forces until 2005. Its main developer in the USSR was the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (Ukraine). The only manufacturer of rockets is the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant. Tests of the BZHRK with the RT-23UTTKh "Molodets" missile (according to NATO classification - SS-24 Scalpel) in the railway version began in February 1985 and were completed by 1987. BZHRK looked like ordinary railway trains made of refrigerated, mail and luggage cars and even passenger cars. Inside each train there were three launchers with solid propellant missiles “Molodets”, as well as their entire support system with a command post and combat crews. The first BZHRK was put on combat duty in 1987 in Kostroma. In 1988, five regiments were deployed (a total of 15 launchers), and by 1991, three missile divisions: near Kostroma, Perm and Krasnoyarsk - each consisted of four missile regiments (a total of 12 BZHRK trains). Each train consisted of several cars . One carriage is a command post, the other three – with an opening roof – are launchers with missiles. Moreover, the missiles could be launched both from planned stops and from any point along the route. To do this, the train was stopped, a special device was used to move the contact suspension of electrical wires to the sides, the launch container was placed in a vertical position, and the rocket was launched.
The complexes stood at a distance of about four kilometers from each other in permanent shelters. Within a radius of 1,500 kilometers from their bases, together with railway workers, work was carried out to strengthen the track: heavier rails were laid, wooden sleepers were replaced with reinforced concrete ones, embankments were filled with denser crushed stone. Distinguish BZHRK from conventional freight trains, thousands plying across the expanses of Russia, was only possible for professionals (launch modules with a rocket had eight wheel pairs, the rest of the support cars had four each). The train could cover about 1,200 kilometers in one day. Its combat patrol time was 21 days (thanks to the reserves on board, it could operate autonomously for up to 28 days). The BZHRK was given great importance, even the officers who served on these trains had ranks higher than their colleagues in similar positions in the mine complexes.
Soviet BZHRK– shock for Washington The rocket scientists tell either a legend or a true story that the Americans themselves allegedly pushed our designers to create the BZHRK. They say that one day our intelligence received information that the United States was working on creating a railway complex that would be able to move through underground tunnels and, if necessary, emerge from the ground at certain points in order to launch a strategic missile unexpectedly for the enemy. Photographs were even attached to the intelligence officers’ report this train. Apparently, these data made a strong impression on Soviet leadership, since it was immediately decided to create something similar. But our engineers approached this issue more creatively. They decided: why drive trains underground? You can use them as usual railways, disguised as freight trains. It will be simpler, cheaper and more effective. Later, however, it turned out that the Americans conducted special studies that showed that in their conditions, BZHRKs would not be effective enough. They simply slipped misinformation to us in order to once again shake up the Soviet budget, forcing us, as it seemed to them then, into useless spending, and the photo was taken from a small full-scale model.
But by the time all this became clear, it was too late for Soviet engineers to work back. They, and not only in the drawings, have already created a new nuclear weapon with an individually targeted missile, a range of ten thousand kilometers with ten warheads with a capacity of 0.43 Mt and a serious set of means for overcoming missile defense. In Washington, this news caused a real shock. Still would! How do you determine which of the “freight trains” to destroy in the event of nuclear strike? If you shoot at everyone at once - no nuclear warheads will not be enough. Therefore, in order to track the movement of these trains, which easily escaped the field of view of tracking systems, the Americans had to almost constantly keep a constellation of 18 spy satellites over Russia, which was very costly for them. Especially considering that the US intelligence services never managed to identify the BZHRK along the patrol route. Therefore, as soon as the political situation allowed in the early 90s, the US immediately tried to get rid of this headache. At first they got from Russian authorities so that BZHRKs do not travel around the country, but are laid up. This allowed them to constantly keep only three or four spy satellites over Russia instead of 16–18. And then they persuaded our politicians to completely destroy the BZHRK. They officially agreed under the pretext of the alleged “expiration of the warranty period for their operation.”
How to cut "Scalpels" The last combat train was sent for melting down in 2005. Eyewitnesses said that when, in the twilight of the night, the wheels of the cars clattered on the rails and the nuclear “ghost train” with Scalpel missiles set off for last way, even the strongest men could not stand it: tears rolled from the eyes of both gray-haired designers and rocket officers. They said goodbye to a unique weapon, in many combat characteristics superior to everything that was available and even planned to be put into service in the near future. Everyone understood that this unique weapon in the mid-90s it became hostage to the political agreements of the country's leadership with Washington. And not selfish. Apparently that's why everyone new stage The destruction of the BZHRK strangely coincided with the next tranche of a loan from the International Monetary Fund. The refusal of the BZHRK had a number of objective reasons. In particular, when Moscow and Kyiv “fled up” in 1991, this immediately hit Russian nuclear power hard. Almost all of our nuclear missiles during the Soviet era were made in Ukraine under the leadership of academicians Yangel and Utkin. Of the 20 types then in service, 12 were designed in Dnepropetrovsk, at the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, and produced there, at the Yuzhmash plant. BZHRK was also made in the Ukrainian Pavlograd.
But each time it became more and more difficult to negotiate with the developers from Nezalezhnaya to extend their service life or modernize them. As a result of all these circumstances, our generals had to report with a sour face to the country’s leadership how “in accordance with the planned reduction of the Strategic Missile Forces, another BZHRK has been removed from combat duty.” But what to do: the politicians promised - the military was forced to fulfill it. At the same time, they understood perfectly well: if we cut and remove missiles from combat duty due to old age at the same pace as in the late 90s, then in just five years, instead of the existing 150 Voyevods, we will not have any of these left heavy missiles. And then no light Topols will make any difference - and at that time there were only about 40 of them. For the American missile defense system, this is nothing. For this reason, as soon as Yeltsin vacated the Kremlin office, a number of people from the country’s military leadership, at the request of the missilemen, began to prove to the new president the need to create nuclear complex, similar to the BZHRK. And when it became finally clear that the United States was not going to abandon its plans to create its own missile defense system under any circumstances, work on the creation of this complex really began. And now, in the very near future, the States will again receive their previous headache, now in the form of a new BZHRK generation called "Barguzin". Moreover, as the rocket scientists say, these will be ultra-modern rockets in which all the shortcomings of the Scalpel have been eliminated.
"Barguzin"– the main trump card against US missile defense The main disadvantage noted by opponents of the BZHRK was the accelerated wear and tear of the railway tracks along which it moved. They had to be repaired frequently, over which the military and railway workers had eternal disputes. The reason for this was the heavy missiles - weighing 105 tons. They did not fit in one car - they had to be placed in two, strengthening the wheel pairs on them. Today, when issues of profit and commerce have come to the fore, Russian Railways are certainly not ready, as it was before, to infringe on their interests for the sake of the country's defense, and also bear the costs of repairing the roadway in the event that a decision is made that BZHRKs should again operate on their roads. It was the commercial reason, according to some experts, that today could become an obstacle to the final decision to adopt them into service. However, this problem has now been removed. The fact is that the new BZHRKs will no longer have heavy missiles. The complexes are armed with lighter RS-24 missiles, which are used in the Yars complexes, and therefore the weight of the car is comparable to the usual one, which makes it possible to achieve ideal camouflage of the combat personnel. However, the RS-24s have only four warheads, and older missiles had them ten. But here we must take into account that the Barguzin itself does not carry three missiles, as it was before, but twice as many. This, of course, is the same - 24 versus 30. But we should not forget that Yars are practically the most modern development and their probability of overcoming missile defense is much higher than that of their predecessors. The navigation system has also been updated: now there is no need to set target coordinates in advance, everything can be changed quickly.
In a day, such a mobile complex can cover up to 1,000 kilometers, plying along any railway lines in the country, indistinguishable from a regular train with refrigerated cars. Autonomy time is a month. There is no doubt that the new group of BZHRK will be a much more effective response to the US missile defense system than even the deployment of our Iskander operational-tactical missiles near the borders of Europe, which are so feared in the West. There is also no doubt that the Americans are interested in the idea of ​​BZHRK obviously will not like it (although theoretically their creation will not violate the latest Russian-American agreements). BZHRK at one time formed the basis of the retaliatory strike force in the Strategic Missile Forces, since they had increased survivability and were very likely to survive after the enemy delivered the first strike. The United States feared it no less than the legendary “Satan,” since the BZHRK was a real factor in inevitable retribution. Until 2020, it is planned to put into service five regiments of the Barguzin BZHRK—that’s 120 warheads, respectively. Apparently, the BZHRK will become the strongest argument, in fact, our main trump card in the dispute with the Americans regarding the advisability of deploying a global missile defense system.

Not so long ago, trains with nuclear missiles were a formidable weapon for the Land of the Soviets and an atomic nightmare for a potential enemy. A special group of 12 American satellites monitored the ghost trains without much success. But after the collapse of the USSR, this unique weapon was hastily and thoroughly destroyed.

In recent years, the rearmament of the army has turned from a dream into a reality. The Ministry of Defense regularly adopts the latest designs military equipment and equipment.

Connoisseurs of Soviet heritage are clearly intrigued by reports from the Russian Ministry of Defense about the resumption of production of Combat Railway Missile Systems (BZHRK) at a new technological level.

The project was named “Barguzin”, and the new BZHRKs will be armed with missiles similar in design to the missiles of the Yars complexes. It was previously reported that the new rocket train would be created before 2018-2020.

Such a BZHRK was already in service Soviet Union in the 80s, but in accordance with the START-2 treaty rockets 15Zh61, which formed the basis of the Molodets complex, were dismantled and destroyed, and the trains themselves were scrapped.

Reporting that BZHRKs have suddenly become relevant again is, at the very least, incorrect. The relevance was there, has not gone away and will continue to be relevant in the future. But now the state leadership has enough political will to return to the railways a unique weapon that they tried, but could not create in the United States.

History of the creation of the BZHRK

The very creation of the BZHRK was a forced measure. Atomic trains were created as a weapon of retaliation; they were supposed to keep a potential enemy from the temptation to press the red button, and if this happened, then strike back.

In the early 70s, our intelligence obtained American plans creation of the BZHRK and its photographs. For the military and political leadership of the country, it was a shock: it was almost impossible to track a train moving around the country, and therefore to point a missile at it.

It turned out that the United States was creating strategic system, for which the USSR has no antidote. But if we cannot intercept, then at least we will create a similar threat, the CPSU Central Committee reasoned and set such a task for designer Vladimir Utkin, who headed the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau in Dnepropetrovsk.

It took Utkin only 3 years to show the military his rocket train project.

But then it turned out that the Americans themselves do not create anything like this. They only planted technical misinformation by photographing a model of a “rocket train” against the backdrop of nature.

The United States initially intended to make a BZHRK, but quickly changed its mind. The country's railway network is not extensive enough, which hampered the movement of the missile train, and a significant part of it is privately owned, which made the passage of such a train commercially unprofitable.

The Americans had an idea to make this train underground. To lay a ring highway underground and drive trains along it: no one needs to pay, and it would be impossible to find this road from a satellite.

The only thing that prevented the practical implementation of this project was the fact that in order to launch ballistic missiles from the underground, hatches had to be made in certain places. And they, as it is easy to assume, had clear coordinates, which makes the existence of an underground missile carrier meaningless. If Russian missiles do not hit the train itself, then it will definitely not be difficult for them to tightly plug the missile vents.

The United States abandoned the construction of the BZHRK due to the high cost and technical complexity of the project, taking nuclear weapons as the basis for its strategic nuclear forces. submarines. The USSR could no longer respond symmetrically.

The West managed to cover the entire world's oceans with a network of acoustic stations and tracked the movements of our missile-carrying submarines. Of course, Soviet submariners resorted to various tricks, and sometimes our nuclear submarines with nuclear missiles unexpectedly appeared where they were not expected. But this did not solve the problem of global secrecy.

Therefore, silo launchers remained the basis of our Strategic Missile Forces. Then mobile ground systems appeared - “Pioneers” and “Topols”. But due to their size and characteristic outlines, they could still be called secretive.

An idea that would be nice to install intercontinental missile on a railway platform, arose immediately after the advent of long-range solid propellant missiles.

The first liquid-fueled ICBMs were very difficult to operate, required lengthy maintenance before launch and were fueled with highly toxic fuel. Everything changed when solid-fuel rockets came into service.

The long shelf life of such missiles made it possible to equip submarines and mobile ground systems with them and load them into mines. Naturally, the temptation arose to create trains armed with missiles.

The Americans weren't particularly worried about this. They considered that missile systems tied to a railway track would be very easy to track from space. And they miscalculated.

Externally, especially from above, BZHRKs were practically no different from refrigerator cars.

True, the strategic trains were pulled by two or three diesel locomotives. So many trains are pulled by two locomotives. And the enormous length and ramifications of the USSR railway network allowed trains to get lost in such a way that even the most advanced satellite reconnaissance could not detect them. The railway workers called the BZHRK “train number zero”.

It was possible to launch rockets from absolutely any point of the railway network or from three at once, and by one train!

For this purpose, the train consisted of three diesel locomotives, which, if necessary, could transport three launch cars to three different points. After launch, the train could be quickly hidden in one of the tunnels.

From the moment the launch command is received until the rocket takes off, about three minutes pass. Everything is done automatically, and the personnel do not even need to leave the cars.

Control came from the command module, which had increased resistance to electromagnetic pulse. Also, special communication antennas were created specifically for the control car, which ensured stable reception of signals through the radio-transparent roofs of the cars.

The advantages of the Combat Railway Missile Complex (BZHRK) are obvious.

A train can travel significant distances, avoiding impacts on previously known coordinates. In a day, a BZHRK train could cover a distance of over 1000 km.

Outwardly, even an experienced railway worker could not distinguish these cars from ordinary ones from 50 meters, and none of the civilians managed to get closer.

The rocket train passed through busy cities only at night; at the station it was met only by a few KGB officers, who also did not know where the train was heading.

Detecting such a train from a satellite is an almost impossible task.

Therefore, such trains were called “ghosts” and the BZHRK became an adequate response to the US deployment of Pershing nuclear missiles in Germany.

Each train carried three special versions of the RT-23 missile, designated 15Zh61 or RT-23 UTTH “Molodets”. The dimensions of the rocket were amazing: diameter 2.4 meters, height 22.6 meters, and weight more than 100 tons. The firing range was 10,100 km, in addition to 10 individually targetable nuclear warheads, each missile carried an overcoming complex missile defense enemy.

The total power of one salvo was 900 times higher than that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Not surprisingly, the missile train became the number one threat to NATO, where it received the designation SS-24 Scalpel.

Although the scalpel is a precise surgical instrument, and the deviation of the “Molodets” from the target was about half a kilometer, with its power this was not so important.

Even falling 500 meters from the target, the “scalpel” warhead was capable of destroying such a protected target as a silo launcher; the rest are not worth talking about.

But the BZHRK, whatever one may say, also has weaknesses.

The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) has a very significant mass. The weight of the rocket-equipped carriage of the Soviet BZHRK “Molodets” reached 150 tons. This imposed additional requirements on the quality of railway tracks and led to their premature wear.

Therefore, in order to distribute the weight evenly, a special three-car coupler was created. This also helped to protect the rails from destruction during rocket launch, when the load increased sharply.

The second problem was the rocket launch itself - it was impossible to launch directly from the carriage, so a simple but effective solution was used.

The rocket was launched at 20-30 m along the mortar, then, while in the air, the rocket was deflected using a powder accelerator, and only then the main engine was turned on.

The need for such complex maneuvers, which the military called a “dance,” was dictated not only by concern for the carrier car, but also the railway track: without such a launch, the rocket would easily sweep away all the rubble for a good hundred meters around.

The third problem was the need to fit the rocket into the refrigerator car. It was also solved simply by making the fairing of variable geometry. At the moment the rocket exited the transport and launch container, pressurization occurred: the metal corrugated fairing took a certain shape under the action of a powder charge (it is also called a “powder pressure accumulator”).

In addition, old inertial navigation systems required predetermined launch coordinates, so along the route of the train it was necessary to organize special points for launching missiles, the coordinates of which, naturally, could fall into the hands of a potential enemy.

Theory, tactics and practice of using BZHRK

In theory, during the threatened period, Soviet missile trains should have dispersed throughout the country, merging with ordinary freight and passenger trains. It is impossible to distinguish one from another from space.

This means that the BZHRK could painlessly escape from the “disarming strike” of American ballistic missiles and deliver its missile salvo from any point along the route.

But this is in theory. Since entering combat duty in 1985, BZHRKs have left the territory of their bases only 18 times. We covered only 400 thousand kilometers.

Veterans of the Strategic Missile Forces recall that the main “enemies” of the BZHRK were not the Americans, who insisted on their disposal under the START-2 treaty, but their own railway authorities.

The BZHRK with the inscription on the sides “For the transportation of light cargo,” after the first passage along the railway tracks, forced the railway management, which could not withstand the vandalism of the military, to immediately file a petition: “They say, war is war, but who will pay for the repair of the road”?

There were no people willing to pay, and they did not send trains with missiles around the country, but training for officer-drivers of missile carriers began to be carried out on civilian trains traveling along the intended routes of the BZHRK.

This turned out to be not only more humane in relation to railway workers, but also much cheaper and safer. The military personnel received the necessary skills to control the train and visualize the route. Which is exactly what was required, because missiles from BZHRK can be launched from any point along the route.

The inability to use the entire territory of the country for combat patrols was also not the only problem in the operation of the BZHRK.

With the declared possibility of launching missiles from any point on the route, the missile train still needed an accurate topographic reference. To do this, along the entire combat patrol route, the military built special “settlers”, where at X-hour a train arrived, tied to a point and could fire a volley of missiles.

It must be understood that these were far from “stormy stops”, but well-guarded “strategic objects” with an infrastructure that treacherously betrayed their purpose.

In addition, by the time START-2 was signed, the USSR had ceased to exist. The Yuzhnoye design bureau, where missiles were created, ended up in Ukraine, as did the Pavlograd plant, where “rental cars” were made.

“It is impossible to extend the service life of any type of weapon indefinitely,” Viktor Yesin, former chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces, expressed his opinion to the ZVEZDA TV channel. “This also applies to the BZHRK, especially considering that this unique complex was created in Ukraine.”

However, the main reasons for abandoning the complex turned out to be the unresolved problem of deployment and the possibility of firing missiles from any point on the route, which in total made the BZHRK not as invulnerable as desired. Which means it’s not such an effective weapon.

Destroy by any means!

Since the advent of the BZHRD, the Americans and their allies have been trying to find a way to ensure their destruction.

If with a silo installation everything is simple: the missile launch is detected from a satellite, then a stationary target is easily destroyed, then with nuclear trains everything is complicated.

Such a composition, if you go by electromagnetic radiation, moves along a certain radius, covering an area of ​​the order of 1-1.5 thousand km. To guarantee the destruction of the train, you need to cover this entire area with nuclear missiles, which is physically very difficult.

Conducted Soviet designers an experiment codenamed “Shift” showed excellent resistance of the BZHRK to the effects of an air shock wave.

For this purpose, several railway trains with TM-57 anti-tank mines (100,000 pieces) were blown up. After the explosion, a crater with a diameter of 80 and a depth of 10 m was formed.

A nuclear train located at some distance was covered by a shock wave; in the habitable compartments, the level of acoustic pressure reached the pain threshold of 150 dB. However, the locomotive was not seriously damaged, and after certain measures were taken to put it on alert, a missile launch was successfully simulated.

Rocket trains "Molodets" with three intercontinental ballistic missiles RT-23 UTTH were put into service in 1987. Each carried 10 warheads. By 1991, 3 had been deployed missile divisions, 4 trains each. They were stationed in the Kostroma region, Krasnoyarsk and Perm territories.

Of course, the Americans did not sit idly by. Here is a documented fact of one of the secret operations to identify Soviet missile trains. To do this, under the guise of commercial cargo, containers were sent from Vladivostok to one of the Scandinavian countries, one of which was stuffed with reconnaissance equipment. But nothing came of it - Soviet counterintelligence opened the container immediately after the train left Vladivostok.

However, after the collapse of the USSR, the situation changed radically and the Americans were able to put an end to the Soviet threat.

Boris Yeltsin, who came to power, on instructions from Washington, banned Scalpels from going on duty, and also pledged to saw all 12 missile trains into metal.

This is how the “Scalpels” were destroyed under the supervision of the Americans.

In addition, on Yeltsin’s instructions, all work on the creation of such systems was prohibited.

To cut up “rocket trains”, a special “cutting” line was installed at the Bryansk repair plant of the Strategic Missile Forces. Under vigilant American supervision, all trains and launchers were disposed of, except for two that were demilitarized and installed as exhibits in the Museum of Railway Equipment at the Warsaw Station in St. Petersburg and in the AvtoVAZ Technical Museum.

By the way, at the same time, most of the launch silos for the most powerful R-36M missiles at that time, which NATO received the designation SS-18 Mod.1,2,3 Satan, were eliminated (filled with concrete).

Naturally, the destruction of complexes that had no analogues in the world did not cause delight either among the military or among experts.

But every cloud has a silver lining! Overseas, initially they didn’t even imagine that they were in a big hurry...

After all, the “Molodets” missiles were designed and produced in Ukraine, in Dnepropetrovsk, mostly at the Yuzhmash plant, which is now slowly but surely being destroyed by the Ukrainian authorities.

And if, under US pressure, Russia had not eliminated its BZHRKs, they would have been a heavy burden on us, because Maintenance and service life extension would become impossible under current conditions.

What is the current situation?

Over the past years, the situation with the BZHRK has changed noticeably. Today, against the backdrop of worsening Russian-American relations, Moscow is ready to once again pull out its “trump card”, which can seriously complicate the life of Washington - to revive the program for creating combat railway missile systems (BZHRK).

In response to the United States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia withdrew from New START in 2002. Now restrictions on multiple warheads no longer apply and there are no formal bans on the use of BZHRK.

The element base has been seriously improved. Modern navigation systems have come a long way and pre-introduction launch coordinates are no longer required.

In fact, all that will remain from the old “Molodets” is the Emergency Catenary Wire Removal System and the mortar launch of the rocket, which allows minimizing damage to the train and tracks when starting the main engine.

Each Barguzin missile train will be armed with 6 RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles. This is a land version of the naval "Bulava". Although these missiles carry only 4 warheads, versus a dozen on the 15Zh61, they are distinguished by significantly greater accuracy and, most importantly, half the weight.

When its creation began, no one could have imagined that a single missile system was being developed for the Navy and Strategic Missile Forces. "Bulava" is for the fleet, and "Yars" can be based on wheeled chassis and railway platforms.

We must thank the former chief of armaments of the Armed Forces, Colonel General Anatoly Sitnov. It was he who insisted that not only new rocket for submarines, namely a multi-purpose unified complex capable of operating both at sea and on land.

When the Americans finally found out about this, it was already too late - they failed to close the project. But still, probably, the designers were constantly hampered by certain external forces, since work on the Bulava was going very hard. Today it is no secret.

Nevertheless, the team of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering under the leadership of the then general designer and general director Yuri Solomonov managed the almost impossible. Apparently, it was no coincidence that in the spring Yuri Semenovich was awarded the title of Hero of Labor.

What will the new Russian BZHRK be like?

In some ways it is very similar to a strategic nuclear submarine. Only more comfortable. All train cars are sealed and very durable - even the explosion of a nuclear warhead a few hundred meters from the train should not disable the complex.

Autonomy – a month. During this time, the crew may not leave the train - there will be enough water and food. The Barguzin will be able to travel up to 1000 km per day. Or he might stop on an “abandoned” branch in a deep forest or hide in an unused tunnel.

By the way, tactics combat use The new BZHRK will most likely be different from the one that “Molodtsy” adhered to.

The missiles are brought into firing position within a few minutes. The firing range is 10 thousand km, the hit accuracy is within a radius of 100 meters from the target. The warheads are maneuverable and capable of overcoming any of the existing missile defense systems.

It is almost impossible for technical reconnaissance equipment to determine the location of a missile train during its combat duty. The most modern means of camouflage have been developed for the BZHRK, powerful systems electronic warfare and the latest methods of protection against terrorists.

The new BZHRK promises to be even more invisible than the previous one. Instead of three old diesel locomotives, the train will be pulled by one modern one. Thus, it will become even more difficult to distinguish combat personnel from ordinary commodity ones.

Also, due to the lighter weight of the rockets, the requirements for the tracks are changing.

The Yars rocket weighs only about 50 tons, which is almost the same as the weight of an ordinary freight car. This reduces track wear and allows a significant part of the railway network to be used for travel.

In addition, there is no need for various tricks characteristic of the Soviet complex, such as unloading devices that redistribute part of the weight to neighboring cars.

But the number of missiles in one train will increase from three to six. Given the smaller number of warheads on each missile, the total charge is smaller. But thanks to the increased accuracy of the hit, the modern complex promises to be more effective.

Conclusion

Roll tests of the missile for the new Russian combat railway missile system (BZHRK) “Barguzin” will take place this year.

And perhaps, at the beginning of the fourth quarter, based on the results of the launch at the beginning of 2017, a decision will be made to launch full-scale work on the BZHRK project, General Designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering Yuri Solomonov told reporters.

“As for the BZHRK, as reported, so-called throw tests are planned this year. They are carried out with the aim of verifying the correctness of the adopted design decisions from the point of view of the impact of the rocket on the units of ground-based launch equipment. This launch is guaranteed to be carried out - it will probably be the beginning of the fourth quarter of this year. And the state of affairs today is such that it inspires absolute optimism that this will be done,” Solomonov said.

The new Russian BZHRK "Barguzin" will be exclusively of domestic production. This complex will be a cheaper and faster response to the deployment by the Americans of a missile defense system in Europe, unlike hypersonic missiles and fighters, work on which will only enter the experimental stage by 2019.

The question arises, why not create an extra regiment of Yars ground systems instead of the rather expensive BZHRKs? After all, the Russian economy is not in the best condition, so why overload it?

It would seem yes, but the most difficult and expensive device in BZHRK these are missiles, and they will have to be produced regardless of the chosen type of deployment.

In addition, although the unpaved complex is mobile, its range of movement is tens of kilometers from the place of permanent deployment, and the BZHRK can cover up to 1000 km per day, which, with an autonomy of 28 days, allows it to reliably get lost in the vastness of our country.

Well, the most important thing is the course towards import substitution.

If missile production has long moved from Ukraine to Russia, then even by the name of the wheeled tractors for the Yars: MZKT-79221, it is clear that they are produced at the Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant.

There are no quality complaints about Belarus, but domestic politics Russia is aimed at complete import substitution in the military sphere. And from this point of view, the BZHRK looks preferable.

Of course, when reviving the BZHRK, all the latest developments in the field of combat missiles will be taken into account. The Barguzin complex will significantly exceed its predecessor in accuracy, missile flight range and other characteristics, which will allow long years“, at least until 2040, this complex will be in the combat composition of the Strategic Missile Forces,” says the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces S. N. Karakaev.

Thus, a grouping will be recreated in the Strategic Missile Forces based on missile systems of three types - silo, mobile ground and railway, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces summarized.

Well, God forbid!

Boris Skupov