What is a clash in the forest, be it taiga, selva, or an ordinary forest middle lane? Features of orientation, organization of all kinds of ambushes, requirements for weapons.

War in the forest, whether it be taiga, selva, or an ordinary forest of the middle lane, has a number of specific features. The danger, in addition to the enemy, comes from fauna, pathogenic microbes and an unfavorable microclimate. Dense vegetation reduces observation and fire contact distances to a minimum. Orientation in the area is very difficult. At the same time, ample opportunities are opening up for tracking down the enemy, organizing all kinds of ambushes and traps. All this imposes special requirements on equipment, weapons and tactical training of fighters.

survival in the forest

To survive and maintain combat readiness in the forest, you need to have an idea of ​​​​the adverse factors that may await you there. This is especially true of the taiga, forest-tundra and tropical forests. Consider some aspects of survival in these types of forest areas.

Let's start with the fact that the weather changes very often in the taiga and forest-tundra zone, so there should be a complete set of protection from precipitation: a tent, a cover for a backpack, clothing with membranes, boots with a membrane and high tops.

Blood-sucking insects become a huge problem from May to August. In May, in the taiga, these are ticks that, in addition to the deadly disease - encephalitis, can carry another most dangerous disease - boreliosis. Vaccination is required!

In the north, in the forest-tundra, there are no ticks, but there are a lot of midges, horseflies and mosquitoes. They literally swarm around. Any exposed areas of the skin, whether it be the hands or the face, will inevitably be bitten.

The best option both in the forest-tundra and in the taiga is special clothing against insects. It consists of pants and a jacket with a hood, made of voluminous mesh. The mosquito cannot reach the skin with its nose and bite, the tick will not crawl through either. In a suit, you can completely cover your face and hands. The advantage is that in hot weather, when you can steam up in ordinary clothes, the mesh will ventilate the body, while at the same time keeping insects out.

Stock up on pills for the fumigator. One such smoky tablet will kill all the mosquitoes that have flown into the tent, and allow you to sleep peacefully. Midges, midges and whitelegs have a nasty feature. They can climb into the sleeve, and bite in the abdomen. After a bite, a dark, itchy swelling appears the size of a 10-kopeck coin. Repellents are a must!

Sleeping in the open air is out of the question. Otherwise, in the morning you will not be able to open your eyes from bites, and there is also no guarantee that vipers are not found in this place. The viper loves warmth and will crawl with pleasure to bask behind your scruff, such cases have happened.

It is necessary to make it a rule to periodically inspect each other for ticks. There are a lot of them in the taiga zone. There can be up to 10 pieces on one branch. Passing by, you, hitting a branch with your shoulder, put them on yourself. In the forest-tundra, it is more convenient to use high-top rubber boots instead of boots and wear them rolled up to the knee. The forest-tundra is completely swampy. Yagel, growing everywhere, absorbs moisture well, and walking on it is like walking on a sponge that has absorbed water. Numerous streams and rivers constantly block the road. In rubber boots, forcing them is not difficult. It is necessary to have a repair kit for shoes, because boots are easy to gouge with a sharp knot.

When you enter the rainforest, any clothing will instantly begin to absorb water from the air and in a few minutes it will become completely wet. The alternative is the same mosquito suit made from a three-dimensional mesh. It is made of synthetics and does not absorb water from the air, and after getting wet it dries instantly, is completely ventilated and protects from insect bites.

As for the dangerous representatives of the animal and plant world living in the selva, their listing alone can take several volumes. First of all, these are snakes and spiders, of which there are a huge number. The main rule when moving through the rainforest is to constantly monitor the places you step on and touch. You can’t just sit on the ground, you must first examine everything around. Some snakes are so "successfully" colored that it is impossible to notice them, even knowing that they should be here. Quite a lot of species of poisonous snakes can crawl through trees. Passing by, you run the risk of disturbing the resting snake, touching the branch on which it lies, which will infuriate it.

Spiders are also very dangerous. They drive night image life and strive to get into the boot. Make it a rule to shake out your boots before putting them on. Unlike spiders, scorpions are less dangerous, among them there is not a single species whose bite would lead to the death of a person. But there are a huge number of spider species that can kill a person.

In addition to insects swarming around, spreading a whole bunch of tropical diseases, each of which is deadly, land leeches are of great concern. They sit on branches and cling to a passing person. It is necessary to make all possible vaccinations.

Everything around is intertwined with vines, and in order to get through, you have to literally cut your way through. For this purpose, you need a long knife - a machete. Be careful, the juice of some plants is extremely toxic, like acid. Even smelling a slice of some of them, you can get poisoned. The author had to observe many such toxic burns and experience their unpleasant effect on himself. A bubble appears at the site of contact with the juice on the skin, as after a thermal burn. It does not go away for a long time, and when everything heals, permanent traces remain. Sometimes such burns can lead to very serious consequences up to death. It is enough to wipe yourself with the wrong sheet - and that's it ...

All water is unfit for consumption. It is rather a broth of billions of pathogens. For safe drinking, it is necessary to dig a hole near the reservoir. The water that enters it is collected, passed through a filter, which everyone should have. Then the water is disinfected with a special tablet and boiled. In this way, you can protect yourself as much as possible. Also, each fighter should have a filter with him - a tube. It filters out everything superfluous well and, if necessary, allows you to drink directly from a puddle, but you should not get carried away with this.

To protect yourself from an unwanted intestinal infection, you must have a supply of alcohol and drink a little before and after every meal. This will destroy all the microbes that have entered the stomach with food. If this rule is neglected, then after 1-2 days you will inevitably experience indigestion at best.

All, even the most insignificant, wounds must be treated with the utmost care. Shoes must be with a membrane, otherwise the feet will be constantly wet. The tent should also have a membrane to protect it from rain and bring heated air out. But these tents are fabulously expensive. It is more convenient to close the anti-mosquito part of the tent with an awning, leaving the side parts open for ventilation. Even if the sky is clear, it may rain in an hour.

Each fighter should have a compass and a map, and preferably a GPS navigator. It is very easy to get lost in the dense impenetrable forest. Enough in the confusion of the battle to scatter in different directions. The GPS navigator records your entire journey, and if necessary, you can easily return back. Also, the device is convenient for memorizing key objects, trails, minefields, single-placed mines, hiding places, which will then be extremely difficult to find.

The absence of the items of clothing and equipment described above makes survival in the forest for any length of time (not to mention hostilities) extremely difficult.

Tactics of warfare in the forest. Platoon armament

We will consider the tactics of combat in the forest using the example of the most familiar zone of temperate forest terrain.

For effective combat in the forest, it is necessary to regroup the platoon. Depending on the combat mission and the region in which the fighting takes place, the specifics, composition and armament of the unit may change. But, since the main danger for the group is always ambushes, the structure of the platoon should provide maximum resistance to them and minimize casualties.

The platoon is divided into 4 squads of 4 fighters each (“fours”) and 4 combat “twos”.

In three combat "fours" are: machine gunner (PKM), assistant machine gunner (AK with GP), sniper (VSS), shooter (AK with GP). In one of the "fours" the sniper needs to have an IED. These are the three main combat units. The squad leader is a sniper. All the fighters of the "quartet" act in his interests. In one of the "fours" are the platoon commander (VSS) and the radio operator (AK).

The fourth combat "four" includes: a machine gunner (PKM), an assistant machine gunner (AKMN with PBS), a grenade launcher (RPG-7), an assistant grenade launcher (AKMN with PBS). This is the fire department. It follows the lead watch. Its task is to create a high density of fire, stop and delay the enemy while the main forces turn around and take up positions to repel the attack. The squad leader is a machine gunner, and all the fighters of the "four" act with their fire, ensuring his work.

The combat "twos" are the head and rear patrols and 2 side guards. Their armament is the same and consists of AK with GP, AKS-74UN2 with PBS is also appropriate. For machine guns, it is better to use magazines from the RPK for 45 rounds. Each fighter, except for machine gunners, an assistant grenade launcher and a radio operator, carries 2-3 RPG-26s, and preferably MRO-A or RGSH-2.

After the start of the clash, the "four" fire countermeasures, following the head patrol, also open fire on the enemy, suppressing his activity with machine-gun fire and fire from RPG-7. The assistant machine gunner and the assistant grenade launcher of the fire resistance group are armed with AKMN with PBS. This allows them, once again without being illuminated, to destroy the enemy, representing an immediate danger to the machine gunner and grenade launcher. If the enemy is detected from the front by the head patrol, and the patrol remains unnoticed, the arrows from the PBS destroy the enemy with fire from a silent weapon.

From the features of such a structure, it can be seen that the fighters in the platoon are somehow grouped in pairs. This contributes to combat coordination, the development of conditional signals, and a better understanding of each other.

At the same time, it should be noted that it is often appropriate to divide a platoon in half, 12 fighters each. Each group performs a specific combat mission. In this situation, a dozen will act differently. Each reinforced squad includes 2 PKM (Pecheneg) machine gunners, 2 VSS snipers, 8 riflemen (AK + GP). The second squad includes an RPG-7 grenade launcher and two shooters with AKMN + PBS. With such an organization in the squad on the march, 3 fighters (machine gunner and 2 shooters), core (4 shooters, 2 snipers) and rear guards (machine gunner, 2 shooters) go on the head patrol.

In case of a sudden collision with the enemy, the lead patrol opens heavy fire and holds the enemy while the rest turn around. In the event of a sudden collision with superior enemy forces, the rear patrol takes up an advantageous position and covers the withdrawal of the entire group.

In the forest area, open areas are not very common - as a rule, these are the banks of rivers and lakes, burnt areas, hilltops, glades. That is, basically the area is “closed”. The range of fire contact in such conditions is minimal, and there is no need for long-range weapons (such as Kord, ASVK, AGS and even SVD), but the soldiers should have a pistol or submachine gun as an additional weapon.

A great tactical advantage in the forest is the use of mines. The most convenient, in my opinion, is MON-50. It is relatively light and practical. Each of the fighters of the group, except for machine gunners, an assistant grenade launcher and a radio operator, can carry at least one mine. Sometimes it is convenient to use the MON-100, which, with a mass of 5 kg, provides a defeat corridor 120 meters long and 10 meters wide. It is convenient to install it on clearings and roads, directing it along them or along the edge of the forest.

POM-2R mines are also needed, truly irreplaceable. After being brought into combat position, the mine becomes armed in 120 seconds and throws four 10-meter target sensors in different directions. The radius of the circular defeat is 16 meters. It is very convenient for mining when a group retreats, or when it is necessary to quickly create a minefield in the enemy's path.

Summarizing the above, we note: the result is a platoon armed with 4 PKM or Pecheneg machine guns, 3 VSS silent sniper rifles, 1 SVU-AS, 1 RPG-7; 17 fighters each have 2-3 RPG-26 grenade launchers (34-51 pcs.), 2 AKMN with PBS, 14 fighters are armed with GP and carry at least 18 mines MON-50 and 18 mines POM-2R.

The order of work of patrols

On the march, it is more convenient to move in a battle formation of the “arrow” type. Machine gunners are coming in front and from the flanks. A side guard is a must. The head patrol does not move more than 100 meters from the first "four", visual communication must be maintained. Such a battle formation allows you to provide the greatest security in case of a surprise attack. In the event of an explosion on a directed mine, only one “four” is hit. Depending on the situation, the battle order may change to a "wedge", "ledge" or "chain".

Patrols and side guards should have special thermal imaging and acoustic reconnaissance devices, through the use of which it is possible to reduce the surprise attack factor to a minimum. At the moment, we are armed with samples that are either outdated or very bulky.

So we again came to the conclusion that you need to buy everything yourself. Nevertheless, there is no such money with which one could evaluate one's own life. The necessary devices can be bought in hunting shops - this is an individual hearing amplifier "Superuho" and Life Finder - a device for searching for wounded animals.

"Superuho" is a headphone that amplifies the sound many times over. With the help of this device, it is easy to hear a quiet rustle, whisper, the clatter of a buckle on a weapon - in a word, all this can give out the presence of an enemy. At the same time, with a strong explosion or powerful shot, the device lowers the threshold of sound vibrations to a safe level of 92 dB. (This is especially true for the grenade launcher, which literally stalls after the first two shots.)

Life Finder is also an extremely effective item for a fighter, as it allows you to catch an enemy entrenched in the thickets by body heat. Its effective range in a forest overgrown with shrubs is 100 meters (branches and leaves strongly delay and shield the heat emitted by the object), in open areas - up to 900 meters. (However, in the rainforest, the Life Finder is ineffective because the ambient temperature is close to human body temperature, which reduces the contrast, in addition, the ability of the device is negatively affected by dense vegetation.)

A set of these two devices should be in each of the security and patrol soldiers. By the way, "Superuho" will allow them not only to identify the enemy, but also to talk quietly at a distance, without using radio stations. Life Finder after completion can be mounted on the machine on the Weaver bar.

Forest ambush tactics

While in an ambush, you must follow some rules. Snipers and machine gunners should be evenly distributed along the front and be sure to control the flanks. The latter, as well as the probable directions of the enemy's approach, are mined. It is also appropriate to mine the front, preferably with a chain of several MON-50s. Sectors of continuous mine destruction must overlap.

When the enemy enters the sector of destruction, the entire mine chain is undermined. Infantry currently moving in full height, will be destroyed. This should be followed by a blow with all the forces and means, aimed at finishing off the enemy. The positions of the snipers are separate, and their single shots are lost against the backdrop of general shooting. This allows them to calmly and systematically shoot the enemy.

If there are no radio-controlled fuses, then you can build a homemade one and blow it up at the right time with a sniper shot. A piece of glass is inserted between two pieces of tin, and all this (not very tightly) is tied around the edges. The contacts of a series-connected circuit of several mines are suitable for the tin. This "sniper fuse" must be placed on a tree trunk from a side convenient for the sniper. When the enemy enters the affected area, a sniper shot at the “fuze” follows, the glass between the pieces of tin crumbles, and the circuit closes. This is how a whole platoon can be laid down with one shot, and many such traps can be placed.

It is even more effective to place a POM-2R mine in the affected area of ​​the MON-50 chain. One or two enemy soldiers will be blown up by a mine, the main part of the personnel of the enemy unit will come to the aid of the wounded. The subsequent detonation of the MON-50 chain will cover them all at once. (In this regard, it is necessary to make it a rule that no more than two people provide assistance to the wounded in the place where the injury occurred.)

In the process of mining, when setting up an ambush, a calculation of 3-4 MON-50 mines per enemy platoon is taken. The problem lies in the need to hit the core so that the patrol and side guards do not notice the ambush ahead of time. The lead watch should be skipped forward (as a rule, these are two soldiers). They are neutralized separately after mines are detonated. With flank protection it is much more difficult. To do this, you need to use a silent weapon.

The enemy reconnaissance group will most likely not follow the path, but move along it. The enemy may be much larger than expected, in which case the remaining forces will attack you in the flank. It is convenient to arrange POM-2R there. The surviving enemy soldiers will go into a lightning-fast counterattack, and if they do not open dagger fire on them, they can take the initiative into their own hands.

During the battle, you must not forget that RPG and VOG shots explode when they hit branches. This is to be feared, but it is also to be used. If the enemy is lying under a bush and you can't reach him, launch the VOG into the crown of the bush above him, and he will be covered with fragments.

When occupying the line, the place for the gap is chosen to the right of the tree, which plays the role of a natural shield. Nothing should block the firing sector and interfere with the view. It is especially important to make sure that there are no anthills nearby. When digging a "scorpion hole", as the shel is sometimes called, it is necessary to carry the earth into the depths of the forest, and ideally, if possible, pour it into a stream, swamp or lake. The gap should not have a parapet, as mounds of dug sand will immediately give away your position. The front of the "scorpion hole" must be directed to the right edge of the firing sector. This is due to the fact that it is more convenient to turn the weapon to the left than to the right, where you need to turn around with your whole body, which is inconvenient in a tight space. For a left-hander, everything will be exactly the opposite.

Lastly, think about the roots of the tree. If possible, you can squeeze between them, because a thick root can stop a fragment.

The fighters are grouped in twos: so they can cover each other in case of a shot delay or when reloading weapons, as well as quickly provide first aid in case of injury.

As for stretch marks. If you set the usual (low), then the first to blow up on it are the fighters of the enemy’s head patrol. At the same time, the more important target is the commander of the enemy group. To destroy it, a directional mine is installed at a height of 2 meters above the ground, and stretching is also carried out at this level. The lookouts will pass under it unhindered, they focus on low tripwires and revealing enemy positions. It is possible to reveal a high stretch only by chance. Next comes the core. In it, next to the commander, there is a radio operator, who breaks the stretching of the antenna radio station.

The use of MANPADS in the forest. tree position device

Wooded terrain complicates the work of MANPADS crews, as the trunks and branches of trees block the view and the firing sector. To arrange a convenient position for calculating MANPADS, find the tallest tree and position yourself on its top. Therefore, it is advisable to have special claws, ropes and suspension systems with you. You need to arrange a "nest" in the place where there are two closely planted, strong horizontal branches. The space between them is braided with a rope in such a way that: a platform is obtained on which you can comfortably lie down or half-sitting. In order to protect against fire from below, deploy a bulletproof vest under you, and to mask your position, insert branches into the lower part of the weave.

All items of equipment and equipment must be fixed on branches and branches to prevent them from falling down, but in such a way that they can be quickly used. Be sure to have a fixed cord: in the event of an immediate departure from the position, you drop its end down and quickly descend along it. It is even better to fasten the second end of a long rope below the “nest”, at a height of about 2.5 meters from the ground. Then, to quickly leave the position, you will only need to attach the elements of your suspension system to the rope and slide down it like Tarzan. So in a matter of seconds you leave the firing zone, and it is much more difficult to hit a person “flying” horizontally among the branches and trunks of trees than going down vertically.

Around the tree, it is desirable to install 3-4 MON-50s in radio-controlled mode. If the enemy comes close to you, detonate mines, because the directed beam of lethal elements does not pose a danger to you. But it is strictly forbidden to attach mines to the trunk of the tree on which you are located, as well as to the trunks of nearby trees (after the explosion, they can fall on your tree).

In such a "nest" you can spend a lot of time, remaining unnoticed from above and below. If it so happened that your position was discovered and a firefight began, do not try to use grenades. In this situation, they pose a much more tangible danger to you than to the enemy. It is much more appropriate to use small arms. The enemy will instinctively lie down after contact begins. A recumbent human figure has a larger profile than in a vertical position, in addition, shooting upwards from a prone position is extremely inconvenient - for this you need to roll over onto your back. Your advantage is that you can avoid fire by hiding behind a tree trunk. A fixed cord and suspension system will help you with this. Being behind the barrel, in extreme cases, you can use a grenade, but then it is better to make it explode in the air.

How to increase the sector of destruction of mines

During the explosion of a directed mine installed on the ground, part of the lethal elements goes into the ground, and more than half flies over the enemy's head. To correct this situation, MON-50 mines, for example, must be placed on a tree, at a height of 2 meters and directed slightly down in the direction of the expected appearance of the enemy (accurately aim the mine at a point at a distance of 30 meters). At the same time, 100 percent of the lethal elements will fly above the ground at a height of less than 2 meters, which is the most effective. For MON-90, installed at a height of 2 meters, this point is located at a distance of 45 meters. But MON-100 and MON-200 are best installed at a height of 3 and 5 meters, respectively, parallel to the ground.

In addition to the vertical angle, the angle of the horizontal installation of the mine relative to the path or road along which the enemy will pass is extremely important. This is especially true of the MON-100 and MON-200 mines, which have a narrow sector of slaughter elements. Installed 25 meters from the path, these mines must be deployed 60 degrees to the road in the direction of the enemy. If you put the same MON-100 against the movement, it can be seen, otherwise it will “hide” behind a tree trunk.

For MON-50 and MON-90 this system is ineffective. A much more effective way to increase the lethal range is to overlap the affected sectors. Mines MON-50 must be placed along the road perpendicularly, every 30 meters, 35 meters from the road. MON-90 are installed 50 meters apart, 45 meters from the trail.

Mines OZM-72 of circular destruction are installed in a "square", 50 meters from each other (15 meters from the road in each direction). With such an installation, 8 mines reliably hit the enemy in an area of ​​​​90 × 200 meters.

OZM-72 is good because it is installed underground and cannot be visually detected. It "jumps" when detonated and explodes at a height of one meter, providing a circular area of ​​destruction with a radius of 30 meters.

The installation of a powerful directional mine MON-200 along the road is very effective. At the turn it is convenient to set 2 mines and direct them along each side of the road. Wherever the enemy comes from, when the explosion is destroyed, all life is destroyed at a distance of 230 meters in both directions. Such a scheme is called a "razor".

Near the road, you can place 3 MON-100 mines in the trees and direct one of them along the road, and the rest at an angle of 25 degrees on each side. As a result, during the explosion, a corridor of 30 × 120 meters is “burned out”. When using the MON-90 mine in a similar situation, the sector of expansion of lethal elements is wider, but the corridor is smaller - 60 × 70 m.

Features of combat operations in the rainforest

Until now, I emphasize once again, we have talked about the tactics of combat in the forest of the temperate climate zone. In conclusion - literally in a nutshell - about some characteristic moments of the tactics of actions in the selva.

It is impossible to use RGO and RGN grenades in the rainforest, this is tantamount to suicide. The use of RPG and GP due to dense vegetation is also extremely limited. For the same reason, there is no need for long-range sniper weapons. Therefore, the best option is VSS.

AGS in a tropical forest is also ineffective, due to the fact that grenades flying along a hinged trajectory explode in the crown of trees, and it starts 50 meters from the ground. Light fragments get stuck in branches and vines, and those that have pierced them are at the end and do not pose a serious danger. A mortar mine, on the other hand, easily passes through branches and explodes on the ground.

Small rivers and canals can be navigated by boats, like on a highway, but these water barriers create a lot of problems for a walking group. Armored vehicles are used extremely rarely and in those areas where it is possible. The main combat unit is a helicopter, which allows you to easily and quickly get to the desired point, land troops or strike.

Bridges and pontoon crossings across rivers play a special role. They are heavily guarded, on the one hand, and they are trying to destroy them by all means, on the other.

It is impossible to detect an enemy from the air under the dense canopy of the rainforest, so defoliants can be used. These are the chemicals that cause the leaves to fall off.

Mines play a special role in the tropical forest. In dense vegetation - this is the most effective weapon. OZM-72, MON-50, POM-2R mines and small PMN-2 pressure mines are especially effective. The problem is that numerous wild animals tear off the stretch marks, so they need to be raised to the level of the belt. It should be noted that the stretch becomes a frame for the web in a few hours, and this effectively masks it. Be careful when cutting through the webs.

It is also possible to mine narrow rivers and channels by installing stretch marks across. Even if it is noticed in advance, the boat or motorboat will still run into it by inertia.

Finally, the last - in the crown of trees, at a height of 50-70 meters, it is very convenient to place MANPADS crews, ambushes.

Rapid urbanization, which is typical of most states in general, makes it necessary to pay special attention to the preparation of army and special units for combat operations in populated areas. The neglect of such training cost the Russian army unreasonably large losses during the fighting in the city of Grozny in the winter of 1995. The usual combined-arms tactics of deploying units to conduct an offensive in the field turned out to be unsuitable for battles in the city. Obtaining the necessary skills went immediately into practice, was richly paid for with blood, and forced Russian strategists to think about the advisability of revising the combat training program.

The main reasons for the unpreparedness of the federal forces for an effective assault on Grozny (the most striking, but not the only sad example) were:

• underestimation of the resistance of militants, their weapons and training, including engineering;
• overestimation of one's own strengths. For example, the role of armored vehicles, aviation and artillery during the storming of the city;
• lack of a unified strategy and control system for a heterogeneous group;
• disgusting coordination and communication between divisions;
• low training of personnel: general, special and psychological.

This list could be continued, but the purpose of this chapter is not a detailed analysis of the Chechen war, in particular its political and ideological aspects. One thing is important - the city was taken only thanks to the courage of the Russian soldier. But something else is even more important: there was a need to learn lessons, in this case tactical ones.

One of the reasons that by the mid-90s most of the Russian troops were not ready for urban battles lies in the fact that the Afghan experience gave us a little in this respect. It would be more appropriate to study the experience of the defense of Stalingrad during the Second World War. But now you can not complain about the lack of experience in combat operations in populated areas.

By far, the city is the most complex theater of operations. Combat in a populated area quickly consumes forces, often without affecting success. Dense buildings limit the mobility of assault units, make it difficult to maneuver in order to concentrate efforts in the right directions, limit reconnaissance activities, complicate the control of units during combat and target designation, reduce the effectiveness of radio communications, limit shelling, visibility, limit and modify the use of various types of weapons and etc. Without a doubt, in a populated area it is much more preferable to keep the defense than to storm. Especially if it is possible to prepare positions in advance.

For assault units, the main complicating factors can be:

• the absence of a detailed scheme of a settlement (NP) and reliable intelligence about the enemy and his defense system;
• the presence of an extensive network of underground communications;
• the presence in the city of the civilian population, whose fate is not indifferent to the assault forces;
• the presence in the NP of historical and architectural monuments, as well as other structures, the preservation of which is important for the attackers.

In this chapter, the assault on a settlement is considered from the point of view of regular troops.

Before storming a settlement, the troops need to surround it and cut off any connection between the besieged and the outside world (which was not done during the capture of Grozny in 1995). Attempts to take it on the move can result in big losses for the attackers. Such tactics can be effective if there is accurate intelligence about the weak defenses of the enemy.

In Chechnya, before storming a village occupied by militants, Russian troops first announced their intention to carry out an invasion and offered the extremists to voluntarily lay down their arms and surrender, and civilians to leave the danger zone along the provided corridor. Practice has shown that in most cases no one surrenders and not all civilians leave the settlement. Some were forcibly held by militants, hiding behind them as hostages. Some refused to leave on their own. Many provided active assistance to extremists, which does not allow them to be defined as “civilians”. However, the use of such a practice can significantly reduce losses both among the civilian population and among the assault units.

When leaving a settlement before an assault, under the guise of civilians, militants almost always try to infiltrate. This is done for various purposes, including to provide disinformation to the besieging forces. Therefore, a check and search of all persons leaving the encirclement is mandatory.

In contrast to the tactics of the long, exhausting siege of past centuries, when the garrison was brought to exhaustion, in modern war such actions are excluded.

First, a long siege causes complications of a political nature.

Secondly, the defenders usually have sufficient food supplies for a long stay in isolation.

Thirdly, in this way a small garrison can bind a significant group.

Fourthly, the besieged have time to prepare engineering defensive lines. The assault on the village of Pervomaiskoye in Chechnya in January 1996 showed that several days were enough to establish good positions.

Bombardment and artillery shelling of a populated area does not cause significant damage to the defenders, especially in a city with high-rise buildings and a network of underground utilities. The actions of helicopters that deliver targeted strikes on garrison positions are more effective. The senseless destruction of buildings usually does not cause the desired damage to the defenders, but subsequently can impede the advance of the assault groups, since, together with the remaining buildings, favorable conditions are created for sheltering the defenders and their military equipment, building well-equipped strongholds in engineering terms, defensive areas and centers of resistance. In addition, after the end of hostilities, everything may have to be restored, and the residents left homeless will become another headache that threatens a humanitarian catastrophe. The destruction of buildings is not excluded, it is often necessary. But such actions (as well as other actions in war) must be justified and make sense.

When entering a populated area, the troops move rapidly but cautiously along the designated directions within the city and in its suburbs, seizing positions and gaining a foothold on them. Developing the pace of movement, the advancing groups should not break away from each other. This is fraught with the fact that the enemy, hiding, will cut the units of the attackers, surround them and destroy them, using the positional advantage. Most good example such tactics - the January assault on the city of Grozny in 1995. Having launched columns of armored vehicles, the militants began to cut them off from the main forces and destroy them. Military equipment was not capable of effectively countering grenade launchers at close range.

Ignorance of the city by the federal forces also had an effect.

The fast pace of the offensive is sometimes fraught with neglect of the danger of possible mining of the routes of probable advance. It is recommended to bypass the strong strongholds of the defenders, which are difficult to capture with a frontal attack. The offensive should be developed in those directions where the enemy's defense is weaker. Subsequently, after isolating the most difficult defense nodes and their surroundings for assault, the attackers can use the advantage gained. In order to break down the active resistance of such strongholds, weak points are groped in the defense. Aviation, armored vehicles and artillery can also be used to capture them. And the greatest benefit artillery firing direct fire.

If it is necessary to concentrate efforts in a certain direction or to capture important objects, attackers can land tactical airborne assault forces from helicopters. However, such a landing is a risky undertaking. At the same time, in most cases, losses are inevitable both among helicopters and among the landing force.

The assault on a populated area is characterized by the extremely high role of small units and each fighter in its implementation. In the German statute "Driving Troops" of 1933, a battle in a populated area is characterized as follows: "It is played out at close range, and its outcome usually depends on the independent actions of junior commanders." Therefore, the attacking group is divided into assault detachments ranging from a platoon to a battalion. Such groups (detachments) can be reinforced by tank, artillery and engineering units.

It is mandatory to have a significant mobile reserve, which is assigned various tasks. The reserve can be sent to help assault units that encounter insurmountable resistance or suffer significant losses. Attackers may need the help of specific specialists - snipers, sappers, flamethrowers, grenade launchers, signalmen and others. Therefore, the reserve should be multifunctional and be able to meet any needs.

The reserve can also be sent to develop an offensive in the event of a slowdown in the rate of advance of any assault detachment in a certain direction. If the forward advancing units can advance successfully at a good pace without encountering stubborn resistance, the reserve can move in a second wave, carefully checking the captured territories and objects for mines and hidden enemies. In addition, in the captured large houses and other buildings, it is necessary to leave several fighters who will guard it and control the rear space. This will protect the forward units from strikes to the rear by infiltrated or hidden enemies. A prerequisite for such cover groups are the choice of positions that provide the best observation, and the presence of communication with the main groups. Assigned to cover groups are usually fighters from the reserve.

Just as an attacking grouping is broken up into assault detachments, so the general plan of an offensive operation is broken up into parts. That is, the capture of a settlement or part of it consists of the seizure by troops of individual sections: microdistricts, quarters, streets, squares, parks, enterprises, houses, etc.

Each assault detachment is assigned its own tasks, final and current. For example, the ultimate task for the battalion is to reach the bridge and organize a strong point there. To achieve it, the battalion needs to go through the three indicated quarters, in which it is necessary to take possession of certain buildings and clear the territory of the enemy. The tasks of capturing individual buildings are distributed among the companies and platoons of the battalion.

To successfully complete this challenging task commanders of assault units must have maps or diagrams of the settlement, know the assigned tasks and have reliable communication with the operation control center and among themselves.

The best for orientation in the locality are large-scale maps (containing the names of streets, squares, house numbers, etc.) and multi-color plans at a scale of 1:10,000 or 1:15,000. It is desirable that they be fresh. More extra useful information they will give aerial photographs of defensive objects (planned and prospective). A good addition to these documents may be: schemes of underground and other communications; description of the city and suburbs; other information that gives an idea about the features of the given settlement as a whole and individual objects. In the future, undoubtedly, special forces will make more extensive use of electronic maps in combination with satellite navigation devices, which not only help to navigate the city well, but also provide data on the position of their troops with high accuracy and speed.

The command must constantly have information about the progress of the offensive and coordinate the actions of all groups, since in the conditions of the city each unit is forced to act almost independently. Combat experience shows that the enemy can take advantage of the inconsistency and unevenness of advance between subunits and infiltrate at the junctions between units. In advance, however, it is possible to calculate the uniformity of progress only approximately. Therefore, it is important to make frequent adjustments to the course of the operation.

Another danger inherent in urban combat is the risk of nearby friendly units coming under fire. At the beginning of the operation to take the city of Grozny in January 1995, the militants used this tactic. Taking advantage of the fact that the assault was conducted by many heterogeneous units, which usually had neither direct communication between themselves, nor a single command, and coordination issues took a lot of time, they provoked different units of the federal forces into fire contacts with each other. For example, using the knowledge of the area and not having any signs of belonging to bandit formations, the militant made his way between two posts of federal forces and opened fire from small arms (usually it was a compact submachine gun of the Chechen production "Volk") in the direction of each post. After that, the militant left this place, often hiding weapons and becoming a “civilian”. At first, the fighters at the posts opened a hurricane of non-aimed fire in the direction of the shooting, that is, in fact, in the direction of the neighboring post. Those, of course, answered them with fire. However, this tactic did not cause any significant losses in the federal forces and was quickly exposed.

Armored vehicles move along the streets in sync with the advancing infantry. Getting ahead of the assault squads is fraught with the destruction of equipment. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers that have strayed from cover become easy prey for grenade launchers. Armored vehicles firing direct fire. Its cannons suppress enemy firing points, destroy heavy weapons, destroy obstacles that have arisen and make passages in the walls. Armored vehicles also cover the movement of infantry.

Artillery, tactical and army aviation can be used to destroy specific objects, create fires and suppress the enemy in defended structures. However, due to the fact that the opposing sides are at a short distance in the settlement, there is a significant risk that their units will fall under this fire.

The tactics of using tanks in the city has its own characteristics

Causing significant damage during the storming of the city is not yet a guarantee of success in Grozny

To avoid this, it is necessary that artillery and aviation deliver targeted strikes only at the command of the commanders in charge of the assault operations, after agreeing on the time and place of the strike. Naturally, such interaction presupposes the existence of reliable communication channels. In Grozny in the winter of 1995, according to various estimates, losses from "friendly" fire ranged from 40 to 60%.

The movement of infantry is carried out not only along the streets, but also through courtyards, parks, underground utilities, gaps in walls, roofs of houses. When advancing, the accumulation of equipment and personnel should be avoided.

Assault groups must include sappers who search for and clear mines and booby traps, carry out demolition work in order to make passages in walls or other obstacles and barriers, as well as to clear barricades, rubble and destruction.

Group tactics

Now directly about the tactics that are used during the assault in small groups.

Action in pairs is the basis of combat coordination ...

For the best interaction, mutual control and mutual assistance, as well as to facilitate the management of the unit as a whole, the groups are divided into pairs or triplets. Fighters in pairs or trios (hereinafter simply pairs) operate in close contact with each other, are constantly within line of sight and maintain voice communication. They must regularly monitor their comrades on the principle of "everyone is responsible for everyone." In order for such pairs to act effectively and have a high level of mutual understanding, it is necessary to form them in advance, even in the process of preparation. Thus, the fighters will develop not only friendly relations, but also a sense of understanding and foreseeing the actions of a comrade. During joint training, the couple will exchange experience and develop a single tactic of action, even develop their own language of communication. The same system, for example, operates in the French Foreign Legion, where the soldiers are divided into pairs (binoms). However, snipers, machine gunners, grenade launchers, etc., and so operate in pairs in a regular manner.

The interaction between couples is also important. When carrying out any movements during the assault, it is necessary to organize mutual cover to ensure safety. One group covers, the second - makes a maneuver. And vice versa.

Infantry movement is made in short throws from cover to cover. During movement, a distance of four to seven meters must be constantly maintained between fighters and groups. Even in the absence of enemy fire, fighters should be careful not to linger in open areas for more than two to three seconds. Inspection of potentially dangerous directions (windows, attics, breaks) should be carried out continuously.

The main cover of the units is carried out by machine gunners, snipers and grenade launchers. Moreover, machine gunners can conduct "disturbing" fire at suspicious places where the enemy may be. Snipers and grenade launchers, on the other hand, shoot at the identified positions of the enemy. After the advanced units pass the next line, it is fixed in the occupied positions and ensures the approach of the cover group, which is pulled up to new positions.

Especially for snipers

When the unit moves on foot along the street, armored vehicles are used as cover. A distance must be maintained between infantrymen and combat vehicles and hilling must be excluded. The infantry moves along the walls, having previously distributed control in all directions, especially the opposite side of the street. Thus, when moving along a street with multi-storey buildings, two pedestrian columns control the situation over each other.

The movement of columns only along the streets is the wrong tactic, which is likely to lead to heavy losses of units, and even to complete destruction. An advance with gaps in battle formations allows the defenders to reach the rear and flanks of the attackers and deliver effective strikes against them. In this case, the whole offensive strategy breaks down, which turns into a chaotic battle that is difficult to manage. Defenders entrenched in houses will gain a positional advantage, while troops caught in the street will be in unfavorable conditions. They will be shot down from above and pelted with hand grenades. In addition, one should not forget about the danger of mining the streets.

In order to maintain a single line of attack, neighboring subunits must have constant communication with each other and coordinate their actions. Guards are left in the checked buildings (this was discussed above).

Building Storm

Storm a large building, in which the enemy holds the defense, is a sure way to unreasonably large losses. First you need to take positions opposite him, and if possible, around him. It is necessary, if possible, to identify the firing points of the defenders and estimate the most optimal routes for the movement of assault groups. The least preferred paths of advance are the most natural ones.

Before you directly enter the building, you must try to destroy the maximum number of enemies. This task is mainly assigned to snipers, machine gunners, grenade throwers and flamethrowers. They do not stop their actions even after the entry of stormtroopers into the building. However, the latter should not be allowed to fall under "friendly" fire. Therefore, as the infantry moves up, the covering ones transfer fire to the upper floors and fire accurately. Machine gunners cease to pour fire on the alleged locations of the enemy.

Grenade throwers and flamethrowers must be especially careful. Greatest Benefit can bring snipers. It is desirable to achieve reliable communication and coordination between the attack aircraft and the cover group under such conditions, but in a real battle it is very difficult.

To combat enemy firing points, armored vehicles and artillery can also be actively involved, which fire at direct fire. However, the fire stops before the attack aircraft. Under certain conditions, the commander may decide to attack the building without artillery preparation. This happens when the commander relies on the surprise and secrecy of the beginning of the assault.

Entry into a building through natural and predictable routes, through windows and doors, carries a high level of risk.

Firstly, such paths are often mined, and secondly, in most cases they are under the gun of the defenders. Therefore, the penetration must go through the breaches made. They are pierced by firing from cannons, grenade launchers and ATGMs. To achieve greater surprise, attack aircraft can penetrate openings immediately after breaking through. In this case, the defenders will not have time to reorganize their orders. However, it is important that the assault units do not suffer at the moment of penetration, so the starting positions for them should be placed at a safe distance.

The tactics of penetration immediately after the formation of a breach is not always used. It is often safer to make a few breaches first and only then attack. If the enemy does not allow attack aircraft to approach the object of assault with aimed fire, the attack can be launched after setting up a smoke screen.

Haste during the storming of the building leads to heavy losses. Having reached the starting line, the assault detachment needs to regroup and look around. Commander plans order further action and brings it to his subordinates.

Undoubtedly, the unit that purposefully prepared for combat operations in urban conditions will achieve the greatest success and the least losses. Each fighter and each pair must work out various options for action so that everyone does his job without a team and is ready to replace comrades who are out of action. After all, the commander will not be able to control all the soldiers, especially since providing each soldier of the Russian army with a personal radio station is an unrealizable dream.

Negotiations on radio stations before the assault regarding the upcoming attack are permitted only if closed radio channels are used.

After taking the building, it is necessary to carefully check it and, if necessary, neutralize all found explosive devices. Now this building is becoming the starting point for further offensive. The commander, having received a report that the building has been cleared, checks the personnel, determines the dead and wounded, plans defensive actions and reports to headquarters. First of all, measures are taken for all-round defense, since the enemy may try to launch a counterattack in order to regain lost positions. This is especially likely if the building is tactically advantageous.

The lower approaches are, if possible, blocked by engineering methods. Particular attention should be paid to basements and various underground passages. During the assault on the city of Grozny, the federal troops did not risk going underground, since this threatened with heavy losses. Therefore, all exits to the surface were filled up and often mined. However, planting mines in a building that is used as a defensive line is a risky practice. It is likely that in the hustle and bustle one of his soldiers can blow up on them.

The assault group distributes positions on different floors and sectors of fire. The commander deals with the prisoners (if any) and plans a further offensive. Thus, the assault team moves from building to building, leaving in the captured groups for protection, unless this function is taken over by the reserve.

The experience of the defense of Stalingrad is interesting, in which, as is known, one of the most difficult street battles of the Second World War took place.

To storm any object, assault groups, consolidation groups and a reserve were allocated. Designed to perform one task, they constituted a single assault group of urban combat. The strength, composition and armament of each group could vary depending on the object and the task.

The main shock core of the entire group were attacking groups of six to eight people each. Of the total composition of the assault group of urban combat, they accounted for about 30%. They were the first to break into buildings, bunkers and independently fought inside the facility. Each group had its own specific task (site).

The rest of the attached forces, which included fighters of various specialties, ensured the advancement of the attacking groups, the development of the offensive and consolidation at the facility. The consolidation group was also divided into several subgroups, which broke into the building from different directions following the attacking groups on a signal from the commander. Having penetrated the building and destroyed the firing points, they immediately began to create their own defenses and stop all enemy attempts to recapture the building or come to the aid of the attacked garrison.

The reserve was used to replenish and reinforce the attacking groups, to counter a possible enemy counterattack from the flanks and rear. If necessary, or in case of heavy losses, new, additional attacking groups could be quickly formed and brought into battle from the reserve.

The assault was carried out both with preliminary artillery preparation and without it, with the expectation of surprise.

The experience of recent wars shows that assault groups achieve greater success after a preliminary artillery strike. An illustrative example is the 76th Airborne Division, whose regiment could not take the stronghold of the militants on the western outskirts of Grozny for 2.5 hours. After an artillery strike, the point was taken in 10 minutes with minimal losses.

Now about what concerns the assault operations at night. If the attackers have enough manpower to spare, a night attack can be a significant success. For the most part, the groups storming the building have a very rough idea of ​​\u200b\u200bits layout and the defending enemy. Especially about those "surprises" that the enemy has prepared in the building. Therefore, there is a risk of heavy losses during a night assault.

This does not mean that in the dark it is impossible to storm buildings at all. But with the greatest chance of success and minimal (or no) casualties, only a well-trained, professional unit can carry out a nighttime takeover of a building. At the same time, it must have good intelligence about the enemy's defenses. In addition, all fighters and the group as a whole must have modern equipment and weapons: individual night vision devices, flashlights attached to weapons, silent weapons, remote listening devices, etc.

Elite anti-terrorist and sabotage units are quite capable of carrying out such operations, which has been repeatedly proven in practice. But what can be said about the chances of success for an ordinary Russian motorized rifle platoon, where everyone has one night vision binoculars, and at best one flashlight per squad!

Darkness can be used to accumulate forces before an assault and pull them up to the closest distance to the object in order to launch an attack from new positions at dawn.

At night, great attention should be paid to the protection of their positions. Artillery positions are especially at risk of attack.

City defense

The defense of a populated area is organized not only for the purpose of holding it, but also to achieve superiority over the enemy by using the advantages of building, knowledge of the terrain and preliminary preparation of defense. A small garrison, even in the absence of heavy weapons, can bleed a significantly larger assault force in terms of numbers and power of weapons.

If there is time to prepare for defense, the garrison equips positions. These can be randomly located centers of resistance, which are located in the most convenient places for protection. But in most cases, the construction of defense is organized, systemic in nature with a single command and coordination of the actions of all groups.

Most often, the city is divided into lines, strongholds, nodes of resistance (a combination of several strongholds), which are located in such a way that the features of the terrain and buildings contribute to the maximum defensive actions and in every possible way prevent offensive ones. Naturally, the ability of the garrison to provide defensive lines with firepower and personnel is taken into account. In many cases, the defenders occupy only the forward lines and, if it is impossible to hold them, retreat to the next line. In such cases, a reserve is allocated, which is sent to weak areas or to places of breakthrough.

If the garrison has enough forces to cover all directions, then an echeloned defense is built. But even in this case, most of the personnel are stationed at the forefront. Up to 30% of the defenders can be in the second echelon. The forces of the reserve or the second echelon are usually sent to close the breakthrough or to carry out a counterattack. For example, to return the advantageous positions captured by the enemy.

It is considered a tactical mistake if the advanced defensive line coincides with the outskirts of the settlement. The removal of the line of defense in front of the settlement was practiced at the beginning of the 20th century, but with modern means weapons is a sure way to defeat. The most preferable is the location of the defensive line near the outskirts.

When planning the defense, the garrison is divided into units. Subdivisions, in turn, are assigned to areas, sectors, sectors, strong points. When choosing the location of positions, not only favorable engineering conditions are taken into account, but also the paths of the probable advance of the enemy assault groups.

When artillery is located on the outskirts, fire is fired at the troops advancing on the settlement in the normal field battle mode. If guns and armored vehicles are located in the depths of a settlement, they should be guided by direct fire. Usually the most likely directions for artillery fire are along the streets. Moreover, the calculations are focused on firing at large targets: armored vehicles and other vehicles. The tactics of a competent assault does not involve accumulations of infantry in open spaces. But, if an accumulation of manpower is noticed or assumed in any building, artillery can fire with the aim of collapsing this building.

Also, the fire of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and cannons can be used to suppress enemy firing points. But the possibility of using such tactics is limited, because in a real battle with dense buildings, the clash distances are very short. The firing points of the opposing sides are usually located no further than 100 meters from each other. Tanks and artillery cannot fire on the upper floors of high-rise buildings. BMPs have a big advantage in this situation. But it is heavy weapons that will become the first targets for the advancing enemy. Therefore, artillery should focus on meeting the enemy with fire as soon as he appears on the distant approaches. We must not forget that the maneuver of defending armored vehicles and artillery is not only limited, but often even impossible. Therefore, in order to reduce the probability of defeat, it is advisable to bury armored vehicles in the ground, drive them into caponiers, or use engineering structures for shelter. For example, low stone fences.

Defensive troops can successfully use mortars for indirect fire on close targets and partially compensate for the limitations in the use of field artillery pieces. Mortar fire can be concentrated and barrage. Concentrated fire is conducted on areas of possible (or known) accumulation of enemy manpower and equipment, and barrage - to cover open areas of defense. Mortars are also convenient from the point of view of the possibility of operational maneuver.

When preparing a settlement for an assault, the garrison actively uses mining. The most promising for laying is, of course, the roadway. Its mining can be carried out with different types of explosive devices. In addition, when planning mining, it is necessary to calculate the most probable paths and directions of movement of assault groups (gardens, flower beds, etc.). Promising for laying explosive devices in the premises are also places convenient for equipping positions and areas of the alleged accumulation of enemy forces. They often use anti-personnel weapons installed with elements of "surprise".

Checkpoint "Rock-37" two days before the attack of militants on the city. These fighters spent the next four weeks surrounded

In a populated area, firing positions can be located in ordinary trenches in the city of Grozny. February 1995

Powerful land mines are laid in buildings in such a way that, when detonated, they cause the collapse of structures. Methods for initiating such charges may be different, but radio control is preferred. In this case, the probability of detecting a charge is reduced or its operation is achieved with a minimal effect. However, radio-controlled detonation can be complicated by limited visibility and some other factors. In addition to mining, the defenders can arrange artificial engineering barriers that hinder the actions of the attackers. It is also desirable to mine such barriers.

Since the fight against armored vehicles and other large enemy targets is a paramount task, it is important for the defending forces to properly distribute fire weapons to destroy them: grenade launchers, ATGM launchers, flamethrowers, etc. Their positions must meet certain requirements. They should allow for review and fire in given sectors, that is, in places where enemy equipment is most likely to appear, to hide and protect the position as much as possible and be able to quickly change it.

To organize a powerful and "viscous" defense, the garrison must make the most efficient use of positions - both natural and artificial. For equipping positions, it is recommended to use buildings with semi-basement and basement rooms that provide the possibility of firing at the adjacent territory. Despite the fact that the offensive is expected in a certain direction, they are all preparing for all-round defense with overlapping sectors of fire and observation.

Underground communications are best suited for withdrawal. For the movement of infantry, the removal of the wounded and the delivery of ammunition through an open expanseable space, communication passages are being prepared. Defensive positions in general should make it possible to move frequently from one embrasure to another. The change of positions is especially important for snipers, machine gunners, flamethrowers and grenade throwers. For the latter, it is also important to have space behind them for the unhindered exit of the jet stream.

In multi-storey buildings, firing positions are located not only in depth, but also on floors, creating a multi-tiered system for simultaneous shelling of the enemy from upper and lower floors. At the same time, most of the firepower is located in the lower floors of buildings and semi-basements. Buildings that interfere with shelling can be destroyed in advance. Firing positions are usually prepared behind stone fences and walls. For firing, not only the windows of buildings, but also artificial camouflaged breaches are used as loopholes. Such a position is more difficult for the enemy to detect and hit.

Individual actions in the city

It has already been said above that in the conditions of urban combat, the role of not only small units, but also of each individual soldier increases significantly. This chapter provides recommendations for conducting individual actions in urban combat conditions.

Before entering a city (village, settlement, etc.), it is necessary that each soldier has an idea of ​​the layout, if not of the entire settlement, then at least of that part of it in which he will have to act. It is no secret that during the assault on the city of Grozny in January 1995, the federal troops had a very vague idea of ​​its layout and, moreover, of the defense system. And this despite the fact that the city of Grozny was his own, Russian city, and not the territory of another state. Moreover, before the assault, scouts from among the Chechens who supported federal government. But at the time of the assault, the units of the federal forces had an insufficient number of fresh maps and diagrams and guides, including fighters who had previously lived in Grozny.

Equipment Features

Outfit and equipment for urban combat are slightly different from the usual ones. A simple fighter (machine gunner) needs an increased supply of hand grenades. Also, the consumption of grenades for the underbarrel grenade launcher will be increased, since its role in the settlement is more significant than in the field or forest. In addition to fragmentation grenades, flash noise and tear grenades (if it is necessary to take someone alive), as well as smoke bombs, will come in handy.

At short distances, the role and possibility of using additional weapons - pistols, knives - increase. They can come in handy when it is impossible to fire from the main weapon (the reason does not play a role). But additional weapons will only be useful when they are available for quick draw and ready for immediate use. Therefore, a fighter should think about his placement in advance and practice in a quick draw.

Wearing body armor is a moot point. It is covered in the chapter on personal equipment. Most fighters wear it only when driving a vehicle or to perform a separate task. Wearing an armored helmet is quite justified.

Each unit and each fighter operating in the city may be cut off from the main forces and will be forced to act independently for a long time. During the storming of the city of Grozny by gangster formations in August 1996, units of the federal forces, which were surrounded "thanks" to the betrayal of the high command, were forced to fight for about a month. Many of them did not receive assistance from the main forces, either with ammunition, or with provisions, or with personnel. Therefore, before the performance, it is necessary to take a reasonable supply of food, spare batteries for the devices used, etc.

Be sure to have a flashlight, even if you have to act during daylight hours.

If the uniform of the enemy has an external similarity with the uniforms of the attackers, it is necessary to introduce a single system of visual identification for all of your soldiers. Each fighter must have a sign that is not characteristic of the traditional form of clothing, clearly visible from afar. For example, during the assault on the city of Grozny in January 1995, federal troops wore white armbands on their left sleeves. If the operation is delayed for a long time, the identification system may change periodically, as it can be used by the enemy. It is important to bring the changes to all soldiers at the same time.

It is not recommended to wear sneakers or other light shoes with soft soles in the city. will be under your feet a large number of broken glass, boards with nails and other sharp and dangerous objects. In addition, movement on stairs and simply uneven surfaces is fraught with a dislocation of the ankle. To reduce the likelihood of such an injury, wear high-top shoes and tighten the lacing tightly. Knee pads and elbow pads, special gloves, dust goggles will be useful. During the battle, a lot of dust and construction chips rise among the buildings, which make it difficult not only to observe, but also to breathe. Therefore, a respirator may come in handy.

Movement

When moving in a populated area, an encounter with the enemy can occur at any moment. In this case, shooting will be carried out at a very short distance, and often at close range. Therefore, the weapon must be ready for immediate use.

The machine must be loaded, removed from the fuse and have a cartridge in the chamber. To be ready for the immediate opening of aimed fire, one should move without lifting the butt of the machine gun from the shoulder, while the barrel goes down a little. When moving between houses, the trunk rises up, controlling the windows. Another way to hold is to rest the butt against the elbow bend. The barrel is directed upwards. This method also has its adherents. The barrel turns in the same direction in which the fighter is looking.

In the village, the sight of the machine gun is set to 100 m, the fuse is set to firing in single mode. Firing bursts is effective only in some cases. For example, when suddenly meeting a group of enemies at close range. In most situations, it makes more sense to shoot single shots. The effect is not less, but the savings in ammo is significant.

When firing from a machine gun, you do not need to wait for the store to be completely empty. If the magazine is partially empty and there is a pause in the battle, you can change the magazine. And you can finish off the missing ammo. To do this, you need to carry cartridges in bulk in a special pocket, which is securely fastened. In order for the shooter to be able to control the consumption of cartridges, starting to equip the magazine, you need to insert three tracer cartridges. All of them can not be shot. As soon as at least one tracer has flown, you need to change the store.

It is even better if there is a cartridge left in the chamber, in which case you will not have to waste time juggling the bolt. However, in the heat of battle, it seems doubtful that a soldier would think about such trifles as counting the rounds fired. In any case, it is better to change an incompletely used magazine than to waste time reloading at a critical moment.

If you throw away empty magazines, there will be problems. But in a tense situation, it is better not to waste time placing them in a vest or pouch. Moreover, in the heat of battle, you can mix up empty and full magazines. When firing from a stationary position, empty magazines must be thrown into one place. When a pause occurs, they must be equipped and placed on yourself.

A hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher (reusable) must also be ready for immediate use. However, it is not always possible to apply it exactly in the place where the need arose. This is due to the danger posed by a jet stream when fired from behind a grenade launcher. Therefore, the grenade launcher must not only be attentive to the choice of positions, but also, when moving, constantly have an idea of ​​​​the possibility of immediate firing. After all, comrades walking behind can suffer from a shot. When it rains, a package is put on the grenade that does not prevent firing.

The underbarrel grenade launcher must also be ready for quick use, that is, be loaded. You don’t need to put it on the fuse (at least the Russian GP-25), since a significant effort is already required for a shot, which practically eliminates the possibility of an accidental shot. You should not fire from the GP-25 at a distance closer than 40 meters, since in this case the grenade may not have time to cock. It is dangerous to shoot at the windows of a high-rise building while standing at its foot, because if it misses, the grenade will ricochet and fall back.

All actions must be performed in pairs (triples). Members of the couple must constantly see each other and know where the other comrades are. There are no such statistics, but many fighters died from the bullets of their own comrades, who confused them with the enemy. However, one should not gather in groups, putting others at risk.

You can not be in an open place motionless. You must either move or hide. Movements occur in quick short dashes from cover to cover. Thus it is impossible to lose orientation in space. It is always necessary to remember which side is yours, which side is strangers. In conditions of dense buildings and uneven progress different groups and individual fighters the situation is changing very quickly. Therefore, if you shoot at everything that moves and suddenly appears, you can hit your own.

For confident orientation, you need to stop more often (in cover) and look around. Movements should be planned, not chaotic.

Before running, you need to clearly understand the direction and goal, upon reaching which the fighter must again take a protected position. Only in the event of falling under sudden enemy fire, it is necessary to immediately occupy the nearest shelter. With dense fire, and in general to reduce risk and increase stealth, movements can be made crawling or on all fours. You need to move along walls, bushes, rubble and other objects, without running out into open places. Smoke is often used to overcome dangerous spaces. It saves from aimed fire.

Any movement must take place under mutual cover. Covering is carried out not only when moving, but also when pauses occur for various reasons: providing assistance, reloading, etc. In this case, voice contact must be maintained. If you need to leave the active battle, you must inform your partner about this.

When moving through an unfamiliar settlement, you need to remember the road, since there is little hope for guides.

Passing under the windows, you need to bend down, and jump over the windows located below waist level. Moving indoors, you should also avoid the appearance of windows and breaks opposite. The enemy can hit with fire from another building or from a different external position.

It is necessary to focus on the "left-handed rule". It lies in the fact that physiologically it is more convenient and faster for a person to transfer fire to the left. This rule applies to right-handers. For lefties it's the other way around. That is, the movement of weapons outward, whether it be a pistol or an assault rifle, is less natural and convenient. The transfer of fire and the conduct of aimed fire to the right (for the right-hander) or to the left (for the left-hander) are associated with the need to turn the hull. The exception is shooting a pistol with one hand. Much follows from this rule, and it will be mentioned further on.

When choosing a firing position or when observing, it is necessary (hereinafter all for the right-handed person) to look out and fire to the right of the object you are hiding behind. Thus, almost the entire body will be protected, with the exception of the right shoulder and arm, as well as the right side of the head. When shooting to the left of the obstacle, the shooter is forced to open up completely. The appearance of a head over a protective object is generally unacceptable. The closer to the ground the head is, the less it will be conspicuous to the enemy. It is even better if there is a mirror (preferably on a rod), with which you can observe without leaning out.

However, the mirror can give glare that unmasks the position. Therefore, when using it, you need to consider where the sun is. In general, if you have a choice of direction, it is better to enter from the side of the sun so that it blinds the enemy, and not you.

If it is necessary to fire to the left of the protective obstacle, it is better to shift the machine gun to the left hand. Although it is inconvenient and unusual, it is much safer. The same goes for pistol shooting.

When driving around any obstacle (for example, the corner of a building), it must be done on the right. In the event of a sudden encounter with the enemy and the need to immediately open fire, the weapon will immediately be directed at the enemy with a minimum "openness" of the fighter's body. To go around the corner on the left, it is also necessary to shift the machine to the left hand. You should not be afraid of inconvenience, since at such short distances it is difficult to miss from a machine gun even from an uncomfortable position. Or you need to send the lefty forward.

Going around the corners, you need to stay away from them. Then the panorama will open gradually and unpleasant surprises will be discovered in time. The bending must be done slowly. In this case, the fighter must be ready both for opening fire and for a quick bounce back.

In general, the movement should be slow and careful. In addition to the frontal direction, various dormer windows, breaks and openings, which can be located both above and below, present a danger. It is very difficult to detect the presence of the enemy in them until he gives himself away. In addition, there is always the danger of hitting mines. In the conditions of buildings, these are mainly stretch marks and various "surprises". Anything can be put on stretch. Doors and various valuables (for example, tape recorders, televisions) are especially often mined. Objects whose movement is logical and predictable are at the greatest risk. Mines are laid in places most convenient for a firing position. Piles of various objects and corpses are often mined. Since this is usually done in a hurry, the simplest methods are chosen. A grenade without a ring is placed under the corpse.

Moving the body releases the trigger lever. The calculation is made that, seeing his comrade lying motionless, the first reaction will be the desire to check whether he is wounded or killed.

All suspicious objects are hooked by a cat anchor on a rope and displaced. In this case, it is necessary to be in cover, since the explosion can be of great power. In the absence of a rope, a long pole or board can be used. Closed doors are undermined or the lock (other locking device) is fired. At the same time, safety measures must be observed. And not only individual ones. We must not forget about the comrades who may be in the affected area from the ricochet or from the consequences of the explosion.

For prevention, it will be useful to flash the door with a few shots. For the same reason, you cannot stand in front of the door yourself. You should be careful with metal doors, as there is a risk of ricochet, especially from small caliber bullets and low penetration. Knocking down doors is risky enough.

Modern ammunition has a very high penetrating power and allows you to hit an enemy behind walls made of certain materials and other, at first glance, durable structures. Often, psychologically, soldiers perceive easily shot through objects as a reliable shelter. You need to remember this, not only hiding from the enemy, but also trying to hit him through cover. Damaging fire can even be fired through a wooden floor or stairs.

Before entering a room or going around a corner, you must throw a grenade there. The grenade should be thrown with a slowdown. That is, after releasing the trigger lever, you need to hold it for two seconds, and then throw it. Such actions require composure, but they will not throw it back to you. After all, a slowdown of three to four seconds is enough time to take countermeasures or shelter from being hit by shrapnel. If comrades are in the affected area, some experts recommend warning them by shouting “Grenade!” or "Shards!". However, enemies are also warned by this cry. In addition, there is no guarantee that the comrades will hear the cry or have time to respond to it in a timely manner.

Therefore, it would be more correct to throw a grenade, knowing for sure that none of your own would be hurt. And yet, conditional shouts are also needed in the case when grenades are thrown by the enemy. Everyone who sees her should warn their people about this with a loud cry. At the same time, you yourself need to jump into the nearest shelter or dive around the corner and open your mouth so that the eardrums are not damaged by the blast wave.

Many instructors recommend literally throwing "pocket artillery" at all suspicious places. Theoretically, this is how it should be. But one fighter is unlikely to take more than 15-20 grenades with him. At the same time, you still need to put stretch marks and leave a few pieces to continue the battle. Therefore, total grenade throwing is permissible during a short-term assault, after which it will be possible to replenish the stock.

Throwing tear gas grenades is not widely used in a combat situation. After all, he not only does not hit the enemy, but also does not guarantee that the enemy is not capable of resistance. In addition, the enemy may have gas masks, and persons under the influence of alcohol or drugs are usually not affected by tear gas.

In addition, the attackers themselves need to take individual measures for protection. It is also difficult to predict how a gas cloud will "behave". The greatest effect of tear gas grenades is achieved when it is necessary to force enemies in an enclosed area to surrender or leave it. Flashbang grenades produce a stunning effect during the explosion and are used in cases where the enemy needs to be taken alive.

Immediately after the grenade explosion, you need to break into the room. It should be remembered that an explosion does not guarantee a complete defeat. The enemy can take cover behind some solid object or hide in another room. Therefore, the calculation is made not only on the damaging effect of the grenade, but also on stunning, stunning the enemy. Having burst into the room, you must be prepared for the immediate opening of fire. In a large room, you can open preventive fire at places where the enemy can hide. But random shooting in all directions can lead to the defeat of their own fighters by ricochet. Fire can be fired without entering the room through the doorway.

The entrance to the premises is made quickly, without delays against the background of the opening. Movement goes obliquely to the wall.

All hit enemies must be checked. You can not move on without making sure that all opponents are dead and without searching them. Perhaps, during the search, the necessary information will be found. For example, maps of minefields, walkie-talkies tuned to enemy frequencies, defense plans, etc.

Moving forward, you can not leave unchecked objects behind. Checked premises can be marked with conventional signs (usually with chalk) for the units coming behind and for yourself, since you may then have to return to the passed premises. Detected mines in the absence of sappers are indicated. IN simple cases you can try to neutralize an explosive device yourself with the help of a “cat” or eliminate it by detonating it with another explosive device or shoot it from a safe distance. But it's still risky.

When moving through a building in the absence of a loud noise background, it is necessary to listen to extraneous sounds. Accordingly, the fighters themselves should move as quietly as possible. To mislead a potential enemy, you need to actively use distracting noises. At the same time, you yourself need to be critical of suspicious sounds. It is not so difficult to distinguish the sound of a thrown stone from the crackling of broken glass underfoot.

The assault on the building must be prepared in such a way as to make it on the first try. Practice shows that an unsuccessful assault strengthens the will of the defenders and undermines the morale of the attackers. And tactically, the enemy will be able to foresee further methods and ways of attack and regroup accordingly. Therefore, once the action has begun, it is no longer possible to stop. Even with significant losses. Otherwise, they will then increase many times, both during the retreat and during the second attempt.

Collision with the enemy at a short distance

Often a soldier comes under fire without understanding where the fire is coming from. At the moment it is more important to hide, to leave the line of fire. To do this, you need to quickly rush to the nearest shelter. In order not to waste time searching for it, even when moving, you should mark suitable places along the way and move between shelters in short throws. In no case should you run away, although for many this is the most natural, instinctive movement. In this case, the enemy will calmly shoot the fleeing man in the back.

In the specialized literature and various articles on urban combat, one can often find recommendations to move to the left (to the right of the enemy) when suddenly meeting with the enemy. In this case, there is a reference to the "left-handed rule" mentioned above.

When you read such recommendations, doubts arise not only about the author's relevant combat experience, but also about his theoretical training. Such advice can really work when meeting with an enemy armed with a pistol. But for a military clash, where the main weapon is a machine gun, everything is different.

Yes, the "left-handed rule" works, but there are other factors besides it, proving once again that mindless cheating from each other is not always useful.

First, for most people, the most natural movement (somersault) to the right.

Secondly, according to the “left-handed rule”, the transfer of fire to the right (for a right-hander) is more difficult and unnatural than to the left. But, putting the enemy in predicament you put yourself in the same position. Moreover, a standing enemy has the ability to move the weapon to the right by turning the entire body, and you, being on the move, are unlikely to be able to do this without acrobatic training.

Thirdly, we must not forget about the inherent properties of automatic weapons. What does the enemy do when meeting you at a short distance? His most likely and dangerous reaction is to point the barrel of his machine gun at you and immediately open fire with a burst. What will the machine do? Having sent the first bullet in the direction of the original direction, its barrel will begin to take it to the right and up. Just in the direction that some theorists recommend running away. Of course, the enemy can carry out fire adjustments in the course of your movement, but there are only a few such professionals. The vast majority will shoot exactly as described above. Moreover, we should not forget that all this happens in a matter of moments.

So the first thing to do is to run for cover. If there is an opportunity to shoot towards the enemy on the move - great. In this case, aiming is not necessary, as this will slow down the movement. The machine gun does not rise for aiming, the fire is fired immediately from its original position. It is important to confuse the enemy, scare, make him think about his safety. If it doesn't work, no big deal. The main thing is to survive the first seconds. Make active use of your peripheral vision.

The same "theorists" recommend throwing grenades at the enemy on the go. You can try if you already have them ready to throw. But this is doubtful. It is unlikely that anyone will be able to simultaneously look for cover, move towards it, shift the machine gun and get grenades, prepare them for a throw and throw them. All movements should be simple. But they need to be worked out in advance. Not a single person in such a situation will think and remember what was written about it in books. His body will think and act for him.

In any case, in any environment, you must immediately leave the line of fire. Even falling to the floor can save you from being hit, since the fire is usually fired at chest level. Opening fire without moving to the side is unacceptable, since the enemy may have an advantage in time and start shooting first. But even without this, there is always a great risk of suffering from the bullets of even a wounded enemy.

In the opposite situation, when an enemy group falls under your fire, you must immediately prioritize hitting targets. The first to be destroyed are enemies who are ready for the immediate use of weapons (opening them) or throwing grenades. In the second place - explicit commanders, grenade launchers, snipers, machine gunners. Fleeing enemies are destroyed last. When destroying a group, it is advisable to start from the back. Then the front ones will not immediately understand that they have been detected, and will not immediately take adequate measures. In the noise of the surrounding combat, your shots may not be recognized immediately. Especially if silent weapons are used. If you kill the one running in front, then the rear ones, seeing his fall, will immediately react to this.

If a comrade was injured during the movement of the group, he should be picked up by those running nearby, dragged into cover and provided with emergency assistance, or immediately handed over to the orderlies, if any. If a comrade was wounded in an open area, shot through by the enemy, when moving to a shelter, you should not immediately rush to rescue him, otherwise you can get under fire yourself. Chechen snipers used this tactic extensively. They intentionally wounded the serviceman in such a way that he could not move independently. Since for a Russian soldier from time immemorial the life of a comrade was no less valuable than his own, the wounded immediately rushed to save. Snipers (sniper) also wounded these soldiers. When the rest of the comrades realized that it was pointless to run to help, the snipers finished off the motionless wounded.

Therefore, to save a wounded comrade, it is necessary to immediately install a smoke screen. Snipers, grenade launchers and machine gunners should try to identify enemy sniper positions and suppress them. It is better to pull out the wounded with the help of a rope thrown to him.

Snipers in the city are generally the most dangerous enemies. When preparing for battle, they choose (if necessary, equip) several positions for themselves: both for observation and for shooting. Snipers can operate alone, but more often with a partner or under the cover of several submachine gunners. A group of snipers can also work.

Sniper Point Suppression Tactics the enemy does not justify itself with a flurry of indiscriminate fire. After firing from the depths of the room, the sniper changes position and usually remains invulnerable. To neutralize it is necessary to calculate its position and destroy it when it appears. Best of all, snipers and grenade launchers cope with this task. If an enemy sniper is not operating in territory under his control, small search teams are engaged in searching for him. When faced with them, it is very difficult for a pair of snipers (the most common practice) to counter an assault team.

Actions in the dark

In the dark, you can not act with a cavalry charge. Progress is made slowly and carefully. Do not enter a dark room until the eyes have adapted to the darkness. To speed up addiction, this technique is used. A few minutes before entering a dark room, one eye closes and opens already in the dark.

If there are lights, the task is simplified. In fact, without them it is better not to enter the darkness. If it is possible to light the room from a safe place outside, this should be used. For example, one soldier will light the room (in a safe manner) through the dormer window and draw attention to himself. At this time, other fighters will carry out penetration. They themselves will be in the dark, but the main volume of the room will be illuminated. If you want to enter yourself, the lantern must be held aside at arm's length.

This issue is now quite controversial. For example, some American police instructors recommend holding a flashlight in the hand crossed at the wrist with the hand holding the gun. Thus, the flashlight beam is always directed in the same direction as the gun barrel. This is definitely good. However, it is not always possible and convenient to fire with two hands. Holding a gun with two hands somewhat restricts movement and limits spatial freedom (the term is not official). The main drawback of this method of holding is the provocation of the hidden enemy to shoot at the source of light, that is, directly at the owner of the lantern.

Statements that “now all criminals are literate and know that they need to shoot not at a light source, but nearby,” do not stand up to criticism. Indeed, in such a situation, firing, rather, will be conducted not according to knowledge, but according to instincts. This technique involves the use of a pistol, since automatic weapons abroad have long been equipped with special flashlights. However, Russian soldiers can only be offered to improvise themselves with the adaptation of ordinary flashlights.

When moving in the dark, you can improvise. For example, to sit down, raising the lantern in an outstretched hand. Or put it down, or throw it so that it illuminates the direction of the alleged enemy shelter, and make a silent maneuver yourself. In this case, distractions can be used.

The most primitive is a throw towards some object. You can periodically turn on the flashlight, confusing and blinding the enemy. However, with such outbreaks, you yourself can lose orientation. Moreover, for such actions, the flashlight should be turned on by pressing a button, and not by a slider or, moreover, by turning the “head”. After each flash, you need to change position. This technique is very effective and less dangerous than driving with a constantly on light source. Some illuminated areas can be dashed through. When driving in the dark, you do not need to make unnecessary noise, smoke and reveal your presence and location with senseless shooting.

Based on the foregoing, we can conclude about the requirements for a lantern. Naturally, it must be compact, reliable, powerful and durable. Turning it on should be done both with a button (it only shines when it is held down) and with a constant light toggle switch. Of course, the flashlight must be shockproof.

The best solution would be to use instruments and night vision goggles. But we must not forget that night vision devices produce radiation that is detected by enemy optics.

The use of small arms that are not equipped with flame arresters or devices for silent and flameless firing also greatly unmasks the positions of shooters in darkness.

In the variety of buildings of the settlement and enemy locations under the influence of dozens of different factors, a lot of different situations arise, each of which is unique. The conduct of hostilities in a populated area requires special preliminary training: combat, physical and tactical. However, a soldier who does not know how to think, improvise and act in difficult situations, it will be difficult even if there is special training. But it will be much worse for his comrades, since in the city the interaction between soldiers and units is especially important.

In the forest, the farthest boundary of fire contact is no more than 40-50 meters, provided that the enemy is moving, since if the enemy has prepared an ambush, then it is quite possible not to notice him at all. So let's look at a few situations.

GROUP PROMOTION FROM 10 TO 30 PEOPLE

1. Dividing into groups of 7-9 people, the distance of movement between groups in open areas of the forest is 30-40 meters, in light forest 20 meters, in the forest 10-15 meters, is determined by the requirement for line of sight between groups;

2. A reconnaissance group should move in front of the guiding group (within a double line-of-sight distance) to detect enemy ambushes at distant lines. The composition of the reconnaissance group is 2-3 people, moving in line in line of sight from each other, the desirable presence of radio communications between themselves and the main group;

3. When a reconnaissance group detects an ambush or an enemy group, it is necessary (provided that the enemy does not detect scouts) immediately stop their movement, disguise themselves, transmit a message by radio to the reconnaissance group and the main group. In no case do not attack on your own without having a two-fold numerical superiority.

Possible courses of action:

If the scouts are not detected, and the enemy is an ambush or barrage post, call one group from the main column (7-9 people), so that this group breaks into two detachments and goes around the ambush site in two arcs, then hitting the rear and from the sides , while the reconnaissance group will have to distract the enemy but will not set themselves up, firing from cover and from a safer distance;

If scouts are detected, and the enemy is an ambush or barrage post, immediately find shelters for firing, then proceed according to the previous scenario;

If the scouts are not detected or detected, and the enemy is a detachment of more than 6-8 people, the scouts disguise themselves and call two detachments from the main column (the point is that when attacking, you need a twofold superiority over the enemy).

One of the best and simplest tactics for fighting in the forest is the "double tail". The main group moves in a column of two in a checkerboard pattern from each other, the right side of the column is responsible (observes) the right side of the path of movement, the left side is behind the left. At the command to attack, the columns, starting from the "tail", bend in a semicircle and move towards the place of conflict, as a result, the location of the enemy is taken into the ring. For of this type one attack is needed important factor- as many radio stations as possible.

GROUP PROMOTION FROM 4 TO 10 PEOPLE

It is best to move in two equal lines in a checkerboard pattern, and the front line should occupy protected positions (behind trees, stumps, in natural ravines, bushes, etc.), and the back line should quickly move 10-20 meters further than the front, then it takes up protected positions, and the group that covered itself should move forward and so on. When the enemy is detected or comes under his fire, it is realistic to estimate the number of the enemy and either attack him or retreat, but in the same order as the group moved on the march. The lines should not be widely stretched, otherwise you can miss the masked enemy, each fighter in the line must have his own sector of fire (the direction of firing which for one fighter should not exceed 90 degrees).

GROUP PROMOTION OF UP TO 4 PEOPLE

With an even number, it is desirable to break into twos and move exactly in twos, and the advancement of each two can occur in any order (both in a column and in a line), it is only necessary not to lose sight of a partner from your two and at least one person from the neighboring one. When moving, it is necessary to make stops (every two or three minutes) in order to look around and listen to sounds that are not related to the natural sounds of the forest. Such a group is the least vulnerable to detection and therefore can be used for deep reconnaissance on neutral or enemy territory. It can also be used for surprise raids (with a quick subsequent withdrawal) against larger enemy forces, but it is not recommended to engage ambushes or similar enemy groups due to early detection of the group's movement.

DEFENSE TACTICS

Necessary actions carried out in preparing positions for defense:

1. Choosing a dominant position for observation and firing;

2. Masking positions for observation and firing;

3. Availability of escape routes;

4. Convenient exit from positions for a counterattack;

5. Distribution of sectors of observation and firing;

6. Relationship between other positions and with the command center;

Necessary actions carried out during the defense of positions:

1. When an enemy is detected, immediately report this to other positions and to the command center, report the approximate number of the enemy, the place of their detection and the intended direction of movement;

2. The distant lines of defense, if they are poorly camouflaged - retreat to the main lines, if they are well camouflaged - let the enemy through and, after fire contact with the main lines of defense, hit the enemy in the rear;

3. To the main lines of defense, let the enemy in at a distance of confident defeat and only after that open, if possible, simultaneous fire on their predetermined sectors;

4. When reloading a weapon, be sure to notify your partners about this, to cover the firing sector, and not allow simultaneous reloading of weapons with more than one neighbor along the defensive line;

5. Counterattack on a common signal, simultaneously, but leaving fire cover in positions;

6. When breaking through the defense in any areas, it is advisable to send there additional forces, if such a step is impossible, retreat in an organized manner deep into the defended territory;

7. With a significant numerical superiority of the enemy, and the encirclement of defense lines, collect the remaining fighters and simultaneously break through with all their forces in one (predetermined) direction.

REMEMBER

When defending, the losses of the attackers are at least 50 percent greater than the losses of the defenders;

The better the defense positions are camouflaged, the later the enemy will detect them and, accordingly, the closer he will come and the more effective the fire of the defenders will be;

The more smoothly the process of reloading weapons, the less "blind" sectors remain and, accordingly, the less likely the enemy will break through the line of defense;

According to the site AirSoftClub.Ru

The insurgent guerrilla movement is a form of struggle of the armed opposition outside the city. The very presence of partisan resistance is not so much a military factor as a political one. Therefore, if in any state, when the internal political situation is aggravated, there are no prerequisites for the emergence of an insurgency, then they are often created from the outside, by the efforts of countries - potential adversaries, for whom destabilization within the competitor's state is extremely important.
In the struggle for power, fuel is added to the fire and homegrown politicians - in political process there is no better tool than bloody conflict. Criminal units hiding in the forests contribute their share to such a conflict. In guerrilla warfare, based on political intrigues, there are no forbidden methods, and sooner or later it takes the form of mass terrorism. Any government fights this evil with two parallel methods: operational intelligence and military force.
Both the military and the operational staff need to know what they are dealing with in order not to make gross mistakes and not add unnecessary work to themselves. The military should remember that resistance spontaneously arises and intensifies many times with unjustified repressions and insults inflicted by the troops on the local population. One of the most cruel orders of I. Stalin for the oppression of the civilian population of the occupied regions of Germany prescribed execution before the formation in the presence of the victims. The leader did not want unpleasant surprises in the rear of the advancing troops. Operatives, on the other hand, need to know as much as possible about the human contingent that they will have to develop. Knowing the psychology of the enemy speeds up the operational process and makes it more effective.

Photo 1. Sniper in shaggy camouflage.

People get into the partisan movement for various reasons. There are religious fanatics. There are those whose loved ones have died or whose property has been lost. Both those and others will hold on to the death under any circumstances. Conflict personalities, as well as ideologically and romantically inclined, do not take root in partisans. They do not have a primary attachment to the movement, and they will never come to terms with the dirt of life, which is always and everywhere present. This is the main reason why they are relatively easy to recruit by government counterintelligence. Many are fighting for a possible bright future, there are offended, adventurers and criminals.

Photo 2. Submachine gunner from the capture group.

Photo 3. His task is to eliminate the extra ones.

But the bulk of the partisan masses are peasants from the local population. The operational staff should pay attention to their detailed characteristics. The peasants are not as simple as it seems, they are extremely freedom-loving, difficult to manage, cunning and dodgy. The first task in life of a peasant of any nationality is to survive. Survive any political process. The government changes, but the peasants remain. For them, family and economic ties are extremely important. The peasant will never go against this - in the village nothing is forgotten and nothing is forgiven. Peasants instinctively and constantly collect absolutely all vital information, from which they draw quick and unmistakable conclusions. They are very observant by nature, have the ability to quickly compare facts and instantly calculate the situation. During interrogations they are very artistic - they beat their chest with the most honest look: “I didn’t participate, I didn’t, I didn’t take it, I didn’t see it, I didn’t hear it, I don’t know, I don’t remember, etc.
It can not be so. The memory of the peasant is phenomenal, and in any case he has information of operational interest. But he begins to tell the truth only after applying unsportsmanlike methods to him, known to practical operatives.
You cannot play psychological games with the peasant, especially if the initiative comes from him. Psychologically, it is impossible to outplay a peasant - his thinking takes place not so much on a logical, but on a psychoenergetic level. A peasant can be deceived, but never fooled. The city operative does not understand this.
The weak point of the peasant is fear. It is the fear of the indifferent cruelty of circumstances that makes the peasant accommodating, very accommodating. It is destroyed by the fear of a real force, adamant and not accepting psychological provocations. And the more energetic ambition a peasant has outside, the more animal and paralyzing consciousness of fear inside. The peasant is not averse to making war, but in no case with a superior enemy. And in troubled times, they are not averse to plunder, taking advantage of the lack of control of the authorities.

Photo 4. Setting up an ambush under shaggy camouflage.

Photo 5. Training process.

There are many in the resistance and those who were mobilized into partisans forcibly, according to the principle: "He who is not with us is against us." During World War II, the task of many partisan commanders was to put under arms and partisan banners thousands of deserters who abandoned the front during German breakthroughs and scattered home.
To successfully conduct a guerrilla war, all this dense mass that does not like to obey must be organized, trained and kept within the framework of strict discipline. This can only be done by a leading core of trained professionals who create the partisan infrastructure.
The guerrilla movement always strives to take, perhaps more complete control over the population and its moods. And if the moods are not the same, they must be formed and kept in the right direction. This initiative cannot be let go. In a guerrilla war, the one on whose side the population stands wins. The population is a reserve of resistance fighters, it is a source of food, very often there is nowhere else to get food, it is warm rest, a bathhouse, a hospital for the wounded, hot food, and finally, these are women, healthy men are fighting and you can’t order them to refrain. And, finally, the most important thing: the population is agents, the eyes and ears of resistance. But, on the other hand, the hardened thinking of a naturally greedy peasant is determined by the current moment - whether it is profitable for him or not. This is where he can cooperate with the authorities. The authorities are helped by those who are dissatisfied and offended, and also out of a sense of revenge, former envy, just out of dirty tricks - the peasant is touchy, vindictive and petty. A more or less trained operative will easily figure out such people. They are always and everywhere. In order to prevent undercover cooperation with the authorities in each locality, the resistance determines its informants in the number of at least three. These people do not know each other, because each of them gives information to the forest about everyone living in the village, including other informants. Thus, the reliability of intelligence and counterintelligence data is controlled. There is necessarily a notification system from the settlement to the partisan forces through messengers who take written reports to the forest and put them in hiding places - mailboxes or verbally report information to the partisan reconnaissance group at certain points in the forest or nahutopax, on the so-called "beacons".

Photo 6. The action of the liquidator, the training process. Practicing a surprise attack from an ambush.

At the "beacons" partisan scouts receive people from the city or, conversely, send people to the city, making it safe for them to move to their destination. Guerrilla counterintelligence regularly bypasses settlements and meets with informers in order to identify agents of government intelligence services, which are constantly sent into the resistance. Subversive groups are constantly working, communications are being monitored, communication lines are being tapped, reconnaissance information is being collected and reports are being retrieved from caches. Propaganda brigades roam the settlements - it is necessary to convince the peasant to take up arms, who wants to quietly deal with his household and does not want to have trouble from the authorities. There is a working exchange between the central bases of resistance and peripheral detachments.

Photo 7. Capture. Educational visual process. Knee thrust to the kidney. It is possible with two knees in both kidneys, in a jump.

Finally, the deployment of bases and detachments should not be permanent, otherwise the likelihood of penetration by government agents increases sharply and the danger that they will be covered by air strikes and "squeezed" by military forces increases. There are still a lot of other tasks that need to be done with effect, with noisy effect, otherwise such opposition is worthless. But for all this you need to constantly move. At first, everything turns out like this - with complete surprise and on a grand scale. The military successes of the opposition cause political resonance. The army forces allocated by the government turn out to be clumsy and ineffective against the age-old guerrilla tactics of plastic contact: raid - withdrawal. Partisans avoid open oncoming combat with superior forces - this is disastrous for them. The military does not like fighting in the forest, just like street fighting - you can’t turn around here with guns and armored vehicles. The troops, not knowing the terrain and the people they are fighting, behave like a bull in a china shop, one way or another infringing on the local population and increasing the number of dissatisfied. At different times and in different countries, this scenario was repeated in the same version. Finally, in the higher headquarters it dawned (usually after a mass of reports from lower-level practical workers) free walking through the forests. Dust-covered old instructions for the use of Jaeger counter-guerrilla tactics, which have been used for centuries against all kinds of insurgents, were being retrieved from the archives. Specially trained, trained, well-armed, recruited from among the pathfinders - professionals, operational staff, tactical and deep intelligence specialists, professional hunters, special groups sat on partisan trails and blocked movement through the forest. And from that moment on, military operations were transferred from government communications to the forest warpath. They were quiet, imperceptible and insidious. Patient rangers, trained to survive in the forest, carefully disguised with shaggy camouflage (an invention also of immemorial prescription - photos 1,2,3) for the time being - for the time being, conducted covert surveillance of everything that happened in their area of ​​​​responsibility. Attention was paid to the smallest details: traces and objects found could tell a lot (in our time - spent cartridges, cans, cigarette butts, old bandages, etc.). It became known who, when, from what settlement went to the forest, it was established on the tracks, what he did there (at the same time, mailboxes-hiding places were very often found, the information was intercepted and sent for operational processing). The routes of partisan reconnaissance and sabotage groups, economic routes gradually loomed, the places of deployment of bases and "lighthouses" were groped. Approaches to them, the presence and location of guard secret posts, the procedure for changing duty outfits to them, the routes of breeding, the frequency of passage of wandering patrols around the base (and in our time - also signaling, detection and warning systems) were revealed. The results of such observations made it possible to communicate with their agents working inside the partisan base. The agent put information in a cache located near the base or even on its territory (usually near a garbage dump or latrine, visiting which is understandable), or on the march, in a specified place. The seizure of such information was assigned to the huntsmen of the special group, they also insured the agent to the extent possible. On the radio, the rangers were informed of additional information obtained operationally from other sources. Knowledge of the situation made it possible for the rangers to significantly harm the resistance. There are countless cases when scouts, having moved beyond the perimeter of partisan secret posts, removed partisan leaders from silent weapons. Special groups made raids on partisan warehouses and supply bases. There were also attacks on large partisan headquarters with a successful catch of captured documents (small detachments of documentation are never kept for secret purposes). But; the main task was the extraction of information, and special groups worked in a sweatshop mode of capturing living people. Most often this happened when a small partisan group moved for reconnaissance, sabotage or economic fishing. Disguise under shaggy camouflage made rangers almost invisible (see photo 1,2,3).

Photo 8. Fixation. Educational visual process.

The ambush was set up flawlessly (photo 4, 5). Elimination of superfluous (photo 6) capture in all possible, impossible conditions in training were practiced to automatism (photo 7,8,9,10,12,13) ​​Those who walked behind were taken prisoner; . from the main group going in front. The front ones were shot with silent weapons or cut out with knives. All this was done instantly and silently. In training, an instantaneous jerk to grab was carefully practiced (photo 14-15).

Photo 9. Training grip, for resistance. A hand-to-hand instructor works for the enemy, who managed to knock the commando down. For such cases, the pistol is “grabbed” with a strap to the wrist (marked with an arrow).

And in our time, capture from a car is also practiced (photo 16), even now few people walk through the forest. There should not be any traces during the capture. The captured "tongue" and the corpses of those killed were dragged aside and away. The dead were buried, and the burial place was masked. The prisoner was interrogated right there. He was shaken until he recovered from stress. The operative, who was in the special group, knew how to do it. In the counter-guerrilla war, too, there are no forbidden tricks. As a rule, the captured peasant began to speak. He knew that he needed to survive here and now so that he would not be killed on the spot. It was even easier with those who asked the commander to leave for a couple of days to stay at home Or with those who went to the village for a wedding, christening, etc. For the peasants, these are very important events and cannot be missed.

Photo 10. Attempt to handcuff. Training process.

They were tracked to the edge of the forest and interrogated in front of their own home. Almost always, the detainees spoke at once and in detail. At the appointed time, they returned to the base, but already as intelligence agents. There were a lot of those who were silent and they were sent to the city. According to Gestapo statistics, every third spoke in the dungeons. In the NKVD, where no such statistics were kept, everyone spoke. The Americans in Vietnam injected the prisoner with a horse dose of scopolamine, he gave out a horse dose of information, no one was interested in his further fate. Scopolamine truth serum. Often languages ​​were taken near the partisan base. The most convenient place for this was the same scavenger and latrine. Despite the warnings set out in the instructions for reconnaissance, studied in all the armies of the world, the same mistake is constantly repeated in all garrisons - the above despised and little-visited places are forgotten before they are needed. It is difficult to calculate how many servicemen (including those in the Soviet Army - remember Afghanistan) were abducted when leaving for a vital necessity.
They did the same at all times with the duty outfits of secret posts: there was a man on duty and disappeared along with his partner, no traces remained. Silently and without a trace, reconnaissance groups that met people from the city at the "beacons" were destroyed. "Citizens" were taken prisoner only alive and only unharmed people knew a lot. The capture of the "language" was carried out not necessarily by the method of physical attack. At all times (and now too) purely hunting methods were in use - nooses, traps, wolf pits and other ingenious traps.
In the course of events, the rangers had to attack large partisan columns. The essence of this process was not to win, but to disrupt the partisan action, for the execution of which the column was advanced. The ambush was carefully prepared. The place for it was chosen so that the column. It was “squeezed” by the terrain (ravines, slopes, etc.) or at least “pressed” on one side and could not quickly disperse and turn into battle formations. The side of the path, along which the column moved, was mined with mines or grenades on stretch marks. Places more or less suitable for shelter from fire were also mined. Nowadays, guided mines and directional mines are used for these purposes. The place in front of the position of the rangers was necessarily mined. They tried to place the ambush on the right side in the direction of the column, do not interfere with each other and each is maximally covered by its own shelter (imagine yourself in the place of the shooter, whose position is opposite - on the left side of the column, how inconvenient it will be to shoot from the right shoulder with a turn to the right, how you will interfere with the one who is in front of you, and how you will interfere with the one who is behind.If possible, choose a place so that the path or road turns to the left in the direction of travel.This allows you to place rangers firing points and on the bend of the path, along the front and towards it also provides greater freedom of maneuver for the special group during the retreat, while less likely to reach open space(paths, roads, clearings) and get under fire (Scheme 1).

Photo 11. Scheme 1.

If a small group was moving ahead of the column, warning guards, then it was usually passed forward without hindrance (although there were cases when such a group was silently destroyed and a prisoner was taken, the corpses were instantly dragged aside).

Photo 12. There are no forbidden tricks in the capture. In this case, this is a banal clip for ...

The column met with dense sudden fire from all trunks, at a distance of 70-80 meters, no closer, so that no one from the column could throw a grenade to the position of the rangers. The partisans are also trained in tactics and rush not to where it is quiet (there is danger), but to where they are shooting from, following the throw of their grenade. The column is a group target, and concentrated fire on it from small arms plus the operation of mines is directed: directed actions have a monstrous effect. To create a greater density and effectiveness of fire, the huntsmen used the method of firing machine guns from machine guns. So that the weapon does not shake and scatter bullets when firing in bursts, the machine gun is grabbed by the belt to the tree trunk (photo 17, 18). Simple and effective. Usually they shoot one magazine from a machine gun and a short tape from a machine gun. Not more. The entire fire raid lasts 10-15 seconds. And now the task of the special group is to instantly disappear and drag the "language" with them, if there is one. We must disappear, despite the temptations to shoot more. Because return firing will begin in 7-8 seconds, and organized resistance will come in 20-25 seconds. Without waiting for him, you must already be on your feet and run away to a safe place - a hollow, a ravine, a reverse slope, etc.
The escape route must be determined and why the old instructions said to do so. It is impossible to allow even one wounded to appear in the special group. This means almost the end of the task. The wounded will be an exorbitant burden for the rangers, just as their wounded will be an exorbitant burden for the partisans. The most unpleasant thing on the warpath for both is not hunger and lack of ammunition, but the presence of the wounded. This is a terrible disaster in partisan life. It is only in low-grade literature that the wounded are shot; in reality, they are dragged out to the last opportunity.

Photo 13. The instructor, who worked for the enemy, was “twisted” only by superior forces.

The guerrilla column, after heavy fire from the rangers, begins to spread to the sides and falls on stretch mines. Burdened with the wounded and killed, having lost the initiative and time, having the unknown ahead, the partisans are not capable of effective actions.
The special group needs to break away faster for a reason that stems from the tactical features of the battle in the forest. Taking advantage of the large amount of tree cover, it is very easy to surround those who are less. Therefore, a knowledgeable partisan commander immediately gives the command to bypass and encircle the rangers. If there was a sudden silence and the shooting almost stopped, this is a sure sign that such a command was received.

Photo 14. Ambush out of the blue in a hollow. Position on the right side in the direction of the enemy's movement (it is more difficult for the enemy to shoot, turning to the right).

True, when the partisans are commanded by an experienced professional, their actions will be accompanied by distracting machine-gun fire. For those who are surrounded, this process is very difficult to detect and control in conditions of limited visibility of the forest. And for people who are passionate about shooting, it is doubly difficult. And if the glues of the environment close behind the back of the special group, the rangers will have a hard time. Their salvation lies in the speed of their disappearance. Therefore, the personnel of the special group is divided into threes with the obligatory appointment of a senior, so that no one is left behind and does not get lost. If, nevertheless, there is a chase (this has happened), the huntsmen will make a distraction by fighting: three people will run and shoot, and the rest will ambush in a convenient place, reload and shoot the pursuers from the flank. Sometimes, according to the situation, you can return and bleed the enemy in an unexpected place. But this is not worth tempting fate. In the memoirs of partisan leaders (Kovpak, Bazyma, Vershigora) reluctantly and casually mentions "more frequent skirmishes with rangers." This is what the skirmishes looked like...

Photo 15

In the capture, this moment is perhaps the most important, the standard is heavy (from a jerk to handcuffs) - two and a half seconds. The task of the submachine gunner (in the foreground) is to shortly and unmistakably “cut down” the extra ones coming in front.
The huntsmen work ingeniously, day and night, in any weather. They already know about them. They are ghostly and terrible in shaggy camouflage and elusive, like shadows. There is fear in the forest. Going out on sabotage, on reconnaissance, taking a person out of the city becomes a problem. It is no longer the peasant who sits in ambush for someone, but they sit for him. You won’t calmly walk through the forest, if you don’t run into a knife, then you will definitely run into a mine. And a bullet from a silent weapon will fly out of nowhere. And people disappear. Jaegers do not accept open combat and cannot be hunted down. Trained people, where they live, what they eat, when they sleep is unknown, their instinct is bestial, they themselves hunt down anyone. It turns out that guerrilla tactics are the opposite - only now they work in plastic contact with them, with the guerrillas. On a tip from the rangers, aviation and artillery are working confidently at the bases of the partisans.

Photo 16. Capturing a prisoner from a car, the task of the submachine gunner is to “knock out” the driver and those who are in the back.

The collected intelligence makes it possible to carry out large-scale military operations in the forest. In settlements, the partisan underground is liquidated. There is an information blockade. Guerrilla bases are cut off from supply sources. The actions of special groups, aviation, artillery and free battalions of rangers create unbearable conditions for the armed opposition. War for the peasant is no longer entertainment, but hard and terribly dangerous work. In the absence of food, smoking and real victories, morale drops. You have to fight far from home. Terrible unknown. The psyche of the peasant can not stand all this. After a hysterical outburst of emotions, desertion begins. The militants disperse in the villages, where they are identified operationally. And those who remained, blocked, without outside support, without cartridges and food, tired and covered in lice, are forced to leave for hard-to-reach areas. Most often, from hunger, they begin to rob all the same rural population, in difficult times, taking the last. It happens that they commit atrocities against women. This is a turning point when the peasants stop supporting the resistance, whose leaders by that time no longer represent any political force other than themselves. Taking advantage of the situation, government intelligence services create armed self-defense units from local residents and, moreover, put up garrisons to protect the population from robberies and arbitrariness. So, in the territory of Western Ukraine already in September 1944, 203 combatant fighter detachments operated, which, along with the military units of the NKVD, took part in the liquidation of the nationalist movement OUN-UPA. In the same place, in the settlements, 2947 armed self-defense groups were organized, the effectiveness of which can hardly be overestimated. In other regions of the USSR, where in the war and post-war years criminals and armed deserters who had gone astray into gangs robbed, trained and armed youth of pre-conscription age took an interest in round-ups and combing forests conducted by the police and the NKVD.
The government's next step is to announce an amnesty. Desertion in the opposition takes on a mass character (according to amnesties in the period from 1944 to 1953, 76,000 OUN-UPA militants voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, even those who had blood on them were forgiven). What remains can hardly be called resistance. There are leaders, obsessed with an obsession, who are frantically trying to improve the situation. Members of the opposition are kept by its leadership from surrendering to the authorities by methods of repression and the destruction of the vacillators. Relations with criminal formations are being established. The bandits are a real force, and the opposition is trying to take them under its control, or at least establish mutually beneficial contacts with them. At the same time, conspiracy deepens, mutual distrust and suspicion increase. This stems from a psychological pattern: the more energetic the leader, the more lust for life he has.

Photo 17. Even a small AKSMU-74 “shakes” when shooting, if it is not pressed against a tree.

His own life. Convinced of the irreversibility of the course of events, many partisan commanders and criminal leaders are thinking about how to live on. And, they see the only way out for themselves in becoming an active agent of the authorities in exchange for life and freedom.
In the late forties and early fifties, the middle-level leaders of the OUN-UPA began: to surrender the OUN underground in the cities and directed military forces at the remnants of military formations hiding in "cache" in the forests. Obsessed Bendera leaders, very cautious, suspicious and especially dangerous were allowed; do not take alive, but destroy on the spot.

Photo 18. This is how even a strong AKM can be fired like a machine gun. When shooting, tighten the belt as much as possible.

Most often, the liquidation took place during gatherings, meetings, meetings, when after the official part a feast began. After a good drink, the agent shot drunk drinking companions sitting at the table. Or quietly cut out with a knife those who went out into the yard out of need. There were other options as well. Sometimes this was done by an operative or a huntsman from a special group embedded in the resistance. But most often the leader acted among his own, earning forgiveness from the authorities. These were wolves among wolves, especially valuable agents who cost much more than certified intelligence officers. One of the old ones; operatives told how during an operation carried out by the forces of a special battalion together with a group of such a "wolf", the general from the MGB, who conducted the briefing, warned "If they shoot one of you, then to hell with him. But if they kill him (the wolf), you you will all go to court."
On the account of some "wolves" were hundreds of surrendered and tens; shot dead by his own former comrades-in-arms. "Wolves" received forgiveness from Stalin. Some of them are still alive. Some even live under their real name. Stalin did not invent anything new. So it has been since the dawn of time. Through the efforts of the secret services, the insurgent political movement always translated into the category of semi-criminal.
It was no longer dangerous for the government.

Part 2
The one who is more patient and enduring wins the warriors on the forest path. The patience threshold of a trained scout is always higher than that of an unprepared peasant. The threshold of patience is the ability to endure hunger, cold, pain, insomnia and domestic inconvenience for a long time. But even for a trained professional, it is not unlimited. The outcome of the forest war is decided by the availability of material supplies and a good base. The strongholds of special groups were usually classified and disguised as economic military units, which were located in zones calm from hostilities. There were conditions for rest and recovery: a hospital, a bathhouse, a kitchen. The special group went to work only at night, in a closed car the rangers were driven to the forest (never in the same place). Further, the rangers traveled to the search site on foot, 20-25 kilometers, in stealth mode. The same car picked up a special group at the appointed place, which had worked out the prescribed time. The place and time were also not the same - it was reported to the returning special group by radio.
The special group should be inconspicuous and mobile. This reduced its number to 15-16 people. A larger number of people leave an "elephant path" in the forest (sometimes such a path was specially left, luring the enemy into a trap). The group must be strong, therefore, it was usually armed with 3 machine guns for strong ammunition (7.62x53 USSR; 7.92x57 Mauser and in our time 7.62x51 - NATO), capable of penetrating at short distances of forest combat (about 200 m) the main shelters - tree trunks. Why three machine guns?
Because 3 machine guns, in the event of an environment, can provide all-round shelling, and when breaking out of the ring with concentrated fire, “break through” a gap in the enemy’s battle formations. For the life support of the group, which was thrown into the forest for a long time (sometimes up to a month or more), a lot of cargo-ammunition, food, and medicines were required. The entire cargo was not worn with them - the main and reserve base camps were equipped in hard-to-reach places. Caches were arranged to store cargo, carefully protected from dampness, which in nature penetrates everywhere. In Western Ukraine, hiding places are still being found, left by the Bendera, and German rangers, and special groups of the MGB (in our time - by an unknown person photo 1-2).

Photo 1. The hiding place, equipped in our time, Its walls are lined with birch bark to protect against dampness. The cache contained ammunition, weapons and money. The hiding place was “guarded” by an F-1 grenade on a stretch (indicated by an arrow).

Photo 2. F-1 grenade, put on a stretch to protect the cache.

The caches were searched for in order to replenish wearable supplies. The rest of the time the special group spent in ambushes and search activities. The area of ​​responsibility of the special group was determined depending on the circumstances, often in a square of 15x15 km. The group commander was usually an army intelligence officer, but his deputy was an operative, knowing people and the situation on site. They were given a task in which they could make decisions independently in the course of events.
Radio communication was banned. The radio worked only for reception at a certain time. At the partisan base, they immediately determined that a transmitter was working nearby (and in our time they will take direction). Broadcasting was allowed only if it was necessary to evacuate the wounded, the prisoner, when adjusting artillery (mortar) fire and directing aircraft to the partisan base.
The group worked silently and discreetly, leaving no traces. It was as if it did not exist in nature at all. No fires, cans, broken branches, broken cobwebs, etc. Smoking was out of the question. The area in its area of ​​responsibility was studied thoroughly. The group was on the warpath. And it took a long time to sit in ambush on partisan trails under shaggy camouflage - sometimes for 2-3 days. The disguise must be impeccable - partisan intelligence is led by the same professionals, and local residents, who will always be in the partisan reconnaissance and sabotage group, remember every bush in the forest.
The main movements along the partisan paths occur only at night. At the same time, enemy No. 1 is not fatigue, not hunger, but mosquitoes. The Germans were given clove oil - there is no better remedy against blood-sucking insects. The Americans in Vietnam were also given something. Russian special groups were never given anything.
Special groups of rangers worked in plastic contact with the opposition - the conditions of the forest allowed this. The huntsmen, who sat at a distance of several kilometers from the partisan base, were practically invulnerable. Combing the forest with partisan forces is pointless, only a search partisan reconnaissance group of about the same size can go out to the rangers, and, as a rule, fall into an ambush) rangers or run into mines. This case is from a series of those when the one who needs more loses.
The work of special groups is not limited to capturing "tongues", hitting partisan columns and monitoring partisan liaisons. The information received by radio directs the special group to purposeful actions. According to the situation, an order may be issued to unite several special groups to strike at a small partisan detachment, to defeat partisan headquarters and seize documentation.
So, in 1946. a daring and successful raid was carried out on the headquarters of the Bendery leader R. The village where the headquarters was located was located deep in the forests, the approach of large military forces to it would have been definitely noticed. Several special groups of the MGB, united, made a distracting raid on the village from the side, no one expected their appearance, but the rebuff was strong. Taking advantage of the fact that the attention of the enemy was distracted, one of the special groups entered the village from the other side and then moved along the streets according to the tactics of street fighting: submachine gunners, under the cover of machine guns, advanced, secured, opened fire, under the cover of which machine gunners pulled up. They advanced quickly and without losses to the headquarters, threw grenades at it, seized archival and intelligence documentation. Half of the special forces were in the Bendera uniform.
In guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare, as already mentioned, there are no forbidden tricks. The creation of false guerrilla units is a common method. These detachments are created on the basis of the aforementioned Jaeger special groups.
In addition, the Germans, conducting combing, for prevention, fired at every suspicious rustle, at dense bushes, at shaded places, at hollows and ravines, at all places tactically dangerous for them, even without a visible target. And this approach paid off as well. Those who comb the forest move in two chains, not closer than 50 m from one another, but not moving away, within line of sight. This guarantees not so much the quality of combing as it prevents the danger of a sudden attack from behind and from the side. In reality, one has to move not only along open spaces and ravines, but also across them. And when one chain or group overcomes such an obstacle, the other one insures in case of a sudden attack (photo 3).

Photo 3. Proper combing of the forest or advancement to capture. One group overcomes the ravine, the other insures against a sudden attack.

It would be wrong to overcome the obstacle all together - in this case, without safety net by fire, moving from bottom to top facing the mountain, everyone is helpless and represents a group goal (photo 4).

Photo 4. Wrong overcoming of an obstacle - all together. In front of an obstacle, there is a natural “knocking down” into a heap and turning into a group target, which is easy to destroy with a burst from the flank or a directional mine.
Such places in the forest where the enemy instinctively accumulates in front of an obstacle, as well as places that can serve as shelter from sudden fire (ditches, funnels, ruts, hollows, etc.) in a war are simply unreasonable not to mine.
If you have to move in hilly terrain, it is preferable to walk so that the ramp is on your left side (photo 5).

Photo 5. Skate to the left of the huntsman. From the machine it is convenient to shoot up the slope, to the right and with a turn to the left.

At the same time, it is convenient to shoot from the right shoulder in any direction and up too. When the mountain (slope) is to your right, it is better to shift the weapon to your left hand, imagine what it will be like for you to turn around to shoot to the right and up from your right shoulder (photo 6).

Photo 6. Ramp on the right. For the shooter, the position is unfavorable - it is inconvenient to shoot with a turn to the right and even more so up.

This is the so-called left-handed rule - it is much faster and easier to shoot to the left and you should not forget about it.
When a chain or group moves uphill, it is also covered with fire from below or from the side. The group that has risen to the height is fixed and fire supports those who rise from the bottom up.
In the forest it is sometimes difficult to advance in a continuous front - the heavily rugged terrain (as in the mountains) will almost always divide the attackers into separate groups, who have to move not in a chain, but in marching order, one after another. Combing takes the form of a collective search. Special groups operate in combined battalions, but structurally - with their own soldered teams. Two special groups of 15-16 people were combined into an ordinary combined arms platoon. And the terrain can lead such a platoon (or half a platoon) to the most unexpected place. It is impossible to predict the development of events, so the huntsmen must be trained for a sudden oncoming collision - the main type of combat in the forest. The methods of individual-group tactics of fire contacts in such conditions are specific. In case of a sudden meeting with an enemy group in the forest, they always try to "press" him to the ground with dense, heavy fire, force him to lie down behind cover, "nail" him to the place, depriving him of freedom of maneuver and preventing him from raising his head for solid shooting.

Photo 7. Scheme 1.

Photo 8. Scheme 2.

At the same time, immediately, while the cover group with a machine gun (indicated by the numbers 1,2,3 in diagrams 1 and 2) keeps the enemy pressed to the ground, the main forces, taking advantage of the relief, hiding behind the trees, sharply make a jerk to the left - forward, trying to go from side of the right flank of the enemy. According to combined arms tactics, the enemy from marching formations will begin to turn into a chain against your group! cover. Shoot this chain from the side like a group target. Use the advantage that the aforementioned left-handed rule gives - with a turn to the right, it will not be convenient for the enemy to shoot in the first minutes of the battle, it will be unusual, his arrows will turn to the right with their barrels in each other's backs. On the side, the enemy will be open to your fire for some time, he will lose this time to rebuild the chain to the right. The winner will be the one who, upon meeting, reacts first and creates an instant superiority with concentrated fire from the side to the right flank of the enemy. The same scheme of action in the event of a surprise attack on a special group - the cover presses the enemy to the ground, the rest move forward with a sharp maneuver to his flank, preferably to the right. The terrain and circumstances do not always allow this, but if there is such an opportunity, it should not be missed. According to the situation, the battlefield and the enemy himself must be "twisted" clockwise, approaching the enemy at a distance of dagger fire.
The above-described method of forest robbers and horse thieves is not new - it has justified itself for centuries. The challenge is to do it all to the max. high speeds. The battle in small units in the forest is fleeting. Situational options with personnel must be worked out in training to automaticity. In a combat situation, there will be practically no time to make decisions and give opportunities to commands. The tactical reaction of both individual fighters and the entire special group must be worked out to the level of the collective instinct of a wolf pack, where everyone without a team knows what to do.
If you move in a chain on a flat place, the beginning of a fire contact is similar - the enemy is pressed to the ground with fire. At the same time, while your machine gunners with dense fire do not allow him to lean out and shoot accurately, cover the enemy from the sides, "squeeze" him from the flanks, shooting targets that are not protected by shelters from the side (schemes 3, 4).

Photo 9. Scheme 3.

Photo 10. Scheme 4.

Again, make the main onslaught with fire from the right flank of the enemy - the left-hand rule gives, albeit a short-term, but very tangible advantage. If there are many of you, the enemy can be surrounded, if not, leave him a "way out" of the pincers and give him the opportunity to break away. Until you beat him next time. Unnecessarily, do not turn fire contact into hand-to-hand combat. If there are few of you and nowhere to go, don't expect to be squeezed. With the concentrated fire of your machine guns, "cut" the enemy's chain in one place, under the fire cover of those who close the group behind, make a dash to the enemy, with grenades "pierce" his battle formations, following the breaks in your faces, break into the punched "hole", turning your machine guns "fan", do not let the enemy raise his head - you will see how the gap immediately expands and deepens. Always critically evaluate whether it is worth cutting the enemy's chain in a weak spot: from its stronger sections, between which you can find yourself, it is easy to "clamp" you with fire and shoot you from the flanks. Sometimes it is more expedient to attack where the enemy's chain is thicker. In the resulting confusion, the enemy fighters will be afraid to hit each other. Depending on the situation, you can make a sharp throw to the left - forward, from the side of the right flank of such a crowded place, but be sure to "grind" to the enemy. Let him turn to the right to shoot and "stick" the trunks into each other's backs. If possible, a dash to the enemy is made unexpectedly, from behind cover, at a very close distance. If not, they cover with dense fire those who will make a breakthrough to throw a grenade. If possible, use the terrain, seep through ravines, hollows, but always under fire cover (see above). Do not break away from your own - whoever broke away is gone. Operate only as part of your unit. Organized actions are much more effective.
In all the situations described above, act sharply, impudently and impudently, faster than the enemy, this is called leaving the initiative behind.
When combing, they are not fond of pursuing small groups that are conducting intense fire, as a rule, this is a distraction from the main forces in battle or luring into a trap. The main goal and the main danger is where there is deathly silence.
If the combing rests against a wall of dense fire and lies down, best support- fire 82 mm mortars. This caliber in the forest is optimal in terms of the striking effect of the mine and the maneuverability of the weapon. It is better not to use aviation during oncoming maneuvering combat in the forest: from the ground it is little controllable, targets and landmarks from the air in the density of the forest are hardly distinguishable, and therefore aviators often hit their own. Another thing is the mortars that you control on the spot, from the hinged fire of which the shelters are useless. A very effective fire weapon in the forest is a heavy machine gun. Its strong ammunition pierces even centuries-old trees, and there is no escape from it. One heavy machine gun is capable of punching a "hole" in any defense (again, from the practice of German rangers).
Fighting in the woods requires a fair amount of ammo and skills in shooting at emerging targets. Therefore, they try to press the enemy to the ground. It is better when he lies behind shelters (trees), and does not flicker between them and immediately hides. Not everyone is trained in the method of shooting "offhand" even at short distances, especially at real distances of a forest battle, usually 150-200 m. Shooting with a "tip" of a weapon is only possible for trained professional snipers or stand-up athletes. For mass use, the most acceptable is the so-called "poke" shooting method.
Notice which tree the target is hiding behind and guard it. The target will definitely appear from behind cover - she needs to shoot and move. And the target will move forward, most likely to the right of itself. Why? If the enemy shoots from behind cover from the right shoulder with a long-barreled weapon (machine gun, rifle), its length will not allow him to turn around or move to the left. When he goes on the attack, he will instinctively move out from behind cover towards his weapon.
Aim at an empty spot along this possible movement and watch (Pic 11).

Photo 11. The dimensions of the weapon prevent the enemy shooting from behind cover from turning around or moving to the left of him. If it is necessary to change position or move forward to attack, he will instinctively go towards his weapon. Wait for him there, slightly “pull up” the descent.

With the beginning of the advancement of the enemy, begin to "choose" the descent, and as soon as he "sits" on the edge of the front sight, squeeze (photo 12).

Photo 12. The enemy jumped out from behind the cover and “sat down” on the front sight. Push down.

While you press it, it will advance further and "bump" into your bullet. If the enemy needs to move to his left, he will definitely lift the barrel of the weapon up, because the tree prevents him from turning around (photo 13).

Photo 13. The enemy raised the barrel, a sign that he is moving to his left. Wait for him to appear on the other side of the tree...
On this basis, take the lead in the same way, but only on the other side of the tree (photo 14).

Photo 14

When shooting in the forest, look not only in front of you - fix the situation on the right and left with peripheral vision. An enemy who is not in front of you, but to the side, will very often be open to your fire from the side. Use this opportunity (photo 15, 16).

Photo 15. An immobile enemy will sooner or later open from the side.

Photo 16. You can't stay still in the forest.
In any case, try to bypass the enemy, preferably to the right of him, while your comrades do not allow him to stick out with fire. It will open from the side in the forest; Most often, such a one is collectively "twisted" according to the left-hand rule and shot, putting him in unfavorable conditions for shooting and defense.
In a fleeting forest battle, everything happens very quickly. You will have to think for the enemy faster than he thinks for himself. He hasn't run anywhere yet, and you need to know where your bullet will meet him (see above). This is called "shoot skirmish". This method is also hundreds of years old, it is used with great success even now, in the jungle and taiga, in the tropics and in the north.
Combing the area usually sets itself the task of driving the enemy out into the open, cutting him off from the forest, putting him under fire from machine guns, artillery and aircraft.
Footprints in the snow always work against those who are smaller. In winter, huntsmen rarely sit on the trails. Large military forces are being brought up, and garrisons are stationed in every village, cutting off the partisans' path to warmth and food. In the zone of partisan activity, the strictest access control and curfew are introduced. Aviation works on partisan bases.
The blockade in winter and spring is terrible for partisans. With the onset of spring thaw, mass combing of the forest begins. The task is to oust the partisan groups from the habitable places. Lack of heating and a roof over your head, dampness under your feet, hunger and the presence of a mass of wounded do their job. The main part of the Bendery resistance of the OUN-UPD in Western Ukraine was destroyed during the February-April blockade of 1946. They still remember it there.
The greatest experience in the fight against partisans, of course, was accumulated by the Germans, who acted meticulously and rationally. Jaegers were reduced to battalions. The battalion in the forest is mobile and manageable, but the regiment is gone. The destruction of the partisan base was subject to thoughtful planning and precise execution. After an exhausting battle, the partisans were allowed to calm down in a place convenient for them to camp. Vigilance was lulled by inaction. The encirclement of the parking lot began in the evening, the last rays of the setting sun. Low-flying planes forced the partisans to "keep their heads down" and made it difficult for outside observation. Under such cover, assault groups were pulled up from different sides, each no larger than a company. At the marked line, the huntsmen scattered into chains that closed with each other, surrounding the partisan camp in a semicircle. Everything was done secretly and quickly, in the gathering twilight, while it was still possible to control the process visually. Immediately secured for insurance against a sudden breakthrough. At night, special groups cut out partisan secret posts. The offensive began at dawn, as soon as the target could be seen. They were advancing from the east, from the side of the rising sun. In the west, a trap awaited the retreating partisans. The rangers had a day ahead. The tactics were based on completing the operation before nightfall, the time most convenient for a breakthrough from the boiler. Twenty years later, the Americans used this tactic against the Viet Cong.
An oncoming battle is destructive and terrible for partisans when, after some events or hostilities, their battle formations are scattered, while for a while there is no single command and control lines are lost, which makes organized resistance difficult. In the complex landscape of the forest, the Americans used the same German technique for this: they “chopped” the partisan column with mortars, cut off the convoy, supplies, headquarters, and immediately transferred fire to the head of the column. The out of control mass was attacked from the sides in the usual way.
A meeting battle in the mountains is very unpleasant for partisans, where it is impossible to evade it. On the mountain paths, which are pinched by the terrain, it is impossible to turn around with large forces, the outcome of the event depends on the level of tactical thinking of the commanders, the degree of preparedness of the fighters, the quality of their weapons and equipment. The cup of success leans in favor of trained mountain infantry units (for the Germans - mountain rangers).
Without the special groups working on the warpath, the large-scale actions described above would hardly have been possible. The method of ambush and forest search in the post-war years was also widely used against ordinary rural gangs of groups - the peasants worked on the collective farm during the day, gathered in a gang at night and went to rob. This method was used both against armed deserters and against gangs of formations disguised as military units. The tasks and methods were the same: to detect, track down, bleed in short night skirmishes, provoke the bandit group to go out for destruction. This method is still used today, especially in the fight against poachers, in the capture of those who escaped from places of detention, etc. Bandits are drawn to housing for the same reasons as guerrillas. And ambushes of special groups sit for days near farms and on the outskirts of villages. You can't make noise. You can't sleep. No smoking. Invisibility must be absolute. The peasants are observant, and they have a connection with the forest through many channels. In the village, all relatives and all acquaintances, everything instantly becomes known. And if the peasants suspect something is wrong, those in the forest will know about it almost immediately.
Sitting in ambush, do not yawn. The forest soothes and lulls. You may not notice how someone will make his way to the farm. This person will also watch the farm for more than one hour. In the morning, be especially careful: morning is the time for intruders. Wolf hour. The one who spent the night on the farm will leave at dawn. He did not observe the situation, but you observed, you have an advantage. Your weapons and equipment are chosen by you according to the situation, but for combat in the forest, a larger caliber is preferable, stronger ammunition. Good camouflage, a periscope, a night vision scope and a silent weapon are a must.
Mosquito and dog repellents are highly desirable. Nowadays, there are many detection devices - capacitive, infrared, ultrasonic, etc. But for some reason they never appear at the right time in the right place, besides, they have learned to deceive them: at night, a prisoner is tied in a clearing, an infrared device detects him, and his own people shoot him. Therefore, in search activities, the main load is on the bestial instinct of a trained intelligence officer, who, moreover, can think and act extraordinary. When searching in the woods, you are on a warpath. The unknown awaits you. Learn to respect this word. You will have to rely only on yourself. A helicopter does not always fly to the rescue even in action movies. He did not always fly even to the Americans in Vietnam.

Photo 17. Covert camouflaged surveillance.

Here are the general principles of counterguerrilla warfare. This is how the Germans acted on our territory. This is how the Americans fought in Vietnam. So in the USSR, the Basmachi, the Bendera movement of the OUN-UPA in Western Ukraine, the green brothers in the Baltic states and criminal gangs that hunted robbery everywhere after the war were liquidated. So in Latin America, numerous revolutionary and drug-mafia neoplasms are being liquidated. Practice shows that the guerrilla movement comes to naught if they are fought for real. The fight in the forest requires non-standard solutions and does not fit into the framework of instructions, orders and regulations. From the search engines operating on the warpath, remarkable ingenuity, originality of thinking and hellish patience are required.
The Germans called these people rangers, the Americans rangers, the Russians did not call them anything - Lavrenty Beria instilled in his subordinates a high culture of silence. In different countries, all these wolfhounds had the same feature - war in the forest was their lifestyle.

Alexey Potapov
"Training of a Special Forces Soldier". SPC "Health of the people", LLC "VIPv".

From myself I will add, the fight in the forest is an ass. NATO has such special forces for fighting
with partisans and rebels, like huntsmen from the German Bundeswehr, from such battles in the event
direct aggression will not go anywhere.
Therefore, we study the tactics of warfare in the forest.

If the RG - then dump it until they are clamped, mining the escape routes. The enemy, not knowing the number of WG,
running into mines, it is unlikely to persist. For greater weight, you can regroup
and part of the group, reinforced by a pair of machine guns, briefly shoot those pursuing them on the flank. And, again,
dump. If you get stuck in battle, there is a risk of loading up with the wounded - a greater disaster for both the WG and for,
let's just say, there is no jaeger group.

The wounded are pulled out to the last. They finish off only in low-grade cheap detectives and action films.

If counter-guerrilla teams (groups) are working (in the Second World War they were called Jagdkommandos),
for example, with organized combing of the area.
The partisan detachment should be divided into groups, which consist of 12-15 people.
Each group must go their own way, keeping in touch with the rest of the groups.

A guerrilla group for fighting in the forest must have samples of heavy weapons, three machine guns of the company type - capable of penetrating the main shelters, bushes, tree trunks and other objects at close range.
The same scheme can also be used by a counter-partisan group when conducting a counter-partisan operation.
in a collision with a small partisan group, even if approximately equal in number,
going for example to sabotage.

In the event of a sudden oncoming collision with the enemy with dense, heavy fire, they press him to the ground,
forcing you to lie down behind cover. those. make him immobilize, deprive him of maneuver, prevent him from raising his head for aimed shooting.
This is handled by the PC cover team. While this group "holds" the enemy, the main forces, using the terrain and camouflage on the ground, make a sharp breakthrough forward into the enemy's right flank.
The enemy at this time will deploy in a chain against the cover group. The main forces at this stage have the opportunity to shoot the enemy from the right flank as a group target.

Moreover, in the first minutes of the battle, and the forest battle is fleeting, the enemy will turn the trunks to the right,
according to the rule of the right hand, sticking the trunks in the back of each other, preventing them from shooting. After concentrated
fire on the flank of the enemy, immediately, noticing his rebuilding, further twist it clockwise until
do not go out to the distance of dagger fire. This old trick forest robbers, and he did not let himself down for several hundred years. The most difficult thing is to do it at extremely high speeds, that is, during the battle there will be no time for making decisions and issuing commands. That is, walkie-talkies are not appropriate here. here it is more important to work out the action of the unit to automatism, and in various variations. As in hand-to-hand combat, the brain begins
work at the level of instincts, at the psycho-energetic level. Also, in these situations, it is not necessary to set out to encircle and destroy the enemy - in a hopeless situation, he will fight to the last. Someone is sure to get hurt. For the band, it's a bummer.

Yes, melee is also not welcome. Someone will still shoot. Again ... If the enemy acts with superior forces and pinches you, then the enemy’s chain is cut in one place with concentrated machine gun fire, and its strong part (chopping the weak part - the enemy will easily pinch you again with strong parts), then under fire cover of those who close the group behind, a dash is made towards the enemy, grenades break through the remnants of his orders, after the gaps they break into his gap, close to the enemy, turning the machine guns like a fan - the main thing is not to let the enemy raise his head and increase the gap, and in this case it will increase.

It is necessary to act boldly, sharply, brazenly and skillfully - it is an initiative in Africa, and an initiative.
When combing forests, it never hurts to “drag” an 82-mm mortar battery behind you.
Its mounted fire is very effective.

Aviation in the forest is an even bigger ass, they will definitely cover everyone and everything, including their own.
Our "friends" will definitely use napalm, cluster bombs and other prohibited weapons!
You are partisans, so the laws of "correct" warfare do not apply to you and you do not have to follow them.
For the enemy, you are robbers and bandits.

Comment! Teach the fighters to shoot, and offhand.
Combine the fly with the whole - you will not be given such an opportunity.
Shooting with the "tip" of weapons is owned only by snipers, stand-up athletes.
In my squad, only a sniper and an anti-sniper machine gunner can shoot like that.
If it so happens that your squad will consist of ordinary Russian people
with training no higher than a conscript soldier, show commanding flair,
identify the most capable, sharpshooters in the group, and let them hone their skills
and skills to perfection.