How to reach the decision maker in active sales? Russia. Correcting names Theory and practice of “soft power”

When people share the worst decisions they have made in their lives, they often cite the fact that the choice was made in a fit of instinctive emotions: passion, fear, greed.

Our life would be completely different if Ctrl+Z operated in life, which would cancel decisions made.

But we are not slaves to our mood. Instinctive emotions tend to dull or disappear altogether. Therefore, folk wisdom recommends that when you need to make an important decision, it is better to go to bed. Good advice, by the way. It wouldn't hurt to take note! Although for many decisions, sleep alone is not enough. A special strategy is needed.

One of effective tools which we would like to offer you, strategy for success at work and in life from Susie Welch(Suzy Welch) - former editor-in-chief of the Harvard Business Review, popular author, television commentator and journalist. It is called 10/10/10 and involves making decisions through the prism of three different time frames:

• How will you feel about it 10 minutes later?
• How will you feel about this decision 10 months from now?
• What will your reaction be to this in 10 years?

By focusing our attention on these deadlines, we distance ourselves some distance from the problem of making an important decision.

Now let's look at the effect of this rule using an example.

Situation: Veronica has a boyfriend, Kirill. They have been dating for 9 months, but their relationship can hardly be called ideal. Veronica claims that Kirill is wonderful person, and in many ways he is exactly what she has been looking for all her life. However, she is very worried that their relationship is not moving forward. She is 30, she wants a family and... She doesn’t have an endless amount of time to develop her relationship with Kirill, who is approaching 40. During these 9 months, she never met Kirill’s daughter from her first marriage, and the cherished “I love you” was never heard in their couple from either side.

The divorce from my wife was terrible. After this, Kirill decided to avoid serious relationships. Moreover, he keeps his daughter out of his personal life. Veronica understands that he is hurt, but she is also offended that such an important part of her loved one’s life is closed to her.

Veronica knows that Kirill does not like to rush into making decisions. But should she then take the step herself and say “I love you” first?

The girl was advised to use the 10/10/10 rule, and this is what came out of it. Veronica was asked to imagine that right now she had to decide whether she would confess her love to Kirill over the weekend or not.

Question 1: How will you feel about this decision 10 minutes later?

Answer:“I think I would be worried, but at the same time proud of myself for taking a risk and saying it first.”

Question 2: How would you feel about your decision if 10 months had passed?

Answer:“I don’t think I’ll regret it 10 months from now. No, I will not. I sincerely want everything to work out. Those who don’t take risks don’t drink champagne!”

Question 3: How will you feel about your decision 10 years later?

Answer:“No matter how Kirill reacts, in 10 years the decision to confess your love first is unlikely to matter. By this time, either we will be happy together, or I will be in a relationship with someone else."

Note that the 10/10/10 rule works! As a result we have quite a simple solution:

Veronica must take the lead. She will be proud of herself if she does this, and sincerely believes that she will not regret what she did, even if nothing works out with Kirill in the end. But without consciously analyzing the situation according to the 10/10/10 rule, making an important decision seemed extremely difficult to her. Short-term emotions—fear, nervousness, and fear of rejection—were distracting and limiting factors.

What happened to Veronica after that, you are probably wondering. She still said “I love you” first. In addition, she tried to do everything to change the situation and stop feeling in limbo. Kirill did not confess his love to her. But progress was evident: he became closer to Veronica. The girl believes that he loves her, that he just needs a little more time to overcome his own and admit that the feelings are reciprocated. In her opinion, the chances that they will be together reach 80%.

Eventually

The 10/10/10 rule helps you win the emotional game. The feelings that you are experiencing now, at this moment, seem intense and sharp, and the future, on the contrary, is vague. Therefore, emotions experienced in the present are always in the foreground.

The 10/10/10 strategy forces you to change your perspective: consider a moment in the future (for example, in 10 months) from the same point that you look at in the present.

This technique puts your short-term emotions into perspective. This is not to say that you should ignore them. Often they even help you get what you want in a given situation. But you shouldn't let your emotions get the better of you.

It is necessary to remember the contrast of emotions not only in life, but also at work. For example, if you deliberately avoid having a serious conversation with your boss, you are allowing your emotions to get the better of you. If you imagine the possibility of having a conversation, then after 10 minutes you will be just as nervous, but after 10 months, will you be glad that you decided to have this conversation? Will you breathe a sigh of relief? Or will you feel proud?

What if you want to reward the work of an excellent employee and are going to offer him a promotion: will you doubt the correctness of your decision after 10 minutes, will you regret what you did 10 months later (what if other employees feel left out), and will it Does the promotion make any difference to your business 10 years from now?

As you can see, short-term emotions are not always harmful. The 10/10/10 rule suggests that looking at emotions in the long term is not the only correct way. It only proves that the short-term feelings you experience cannot be at the head of the table when you make important and responsible decisions.

Why in modern world Overloaded with small issues, it becomes increasingly difficult for us to make decisions - and how to cope with fatigue so that you have time for something really important. You probably already know the basic rules: plan more (so you don’t have to worry every evening about whether to go to the gym or not), deal with important issues with a fresh mind and a full stomach, and if the choice is not very important, but you don’t want to waste time, put give yourself a time limit and act. Now let’s figure out how to act if you are faced with a difficult question.

Don't rely too much on others

Finding out the opinions of others before making an important decision is a normal practice: everyone sometimes needs an outside perspective, especially if it is not possible to comprehensively and objectively assess the situation from the inside. Another thing is that in the pursuit of finding out someone else’s opinion, there is always a risk of forgetting about own desires and arguments. No matter how valuable the advice of friends, colleagues and loved ones may be, it is your life and your own choice - only you know what is more important to you in a relationship or work. Remember that the final decision is always yours: ask others to understand where you may be biased, but do not forget that you will have to live with the consequences.

Modern methods - a book on how to use historical experience, fresh and old, making political decisions and paving the way from today to tomorrow. In stories of successes and failures, the authors offer a technique that, once it becomes routine, can at least protect against the most common mistakes. The book is based on an analysis of US political practice, but in my opinion, the methods proposed by the authors will also be useful in management. Also, although the authors say that this is not a history book, some of the examples given are interesting in their own right. I found a link to the book from Morgan Jones. .

Richard Neustadt, Ernest May. Modern reflections. About the benefits of history for those who make decisions. – M.: Publishing house A.d Marginem, 1999. – 384 p.

Download a summary in or format (the summary is about 4% of the book)

At the time of publication of this note, the book is available only in used bookstores

Washington is dominated by people who do not want to know about any history and are not in the least offended by their ignorance; people who believe that the world and all its problems have been reborn for them (since Hiroshima, Vietnam, Watergate, or even the last election) and that political decisions require only rational justification or emotional impulse, depending on personal preference.

Chapter first. History of success

For President Kennedy, the missile crisis entered its decisive phase on Tuesday, October 16, 1962. In the morning, Assistant national security McGeorge Bundy reported to the President that a U-2 reconnaissance plane had taken photographs indicating a Russian deployment in Cuba. nuclear missiles medium range. Kennedy immediately convened a group of people with whom he wanted to discuss the situation. It would later be called the Executive Committee of the National Security Council.

Once they got to work, Kennedy and the executive committee used (or did not use) historical knowledge in a very typical manner. At least nine times out of ten, debates about a serious problem begin with the question: What should we do? The history of the topic and context are usually left out. They turn to the past (if they do so at all) only for analogies, comparing the current situation with some of the previous ones. Sometimes this is done in order to squeeze an unfamiliar phenomenon into a familiar framework. Sometimes - to strengthen one’s position, since a reference to a similar situation usually justifies the proposed solution. In all other cases, the focus is solely on the present or future.

After the committee members speak, President John F. Kennedy sets the stage for all subsequent debates on the first day, outlining three options: eliminate only the missiles; destroy all aircraft as well; organize an invasion.

The president's brother, Robert Kennedy, was wary of the idea of ​​an airstrike from the very beginning. He spoke quite decisively against synchronized bombing of missile positions and airfields. “If you choose the second option, you will have to bomb all of Cuba... A lot of people will die, and someone will have to answer for it.” Expressing similar doubts, George Ball turned to analogies: “Remember, at one time Pearl Harbor only scared us.” Drawing such parallels is a fairly typical thing; but they, unfortunately, are very imperfect.

On October 22, the President informed the world about Russian intrigues and imposed a maritime quarantine on Cuba. McNamara noted: "This alternative does not seem very attractive, until you meet others." The US Navy was charged with preventing the delivery of new missiles to Cuba. This bought Kennedy time to try to convince the Russians to remove the missiles already stationed there from the island. A week later, however, having failed in this matter, the president again returned to his original position. The question again was whether to bomb only rocket launchers or subject airfields to airstrikes. But on the second Sunday of the crisis, Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of missiles. The story thus became a success story.

The steps taken by the executive committee indicate an unusual scale for us to attract and test analogies. The second aspect in which the Executive Committee deviated from traditional patterns was its close attention to the history of the problem - to its origins and context. Kennedy himself played a major role in this, forming the executive committee. He gathered around him people who had extensive experience in communicating with the Soviet Union since the Second World War. The third innovation was that Kennedy and his Executive Committee subjected the key premises of their reasoning to a thorough revision.

No one calculated the effectiveness of past air operations, but some of the committee members had seen enough of them. Lovett, once a naval aviator, was in charge of the ground component of the US Air Force during World War II. This fact played a role when he spoke out in favor of a naval blockade over air raids. Robert Kennedy later liked to recall Lovett's phrase: “The right decision usually comes from experience. And experience is often the result of bad decisions.” During the thirteen days of the missile crisis, many other stereotypes were challenged.

Kennedy and his executive committee surprise us with the persistence with which the question was asked again and again: how reliable are the premises on which we are going to act? Kennedy and the Executive Committee found themselves unusually interested in how their opponents viewed history. According to Robert Kennedy, the president constantly tried to put himself in Khrushchev's place.

Kennedy and the executive committee paid considerable attention to the historical evolution of organizations and institutions. Kennedy himself set a similar attitude. Apparently, he felt with his skin the habit of large organizations today to behave in exactly the same way as they did yesterday. Sovietologists helped Kennedy and his team assess the possibility that on the Soviet side, developments might be determined less by deliberate intent and more by organizational routine.

At the end of the crisis, Kennedy said that, in his opinion, the chances of a war breaking out were very high: “about one in three, or even higher.” At the same time, according to Robert Kennedy, the president viewed Khrushchev as “a rational, intelligent man who, given enough time and knowledge of our intentions, is capable of changing his position.”

But we still do not see this as the most important feature of the work of the Executive Committee. In a manner very uncharacteristic for the present time, its members saw in the problem that occupied them only one of the links in a time stream that began long before the crisis and stretched into the distant future. Moving away from the simplest question - what actions need to be taken now - they went to a more complex one: how will our decisions today affect the future, how will they be perceived in ten years or a century? The president's desire to view the situation in a broad temporal context is well illustrated by remarks addressed to his brother regarding the First World War. He had just read Barbara Tuchman's book at the time. Kennedy said: “I am not going to follow a course that might allow someone to write the same kind of book about our times - something like October Rockets.” Scientists of the future should understand that we did everything possible to achieve peace, and any step we took was a step towards the enemy.”

• an indomitable desire to act;
• dependence on random analogies used either for apologetic or analytical purposes, or even both;
• inattention to the history of the issue;
• failure to look critically at the premises on which a decision is made;
• stereotypical views of the individuals or organizations involved;
• inability to fit the decision being made into the general sequence of historical events.

Chapter three. Misconceptions born of analogies

From reflecting on the Korean epic - the story of a lost victory - we draw the following moral: the first step in making any decision should be to analyze and identify those moments in the situation that call for action. We propose a mini-method, the constant application of which, in our opinion, will reduce the number of cases in which a particular step is overlooked or deliberately ignored.

You just need to decompose “now” - the current situation, into components, separating Famous from Unclear, and then both - from Alleged(assumed by those who deal with the problem and make decisions). We need to understand why in this situation at all some solution is required.

The essential components of our headings - Known, Unclear and Supposed - are those details and particulars that make the current situation different from the previous one, which did not require attention. This kind of focus immediately protects us from the natural desire to replace the question “What is our problem?” with the question “What the hell should we do?”

Trying to figure out why you need to act in a given situation at all helps to outline the expected results. If the situation was previously quite tolerable, then one possible goal may be to return it to its previous course. In normal practice, as far as we know, things often turn out differently. By discussing what to do without figuring out why it is needed at all, politicians set erroneous goals that are not directly related to the problem.

Chapter five. Avoiding boring analogies

Working with analogies fits into three words: Stop! Look around! Listen up! A simple appeal to them can sometimes replace serious reflection. The first line of defense is sorting out the Known, the Unknown and the Inferred. This procedure focuses thought on the present situation. The second line is the identification of suitable analogies, the more the better, and analysis Similarities And Differences. Thus, it is possible to get rid of unnecessary illusions.

Chapter six. Studying the history of the issue

Previous chapters have looked at ways in which the use of analogies, the most typical use of historical material, can be prevented, inhibited, or expanded. Separating the Known from the Unclear and Supposed, as well as recognizing the Similarities and Differences of the corresponding analogies, allows us to more clearly outline the current situation and understand what its highlight is. By doing this, we will never confuse the 1976 swine flu with the 1918 Spanish flu. This and subsequent chapters will take a historical approach to the problems themselves, the individuals involved, and the institutions.

There is a certain set of problems that need to be identified before making a final decision. What is our goal? What do we intend to achieve? What exactly do we want to replace the current state of affairs with? Understanding how the problem arose and how the situation changed can be extremely helpful. This knowledge alone will not answer the questions posed above. The future is never exactly like the past. It simply cannot be like that. But in the specifics of the past one can often find the keys to the possibilities of the future.

Goldberg's Rule- a scientist and gentleman who runs Stop and Shop, a chain of grocery and discount department stores in New England. He said: “When a manager comes to me, I don’t ask him: “What’s the problem?” I say: “Tell me everything from the very beginning.” In this way I find out what the real difficulty is."

When studying the history of an issue, it is worth writing down on a piece of paper the dates associated with the event of interest to us. Since business people are often too lazy to delve too deeply into the past, we emphasize that it is important to start with the earliest dates relevant to the problem.

Applying our questionnaire in the same way in all possible situations may not be productive. Some selection is required. The selection rules are as follows. First, start by identifying trends - “first the forest, then the trees.” Secondly, try to focus on those “trees” - the nodal points of history where politics (whether legislative, bureaucratic, electoral or international) had a decisive impact on the final result.

Chapter seven. Finding what you need in history

People facing major decisions should take a pause to reflect on the problem facing them. They need to beware of any misleading analogies. Then, to the extent possible, they should try to look at the problem of interest in historical context, looking for key trends and features in the past that help make decisions today. And here we propose, firstly, Goldberg’s rule - a principle according to which it is recommended to think more often: “What is the history of the issue?”; secondly, the “time scale”, that is, a principle related to the previous one and saying that any history must be studied down to its origins (this sharply reduces the chances of using historical data for the purpose of self-justification); finally, thirdly, “journalistic” questions addressed to the past - Where, Who, How And Why, and When And What exactly. With this arsenal of tools, both present conditions and future prospects can be clarified. All three steps are interdependent, they presuppose each other.

Chapter eight. Checking the premises

How can politicians identify and test the assumptions that inspire them (or those around them), while eliminating the weakest and most unreliable ones? The 1961 Bay of Pigs adventure is a classic example of the consequences of not paying attention to the premises. Participants in those events relied on different premises, but did not explore either the differences between them or the discrepancies between their expectations and what actually happened.

In retrospect, this whole story is striking in how uncritically Kennedy reacted to the proposals of the developers of the operation, the opinion of the chiefs of staff, and the position of other persons involved in the matter. For the president and his advisers, certain premises stimulated very specific expectations and preferences, to the exclusion of all others; no one even tried to find out whether they were verifiable, let alone publicly disclose all the logic of cause and effect that follows from them.

The chiefs of staff apparently assumed that imminent civil unrest was a key component of Bissell's plans. The latter, on the contrary, believed that riots would begin within a week or two after the anti-Castro government established itself on the island. In the State Department, as in many parts of the CIA, the insurrection was considered a chimera. If Kennedy or one of his aides had attempted to probe the Joint Chiefs of Staff's premise and then insisted on interviewing all intelligence branches, the disagreements would have become apparent.

If someone talks about the "good chance" of the Bay of Pigs, or the "serious possibility" of a swine flu epidemic, or asserts that "the Guatemalans will not allow our training camps to be used," you should ask: "When betting, what bet would you would you personally respond to this statement?” As a second test we suggest Alexander's question. He first asked it in March 1976 at an advisory committee meeting that preceded the decision to mass inoculate against swine flu. Dr. Russell Alexander, a public health professor at the University of Washington, wanted to know what the new data was that was causing his colleagues to reconsider earlier decision that the country can only be prepared for mass immunization by next summer.

Alexander's question brings out of the shadows causal associations that are thought to be confirmed by prior experience. To understand the inner mechanics of the process, imagine someone telling Kennedy in 1960, right after the election, something like this: “Make a list of the things that bother you about the Bissell plan, and then make a list of the events that, if they actually happened, will increase anxiety. Then watch to see if any of the above actually happen. If so, reconsider the problem."

You should also check the “axiom premises”. First of all, they need to be identified as such, if only because they influence the language in which the options are formulated. Having completed the “identification”, one should determine their sources, basis, and degree of reliability.

• you should start by sorting the facts - by highlighting the Known, the Unclear and the Assumed;
• we need to get rid of useless analogies that obscure the vision of the situation that interests us and the problems it generates; while doing this, it is worth noticing the Similarities and Differences of the analogies that come to mind with the current moment;
• it is necessary to refer to the history of the issue; identifying the source of our worries will help determine how to cope with them and, perhaps, push us to one solution or another;
• we need to do what we usually try to start with: outline possible solutions, recording the arguments in each case behind And against;
• we must pause to answer the question: what are the premises that stand behind each argument used in this case? behind or against? What bets do different people place on this or that scenario? What answers can you get to Alexander's question?
• it is necessary to at least briefly explore common stereotypes about the people involved in the case;
• Organizations must go through the same procedure.

Chapter Nine. Dealing with the actors

Different people often perceive the same difficulty in different ways. Sometimes such differences are explained by institutional reasons. Rufus Miles' maxim is well known: "Beliefs are determined by position." But sometimes differences in views are more personal.

When certain actions are planned, it is very important to recognize and take into account the different angles from which the actors look at the world around them and their place in it. In our opinion, “tracking” individuals and learning their personal histories, used with some caution and within clearly defined boundaries, can greatly improve both decision-making and execution.

In relation to the main characters, it is equally productive to ask yourself a few simple questions: when was our hero born? Where? what happened to him then? Once you accept that someone older or younger than you may perceive history completely differently, the operation we call begins arrangement of characters. This neutral term refers to the use of historical data to challenge underlying stereotypes about other people's views. During this procedure, established stereotypes become “complicated” - in the sense that they are enriched with additional fragments, perspectives, even hints, thereby displacing unfounded hypotheses and bare guesses.

The American power pyramid - with its characteristic pluralism of interests and institutions, indefinite tenure in top positions, and the enormous influence of private business - is overcrowded with “outsiders.” Often they perceive each other quite stereotypically (and when such expectations are not met, they become indignant and indignant). In order to effectively persuade or confront each other, which they have to do all the time, they must be able to “enrich” their own stereotypes. The arrangement of characters allows us to at least partially solve this problem.

Chapter ten. "Arrangement" in the presence of barriers

“Enrichment” of stereotypes with the help historical materials and events privacy is uniquely complicated by racial and class differences, especially when they overlap. At the same time, the conclusions are often perceived in a distorted form. However, they cannot be interpreted absolutely correctly, since they are silent about psychological characteristics both the object of study and the observer. Our position is simple: something is better than nothing. “Enriched” stereotypes are preferable to primitive ones.

Chapter Eleven. Beware of patterns

Among Americans, at least those who consider themselves to be “arbiters of destinies,” making hidden beliefs public is not a practice. It is not customary for us to explain differences in opinions by differences in value systems. Our pragmatic, law-abiding society assumes that if people think differently, they either have different facts or different interests. In the first case, it is necessary to reveal the truth; in the second - to find a compromise. Most Americans have difficulty reconciling the alternative possibility that divergent views may be explained by divergent concepts of causation involved at a level where evidence or compromise is simply not possible.

While we advocate the importance of constellation, we caution that remember, the sole purpose of this procedure is to improve the quality of working hypotheses; its outcome is still an assumption that may well turn out to be wrong.

Chapter twelve. Studying organizations

Organizations, like people, can be subject to constellation, and this is great because the history of an organization, like the history of an issue, can be useful in making a policy decision. We have a thoroughly documented example. This is the story in the Bay of Pigs. The organization we are interested in will be the CIA. If the main trends in the development of this institution were identified (even if superficially) and if the stereotypical perception of this service by John Kennedy could be slightly “enriched” organizational issues the president would undoubtedly have raised questions of principle: where did Robert Emory go? where is Richard Helms?

We often provide our listeners with a historical sketch of this scam up to February 1961 (when Kennedy held a series of chaotic meetings with the most different people), supported by a twenty-page overview of CIA activities in 1960, drawn from two sources - a published report of the Senate Intelligence Committee and a biography of Helms written by Thomas Powers. We then ask students: If you knew so much and served as Kennedy's advisor, what questions would you recommend asking Allen Dulles? As a rule, at the top of the list is a proposal to listen to the two aforementioned intelligence officers. For even open history that knows no secrets invariably emphasizes three features of the CIA's structural growth.

First, management was born out of several independent organizations, each of which had its own employees. Secondly, after the unification, this alienation remained and even acquired institutional features. Thirdly, the very activities of the CIA contributed to such isolation, since it strongly encouraged isolation, the desire to know only what was prescribed, and at all levels, including deputy directors.

Why is it necessary to turn to history? Why worry about the “big” events and “small” details on the “timeline” when you can simply wonder how a given structure is being run at the moment? There are at least three reasons for this. The first of these is prejudice. Kennedy would have been unlikely to have gained a correct understanding of the work of the CIA if he had inquired about it from Dulles or Bissell. And if he had asked the same question to Emory or Helms, he probably would not have believed what he heard.

Even more open organizations The picture presented by any employee usually embellishes the part of the work that he personally does. And interviewing several figures requires a significant amount of time. And here we come to the second reason: saving time. For a beginner the most quick way drawing up an objective portrait of an organization is to compare its current management system, resources and human resources with similar indicators in the past.

Finally, the third reason: those who want to get their bearings need not only to know what the organization does, but also to imagine what it is capable of or what should not be expected from it. With organizations, as with problems, looking at the past can help make sense of the future.

Chapter thirteen. What and how to do: summing up

The Athenian exile Thucydides believed that the history of the Peloponnesian Wars he described would allow future politicians to prove themselves more effectively in similar situations. He said that he writes for those “who want to understand the events of the past, which sooner or later - for human nature unchanged - will be repeated in the same features and in the same way in the future.”

But as soon as we imagine aides telling President Lyndon Johnson about the Athenians of the 5th century BC, we are immediately overcome with doubt. Johnson's aides simply didn't know what to say if the president suddenly asked, as is his wont, "So what of it?" The idea of ​​progress and the achievement of modern technology, not to mention the sense of American exceptionalism, obscured from them (and from the President) the lessons of the classical past.

Could the history of these spear-wielding, oar-swimming, slave-ruling, electronics-less, aviation-less ancient peoples be of use to people who succeeded in modern wars? In our opinion, a definite answer can still be offered. A sense of self-superiority, complacency or excessive timidity of generals, intelligence miscalculations, fickleness of the public, unreliability (or the presence of self-interest) of allies, uncertainty of the outcome - these are the features that, even without coinciding in particulars, unite the two adventures, Athenian and American, and determine parallels between them. And yet the Greeks would not have warned Lyndon Johnson against mistakes - references to unknown events only obscure the essence of the matter. Getting to know ancient history would not have been able to keep him from recklessly, without any concept of prospects, sliding into war.

In a situation that prompts action, good hardware work begins with an analysis of the situation: what is actually happening? Then you need to understand the subject of your own concern, as well as the main concern of your superiors: if you need to solve some problem (or live with it), then what is it? And who does it concern primarily?

Some participants will almost certainly try to start with their favorite and proven schemes. They will tend to ignore anything that does not fit with their approach and define the problem in such a way that the solution they already have at hand is suitable for solving it.

We want standard hardware work to begin by listing, in three different columns, the key elements of the situation at hand - Known, Unknown, and Inferred. This simple technique allows you to focus on the situation itself, and not on the question “what to do?” (which will have to be pushed into the background for a while). A quick sketch of Similarities and Differences on paper can block potentially misleading analogies.

After the situation itself and the problems associated with it are more or less defined, the next logical step of the apparatus should be to identify the goal - that is, to describe the state with which we would like to replace the current one. And here an appeal to the history of the issue comes to the rescue. In this regard, we recommend the daily use of three tools. The first of these is the “Goldberg Rule”. Armed with some clear definitions of the problem, it is worth asking: “What is the history of the issue? How exactly did these troubles mature?”

The second device is the “time scale”. Start the story of the problem from the beginning, tracking key trends along the way and noting major events, especially major changes. The third technique involves posing so-called “journalistic questions.” Despite what the "time scale" shows, When And What, feel free to find out also, Where, Who, How And Why.

The history of the issue sheds light on the next logical step - the selection of options to achieve the goals. What worked yesterday may well happen tomorrow. Past failures can also be repeated. However, don't neglect the Similarities and Differences test.

We recommend the bet and Alexander's question as the simplest tests. The first involves nothing more than making a bet about the expected outcome (or, which is acceptable, conducting a small survey about how much money our interlocutor is willing to risk predicting this or that outcome. In this way, a politician can reveal disagreements among experts, often hidden under concepts like “good odds” or “high probability.” The second, referring to Dr. Alexander’s tactics in the swine flu story, is to pose the question of what are the new circumstances that prompt a revision of previous premises.

If nothing new is presented to you, good, but if something does appear, try to go through the possible choices again. Finally, both before making a final decision and during its execution, it is necessary to use a procedure that we call “arrangement.” This involves studying the prerequisites relating to the people and organizations involved, on whose active assistance success depends. The goal is to “enrich” basic stereotypes that often distort the perception of individuals or structures. In this case, it is necessary to keep in mind the time factor that cements prejudices.

For this purpose, we propose a “time scale” on which events and details of the lives of individuals and organizations are recorded (significant social dates constitute “events”, and milestones of personal destiny or the internal history of organizations are “details”). And don’t get stuck by the first stereotype you come across, be it “woman”, “actor”, “bureaucracy” or “interest group”. Mark major events in which the person or organization was involved. Add, where necessary, special events that affect only certain groups or social strata.

And finally, formulate conclusions - working hypotheses that, in your opinion, are more “rich” than the original stereotypes. Based on the assumptions received, one should get rid of old prejudices.

The proposed mini-methods encourage historical reading and awareness. This remark concerns registry And context. By register we mean a certain reservoir of historical data stored in reserve in the memory of a particular person; with its help, analogies are built, a time scale is filled in, or others are checked to see if they have completed it. The meaning of the word context here is also quite simple: the larger the array of historical knowledge mastered by a politician, the better he understands the alternatives that open up in the course of historical development.

Chapter fourteen. Viewing time as a flow

Explaining the worldview of George Marshall, let us turn to an episode that took place in 1948. After retiring, Marshall served as Secretary of State in Truman's cabinet. One of his main problems was China. The communists were about to win the battle going on there civil war. Like the other Washingtonians, Marshall wanted them to lose. He asked General Albert Wedemeyer (formerly his chief staff officer and, at the end of the war, commander of American forces in China) to see what could be done in the current situation. After visiting the region, Wedemeyer recommended sending several thousand American military advisers to China. By joining the Nationalist army, the general predicted, the advisers would change the balance of power and perhaps even allow Chiang Kai-shek to gain the upper hand.

Respecting the professionalism of his colleague, Marshall nevertheless decided that the United States should limit itself to monetary assistance and arms supplies. Explaining his position to the Senate Committee on foreign affairs, he emphasized that anything more would entail “commitments that the American people would not be able to accept.” In the long run, the Secretary of State added, the Chinese themselves would regret foreign interference. In addition, he doubted whether there were enough qualified specialists in America. Be that as it may, “it is not possible to calculate the final costs…. This operation will inevitably take a long time. It will bind the current administration with obligations that will then be impossible to refuse.”

Perhaps the most outstanding achievement of his career was the so-called Marshall Plan. In 1947, Marshall decided that the economic condition of Europe required rapid and decisive action. First, according to Marshall, the subject of the initiative was "neither country nor doctrine, but ... hunger, poverty, despair and chaos." Second, he declared, “as a series of crises deepen, recovery efforts cannot be half-hearted”: the plan must “involve radical healing, not temporary relief.” Thirdly, the participation of the Russians and their allies should be welcomed, based, of course, on the fact that they are ready for serious cooperation and do not seek to “derive political or other benefits from human suffering.” Finally, the initiative must come from the Europeans themselves. They will have to jointly determine what they need first and turn to the United States for help.

Marshall's assessments were reinforced by the habit of considering time is like a stream. This approach to time has three components. The first is the realization that the future is not born on its own; it arises only from the past, thanks to which the gift of historical foresight is possible. Another element is the belief that all features of the present that have significance for the future are born of the past; Changes and shifts that change the usual course of time constantly adjust our ability to predict. Finally, the third component should be considered a tireless comparison, almost continuous movements from the present to the future (or to the past) and back, allowing one to realize changes, study, limit, direct, slow down or accept them - depending on the results of such a comparison.

McGeorge Bundy's criticism of McNamara's 1965 defense initiatives (the slide into the Vietnam War) echoes the same long-term consequences and dangers that warned Marshall against intervention in China eighteen years earlier. Rajek, who idolized Marshall, also saw a similar perspective; Let us remember the recommendations addressed to Bundy and McNamara to solve the problem in such a way as not to abandon Vietnam and not to increase the American military presence. But to McNamara, at least in 1965, it seemed that if a problem was “driven to the door of his workshop,” then without further ado it should be “disassembled piece by piece,” and without paying attention to the context. This is how he perceived his duty.

Another politician, who sees the future as a stream continuously flowing from the past, both American and Vietnamese, would be more cautious - especially if he understood that the accomplished future is also capable of deceiving past hopes, as the present does. An example of opposing views is President Jimmy Carter. His approach was no more than one problem at a time; resolve the first, and only then move on to the next - and there is no holistic vision. In addition, in the face of possible difficulties, he showed self-confidence bordering on stupidity.

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THE PATH OF TRUTH - INTELLIGENCE

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOFT POWER

SKY POLITICS

Andrey Devyatov

Proceedings of the Academy of Development Management

INSTITUTE OF HEALTH POLITICS

Only for Nobles and candidates for Nobility

Intelligent special forces

Under the banner of vezhdism. Discern the illusion. Understand the truth!

A treatise to help those who seek the truth

The book “Heavenpolitics. The path of truth is intelligence” is the fourth in a series of instructions on heavenly politics. Published:

1. Skypolitics. Short course. – M.: Ant, 2005.

2. Heavenly politics as art. Other facets. – M.: Military University, 2006.

3. Skypolitics. For those who make decisions. – M.: Zhigulsky Publishing House, 2008.

In 2011, the book “Heavenly Politics. For those who make decisions" was published on Chinese in the publishing house of the Academy social sciences China. At the same time, in China, heavenly politics received the status of a “teaching” (Tianyuan zheng-zhi xuyou).

In the art of management there is an integral sphere of activity, which, like the chastity of a woman, is not discussed. This area of ​​activity is called intelligence.

The purpose of intelligence is to find out the truth. But the truth is always bitter. The truth hurts my eyes. That's why it's covered in secrecy. Revealing the secrets of existence is a sophisticated and risky activity of “cloak and dagger”; concentration of will and intense, resourceful work of the mind; long searches and discoveries and, finally, a breakthrough to understanding the processes.

In its way of knowing the truth of life, intelligence is something that embraces science, art, and mysticism. In the masterpieces of its activities, intelligence predicts the order of events. The transition of humanity through the post-industrial barrier at the level of the Universe accompanies the change of cosmic eras; The precession axis of planet Earth from 2003 to 2014 completes the transition from the constellation Pisces to the constellation Aquarius. There are cardinal changes in the state of nature, society and consciousness.

The “new sky” of Aquarius also promises a “new earth” of the information society. In this treatise, to help those who seek the truth, the most probable scenario for the future of Russia is predicted using the methods of higher intelligence of consciousness and time.

Preface

Reasonings of the last head of political intelligence of the USSR about intelligence work, about a person in intelligence and the meaning of his life.

“A scout becomes known to the world only when he suffers a major failure. Perhaps the same can be said about intelligence. This organization, by its nature, must see and hear everything, while remaining invisible itself.

For me, predecessors are people who did the same thing as me, these are colleagues who help me work, and sometimes confuse me with an incorrect view of this or that event, a frivolous attitude towards some fact, etc. We deprived of the possibility of direct communication. It’s okay, we don’t communicate with many of our contemporaries who are busy doing the same things as us, although we know them in absentia. They also belong to our community, where the main thing is not time barriers, but involvement in a common cause. It seems that my idea is not presented quite clearly, but it is hardly worth quibbling about the clarity of the formulation. You must feel that you yourself, your work, your life are just an insignificant part of a huge common thing, not divided into past, present and future. The predecessors also remain part of this commonality.

The main question that sooner or later every person asks himself: “Why me? What is the meaning of my life? What is the meaning of my work? It would be extremely naive to seek an answer to the question of the meaning of life, and not because the question is not important. It's difficult to answer this question. As a starting point for further reasoning, we can take this, not indisputable, but absolutely necessary for people of our profession, definition: “The meaning of life is in serving the cause.” Not worship, not praise, not vows, not just work, not service, but service to the cause.

This stage is reached when business becomes an unconscious, undeclared core of existence, when every step is consistent with the interests of the business, when business, without crowding out a person’s everyday, spiritual, intellectual interests, quietly shapes them, turning into unnecessary and irritating everything that can interfere business.

In order to serve a cause, one must believe that it is right, that it is part of something larger than the life of any of its participants.

We exist, we are alive, we feel like people only because we have a Motherland. We will stand on this and from this point evaluate the past, judge the actions of our predecessors and contemporaries, and look into the turbulent future. This clarifies the essence of our matter. The good of the Fatherland, the good of the people is higher than ideological disputes, personal and group self-interest, politics today, above ambitions and grievances. For decades, we have been monitoring the maneuvers of external forces, opponents and partners, revealing their secret plans, suggesting the direction of retaliatory moves, engaging in the most intense battles, and suffering losses. And always, even in the most difficult circumstances, the thought was present: the Fatherland is behind us, a powerful, unshakable state, a great people is behind us. The struggle for the Fatherland continues on new frontiers.

It is clear that a single, powerful, united state in the vast European spaces will not be left alone by either the West or the East. The reason is not that it threatens anyone's safety. As long as it exists in this capacity, a monopoly of power - military, political or economic - is impossible in the world; the dominance of any coalition is impossible.

Our service, as a kind of public institution, rests on three pillars: mutual trust of the actors, dedication and exactingness... Trust does not exclude exactingness. It is exactingness that makes it possible to stimulate work, highlight capable and conscientious people, and get rid of those who do not live up to trust. Exactingness is one of the faces of human justice; it should be the same for everyone - from the head of intelligence to the youngest, novice employee. Demanding cannot only come from top to bottom; it must be universal and mutual. And finally, dedication. Our service cannot offer an employee material goods, fast career, public recognition. A scout must be modest and inconspicuous, his main motive is dedication to the cause and his comradeship, in serving the Fatherland.

The leader must be his own conscience. And away from people. who need power. Farther from power and its companion - lies... Yes, I am a soldier of a defeated, retreating army, but I will not allow a louse to eat me!

The work that my colleagues and I have been doing for many years is more interesting, more exciting, in my opinion, than anything that life could offer.

That's how it seemed to me and still seems to me. Life is part of work, and it was always thought that they would end at the same time. Did not work out. The service is over, life goes on. The work continues, of which my work was an insignificant part. This business began centuries before I was born, and it will not be completed as long as Russia lives. More and more people will come, they will be smarter, more educated than us, they will live in a different world, not like ours. But they will continue the eternal work, of which we and our unknown predecessors were a part, they will serve to ensure the security of Russia. God help them!

Time goes fast. What seemed unshakable crumbles into dust. That leaves Russia... The sacred task is to help the Fatherland, to the best of our ability, to shorten the time severe tests, to regain its place in the world community as a great power with a thousand-year history, great culture, great traditions, with a modern economy and science. I believe it will happen!”

Leonid Vladimirovich Shebarshin

Part I. INTELLIGENCE AS AN ART OF THE UNIQUE

1.1. Story

In the art of managing the state, economy and society there is an integral sphere of activity, which, like the chastity of a woman, is not discussed. This area of ​​activity is called intelligence.

Reconnaissance is a sophisticated operational information and sabotage activity aimed at combat support for capturing the future in a secret fight against competitors. To think otherwise means to forget the ABCs of military art.

Intelligence is carried out by both states and non-state structures (companies, banks, parties, clans, gangs). As well as supranational formations (spiritual orders, secret societies, Masonic lodges).

Intelligence as such is a management attribute associated with forecasting, foreseeing and anticipating the development of events. The forecast is achieved by calculation. Foresight is built by analogy with the past. And anticipation requires penetration to the source of the event. In Russian: the conduct of the beginning or the conduct of Raza is Intelligence.

The word “intelligence” has different meanings in different languages. So, if in Russian it means active search truth and insight into the root cause of an event, then in English intelligence is a pure game of the mind, subtle calculation, puzzle and intricacy of thought. And in Chinese there are two characters with the reading qing bao– this is not the mind or calculation, but the heart. This is a notification of interest, a report of aspirations and aspirations, a response to experiences, a registration of motives, sincere service and retribution.

Reconnaissance is a high style of solving problems of attack control without the use of outright violence. It is characterized by aggressiveness, audacity, resourcefulness, technicality and ingenuity in operational combinations. Acts as a hidden source of danger.

An enemy intelligence officer (spy) is a particularly dangerous criminal for any country, non-state entity or secret organization, who must be neutralized immediately and at any cost. For the scout is always on the offensive. And since only two types of military actions lead to victory - offensive and oncoming combat, a scout is always potentially a Victorious. In the pre-industrial period and in industrial societies, espionage was punishable by death. On the transition of humanity through the post-industrial barrier into the global Information society intelligence remains a source of danger of the first degree, which the relevant authorities and security services are busy blocking.

Intelligence has always been a dangerous and cruel business. And only people devoid of excessive sensitivity, tenderness and pity could engage in it.

In intelligence, the goal is often achieved, regardless of the means. Here theft, hypocrisy, temptation, deception, setup, blackmail, trap- The usual thing. Soft-hearted, conscientious and tearful people in intelligence did not cope with their tasks and died. The path of a scout is the best test of a person not only for loyalty to an ideal and resistance to temptation, but also for a tendency to deceit.

Intelligence is a difficult and thankless job that someone has to do anyway. Scout is one of the oldest professions. More biblical prophet Moses sent people from himself “to spy out the land of Canaan... what is it like, and the people living on it, whether they are strong or weak, whether they are few or many? And what is the land on which he lives, is it good or bad? and what are the cities in which he dwells, whether he dwells in tents or in fortifications?” (Numbers 13:18–20).

Intelligence is a service that over the years turns into a lifestyle. There are no former intelligence officers in the sense that if the correct order is given, the intelligence officer will always answer “Yes.”

Intelligence is a way of identifying things in the darkness of the mysteries of existence. In addition to exploration, science, religion and art deal with the mysteries of existence.

Mystery is darkness and light is truth. Light does not fight darkness. It’s just that where light penetrates, darkness retreats. Therefore, we can say that intelligence is the “sword” of the Spirit of Truth, cutting a path for the truth of existence. And the greatest scouts of the Path, Truth and Life are prophets.

Since intelligence deals with uncovering secrets, it is an instrument of truth. For “he who does righteousness comes to the light, so that his deeds may be made clear, because they have been done in God” (John 3:21).

The ideal image of a scout is an emissary (messenger) of Truth, carrying and defending the ideals of truth and justice in a country of happiness and joy.

The Christian Scriptures speak about the mystery of lawlessness and the mystery of piety. Therefore, the highest field of intelligence activity is the sphere of consciousness and time: feelings, memory, thinking, will - in the past, present and future. Where these highest secrets of “the way, the truth and the life” are hidden. For only intelligence does not face the question of the naturalness of an organic combination of the mystical (not of this world) and the purely practical.

The next level of knowledge of the truth of life is exploration of the secrets of nature: geological and mineralogical (subsoil), geodetic (land), hydrographic (water), meteorological (air), astrophysical (space). The essence is groping (probing) and identification of things in the environment.

Then comes the classic intelligence of the secrets of society: political, military, economic, industrial, financial, scientific and technical, etc.

Intelligence is one way or another active action. This is the scouting (mining), collection, accounting, accumulation and systematization of data, usually closed from the direct views of outsiders.

In addition to finding out and logical analysis of the texture (of what is), intelligence is called upon to notice and evaluate what is not there, and answer the question: “Why not?”

To notice what is not there, the gift of judgment is useless. The gift of discernment is at work here. And in order to successfully distinguish (and it is necessary to distinguish not the signs of form, but the signs of the essence of things), reconnaissance must be carried out continuously, so that there is something to compare, and to notice signs of difference - signs. “Discerning the signs of the times” is commanded in Scripture.

Information intelligence work is about overcoming the mystery of existence through the ability to work with meanings. This is a breakthrough to knowledge and understanding primarily through the effort of the mind and heart. This is the sphere of high socio-humanitarian technologies that can tear off incognito masks. Or, conversely, hide cognitive models for controlling people’s behavior with veils of misinformation.

Intelligence is scientific in method, but it is not a science. For science analyzes facts and establishes patterns, while intelligence is called upon to evaluate signs and find, first of all, the root cause of an upcoming event.

Intelligence recognizes the irrational basis of events, but this is not religion. For, easily connecting the mystical and practical principles, intelligence is directly related not to “heaven”, but to practice (nature).

Intelligence in the results of insight creates masterpieces, but is not art in its pure form. Because it is not focused on abstraction artistic image, but in truth as it is, intelligence is always specific in unique conditions current situation. And therefore there is an art of the unique.

Intelligence is a superposition over the triangles of science, religion and art, completing the plane of knowledge of the secrets of existence to completeness, integrity and adequacy of understanding the picture of the world in volume.

Intelligence as a system of penetration into the secrets of existence is characterized by such words as information, management, future.

The biggest mystery of existence is what will be. Capturing the future requires managing events. And management requires information.

Information but it is nothing more than that which is contained within the form. And inside the form is the content. That is, when strangers show interest in a thing, only the form is available to a first approximation. What is given in sensations. Otherwise - data. And not at all what is hidden inside the form. Otherwise - in formation. Because when mentally capturing the future we're talking about about immaterial things of existence, then information (content hidden by form) is only that which carries meaning. Meaning is what answers the questions: why and why? There is no meaning, there is no information.

And to get to the meaning, you first need to obtain (collect) data. Then, with the effort of thought, organize the scattered data. Reduce them to one or another accounting system, that is, turn data (news) into information. And finally, identify the meaning in the information. Look at the contents of the forms. Reach out in formations. The point is to remove the clothes of forms and expose meanings. And the meaning can only be understood (understood) by distinguishing one from another in a group.

The meanings of existence are different for people of different genotypes (blood) and different archetypes (cultures), different races and languages. The memory of generations, for example, is completely different between the British and the Chinese. Therefore, it is impossible to avoid competition – the “war of meanings” – between projects of the future.

The meanings of capturing the future include goals, intentions and opportunities, real and potential. They are the goals, intentions and capabilities, your own and those of your competitors, and are the valuable information needed to manage events.

What is an event? Being a portion of the flow has taken place - that’s the event.

Existence in volume is nature, society and consciousness. In time it is past, present and future. And as a process it is the metabolism, energy and information. A substance is any nature. Energy is something that can do work. And information is something that carries meaning.

Since the process of being as the exchange of substances and energy is impossible without the third - information, the possession of information ensures control and management of the entire process. This is where the role and place of intelligence appears.

In the social life of people, the possession of information makes it possible to control and manage the exchange of natural values ​​in the form of land, buildings, structures, machines, equipment, raw materials, fuel, gold, drugs, etc. And most importantly, to manage energy. Including the energy of human life: money (body), conscience (soul), honor (spirit). Where money, conscience and honor are the motives of people’s behavior, their desire to get up and do the job.

People management- this is nothing more than mastering them attention and then imposition behavior patterns influencing instincts (body), reflexes (soul) or passions (spirit). You can influence with signals (commands), or without signals, changing the environment in which a person is located. Behavior is determined by the intended goals of action or inaction, intentions (plans) and opportunities to achieve the goal.

Goals, intentions and opportunities are a secret, since their open demonstration exposes the control system to the attacks of competitors to seize the future. A management system is built from elements and structure. The elements in the behavior management system are meanings, things that answer the question: “Why?” The structure will be the relationship of meanings with each other. Without interconnections, meanings can either be misinterpreted or represent clever misinformation. The essence of disinformation is to divert attention to false targets and then correct behavior.

The role and place of reconnaissance in managing people, and through people and events, is to open a competitor's control system. Assess her condition (strengths and weak sides) and the prospect of development or stagnation, identify vulnerabilities and, if necessary, carry out a sabotage explosion.

When controlling signals, secrecy is achieved by classifying the signal. This is what cryptography does. Intelligence efforts here are focused not on elements, but on the control infrastructure: operating systems, communication protocols, codes, ciphers, the decryption of which reveals the secret. Protection against impacts on the signal control structure is achieved by high information technology plus redundancy of signal transmission channels. And disinformation with duplication of false data - to create the effect of their confirmation - in different sources.

When controlled without signals - through a change in the environment ( external conditions environment) - a person can fall into an induced whirlwind of passion (egregor of the collective unconscious), when the mind (logic) turns off and only the “heart” (feelings) remains. No signals - no clear reflexes. Reflexes are dull. Instincts are inhibited. For without signals there is no relationship between one thing and another, no gear ratio, no ratio. That is, there is no actual information. Management is non-rational and non-informational. And a vortex (mental epidemic) can either be resonantly accelerated by a traveling wave (panic) or blocked standing waves(stupor). In such a situation, intelligence must work primarily on the elements of the control system - meaning, rely on high cognitive technologies for modeling the processes of people's consciousness.

Future there is a question of time, on the understanding of which the concept of the “war of meanings” and the image of victory over a competitor depend. In the pre-industrial period, time was threefold. The ancient Greeks had separate names for the three aspects of a single time: chronos, cyclos, kairos.

Chronos- This is a modern chronology. This is a measured step forward and upward from the starting point. This is the now generally accepted linear Gregorian calendar in the world from 1582. This is Newtonian (since the 17th century) duration in science. This is a loan and loan interest in economics. This is arrow-shaped progress and modernity of industrial society.

Cyclos– these are sunrises and sunsets, ebbs and flows. This is development in rounds of change. This is the indiction of the Roman calends, also known as the Russian system for recording the circles of the Sun and Moon - “vrutseleto”. These are Chinese cyclic signs devoid of the idea of ​​magnitude of number ( jia. and, bean, ding...) and Chinese cyclic calendar ( sat down). This is the order of events one after another, regardless of the duration of each of them. In finance, this is profit through margin from the exchange of three currencies. This is what is called a transaction (work done successfully and to the end) - a concept that appeared during the transition of humanity through the post-industrial barrier.

Kairos– this is the moment of arrival on Earth of a quantum (the next portion) of a flow of radiant energy that has a cosmic basis. This is a phase, an instant of the start of a new state in the development of life circumstances. This is a sharp deviation of the curve of a periodic process in relation to the axis of equilibrium (progress). This is a successful capitalization of expectations from everything that is called goodwill in finance. This is the lucky chance of winning the Great Game with many unknowns.

The trinity of time is held by music. The trinity is irrational, so there is no philosophy of music.

Time in all three aspects allows us to see history not as a linear progress from the creation of the world to the end of the world, but as a sum of waves of different periods. Where is the progress of “this world”? special case an ascending wave of a very long period, on which waves of other periods are superimposed.

Therefore, the role and place of intelligence in capturing the future is as follows:

■ get ahead of competitors in chronos– reach the milestones of intentions and operational plans faster than others;

■ ride the wave of cyclos– ensure that your own efforts are in sync with the wave of change. Achieve synergy between different processes. Reduce the number of transactions on the way to the intended result. To be ahead of competitors not in the speed (duration) of reactions to signals (calls), but in the order of the route - the choice of route and the number of transfers - to the destination;

■ catch kairos– relying on prophets, seers and masters of scientific forecasting, identify waves of historical development and promptly set a trap for antiphase to periodic processes. Strengthen your own capabilities with a flow of energy “not of this world.”