In numbers. On the effectiveness of Soviet artillery (tanks) in the Second World War. In numbers Development of artillery on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War

Artillery during the Second World War Part I

M. Zenkevich

Soviet artillery was created during the Civil War and went through two stages in its pre-war development. In the period from 1927 to 1930. modernization of the artillery weapons inherited from the tsarist army was carried out, as a result of which the main tactical and technical characteristics of the guns were significantly improved in accordance with the new requirements, and this was done without great expense on the basis of existing weapons. Thanks to the modernization of artillery weapons, the firing range of artillery has increased on average by one and a half times. The increase in firing range was achieved by lengthening the barrels, increasing the charges, increasing the elevation angle and improving the shape of the projectiles.

Increasing the power of the shot also required some modification of the carriages. The carriage carries a 76-mm cannon mod. In 1902, a balancing mechanism was introduced, and muzzle brakes were installed on the 107 mm and 152 mm guns. A single sight of the 1930 model was adopted for all guns. After modernization, the guns received new names: 76-mm gun of the 1902/30 model, 122-mm howitzer mod. 1910/30 etc. Of the new types of artillery developed during this period, the 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927 The beginning of the second stage in the development of Soviet artillery dates back to the early 30s, when, as a result of the accelerated development of heavy industry, it became possible to begin a complete rearmament of artillery with new models.

On May 22, 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR adopted the artillery weapon system developed by the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) for 1929-32. This was an important policy document for the development of Soviet artillery. It provided for the creation of anti-tank, battalion, regimental, divisional, corps and anti-aircraft artillery, as well as artillery of the Reserve of the High Command (RGK). The system was adjusted every five-year plan and was the basis for the development of new weapons. In accordance with it, a 37-mm anti-tank gun was put into service in 1930. The carriage of this gun had sliding frames, which provided a horizontal firing angle of up to 60° without moving the frame. In 1932, a 45-mm anti-tank gun was adopted, also on a carriage with sliding frames. In 1937, the 45-mm gun was improved: semi-automatic was introduced into the wedge breech, suspension was used, and ballistic qualities were improved. Extensive work was carried out to re-equip divisional, corps and army artillery, as well as high-power artillery.

The 76-mm gun mod. was adopted as a divisional gun. 1939 with a semi-automatic wedge bolt. The carriage of this gun had a rotating upper machine, high-speed lifting and turning mechanisms, and sliding frames. Chassis with suspension and rubber weights on the wheels, it allowed transportation speeds of up to 35-40 km/h. In 1938, a 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938. This weapon, in terms of its tactical and technical characteristics, far surpassed all foreign models of this type. The 107-mm cannon mod. 1940 and a 152-mm howitzer mod. 1938

The army artillery included: 122-mm gun mod. 1931/37 and 152-mm howitzer mod. 1937. The first sample of a 122-mm cannon was developed in 1931. 122-mm cannon arr. 1931/37 was obtained by applying the barrel of a 122-mm cannon mod. 1931 for a new carriage mod. 1937, adopted as a single carriage for a 122 mm gun and a 152 mm howitzer. For all divisional and corps artillery guns, a sight was adopted that was independent of the gun, which made it possible to simultaneously load and aim the gun at the target. The problem of creating Soviet high-power artillery was also successfully resolved.

In the period from 1931 to 1939. adopted for service: 203-mm howitzer mod. 1931, 152-mm gun mod. 1935, 280-mm mortar mod. 1939, 210 mm gun mod. 1939 and 305-mm howitzer mod. 1939. The carriages of the 152-mm cannon, 203-mm howitzers and 280-mm mortars are of the same type, on caterpillar tracks. In the traveling position, the guns consisted of two carts - a barrel and a carriage. In parallel with the development of the material part of the artillery, important measures were taken to improve ammunition.

Soviet designers developed the most advanced long-range projectiles in shape, as well as new types of armor-piercing projectiles. All shells were equipped with fuses and tubes of domestic production. It should be noted that the development of Soviet artillery was influenced by such a widespread idea abroad at that time as universalism. The talk was about creating so-called universal or semi-universal guns, which could be both field and anti-aircraft at the same time. Despite the attractiveness of this idea, its implementation led to the creation of overly complex, heavy and expensive weapons with low combat qualities. Therefore, after the creation and testing of a number of samples of such guns, in the summer of 1935, a meeting of artillery designers was held with the participation of government members, at which the inconsistency and harmfulness of universalism were revealed and the need for specialization of artillery according to its combat purpose and types was pointed out. The idea of ​​replacing artillery with aviation and tanks also did not find support in the USSR.

For example, the German army followed this path, placing its main emphasis on aviation, tanks and mortars. Speaking in 1937 in the Kremlin, I.V. Stalin said: “The success of the war is decided not only by aviation. For the success of a war, artillery is an extremely valuable branch of the military. I would like our artillery to show that it is first class."

This line of creating powerful artillery was strictly implemented, which was reflected, for example, in a sharp increase in the number of guns for all purposes. If on January 1, 1934, the Red Army had 17,000 guns, then on January 1, 1939, their number was 55,790, and on June 22, 1941, 67,355 (without 50-mm mortars, of which there were 24,158). In the pre-war years, along with the rearmament of rifled artillery, extensive work was carried out on the creation of mortars.

The first Soviet mortars were created back in the early 30s, but some leaders of the Red Army viewed them as a kind of “surrogate” for artillery, of interest only to the armies of underdeveloped states. However, after mortars proved their high efficiency during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-40, their mass introduction into the troops began. The Red Army received 50-mm company and 82-mm battalion mortars, 107-mm mountain pack and 120-mm regimental mortars. In total, from January 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941, over 40 thousand mortars were delivered to the Red Army. After the start of the war, along with solving problems of increasing the supply of artillery and mortar weapons to the front, design bureaus and industrial enterprises developed and introduced new artillery systems into production. In 1942, a 76.2-mm divisional gun mod. 1941 (ZIS-3), the design of which, with high combat characteristics, fully satisfied the requirements of mass production. To combat enemy tanks in 1943, a 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank gun was developed on a carriage of a 76.2-mm gun mod. 1942

Somewhat later, an even more powerful 100-mm cannon mod. 1944 Since 1943, the troops began to receive 152-mm hull howitzers and 160-mm mortars, which became an indispensable means of breaking through enemy defenses. In total, during the war years the industry produced 482.2 thousand guns.

351.8 thousand mortars were manufactured (4.5 times more than in Germany, and 1.7 times more than in the USA and other countries British Empire). In the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army also widely used rocket artillery. The beginning of its use can be considered the formation in June 1941 of the first separate battery, which had seven BM-13 installations. By December 1, 1941, there were already 7 regiments and 52 separate divisions in the field rocket artillery, and at the end of the war the Red Army had 7 divisions, 11 brigades, 114 regiments and 38 separate divisions of rocket artillery, for the armament of which more than 10 thousand were manufactured .multi-charge self-propelled launchers and more than 12 million rockets.

salvo "Katyusha"

ZIS-3 76-MM CANNON MODEL 1942

A few weeks after the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow on January 5, 1942, the ZIS-3, the famous 76-mm divisional gun, received the go-ahead.

“As a rule, we received tactical and technical requirements for the development of new guns from the Main Artillery Directorate,” says the famous designer of artillery systems V. Grabin. But some guns were developed on our own initiative. This was the case with the divisional 76-mm ZIS-3 gun.” .

The caliber 76 mm - 3 inches - has been considered the classic caliber of a divisional gun since the beginning of our century. A gun powerful enough to hit enemy personnel from closed positions, suppress mortar and artillery batteries and other fire weapons. A gun that is mobile enough to move across the battlefield with the forces of a combat crew, accompany the advancing units not only with fire, but also with wheels, crushing bunkers and pillboxes with direct fire. Experience of the First World War. showed that when trench defense is saturated with fire weapons, attacking units need battalion and regimental close-combat artillery. And the appearance of tanks required the creation of special anti-tank artillery.

Equipping the Red Army with military equipment has always been the focus of attention of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. On July 15, 1929, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks made a historic decision to create new military equipment, including artillery. Carrying out the program drawn up by the party, Soviet designers carried out work on the creation of both close combat artillery and anti-tank artillery (37 and 45 mm guns). But when, by the end of the 30s, there was a gap between the capabilities of these anti-tank guns and the armor of tanks, the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) developed tactical and technical specifications for a 76-mm divisional gun, capable of fighting against tanks.

Solving this problem, a team of designers headed by V. Grabin created the 76-mm F-22 divisional gun in 1936. Three years later, the F-22 USV was put into service. In 1940, the same team developed a 57-mm anti-tank gun. And finally, in 1941, having placed a 76-mm barrel on the improved carriage of this gun, the designers (A. Khvorostin, V. Norkin, K. Renne, V. Meshchaninov, P. Ivanov, V. Zemtsov, etc.) created the famous ZIS -3, - which was highly appreciated not only by our allies, but also by our opponents.

... "The opinion that the ZIS-3 is the best 76-mm gun of the Second World War is absolutely justified," said German professor Wolf, former head of the artillery design department at Krupp. "Without any exaggeration, it can be said that this is one of the most ingenious designs in the history of barrel artillery".

The ZIS-3 was the last and most advanced 76 mm divisional gun. Further development of this class of guns required a transition to a larger caliber. What is the secret of the success of the ZIS-3? What, so to speak, is the “highlight” of its design?

V. Grabin answers these questions: “In lightness, reliability, convenience of combat crew work, manufacturability and low cost.” And indeed, without containing any fundamentally new components and solutions that would be unknown in world practice, the ZIS-3 is an example of successful design and technical development, an optimal combination of qualities. In ZIS-3, all non-working metal has been removed; used for the first time in domestic serial 76 mm divisional guns muzzle brake, which reduced the length of the recoil, reduced the weight of the recoil parts and lightened the carriage; riveted frames were replaced by lighter tubular ones. Leaf springs in the suspension device have been replaced with lighter and more reliable spring ones: A carriage with sliding frames has been used, sharply increasing the angle of horizontal fire. For the first time, a monoblock barrel was used for this caliber. But the main advantage of the ZIS-3 is its high technology.

The design team, headed by V. Grabin, paid particular attention to this quality of the guns. Working according to the method of accelerated artillery design, in which design and technological issues are resolved in parallel, engineers systematically reduced the number of required parts from sample to sample. Thus, the F-22 had 2080 parts, the F-22 USV - 1057, and the ZIS-3 - only 719. Accordingly, the number of machine hours required to manufacture one gun was reduced. In 1936 this value was 2034 hours, in 1939 - 1300, in 1942 - 1029 and in 1944 - 475! It is thanks to its high manufacturability that the ZIS-3 went down in history as the world’s first gun put into mass production and assembly line assembly. By the end of 1942, only one plant was producing up to 120 guns per day - before the war, this was its monthly program.

ZIS-3 on tow T-70M

Another important result achieved when working using the accelerated design method is broad unification - the use of identical parts, assemblies, mechanisms and assemblies in different samples. It was unification that made it possible for one plant to produce tens of thousands of guns for various purposes - tank, anti-tank and divisional. But it is symbolic that the hundred-thousandth cannon of the 92nd plant was the ZIS-3 - the most popular cannon of the Great Patriotic War.

Projectile type:

Initial speed, m/sec

Range straight. shot at a target height of 2 m, m

High explosive

Armor-piercing

Sub-caliber armor.

Cumulative

A-19 122-MM CANNON MODEL 1931/1937

“In January 1943, our troops had already broken through the blockade and fought stubborn battles to expand the breakthrough at the famous Sinyavinsky Heights,” recalls Artillery Marshal G. Odintsov, former artillery commander of the Leningrad Front: “The firing positions of one of the batteries of the 267th Corps Artillery Regiment were in a swampy area, camouflaged by thickets of thick bushes. Hearing the roar of a tank engine ahead, the senior man on the battery, having no doubt that the tank was ours, and fearing that it might crush the gun, decided to warn the driver. But, standing on the carriage, he saw that A huge, unfamiliar-shaped tank with a cross on the turret is moving straight towards the gun... The shot was fired from some 50 m. The shell literally demolished the split turret, and its pieces hit the armor of the second tank following with such force that its crew He fled without even having time to turn off the engine.Then our tank crews pulled out the enemy vehicles.

A serviceable “tiger” walked through the streets of besieged Leningrad, and then both tanks became exhibits at a “trophy exhibition” in the Moscow Gorky Park of Culture and Leisure. Thus, the 122-mm hull gun helped to capture intact one of the first “tigers” that appeared at the front, and helped the personnel of the Soviet Army to recognize the vulnerable spots of the “tigers”.

The First World War showed how dearly France, England and Russia had to pay for neglecting heavy artillery. Counting on maneuverable warfare, these countries relied on light, highly mobile artillery, believing that heavy guns were unsuitable for rapid marches. And already during the war they were forced to catch up with Germany and, catching up, urgently create heavy weapons. And yet, at the end of the war, the United States and England considered corps artillery generally unnecessary, while France and Germany were satisfied with the modernized corps guns of the end of the First World War.

Things were completely different in our country. In May 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic approved the artillery armament system for 1929-1932, and in June 1930, the XVI Congress of the CPSU (b) decided to fully accelerate the development of industry, and primarily the defense industry. The industrialization of the country provided a solid basis for the production of modern military equipment. In 1931, in pursuance of the approved weapon system, the 122-mm A-19 cannon was manufactured at Artillery Plant No. 172. This gun was intended for counter-battery combat, to disrupt enemy command and control, suppress his rear, preventing the approach of reserves, the supply of ammunition, food, etc.

“The design of this gun,” says Major General of the Engineering and Technical Service N. Komarov, was entrusted to the design bureau of the All-Union Weapon and Arsenal Association. working group, headed by S. Shukalov, included S. Ananyev, V. Drozdov, G. Vodokhlebov, B. Markov, S. Rykovskov, N. Torbin and me. The project was completed quickly and the drawings were immediately sent to the 172nd plant for the production of a prototype. But then it turned out that the project was made without taking into account the plant’s equipment, and the working drawings had to be redone in relation to the technological capabilities of the plant.

In terms of projectile power and firing range, the gun was superior to all foreign guns of this class. True, she turned out to be somewhat heavier than them, but heavy weight did not affect its combat qualities, since it was designed for mechanical traction.

The A-19 differed from older artillery systems in several innovations. The high initial velocity of the projectile increased the length of the barrel, and this, in turn, created difficulties during vertical aiming and when transporting the gun. To relieve the lifting mechanism and make the gunner's work easier, we used a balancing mechanism; and in order to protect the critical components and mechanisms of the gun from shock loads during transportation, a travel-style fastening mechanism: before the trip, the barrel was separated from the recoil devices, pulled back along the cradle and secured with stoppers to the carriage. Avoid closing and opening the bolt when the barrel is not fully connected to recoil devices allowed the mechanism of mutual closure. For the first time on guns of this kind large caliber Sliding frames and a rotating upper machine were used, which ensured an increase in the horizontal firing angle; suspension and metal wheels with rubber rim tires, which made it possible to transport the gun on the highway at speeds of up to 20 km/h."

After extensive testing of the prototype A-19, it was adopted by the Red Army. In 1933, the barrel of a 152-mm cannon of the 1910/1930 model was placed on the carriage of this gun, and the 152-mm cannon of the 1910/1934 model entered service, but work on improving the single carriage continued. And in 1937, two hull guns on a unified carriage were adopted by the Red Army - a 122-mm gun of the 1931/1937 model and a 152-mm howitzer - a gun of the 1937 model. In this carriage, the lifting and balancing mechanisms are divided into two independent units, the elevation angle is increased to 65°, and a normalized sight with an independent aiming line is installed.

The 122-mm cannon brought many bitter moments to the Germans. There was not a single artillery preparation in which these wonderful guns did not participate. With their fire they crushed the armor of Hitler's Ferdinands and Panthers. It is no coincidence that this gun was used to create the famous ISU-122 self-propelled gun. And it is no coincidence that this gun was one of the first to open fire on fascist Berlin on April 20, 1945.

122 mm gun model 1931/1937

B-4 203-MM HOWITSER MODEL 1931

Direct fire from high-power howitzers of the reserve artillery of the main command (ARGK) is not provided for by any shooting rules. But it was precisely for such shooting that the commander of the battery of 203-mm guard howitzers, Captain I. Vedmedenko, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On the night of June 9, 1944, on one of the sections of the Leningrad Front, under the noise of a firefight that drowned out the roar of engines, tractors dragged two huge massive guns on caterpillar tracks to the front line. When everything calmed down, only 1200 m separated the camouflaged guns from the target - a giant pillbox. Reinforced concrete walls two meters thick; three floors going underground; armored dome; approaches covered by fire from flank bunkers - it was not for nothing that this structure was considered the main center of enemy resistance. And as soon as dawn broke, Vedmedenko’s howitzers opened fire. For two hours, hundred-kilogram concrete-piercing shells destroyed two-meter walls, until finally the enemy fortress ceased to exist...

“For the first time, our artillerymen began direct fire at concrete fortifications from high-power ARGC howitzers in battles with the White Finns in the winter of 1939/1940,” says Marshal of Artillery N. Yakovlev. “And this method of suppressing pillboxes was born not within the walls of headquarters, not in academies, and on the front line among the soldiers and officers directly servicing these wonderful guns."

In 1914, the war of maneuver that the generals were counting on lasted only a few months, after which it took on a positional character. It was then that the number of howitzers began to rapidly increase in the field artillery of the warring powers - guns capable, unlike cannons, of hitting horizontal targets: destroying field fortifications and shooting at troops hiding behind folds of terrain.

Howitzer; As a rule, it conducts overhead fire. Lethal effect a projectile is determined not so much by its kinetic energy at the target as by the amount of explosive contained in it. The initial velocity of the projectile, which is lower than that of a cannon, makes it possible to reduce the pressure of the powder gases and shorten the barrel. As a result, the wall thickness is reduced, the recoil force is reduced and the carriage is lighter. As a result, the howitzer turns out to be two to three times lighter than a gun of the same caliber. Another important advantage of the howitzer is that by changing the size of the charge, it is possible to obtain a beam of trajectories at a constant elevation angle. True, the variable charge requires separate charging, which reduces the rate of fire, but this disadvantage is more than compensated by its advantages. In the armies of the leading powers, by the end of the war, howitzers accounted for 40-50% of the total artillery fleet.

But the trend towards the construction of powerful field-type defensive structures and a dense network of long-term firing points urgently required heavy guns with increased range, high projectile power and canopy of fire. In 1931, following the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Soviet designers created a domestic high-power howitzer B-4. It began to be designed at the Artkom Design Bureau in 1927, where the work was headed by F. Lander. After his death, the project was transferred to the Bolshevik plant, where Magdesiev was the chief designer, and Gavrilov, Torbin and others were among the designers.

B-4 - a 203-mm howitzer of the 1931 model - was intended to destroy particularly strong concrete, reinforced concrete and armored structures, to combat large-caliber enemy artillery or covered with strong structures, and to suppress distant targets.

To speed up the equipping of the Red Army with new weapons, production was organized simultaneously at two factories. During the development process, working drawings were changed at each plant, adapting to technological capabilities. As a result, practically two different howitzers began to enter service. In 1937, unified drawings were worked out not by changing the design, but by assembling individual parts and assemblies that had already been tested in production and operation. The only innovation was that it was mounted on caterpillar tracks. allowing firing directly from the ground without special platforms.

The B-4 carriage became the basis for a whole family of high-power guns. In 1939, a number of intermediate samples were completed by the 152 mm Br-19 cannon and the 280 mm Br-5 mortar. These works were carried out by a team of designers. plant "Barricade" under the leadership of Hero of Socialist Labor I. Ivanov.

Thus, the creation of a complex of high-power ground guns on a single carriage was completed: cannons, howitzers, and mortars. The implements were transported by tractors. For this purpose, the guns were disassembled into two parts: the barrel was removed from the carriage and placed on a special gun carriage, and the carriage, connected to the limber, made up the carriage.

Of this entire complex, the B-4 howitzer is the most widely used. The combination of a powerful projectile with a large elevation angle and a variable charge giving 10 initial speeds determined its brilliant combat qualities. At any horizontal targets at a distance from 5 to 18 km, the howitzer could fire along a trajectory of the most favorable steepness.

B-4 lived up to the hopes placed on it. Having begun her combat career on the Karelian Isthmus in 1939, she marched along the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, participating in all major artillery preparations, storming of fortresses and large cities.

203 mm howitzer model 1931

Projectile type:

Initial speed, m/sec

Concrete-piercing

High Explosive

Concrete-piercing

ML-20 152-MM HOWITTER-GUN MODEL 1937

“When they ask me what type of artillery shooting places the highest demands on the art of personnel,” says Marshal of Artillery G. Odintsov, “I answer: counter-battery combat. It is, as a rule, carried out at long firing ranges and usually results in a duel with the enemy, who fires back, threatening the shooter. The one with the highest skill has the greatest chance of winning a duel. more precisely a weapon, more powerful projectile.

The experience of the fronts showed that the best Soviet weapon for counter-battery warfare was the 152-mm howitzer-cannon of the 1937 model ML-20."

The history of the creation of the ML-20 dates back to 1932, when a group of designers of the All-Union Gun Arsenal Association - V. Grabin, N. Komarov and V. Drozdov - proposed creating a powerful 152-mm hull gun by placing the barrel of a 152-mm Schneider siege gun on a carriage 122 mm A-19 guns. Calculations have shown that such an idea when installing a muzzle brake, which takes away part of the recoil energy, is real. Tests of the prototype confirmed the validity of the technical risk taken, and a hull-mounted 152-mm gun of the 1910/34 model entered service. In the mid-30s, a decision was made to modernize this weapon. The modernization work was headed by the young designer F. Petrov. Having studied the features of the A-19 cannon carriage, he identified the main disadvantages of this weapon: the lack of suspension at the front limited the speed of movement; the lifting and balancing mechanism was difficult to fine-tune and provided insufficient high speed vertical aiming; transferring the barrel from the traveling position to the firing position and back required a lot of energy and time; the cradle with recoil devices was difficult to manufacture.

Having developed a new cast upper machine, dividing the combined lifting and balancing mechanism into two independent ones - a sector lifting and balancing one, designing a front end with suspension, a sight with an independent aiming line and a cradle with a cast trunnion clip instead of a forged one, the designers created, for the first time in world practice, an intermediate type gun with properties of both guns and howitzers. The elevation angle, increased to 65°, and 13 variable charges made it possible to obtain a gun that, like a howitzer, has hinged trajectories and, like a cannon, high initial projectile velocities.

In the development and creation of a howitzer gun Active participation hosted by A. Bulashev, S. Gurenko, M. Burnyshev, A. Ilyin and many others.

“The ML-20, which we developed in 1.5 months, was submitted for state testing after the first 10 shots fired at the factory range,” recalls Lenin and State Prize laureate, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lieutenant General of the Engineering and Technical Service, Doctor technical sciences F. Petrov. These tests were completed at the beginning of 1937, the gun was put into service and put into mass production that same year. At first everything went well, but suddenly the barrel of one, then another, then a third howitzer-guns from shots at small elevation angles began to "give a candle" - spontaneously lift up to the maximum angle. It turned out that for a number of reasons the worm gear was not self-braking enough. For us, and especially for me, this phenomenon caused a lot of trouble, until after tedious days and sleepless nights it was found quite simple solution: We proposed placing a spring-loaded steel disc with a small adjustable gap in the threaded cover that secures the worm in the crankcase. At the moment of firing, the end part of the worm comes into contact with the disk, which, creating a large additional friction, prevents the worm from turning.

What a relief I felt when, having found such a solution and quickly sketched out sketches, I introduced it to the director and chief engineer of the plant, as well as the head of military acceptance. All of them found themselves in the assembly shop that night, which, however, happened often, especially when it came to fulfilling defense orders in a short time. An order was immediately given to produce the parts of the device by morning.

When developing this weapon, we paid special attention to increasing manufacturability and reducing cost. It was with the production of the howitzer-gun in artillery technology that the widespread use of steel shaped casting began. Many components - the upper and lower machines, the hinge and trunk parts of the frames, the wheel hubs - were made of cheap carbon steel."

Originally intended for "reliable action against artillery, headquarters, establishments and field installations", the 152 mm howitzer gun turned out to be a much more flexible, powerful and effective weapon than previously thought. The combat experience of the battles of the Great Patriotic War continuously expanded the range of tasks assigned to this remarkable weapon. And in the “Service Manual”, published at the end of the war, the ML-20 was prescribed to fight enemy artillery, suppress long-range targets, destroy pillboxes and powerful bunkers, fight tanks and armored trains, and even destroy balloons.

During the Great Patriotic War, in all major artillery preparations, in counter-battery combat, the 152-mm howitzer gun of the 1937 model invariably took part in the assault on fortified areas. But this weapon played a particularly honorable role in the destruction of heavy fascist tanks. A heavy projectile fired with a high initial velocity easily tore the Tiger's turret off its shoulder strap. There were battles when these towers literally flew in the air with gun barrels dangling limply. And it is no coincidence that the ML-20 became the basis of the famous ISU-152.

But perhaps the most significant recognition of the excellent qualities of this weapon should be considered the fact that the ML-20 was in service with Soviet artillery not only during the Great Patriotic War, but also in the post-war years.

BS-3 100-MM FIELD GUN MODEL 1944

“In the spring of 1943, when Hitler’s Tigers, Panthers, and Ferdinands began to appear on the battlefields in large numbers,” recalls the famous artillery designer V. Grabin, “in a note addressed to the Supreme Commander, I proposed, along with the resumption of production 57 mm anti-tank gun: ZIS-2 guns, create a new weapon - a 100 mm anti-tank gun with a powerful projectile.

Why did we choose the new 100 mm caliber for ground artillery, and not the already existing 85 and 107 mm guns? The choice was not accidental. We believed that we needed a gun whose muzzle energy would be one and a half times greater than that of a 107-mm gun of the 1940 model. And 100-mm guns have been successfully used in the navy for a long time; a unitary cartridge was developed for them, while the 107-mm gun had separate loading. The presence of a shot mastered in production played a decisive role, since its development takes a lot of time. And we didn't have much time...

We could not borrow the design of a naval cannon: it was too bulky and heavy. The requirements for high power, mobility, lightness, compactness, and high rate of fire led to a number of innovations. First of all, a high-performance muzzle brake was needed. The previously used slot brake had an efficiency of 25-30%. For the 100 mm gun, it was necessary to develop a double-chamber brake design with an efficiency of 60%. To increase the rate of fire, a semi-automatic wedge bolt was used. The layout of the gun was entrusted to the leading designer A. Khvorostin."

The outlines of the gun began to appear on whatman paper during the May holidays of 1943. In a few days, the creative groundwork was realized, which was formed on the basis of long thoughts, painful searches, studying combat experience and analyzing the best artillery designs in the world. The barrel and semi-automatic bolt were designed by I. Griban, the recoil devices and hydropneumatic balancing mechanism were designed by F. Kaleganov, the cast cradle was designed by B. Lasman, and the equal-strength upper machine was designed by V. Shishkin. The issue of choosing a wheel was difficult to resolve. The design bureau usually used automobile wheels of GAZ-AA and ZIS-5 trucks for guns, but they were not suitable for the new gun. The next car was a five-ton YaAZ. However, its wheel turned out to be too heavy and large. Then the idea was born to install twin wheels from GAZ-AA, which made it possible to fit into the given weight and dimensions.

A month later, working drawings were sent to production, and five months later, the first prototype of the famous BS-3, a gun designed to fight tanks and other mechanized vehicles, to fight artillery, to suppress long-range targets, to destroy fire weapons of infantry and manpower, enemy forces.

"Three design features distinguish BS-3 from previously developed domestic systems, says the laureate State Prize A. Khvorostin. - This is a torsion bar suspension, a hydropneumatic balancing mechanism and a carriage made according to the inverted support triangle pattern. The choice of a torsion bar suspension and a hydropneumatic balancing mechanism was determined by the requirements for lightness and compactness of the units, and a change in the carriage design significantly reduced the load on the beds when firing at maximum angles of rotation of the upper machine. If in conventional carriage designs each frame was designed for 2/3 of the recoil force of the gun, then in the new scheme the force acting on the frame at any horizontal aiming angle did not exceed 1/2 of the recoil force. In addition, the new scheme simplified the equipment of the combat position.

Thanks to all these new products, BS-3 stood out for its extremely high metal utilization rate. This means that in its design it was possible to achieve the most perfect combination of power and mobility."

The BS-3 was tested by a commission chaired by General Panikhin, a representative of the artillery commander of the Soviet Army. According to V. Grabin, one of the most interesting moments was shooting at a tiger tank. A cross was drawn on the tank's turret with chalk. The gunner received the initial data and fired a shot from 1500 m. Approaching the tank, everyone was convinced: the shell hit almost the cross and pierced the armor. After this, the tests continued according to the given program, and the commission recommended the weapon for service.

Tests of the BS-Z led to a new method of combating heavy tanks. Once at the training ground, a shot was fired at a captured Ferdinand from a distance of 1500 m. And although, as expected, the shell did not penetrate the 200-mm frontal armor of the self-propelled gun, its gun and control system were damaged. BS-Z turned out to be capable of effectively fighting enemy tanks and self-propelled guns at distances exceeding the range of a direct shot. In this case, as experience has shown, the crew of enemy vehicles was struck by fragments of armor that broke off from the hull due to the enormous overvoltages that occurred in the metal at the moment the projectile hit the armor. The living force that the projectile retained at these ranges was sufficient to bend and distort the armor.

In August 1944, when the BS-Z began to arrive at the front, the war was already nearing its end, so the experience of combat use of this weapon was limited. Nevertheless, the BS-3 rightfully occupies an honorable place among the guns of the Great Patriotic War, because it contained ideas that became widespread in artillery designs of the post-war period.

M-30 122-MM HOWITSER MODEL 1938

“Wow! A gray cloud shot up on the enemy side. The fifth shell hit the dugout where the ammunition was stored. A grenade with a fuse set to slow down struck several rolls and exploded inside the warehouse. Following the barely audible sound of the explosion, a large black pillar rose high up smoke, and a huge explosion shook the surroundings” - this is how in the book “Howitzers Fire” P. Kudinov, a former artilleryman and war participant, describes the everyday combat work of the M-30, the famous 122-mm divisional howitzer of the 1938 model.

Before the First World War, the artillery of the Western powers adopted the 105 mm caliber for divisional howitzers. Russian artillery thought went its own way: the army was armed with 122-mm divisional howitzers of the 1910 model. Combat experience has shown that a projectile of this caliber, while possessing the most advantageous fragmentation effect, at the same time provides a minimally satisfactory high-explosive effect. However, at the end of the 20s, the 122-mm howitzer of the 1910 model did not meet the views of experts on the nature of the future war: it had insufficient range, rate of fire and mobility.

According to the new "Artillery Weapon System for 1929-1932", approved by the Revolutionary Military Council in May 1929, it was planned to create a 122-mm howitzer with a weight in the stowed position of 2200 kg, a firing range of 11-12 km and a combat rate of fire of 6 rounds per minute. Since the model developed according to these requirements turned out to be too heavy, the modernized 122-mm howitzer of the 1910/30 model was retained in service. And some experts began to lean toward the idea of ​​abandoning the 122-mm caliber and adopting 105-mm howitzers.

“In March 1937, at a meeting in the Kremlin,” recalls Hero of Socialist Labor, Lieutenant General of the Engineering and Technical Service F. Petrov, “I spoke about the reality of creating a 122-mm howitzer and, answering numerous questions, stated what was said, bills. My optimism was fueled by the great, as it seemed to me then, success of our team in creating a 152-mm howitzer - the ML-20 cannon. The meeting identified a plant (unfortunately, not the one where I worked), which was to develop a prototype. Feeling great responsibility for everything I said at the meeting in the Kremlin, I proposed to the management of my plant to take the initiative in developing a 122-mm howitzer. For this purpose, a small group of designers was organized. The very first estimates, which used diagrams of existing guns, showed that the task was really difficult But the persistence and enthusiasm of the designers - S. Dernov, A. Ilyin, N. Dobrovolsky, A. Chernykh, V. Burylov, A. Drozdov and N. Kostrulin - took their toll: in the fall of 1937, the defense of two projects took place: developed by the team of V. Sidorenko and ours. Our project received approval.

According to tactical and technical data, primarily in terms of maneuverability and flexibility of fire - the ability to quickly transfer fire from one target to another - our howitzer fully met the requirements of the GAU. In terms of its most important characteristic - muzzle energy - it was more than twice as good as the 1910/30 model howitzer. Our gun also differed favorably from the 105-mm divisional howitzers of the armies of capitalist countries.

The estimated weight of the gun is about 2200 kg: 450 kg less than the howitzer developed by V. Sidorenko’s team. By the end of 1938, all tests were completed and the gun was put into service under the name 122-mm howitzer model 1938."

For the first time, the combat wheels were equipped with an automobile-type travel brake. The transition from traveling to combat position took no more than 1-1.5 minutes. When the frames were moved apart, the springs were automatically turned off, and the beds themselves were automatically secured in the extended position. In the stowed position, the barrel was secured without being disconnected from the recoil device rods and without being pulled back. To simplify and reduce the cost of production in the howitzer, parts and assemblies of existing artillery systems were widely used. So, for example, the bolt was taken from a standard howitzer of the 1910/30 model, the sight from a 152-mm howitzer - a gun of the 1937 model, the wheels - from a divisional 76-mm gun of the 1936 model, etc. Many parts were made by casting and stamping. That is why the M-30 was one of the simplest and most inexpensive domestic artillery systems.

An interesting fact testifies to the great survivability of this howitzer. Once during the war, it became known at the plant that the troops had a gun that fired 18 thousand shots. The factory offered to exchange this copy for a new one. And after a thorough factory inspection, it turned out that the howitzer had not lost its qualities and was suitable for further use. combat use. This conclusion received unexpected confirmation: when forming the next echelon, as luck would have it, one gun was missing. And with the consent of military acceptance, the unique howitzer again went to the front as a newly manufactured weapon.

M-30 on direct fire

The experience of the war showed: the M-30 brilliantly performed all the tasks that were assigned to it. It destroyed and suppressed enemy manpower in open areas. and located in field-type shelters, destroyed and suppressed infantry fire weapons, destroyed field-type structures and fought artillery, etc. enemy mortars.

But most clearly the advantages of the 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model were manifested in the fact that its capabilities turned out to be wider than prescribed by the service management. -During the days of the heroic defense of Moscow, howitzers shot at fascist tanks with direct fire. Later, the experience was consolidated by the creation of a cumulative projectile for the M-30 and an additional clause in the service manual: “The howitzer can be used to fight tanks, self-propelled artillery units and other armored vehicles of the enemy.”

See the continuation on the website: WWII - Weapons of Victory - Artillery of WWII Part II

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 3/2000, pp. 50-54

Experience in the use of artillery in the Great Patriotic War and modern practice

Colonel A. B. BUDYAEV,

candidate of military sciences

FIFTY-FIVE years separate us from the day when the Great Patriotic War ended. The participants have long since completed their service in the Armed Forces, the combat experience they accumulated is gradually being forgotten, and yet this experience has enduring significance.

Today, scientific research is increasingly focused on those forms and methods of armed struggle that are used abroad during local wars. However, they involve the use of the latest weapons and military equipment, which our Armed Forces, given the deplorable state of the country’s economy, are unlikely to be equipped with in the near future. That is why, when determining ways to increase the effectiveness of the combat use of artillery, it is necessary to turn to the rich heritage of the artillerymen of the Great Patriotic War.

In the preparation and conduct of military and military operations, one of the main questions is on the organization of artillery reconnaissance. IN During the war, it was divided into air and ground. Aerial reconnaissance was carried out by crews of corrective reconnaissance aircraft, units of which were transferred to operational subordination to front artillery headquarters, and from observation balloons. Ground reconnaissance was carried out from observation points (OP) of artillery commanders of all units and artillery instrumental reconnaissance. In addition, special teams were assigned to monitor enemy artillery, and in some cases artillery reconnaissance groups were sent behind the front line. Then it was believed that discovering a target was no less valor than hitting it. This position was confirmed in literally every battle. If the artillery fired not just “in the direction of the enemy,” but at targets that had been scouted in advance and accurately, success in battle was guaranteed.

The enemy always sought to act suddenly, so he carefully camouflaged his battle formations, and it was not easy to open his fire system. Under these conditions, artillery reconnaissance worked with particular intensity, and the duty of artillery reconnaissance officers at observation points was organized on the principle of guard duty, which emphasized the responsibility of the personnel on duty. This approach had a beneficial effect on the discipline of observers, the organization of their work, and prevented the unmasking of reconnaissance sites.

As combat experience shows, optical reconnaissance had the greatest effect in cases where the reconnaissance sector assigned to one observer did not exceed 1-00 (6°), so that he had the opportunity to study every fold of the terrain and detect even subtle targets.

Optical reconnaissance was based on a wide network of observation points, some of which were moved forward into infantry battle formations, and sometimes beyond the line of combat contact of troops. It also happened that the most distant targets could be discovered from points located at heights, in the depths of our battle formation, and targets on the front line could only be reconnoitred when we were as close as possible to them. So, in

During the battle of Stalingrad, scouts from one of the artillery regiments, sergeants Karyan and Razuvaev, conducted observation at a distance of 200 m from the enemy and discovered three well-camouflaged guns, a machine-gun battery and a large dugout during the day. An artillery battery was discovered in the same regiment, the exact coordinates of which could only be determined when Lieutenant Chernyak came close to the German front line. In both cases, the targets were destroyed.

Very often, artillery reconnaissance officers were included in military reconnaissance groups and night search parties. With them, they infiltrated behind the front line of the enemy’s defense and reconnoitered targets, and subsequently often controlled fire.

The use of all types of artillery reconnaissance, the inclusion of artillerymen in military reconnaissance groups, as well as the careful organization of the work of each observer, the collection and processing of intelligence data ensured the receipt of fairly complete information about the targets. Major General of Artillery M.V. Rostovtsev, sharing his combat experience, wrote: “... our fire will always be adequately accurate if the artillery commanders painstakingly engage in reconnaissance, and the combined arms commanders contribute to this in every possible way.”

Let's consider how today we can using existing artillery reconnaissance means to increase its effectiveness.

To conduct reconnaissance in artillery units of combined arms formations and units, it is advisable to have artillery observer groups of two or three people: a group commander (a sergeant, and in some cases an officer - a specialist in artillery fire control and topographic geodetic reference), a reconnaissance rangefinder, a signalman-sniper. The group's armament should include a laser rangefinder with a coordinate converter, a navigation device, a portable radio station, and special small arms.

We propose to have the number of groups equal to the number of guns in an artillery battery (in a mortar battery - the number of fire platoons). We believe that in rocket artillery and army (corps) artillery, optical reconnaissance should be carried out by existing agencies.

The presence of such a structure of reconnaissance organs at the regimental and division level will make it possible to organize the effective defeat of the enemy from the maximum artillery firing ranges. For example, when going on the defensive outside of contact with the enemy, a network of forward observation posts must be deployed in advance behind the front edge of our troops. Observation points must be equipped in engineering terms and carefully camouflaged. From them, targets for which artillery fire is being prepared, as well as the most likely routes of enemy advance, should be clearly visible. After completing tasks from the forward OP, the groups, continuing to control artillery fire, move along a predetermined route to the battle formations of their troops.

Improving the organizational structure of artillery reconnaissance will be facilitated by the inclusion of units, formations and formations in the staff of artillery headquarters artillery reconnaissance control points.

One more important issue is placement of artillery in combat formations of troops. One of the main principles of organizing artillery combat operations during the Great Patriotic War - massing it in the main directions∗ - remains relevant in modern conditions. This implies both the massing of artillery units (units) and the massing of their fire.

According to the current statutory documents, the main firing positions are selected (depending on the organizational affiliation of the artillery and the conditions of the situation) at a distance of 2-6 km from the forward units of friendly troops. This situation has remained unchanged since the Great Patriotic War. However, the firing range of cannon artillery in those years averaged 10 km. Today, artillery capabilities exceed this figure more than twice. Thus, modern divisional artillery is capable of hitting the enemy to almost the entire depth of the combat mission of a formation in an offensive. As during the war, artillery firing positions are assigned in the direction of the main attack of our troops. In rather narrow zones of the upcoming offensive of units and formations, a significant amount of artillery is concentrated, and no less than 2-3 hours before the start of artillery preparation for the attack. With modern reconnaissance means, hiding such a group from the enemy is very problematic. In addition, by concentrating a large number of artillery fire units in the direction of the main attack, we give the enemy the opportunity to reveal our plan in advance. In addition, when going on the offensive on the move with advance from the depths, the deployment of combined arms units for the attack will take place in the area of ​​artillery firing positions, which at this time is conducting high-density fire, carrying out, as a rule, the last fire raid of the artillery preparation for the attack. Firing positions, especially in summer conditions, will be shrouded in dust and smoke, which will significantly complicate the actions of tank and motorized rifle units.

In our opinion, the massing of artillery must be ensured primarily through the massing of its fire. Having placed the main part of the firing positions on the flanks of the combat formations of units, operating in the direction of the main attack (the breakthrough area), we will, firstly, mislead the enemy regarding our intentions, and secondly, we will ensure the necessary depth of his defeat. In the main direction, you can equip false firing positions and simulate firing from them with nomadic guns. This arrangement is also supported by the fact that the effectiveness of firing at platoon strongholds from firing positions located on the flanks is 1.5-2 times higher than when they are hit from the front.

In a defensive battle, the main artillery firing positions are assigned in tank-hazardous directions between the battalions of the first and second echelons. Artillery groups of units, formations, and sometimes formations are deployed in a small space. Such a massing of artillery units increases their vulnerability and unmasks areas on the retention of which the stability of the defense depends. The increased depth capabilities of artillery make it possible to designate areas of main firing positions at a greater distance from our forward edge. So, for grouping the artillery of a formation, they can be chosen between the second and third positions of defense of our troops and away from the direction of concentration of the main efforts. It is also possible to deploy parts of the association’s artillery group there; in some cases, it can be placed behind the third position.

The expediency of this approach is also indicated by the fact that during the fire repelling of an attack, especially when the enemy has penetrated into the defense areas of the first echelon battalions, the artillery must fire with maximum intensity, without moving to reserve firing positions.

Between the first and second positions in the most important tank-hazardous directions, taking into account terrain conditions, firing positions should be assigned to artillery battalions from the regimental artillery group. They must be technically equipped and camouflaged. In case of a fight against enemy armored vehicles that have broken through into the op area, it is necessary to prepare sites for direct fire.

Requires separate consideration the issue of placing command and observation posts. IN In an offensive battle, combined arms formations (units), as a rule, are reinforced by a fairly large amount of artillery. In addition, they are also assigned supporting artillery units and units. Command and observation posts of batteries, divisions, and observation posts of artillery groups cover in a dense network all areas more or less suitable for their deployment. In many cases they are located literally “overlay”. For example, a regiment advancing in a breakthrough area can be reinforced and supported by at least two artillery battalions. This means that it will be necessary to deploy at least one and a half dozen command and observation posts at intervals of 100-200 m along the front with a depth of about 500 m. If we take into account that the command and observation posts of combined arms commanders, artillery senior commanders, combat arms and special troops will be located in the same area, the difficulties arising in connection with this will become clear.

There is a known case in the history of war when, in the zone of action of a formation that was preparing for an offensive, there were up to ten command and observation posts of infantry and artillery at a commanding height. They had the most varied design: some were well camouflaged and equipped with strong ceilings, others were built hastily, representing only open cracks. The entire area in this area and on the approaches to it was covered with a web of wires. At each command and observation post, combat life flowed differently. In some, the movement of soldiers and officers was strictly regulated. They camouflaged themselves on the approaches to the NP, choosing hidden paths to move. In others, everyone walked around openly, unmasking not only themselves, but also their neighbors. As soon as the division began its offensive, enemy artillery opened fire along the heights. Unit control was disrupted, which primarily affected the interaction between infantry and artillery and led to large losses of our troops.

The experience of war, as well as the training of troops in the post-war period, shows that the issues of placing command and observation posts, especially in motorized rifle and artillery units located in close proximity to the enemy, should be resolved centralized in combined arms headquarters. When assessing the terrain, the combined arms headquarters must determine areas suitable for the location of observation and command observation posts. The fewer of them there are in the offensive zone, the more organization is needed in their use. Otherwise, most commanders will prefer areas convenient for observation, and it may turn out that the best ones will be occupied by those who need them less.

In addition, in each area where observation posts are located, it is necessary to appoint a general commander, giving him responsibility for maintaining order. He must determine camouflage measures at observation posts and monitor their implementation, outline approach routes, and organize their equipment. In open sections of the route it is necessary to install vertical masks, and in areas under enemy fire, communication passages and cracks must be torn off. Equipment locations should also be equipped. On routes leading to the area where observation posts are located, traffic controllers should be posted to meet arriving liaison officers and messengers and point them in the right direction.

We believe that it is necessary to abandon the stationing of commanders of artillery units of the army (corps) and rocket artillery at the control point. Their workplace should be fire control points, located in areas of firing positions. This is due to the fact that it is at firing positions that a large amount of work is carried out to carry out fire missions, combat, technical and logistics support. In addition, this will reduce the total number of observation posts and reduce the losses of artillery unit commanders.

To summarize what has been said, we would like to once again emphasize the need for a creative approach to the experience of the Great Patriotic War, its processing taking into account the peculiarities of armed struggle in modern conditions.

∗ In the most important operations of the final stage of the war, artillery densities reached 300 guns per 1 km of the breakthrough area.

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Appendix 7

Deliveries and losses of artillery and ammunition in the Great Patriotic War

Table 46. Supply of artillery pieces to the fronts from June 22, 1941 to May 5, 1945

Table 47. Supply of artillery pieces to new formations in 1941–1944.

Table 48. Supply of artillery systems by industry from June 22, 1941 to May 5, 1945.

Table 51. Industry supplies of tank weapons from June 22, 1941 to May 5, 1945.

Table 53. Ammunition consumption in 1941–1945 (thousand pieces)

Table 54. Ammunition production 1941–1945 (thousand pieces)

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EXPERIENCE TEACHES ARTILLERISTS

For centuries, artillerymen and engineers have strived to make artillery weapons technically perfect. How much effort, persistence and hard work it took to achieve this. But these efforts were not in vain. Now our artillery can successfully solve all the tasks that arise before it in battle.
A weapon, no matter how perfect it is, cannot by itself decide the fate of a battle. You must be able to use it correctly in battle, and be able to extract the greatest benefit from it.
The largest technical improvements in artillery usually appeared as a result of wars; In battles and battles, new principles for the combat use of artillery were born.
During the war, mistakes were corrected and new techniques for the combat use of artillery were tested in practice. The experience of the civil war was very valuable in this regard.

At the beginning of the Civil War, artillery was used in battle in the old way, as they were accustomed to using it at the end of the First World War. In connection with new forms of combat, it was necessary to use artillery in a completely new way. The old artillery tactics were replaced by tactics of flexible maneuver and decisive concentration of artillery in the direction of the main attack of the troops.
The following examples show how old outdated traditions in the combat use of artillery were broken. In October 1918, the seventy-thousand-strong White Guard army of General Krasnov, armed and equipped by the Germans, surrounded Tsaritsyn and pressed the heroic defenders of the city to the banks of the Volga. The number of Soviet troops defending Tsaritsyn did not exceed 50 thousand people. The supply of shells and ammunition among the city’s defenders was coming to an end, and the routes of communication with Moscow and the Caucasus were cut off by the White Guards. The situation was difficult. On October 16, the White Guards occupied the Voroponovo station, located just 10 kilometers west of the city, and continued to advance forward, showering shells on the Red Army units. Due to a lack of shells and rifle cartridges, the heroic defenders of Tsaritsyn increasingly had to fight back with bayonets and swords. By the end of the day on October 16, the front was already 7 kilometers from the city. In the evening, our observers noticed that new military units had arrived to help the White Guards. As it turned out later, a White Guard officer brigade of about a thousand people approached the front.
The critical moment has arrived. Tsaritsyn was in mortal danger.
At this difficult moment, Comrade Stalin, who, on instructions from the Central Committee of the Party, personally led the defense of Tsaritsyn, mobilized all his forces and means to repel the enemy. Almost all artillery pieces and ammunition were concentrated on the central sector of the front opposite the Voroponovo station.
There were about 200 guns on a 40-kilometer front. Almost all of them were now converging on the central section of the front. The batteries stood just a few dozen paces from one another, preparing to repel the attack of the White Guards.
At dawn, the white artillery opened fire, and soon their infantry moved to attack. Officer regiments marched in full dress uniform, chain after chain, column after column. The officer brigade was ahead, and behind it were the regiments of General Krasnov. The White Guards counted on the fact that the Red Army could not stand it, that the mere sight of a steadily moving forward mass of armed people would demoralize them. The artillery of the Red Army was silent: it was waiting for the conditional signal. Now the advanced chains of the Whites are half a kilometer from our infantry... Only 400 meters remain... Every second one could expect that the chains of the White Guards would change their fast step to a swift run and go on the attack. At this moment, a signal was given: 4 high bursts of shrapnel - 4 bright white smoke clouds hanging in the clear morning sky. And after this the whole steppe began to rumble. The sounds of gunfire and shell explosions merged into a continuous roar. Each battery fired at its assigned section of the front, and together they created a continuous wall of fire. The shells exploded in the very thick of the enemy's advancing columns. Having suffered heavy losses, the White Guards lay down. They were stopped, but not yet defeated. At this time, an armored train approached from the north along the ring railway line; on the right and left flanks of the front sector, trucks converted into armored vehicles and armed with machine guns rushed forward; The batteries moved their fire deep into the White Guards' positions in order to cut off the escape routes for their advanced units. The red infantry launched a counterattack. She moved forward quickly. And as the artillery carried the fire further and further, a still smoking battlefield, strewn with the corpses of the White Guards and plowed up by shells, opened up before the eyes of the observers. The half-destroyed White Guard regiments rolled back in disarray to the south and west, scattering across the steppe. The siege ring was broken. Red Tsaritsyn was saved. In 1919, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Stalin led the defeat of the White Guard troops of General Yudenich, who were rushing to Petrograd. The position of the Soviet troops was complicated by the fact that a counter-revolutionary rebellion was raised in the rear of the Red Army at the forts “Krasnaya Gorka” and “Seraya Loshad”. It was impossible to take well-armed forts by storm, advancing only from land with the support of small artillery. Comrade Stalin proposed attacking the rebel forts with a combined attack from land and sea, using the powerful artillery of the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Comrade Stalin's plan was approved and implemented. The suppression of the rebel forts was carried out brilliantly. The rebel forts, unable to withstand powerful attacks from naval artillery, were taken by Red Army units and detachments of Baltic sailors and St. Petersburg workers. Yudenich's army was defeated and its remnants were thrown back to Estonia. Artillery provided powerful support to the infantry on the Southern Front when troops under the leadership of M.V. Frunze stormed Perekop. The artillery of the First Cavalry Army also acted boldly and decisively, showing examples of skillful interaction with cavalry and high maneuverability on the battlefield. Studying the experience of past wars helped our party and the Soviet Government to correctly outline further steps along the path of development of Soviet artillery and clearly define the tasks that artillery should solve in battle. The re-equipment of artillery with new types of guns that followed in 1937 and 1938 contributed to a significant increase in its power. The power of the crushing blows of Soviet artillery was soon experienced by the enemies of our Motherland, who dared to encroach on the inviolability of the borders of the country of the Soviets. In the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River in 1939 and in the Soviet-Finnish War in 1939/40, our artillery provided powerful support to infantry and tanks, hit enemy personnel, destroyed his military equipment and destroyed his powerful engineering structures.

After the First World War of 1914–1918, many military experts in Western Europe argued that artillery was no longer decisive in battle and that in modern wars the success of the battle would be decided by tanks and aircraft - these new types of troops. The Nazis thought so too. They assigned the main role on the battlefield to tanks and aircraft and believed that artillery fire could be replaced by mortar fire. The Nazis hoped that the ability to quickly produce mortars in mass quantities would make the mortar a decisive force in an infantry offensive. Reality showed that they had cruelly miscalculated. The situation was no better in the artillery of the British and American armies. Only after the defeat at Dunkirk, the British began rearmament of their artillery and completed it by the end of the war, and the American army entered the war armed with light and anti-tank artillery with a slightly improved 75-mm French cannon of the 1897 model. The development of our Soviet artillery followed completely different paths. The plan for creating the armed forces of our state was based on taking into account the experience of past wars and on the principle of close interaction between all branches of the military in battle. While creating new types of troops - aviation and tanks - our party and the Soviet Government paid unrelenting attention to the development of artillery, improving its military equipment and increasing the power of its fire.
The Communist Party and the Soviet Government also tirelessly cared for the education of well-trained artillery personnel devoted to the cause of the party and our Socialist Motherland. In 1937, on the day when the Soviet people honored their aviation and celebrated its successes, Comrade Stalin gave a speech in the Kremlin, which pointed out the importance of artillery in modern warfare: “It’s not just about aviation in modern warfare. The success of the war is not determined only by aviation. Who thinks that with the help of one powerful aviation; you can win the war - he is deeply mistaken. If you and I look into history, we will see what important role Artillery played a role in all wars. Aviation on the battlefield appeared relatively recently; she begins the first fight with the enemy in the deep rear, instills fear and panic, shakes the enemy morally, but this is not what is required for the final defeat and victory over the enemy. Artillery was always required to decide the success of a war. How did Napoleon win? First of all, with its artillery. How were the French defeated near Sedan in 1870? Mainly artillery. Than in world war Did the French beat the Germans at Verdun? - Mainly artillery. For the success of a war, artillery is an extremely valuable branch of the military.” To make our artillery first-class, many conditions were required. First of all, what was needed was a powerful industry, equipped with the latest technology. Experienced designers were needed who had fully mastered modern science; engineers, technicians and workers, metallurgists, mathematicians, mechanics, otologists, electrical engineers, radio engineers were needed... The industrialization of the country, carried out under the leadership of our Communist Party, brought success to the cause. Without the development of heavy industry, we would not have had such powerful artillery, which has earned the honorable name of the main fire strike force of the Soviet Army. During the first five-year plans, research work expanded widely, which ensured the high technical level of our artillery. Institutes and technical schools have trained thousands of engineers and technicians. A cadre of skilled artillerymen was also trained. Thanks to the concerns of the Communist Party, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Army had first-class artillery, which in all respects was superior to the artillery of any capitalist country. During the war, work on creating new types of artillery weapons expanded even more widely. As you know, in the first two years of the war the Nazis had to strengthen armor protection their tanks: it turned out that their armor was easily penetrated by Soviet artillery shells. In 1943, new powerful tanks with the “terrifying” names “tiger” and “panther” appeared on the Soviet-German front. Their armor was very thick and durable. It was necessary to very quickly create a new anti-tank weapon that could penetrate the armor of powerful fascist tanks. In a very short time such a weapon was created. New gun appeared on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and immediately gained great popularity among Soviet soldiers; this gun penetrated the armor of all tanks and self-propelled guns that were in service with the Nazi army. Ground and anti-aircraft artillery were armed with new equipment. Rocket-propelled mortars entered service, the appearance of which on the battlefield came as a complete surprise to the Nazis. Soviet artillery was also well equipped with all types of reconnaissance and communications equipment and fire control devices.
Even during the period of defensive battles with superior enemy forces, the Communist Party foresaw a radical turn in the course of the war on the Soviet-German front and prepared the Soviet Army for the final defeat of the enemy. In the upcoming battles, the artillery, with its massive fire, was supposed to destroy enemy fortifications, suppress enemy fire weapons, exterminate manpower and clear the way for our infantry, cavalry and tanks. In the battles of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery successfully coped with all these tasks,

THE REAR HELPES THE FRONT

To wage a modern war you need a lot of military equipment and especially artillery weapons. War requires constant replenishment of the army's equipment and ammunition, and, moreover, many times more than in peacetime. In wartime, not only defense factories increase production, but also many “peaceful” factories switch to defense work. Without the powerful economic foundation of the Soviet state, without the selfless labor of our people in the rear, without the moral and political unity of the Soviet people, without their material and moral support, the Soviet Army would not have been able to defeat the enemy. The first months of the Great Patriotic War were very difficult for our industry. The unexpected attack of the Nazi invaders and their advance to the east forced the evacuation of factories from the western regions of the country to a safe zone - to the Urals and Siberia. The relocation of industrial enterprises to the east was carried out according to plans and under the leadership State Committee Defense. At remote stations and stops, in the steppe, in the taiga, new factories sprang up with fabulous speed. The machines began to work in the open air as soon as they were installed on the foundation; the front required military products, and there was no time to wait for the completion of the construction of factory buildings. Among others, artillery factories were also deployed. The speech of the Chairman of the State Committee played a huge role in strengthening our rear and mobilizing the masses to defend the Motherland. Defense of J.V. Stalin on the radio on July 3, 1941. In this speech, J.V. Stalin, on behalf of the party and the Soviet Government, called on the Soviet people to reorganize all work on a war footing as soon as possible. “We must,” said J.V. Stalin, “strengthen the rear of the Red Army, subordinating all our work to the interests of this cause, ensure the intensive work of all enterprises, produce more rifles, machine guns, guns, cartridges, shells, aircraft, organize the security of factories, power plants, telephone and telegraph communications, establish local air defense" The Communist Party quickly restructured the entire national economy, all the work of party, state and public organizations on a war footing. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, our people were able not only to fully provide the front with weapons and ammunition, but also to accumulate reserves for the successful completion of the war. Our party turned the Soviet country into a single combat camp and armed the home front workers with an unshakable faith in victory over the enemy. Labor productivity has increased enormously; new improvements in production technology have sharply reduced the production time of weapons for the army; The production output of artillery plants increased significantly. The quality of artillery weapons also continuously improved.
The calibers of tank and anti-tank artillery guns have increased. The initial speeds have increased significantly. The armor-piercing ability of Soviet artillery shells has increased several times. The maneuverability of artillery systems has been greatly increased. The most powerful self-propelled artillery in the world was created, armed with such heavy guns as a 152-mm howitzer gun and a 122-mm cannon. Soviet designers achieved especially great success in the field of jet

Neither fascist artillery nor fascist tanks could compete with Soviet artillery and tanks, although the Nazis robbed all of Western Europe, and the scientists and designers of Western Europe mostly worked for the Nazis. The Nazis had the largest metallurgical plants in Germany (Krupp plants) and many other factories in European countries occupied by Hitler's troops. And yet, neither the industry of all Western Europe, nor the experience of many Western European scientists and designers could provide the Nazis with superiority in the creation of new military equipment.
Thanks to the care of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, our country has produced a whole galaxy of talented designers who, during the war, created new types of weapons with exceptional speed.
Talented artillery designers V.G. Grabin, F.F. Petrov, I.I. Ivanov and many others created new, advanced models of artillery weapons.
Design work was also carried out at factories. During the war, the factories produced many prototypes of artillery weapons; a significant part of them went into mass production.
The Second World War required a lot of weapons, incomparably more than for previous wars. For example, in one of the greatest battles of the past, the Battle of Borodino, the two armies - Russian and French - had a total of 1227 guns.
At the beginning of the First World War, the armies of all the warring countries had 25,000 guns, which were scattered along all fronts. The saturation of the front with artillery was insignificant; Only in some areas of the breakthrough were they able to assemble up to 100–150 guns per kilometer of front.
Things were different during the Great Patriotic War. When breaking the enemy blockade of Leningrad in January 1944, 5,000 guns and mortars took part in the battle on our side. When breaking through the powerful enemy defenses on the Vistula, 9,500 guns and mortars were concentrated on the 1st Belorussian Front alone. Finally, during the assault on Berlin, 41,000 Soviet guns and mortars rained down on the enemy.

In some battles of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery fired more shells in one day of battle than the Russian army used during the entire war with Japan in 1904–1905.
How many defense factories had to be had, how fast they had to work in order to produce such a huge number of guns and ammunition. How skillfully and efficiently transport had to work in order to smoothly transfer countless guns and shells to the battlefields!
And the Soviet people, inspired by love for the Motherland, for the Communist Party, for their Government, coped with all these difficult tasks.
During the war, Soviet factories produced huge quantities of guns and ammunition. Back in 1942, our industry produced much more guns of all calibers in just one month than the Russian army had at the beginning of the First World War.

Thanks to the heroic work of the Soviet people, the Soviet Army received a continuous stream of first-class artillery weapons, which in the capable hands of our artillerymen became the decisive force that ensured the defeat of Nazi Germany and the victorious end of the war. During the war, our domestic industry increased its production from month to month and supplied the Soviet Army with tanks and aircraft, ammunition and equipment in increasing quantities.
The artillery industry annually produced up to 120 thousand guns of all calibers, up to 450 thousand light and heavy machine guns, over 3 million rifles and about 2 million machine guns. In 1944 alone, 7 billion 400 million rounds of ammunition were produced.
Soviet people, working selflessly in the rear, helped the Soviet Army defend the freedom and independence of our Motherland and saved the peoples of Europe from fascist enslavement.
The victory of our country in the Great Patriotic War speaks of the vitality of the Soviet social system, of the invincibility of the cause for which the Soviet people fought under the leadership of our party, carrying out the Great October Socialist Revolution.
The great strength of the leadership of the Communist Party ensured the Soviet people complete victory over a strong and treacherous enemy in the most difficult war that humanity has ever had to fight.
During the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party appeared before all the peoples of the Soviet Union as the inspirer and organizer of the nationwide struggle against the fascist invaders. The organizational work of the party united and directed all the efforts of the Soviet people towards a common goal, subordinating all forces and means to the cause of defeating the enemy. During the war, the party became even more close to the people, even more closely connected with the broad masses of the working people.

SOVIET ARTILLERY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
We have already said that by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, our army had first-class artillery, which in all respects was superior to the artillery of any foreign army. Soviet artillery personnel were well trained and distinguished by high moral qualities.
In the initial period of the war, our artillery with its fire repelled the attacks of enemy tanks, which were the main striking force of the Nazi army, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment, and helped our infantry stop the enemy and gain a foothold on advantageous lines.
How did the artillery solve its combat missions?
When Hitler's armored hordes attacked our Motherland, they met stubborn resistance and well-aimed fire from Soviet artillery, which bore the brunt of the fight against enemy tanks. Our artillery was the force that helped the Soviet Army thwart Hitler’s plans for the “lightning-fast” defeat of our Motherland.

For a more successful fight against Nazi tanks, it was necessary to form new anti-tank artillery units. Special anti-tank artillery units were formed, which played a vital role in the destruction of enemy tanks.
Bravely defending prepared lines, Soviet artillerymen dealt blow after blow to the enemy. Each city that the enemy approached turned into a fortress, on the outskirts of which selected Nazi units perished. The legendary defense of the hero cities: Odessa, Leningrad, Sevastopol, Stalingrad has gone down in history forever.
In all defensive battles, artillery fire ensured the strength of the defense of our troops. During the defense of Leningrad and Sevastopol, along with mercenary artillery, coastal and naval artillery operated successfully, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.
Soviet artillery became especially famous in the battles on the outskirts of Moscow, to capture which the Nazis sent 51 divisions, including 13 tank and 5 motorized, to defeat the Soviet Army and, having captured Moscow, end the war before the onset of winter 1941.

For twenty days in a row the battle on the outskirts of the capital of our Motherland did not subside for an hour. The artillerymen bravely fought against fascist tanks, setting fire to and knocking out armored vehicles in dozens and hundreds. One of the regiments of anti-tank artillery destroyed 186 enemy tanks on the approaches to Moscow. For the courage shown in battles with the Nazi invaders, for the steadfastness, courage and heroism of the glorious enemy tank destroyers, this regiment was transformed into the 1st Guards Anti-Tank Destroyer Regiment.

Soviet troops, having crushed the enemy’s strike forces, stopped him,” and then, having pulled up and concentrated reserves, launched a counteroffensive on December 6, 1941. Near Moscow and on other sectors of the front, the enemy was defeated and thrown back far to the west. During these battles, the enemy suffered huge losses. In the first 40 days of our offensive, the Nazis lost only 300,000 soldiers and officers killed, hundreds of tanks, guns and mortars, thousands of cars and many other weapons and military equipment.
The defeat of enemy armies near Moscow was of great importance for the further course of the war. For the first time during the Second World War, fascist troops were not only stopped, but suffered a complete defeat. As a result of the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the Nazi army was dispelled.
Assessing the role of artillery in the defensive battles of the Soviet Army near Moscow and Leningrad, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union Stalin, in an order dedicated to the celebration of Artillery Day, wrote on November 19, 1944: “As is known, artillery was the force that helped the Red Army stop the enemy’s advance at approaches to Leningrad and Moscow."

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLES NEAR STALINGRAD
At the beginning of the book, we already mentioned the role that Soviet artillery played in the Battle of Stalingrad. The role of our artillery was so great that we need to talk about it in a little more detail.
Having suffered defeat near Moscow and in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, the Nazis hastily began to prepare a new offensive against the Soviet Union. They wanted to break through our defenses, bypass Moscow from the east, cut it off from the Volga and Ural rear and then attack Moscow. This adventuristic plan of the fascists provided for the capture of Stalingrad. To accomplish this task, the Nazi command concentrated huge forces of infantry, tanks, self-propelled artillery, aviation, and many other military equipment in the Stalingrad direction.
The fascist command decided to launch an offensive with the expectation of capturing Stalingrad by July 25, and capturing Kuibyshev by August 15 and ending the war in the east by the winter of 1942. The Nazis began to carefully prepare for the offensive. A front breakthrough was planned in the direction of Voronezh and Stalingrad.
When developing their plans, the Nazis hoped that the American-British imperialists would not come to the aid of the Soviet Union, that they would not land their troops on the coast of France to create a second front against Nazi Germany.
And indeed, the American-British imperialists constantly delayed the opening of a second front in Europe; they wanted to exhaust and weaken the Soviet Union in such a way that after the war our country would become economically dependent on the United States of America and England.
In addition, they hoped that a difficult war with the Soviet Union would weaken Hitler's Germany; which was the most dangerous competitor of the USA and England in the world market.
On July 24, 1941, in the New York Times, American Senator Truman, who later became President of the United States, wrote: “If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia wins, then we should help Germany . And thus, let them kill as many as possible."
Violating their allied obligations, the American and British imperialists secretly from the Soviet Union negotiated peace with Nazi Germany.

During the days of heavy fighting at Stalingrad, the American-British imperialists had about six million inactive soldiers and huge masses of military equipment under arms. These forces and means could have provided significant assistance to the Soviet Army, but in the summer of 1942, American-British reactionaries made a fuss in their newspapers that American and British troops were not prepared to open a second front in Europe.
By this they made it clear to Hitler that he could concentrate all his forces against our army without fear for his rear.
At the same time, the imperialists of the USA and England supplied Nazi Germany with the most important military materials through “neutral” countries.
Thus, the monopolists of the USA and England overtly and secretly helped Nazi Germany in its struggle against the Soviet Union.
Choosing the Stalingrad direction, the Nazis hoped that in the Stalingrad steppes they would be able to make the most extensive use of tank and mechanized troops, quickly complete the capture of Stalingrad and Kuibyshev and finally defeat the Soviet Army.
But they cruelly miscalculated, they did not take into account the ability of our army for long-term resistance; Nor did they foresee the inexhaustible strength of our Soviet people, their unshakable will in striving to destroy the enemy.
The Supreme High Command promptly unraveled the plans of the Hitlerite command and developed a plan for the defeat of the fascist troops at Stalingrad. Soviet troops were given the task of exhausting and bleeding the Nazi troops rushing to Stalingrad in stubborn battles, and then encircling them and destroying them. This plan was successfully implemented.

In the battles that unfolded between the Don bend and the Volga, our army dealt strong blows to the Nazi troops, destroying selected Nazi regiments and divisions and delaying the advance of Hitler’s troops. To cover the distance from the Don to Stalingrad, the Nazis had to fight bloody battles for about two months. Only in mid-September were Nazi troops able to approach the outskirts of the city.

At Stalingrad, the Nazis encountered resistance and tenacity of Soviet troops and workers of Stalingrad enterprises unprecedented in the history of wars.
The enemy threw division after division into battle, but all his attempts to capture the city were defeated by the staunch defense of our troops. The approaches to the city and the ruins of city blocks were littered with corpses of the Nazis. The enemy's forces were melting away. The heroic defenders of Stalingrad crushed Hitler’s elite troops and prepared the conditions for their complete defeat.
Soviet artillery played a particularly large role in this battle; it waged a fierce and prolonged struggle with Nazi tank and mechanized forces on the distant and near approaches to Stalingrad and delayed their advance. The artillerymen blocked the path of the enemy infantry and tanks with the fire of their guns, inflicting enormous damage on them in manpower and equipment. In this way, the artillery made it possible for our troops to prepare the defense of the city.
Artillery of all calibers took part in the heroic defense of Stalingrad, from small-caliber guns to high-power guns. Together with ground artillery, our anti-aircraft artillery destroyed the enemy in the air and on the ground.
The interaction of artillery fire with infantry fire was very well organized. Defensive battles in Stalingrad were very active. Our units continuously counterattacked the enemy and kept him in a tense state, in constant anticipation of an attack.
During September - October and the first half of November 1942, the Nazis launched an average of 10 attacks per day. The fight was for every inch of Soviet land, for every block, for every house, for every floor of the house. Soviet soldiers, including artillerymen, heroically defended the city. They turned every block, street, and house into fortresses that destroyed fresh reserves brought into battle by the Nazi command.
During these same months, the Nazis launched 4 offensive operations that lasted several days; they threw over ten divisions into battle at the same time, supported by 400–500 tanks.
The Nazi invaders managed to break into the city, but they were never able to take control of it completely.
The defenders of Stalingrad remembered the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - “Stalingrad must not be surrendered to the enemy” - and sought to defend the glorious Soviet stronghold on the Volga at any cost. The soldiers of the Stalingrad Front wrote to Comrade Stalin: “Before our battle banners, before the entire Soviet country, we swear that we will not disgrace the glory of Russian weapons, we will fight to the last opportunity. Under your leadership, our fathers won the Battle of Tsaritsyn, and under your leadership we will win now in the great battle of Stalingrad!” The defenders of Stalingrad kept this oath with honor.
Thousands of Stalingrad residents - city residents - took part in street battles.
Here is one typical case. The Nazis tried to force a Russian woman to help them get around the house, which was defended by our machine gunners. This attempt cost the Nazis dearly. The woman led the enemy soldiers into the yard under the fire of our riflemen and shouted: “Shoot, comrades!” Almost all the fascists were killed. One of the fascists, wounded, shot at the woman. When our shooters ran up to her, she said: “After all, I was not mistaken.” Glory to the nameless heroine!
The defensive battles of the Soviet Army near Stalingrad were only the first stage of the Battle of Stalingrad. Heroically resisting, the defenders of Stalingrad stopped the Nazi advance in the Stalingrad direction.

The destructive fire of Soviet artillery caused enormous devastation in the enemy's disposition.

During the defensive battle, which lasted from mid-July to November 19, Hitler's armies were drained of blood. They lost 182,000 killed and more than 500,000 wounded. In addition, our troops knocked out and destroyed 1,450 enemy tanks, 4,000 machine guns, and over 2,000 guns and mortars. 1,337 aircraft were destroyed by anti-aircraft artillery fire and fighter aircraft. All this affected the morale of the Nazis and made them talk about the “impregnability of the Stalingrad fortress,” the “Volga Verdun,” and the “incomprehensible tenacity of the Russians.”
Corporal Walter wrote in a letter home: “Stalingrad is hell on earth, Verdun, Red Yerden with new weapons. We attack daily. If we manage to occupy 20 meters, then in the evening the Russians will push us back.”
But, despite heavy losses, the Nazis decided to hold their positions near Stalingrad during the winter, and launch an offensive again in the summer in order to achieve their crazy goal - to capture Moscow.
Even while fierce battles were taking place on the streets of the city, our new units and formations, armed with new military equipment, capable of defeating the enemy, were concentrated in the Stalingrad area.
To defeat the enemy it was necessary to concentrate a large number of troops and military equipment. Artillery, the main striking force of the advancing fronts, was especially needed. The artillery was supposed to use its fire to break through the enemy’s defenses and ensure the transition of our troops to a counteroffensive. In the silence of the night, the hum of engines was continuously heard. It was guns, tanks, cars moving towards the front, and there was no end in sight to the long columns of people and equipment. All preparations for the offensive were carried out secretly. The troops approached the front only at night. During the day, they hid in populated areas and in numerous ravines, carefully camouflaging themselves from aerial observers! enemy. Our troops carefully prepared for the upcoming battles. Soviet artillery reconnaissance did a lot of work during the preparatory period. She identified important targets on which the artillery was supposed to bring down its fire. Much attention was paid to organizing interaction between different branches of the military.
Finally, by mid-November, preparations for the offensive were completed. The task was to encircle and completely destroy all enemy divisions that had broken through to Stalingrad.
To do this, our troops, in close cooperation, had to break through the front of the Nazis and defeat them in the middle reaches of the Don and south of Stalingrad, and then, with a swift strike of mobile troops in the direction of the Don, encircle the Nazi hordes at Stalingrad and destroy them.
On November 19, 1942, according to a plan developed by the Supreme High Command, Soviet troops launched a decisive counterattack.

Before the start of the infantry and tank offensive, an artillery preparation of unprecedented force was carried out. Thousands of guns and mortars rained down a huge number of shells and mines on enemy positions. A sudden powerful fire strike was delivered against enemy resistance units at the front line and in the depths of the defense, against his mortars and artillery batteries, against command posts, and against reserves. The entire area seemed to have been plowed by a giant plow of war. The surface of the earth was pitted with many craters from exploding shells, mines and aerial bombs. Entire enemy units ran out of trenches and dugouts and rushed from side to side in panic, finding no escape. The Nazis' losses in manpower and equipment were enormous. Despite the fog that limited visibility, our artillery coped with its tasks perfectly.
Enemy trenches and fortifications were destroyed by massive artillery fire. On the first day of the offensive, the artillery of only one front destroyed and suppressed 293 heavy machine guns, 100 artillery and 60 mortar batteries, destroyed 196 dugouts, and 126 defensive structures. A lot of enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed by artillery fire.
Having broken through the enemy front, our troops began to quickly move forward. Our artillery advanced along with the troops and did not lag behind them.
During the offensive, Soviet artillerymen showed the high art of controlling massive fire. They destroyed enemy fortifications and accompanied our attacking infantry, cavalry and tanks with fire.
Thus began the defeat of Hitler’s army, a defeat in which Soviet artillery played an outstanding role.
As a result of a well-organized infantry offensive in cooperation with artillery, tanks and cavalry, on November 23, a 330,000-strong group of selected Nazi troops was surrounded. The history of wars does not know an example of the encirclement and complete defeat of such a huge mass of troops armed with the latest technology.
In December 1942, Hitler addressed the encircled troops with a special order - he demanded that they hold their positions near Stalingrad at all costs.
Hitler's command made desperate attempts to save the encircled troops. To assist them in the areas of Tormosino and Kotelnikovo, the Nazis created two strong groupings of troops, 8 divisions each, which were supposed to break through the ring of Soviet troops around Stalingrad.
In December, our troops defeated both of these enemy groups and continued to develop the offensive further and further to the west.

This is how the Nazis’ attempts to liberate their encircled armies ended ingloriously.
Meanwhile, our troops, who surrounded the main group of Nazis at Stalingrad, were preparing for its destruction.
In the last, decisive battle according to our plan Supreme High Command it was necessary to dismember the encircled enemy troops into pieces and then destroy each isolated enemy group separately. The artillery was entrusted with the task of paving the way for infantry and tanks through the enemy’s fortifications, suppressing and destroying its firepower and manpower.
On January 10, at 8:50 a.m., the command to begin the offensive was issued from the front commander’s point. The air trembled with the thunder of artillery cannonade, which began simultaneously along the entire front. Squadrons of our bomber and attack aircraft appeared in the sky.
The advance of our troops was supported by strong artillery fire. The artillery was used in large numbers and provided good fire support for our infantry and tanks.
The sounds of shots and explosions of artillery shells, mines and aerial bombs merged into a continuous roar. Losses inflicted on the enemy

The fire from our artillery, mortars and aircraft was very significant. According to the testimony of prisoners, “entire battalions knelt down and turned to God in prayer, asking to spare them and protect them from Russian artillery fire.”
Our tanks with troops mounted on them rushed towards the enemy; rifle units followed them into the attack. For two weeks, units of the Soviet Army, advancing from the west, advanced east towards Stalingrad with fierce battles, and by the end of January 26, 1943, in the area of ​​Mamayev Kurgan, they united with the troops of General Chuikov, advancing from Stalingrad.
The Nazi troops found themselves cut into two parts: the northern one in the area of ​​the tractor plant and the Barricades plant and the southern one in the northwestern half of the city.
On January 31, the southern group of Nazi troops was finally defeated; On February 1, our troops began an assault on the northern group of enemy forces. After artillery preparation, the enemy’s defenses were broken through, and the next day our troops defeated this last enemy center of resistance. Our artillery carried out the tasks assigned to it with honor. Suffice it to say that in the period from January 10 to February 2, artillery fire

98 tanks were shot down and burned, over 70 batteries were suppressed and destroyed, about 1,000 wood-and-earthen firing points and over 1,500 dugouts were destroyed. Several tens of thousands of fascist invaders died under the explosions of shells and mines.

Our anti-aircraft artillery provided great assistance to the advancing troops. In the battles near Stalingrad, anti-aircraft artillery shot down 223 enemy aircraft and disabled a large number of aircraft.
The front commander reported to the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that the destruction of the encircled Stalingrad group of enemy troops ended at 16:00 on February 2, 1943.
The Battle of Stalingrad ended with the complete defeat of the 330,000-strong selected Nazi army, consisting of 22 divisions.

The size of the carnage, unprecedented in history, is indicated by the numbers of enemy losses. At the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, 147,200 corpses of killed Nazis were collected and buried in the ground. Between January 10 and February 2, the front forces destroyed about 120,000 and captured 130,000 Nazi soldiers and officers.

In addition, the following were captured: 5,762 guns, 1,312 mortars, 12,701 machine guns, 1,666 tanks, 216 armored vehicles and much other property.
Thus ended one of the greatest battles in the history of war - the Battle of Stalingrad. In the battles near Stalingrad, the role of artillery in modern warfare as the most formidable weapon, as the main striking force of the Soviet Army, was especially clearly revealed. Using the example of the Battle of Stalingrad, it became clear on what a wide scale artillery must be used to achieve victory in a modern war. The Stalingrad victory showed how the military skill of our soldiers, officers and generals had increased.

The Battle of Stalingrad put an end to the advance of Hitler's troops into the interior of our country. The mass expulsion of invaders from Soviet soil began. The word "Stalingrad" became a symbol of the courage and heroism of the Soviet people. It resonated in the hearts of all honest people in the world and raised them to fight fascism, to fight for their freedom and independence.

The defeat of Hitler's army at Stalingrad forced imperialist Japan and Nazi Germany's secret ally Turkey to refrain from openly opposing the Soviet Union.

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK
Back in January - February 1943, our troops defeated the Nazis in the Voronezh and Kursk region and threw back the Nazi troops far to the west.
A protrusion formed in the outlines of the front, which protruded deeply into the enemy’s position. At this point, the front stabilized, and both warring sides began to prepare for summer hostilities.

Hitler's army intended to once again break through the front of the Soviet Army. With attacks from the north and south, the Nazis wanted to take the Kursk group of our army into a “pincer” in order to encircle and destroy Soviet troops concentrated in the Kursk area, capture Kursk on the fifth day of the offensive, and then move on Moscow.

To imagine the scale of this battle, it is enough to say that in the Kursk direction, the Nazi command concentrated over 430 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 3 thousand tanks, including new heavy Tiger tanks and Ferdi-Nand self-propelled guns, 6,763 guns, 3,200 mortars and 1,850 aircraft, including about a thousand bombers.
And this enemy plan was promptly guessed by the Soviet command. The necessary measures were taken to prevent Hitler's command from carrying out his plans. The troops defending Kursk were prepared for both defense and attack.
The Soviet Army, taking into account its rich experience in the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, was preparing for decisive battles with the enemy.
Our troops created powerful defenses in areas of a possible Nazi offensive in order to exhaust and bleed the enemy in defensive battles, and then launch a decisive counter-offensive and defeat the enemy.

The artillerymen carefully prepared for the upcoming battles. They studied the experience of past battles, improved their skills, and learned to beat the enemy for sure.
On the night of July 5, when the Nazis concentrated large forces in the initial areas for the offensive, our artillery launched a powerful fire attack on the enemy 10 minutes before the start of the offensive. Several hundred guns suddenly rained down their shells on the Nazi positions. The artillery smashed the enemy's infantry, his tank and motorized troops, who were preparing for the offensive, as well as the enemy's batteries, observation and command posts.

The crushing fire of artillery and mortars inflicted huge losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment and lowered the morale of the fascist troops. As a result of a powerful artillery fire raid, the Nazis lost 90 artillery and mortar batteries, 10 ammunition and fuel warehouses were blown up, 60 observation posts were destroyed, and many tanks and other military equipment were knocked out.

The sudden attack of our artillery and mortars disrupted the battle formations of enemy infantry and tanks. Having suffered heavy artillery losses, the Nazis were forced to shift some of the artillery tasks to aviation. Only a few hours later the Nazis recovered from the unexpected blow and were able to launch their offensive.
And when the Nazis nevertheless went on the offensive with large forces of tanks and infantry, they met fierce resistance from Soviet troops. The famous battle of Kursk began.
South of Orel and north of Belgorod, battles broke out, unprecedented in ferocity and in the amount of military equipment used in them. In the northern direction, from the Orel area, the Nazis threw 7 tank, 2 motorized and 11 infantry divisions into battle, and from the Belgorod area - 10 tank, one motorized and 7 infantry divisions, the bulk of which operated along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. Tanks and self-propelled guns were the first to attack. Infantry moved behind the tanks in armored personnel carriers. Enemy bombers in large groups, wave after wave, covered their advancing troops.

Despite their enormous forces, the Nazis were unable to break through our defenses. They were met by strong massive fire from our artillery and the defending troops. Enemy tanks flew into the air, exploding in minefields, and caught fire from well-aimed shots from artillerymen and armor-piercers. Five times the Nazis rushed to attack, but to no avail. Fierce fighting raged throughout the day. The enemy failed to achieve major successes. In the Oryol and Belgorod directions, at the cost of heavy losses, the fascist troops only wedged several kilometers into our position.
On July 11, a fierce tank battle of unprecedented proportions unfolded again, in which over 1,500 tanks and large aviation forces took part on both sides. In one day of battle, the enemy lost over 400 tanks and did not advance a single meter. Already on the seventh day after the start of the offensive, the northern group of troops was stopped, and on the twelfth day, the southern one was stopped. By July 13, the Nazis, as a result of huge losses, were forced to stop the offensive along the entire front. The new campaign against Moscow ended in complete failure for the Nazis.
The plan of Hitler's command collapsed. The stable, pre-prepared defense of the Soviet troops turned out to be truly insurmountable.
Our artillery played an exceptionally large role in the battles near Kursk, which bore the brunt of the fight against the masses of fascist heavy and light tanks trying to make a hole in our defense. The fight between Soviet guns and enemy armored vehicles ended in victory for the Soviet artillerymen. In the first three days of fighting alone, Soviet artillerymen, together with other branches of the military, destroyed 1,539 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns.
The artillerymen steadfastly and courageously fought against enemy tanks and with heroic exploits increased the glory of Russian artillery. In some cases, the artillerymen fired until the last shell, and then began hand-to-hand combat. Here is an example of the courageous struggle of “Soviet artillerymen against enemy tanks.
In the battle near Ponyry, a large group of enemy tanks and infantry moved towards Sergeant Major Sedov’s gun. Sergeant Major Sedov, allowing the enemy to come within 200 meters, opened fire on the tanks. He fired from a gun at the most vulnerable places of the tanks, not allowing the enemy to come to his senses. In a short period of time, Sedov knocked out four “tigers” with his gun and destroyed up to 100 enemy soldiers. And when an enemy shell destroyed the gun, Sedov and his comrades took anti-tank grenades and continued the battle with the fascist tanks.
Anti-aircraft artillery, which operated together with them on the battlefield, provided an invaluable service to ground troops. Anti-aircraft artillery in the battles near Kursk destroyed 660 enemy aircraft.
Having exhausted and bled the selected fascist divisions in the battle of Kursk, our troops broke through the enemy front and themselves launched a counteroffensive, which then unfolded into a powerful offensive on a front stretching over 800 kilometers. The pre-prepared, deeply echeloned, powerful defensive lines and fortified centers of resistance created by the Nazis for almost two years were destroyed by our artillery, operating together with other branches of the military.
As a result of the defeat of Hitler's armies near Kursk, the fascist myth that “the Russians only know how to attack in winter” was dispelled. Soviet troops have proven that in the summer they break through enemy defenses and lead the offensive just as well as in the winter.
On August 5, 1943, the Soviet Army, after intense street fighting, captured Orel and Belgorod. On this day, in the capital of our Motherland - Moscow - the first artillery salute sounded in honor of the victory of our troops, who liberated Orel and Belgorod. Since then, every major victory of the Soviet troops began to be celebrated with an artillery salute.
The Battle of Kursk played an important role during the Great Patriotic War. About the significance of the Battle of Kursk, Chairman of the State Defense Committee J.V. Stalin said: “If the Battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the Nazi army, then the Battle of Kursk confronted it with disaster.”
After the defeat at Kursk and Kharkov, all the Nazis’ hopes of holding out in the east collapsed.
A continuous offensive of the Soviet Army to the west began.
1943 was a turning point in the Great Patriotic War. Major victories of the Soviet troops were not only important for the Soviet-German front, but they also influenced the entire course of the Second World War.
In 1944, the Soviet Army delivered ten crushing blows to the enemy, as a result of which up to 120 divisions of Nazi Germany and its allies were defeated and disabled. In these decisive battles, the Soviet artillery, as always, carried out all the tasks assigned to it with honor.
Having expelled Hitler's troops from the borders of our country, the Soviet Army moved its fighting into enemy territory. Soviet troops, moving westward, liberated countries enslaved by Hitler's Germany one after another. And only after it became obvious that the crushing blows of the Soviet Army were inevitably fatal and the Soviet Union alone would put an end to Nazi Germany and its satellites, the American and British generals were forced to rush to open a second front two years late.
However, despite the existence of a second front in Western Europe, the main forces of the Nazi armies were still on the Soviet-German front. Our army continued to bear the brunt of the war on its shoulders.
The offensive of the Soviet Army in the winter of 1944/45 was one of the largest in the entire war. In terms of the number of troops and military equipment participating in it, and the strength of the blows, this was an offensive unprecedented in the history of wars. Suffice it to say that in just 40 days of our offensive, the Nazis lost: over 1,150,000 soldiers and officers captured and killed, about 3,000 aircraft, more than 4,500 tanks and self-propelled guns and at least 12,000 guns. With a mighty blow, the artillery broke through the enemy’s defenses along a 1,200-kilometer front from the Baltic to the Carpathians; By the end of January 1945, the Soviet Army cleared the territory between the Vistula and Oder rivers of enemy troops, thwarted the Nazi offensive on the Western Front in the Ardennes and reached the last fortified lines covering the capital of Nazi Germany - Berlin.

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE OF BERLIN
The Battle of Berlin began in the second half of April 1945, when our troops captured bridgeheads on the Oder and Neisse rivers.
Hitler's command understood that the fate of Berlin would be decided on the Oder, therefore, throughout the vast territory from the Oder to Berlin, a system of heavily fortified defensive lines with numerous concreted firing points and other engineering structures was created in advance.
Every inch of land in this area was prepared for defense; the presence of numerous lakes, rivers, canals, a dense network settlements with stone houses further strengthened the defense.
Berlin and its approaches were also turned into a fortified area. On the approaches to Berlin, the Nazis built three additional powerful lines of fortifications. Berlin was divided along its circumference into eight defense sectors; the city center was the most heavily fortified.
Barricades, anti-tank barriers and concrete gun emplacements were built on every street. The Nazis deployed several armies to defend the approaches to Berlin. All special units, military schools and academies were also sent to defend Berlin. Members of the Nazi Party were mobilized to create tank destroyer brigades, which were armed with Faust cartridges (a new jet weapon for fighting tanks). Separate battalions were specially trained for street fighting. In total, in the Berlin direction, the Nazi command concentrated up to half a million troops with a huge amount of military equipment.
Soviet soldiers irrepressibly strove for Berlin in order to quickly put an end to the fascist beast in its lair.
By order of the command, a struggle began in the artillery units for the honor of firing the first shot at Berlin. The units read with enthusiasm the appeal of the Military Council of the front, which said: “Fighting friends! Comrade Stalin, on behalf of the Motherland and the entire Soviet people, ordered the troops of our front to defeat the enemy on the nearest approaches to Berlin, to capture the capital of Germany, Berlin, and to hoist the Victory Banner over it.”
To complete this last battle, such an amount of manpower and military equipment was concentrated that it was possible to break the resistance of the fascist troops and capture Berlin in the shortest possible time. No other operation involved as much artillery as was concentrated for the attack on Berlin.
The preparations for the offensive were carried out very carefully and secretly,
The Nazis did not know when our offensive would begin.
On April 14, 1945, our artillery suddenly opened powerful hurricane fire along the entire front. The enemy took this as the beginning of the offensive of our troops. But there was no offensive from our side, and the Nazis calmed down, believing that the offensive had failed. In fact, the artillery fire was undertaken for reconnaissance purposes.

The offensive was scheduled for another day.
The start of the general offensive on Berlin was announced by a salvo of a huge mass of artillery and mortars. On the night of April 15-16, a blow of unprecedented force was suddenly delivered to the enemy’s defensive lines.
After artillery and air preparation they went on the attack. soviet infantry, tanks and self-propelled guns. The rapid advance of our troops was supported by artillery fire and air bombing strikes.
Our attack turned out to be unexpected and stunning for the enemy. Our tanks quickly crushed the forward positions and broke into the enemy's defense line. Destroying trenches, breaking barriers, destroying the enemy and his firepower, Soviet tanks and infantry rapidly moved forward. The Nazis did not expect such a powerful blow; their resistance was quickly broken. The defeated Nazi divisions began to retreat to Berlin. Units of the Soviet Army followed on the heels of the enemy and on April 20 approached the capital of Germany.
At 11 o'clock on April 20, the division commander, Major Zyukin, was the first to open fire on the lair of the fascist beast - Berlin. Artillery

The fire kept growing - after Major Zyukin’s batteries, other batteries entered the battle. The closer our troops came to Berlin, the more the Nazis' resistance increased.
After five days of fierce fighting, our troops surrounded Berlin, and on April 21 the assault on the city itself began.
Our warriors met with a previously prepared defense. The Nazis blocked the streets with numerous rubble and barricades. Groups of multi-storey buildings were turned into powerful strongholds with many firing points. Soviet troops had to knock out the enemy from every street, from every building. Fierce fights took place on the stairs of multi-story buildings, in basements, and on roofs. From building to building, from block to block, our infantrymen, artillerymen, mortarmen, tank crews, sappers, and signalmen fought forward.
In these difficult conditions, our artillerymen brilliantly coped with the assigned tasks. Rolling out their guns for direct fire, they destroyed enemy firing points, destroyed their defensive structures and cleared the way for infantry and tanks. Brave Soviet artillerymen, under enemy fire, rolled their guns in their hands over dilapidated barricades and rubble.
Our artillery helped the infantry and tanks cross the Spree River and canals, of which there are many in the city. Having suppressed the enemy’s defenses on the opposite bank, the artillery ensured the capture of coastal neighborhoods.
So, clearing block after block, our troops, supported by artillery fire, made their way to the city center, to the Reichstag building.
Before the storming of the Reichstag, a final short artillery preparation was carried out, after which our infantry rushed into the attack and burst inside the building. The battle for the capture of the Reichstag lasted several hours.
At 14:20 on April 30, 1945, the Reichstag was taken. The banner of the Victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany was hoisted over Berlin.
At 3 pm on May 2, 1945, the Berlin garrison unconditionally surrendered to the victorious Soviet troops.
Soviet artillery, with its crushing blows, contributed to the final defeat of the Nazi troops defending Berlin.
The Battle of Berlin involved 41,000 artillery pieces and mortars, firing a huge number of shells and mines weighing over 26,000 tons.
In the bloody battles for Berlin, which lasted sixteen days, about 150,000 Nazi soldiers and officers were killed; over 300,000 Nazis were captured by Soviet troops. (475)
The greatest offensive in history by the heroic Soviet Army ended in the complete defeat of the Nazis and brought liberation to the peoples of Europe from the terrible tyranny of Hitlerism.
* * *
The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against Nazi Germany ended with the victorious Battle of Berlin. To commemorate the victory over Nazi Germany on May 9, 1945, Victory Day, the capital of our Motherland saluted the valiant troops of the Soviet Army with thirty artillery salvoes from a thousand guns.
However, there was another threat of attack on our Motherland - from imperialist Japan, which for decades provoked military clashes in the Far East.
On the borders with the Soviet Union, Japan concentrated its best, selected troops - the one and a half million Kwantung Army, which relied on numerous field and long-term defensive fortifications.
In order to eliminate this last hotbed of war and secure the Soviet Far East from the threat of military attack, it was necessary to defeat the Japanese Kwantung Army and force Japan to unconditional surrender.
Three months after the end of the war in Europe, the Soviet Army, true to its allied duty, began military operations against the Japanese Kwantung Army.
On the night of August 9, 1945, the Soviet Army, ships of the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla inflicted crushing blows on the enemy. The defeat of the Japanese army began.
Despite the difficult conditions, the combat operations of our troops were distinguished by great swiftness. The retreating Japanese units did not have time to prepare for battle before they were already overtaken by shells from Soviet artillerymen.
Thanks to such swiftness and high mobility, Soviet artillery, together with infantry and tanks, fought through the whole of Manchuria in a short time and ended their military campaign on the shores of the Yellow Sea.
Through its military operations, Soviet artillery greatly contributed to the defeat of the Japanese army.
On September 2, 1945, militaristic Japan admitted itself defeated and unconditionally surrendered.
The war of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany in the West and against Japanese militarists in the Far East was victoriously completed.
Having won the Second World War, the Soviet people defended the freedom and independence of our Motherland and saved the peoples of Europe from the threat of fascist enslavement.
The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was the victory of the new Soviet social and political system, victory of our Armed Forces.
Everything that is described in this book shows how varied and responsible the combat work of artillerymen is, how much knowledge they must have in order to successfully cope with their work.
“To be a good artilleryman,” said Comrade Voroshilov, “especially an artillery commander, means to be a comprehensively educated person. Perhaps no type of weapon requires such discipline of mind, will and knowledge from the commander and fighter as artillery.”
On the battlefield, artillerymen must be proactive, brave and courageous; The fate of the battle very often depends on their courage and heroism.
The Great Patriotic War showed that all these qualities are fully possessed by the artillerymen of our glorious Soviet Army, selflessly devoted to their Motherland.
Having such cadres of artillerymen, our artillery, armed with the most advanced artillery equipment, together with other branches of the military, will ensure the victory of the Soviet Army over any enemy if he dares to interfere with the peaceful and victorious movement of the Soviet people towards their great goal - communism.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government have always shown and continue to show tireless concern for the defense capability of our Motherland; the 19th Congress of the Communist Party, having outlined a majestic program for the construction of communism in the USSR, set the Communist Party the task of strengthening in every possible way the active defense of the Soviet Motherland from the aggressive actions of its enemies.
Our people, who defend the cause of peace by all means, can confidently rely on their Soviet Army and its main fire strike force - artillery.

Introduction

Despite the fundamental changes that have taken place in the development of weapons, all types of weapons and military equipment, the progress of modern artillery weapons and the theory of the combat use of missile forces and artillery is unthinkable without a deep study and use of the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

Soviet artillery played an extremely important role in the Great Patriotic War and became the main firepower of the Ground Forces. It was the backbone of the defense of the Soviet Army and was the force that helped stop the enemy. In the battle of Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the fascist army was dispelled. Soviet artillery demonstrated formidable fighting qualities in the great Battle of the Volga. In the battles near Kursk, artillery with its fire played a decisive role in creating a turning point in the course of hostilities, and then ensured the advance of our troops.

The strategic offensive of the Soviet Army after the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk continued until the very end of the Great Patriotic War. Each operation of our troops began under the thunder of artillery cannonade from hundreds and thousands of guns and developed with continuous artillery support. The main defense was anti-tank artillery. It accounts for over 70% of enemy tanks destroyed. Respect for artillery was so great that since 1940 it was called the “god of war.”

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery increased quantitatively 5 times. The Soviet Union outsold Germany in the production of guns and mortars by 2 and 5 times, respectively, the USA by 1.3 and 3.2 times, and England by 4.2 and 4 times. During the war, our industry supplied the front with 775.6 million shells and mines, which made it possible to deliver crushing fire strikes against the enemy. The power of artillery, mass heroism and military skill of Soviet artillerymen together ensured victory in this difficult war.

The work examines the development of ground artillery during the Great Patriotic War.

Development of artillery on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War

Development of artillery materiel

During the pre-war five-year plans, various design bureaus carried out work to modernize the existing artillery equipment, which was aimed at increasing the firing range, increasing the rate of fire, increasing the firing angles, increasing the power of ammunition, etc. At the same time, new systems were being developed.

The first new weapon of our Soviet artillery was the 76-mm regimental gun of the 1927 model. And although the gun was heavy and had an insufficient horizontal firing angle, it remained the best regimental gun of that time.

In the 1930s, 37 mm and 45 mm anti-tank guns were adopted. The latter was a powerful means of combating all types of tanks of that time.

A major achievement of Soviet scientists and Soviet industry was the creation of a 76-mm cannon mod. 1939 (USV), 122-mm howitzers mod. 1938 (M-30), 152-mm howitzers-guns 1937 (ML-20), 203-mm howitzers mod. 1931 (B-4) (Figures 1, 2).

The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War are given in Table 1.

In the pre-war years, mortars were re-created. The number of mortars in the Red Army increased sharply after the military conflict with Finland, where military operations showed the high effectiveness of these weapons.

Table 1 - Main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War

Organizational affiliation

Firing range, km

Projectile weight kg

Initial projectile speed

Weight of gun kg

45 mm PT gun 1937

76 mm gun 1927

76-mm gun 1939 (USV)

122 mm howitzer 1938 (M-30)

152 mm howitzer 1938 (M-10)

107 mm gun 1940 (M-60)

122 mm gun 1937 (A-19)

152 mm howitzer-gun 1937 (ML-20)

152 mm gun 1935 (Br-2)

203 mm howitzer 1931 (B-4)

210 mm gun 1939 (Br-17)

280 mm mortar 1939 (Br-5)

305 mm howitzer 1939 (Br-18)

So, if throughout 1939 1,678 82-mm battalion mortars were produced, then from January to April 1940, 5,322 of them were fired. At the beginning of the war, mortars of caliber 37 mm, 50 mm, 82 mm, 107 mm were in service and 120 mm.

The first work on the creation of self-propelled artillery began in the 20s at the Commission for Special Artillery Experiments; research and experiments began most fully in the 30s. Some samples were tested in combat on the Karelian Isthmus, but for a number of reasons, not a single self-propelled artillery mount was put into service.

Much attention was paid to the creation and development of jet weapons. By the beginning of 1941, an experimental batch of BM-13 combat installations was manufactured, in February they moved to their factory production, and already on June 21, 1941, a decision was made on the full development jet systems volley fire and the immediate deployment of their mass production.

Thus, thanks to the care of the party and government, the Red Army entered the Great Patriotic War, having mainly modern artillery material. A number of guns fully met wartime requirements, some of them were in service until the end of the war. But combat practice required the presence of new types of artillery, ammunition, instruments and means of propulsion.

By the end of the war, the share of anti-tank guns in ground artillery was 14%, and for firing from indirect firing positions - 86%. In artillery for firing from closed firing positions, guns accounted for 36%, mortars - 61% (excluding 50-mm mortars), RA BM - 3%.

The main anti-tank weapon of the Soviet Army in the first period of the war was the 45-mm cannon mod. 1937 (Figure 3)

The modernization of this gun in 1942 further increased its anti-tank capabilities. In 1943 it entered service new system- 57-mm anti-tank gun model 1942 ZIS-2. During the Second World War, not a single army in the world had an anti-tank weapon whose combat characteristics would exceed those of the ZIS-2.

Soviet designers responded to improving the armor of enemy tanks by creating a 100-mm field gun, model 1944, BS-3. The gun had high ballistic data and combined the qualities of an anti-tank and hull gun (firing range 20 km). The gun was distinguished by the originality of the design of its components and their layout.

In 1943, to replace the regimental 76-mm gun mod. In 1927, a new system was introduced, which was distinguished by ease of production and higher maneuverability. By placing a 76 mm barrel on the carriage of a 45 mm gun mod. In 1942, a regimental 76-mm gun mod. 1943 (ob-25).

Beginning in 1942, it was adopted into divisional artillery, replacing the 76-mm cannon mod. 1939 (USV), a new 76-mm gun mod. 1942 ZIS-3. It became not only the best, but also the most popular gun of the Second World War - the artillery of the Red Army received over 48 thousand of these guns. The rate of fire of the ZIS-3 was 25 rounds per minute, and the firing range was 13 km. If necessary, the gun could be controlled by one person. Many gunners from ZIS-3 crews became Heroes of the Soviet Union for winning single-handed battles with several enemy tanks.

With the restoration of the corps control level in 1943, the need arose to have a corps howitzer. Along with the modernization of the models created in the pre-war period, a hull-mounted 152-mm howitzer of the 1943 model D-1 was developed. This gun was also created by superimposing the barrel of a 152-mm howitzer of the 1938 model (M-10) onto the carriage of a 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model (M-30) with the introduction of a row constructive changes. The main tactical and technical characteristics of the Red Army artillery systems produced during the Great Patriotic War are shown in Table 2.

Based on pre-war developments and experience in the use of rockets in pre-war conflicts, the development of rocket artillery continued. In the Great Patriotic War, dozens of types of unguided missiles and launchers were used. The most famous are BM-8, BM 13 (Figure 4). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for M-31 shells on the Studebaker chassis - BM-31-12 - was put into service.

The main direction of improvement of rocket projectiles during the war was to improve accuracy, as well as to increase the weight of the warhead and the projectile's flight range. The main tactical and technical characteristics of the Red Army's rockets during the Great Patriotic War are given in Table 3.

Table 2 - Main tactical and technical characteristics of the Red Army artillery systems produced during the Great Patriotic War

Name

Weight in firing position, kg

Firing range, km

Projectile weight, kg

Initial projectile speed, m/s

Rate of fire, rds/min

45-mm anti-tank gun (M-42) mod. 1942

57-mm anti-tank gun (ZIS-2) mod. 1943

76-mn P (ZIS-3) arr. 1942

76 mm P (rev-25) mod. 1943

100 mm P (BS-3) mod. 1944

152 mm G (D-1) mod. 1943

160 mm M arr. 1943

During the war, the number of mortars increased almost sixfold. This is explained by their high combat qualities and the ability to ensure their mass production at lower costs. The 82-mm battalion and 107-mm mountain-pack mortar (1943) underwent modernization. 37-mm and 50-mm mortars did not receive further development and were withdrawn from service. 120-mm regimental mortar mod. 1938 in 1943 (Figure 5) was also modernized. The result was a system that is still used today with minor improvements in combat formation. In 1944, a 160-mm mortar was adopted. The design feature of the mortar was that it had an inseparable wheeled carriage and was loaded from the breech.

Table 3 - Main tactical and technical characteristics of rockets of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War

Projectile type

Time of adoption

January 1943

April 1944

April 1944

October 1944

Caliber, mm

Explosive weight, kg

Table range, max., m

Range deviation at max. range, m

Directional deviation at max. Range, m

Self-propelled artillery received its development, essentially, only during the war years. At the end of 1942, the light self-propelled gun SU-76, based on the T-70 tank, equipped with a 76-mm ZIS-3 cannon, was put into service. The gun was located in an armored cabin open at the top and rear. It was first used in battle in January 1943 and was successfully used until the end of the war.

At the end of 1942, based on the T-34, production of the SU-122 self-propelled gun began; in August 1943, the medium SU-85 entered the fight against enemy tanks, which was replaced by the new SU-100 at the end of 1944.

Heavy installations such as ISU-122 and ISU-152, which were nicknamed “St. John’s worts,” were created in 1944 on the basis of the IS-2 heavy tank. There are known cases when ISU-152 shells tore off the turrets of heavy enemy tanks. These self-propelled guns were used to accompany all types of tanks and infantry in battle, and successfully fought against heavy tanks and self-propelled guns the enemy, and were also used to destroy other defensive structures, demonstrating their combat qualities perfectly during the assault on the forts of Konigsberg and during street battles in Berlin.

Since 1943, self-propelled artillery was removed from the subordination of the Commander of Artillery of the Red Army and subordinated to the Commander of Armored and Mechanized Forces; in combat use it was equated to tanks and is not considered further in this work.



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