The consumption of ammunition in the Second World War and the balance between the number of barrels and the consumption of shells. Volley fire systems in WWII Grenades of the former German army and its allies

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The female name Katyusha entered the history of Russia and even into world history as the name of one of the most scary sights weapons of World War II.
At the same time, none of the weapons was surrounded by such a veil of secrecy and disinformation ...

PAGES OF HISTORY

No matter how much our fathers-commanders did not secret the Katyusha materiel, it was already a few weeks after the first combat use fell into the hands of the Germans and ceased to be a secret. But the history of the creation of "Katyusha" for many years was kept "with seven seals" both because of the ideological attitudes and because of the ambitions of the designers.

The first question is why rocket artillery was used only in 1941? After all, powder rockets were used by the Chinese a thousand years ago. In the first half of the 19th century, rockets were widely used in European armies (rockets by V. Kongrev, A. Zasyadko, K. Konstantinov and others).

Rocket launchers of the early 19th century. V. Kongrev (a) and I. Kosinsky (b)

Alas, the combat use of missiles was limited by their huge dispersion. At first, long poles made of wood or iron - “tails” were used to stabilize them. But such missiles were effective only for hitting area targets. So, for example, in 1854, the Anglo-French from rowing barges fired rockets at Odessa, and the Russians in the 50-70s of the XIX century - the Central Asian cities.

But with the introduction of rifled guns, powder rockets become an anachronism, and between 1860-1880 they are removed from service with all European armies (in Austria - in 1866, in England - in 1885, in Russia - in 1879). In 1914, only signal rockets remained in the armies and navies of all countries. Nevertheless, Russian inventors constantly turned to the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) with projects for combat missiles. So, in September 1905, the Artillery Committee rejected the high-explosive rocket project. The warhead of this rocket was stuffed with pyroxylin, and not black, but smokeless powder was used as fuel. Moreover, the good fellows from the GAU did not even try to work interesting project, and swept it off the threshold. It is curious that the designer was ... Hieromonk Kirik.

It was not until the First World War that interest in rockets revived. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, slow-burning gunpowder was created, which made it possible to dramatically increase the flight speed and firing range. Accordingly, with an increase in flight speed, it became possible to effectively use wing stabilizers and improve the accuracy of fire.

The second reason: the need to create powerful weapons for airplanes of the First World War - "flying whatnots".

And finally the most main reason- the rocket was best suited as a delivery vehicle chemical weapons.


CHEMICAL PROJECT

As early as June 15, 1936, the head of the chemical department of the Red Army, corps engineer Y. Fishman, was presented with a report from the director of the RNII, military engineer 1st rank I. Kleimenov and the head of the 1st department, military engineer 2nd rank K. Glukharev on preliminary tests of 132 / 82-mm short-range rocket-chemical mines . This munition supplemented the 250/132 mm short-range chemical mine, the tests of which were completed by May 1936.

Rocket M-13.
The M-13 projectile consists of a head and a body. The head has a shell and a combat charge. A fuse is fixed in front of the head. The hull provides the flight of a rocket projectile and consists of a skin, a combustion chamber, a nozzle and stabilizers. In front of the combustion chamber there are two electro-powder igniters. On the outer surface of the shell of the combustion chamber there are two guide pins screwed on the thread, which serve to hold the rocket projectile in the guide mounts. 1 - fuse retaining ring, 2 - GVMZ fuse, 3 - detonator block, 4 - bursting charge, 5 - warhead, 6 - igniter, 7 - chamber bottom, 8 - guide pin, 9 - powder rocket charge, 10 - rocket part, 11 - grate, 12 - nozzle critical section, 13 - nozzle, 14 - stabilizer, 15 - remote fuse check, 16 - AGDT remote fuse, 17 - igniter.

Thus, “RNII has completed all the preliminary development of the issue of creating a powerful short-range chemical attack weapon, and is awaiting from you a general conclusion on testing and an indication of the need for further work in this direction. For its part, the RNII considers it necessary now to issue an experimental-gross order for the manufacture of RHM-250 (300 pieces) and RHM-132 (300 pieces) in order to conduct field and military tests. The five pieces of RHM-250 remaining from the preliminary tests, of which three at the Central Chemical Test Site (Prichernavskaya station) and three RHM-132 can be used for additional tests according to your instructions.

Experimental installation M-8 on a tank

According to the report of the RNII on the main activity for 1936 on topic No. 1, samples of 132-mm and 250-mm chemical rockets with a warhead capacity of 6 and 30 liters of OM were manufactured and tested. Tests carried out in the presence of the head of the VOKHIMU of the Red Army gave satisfactory results and received a positive assessment. But VOKHIMA did nothing to introduce these shells into the Red Army and gave the RNII new tasks for shells with a longer range.

For the first time, the Katyusha prototype (BM-13) was mentioned on January 3, 1939, in a letter from People's Commissar of the Defense Industry Mikhail Kaganovich to his brother, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lazar Kaganovich: basically passed factory tests by shooting at the Sofrinsky control and test artillery range and is currently undergoing field tests at the Central Military Chemical Range in Prichernavskaya.

Experimental installation M-13 on a trailer

Note that the customers of the future Katyusha are military chemists. The work was also financed through the Chemical Department and, finally, the warheads of the missiles are exclusively chemical.

132-mm RHS-132 chemical projectiles were fire tested at the Pavlograd artillery range on August 1, 1938. The fire was fired by single shells and series of 6 and 12 shells. The duration of firing a series of full ammunition did not exceed 4 seconds. During this time, the target area reached 156 liters of RH, which, in terms of an artillery caliber of 152 mm, was equivalent to 63 artillery shells when firing in a salvo of 21 three-gun batteries or 1.3 artillery regiments, provided that the fire was fired with unstable RH. The tests focused on the fact that the metal consumption per 156 liters of RH when firing rocket projectiles was 550 kg, while when firing chemical 152-mm projectiles, the weight of the metal was 2370 kg, that is, 4.3 times more.

The test report stated: “The automotive mechanized rocket launcher for chemical attack during the test showed significant advantages over artillery systems. A system capable of firing both single fire and a series of 24 shots within 3 seconds is installed on a three-ton machine. The speed of movement is normal for a truck. Transfer from marching to combat position takes 3-4 minutes. Firing - from the driver's cab or from cover.

The first experimental installation M-13 on a car chassis

The warhead of one RHS (reactive-chemical projectile. - “NVO”) holds 8 liters of OM, and in artillery shells of a similar caliber - only 2 liters. To create a dead zone on an area of ​​12 hectares, one volley from three trucks is enough, which replaces 150 howitzers or 3 artillery regiments. At a distance of 6 km, the area of ​​​​contamination of OM with one volley is 6-8 hectares.

I note that the Germans also prepared their multiple rocket launchers exclusively for chemical warfare. So, in the late 1930s, the German engineer Nebel designed a 15-cm rocket projectile and a six-barreled tubular installation, which the Germans called a six-barreled mortar. Mortar tests began in 1937. The system received the name "15-cm smoke mortar type" D ". In 1941, it was renamed 15 cm Nb.W 41 (Nebelwerfer), i.e. 15 cm smoke mortar mod. 41. Naturally, their main purpose was not to set up smoke screens, but to fire rockets filled with poisonous substances. It's interesting that soviet soldiers called 15 cm Nb.W 41 "Vanyush", by analogy with the M-13, called "Katyusha".

Nb.W 41

The first launch of the Katyusha prototype (designed by Tikhomirov and Artemyev) took place in the USSR on March 3, 1928. The range of the 22.7-kg rocket was 1300 m, and the Van Deren mortar was used as a launcher.

The caliber of our rockets of the period of the Great Patriotic War - 82 mm and 132 mm - was determined by nothing more than the diameter of the powder cartridges of the engine. Seven 24-mm powder cartridges, tightly packed into the combustion chamber, give a diameter of 72 mm, the thickness of the chamber walls is 5 mm, hence the diameter (caliber) of the rocket is 82 mm. Seven thicker (40 mm) checkers in the same way give a caliber of 132 mm.

The most important issue in the design of rockets was the method of stabilization. Soviet designers preferred feathered rockets and adhered to this principle until the end of the war.

In the 1930s, rockets with an annular stabilizer that did not exceed the dimensions of the projectile were tested. Such shells could be fired from tubular guides. But tests have shown that it is impossible to achieve stable flight with the help of an annular stabilizer.

Then they fired 82-mm rockets with a four-bladed tail span of 200, 180, 160, 140 and 120 mm. The results were quite definite - with a decrease in the scope of the plumage, flight stability and accuracy decreased. The plumage with a span of more than 200 mm shifted the center of gravity of the projectile back, which also worsened the stability of the flight. Lightening the plumage by reducing the thickness of the stabilizer blades caused strong vibrations of the blades until they were destroyed.

Grooved guides were adopted as launchers for feathered missiles. Experiments have shown that the longer they are, the higher the accuracy of the shells. The length of 5 m for the RS-132 became the maximum due to restrictions on railway dimensions.

I note that the Germans stabilized their rockets until 1942 exclusively by rotation. Turbojet rockets were also tested in the USSR, but they did not go into mass production. As it often happens with us, the reason for the failures during the tests was explained not by the wretchedness of the execution, but by the irrationality of the concept.

FIRST volleys

Whether we like it or not, for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the Germans used multiple launch rocket systems on June 22, 1941 near Brest. “And then the arrows showed 03.15, the command “Fire!” sounded, and the devilish dance began. The earth shook. The nine batteries of the 4th Special Purpose Mortar Regiment also contributed to the infernal symphony. In half an hour, 2880 shells whistled over the Bug and hit the city and fortress on the eastern bank of the river. Heavy 600-mm mortars and 210-mm guns of the 98th Artillery Regiment rained down their volleys on the fortifications of the citadel and hit point targets - the positions of Soviet artillery. It seemed that there would be no stone left unturned from the fortress.”

This is how the historian Paul Karel described the first use of 15 cm rocket-propelled mortars. In addition, the Germans in 1941 used heavy 28 cm high-explosive and 32 cm incendiary turbojet shells. The shells were over-caliber and had one powder engine (the diameter of the engine part was 140 mm).

A 28-cm high-explosive mine, with a direct hit on a stone house, completely destroyed it. The mine successfully destroyed field-type shelters. Living targets within a radius of several tens of meters were hit by a blast wave. Fragments of the mine flew at a distance of up to 800 m. The head part contained 50 kg of liquid TNT or ammatol brand 40/60. It is curious that both 28-cm and 32-cm German mines (rockets) were transported and launched from the simplest wooden closure such as a box.

The first use of Katyushas took place on July 14, 1941. The battery of Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov fired two salvos from seven launchers at the Orsha railway station. The appearance of "Katyusha" was a complete surprise for the leadership of the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht. General Command ground forces On August 14, Germany notified its troops: “The Russians have an automatic multi-barreled flamethrower cannon ... The shot is fired by electricity. During the shot, smoke is generated ... When capturing such guns, report immediately. Two weeks later, a directive appeared entitled "Russian gun throwing rocket-like projectiles." It said: “... Troops report on the use by the Russians of a new type of weapon that fires rockets. A large number of shots can be fired from one installation within 3-5 seconds ... Each appearance of these guns must be reported to the general, commander of the chemical troops at the high command, on the same day.

Where the name "Katyusha" came from is not known for certain. The version of Pyotr Hook is curious: “Both at the front, and then, after the war, when I got acquainted with the archives, talked with veterans, read their speeches in the press, I met a variety of explanations of how a formidable weapon received a girl's name. Some believed that the beginning was laid by the letter "K", which was put by the Voronezh Comintern on their products. There was a legend among the troops that the guards mortars were named after a dashing partisan girl who destroyed many Nazis.

When soldiers and commanders asked the representative of the GAU to name the “genuine” name of the combat installation at the firing range, he advised: “Call the installation as an ordinary artillery piece. It's important to maintain secrecy."

Soon, Katyusha showed up younger brother named "Luca". In May 1942, a group of officers of the Main Armaments Directorate developed the M-30 projectile, in which a powerful over-caliber warhead made in the shape of an ellipsoid with a maximum diameter of 300 mm was attached to the rocket engine from the M-13.

Installation M-30 "Luka"

After successful ground tests, on June 8, 1942, the State Defense Committee (GKO) issued a decree on the adoption of the M-30 and the start of its mass production. In Stalin's times, all important problems were solved quickly, and by July 10, 1942, the first 20 M-30 Guards mortar divisions were created. Each of them had a three-battery composition, the battery consisted of 32 four-charge single-tier launchers. The divisional salvo, respectively, was 384 shells.

The first combat use of the M-30 took place in the 61st Army of the Western Front near the city of Belev. On the afternoon of June 5, two regimental volleys hit the German positions in Annino and Upper Doltsy with a thunderous roar. Both villages were wiped off the face of the earth, after which the infantry occupied them without loss.

The power of the Luka shells (M-30 and its modifications M-31) made a great impression both on the enemy and on our soldiers. There were many different assumptions and inventions about the Luka at the front. One of the legends was that it was as if the warhead of the rocket was stuffed with some kind of special, especially powerful, explosive, capable of burning everything in the area of ​​​​the gap. In fact, conventional explosives were used in the warheads. The exceptional effect of the Luka shells was achieved through volley fire. With the simultaneous or almost simultaneous explosion of a whole group of projectiles, the law of addition of impulses from shock waves came into force.

Installation of the M-30 "Luka" on the Studebaker chassis

M-30 shells had high-explosive, chemical and incendiary warheads. However, a high-explosive warhead was mainly used. For the characteristic shape of the head of the M-30, the front-line soldiers called it "Luka Mudischev" (the hero of Barkov's poem of the same name). Naturally, this nickname, in contrast to the replicated "Katyusha", the official press preferred not to mention. The Luka, like the German 28 cm and 30 cm shells, was launched from a wooden corking box in which it was delivered from the factory. Four, and later eight of these boxes were placed on a special frame, resulting in a simple launcher.

Needless to say, after the war, the journalistic and writer fraternity commemorated Katyusha out of place and out of place, but chose to forget her much more formidable brother Luka. In the 1970s and 1980s, at the first mention of Luka, veterans asked me with surprise: “How do you know? You didn't fight."

ANTI-TANK MYTH

"Katyusha" was a first-class weapon. As often happens, the father commanders wished it to become a universal weapon, including an anti-tank weapon.

An order is an order, and victorious reports rushed to the headquarters. If you believe the secret publication "Field Rocket Artillery in the Great Patriotic War" (Moscow, 1955), then on the Kursk Bulge in two days in three episodes "Katyushas" destroyed 95 enemy tanks! If this were true, then the anti-tank artillery should have been disbanded and replaced with multiple rocket launchers.

In some ways, the huge numbers of wrecked tanks were influenced by the fact that for each wrecked tank, the crew of the combat vehicle received 2,000 rubles, of which 500 rubles. - commander, 500 rubles. - to the gunner, the rest - to the rest.

Alas, due to the huge dispersion, shooting at tanks is ineffective. Here I am picking up the most boring brochure "Tables of firing rockets M-13" of the 1942 edition. It follows from it that at a firing range of 3000 m, the range deviation was 257 m, and the side deviation was 51 m. For shorter distances, the range deviation was not given at all, since the dispersion of shells could not be calculated. It is not difficult to imagine the probability of a rocket hitting a tank at such a distance. If, theoretically, we imagine that the combat vehicle somehow managed to shoot at the tank at close range, then even here the muzzle velocity of the 132-mm projectile was only 70 m / s, which is clearly not enough to penetrate the armor of the Tiger or Panther.

It is not without reason that the year of publication of the shooting tables is specified here. According to the tables of firing TS-13 of the same M-13 rocket, the average deviation in range in 1944 is 105 m, and in 1957 - 135 m, and the side deviation, respectively, 200 and 300 m. Obviously, the tables of 1957 are more correct, in which the dispersion increased by almost 1.5 times, so that in the tables of 1944 there are errors in the calculations or, most likely, deliberate falsification to raise the morale of the personnel.

There is no doubt that if an M-13 projectile hits a medium or light tank, it will be disabled. The frontal armor of the "Tiger" is not able to penetrate the M-13 projectile. But in order to be guaranteed to hit a single tank from a distance of the same 3 thousand meters, it is necessary to fire from 300 to 900 M-13 shells due to their huge dispersion, while at shorter distances an even larger number of missiles will be required.

And here is another example, told by veteran Dmitry Loza. During the Uman-Botoshansk offensive on March 15, 1944, two Shermans from the 45th mechanized brigade of the 5th mechanized corps got stuck in the mud. The troops jumped off the tanks and retreated. German soldiers surrounded the stuck tanks, “smeared the viewing slots with mud, covered up the aiming holes in the turret with black soil, completely blinding the crew. They knocked on hatches, tried to open them with rifle bayonets. And everyone bawled: “Rus, kaput! Give up! But then two combat vehicles BM-13 left. "Katyusha" front wheels quickly descended into the ditch and fired a volley of direct fire. Bright fiery arrows hissed and whistled into the hollow. A moment later, blinding flames danced around. When the smoke from the rocket explosions dissipated, the tanks stood unharmed at first glance, only the hulls and turrets were covered with thick soot ...

Having corrected the damage to the tracks, having thrown out the burnt tarpaulins, the Emcha went to Mogilev-Podolsky. So, thirty-two 132-mm M-13 shells were fired at two Shermans point-blank, and they ... only burned the tarpaulin.

WAR STATISTICS

The first M-13 firing mounts had the BM-13-16 index and were mounted on the chassis of a ZIS-6 vehicle. The 82 mm BM-8-36 launcher was also mounted on the same chassis. There were only a few hundred ZIS-6 vehicles, and at the beginning of 1942 their production was stopped.

The launchers of the M-8 and M-13 missiles in 1941-1942 were mounted on anything. So, six M-8 guide shells were installed on machines from the Maxim machine gun, 12 M-8 guides - on a motorcycle, sled and snowmobile (M-8 and M-13), T-40 and T-60 tanks, armored railway platforms (BM-8-48, BM-8-72, BM-13-16), river and sea boats, etc. But basically, launchers in 1942-1944 were mounted on cars received under Lend-Lease: Austin, Dodge, Ford Marmont, Bedford, etc.

During the 5 years of the war, out of 3374 chassis used for combat vehicles, the ZIS-6 accounted for 372 (11%), the Studebaker - 1845 (54.7%), the remaining 17 types of chassis (except for the "Willis" with mountain launchers) - 1157 (34.3%). Finally, it was decided to standardize combat vehicles based on the Studebaker car. In April 1943, such a system was put into service under the symbol BM-13N (normalized). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for the M-13 was adopted on the BM-31-12 Studebaker chassis.

But in the post-war years, the Studebakers were ordered to be forgotten, although combat vehicles on its chassis were in service until the early 1960s. In secret instructions, the Studebaker was referred to as a "cross-country vehicle." On numerous pedestals, "Katyusha" mutants ascended on the ZIS-5 chassis or post-war types of vehicles, which stubbornly pass off as genuine military relics, but the genuine BM-13-16 on the ZIS-6 chassis was preserved only in the Artillery Museum in St. Petersburg.

As already mentioned, back in 1941 the Germans captured several launchers and hundreds of 132-mm M-13 and 82-mm M-8 shells. The Wehrmacht command believed that their turbojet shells and tubular launchers with revolver-type guides were better than Soviet wing-stabilized shells. But the SS took up the M-8 and M-13 and ordered the Skoda company to copy them.

In 1942, on the basis of the 82-mm Soviet M-8 projectile, 8 cm R.Sprgr rockets were created in Zbroevka. In fact, it was a new projectile, and not a copy of the M-8, although outwardly the German projectile was very similar to the M-8.

Unlike the Soviet projectile, the stabilizer feathers were placed obliquely at an angle of 1.5 degrees to the longitudinal axis. Due to this, the projectile rotated in flight. The rotation speed was many times less than that of a turbojet projectile, and did not play any role in projectile stabilization, but it eliminated the thrust eccentricity of a single-nozzle rocket engine. But the eccentricity, that is, the displacement of the engine thrust vector due to the uneven burning of gunpowder in checkers, was the main reason for the low accuracy of Soviet missiles of the M-8 and M-13 types.

German installation for firing prototypes of Soviet missiles

On the basis of the Soviet M-13, the Skoda company created a whole range of 15-cm missiles with oblique wings for the SS and Luftwaffe, but they were produced in small batches. Our troops captured several samples of German 8-cm shells, and our designers based on them made own samples. Missiles M-13 and M-31 with oblique plumage were adopted by the Red Army in 1944, they were assigned special ballistic indices - TS-46 and TS-47.

R.Sprgr projectile

The apotheosis of the combat use of the Katyusha and Luka was the assault on Berlin. In total, more than 44 thousand guns and mortars, as well as 1,785 M-30 and M-31 launchers, 1,620 rocket artillery combat vehicles (219 divisions) were involved in the Berlin operation. In the battles for Berlin, rocket artillery units used the rich experience they had gained in the battles for Poznan, which consisted in direct fire with single projectiles M-31, M-20 and even M-13.

At first glance, this method of firing may seem primitive, but its results turned out to be very significant. Shooting single rockets during the fighting in such a huge city as Berlin has found the widest application.

To conduct such fire in the guards mortar units, assault groups of approximately the following composition were created: an officer - group commander, an electrical engineer, 25 sergeants and soldiers for the M-31 assault group and 8–10 for the M-13 assault group.

The intensity of the battles and the fire missions performed by rocket artillery in the battles for Berlin can be judged by the number of rockets used up in these battles. In the offensive zone of the 3rd shock army, the following were used up: M-13 shells - 6270; shells M-31 - 3674; shells M-20 - 600; shells M-8 - 1878.

Of this amount, rocket artillery assault groups used up: M-8 shells - 1638; shells M-13 - 3353; shells M-20 - 191; shells M-31 - 479.

These groups in Berlin destroyed 120 buildings that were strong centers of enemy resistance, destroyed three 75-mm guns, suppressed dozens of firing points, and killed over 1,000 enemy soldiers and officers.

So, our glorious "Katyusha" and her unfairly offended brother "Luka" became a weapon of victory in the full sense of the word!

The information used in the writing of this material is, in principle, generally known. But maybe at least someone will learn something new for themselves

Here is a small illustration:

Suppose I read in a 12-volume book (which usually exaggerates the strength of the Germans and satellites opposing us) that by the beginning of 1944 on the Soviet-German front, the ratio of forces in artillery pieces and mortars was 1.7: 1 (95,604 Soviet against 54,570 enemy). More than one and a half overall superiority. That is, in active sectors it could be brought up to three times (for example, in the Belarusian operation, 29,000 Soviet against 10,000 enemy) Does this mean that the enemy could not raise his head under the hurricane fire of Soviet artillery? No, an artillery piece is just a tool for firing shells. There are no shells - and the gun is a useless toy. And providing shells is just the task of logistics.

In 2009, at VIF, Isaev posted a comparison of the ammunition consumption of Soviet and German artillery (1942: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1718/1718985.htm, 1943: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/ forum/0/archive/1706/1706490.htm, 1944: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1733/1733134.htm, 1945: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/ 0/archive/1733/1733171.htm). I collected everything in a table, supplemented it with rocket artillery, for the Germans I added from Hann the consumption of captured calibers (often it gives a negligible addition) and the consumption of tank calibers for comparability - in Soviet figures tank calibers (20 mm ShVAK and 85 mm non-anti-aircraft) are present. Posted. Well, grouped a little differently. It turns out to be pretty interesting. Despite the superiority of Soviet artillery in the number of barrels, the Germans shot more shells in pieces, if we take artillery calibers (i.e. guns 75 mm and above, without anti-aircraft guns) the Germans have more:
USSR Germany 1942 37,983,800 45,261,822 1943 82,125,480 69,928,496 1944 98,564,568 113,663,900
If translated into tons, then the superiority is even more noticeable:
USSR Germany 1942 446.113 709.957 1943 828.193 1.121.545 1944 1.000.962 1.540.933
Tons here are taken by the weight of the projectile, not the shot. That is, the weight of metal and explosives falling directly on the head of the opposing side. I note that I did not count the armor-piercing shells of tank and anti-tank guns for the Germans (I hope you understand why). It is not possible to exclude them for the Soviet side, but, judging by the Germans, the amendment will come out insignificant. In Germany, consumption is given on all fronts, which begins to play a role in 1944.

In the Soviet army, on average, 3.6-3.8 shells were fired per day on the barrel of a gun from 76.2 mm and above in the active army (without RGK). The figure is quite stable both in years and in calibers: in 1944, the average daily shot for all calibers was 3.6 per barrel, for a 122-mm howitzer - 3.0, for 76.2 mm barrels (regimental, divisional, tank) - 3.7. The average daily shot per mortar barrel, on the contrary, is growing year by year: from 2.0 in 1942 to 4.1 in 1944.

As for the Germans, I do not have the presence of guns in the army. But if we take the total availability of guns, then the average daily shot per barrel of 75-mm and higher caliber in 1944 will be about 8.5. At the same time, the main workhorse of divisional artillery (105-mm howitzers - almost a third of the total tonnage of shells) fired an average of 14.5 shells per barrel per day, and the second main caliber (150-mm divisional howitzers - 20% of the total tonnage) about 10, 7. Mortars were used much less intensively - 81-mm mortars fired 4.4 rounds per barrel per day, and 120-mm only 2.3. Regimental artillery guns gave a consumption closer to the average (75-mm infantry gun 7 rounds per barrel, 150-mm infantry gun - 8.3).

Another instructive metric is the expenditure of shells per division.

The division was the main organizational building block, but typically the divisions were reinforced by units. It is interesting to see what supported the middle division in terms of firepower. In 1942-44, the USSR had in the active army (without the RGC) about 500 calculated divisions (weighted average: 1942 - 425 divisions, 1943 - 494 divisions, 1944 - 510 divisions). IN ground forces ah the active army was about 5.5 million, that is, the division accounted for about 11 thousand people. This "had to" naturally, taking into account both the actual composition of the division, and all the reinforcement and support units that worked for it both directly and in the rear.

Among the Germans, the average number of troops per division of the Eastern Front, calculated in the same way, decreased from 16,000 in 1943 to 13,800 in 1944, approximately 1.45-1.25 times "thicker" than the Soviet one. At the same time, the average daily shot on the Soviet division in 1944 was about 5.4 tons (1942 - 2.9; 1943 - 4.6), and on the German - three times more (16.2 tons). If we calculate for 10,000 people of the active army, then from the Soviet side to support their actions in 1944 5 tons of ammunition were spent per day, and from the German 13.8 tons.

The American division in the European theater in this sense stands out even more. It had three times as many people as the Soviet one: 34,000 (this is without Supply Command troops), and the daily ammunition consumption was almost ten times more (52.3 tons). Or 15.4 tons per day per 10,000 people, that is, more than three times more than in the Red Army.

In this sense, it was the Americans who implemented the recommendation of Joseph Vissarionovich "to fight with little blood but with a lot of shells." It can be compared - in June 1944 the distance to the Elbe was approximately the same from Omaha Beach and from Vitebsk. The Russians and the Americans also reached the Elbe at about the same time. That is, they ensured the same speed of advancement for themselves. However, the Americans on this route used up 15 tons per day per 10,000 personnel and lost an average of 3.8% of troops per month in killed, wounded, captured and missing. Soviet troops advancing at the same speed spent (specifically) three times less shells, but they also lost 8.5% per month. Those. speed was provided by the expenditure of manpower.

It is also interesting to see the distribution of the weight consumption of ammunition by types of guns:

I remind you that all the numbers here are for artillery of 75 mm and above, that is, without anti-aircraft guns, without 50 mm mortars, without battalion / anti-tank guns with a caliber of 28 to 57 mm. Infantry guns include German guns with this name, Soviet 76-mm regiments and American 75-mm howitzer. The remaining guns weighing less than 8 tons in combat position are counted as field guns. Systems such as the Soviet 152 mm ML-20 howitzer gun and the German s.FH 18 fall here at the upper limit. Heavier guns such as the Soviet 203 mm B-4 howitzer, the American 203 mm M1 howitzer or the German mm mortar, as well as 152-155-170-mm long-range guns on their carriages fall into the next class - heavy and long-range artillery.

It can be seen that in the Red Army the lion's share of fire falls on mortars and regimental guns, i.e. to fire on the near tactical zone. Heavy artillery plays at all minor role(more in 1945, but not by much). In field artillery, forces (by weight of projectiles fired) are roughly evenly distributed between the 76mm cannon, 122mm howitzer, and 152mm howitzer/howitzer cannon. Which leads to average weight the Soviet projectile is one and a half times smaller than the German one.

In addition, it should be noted that the farther the target, the (on average) it is less covered. In the near tactical zone, most of the targets are somehow dug / covered, while in the depths there are such uncovered targets as advancing reserves, enemy troops in clusters, headquarters, etc. In other words, a projectile that hits the target in depth on average does more damage than a projectile fired at the leading edge (on the other hand, the scattering of projectiles at long distances is higher).

Then, if the enemy has parity in the weight of fired shells of shells, but at the same time keeps half as many people at the front, thereby he gives half as many targets to our artillery.

All this works for the observed loss ratio.

(As an extended commentary on

Universal shooting system of low ballistics for close combat of infantry units of the Red Army

The available information about the ampoule guns of the Red Army is extremely scarce and is mainly based on a couple of paragraphs from the memoirs of one of the defenders of Leningrad, a description of the design in the manual for the use of ampoule guns, as well as some conclusions and common conjectures of modern searchers-diggers. Meanwhile, in the museum of the capital's plant "Iskra" named after I.I. Kartukov for a long time lay like a dead weight in the amazing quality of the range of shooting front-line years. Text documents to it, obviously, are buried in the depths of the archive of the economy (or scientific and technical documentation) and are still waiting for their researchers. So when working on the publication, I had to generalize only known data and analyze references and images.
The existing concept of "ampulomet" in relation to the combat system developed in the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War does not reveal all the possibilities and tactical advantages of this weapon. Moreover, all available information refers only, so to speak, to the late period of serial ampoule guns. In fact, this "pipe on the machine" was capable of throwing not only ampoules from a tin or bottle glass, but also more serious ammunition. And the creators of this simple and unpretentious weapon, the production of which was possible almost “on the knee”, no doubt deserve much more respect.

The simplest mortar

In the flamethrower system of weapons of the ground forces of the Red Army, the ampoule occupied an intermediate position between knapsack or easel flamethrowers, firing at short distances with a jet of liquid fire mixture, and field artillery (barreled and reactive), which occasionally used incendiary projectiles with solid incendiary mixtures such as military thermite at full range brand 6. As conceived by the developers (and not the requirements of the customer), the ampoule gun was mainly (as in the document) intended to fight tanks, armored trains, armored vehicles and fortified enemy firing points by firing at them with any ammunition of a suitable caliber.

Experienced 125-mm ampoule during factory testing in 1940

The opinion that the ampoule gun is a purely Leningrad invention is obviously based on the fact that this type of weapon was also produced in besieged Leningrad, and one of its samples is on display at the State Memorial Museum of the Defense and Siege of Leningrad. However, ampoules (as, indeed, infantry flamethrowers) were developed in the pre-war years in Moscow in the experimental design department of plant No. 145 named after SM. Kirov (chief designer of the plant - I.I. Kartukov), which is under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry of the USSR. The names of the designers of ampoule guns, unfortunately, are unknown to me.

It is documented that the 125-mm ampoule gun with ammunition from ampoules passed field and military tests in 1941 and was adopted by the Red Army. The description of the design of the ampoule gun, given on the Internet, is borrowed from the manual and only in general terms corresponds to pre-war prototypes: “The ampoule gun consists of a barrel with a chamber, a bolt, a firing device, sights and a carriage with a fork.” In the version supplemented by us, the barrel of a serial ampoule launcher was a seamless steel pipe made of Mannesmann rolled products with an inner diameter of 127 mm, or rolled from 2 mm sheet iron, muffled in the breech. The barrel of a regular ampoule gun was freely supported by trunnions on the lugs in the fork of a wheeled (summer) or ski (winter) machine. There were no horizontal or vertical aiming mechanisms.

In an experienced 125-mm ampoule gun, a blank cartridge from a 12-gauge hunting rifle with a folder sleeve and a 15-gram weight of black powder was locked with a rifle-type bolt in the chamber. The firing mechanism was released by pressing the thumb of the left hand on the trigger lever (forward or down, there were different options), located near the handles similar to those used on heavy machine guns and welded to the breech of the ampoule.

In a serial ampoule gun, the firing mechanism was simplified due to the manufacture of many parts by stamping, and the trigger lever was moved under the thumb right hand. Moreover, in mass production, the handles were replaced with steel pipes bent like ram's horns, structurally combining them with a piston valve. That is, now for loading the shutter was turned with both handles all the way to the left and, relying on the tray, they pulled it towards themselves. The entire breech with handles along the slots in the tray moved to the rearmost position, completely removing the spent cartridge case of the 12-gauge cartridge.

The sights of the ampoule gun consisted of a front sight and a folding sight stand. The latter was designed to fire at four fixed distances (obviously from 50 to 100 m), indicated by holes. And the vertical slot between them made it possible to shoot at intermediate ranges.
The photographs show that on the experimental version of the ampoule gun, a roughly made wheeled machine welded from steel pipes and an angle profile was used. It would be more correct to consider it a laboratory stand. At the ampoule machine proposed for service, all parts were more carefully finished and supplied with all the attributes necessary for operation in the troops: handles, coulters, slats, brackets, etc. However, the wheels (rollers) on both experimental and serial samples were provided with monolithic wooden , upholstered with a metal strip along the generatrix and with a metal sleeve as a plain bearing in the axial hole.

In the St. Petersburg, Volgograd and Arkhangelsk museums there are later versions of the factory-made ampoule gun on a simplified, lightweight, wheelless, non-folding machine with a support of two pipes, or without a machine at all. Tripods made of steel rods, wooden decks or oak crosses as carriages for ampoule guns were adapted already in war time.

The manual mentions that the ammunition carried by the calculation of the ampoule gun was 10 ampoules and 12 expelling cartridges. On the machine of the pre-production version of the ampoule, the developers proposed to install two easily removable tin boxes with a capacity of eight ampoules each in the transport position. One of the fighters apparently carried two dozen rounds of ammunition in a standard hunting bandolier. In a combat position, boxes of ammunition were quickly removed and placed in a shelter.

On the barrel of the pre-production version of the ampoule gun, two welded swivels were provided for carrying it on a belt over the shoulder. Serial samples were devoid of any "architectural excesses", and the barrel was carried on the shoulder. Many note the presence of a metal divider grille inside the barrel, in its breech. This was not the case for the prototype. Obviously, the grate was needed to prevent the cardboard and felt wad of a blank cartridge from hitting the glass ampoule. In addition, it limited the movement of the ampoule into the breech until it stops, since the serial 125-mm ampoule had a chamber in this place. The factory data and characteristics of the 125 mm ampoule gun are somewhat different from those given in the descriptions and instructions for use.

Incendiary ampoules

As indicated in the documents, the main ammunition for ampoule guns was aviation tin ampoules АЖ-2 of 125 mm caliber, equipped with a self-igniting variety of condensed kerosene of the KS grade. The first tin spherical ampoules entered mass production in 1936. In the late 1930s. they were also improved at the OKO of the 145th plant (in the evacuation, this is the OKB-NKAL of plant No. 455). In factory documents, they were called aviation liquid ampoules АЖ-2. But still right
it would be more correct to call the ampoules tin ampoules, since the Red Army Air Force planned to gradually replace the AK-1 glass ampoules, which had been in service since the early 1930s, with them. like chemical munitions.

There were constant complaints about glass ampoules that they were, de, fragile, and if broken ahead of time, they could poison both the aircraft crew and ground personnel with their contents. Meanwhile, mutually exclusive requirements were imposed on the glass of ampoules - strength in handling and fragility in use. The first, of course, prevailed, and some of them, with a wall thickness of 10 mm, even when bombed from a height of 1000 m (depending on the density of the soil) gave a very large percentage of not crashed. Theoretically, their thin-walled tin counterparts could solve the problem. As tests later showed, the aviators' hopes for this were also not fully justified.

This feature probably also manifested itself when firing from an ampoule, especially along flat trajectories for a short range. Note that the recommended type of targets for the 125mm ampoule launcher also consists entirely of objects with strong walls. In the 1930s. aviation tin ampoules were made by stamping two hemispheres from thin brass 0.35 mm thick. Apparently, since 1937 (with the beginning of the austerity of non-ferrous metals in the production of ammunition), their transfer to tinplate with a thickness of 0.2-0.3 mm began.

The configuration of parts for the production of tin ampoules varied greatly. In 1936, at the 145th plant, the design of Ofitserov-Kokoreva was proposed for the manufacture of AZh-2 from four spherical segments with two options for rolling the edges of parts. In 1937, even the AZH-2 consisted of a hemisphere with a filler neck and a second hemisphere of four spherical segments.

At the beginning of 1941, in connection with the expected transfer of the economy to a special period, technologies for the production of AZH-2 from black tin (thin rolled 0.5 mm pickled iron) were tested. From the middle of 1941, these technologies had to be used in full. Black tin during stamping was not as ductile as white or brass, and deep drawing of steel complicated production, therefore, with the outbreak of war, AZh-2 was allowed to be made from 3-4 parts (spherical segments or belts, as well as their various combinations with hemispheres).

Soldering the seams of black tin products in the presence of special fluxes then also turned out to be quite an expensive pleasure, and academician E.O. Paton introduced into the production of ammunition only a year later. Therefore, in 1941, the parts of the AZh-2 hulls began to be connected by rolling the edges and sinking the seam flush with the contour of the sphere. By the way, before the birth of ampoules, the filling necks of metal ampoules were soldered on the outside (for use in aviation, this was not so important), but since 1940, the necks began to be fixed inside. This made it possible to avoid the diversity of ammunition for use in aviation and ground forces.

The filling of ampoules AZH-2KS, the so-called "Russian napalm" - condensed kerosene KS - was developed in 1938 by A.P. Ionov in one of the capital's research institutes with the assistance of chemists V.V. Zemskova, L.F. Shevelkin and A.V. Yasnitskaya. In 1939 he completed the development of technology industrial production powdered thickener OP-2. How the incendiary mixture acquired the properties of instantly self-igniting in air remains unknown. I'm not sure that the trivial addition of granules of white phosphorus to a thick incendiary mixture based on petroleum products here would guarantee their self-ignition. In general, be that as it may, already in the spring of 1941, at factory and field tests, the 125-mm ampoule gun AZH-2KS worked normally without fuses and intermediate igniters.

According to the original plan, AZh-2s were designed to infect the terrain with persistent poisonous substances from aircraft, as well as to destroy manpower with persistent and unstable poisonous substances, later (when used with liquid fire mixtures) - to set fire to and smoke tanks, ships and firing points. Meanwhile, the use of military chemicals in ampoules against the enemy was not ruled out by using them from ampoules. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the incendiary purpose of the ammunition was supplemented by the smoking out of manpower from field fortifications.

In 1943, in order to guarantee the operation of the AZh-2SOV or AZH-2NOV during bombing from any height and at any carrier speed, the ampoule developers supplemented their designs with fuses made of thermosetting plastic (resistant to the acid base of toxic substances). As conceived by the developers, such modified ammunition already affected manpower as fragmentation-chemical ones.

Ampoule fuses UVUD (universal percussion fuse) belonged to the category of all-round fuses, i.e. worked even when the ampoules fell sideways. Structurally, they were similar to those used on ADS aviation smoke bombs, but it was no longer possible to shoot such ampoules from ampoule guns: from overloads, a non-safety type fuse could work right in the barrel. During the war period and for incendiary ampoules, the Air Force sometimes used cases with fuses or with plugs instead.

In 1943-1944. AZH-2SOV or NOV ampoules were tested, intended for long-term storage in running order. To do this, their bodies were coated inside with bakelite resin. Thus, the resistance of the metal case to mechanical stress increased even more, and fuses were mandatory installed on such ammunition.

Today, in the places of past battles, "diggers" can already come across in a conditioned form only ampoules AK-1 or AU-125 (AK-2 or AU-260 - an extremely rare exotic) made of glass. Thin-walled tin ampoules are almost all decayed. Do not try to defuse glass ampoules if you can see that there is liquid inside. White or yellowish cloudy - this is the CS, which by no means lost its properties for self-ignition in air, even after 60 years. Transparent or translucent with yellow large crystals of sediment - this is SOV or NOV. In their glass containers combat properties can also persist for a very long time.

Ampoules in battle

On the eve of the war, units of knapsack flamethrowers (flamethrower teams) were organizationally part of rifle regiments. However, due to the difficulties of using in defense (extremely short range of flamethrowing and unmasking signs of the ROKS-2 knapsack flamethrower), they were disbanded. Instead, in November 1941, teams and companies were created, armed with ampoules and rifle mortars for throwing metal and glass ampoules and Molotov cocktails at tanks and other targets. But, according to the official version, ampoules also had significant shortcomings, and at the end of 1942 they were removed from service.
At the same time, there was no mention of the abandonment of rifle-bottle mortars. Probably, for some reason they did not have the shortcomings of ampoules. Moreover, in other divisions of the rifle regiments of the Red Army, it was proposed to throw bottles with KS at tanks exclusively by hand. The bottle-throwers of the flame-throwing teams, obviously, were revealed a terrible military secret: how to use the aiming bar of the Mosin rifle for aimed shooting with a bottle at a given distance, determined by eye. As I understand it, there was simply no time to teach the rest of the illiterate infantrymen this “tricky business”. Therefore, they themselves adapted a sleeve from a three-inch rifle to the cut of a rifle barrel and themselves "out of school hours" were trained in aimed bottle throwing.

When meeting with a solid barrier, the body of the AZh-2KS ampoule was torn, as a rule, along the solder seams, the incendiary mixture splashed out and ignited in air with the formation of a thick white-
th smoke. The combustion temperature of the mixture reached 800 ° C, which, when it got on clothes and open areas of the body, caused the enemy a lot of trouble. No less unpleasant was the meeting of the sticky CS with armored vehicles - starting from a change in the physicochemical properties of the metal during local heating to such a temperature and ending with an indispensable fire in the engine-transmission compartment of carburetor (and diesel) tanks. It was impossible to clean off the burning COP from the armor - all that was required was to stop the access of air. However, the presence of a self-igniting additive in the CS did not rule out spontaneous combustion of the mixture again.

Here are a few excerpts from the combat reports of the Great Patriotic War, published on the Internet: “We also used ampoules. From an obliquely mounted tube mounted on a sled, a shot of a blank cartridge pushed out a glass ampoule with a combustible mixture. She flew along a steep trajectory at a distance of up to 300-350 m. Breaking when falling, the ampoule created a small but stable fire, hitting the enemy’s manpower and setting fire to his dugouts. The consolidated ampoule company under the command of Senior Lieutenant Starkov, which included 17 crews, fired 1620 ampoules in the first two hours. “The ampoule-throwers moved in here. Acting under the cover of infantry, they set fire to an enemy tank, two guns and several firing points.

By the way, intensive shooting with black powder cartridges inevitably created a thick layer of soot on the barrel walls. So after a quarter of an hour of such a cannonade, the ampoule-throwers would probably find that the ampoule rolls into the barrel with more and more difficulty. Theoretically, before this, carbon deposits, on the contrary, would somewhat improve the obturation of the ampoules in the barrel, increasing their firing range. However, the usual range marks on the sight bar, for sure, “floated”. About banniks and other tools and devices for cleaning ampoule gun barrels, probably, it was mentioned in the technical description ...

And here is a completely objective opinion of our contemporaries: “The calculation of the ampoule gun was three people. The loading was carried out by two people: the first number of the calculation inserted the expelling cartridge from the treasury, the second put the ampoule itself into the barrel from the muzzle. “The ampoules were very simple and cheap“ flamethrower mortars ”, they were armed with special ampouling platoons. The combat manual of the infantry of 1942 mentions the ampoule gun as a standard infantry weapon. In combat, the ampoule gun often served as the core of a group of tank destroyers. Its use in defense as a whole justified itself, while attempts to use it in the offensive led to large losses in crews due to the short firing range. True, they were not without success used by assault groups in urban battles - in particular, in Stalingrad.

There are also memories of veterans. The essence of one of them boils down to the fact that in early December 1941, Major General D.D. Lelyushenko was delivered 20 ampoules. The designer of this weapon also came here, as well as the commander himself, who decided to personally test the new equipment. In response to the designer’s comments on loading the ampoule launcher, Lelyushenko grumbled that everything hurts cunningly and for a long time, and the German tank will not wait ... At the first shot, the ampoule broke in the ampoule launcher barrel, and the entire installation burned down. Lelyushenko, already with metal in his voice, demanded a second ampoule. Everything happened again. The general became "angry", switching to profanity, forbade the fighters to use weapons so unsafe for calculations and crushed the remaining ampoules with a tank.

Quite a likely story, although not very pleasant in the general context. As if the ampoule guns did not pass factory and field tests ... Why could this happen? As a version: the winter of 1941 (all eyewitnesses mentioned this) was very frosty, and the glass ampoule became more fragile. Here, unfortunately, the respected veteran did not specify what material those ampoules were made of. The difference in temperatures of thick-walled glass (local heating), which is fired when fired by the flame of the expelling charge, can also affect. Obviously, in severe frost it was necessary to shoot only with metal ampoules. But "in the hearts" the general could easily ride through the ampoules!

Fire cocktail frontline spill

It is only at first glance that the scheme for using the ampoule gun in the troops seems to be primitively simple. For example, the crew of an ampoule gun at a combat position fired off the wearable ammunition and dragged the second ammunition load ... What is simpler - take it and shoot. Look, Senior Lieutenant Starkov's two-hour consumption of the unit exceeded one and a half thousand ampoules! But in fact, when organizing the supply of troops with incendiary ampoules, it was necessary to solve the problem of transportation over long distances from factories from the deep rear of incendiary ammunition that is far from safe to handle.

Ampoule tests in the pre-war period showed that these munitions, when fully equipped, can withstand transportation no further than 200 km along peacetime roads in compliance with all rules and with the complete exclusion of "road adventures". In wartime, things got much more complicated. But here, no doubt, the experience of Soviet aviators came in handy, where ampoules were equipped at airfields. Prior to the mechanization of the process, the filling of ampoules, taking into account the unscrewing and wrapping of the fitting plug, required 2 man-hours per 100 pieces.

In 1938, for the Red Army Air Force at the 145th NKAP plant, a towed aircraft filling station ARS-203, made on a single-axle semi-trailer, was developed and later put into service. A year later, the self-propelled ARS-204 also entered service, but it was focused on servicing aircraft pouring devices, and we will not consider it. ARSs were mainly intended for pouring military chemicals into ammunition and isolated tanks, but they turned out to be simply indispensable for working with a ready-made self-igniting incendiary mixture.

In theory, in the rear of each rifle regiment, a small unit was supposed to work to equip ampoules with a mixture of KS. Without a doubt, it had an ARS-203 station. But KS was also not transported in barrels from factories, but cooked on the spot. To do this, any products of oil distillation (gasoline, kerosene, solarium) were used in the frontline zone, and according to the tables compiled by A.P. Ionov, added to them different quantity thickener. As a result, despite the difference in the initial components, a CS was obtained. Further, it was obviously pumped into the ARS-203 tank, where the self-ignition component of the fire mixture was added.

However, the option of adding the component directly into the ampoules, and then pouring the CS liquid into them is not excluded. In this case, ARS-203, in general, was not so necessary. And an ordinary soldier's aluminum mug could also serve as a dispenser. But such an algorithm required that the self-igniting component be inert for some time in the open air (for example, wet white phosphorus).

ARS-203 was specially designed to mechanize the process of filling ampoules АЖ-2 to the working volume in the field. On it, from a large reservoir, liquid was first poured simultaneously into eight measuring tanks, and then eight ampoules were filled at once. Thus, it was possible to fill 300-350 ampoules in an hour, and after two hours of such work, the 700-liter tank of the station was emptied, and it was again filled with CS liquid. It was impossible to speed up the process of filling the ampoules: all the overflows of liquids took place in a natural way, without pressurization of the container. The filling cycle of eight ampoules was 17-22 s, and 610 liters were pumped into the working capacity of the station using a Garda pump in 7.5-9 minutes.

Obviously, the experience of operating the ARS-203 in the ground forces turned out to be unexpected: the performance of the station, focused on the needs of the Air Force, was considered excessive, as well as its dimensions, weight and the need to be towed by a separate vehicle. The infantry needed something smaller, and in 1942, in the OKB-NKAP of the 455th plant, the Kartukovites developed a field filling station for the PRS. In its design, dipsticks were abolished, and the filling level of opaque ampoules was controlled using a Glass SIG-Extremely simplified version of the ORS nasal tube. for use in the field. Capacity of working re-
the tank was 107 liters, and the mass of the entire station did not exceed 95 kg. The PRS was designed in a "civilized" version of the workplace on a folding table and in an extremely simplified one, with the installation of a working container "on stumps". The productivity of the station was limited to 240 ampoules of AZh-2 per hour. Unfortunately, when the field tests of the PRS were completed, the ampoule guns in the Red Army had already been removed from service.

Russian reusable "faustpatron"?

However, unconditionally classify the 125-mm ampoule to incendiary weapons will not be correct. After all, no one allows himself to consider the barreled artillery system or the Katyusha MLRS as flamethrowers, which fired, if necessary, incendiary ammunition. By analogy with the use of aviation ampoules, the designers of the 145th plant proposed expanding the arsenal of ampoule ammunition by using modified Soviet anti-tank bombs PTAB-2.5 of cumulative action, created at the very beginning of World War II.

In the book by E. Pyryev and S. Reznichenko "Bomber armament of Russian aviation in 1912-1945." in the PTAB section it is said that small cumulative bombs in the USSR were developed only in GSKB-47, TsKB-22 and SKB-35. From December 1942 to April 1943, they managed to design, test and work out the full program of 1.5-kg PTAB cumulative action. However, at the 145th plant I.I. Kartukov dealt with this problem much earlier, back in 1941. Their 2.5-kg ammunition was called the AFBM-125 high-explosive armor-piercing mine of 125 mm caliber.

Outwardly, such a PTAB strongly resembled the high-explosive bombs of Colonel Gronov of small calibers during the First World War. Since the wings of the cylindrical tail were welded to the body of the aviation ammunition by spot welding, it was not possible to manage to use the mine in the infantry by simply replacing its tail. The new mortar-type plumage was installed on aerial bombs with an additional propellant charge built into it in a capsule. The ammunition was fired as before, with a blank 12-gauge rifle cartridge. Thus, in relation to the ampoule-launcher, the system was obtained in some Step-Mina fBM. 125 without additional NO active-reactive. contact fuse fuse.

For quite a long time, the designers had to work on improving the reliability of cocking the mine's contact fuse on the trajectory.

Meanwhile, the problem in the episode of 1941 mentioned above with the commander of the 30th Army, D.D. Lelyushenko could also occur when firing early models of FBM-125 high-explosive armor-piercing mines from ampoules. This is also indirectly indicated by Lelyushenko’s grumbling: “Everything hurts cunningly and for a long time, the German tank will not wait,” since inserting an ampoule and loading a cartridge into a conventional ampoule gun did not require special tricks. In the case of using the FBM-125, before firing, the safety key had to be unscrewed from the ammunition, opening the fire to the powder press of the safety mechanism holding the inertial striker of the contact fuse in the rear position. To do this, all such ammunition was supplied with a cardboard cheat sheet with the inscription "Turn out before firing", tied to a key.

The cumulative recess in the front of the mine was hemispherical, and its thin-walled steel lining rather formed a given configuration when filling explosives, rather than playing the role of a shock core during the cumulation of a combat charge of ammunition. The documents indicated that the FBM-125, when fired from regular ampoule guns, was designed to disable tanks, armored trains, armored vehicles, vehicles, as well as to destroy fortified firing points (DOTov.DZOTovipr.).

Landfill tests of the ammunition took place in 1941. Their result was the launch of the mine into pilot production. Military tests of the FBM-125 were successfully completed in 1942. The developers proposed, if necessary, to equip such mines with irritant military chemicals (chloracetophenone or adamsite), but this did not come to that. In parallel with the FBM-125, the OKB-NKAP of the 455th plant also developed the armor-piercing high-explosive mine BFM-125. Unfortunately, its combat properties are not mentioned in the factory certificates.

Cover the infantry with smoke

In 1941, it passed field tests developed at the plant No. 145 named after. CM. Kirov aviation smoke bomb ADSH. It was intended for setting up vertical camouflage (blinding the enemy) and poisonous smoke (fettering and exhausting the enemy’s combat forces) curtains when dropping bombs from an aircraft. On aircraft, the ADS were loaded into ampoule-bomb cartridges, after removing the safety forks of the fuses. Checkers spilled out in one gulp when the doors of one of the sections of the cassette were opened. Ampoule-bomb cartridges were also developed at the 145th plant for fighters, attack aircraft, long-range and short-range bombers.

The contact fuse has already been made with an all-round mechanism, which ensured its operation when the ammunition fell to the ground in any position. The fuse spring protected the fuse from triggering in the event of an accidental fall, which did not allow the drummer to prick the igniter primer with insufficient overloads (when falling from a height of up to 4 m onto concrete).

It is probably no coincidence that this ammunition also turned out to be made in a caliber of 125 mm, which, according to the assurances of the developers, made it possible to use ADSh from standard ampoule guns. By the way, when fired from an ampoule gun, the ammunition received an overload much greater than when it fell from 4 m, which means that the saber began to smoke already in flight.

Even in the pre-war years, it was scientifically proven that it is much more effective to cover your troops if you smoke it, and not your own infantry, in an attack on a firing point. Thus, the ampoule gun would turn out to be a very necessary thing when, before an attack, it was necessary to throw a few checkers a couple of hundred meters to the bunker or bunker. Unfortunately, it is not known whether ampoules were used on the fronts in this variant ...

When firing heavy ADSh bombs from a 125-mm ampoule gun, its sights could only be used with amendments. However, great accuracy of shooting was not required: one ADS created an impenetrable creeping cloud up to 100 m long.
an additional expelling charge was impossible, for firing at the maximum distance it was required to use a steep trajectory at elevation angles close to 45 °.

Regimental agitation initiative

The plot for this section of the article about the ampoule was also borrowed by me from the Internet. Its essence was that one day the political officer, having come to the sappers in the battalion, asked who could make a propaganda mortar mine? Pavel Yakovlevich Ivanov volunteered. He found the tools at the site of the destroyed forge, he made the body of the ammunition from a chock, adapting a small powder charge to break it in the air, the fuse from a fuse cord, and the stabilizer from cans. However, the wooden mortar mine turned out to be light and fell slowly into the barrel without breaking through the primer.

Ivanov reduced its diameter so that the air from the barrel came out more freely, and the primer stopped falling on the firing pin. In general, the craftsman did not sleep for days, but on the third day the mine flew and exploded. The leaflets swirled over the enemy trenches. Later, he adapted an ampoule gun for firing wooden mines. And in order not to cause return fire on his trenches, he carried it to the neutral zone or to the side. Result: German soldiers once crossed over to our side in a group, drunk, in broad daylight.

This story is also quite plausible. It is quite difficult to make an agitation in a metal case from improvised means in the field, but from wood it is quite possible. In addition, such ammunition, according to common sense, should be non-lethal. Otherwise, what kind of propaganda is there! But factory propaganda mines and artillery shells were in metal cases. To a greater extent, so that they fly further and so as not to greatly disrupt ballistics. However, before that, it never occurred to the designers of the ampoule gun to enrich the arsenal of their offspring with such a kind of ammunition ...

noloader, with a piston valve. Shooting mechanisms - similar in systems of both calibers.
The Ampulomet easel mortars were not put into service. According to the classification of artillery systems, samples of both calibers can be attributed to hard-type mortars. Theoretically, the recoil forces when firing high-explosive armor-piercing mines should not have increased compared to throwing ampoules. The mass of the FBM was greater than that of the AZh-2KS, but less than that of the ADSH. And the expelling charge is the same. However, despite the fact that the Ampulomet mortars fired along more flat trajectories than the classic mortars and bombers, the former were still much more “mortar” than the Katyusha Guards mortars.

conclusions

So, the reason for the removal of ampoule guns from the armament of the ground forces of the Red Army at the end of 1942 was officially their insecurity in handling and use. But in vain: ahead of our army, not only an offensive was waiting, but also numerous battles in settlements. That's where it would come in handy.
100-mm mounted anti-tank mortar in the process of loading.

By the way, the safety of using a knapsack flamethrower in an offensive battle is also very doubtful. Nevertheless, they were returned "to service" and used until the end of the war. There are front-line memories of a sniper, where he claims that an enemy flamethrower is always visible from afar (a number of unmasking signs), so it is better to aim at chest level. Then, from short distances, a bullet from a powerful rifle cartridge pierces right through both the body and the tank with the fire mixture. That is, the flamethrower and the flamethrower "cannot be restored."
The calculation of the ampoule gun could also be in exactly the same situation when bullets or fragments hit incendiary ampoules. Glass ampoules in general could be smashed against each other by a shock wave from a close gap. And in general, the whole war is a very risky business ... And thanks to the "hussars of the generals Lelyushenko" such hasty conclusions were born about the low quality and combat inefficiency of individual types of weapons. Remember, for example, the pre-war ordeals of the designers of the Katyusha MLRS, mortar weapons, submachine guns, the T-34 tank, etc. The vast majority of our gunsmith designers were not amateurs in their field of knowledge and no less than generals sought to bring victory closer. And they were "dipped" like kittens. The generals are also easy to understand - they needed reliable models of weapons and with "fool protection".

And then, the warm memories of infantrymen about the effectiveness of Molotov cocktails against tanks against tanks look somehow illogical against the backdrop of a very cool attitude towards ampoules. Both are weapons of the same order. Unless the ampoule was exactly twice as powerful, and it could be thrown 10 times further. It is not entirely clear here why there were more claims "in the infantry": to the ampoule gun itself or to its ampoules?

At the same time, the same “very dangerous” AZH-2KS ampoules in Soviet attack aviation remained in service at least until the end of 1944 - beginning of 1945 (in any case, M.P. Odintsov’s attack aviation regiment used them already on the German territory by tank columns hiding in the forests). And this is on attack aircraft! With unarmored bomb bays! When from the ground all the infantry of the enemy is hitting them from anything! The pilots were well aware of what would happen if only one stray bullet hit the cartridge with ampoules, but, nevertheless, they flew. By the way, a timid mention on the Internet that ampoules were used in aviation when firing from such aircraft ampoule guns is absolutely untrue.

The cumulative effect of a directed explosion became known as early as the 19th century, shortly after the start of mass production of high explosives. the first scientific work devoted to this issue was published in 1915 in Great Britain.

This effect is achieved by giving a special shape to explosive charges. Usually, for this purpose, charges are made with a recess in the part opposite to its detonator. When an explosion is initiated, a converging flow of detonation products is formed into a high-speed cumulative jet, and the cumulative effect increases when the recess is lined with a metal layer (1-2 mm thick). The speed of the metal jet reaches 10 km/s. Compared to expanding detonation products of conventional charges, in a converging flow of shaped charge products, the pressure and density of matter and energy are much higher, which ensures the directed action of the explosion and high penetrating power of the shaped charge jet.

When the conical shell collapses, the velocities of the individual parts of the jet turn out to be somewhat different, as a result, the jet stretches in flight. Therefore, a small increase in the gap between the charge and the target increases the depth of penetration due to elongation of the jet. The thickness of the armor pierced by HEAT shells does not depend on the firing range and is approximately equal to their caliber. At significant distances between the charge and the target, the jet is torn apart, and the penetration effect is reduced.

In the 30s of the XX century, there was a massive saturation of the troops with armored vehicles. In addition to traditional means of dealing with them, in the pre-war period, some countries were developing cumulative projectiles.
Particularly tempting was the fact that the armor penetration of such ammunition did not depend on the speed of the encounter with the armor. This made it possible to successfully use them to destroy tanks in artillery systems that were not originally intended for this, as well as to create highly effective anti-tank mines and grenades. Germany advanced the most in the creation of cumulative anti-tank munitions; by the time the attack on the USSR, cumulative artillery shells of 75-105 mm caliber had been created and put into service.

Unfortunately, in the Soviet Union before the war, due attention was not paid to this area. In our country, the improvement of anti-tank weapons proceeded by increasing the calibers of anti-tank guns and increasing the initial velocities of armor-piercing projectiles. In fairness, it should be said that in the USSR at the end of the 30s an experimental batch of 76-mm cumulative shells was fired and tested. During the tests, it turned out that HEAT shells equipped with regular fuses from fragmentation shells, as a rule, do not penetrate armor and give ricochets. Obviously, the matter was in fuses, but the military, who already did not show much interest in such shells, finally abandoned them after unsuccessful firing.

At the same time, a significant number of recoilless (dynamo-reactive) Kurchevsky guns were manufactured in the USSR.

76 mm Kurchevsky recoilless gun on a truck chassis

The advantage of such systems is their low weight and lower cost compared to "classic" guns. Recoilless in combination with cumulative shells could quite successfully prove themselves as anti-tank.

With the outbreak of hostilities, reports began to come from the fronts that German artillery was using previously unknown so-called "armor-burning" shells that effectively hit tanks. When examining the wrecked tanks, they noticed the characteristic appearance of holes with melted edges. At first, it was suggested that the unknown shells used "fast-burning thermite", accelerated by powder gases. However, this assumption was soon refuted experimentally. It was found that the combustion processes of thermite incendiary compositions and the interaction of the slag jet with the metal of the tank armor proceed too slowly and cannot be realized in a very short time for the shell to penetrate the armor. At this time, samples of "armor-burning" shells captured from the Germans were delivered from the front. It turned out that their design is based on the use of the cumulative effect of the explosion.

At the beginning of 1942, the designers M.Ya. Vasiliev, Z.V. Vladimirova and N.S. Zhitkikh designed a 76-mm cumulative projectile with a conical cumulative recess lined with a steel shell. An artillery shell body with bottom equipment was used, the chamber of which was additionally bored into a cone in its head part. A powerful explosive was used in the projectile - an alloy of TNT with RDX. The bottom hole and plug served to install an additional detonator and a beam detonator cap. The big problem was the lack of a suitable fuse in production. After a series of experiments, the AM-6 instantaneous aircraft fuse was chosen.

HEAT shells, which had an armor penetration of about 70-75 mm, appeared in the ammunition of regimental guns from 1943, and were mass-produced throughout the war.

Regimental 76-mm gun mod. 1927

Industry supplied the front with about 1.1 million 76-mm cumulative anti-tank shells. Unfortunately, it was forbidden to use them in tank and divisional 76-mm guns due to the unreliable operation of the fuse and the danger of an explosion in the barrel. Fuzes for cumulative artillery shells, meeting the safety requirements for firing from long-barreled guns, were created only at the end of 1944.

In 1942, a group of designers consisting of I.P. Dziuba, N.P. Kazeykina, I.P. Kucherenko, V.Ya. Matyushkin and A.A. Grinberg developed cumulative anti-tank shells for 122-mm howitzers.

The 122-mm cumulative projectile for the 1938 model howitzer had a steel cast iron body, was equipped with an effective RDX-based explosive composition and a powerful heating element detonator. The 122-mm cumulative projectile was equipped with the B-229 instantaneous fuse, which was developed in a very short time at TsKB-22, led by A.Ya. Karpov.

122-mm howitzer M-30 mod. 1938

The projectile was put into service, put into mass production at the beginning of 1943, and managed to take part in the Battle of Kursk. Until the end of the war, more than 100 thousand 122-mm cumulative shells were produced. The projectile pierced armor up to 150 mm thick along the normal, ensuring the destruction of heavy German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther". However, the effective range of howitzer fire against maneuvering tanks was suicidal - 400 meters.

The creation of HEAT projectiles opened up great opportunities for the use of artillery pieces with relatively low initial velocities - 76-mm regimental guns of the 1927 and 1943 models. and 122-mm howitzers of the 1938 model, which were in large quantities in the army. The presence of HEAT shells in the ammunition of these guns significantly increased the effectiveness of their anti-tank fire. This significantly strengthened the anti-tank defense of the Soviet rifle divisions.

One of the main tasks of the Il-2 armored attack aircraft put into service at the beginning of 1941 was the fight against armored vehicles.
However, the cannon armament available in the arsenal of attack aircraft made it possible to effectively hit only lightly armored vehicles.
Rocket 82-132-mm shells did not have the required accuracy. However, for arming the Il-2 in 1942, the cumulative RBSK-82 were developed.

The head part of the RBSK-82 rocket consisted of a steel cylinder with a wall thickness of 8 mm. A cone of sheet iron was rolled into the front of the cylinder, creating a recess in the explosive poured into the cylinder of the projectile head. A tube passed through the center of the cylinder, which served "to transmit a beam of fire from the capping cap to the TAT-1 detonator cap." The shells were tested in two versions of explosive equipment: TNT and alloy 70/30 (TNT with RDX). Shells with TNT had a point for the AM-A fuse, and shells with an alloy 70/30 had an M-50 fuse. The fuses had a capillary action of the APUV type. The missile part of the RBSK-82 is standard, from M-8 rocket shells equipped with pyroxylin powder.

In total, 40 pieces of RBSK-82 were used up during the tests, of which 18 were fired in the air, the rest on the ground. Captured German tanks Pz. III, StuG III and Czech tank Pz.38(t) with reinforced armor. Shooting in the air was carried out at the StuG III tank from a dive at an angle of 30 ° in volleys of 2-4 rounds in one run. The firing distance is 200 m. The shells showed good stability on the flight path, but not a single fall into the tank could be obtained.

The RBSK-82 HEAT armor-piercing projectile, equipped with 70/30 alloy, pierced 30 mm thick armor at any encounter angles, and pierced 50 mm thick armor at a right angle, but did not penetrate at an encounter angle of 30 °. Apparently, the low armor penetration is a consequence of the delay in the operation of the fuse "from the ricochet and the cumulative jet is formed with a deformed cone."

RBSK-82 shells in TNT equipment pierced armor 30 mm thick only at meeting angles of at least 30 °, and 50 mm armor did not pierce under any conditions of impact. The holes obtained by penetrating through the armor had a diameter of up to 35 mm. In most cases, armor penetration was accompanied by metal spalling around the exit hole.

HEAT rockets were not accepted into service due to the lack of a clear advantage over standard rockets. There was already a new, much stronger weapon on the way - PTABs.

Priority in the development of small cumulative air bombs belongs to domestic scientists and designers. In mid-1942, the well-known developer of fuses I.A. Larionov, proposed the design of a light cumulative anti-tank bomb. The Air Force command showed interest in implementing the proposal. TsKB-22 quickly carried out design work and testing of the new bomb began at the end of 1942. The final version was PTAB-2.5-1.5, i.e. anti-tank aviation bomb of cumulative action weighing 1.5 kg in dimensions of a 2.5-kg aviation fragmentation bomb. GKO urgently decided to adopt the PTAB-2.5-1.5 and organize its mass production.

In the first PTAB-2.5-1.5, the hulls and riveted pinnately cylindrical stabilizers were made of sheet steel 0.6 mm thick. To increase the fragmentation action, a 1.5-mm steel shirt was additionally put on the cylindrical part of the bomb. The combat charge of the PTAB consisted of a mixed BB type TGA, loaded through the bottom point. To protect the impeller of the AD-A fuse from spontaneous folding, a special fuse was put on the bomb stabilizer from a square-shaped tin plate with a fork of two wire whiskers attached to it, passing between the blades. After dropping the PTAB from the aircraft, it was torn off the bomb by a counter flow of air.

Upon impact with the armor of the tank, a fuse was triggered, which, through a tetryl detonator checker, caused the detonation of the explosive charge. During the detonation of the charge, due to the presence of a cumulative funnel and a metal cone in it, a cumulative jet was created, which, as field tests showed, pierced armor up to 60 mm thick at an encounter angle of 30 °, followed by a destructive effect behind the armor: defeating the tank crew, initiating detonation of ammunition , as well as ignition of fuel or its vapors.

The bomb load of the Il-2 aircraft included up to 192 PTAB-2.5-1.5 bombs in 4 clusters of small bombs (48 pieces each) or up to 220 pieces with their rational placement in bulk in 4 bomb bays.

The adoption of the PTAB for some time was kept secret, their use without the permission of the high command was prohibited. This made it possible to use the effect of surprise and effectively use new weapons in the battle of Kursk.

The massive use of the PTAB had a stunning effect of tactical surprise and had a strong moral impact on the enemy. German tankers, however, like the Soviet ones, by the third year of the war were already accustomed to the relatively low effectiveness of bombing strikes. At the initial stage of the battle, the Germans did not at all use dispersed marching and pre-battle formations, that is, on the routes of movement in columns, in places of concentration and at their starting positions, for which they were severely punished - the PTAB expansion strip blocked 2-3 tanks, one removed from another at 60-75 m, as a result of which the latter suffered significant losses, even in the absence of a massive use of IL-2. One Il-2 from a height of 75-100 meters could cover an area of ​​15x75 meters, destroying all enemy equipment on it.
On average, during the war, the irretrievable losses of tanks from aviation did not exceed 5%, after the use of PTAB in certain sectors of the front, this figure exceeded 20%.

Having recovered from the shock, the German tankers soon switched exclusively to dispersed marching and pre-battle formations. Naturally, this greatly hampered the management of tank units and subunits, increased the time for their deployment, concentration and redeployment, and complicated the interaction between them. In the parking lots, German tankers began to place their vehicles under trees, light mesh canopies and install light metal meshes over the roof of the turret and hull. The effectiveness of IL-2 strikes with the use of PTAB decreased by about 4-4.5 times, nevertheless remaining, on average, 2-3 times higher than when using high-explosive and high-explosive fragmentation bombs.

In 1944, a more powerful anti-tank bomb PTAB-10-2.5 was adopted, in the dimensions of a 10-kg aviation bomb. It provided penetration of armor up to 160 mm thick. According to the principle of operation and the purpose of the main components and elements, the PTAB-10-2.5 was similar to the PTAB-2.5-1.5 and differed from it only in shape and dimensions.

In service with the Red Army in the 1920-1930s was the muzzle-loading "Dyakonov grenade launcher", created at the end of the First World War and subsequently modernized.

It was a 41-mm mortar, which was put on the barrel of a rifle, being fixed on the front sight with a cutout. On the eve of World War II, a grenade launcher was available in every rifle and cavalry squad. Then the question arose of giving the rifle grenade launcher "anti-tank" properties.

During the Second World War, in 1944, the VKG-40 cumulative grenade entered service with the Red Army. A grenade was fired with a special blank cartridge with 2.75 g of gunpowder of the VP or P-45 brand. The reduced charge of a blank cartridge made it possible to shoot a direct-fire grenade with the butt resting on the shoulder, at a distance of up to 150 meters.

Rifle cumulative grenade is designed to deal with lightly armored vehicles and enemy vehicles that are not protected by armor, as well as firing points. The VKG-40 was used very limitedly, which is explained by the low accuracy of fire and poor armor penetration.

During the war, a significant number of hand-held anti-tank grenades were fired in the USSR. Initially, these were high-explosive grenades, as the thickness of the armor increased, so did the weight of anti-tank grenades. However, this still did not ensure penetration of the armor of medium tanks, so the RPG-41 grenade, with an explosive weight of 1400 g, could penetrate 25 mm armor.

Needless to say, what a danger this anti-tank weapon represented for the one who used it.

In the middle of 1943, a fundamentally new RPG-43 cumulative action grenade, developed by N.P. Belyakov. It was the first cumulative hand grenade developed in the USSR.

RPG-43 hand cumulative grenade in section

The RPG-43 had a body with a flat bottom and a conical lid, a wooden handle with a safety mechanism, a belt stabilizer and a shock-ignition mechanism with a fuse. Inside the body is placed a bursting charge with a cumulative recess of a conical shape, lined with a thin layer of metal, and a cup with a safety spring and a sting fixed in its bottom.

A metal sleeve is fixed at its front end of the handle, inside of which there is a fuse holder and a pin holding it in the rearmost position. Outside, a spring is put on the sleeve and fabric tapes are attached to the stabilizer cap. The safety mechanism consists of a folding bar and checks. The hinged bar serves to hold the stabilizer cap on the grenade handle until it is thrown, preventing it from sliding or turning in place.

During the throw of a grenade, the folding bar is separated and releases the stabilizer cap, which, under the action of a spring, slides off the handle and pulls the ribbons behind it. The safety pin falls out under its own weight, releasing the fuse holder. Due to the presence of a stabilizer, the grenade flew forward, which is necessary for the optimal use of the energy of the cumulative charge of the grenade. When a grenade hits an obstacle with the bottom of the case, the fuse, overcoming the resistance of the safety spring, is impaled on the sting by a detonator cap, which causes an explosive charge to explode. The cumulative charge of the RPG-43 pierced armor up to 75 mm thick.

With the advent of German heavy tanks on the battlefield, a hand-held anti-tank grenade with greater armor penetration was required. A group of designers consisting of M.Z. Polevanova, L.B. Ioffe and N.S. Zhitkikh developed the RPG-6 cumulative grenade. In October 1943, the grenade was adopted by the Red Army. The RPG-6 grenade is in many ways similar to the German PWM-1.

German hand-held anti-tank grenade PWM-1

The RPG-6 had a drop-shaped case with a charge and an additional detonator and a handle with an inertial fuse, a detonator cap and a belt stabilizer.

The fuse drummer was blocked by a check. The stabilizer tapes fit into the handle and were held by a safety bar. The safety pin was removed before the throw. After the throw, the safety bar flew off, the stabilizer was pulled out, the drummer pin was pulled out - the fuse was cocked.

Thus, the RPG-6 protection system was three-stage (for RPG-43 it was two-stage). In terms of technology, an essential feature of the RLG-6 was the absence of turned and threaded parts, the widespread use of stamping and knurling. Compared to the RPG-43, the RPG-6 was more technologically advanced in production and somewhat safer to handle. RPG-43 and RPG-6 rushed at 15-20 m, after the throw, the fighter should have taken cover.

During the war years, hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers were not created in the USSR, although work was carried out in this direction. The main anti-tank weapons of the infantry were still anti-tank rifles and hand-held anti-tank grenades. This was partly offset by a significant increase in the number of anti-tank artillery in the second half of the war. But in the offensive, anti-tank guns could not always accompany the infantry, and in the event of the sudden appearance of enemy tanks, this often led to large and unjustified losses.

There are three modifications of grenade launchers. The original and already obsolete VOG-17 type with an instantaneous fuse. The subsequent modification, VOG-17M, differs from the previous one in that the fuse is equipped with a self-destruct device. The self-liquidator mechanism is activated from overloads when fired.

For shooting from automatic grenade launchers 40x53-mm shots are used with an initial grenade velocity of more than 240 m / s. The effective firing range of these grenades is 2000-2200 m. An important feature of foreign ammunition for anti-personnel grenade launchers is their diversity.

Experience of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. showed the need for mass production of cartridges. In one of his speeches, I. V. Stalin said that in 1944 alone the Soviet Union produced 7 billion 400 million cartridges.

Evaluation of the effectiveness of gas cartridges is carried out experimentally in order to determine the concentration of the tear substance at different distances. For this, sampling tubes of a special design are used, in which a package of filtering and sorbing material is placed.

Evaluation of the effectiveness of traumatic cartridges is carried out according to the following methods:
- by specific kinetic energy, which should not exceed 0.5 J/mm2;
- by imprint in ballistic plasticine;
- hydrostatic pressure, which should not exceed 50 MPa.

The enemy can use various means protection against damage: building structures, car body, personal armor protection equipment (NIB). When hitting an obstacle, the bullets are deformed.
Armor-piercing bullets provide the greatest penetration depth.

The tasks of experimental evaluation of the effectiveness of the lethal (damaging) effect of cartridges are the assessment of the behavior of a bullet, regardless of the place of impact and the trajectory of the bullet in the body, correlated with real results use of ammunition.

In the 80s. XX century, the US National Law Institute developed mathematical model, which allows using a computer to obtain a coefficient of relative stopping power RII (Relative Incapacitation Index) for various ammunition.

The effectiveness of a cartridge is determined by the probability of incapacitating manpower or other targets when it is fired from a weapon and depends on the probability of hitting the target, the lethal, stopping and penetrating action of the bullet. Determining the probability of hitting a target is described in sufficient detail in the specialized literature.

It is well known that the shot firearms accompanied by a loud sound, which, along with muzzle flash, is the main unmasking factor for the sniper, indicating the direction of the shot and warning the enemy of the threat.

The small arms system that Russia inherited from the USSR was oriented towards the concept of a global conflict involving large human and material resources. However, the experience of local wars in the second half of the 20th century showed the need to increase the range of fire of sniper weapons with the probability of hitting a “running figure” target at a distance of 1500 m. In this regard, sniper rifles were developed chambered for .50 Browning and the domestic cartridge 12.7 × 108 mm .

The main domestic rifle cartridge is the 7.62 × 54 mm cartridge of the 1908/30 model, which was the basis for the creation of the SVD family of sniper rifles and other weapon designs (Fig. 1). Especially for sniper rifles, 2 types of cartridges were developed: "sniper" 7N1 and the so-called "with bullets with a silver nose" 57-N-323S.

The main cartridges used for sniper shooting by foreign armies and special services are: 5.56 × 45 mm NATO cartridge (.223 Remington), .243 Winchester, 7 mm Remington Magnum, 7.5 × 54 mm, .300 Winchester Magnum, 7.62x51mm NATO, .338 Lapua Magnum, .50 Browning.
Cartridge .243 Winchester (Fig. 1, a) is a typical hunting ammunition that has little recoil compared to larger caliber ammunition and, accordingly, provides better accuracy.

Shooting farther and more accurately is one of the priority tasks for the development of small arms and ammunition. As soon as one of the warring parties achieved an increase in the capabilities of one or another type of small arms, the other side immediately suffered additional losses and was forced to change the tactics of its troops.

Gas cartridges are used mainly in civilian weapons due to their sufficient effectiveness in riot control. They are equipped with irritants - substances that cause a person to temporarily lose the ability to conduct active actions due to irritation of the mucous surfaces of the eyes, upper respiratory tract, and also the wet skin cover.

Small-caliber pistol cartridges designed for use in PDW (Personal Defense Weapon) weapons can be classified as a separate group. They are characterized by a caliber of 4.4 ... 5.8 mm, a small bullet mass, an initial bullet velocity of more than 700 m / s, a bottle sleeve, and a relatively high penetrating action for pistol cartridges.

In the early 1980s relatively light bulletproof vests of varying degrees of protection appeared. So, for example, a bulletproof vest of the 1st class provides protection against bullets of cartridges 57-N-181 C (for the PM pistol) and 57-N-111 (for the Nagant revolver), and the 2nd class of protection - from bullets of the 7N7 cartridge (to the PSM pistol) and 57-11-134 C (to the TT pistol). And although the body armor covers 25-30% of the human body, it significantly increased survival in combat conditions.

Cartridge 9-mm "Parabellum", adopted by Germany on August 22, 1908, and to this day is in service with the army of most countries of the world. To a large extent, such a long cartridge life is due to the fact that it has been constantly improved.

In 1936, the German company Gustav Genschow & Co created the 9-mm Ultra cartridge for the Walter PP pistol. The 9-mm "Kurz" cartridge was taken as the basis, with the sleeve lengthened from 17 to 18.5 mm. The cartridge was produced until the end of World War II.

The “father” of modern pistol cartridges is considered Hugo Borchardt, chief engineer of the German arms company Ludwig Lewe and Co., who in 1893 developed for his self-loading pistol cartridge 7.65 × 25 (caliber × length of the sleeve) with a bottle sleeve, a groove instead of a rim and a shell bullet.
The pistol was not accepted into service, and Borchard did not continue to refine his pistol and cartridge.

Pistol cartridge bullets are divided into shellless (solid), shell, semi-shell (with an open nose), expansive (with a cavity in the head), armor-piercing. in the USA and Western countries abbreviations are used to denote design features. The most common abbreviations are shown in the table

According to the forensic requirements of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the minimum energy criterion for human susceptibility is the specific kinetic energy of 0.5 J/mm².

Bullet weight matters a lot. The lighter the bullet, the faster it loses kinetic energy, the more difficult it is to keep it within the limits of the permissible traumatic effect at an acceptable firing range. As a result, it is necessary to significantly overestimate the initial energy, introducing restrictions on the minimum allowable distance for the use of weapons, which is not always possible to withstand.

The predecessor of these ammunition is the 7.62 mm reduced velocity cartridge (RS), created in the early 60s. for use in the AKM assault rifle equipped with a silent and flameless firing device (PBS).

Cartridges SP-5 and SP-6 of 9 mm caliber were created according to the same principle in the mid-80s. N. Zabelin, L. Dvoryaninova and Yu.Z. Frolov at TsNIITOCHMASH based on the 7.62-mm cartridge case mod. 1943 Leaving its shape, length and primer the same, the designers changed the case muzzle - for attaching a 9-mm bullet, and the powder charge - for communicating a bullet weighing about 16 g with an initial speed of 280-295 m / s. Used to fire 9mm sniper rifle VSK-94, Kalashnikov AK-9 assault rifle, special “Val” assault rifle.

The first thing you need to understand for yourself is that traumatic weapon this is far from combat and not even service, although it can be performed on its basis. In other words, you should not expect miracles from a traumatic pistol, since when it was created, I am more than sure that the main requirement for any model was to make the likelihood of serious injuries that could lead to death minimal. Nevertheless, do not underestimate trauma, considering it a child's toy, with which a share of pampering is acceptable. This is the same weapon, it can also kill under certain conditions, not guaranteed, of course, but it can.

Often, in modern conditions, the outcome of a fire contact will depend not only on the skill of the shooter, his weapons, but also on the ammunition used.
The purpose of the cartridge depends on the type of bullet with which it is equipped. To date, there are many bullets of different types with a wide variety of degrees of damage - from non-lethal to armor-piercing. The main meaning of these differences is a barrier (destruction of manpower protected by armor) or a stopping action (braking of a bullet in a target and complete transfer of momentum). The stopping action implies an increased traumatic effect.