Stalin proposed to create an air defense system. To the history of national air defense. Letter to the editor. Stages of testing and adoption

Exactly 60 years ago-August 9, 1955-The Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution on the development of the first Berkut anti-aircraft missile system to protect Moscow from a potential air threat. This brainchild of the Cold War was a triumph of Soviet engineering and cost half a billion rubles. Disputes about the effectiveness of System-25 "Berkut" do not subside even 30 years after the removal of the complex from combat duty.

Relationships of participants anti-Hitler coalition have never been completely flawless. But as the defeat of Germany became apparent, the future victors paid more and more attention to the post-war reconstruction of the world, and the conflict of interests predictably escalated. Immediately after the end of the war, things came to tough political confrontations - in particular, the well-known Iranian and Turkish crises - and the development of the first plans for a war between the USSR, the USA and England.

On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill's famous Fulton speech marked the beginning of a period that would later be called the Cold War. The prospect of an open military confrontation between the recent allies became more and more distinct, and in the Korean War of 1950-1953, Soviet and American pilots were already firing at each other with might and main. The great powers were hastily preparing for a new world war and, of course, tried to imagine what it would look like and what, in fact, should be prepared for. Of course, first of all, the experience of that war, which had just ended, was analyzed.

fourth force

The experience of the war, among other things, postulated the enormous and ever-increasing importance of air defense. Even in the middle of the war, in July 1943, the USSR GKO Radar Council was formed, in 1947 it was transformed into the Radar Committee, and in 1950, on the initiative of Lavrenty Beria, the Third Main Directorate was created under the Council of Ministers. The Air Defense Forces were separated into a separate, by that time the fourth type of armed forces, along with the Air Force, Navy and ground forces.

One of the primary tasks of air defense was the defense of cities from massive raids by a large number of bombers, examples of which were still fresh in memory. In the eternal struggle of armor and projectile, the projectile temporarily won: bombers learned to fly at heights that were completely unattainable for anti-aircraft artillery, and for fighter aircraft of those times too. Widespread use of missile delivery vehicles nuclear weapons it was then a matter of the near, but still future, but the weapon itself already existed, so the passage of even one enemy aircraft to the target was extremely undesirable. Meanwhile, high-altitude British "Canberra" and American "Stratojets" from time to time invaded the airspace of the USSR, and calmly returned to their bases. It was necessary to find some new, and at the same time reliable solution. They became guided anti-aircraft missiles.

The idea of ​​guided anti-aircraft missiles was not fundamentally new: projects of this kind were tried to be implemented in different countries even before the start of the Second World War, but not a single project reached the working state. During the war, German engineers came closest to solving problems, but Germany did not even get to the point of putting air defense missiles into service.

In 1946, the development of the Nike-Ajax missile system began in the United States, successfully tested and put into production in 1951, and put into service two years later. Single-channel, i.e. with the possibility of simultaneous tracking and firing of only one air target, without the relationship between the batteries, the organization rather resembled cannon artillery of wartime. In the Soviet Union they approached the matter much more thoroughly.

American missile system Nike-Ajax
http://nikemissile.org

On August 9, 1950, after a series of discussions with the participation of Stalin, it was decided to create a missile defense system for major cities. First - for Moscow, then a similar system was supposed to be built at least for Leningrad. The development of the system with the conditional name "Berkut" was entrusted to KB-1, known today under the name of NPO Almaz. Individual elements of the system were developed by the Radio Engineering Institute and OKB-301, the current NPO. S. A. Lavochkina. The head of KB-1 was Konstantin Mikhailovich Gerasimov. The main designers were Pavel Nikolaevich Kuksenko and Sergo Lavrentievich Beria. Deputy chief designer - Alexander Andreevich Raspletin. Supervised the work directly Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria.

Already on July 25, 1951, less than a year after the decision was made, as part of the start of the factory tests, the first launch of a rocket, “product 205”, was carried out. A prototype of the B-200 radar station also began to be tested in the summer of 1951, and in the fall of 1952 it was already sent to the test site with missile launches. On April 26, 1953, at the Kapustin Yar training ground, a Tu-4 bomber used as a target was shot down for the first time with two missiles.

The vertical antenna of the B-200 station is designed to view the airspace in the elevation plane
http://www.raketac25.narod.ru

In mid-1953, L.P. Beria was arrested, removed from all posts, relieved of all posts and soon shot. Sergo Beria, one of the chief designers of KB-1, was suspended from work, deprived of his academic degrees, titles, awards, placed under house arrest, then imprisoned until the end of 1954, and subsequently had no relation to the design of the system. P. N. Kuksenko was removed from the post of chief designer and appointed scientific secretary of the scientific council of the Design Bureau. The place of the chief designer was taken by A. A. Raspletin.

Birth of System-25

However, these personnel changes had little effect on the course of work. Organizational changes turned out to be much more sensitive: the Kapustin Yar training ground was transferred to the Main Artillery Directorate, as was the order for the system. Rocket systems were new to artillerymen, and they approached the novelty with doubts and caution. State acceptance tests of the system, called "System-25", or S-25 for short, began in June 1954. The elements of the system presented for testing generally met the technical requirements specified in the decree of 1950, and in some parts they noticeably exceeded them. However, the GAU was in no hurry to make a decision on the final acceptance of the system. There are conflicting opinions about who exactly slowed down the system's deployment to combat duty. The military was frightened by the complexity and novelty; it was proposed to put the system into operation without putting it into service, there were statements about the need to refine it for the constantly changing characteristics of the weapons of a potential enemy. Finally, N. S. Khrushchev unequivocally spoke out in favor of the system, and on May 7, 1955, the S-25 system was put into service.

The appearance of the rocket and the characteristics of the S-25 complex. Magazine "Air Defense Forces"

In parallel with the development, large-scale construction was carried out. Already in March 1951, a resolution of the Council of Ministers on the organization of the construction department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 565 was issued with the tasks of building air defense facilities around Moscow. In June of the same year, the selection of sites for construction begins, organizational and management structures are formed, labor camps are organized to provide construction with a workforce. The construction of positions began in December 1951.

As a result, the S-25 consisted of several rings for various purposes, combined into a single system. At a distance of 200–250 kilometers from the capital, ten positions of the A-100D Kama all-round radar were deployed with a detection range of up to six hundred kilometers, two radars per position. At a distance of about a hundred kilometers from Moscow, there was an outer ring of positions connected by a ring road with a coating of concrete slabs: thirty-four missile regiments with launch positions for sixty missiles, the first models of which had a target range of up to 22 kilometers, and radar guidance stations B- 200 with a target tracking range of up to 50 kilometers. Each regiment controlled a sector of 60 degrees, the firing sectors of the regiments overlapped. Near the positions of the regiment, a residential town was erected for officers and members of their families.

View of the S-25 positions from space. Visible "Christmas tree" starting positions, CRN and a residential town

Seven missile refueling and storage bases provided launch sites with fueled missiles. The transportation of missiles was carried out by ZIS-151, later ZIL-157, and at the very end partially by ZIL-131, equipped with special trailers. About a thousand missiles were stored at each base, including 20 fully fueled ones. The shelf life of the rocket in a fueled state initially did not exceed two and a half months, later than six months. After a series of upgrades and replacement of missiles with newer ones, the shelf life increased further.

The second, inner ring of positions, also connected by a ring road, consisted of 22 regiments and was located about fifty kilometers from Moscow. The last ring was four more positions of the Kama detection radar, data on the exact model are contradictory. Probably, these were not the A-100D with a circular view, but the A-100B with a sector view and a detection range of up to 225 kilometers. All radar detection information was transmitted to the central command post. The whole system made it possible to simultaneously fire at up to 1120 enemy aircraft, evenly flying up to Moscow from all sides. Each regiment simultaneously escorted and fired at up to 20 targets, and each could launch three missiles. To combat large formations of enemy aircraft, it was supposed to either “break” them on approach with the actions of fighters, forcing them to disperse into the firing zones of several regiments, or use a missile with a special, in other words, nuclear, warhead. The power of the nuclear charge was estimated at ten kilotons, the first test of such a rocket was carried out in 1957. And on November 7, 1960, V-300 missiles were first shown at a military parade in Moscow.

V-300 missiles at the parade on Red Square
http://topwar.ru

The costs of building the system were so high that the construction of a modified system for Leningrad was cancelled. The rapid development of means of attack and electronic warfare led to the partial obsolescence of the S-25 even before it was placed on combat duty. In the course of service, the system underwent four major stages of modernization and several smaller ones: the speed and range of missiles, noise immunity increased, and the minimum target interception height decreased. But by the end of the 1970s, the possibilities for improving the system were exhausted, and in 1982 the S-25 was removed from combat duty.

ZIS-151 tractor with V-300 missile

The effectiveness of the C-25 has always been quite controversial. Opponents of the system point primarily to its stationarity, and therefore vulnerability to attack. The cost of construction and operation also left much to be desired. On average, one object in the second half of the 50s cost half a billion a year, while the total cost amounted to almost 13 billion rubles.

Information about the cost of the S-25 system in 1956-1957

The technical problems were proportional to the complexity of the system. It was necessary to balance between the number of fueled missiles and the short shelf life of the missile in the fueled state, after which the missile had to be written off.

The pride of the developers was the electronic, and not the electromechanical equipment of the calculating devices, implemented on radio tubes. In addition to the obvious advantages and progressiveness, at the time of manufacture there were also disadvantages. Only in the equipment of the central radar guidance of radio tubes, there were about thirteen thousand. In addition to the monstrous amount of electricity consumed by the heat, and the equally monstrous heat generation, which required powerful ventilation systems, lamps have a very limited service life, usually in the thousands of hours. Further, the cathodes lose their emission, and the lamp fails. In general, the station was considered combat-ready if it could provide at least eighteen channels out of twenty declared.

Command post firing complex
http://historykpvo.narod2.ru/

There were big problems with logistics. Three volleys of the regiment, sixty launches, could be fired within a couple of minutes. Reloading was theoretically possible in two hours - in practice, such an urgent reloading required sixty trucks, taking missiles to a trailer at the storage base, carrying them over a distance of several tens of kilometers along a very narrow concrete road, somehow driving around with returning empty vehicles - and so eight times. Since one storage base provided eight regiments.

In defense of the system, we can say that at least it was, and in any case, it performed the functions of intimidation regularly: after the S-25 was put on combat duty, reconnaissance flights within its reach instantly stopped. Also, and often underestimated, Soviet Union gained unique experience in the development, creation and operation of a complex, heterogeneous, geographically distributed weapons system operating in real time. Such an experience by that time, perhaps, could not be obtained anywhere in the world.

To date, part of the S-25 sites are occupied by more modern S-300 complexes, part summer cottages, but most of them are simply abandoned and destroyed.

V-300 missile and B-200 radar at the Aviation Museum on Khodynka field in Moscow
http://pvo.guns.ru

V-300 missiles of various models are being converted and used as targets in air defense exercises.

The history of System-25 is over.

References:

1. General characteristics of the Berkut air defense complex, technical design. Section 1. 1951
2. Anti-aircraft missile forces of air defense. MO RF, 1994
3. Leonov Dmitry. Book about 658 ZRP.

Dear Yury Albertovich, I watched with great interest a series of programs with your participation on the topic “Defending the sky of the Motherland. History of Russian Air Defense” on November 21-23 and again on November 26 of this year on the Zvezda TV channel.

With the end of the 2nd World War and the aggressive desire of our former allies to defeat the USSR (W. Churchill, March 1946, Fulton USA), including with the help of captured German rocket weapons, means of their production and bringing them to the intercontinental range, I. IN. Stalin seriously considered creating missile defense countries, especially since there was experience of English air defense against German missiles. However, two circumstances prevented the adoption of practical decisions: firstly, the existing missiles could not yet take on board an atomic bomb of the mass and dimensions that it had at that time; secondly, the range of these missiles was still insufficient to strike at the majority of vital large objects on the territory of the USSR.

At the same time, the threat from the strategic aviation of the United States and Great Britain was very real. Their strategic bombers (B-36 and B-50), in terms of flight range, mass and dimensions of the payload, were quite capable of carrying atomic bombs, which was shown by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If earlier, during the Great Patriotic War, the breakthrough of one or two German bombers even to the capital did not pose an overly serious danger, now the breakthrough of even one aircraft, but with an atomic bomb, was catastrophic. In this regard, by decision of I.V. Stalin in 1948 air defense troops are withdrawn from the subordination of the chief of artillery Soviet army, and an independent branch of the armed forces is formed - the Air Defense Forces of the country, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov, while simultaneously holding the post of Deputy Minister of War of the USSR. The advanced points of the VNOS were moved significantly to the west on the territory of the countries of people's democracy, to the south - to the borders of the USSR and to the east - beyond the Urals.

I was sent to the Air Defense Forces in the same 1948 to the receiving radio center of the communications center of the Main Headquarters of the Air Defense Forces of the country as a shift leader. In 1949 I was appointed head of this radio center. The radio bureau (nodal point of the receiving radio center, which serves to receive radiograms and control transmitters) was located at the command post of the Air Defense Commander of the country in his personal room, which occupied the entire compartment with its own elevator (Frunzenskaya embankment, 22, 3rd entrance) in the building of the Ministry of Defense USSR from the first to the last floor. The radio bureau itself was located directly next to the tablet room of the command post and served its tablet complex. Such placement of the radio office in the immediate vicinity of the tablet hall was due to the urgent need to minimize the time of delivery of radiograms to the tablet complex. Suffice it to say that the radiograms of the “Air” series about the dangerous crossing of the borders of the USSR by an alien aircraft were supposed to reach the VNOS point to the tablet complex in no more than 2 minutes, in order to provide the Air Defense Commander of the country with the necessary time to decide on response actions. In the course of our media there was this kind of response to requests from foreign newspapers and radio about the fate of the aircraft that crossed the border of the USSR: "The aircraft retired towards the sea." In our country's air defense, this meant: the aircraft was spotted by VNOS points, a radiogram was received at the radio bureau, reported to the Commander, he discussed measures with the country's leadership, and the intruder was shot down. In cases of erroneous flight of foreign aircraft and their warning, they changed course and moved away from the line of VNOS points.

In parallel with these transformations of the air defense forces and the improvement of the warning and communication system on the initiative of I.V. Stalin began development new system Air defense of the USSR with the use of anti-aircraft missile weapons. To this end, I.V. Stalin summoned the doctor of technical sciences, professor P.N. Kuksenko (Head of the Department of Radio Receivers and Radio Intelligence of the Military Red Banner Academy of Communications named after S.M. Budyonny (VKAS named after S.M. Budyonny)) and he, as the future director of KB-1 and chief designer of the air defense system of the Moscow Industrial Region (MPR), instructed to develop the structure of this system, the composition of its funds, proposals for the transformation of SB-1 into the head scientific and design organization (KB-1), the composition of the co-executors of the developers of these tools and the provision of the created organizations with the necessary specialists. Technical solutions were supposed to be taken on the basis of the graduation project of Sergo Lavrentievich Beria on the topic: “The defeat of the enemy’s navy with the help of guided missiles launched from a carrier aircraft”, made at the VKAS named after S.M. Budyonny under the leadership of P.N. Kuksenko. The project was implemented in industry, its industrial design was tested at sea, where the role of the American aircraft carrier was played by the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz, and was adopted by aviation Navy THE USSR. S.L. Beria and P.N. Kuksenko were awarded the Stalin Prize. S.L. Beria (candidate of technical sciences in 1947, doctor of technical sciences in 1952) was appointed the second chief designer of the MPR air defense system in KB-1. Amo Sergeevich Elyan, the former director of the plant that produced guns V.G., was appointed the head of the experimental, and then serial production. Grabin brand "ZIS", where for the first time in world practice the technology of their in-line production was developed and applied. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, this plant produced more than 100,000 guns. A.S. himself Yelyan was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.

As P.N. Kuksenko, all work on the implementation of the instructions of I.V. Stalin and the preparation of a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR began to spin with extraordinary speed.

"Berkut" - the first Soviet anti-aircraft missile system received such a code. Her birthday is August 9, 1950. (Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3389-1426 SS / OP 08/09/1950). According to this decree, the Third Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers (3 TGU of the USSR Council of Ministers) was formed, which acted as the customer of the system, created its own military acceptance, its own anti-aircraft missile range in the Kapustin Yar area and, subsequently, military formations for the combat operation of the circular air defense of Moscow. The curator of all the work was Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, who at that time was Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR I.V. Stalin.

The Berkut air defense system was designed not only to protect the capital, but also the larger Moscow industrial region from a single (one aircraft), mass (up to 1000 aircraft) and star (mass raid from all sides) raid, in which not a single aircraft could overcome it.

At the same time, the country's air defense command, I.V. Stalin, was entrusted with the preparation and conduct of a retaliatory strike against the territory of the United States, against the cities of their eastern coast. In order to fulfill these instructions, I.V. Stalin and for training by the Commander of the Air Defense of the country, Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov organized and conducted combined-arms exercises of air defense and long-range bomber aviation. The city of Stalingrad was chosen as an object for practicing a retaliatory strike on the east coast of the United States. The city, which stretches along the banks of the Volga for more than 60 km. With this location, he perfectly imitated the North American east coast. The exercise plan included a real flight of a squadron of long-range bomber aircraft with the development of a strike on Stalingrad (conditionally) with atomic bombs throughout its entire length with an overlap in its north and south. Air refueling was planned for the bombers, as well as the return of the bombers and tankers to their nearest airfields. All stages of the exercises: approach for bombing, dropping bombs, practicing refueling in the air - were successful. Communication with the squadron, control of combat operations was carried out by the country's air defense command by radio through the radio bureau mentioned above. The project of the radio bureau, its installation and installation took place according to the project, under the guidance and with the direct participation of the head of the decimeter radio center of the air defense communications center of the country, Captain Popov Viktor Emelyanovich. I, as the future shift chief of the radio operators of the radio bureau, was involved in the installation of workplaces and switches. After the explosion of an experimental nuclear charge near Semipalatinsk, and especially after these combined arms exercises "with a retaliatory strike on the cities of the eastern coast of the United States," the intensity of aggressive intentions dropped sharply, which even we felt it on our duty. The number of reports of violations of our borders has dropped sharply. The United States realized that it was better not to hurt the USSR!

The development of the Berkut system went on as usual. The whole system included: A-100. Stationary all-round radar "Kama" 10 cm range, based onwhich determined two rings of radar detection:near (25-30 km from Moscow) and far (200-250 km). main condesigner L.V. Leonov. Research Institute - 244 (now YARTI);B-200.Radar for guidance of anti-aircraft missiles from two rings: near (24 objects) andfar (32 objects). Leading designer V.E. Magdesiev. Razrabotka receiving, transmitting, feeder paths, antennas and receivingvetchik on an anti-aircraft missile cm range - author and lead designertor G.V. Kisunko. Participant in the development of M.B. Saxon. All from KB-1.B-300.Anti-aircraft guided missiles deployed at launch sites inclose proximity to the guidance radar. General designtor S.A. Lavochkin. OKB-301. Starting equipment for launching thesemissiles - Chief Designer V.P. Barmin. GSKB MMP.G-400.Tu-4 interceptor aircraft with G-300 air-to-air missilesspirit". Chief designer L.I. Korchmar. OKB-301. Re developmentsnatch was discontinued at an early stage due to complex linkages withground complexes and low efficiency.D-500. Early warning aircraft based on Tu-4.However, they did not come to real use in the Berkut system.E-600.Modifications of various types of V-300 missiles with high-explosive fragmentationwarhead with a radius of destruction of at least 75 meters. constructory N.S. Zhidkikh, V.A. Sukhikh, K.I. Kozorezov. KB NII-6 MSHM. direktor NII-6 MSHM Rastorguev.

The equipment of missile guidance stations for determining the coordinates of targets, missiles and giving commands to undermine the warhead was developed by a team of German specialists who were in the USSR as prisoners of war, under the leadership of Aizenberger.

The B-200 complex provided tracking of up to 200 targets along 200 firing channels with automatic (manual) tracking of targets and simultaneous guidance of 1-2 missiles for each target. In general, the Berkut system could protect the Moscow industrial region from an attack by more than 1,000 bombers. By a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Berkut system, named in 1953. as S-25, was put into service on May 7, 1955. It is interesting to note that this day has been celebrated in the USSR for 10 years as “Radio Day”, and it has been 60 years since the discovery of radio by the Russian scientist A.S. Popov, when for the first time in the world he transmitted the telegram " Heinrich Hertz » in honor of the German scientist who first proved the validity of the electromagnetic theory of the English scientist James Clerk Maxwell ´ a about the possibility of independent existence and propagation of radio waves.

During operation, the S-25 air defense system was improved with the replacement of its elements with new ones. The modernized S-25M system was withdrawn from service in 1982 with its replacement with anti-aircraft missile systems. medium range S-300P. Chief designer V.D. Sinelnikov Deputy General Designer of the Almaz Central Design Bureau. The S-300 complexes were supplied in three versions: S-300P for the country's air defense forces, S-300V for the Ground Forces and S-300F for the Navy.

Subsequently, from the air defense of the country, which retained its own characteristics, the anti-missile defense system (ABM) grew, the complexes of which were put into service in 1978. This is the A-35 system, General Designer Grigory Vasilyevich Kisunko, KB-1.

I am enclosing to my letter a photocopy of my article dedicated to this great man and the 40th anniversary of the world's first non-nuclear defeat of an anti-missile warhead of a ballistic missile, which took place on March 04, 1961, 23 years earlier than the United States!

Now, due to the very high scientific and technical complexity and huge material costs only two countries in the world are able to possess and possess missile defense systems. These are Russia and the USA.

Literature.

PRO systems. 44 Rocket Regiment, military unit 89503.http :// rocketpolk44. people. ru/ kosm-v/ PRO. htm

Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Third Edition, Volume 5, p.200. Air Defense Troops, 1971

Kisunko G.V. "Secret zone. Confession of the General Designer" - Moscow.: "Sovremennik", 1996. - 510s., illustration.

Ganin S. “The first domestic anti-aircraft missile defense system of Moscow S-25 Berkut”, Nevsky Bastion, No. 2, 1997

PS . Yuri Albertovich, I express the hope that when writing the script for the next screenings of the series “Defending the sky of the Motherland. The history of domestic air defense "You will take into account the factual data presented in my letter to you. Mainly about the people who created the country's air defense. In my opinion, this is not difficult to do without increasing the time of the series, since it is oversaturated with often repeated, almost identical data about the technique and its photographs.

Please accept my congratulations on the 70th anniversary of the counter-offensive of our troops near Moscow and the defeat of the Nazi troops.

Sincerely,

doctor of technical sciences, professor Troshin G.I.

December 2011

In my memoirs about Grigory Vasilyevich Kisunko, I will not touch on his difficult, generally accepted biography or impressive path in science, especially since G. Troshin’s book, which deserves the closest attention on the eve of his 95th birthday, has just been published. Scientific biography G.V. Kisunko "- I will try to tell in more detail about the situation that has developed for Grigory Vasilyevich and around him in the course of those unique developments in which I was fortunate enough to participate as a tester and for which he is rightfully recognized as the founder of the national missile defense - A "seer", according to the apt assessment of A. Tolkachev.

From RE to systems "A" and "A-35"

I am still surprised and amazed by the work of G. Kisunko with experimental radars RE-1 - RE-4. After all, a “high” decision had already been made to create an experimental missile defense range complex (System “A”), the development and production of equipment and equipment had been launched, in Moscow, combat algorithms and programs were being developed and tested on an integrated system model (CMS), and he, as if nothing had happened, he experimentally tested the possibility of detecting a warhead BR! Apparently there were doubts. And so, on June 7, 1957, the first work of the RE-1 on the R-2 type ballistic missile launched from Baikonur took place - the radar detected the target (saw it!). And already on April 8, 1958, the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "Problems of missile defense" was issued with the definition of cooperation and the assignment of solving each organization and undertaking specific tasks to create the Moscow missile defense system "A-35". By the way, the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense was tasked with developing TTT for this system. Titan-2 and Minuteman-2 (monoblock!) were identified as targets for the system. In my opinion, the leadership was impressed by the S-25 - the main thing is to "see" the goal and the task will be solved! G. Kisunko does not stop at the experiment with RE-1 - he changes the station to the RE-2 radar operating at the RTN frequency. At the beginning of the summer of 1958, another experiment was being conducted - the ability to detect and track the warheads of BR was again confirmed! These works with RE gave a lot: firstly, besides the warheads, the hulls were also found (the single-channel stations did not allow them to be taken to the NPP), which was later taken into account in the Aldan RCC by introducing a second counter-reflector; secondly, during the launches of the BR SD to our range and, especially, the BR DD to Kamchatka, where the RE-3 was installed, it was found that the BR body was ahead of the warhead! There was a question about the selection of signals reflected from the hull and warhead of the BR. There were other moments - everything had to be comprehended and overcome for the first time. Autonomous and factory tests of the experimental system "A" were still going on, and in November 1959, the first version of the preliminary design of the "A-35" system was already completed in KB-1. Special mention should be made of it: it turned out to be erroneous in that, similar to the “A” system, it was based on the triangulation method for determining the coordinates of the target and the anti-missile. But the "A" system, used for warheads using anti-missiles equipped with a conventional (high-explosive) warhead with a radius of destruction of 49 m (according to the proposal of Grigory Vasilyevich, rounded to 50 m), this was necessary to ensure the accuracy of measuring coordinates. In addition, at that time, work was carried out at the training ground on a single target that was not equipped with means to overcome missile defense, and the TTT (4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense) assumed, if I am not mistaken, 8 - 16 target elements. The construction, suitable for the training ground, turned out to be unsuitable for the combat system. In addition to identifying targets (48 RCCs and 96 RCTs were planned in the system), there were issues of electromagnetic compatibility, project cost, etc. In a word, the proposed project was not without sin at the beginning - were they in a hurry themselves or were they in a hurry? And, on the other hand, there are only 24 hours in a day - Grigory Vasilyevich was completely and completely absorbed in the affairs and problems on the "A" system.

So, by the autumn of 1960, autonomous tests of the Sistema "A" experimental range complex were basically completed, 20 works were carried out, and only in two of them was the V-1000 PR brought to the meeting point, but even in them the warhead PR designed by Voronov did not ensure the defeat of the target and was later recognized as unsuitable. We switched to warhead PR designer K. Kozorezov. At that moment (1960), a visit to the 2nd site of the test site by “that still friend” G. Kisunko A. Raspletin took place, who was very skeptical about the missile defense issues in general, even after his proposal to the government to use the S-225 complex with the V- missile 825 to repel an attack by American missiles flying from a southerly direction along flat trajectories. So, A. Raspletin reported to the government that he is developing the S-225 system, which, apparently, will be able to intercept global missiles. After the report, in my opinion, to the Central Committee of the CPSU, he was recommended to speed up the development. But no “forcing” took place - S-125 were on the agenda ( chief designer Figurnovsky) and S-200 (Bunkin). A. Raspletin did not interfere with the development of these preliminary designs, heard intermediate results, and helped with external cooperation. It was here that V. Markov, feeling that the fate of the development of the S-225 was unstable, took a risky step and, without agreement with A. Raspletin, suggested that Grigory Vasilyevich include the S-225 system in the Moscow missile defense system, but received a polite refusal. As a result, the A-35 system was left without close interception, and G. Kisunko made himself another worst enemy in the person of V. Markov (later Deputy of the USSR Ministry of Radio Industry). To complete this story with the S-225 system, it should be said that the development of its preliminary design and its protection on the NTS KB-1 were completed in 1963. Further, technical documentation was developed and, according to it, an experimental and two prototypes were made, delivered to the test site. One of them (Azov) was tested at the test site, including to test the possibility of intercepting the warhead BR in the near zone using the selection of passive decoys in the atmosphere, the other (5K17) was relocated to the Kura test site (peninsulas Komchatka) to participate in the work on ICBM Strategic Missile Forces. Unfortunately, I do not know the results of selection work; in our 1st Directorate, the 2nd department under the supervision of L. Belozersky was engaged in this work.

In December 1960, Academician V.Chelomei arrived at the test site, accompanied by N.S. Khrushchev's son Sergei Nikitovich, who worked for him as chief engineer. For what purpose? A. Kulakov in his book "Balkhash polygon" writes that it was, most likely, a study tour. Grigory Vasilyevich avoided the meeting and Alexander Fedorovich conducted the conversation with Sergei Nikitovich. There has not yet been a conflict over missile defense. And then it “happened” on March 04, 1961 - a triumphant result with the “interception” of the BR warhead! After this work, G. Kisunko carried out a series of works to improve the efficiency of the system (work under conditions of various kinds of interference and nuclear explosions, carried out under the codes of Verba, Cactus, Mole, and, finally, K1 - K5). They continued until 1964, when, based on the totality of the results obtained, it became clear that the selection of warheads was needed (by the way, the Americans had recognition stations in all systems, starting with the Nike-Zeus) and the use of a nuclear charge in warheads PR (out of 100 PR launches provided for testing the "A" system after March 04, 1961 were made only 16, in 11 of which the PR "came" to the planned meeting point, and the "defeat" of the warhead was recorded only in 6 cases ). The use of a nuclear charge was supposed to ensure reliable hitting of the target and made it possible to abandon the cumbersome and insufficiently accurate triangulation method of targeting the PR, implemented in the A-35 system. So G. Kisunko, having switched to traditional radar (the range is measured by the radar, and the angular coordinates are “taken” from goniometric sensors), he overcame another “paradigm” (remember the preliminary project). What technical courage one had to have to admit that the principles of hitting a target laid down in the experimental system “A” “did not work” and to start everything, in fact, “from scratch” on the A-35 system! But Grigory Vasilievich found such strength in himself, although the use of a nuclear charge in a warhead PR and a selective nuclear explosion (almost the only possible method of extra-atmospheric selection) led to a significant limitation of the capabilities of the missile defense system - even the Americans never at that time spoke about the possibility of effective reflection massive BR raid! And, here the military pushed the leadership: “Give us a territorial missile defense system!”. Here we will have to recall the above-mentioned V. Chelomey with his "Taran" system, also because the control center for his UR-100 missiles undertook to provide " old friend» Grigory Vasilyevich A. Mints. In a nutshell about "Taran": this is the use of their ICBMs as a means of destroying enemy ICBMs without correcting the trajectories of their ICBMs with compensation for a big miss through the use of powerful warheads. In addition, it was proposed to use the Danube-3 SDO of the A-35 system and the TsSO-S, which was 500 km away from Moscow towards Leningrad. They were supposed to be activated by the signals of the early warning nodes RO-1 (Murmansk) and RO-2 (Riga). But these nodes created by RTI (A. Mints) had limited technical capabilities and could only be used to solve particular problems, which turned out to be a key argument in rejecting the Ram, and the UR-100 ICBMs themselves turned out to be unsuitable for use as anti-missiles.

Returning to Grigory Vasilyevich, it must be said that at the end of the 70s he had to overcome not only and not so much technical as political difficulties - his "friends-opponents" and competitors spoke a lot about the mistakes made by G. Kisunko (of course, such were - the one who does nothing is not mistaken) and themselves prevented him from developing his ideas in the development and creation of missile defense, either offering his own developments as a counterweight to it, or participating in alternative developments of other designers. First of all, the ill-wishers were in the Ministry of Radio Industry from SB-1 (KB-1) A. Raspletin. This is the “magnificent four”: A. Raspletin himself, A. Mints, A. Basistov and V. Markov - Grigory Vasilyevich was in conflict with them almost constantly after the completion of work on the S-25 system, on which, by the way, they all worked together together, solving a common problem (V. Markov - head of the thematic laboratory, then deputy chief designer, A. Basistov - complex specialist, A. Mints - radio receiving path, G. Kisunko - antenna-feeder devices). And it did! On the instructions of I. Stalin in 1948, they managed to create a reliable air defense system for Moscow S-25, and on its basis - air defense of the entire territory of the USSR. A system capable of shooting down up to a thousand enemy aircraft in one massive raid. In the future, G. Baidukov, the former chairman of the State Commission for the adoption of the system, and Yu. Votintsev, who served on it as deputy commander for combat training, will be mentioned in connection with it. The S-25 system successfully passed state tests in 1955 and was put into service.

So G.Baidukov, it can be considered, also took a direct part in the creation of the S-25 system. But, despite this, he turned out to be an opponent of Grigory Vasilyevich: shortly before his departure from the 4 GUMO, as E. Gavrilin recalls, after consulting with D. Ustinov, he wrote letters to the Central Committee of the CPSU and the military-industrial complex about the ugly attitude of the Ministry of Radio Industry to the missile defense problem in in general and to its chief designer A.Basistov, in particular. Let me give here a replica of the respected M. Mymrin. During a break in some regular meeting with the hearing of the missile defense developers in connection with the problems arising in the creation of the A-35 system, at the moment when the "military side" was left alone, he expressed his opinion, hinting at the situation from the well-known anecdote: “It is not necessary to move furniture, but b ... change!”. Can't be more clear.

From experimental and combat to super-system

In his memoirs, A. Tolkachev notes that, despite being very busy with the problems of creating a test site sample of the SC of the A-35 (Aldan) system, Grigory Vasilievich Kisunko very carefully monitored the fundamental issues related to the creation of the Argun radar and SC on its basis. He was especially interested in the polarization methods of object recognition and active interference compensation, since he rightly believed that this was one of the effective ways to deal with the radio technical protection of the BR in the non-atmospheric section of the flight trajectory, as well as the problems of energy potential, bearing in mind some of the difficulties in this part that arose when creating the RCC system "A". It should be noted here that G. Kisunko (contrary to V. Markov’s assertion that, after the successful interception of the BR on March 4, 1961, he allegedly experienced “dizziness from success” and did not take into account that in the USA and in our USSR we were already developing active and passive interference of missile defense, took this issue seriously), since 1962 he was the scientific director of the complex R & D "Choice" and "Selection" precisely on these problems. As noted by V. Repin, who at that time headed the scientific laboratory at the Vympel Central Research and Production Association, these were two comprehensive research projects that involved all developers of missile defense systems and means of overcoming missile defense, military institutes and training grounds, a number of organizations of the Academy of Sciences THE USSR. The parent organization was TsNPO Vympel. So, in this sense, V. Markov was wrong - G. Kisunko saw everything, knew and seriously dealt with these issues. The compiler of the book "Lines of Defense - in Space and on Earth" N. Zavaliy rightly notes that "... at that time he (Kisunko) could not find a sufficiently effective solution to the problems of selection ... In fairness, it must be said that such a solution has not been found even now, including abroad” (the book was published in 2004). At the same time, V. Repin notes that “…practically the only more or less effective and stable selection method is the use of the natural selective properties of the atmosphere, which make it possible to arrange CBC elements in relation to their mass to the surface area, or the equivalent selective properties of a high-altitude nuclear explosion. All other possible selection methods turned out to be ineffective - they gave some result only for imperfect camouflage means with a large difference in the characteristics of decoys from the characteristics of missile warheads and were completely unstable in relation to technological progress in improving camouflage means. This is probably why Grigory Vasilyevich came up with the idea of ​​a “second line of interception” in the A-35 system using Azov. Yes, and V. Markov in his memoirs "kicks" the A-35 system in this part: "... tests at the range to detect our BR with less interference confirmed the inefficiency of the radar of the target channel in isolating the BR warhead against the background of interference." But after all, the RCC did not provide for any selection according to the TTZ - it had to receive and received two different target designations even after the system was upgraded to work on the SBC! Again, V. Markov is wrong.

Probably, it was not in vain that A. Basistov was also interested in "non-global" missile defense systems. After all, the Azov, intended for the second (nearest) line of interception, was eventually withdrawn from the A-135 system and all questions regarding this stage of interception were assigned to the Don-2N. But then V. Repin (noting that the improvement of warhead camouflage was and remains unlimited, and, speaking of the lack of real progress in creating an effective missile defense system from missiles equipped with advanced means of overcoming), writes that all this required a significant revision of the concept itself work on missile defense. What he means is that the application of atmospheric selection requires short-range "low-altitude" atmospheric interception, i.e. creation of a new generation of high-speed highly maneuverable missiles, and that nuclear-dynamic selection on high altitudes with long-range interception, it entails the most difficult problems of interfering effects of a nuclear explosion. High-precision multi-channel radars with high resolution and throughput, with phased array or lens antennas, were needed. Highly desirable are multi-band radars, high-precision basic correlation and interferometric systems, etc. And here, according to V. Repin, Grigory Vasilyevich did not show his characteristic technical courage: he claims that, judging by the results of numerous the consequences of fundamental changes in the target environment in the transition from simple to complex targets, G. Kisunko understood the situation well and was aware that neither the A-35 missile defense system he was creating near Moscow, nor the territorial anti-missile system developed in the Aurora project of defense, both in terms of the principles of construction, and in terms of the composition and characteristics of technical means, are not adequate to these changes. “Probably it would be right,” V. Repin believes, “to himself, using his enormous and, of course, well-deserved technical authority, to stop for a while and ask for an extension of the deadline for the Aurora project to revise both the requirements for the missile defense system in the direction of their feasibility, and the development of effective technical ways (system architecture, information and destructive means, combat algorithms, etc.) to implement these requirements.

MVK for three projects

However, this was not done, and in the first half of 1967 the project territorial system The Aurora missile defense system was submitted for consideration by the interdepartmental commission (MVK) chaired by Yu. Votintsev, who had just been appointed commander of the missile defense and air defense forces. According to the memoirs of the latter, the work of the MVK took place at the 45th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense for two months - August-September 1967. The composition of the MVK is 60 people. She was presented with three draft designs: the first - for the Aurora missile defense system (G. Kisunko), the second - for the Don-N radar (A. Mints), the third - for the Neman radar (Yu. Burlakov).

The first project for the Aurora missile defense system provided for the creation of 4 MKSKs near Moscow and Kuibyshev, each of which consisted of a detection radar (for the first time with phased array), capable of detecting and tracking a large number of targets and providing information about them to a multi-channel anti-missile guidance radar. It was supposed to use two types of anti-missiles: the A-350R with a wide range of combat use in height and range, and the long-range A-900. I must say that the proposal to use the "Grushinsky" PR A-350R was a "red rag" for the military because, as I already said, they were based on open launch positions (Chief Designer Bermin), unprotected from vandalism by the "bored" guard personnel.

The second project is a sector multifunctional radar designed to detect targets and aim PR at them. This MRLS "Don-N" with phased array was also developed for the first time.

The third project is the Neman broadband radar using Luneberg lenses. It could become a means of detecting and selecting warheads in conditions of interference.

In early September, the General Designer of the A-35 System G. Kisunko and the Chief Designer of the Don-N MRLS A. Mints were heard at the same time - as Yu. Votintsev recalls, the commission witnessed their fierce fight, which reached mutual insults. Then Y. Burlakov was also heard. As a result of the work of the IAC, it was decided to reject all three submitted projects, because. they did not offer a solution with the required efficiency of the following main missile defense problems:

- selection (isolation) of BR warheads against the background of promising decoys, under conditions of intense interference and the impact of nuclear explosions;

— creation of a new generation of computing facilities with a speed of hundreds of millions of operations per second;

- Creation effective means damage at various ranges and heights.

As for the choice of early warning radar (DO), either V. Sosulnikov (later stepped aside along with G. Kisunko's “departure”) or A. Mints (he subsequently did not participate in the work) were mentioned here. There was a legitimate question, why? The answer was found in the memoirs of V. Repin, who was involved from the end of the 50s as an expert in solving difficult problems in this area. It turned out that A. Mints "did not participate" in the radar station for the Moscow missile defense system "A-35". And although the consideration of this issue was held under the auspices of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Ministry of Defense, the right of the final decision remained with Grigory Vasilyevich, as the General Designer of the system and the head of work. Taking into account the positive experience of operating the test site "A", a decision was made - to solve the problem of early warning for the "A-35" on the basis of the radar station "Danube" (Chief Designer Vladimir Panteleymonovich Sosulnikov). In other words, A. Mints was “not taken” by Grigory Vasilievich into cooperation on the creation of the Moscow missile defense system, and this is not forgotten - their confrontation did not end there, it was just beginning. True, A. Mints was invited to implement his project at site 54 (Gulshat village, Balkhash island) and further implement it for peripheral nodes of early warning systems and SKKP radars of the Dnestr and Dnepr types.

Who made the decision?

Here I will allow myself some digression and tell about the Customer's representatives participating in the consideration of the preliminary design. E. Gavrilin in his book “Overcoming Complexity - the RKO Paradigm” with reference to Mikhail Pervov’s book “RKO Systems were Created This Way” writes that K. Trusov (deputy head of the ordering Department) and N. Chervyakov (also deputy head, but already the Main ordering Department). The latter, allegedly, in a conversation with K. Trusov said: “You can’t master such a colossus without Lavrenty Pavlovich ...”, and then Evgeny Vasilyevich writes: “And the latter’s reference to Lavrenty Pavlovich was far from harmless. N. Chervyakov knew this all-powerful official well.” I don't know if the head of the 4th GUMO had such a deputy as N. Chervyakov, or if this is an "artistic image" of the author of the book. And, here Nikolai Pavlovich Seleznev was (in 1965 he was the first deputy head of the 4th GUMO, lieutenant general). If Yevgeny Vasilievich meant him, then I found the answer to how well he knew L. Beria in N. Karpov's book "Marshal Zhukov". “... I.V. Stalin,” Karpov writes, “did not trust, envied the popularity and authority of G.K. Zhukov (Georgy Konstantinovich signed the act of surrender, hosted the Victory Parade, etc.) and wanted to deal with him. To do this, in March 1946, the commander of the SA Air Force, Chief Marshal of Aviation Novikov, was removed from his post and arrested (later used as the main witness against G. Zhukov), and before that they were arrested: Minister of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin, Generals Repin and Seleznev (from leadership of the Air Force), Shamanov, Budilov and Grigoryan (senior officials of the Central Committee) - they were all declared a "group of major pests." The bottom line is this: Minaviaprom produced batches of low-quality aircraft, and the Air Force leadership accepted them and sent them to the staffing of aviation units, which led to accidents and even death of the flight crew. Everything, of course, was far-fetched and pursued the main goal - the massacre of G. Zhukov. Here is what, according to N. Karpov, N. Seleznev, who at that time was the head of the Main Directorate of Arms Orders for the Air Force, said (he, at the age of 86, remained then in 1992 the only living accused and actually served 6 years in that case) : “War is war. There is no time for subtleties of decoration, the main thing is the presence of fighting qualities. Each time, as the person responsible for acceptance, I recorded all factory defects. But the same Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin and Malenkov, who was especially in charge of aviation production, drove us “to the tail and mane”, demanding not to waste time on trifles and not to delay the delivery of aircraft to the front. By the way, the number of aircraft accidents recorded during the war for technical reasons does not exceed the norm allowed for such a period, and even in wartime production conditions. We should have been rewarded, not punished for such performance!”

And in order to clarify this judicial reprisal, one clarification must be made: Vasily Stalin “tricked” them. This half-educated, drunkard and buzzer, who received the rank of lieutenant in 1940, was already a colonel in 1942 and served as an Air Force inspector, and, being removed from this position, “served” further with Chief Air Marshal Novikov, who was on friendly terms with G. Zhukov. And so, when, at the end of the war, I. Stalin offered Novikov to give his son the rank of general, he refused and called G. Zhukov with the question: "What should I do?" He replied that this was the order of the Supreme and it must be carried out. But it was too late: I. Stalin gave the command not to draw up an individual presentation for his son, but to present him in general list. Then he dealt with both - it's good that he didn't destroy them! In general, if you remember how he dealt with the command of the Air Force just before the war (Smushkevich, Rychagov, etc.) and during the war (during June 1941, the aviation commanders of the North-Western, Western, South-Western and Southern fronts were shot ), becomes uncomfortable. So, I do not rule out that the ominous shadow of Lavrenty Pavlovich hovered here over the work of the MVK and its decisions.

Nevertheless, the MVK, which rejected all three considered projects, recommended the creation of experimental models of the Argun MCC and the Neman radar at the test site. As you can see, the Don MRLS has not yet got here and “surfaced” later after A. Mints retired with the chief designer V. Sloka. Here it is also appropriate to recall how V. Markov, "painting" the deplorable state of our early warning system by the end of the 60s, also says that "... the situation with work in the field of missile defense was even more critical. In 1957, under the leadership of General Designer G. Kisunko, the Aurora project was developed for missile defense of the European part of the USSR from a massive ICBM raid. General Designer G. Kisunko, by his previous statements, created confidence among the country's leadership in the possibility of creating an effective missile defense system from a massive nuclear missile strike, but it turned out that this confidence was unfounded. The consideration of this project by the International Military Commission (chaired by Yu. Votintsev) showed that the General Designer did not attach due importance to the already available data on the state of active and passive interference of the missile defense radar, in the presence of which the defeat of not only dozens, but even single ICBMs was not guaranteed. The Aurora project was rejected." These are the details of the consideration of the Aurora project at the MVK by V. Markov, and at the same time he does not say anything about either the Don or the Neman!

What did the General propose?

Thus, at least three designers were developing. True, Grigory Vasilyevich brought his work to the project of the territorial missile defense system "Aurora", and A. Mints and Yu. Burlakov - only to the projects of new radars ("Don-2N" and "Neman", respectively).

The draft design for the Argun radar for the Aurora system was completed (developed, presented and protected) at the end of 1966. It ensured the detection, tracking and interception of 10-15 BTs. As I remember, according to the TTZ, the Argun RCC was supposed to be 30-channel! The specified restriction in the preliminary design was introduced by a joint decision with the Customer, since there was no corresponding computer (for example, the Elbrus type) and it was supposed to use five computers of the 5E92b type at the MKSK Argun. As A. Tolkachev notes, Grigory Vasilievich well understood the current situation and the need to master new technological solutions adequate to the impending problems, namely:

- ensuring the detection and simultaneous tracking of all elements of the CBS;

- creation of effective algorithms for selecting warheads (warheads) from other elements of the SBC that do not carry a combat charge;

- the need to significantly improve the accuracy of measuring the difference in the angular coordinates of the warhead intended for destruction in order to reduce the miss when using one firing radar;

— development and implementation of effective methods of combating active interference.

I will not enumerate the new technological solutions implemented in the Argun radar, I will only refer to the opinion of its Chief Designer A. Tolkachev: “It seemed that the adopted technical solutions would make it possible to create radar facilities capable of solving information problems as part of the SC when reflecting the SBC raid, equipped with means of radio-technical protection. I note that SBC is referred to in the singular - if Grigory Vasilyevich also understood (and this was exactly the case), then V. Markov’s statement that G. Kisunko guaranteed the country’s leadership to repel a massive strike seems at least strange . I have never met such criticism of Grigory Vasilyevich from anyone! It should be especially noted that Grigory Vasilievich carefully monitored the fundamental issues related to the creation of the radar and the Argun MCSC, and especially the polarization methods of object recognition and active interference compensation, since he rightly believed that this is one of the most effective ways to deal with electronic protection equipment BR on the extra-atmospheric section of the trajectory of its movement. In other words, he already at that time presented the solution that A. Tolkachev is talking about now: “... a radar that has no close analogues either in our country or abroad ...” and further “... the Argun radar did not become a prototype of a combat ABM, as G. Kisunko suggested, and which would allow creating a system in a shorter time, at lower costs and with greater technical capabilities than when using the Don-2N radar. I think that Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor A. Tolkachev is absolutely right here. To his great regret, he, speaking about the fact that the work related to polarization methods of object recognition and polarization compensation of interference, did not become the property of a wide technical community, he himself does not write anything additional about this in his memoirs. He does not say anything about the implemented achievements of the radar in terms of recognition and noise immunity, although the same V. Markov, speaking of success in recognition, cites the example of the Neman and Argun radars. But it will be much later, when the MCSC "Argun" and its radar, in the words of Alexei Alekseevich, "will be consigned to oblivion." And then, as I already noted, after the MVK "Don-2N" for a long time "went into the shadows", and the radar stations of the MKSK "Argun" and "Neman" were allowed to "erect" at the training ground.

As missile defense veterans recall, the Neman radar could serve as a missile defense system no worse than the Don-2N radar, but it turned out to be more complex in technical construction. It is surprising that A. Basistov in his A-135 missile defense system "did not see" not only a single element of the A-35 system (RKTs, SPD, SDO, KP, etc.), but also, in the words of Yu .Votintseva, “I didn’t want to see the Neman either.” Later, as evidenced by the current Chief Designer of the Neman radar B. Panteleev and a former employee of the military-industrial complex apparatus under the USSR Council of Ministers V. Yakunin, ignoring positive results this radar ("Neman") was completely unjustified. Moreover, it could significantly affect the structure of the missile defense system and the concept of its further development.

Story

Prerequisites for creation

Beginning of work

First project

According to the released project, the system consisted of several rings of radar stations and anti-aircraft missile systems located concentrically around Moscow.

Early warning system- 350 km from the center. It consisted of 10 A-100D radar stations, each of which consisted of two Kama radars and a radio altimeter, combined into a radio engineering center. They were located in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe cities: Bui, Gorky, Kadom, Michurinsk, the village of Russian Brod (Oryol region), Bryansk, Smolensk, Andreapol, Borovichi, Cherepovets, forming a continuous radar field at ranges up to 650 km. The radar stations worked continuously, information from them was transmitted to the Central Command Center, from which, in the event of a threatening situation, protective equipment was put into action.

First Air Protection Belt- 80 km from the center, 34 air defense systems located along the circumference after 14.7 km. They created a continuous belt of defense with an outer radius of 110 km, with partial overlap of areas of responsibility. To protect low altitudes at the junctions of the air defense system, the second stage was supposed to additionally install simple single-channel complexes.

Second air defense belt- 46 km from the center, 22 air defense systems through 13.1 km. It was built on similar principles and had an outer radius of the defense ring of about 80 km.

Air protection inner ring- it was calculated to destroy single enemy aircraft that broke through 2 defense rings to a distance closer than 55 km from the center (later this element of the system was abandoned, considering it redundant). It was designed on the basis of the G-310 super-heavy interceptor aircraft (a special modification of the Tu-4), carrying an all-round radar with a range of 35-40 km, 4 G-300 air-to-air missiles with a guidance system, navigation equipment that allows take-off and landing in any weather conditions (autoradio compass ARK-5, navigation coordinator NK-46B, blind landing systems "Mainland"), the necessary means of communication and the identification system "friend or foe" "Electron". Rising on alarm, the planes were supposed to move dispersed along the ring route, forming the third belt of protection. Conceptually, the complex resembled the air-sea system KS-1 Kometa. The missile was also controlled in the beam of the guidance station with the transition to the GOS in the final section. Subsequently, the air protection ring was considered redundant and it was not implemented in the project.

Close proximity detection system- 4 A-100B radars (of the same type as the A-100D) with a sector area of ​​​​responsibility were located 25 km from the center in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bsector command posts (SKP). They created a continuous radar field at ranges up to 200 km and were intended to issue an operational air situation to the air defense system during combat work.

All information about the air situation from the A-100D and A-100B radars was collected on the TsKP tablet screen, which was located in a bunker on the territory of Moscow (there was also a spare TsKP), from where the overall command and control of the air segment of the complex was carried out, the UPC coordinated the work of the air defense system, in the area of ​​responsibility.

Rocket ground complex, according to the project, had a starting weight of 3327 kg (fuel 941 kg, warhead - 260 kg), launched vertically from the launch pad, the first 9 from the flight (up to a speed of 120 m / s) was controlled using gas rudders, the software mechanism deflected it to the side targets, then the rudders were dropped and further control went with the help of aerodynamic rudders in the guidance mode from the CRN. Subsequently, after working out the system, it was supposed to switch to the more promising inclined launch rocket ShB-32 (the group of D. L. Tomashevich worked on it in KB-1) with a powder booster of the first stage, but this was not implemented within the framework of the S-25 project ( a missile based on the ShB-32 was used in the next development of KB-1 - the S-75 complex). A significant increase in the mass of the rocket compared to the original task was also a compromise solution, because it was difficult to create small-sized on-board equipment in such a tight timeframe. To be able to hit targets at high altitudes, where the missile's maneuverability dropped significantly, guidance was carried out according to a specially developed method of parallel approach, which excludes significant overloads in the final flight segment. As part of the TsRN, the task of guidance was to be solved by a central calculating and decisive device (TsSRP) of an electromechanical type, made on rotating transformers (subsequently, the design was significantly revised and the TsSRP was built entirely on electronic components), consisting of 20 identical sections, each of which led the development commands for each target-missile pair. 500 m before the target, the TsSRN automatically issued a command to cock the airborne radar fuse.

For aviation complex it was supposed to develop a similar missile with a launch weight of 1150 kg with a shorter range and a less powerful warhead.

Participation in the development of "Berkut" German specialists

Germany, which achieved great success in rocket technology, attracted the close attention of the USSR and the USA even during the war. Despite the fact that on May 2, 1945, almost all the heads of German missile programs and leading scientists who had complete information about German technologies emigrated to the United States in an organized manner, the Soviet Union managed to study the structure of the German missile industry and continue many areas of promising developments. With the help of Soviet specialists specially sent to the zone of occupation, several new scientific institutes were organized in Germany, in which the collection and systematization of scientific and technical information of interest began with the involvement of German scientists and specialists.

In 1946, at the initiative of the American side, the Allied Control Council in Berlin adopted a law prohibiting military-applied production and scientific work in the occupied territory, and German specialists were transferred to the USSR. Mostly they were former employees of well-known firms "Siemens", "Askania Werke", "Telefunken", "C. Lorenz AG", AEG, "Blaupunkt", etc., and many of them had not previously come into direct contact with rocket technology. Although the specialists were forcibly taken out and were limited in their rights of movement around the country, in the USSR they were provided with good living conditions and high salaries.

In KB-1, a significant proportion of the German contingent was made up of employees of the Ascania diversified company specializing in precision instrumentation (after the war, the company was taken from Germany to the USSR along with instruments and equipment). . The personnel of the German department consisted of about 60 specialists, headed by the technical director Dr. Voldemar Meller, during the development of the Berkut they were not allowed to discuss the test results and dealt with individual issues, working as an isolated unit, which was supervised by S. Beria. The execution of tasks parallel to those of the Soviet developers often caused conflicts when making the final decision. The greatest contribution to the development of the Berkut was made by Dr. Hans Hoch, who proposed to translate the CRN coordinate system into the scanning plane of the antennas and use the relative coordinates of the target and the missile when solving the problem, which, with increasing accuracy, greatly simplified the construction of the calculating instrument, allowing it to be transferred from an electromechanical on a fully electronic base, he also made a significant contribution, together with Kurt Magnus, to the development of a rocket autopilot based on summing gyroscopes. . In 1953, after the arrest of L. Beria and S. Beria, German specialists were removed from work and soon returned to Germany.

Stages of testing and adoption

On September 20, 1952, a prototype B-200 was sent to the Kapustin Yar training ground for firing tests with V-300 missiles. On May 25, 1953, a Tu-4 target aircraft was shot down for the first time by a guided missile. In 1953, at the insistence of a group of military men who pointed out the excessive complexity of operating the system and its low efficiency, comparative tests of anti-aircraft artillery and the Berkut system were carried out. It was only after these comparative shootings that the last doubts about the effectiveness of guided missile weapons disappeared from the gunners.

Serial samples of missiles were tested in 1954: 20 targets were simultaneously intercepted. Immediately after the final stage of testing, a heated debate began about whether to accept the S-25 system into service. The military believed that the system was so complex that it should not be put into service immediately, but should be put into trial operation for one year, after which, without additional tests, put on combat duty. The developers of the system believed that the system should be immediately put into service and put on combat duty, and the troops should be trained right during combat duty. Nikita Khrushchev put an end to the dispute. On May 7, 1955, by a decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the S-25 system was put into service.

Operation and decommissioning

For the first time, the missiles of the complex (B-300) were openly shown at the military parade on November 7, 1960.

Deployment

In accordance with Stalin's instructions, the air defense system of Moscow was supposed to have the ability to repel a massive enemy air raid involving up to 1200 aircraft. Calculations showed that this would require 56 multi-channel anti-aircraft missile systems with sector-view radar and launchers missiles placed on two rings. On the inner ring, at a distance of 45-50 km from the center of Moscow, it was planned to place 22 complexes, on the outer ring, at a distance of 85-90 km - 34 complexes. The complexes were to be located at a distance of 12-15 km from each other - so that the sector of fire of each of them overlapped the sectors of the complexes located on the left and right, creating a continuous field of destruction.

Military units equipped with S-25 complexes were rather large objects in area, served by a large number of personnel. The main type of disguise was the location in the forests, the crowns of which hid installations and structures from prying eyes.

Later, the areas of responsibility of all S-25 regiments were divided into four equal sectors, each of which contained 14 anti-aircraft missile regiments of the near and far echelons. Every 14 regiments formed a corps. Four corps made up the 1st Special Purpose Air Defense Army.

Project evaluation

For its time, the S-25 system was technically perfect. It was the first multi-channel anti-aircraft missile system capable of simultaneously tracking and destroying a significant number of targets and organizing interaction between individual batteries. For the first time, multi-channel radars were used as part of the complex. No other anti-aircraft missile system until the late 1960s had such capabilities.

However, the S-25 system also had a number of disadvantages. The key one was the extremely high cost and complexity of the system. The deployment and maintenance of S-25 complexes was economically justified only to cover the most important, key objects: as a result, the complexes were deployed only around Moscow (plans for deploying a modified version of the complex around Leningrad were canceled), and the rest of the territory of the USSR did not have anti-aircraft missile cover up to the 1960s, although in the United States in the same period of time more than a hundred MIM-3 Nike Ajax anti-aircraft batteries were deployed to protect cities and military bases, which, although they were single-channel and significantly more primitive, at the same time cost smaller, and could be deployed in much larger numbers. Another drawback of the S-25 was its stationarity: the complex was completely immobile and could not be relocated. Thus, the complex itself was vulnerable to a possible nuclear attack by the enemy. The main drawback of the S-25 system was that its original requirements for protection against a massive raid using hundreds of bombers were outdated by the time it was put into service. Nuclear strategy was now based on the independent actions of small bomber squadrons, which were much more difficult to detect than earlier air armadas. Thus, by the time it was put into service, the requirements laid down in the system turned out to be redundant: the existing altitude restrictions meant that the complex could be overcome by bombers or cruise missiles flying at low altitude. As a result, the USSR abandoned the further deployment of the S-25 system in favor of simpler, but also cheaper and more mobile S-75 air defense systems.

Former operators

Notes

1. Batyuk V.I., Pronin A.V.“Why did G. Truman “spare” the USSR” // Military History Journal. - 1996. - No. 3. - S. 74.
2. Edges of the Diamond. 55 years (History in events and persons 1947-2002). Comp. S. Kasumova, P. Prokazov. - M.: "Diamond", 2002. - ISBN 5-86035-035-X
3. Dmitry Leonov. Start work on creation anti-aircraft missile system Berkut// Book about 658 ZRP.
4. Lead developer of KS-1 Kometa
5. Concern "RTI Systems". - Structure assets
6. , With. 138.
7. , With. 24.
8. "Failed rival". Anti-aircraft guided missile ShB-32 of the complex S-25. Website "Vestnik PVO"
9. , With. 136.
10. , With. 395.
11. , With. 283.
12. Leonov Leonid Vasilyevich (1910-1964) - chief designer of radar stations for detecting the centimeter range. In 1949, he developed and created the first such station P-20.
13. K. S. Alperovich|“This is how a new weapon was born” Notes on antiaircraft missile systems and their creators // UNISERV, Moscow, 1999 ISBN 5-86035-025-2
14. , With. 160.
15. , With. 448.
16. , With. 143.
17. , With. 500.
18. "Super-heavy air defense interceptor Tu-4 D-500 [ ]
19. K. S. Alperovich. Years work on air defense system Moscow - 1950-1955. (Notes engineer). - 2003. - ISBN 5-7287-0238-74.
20. "Golden eagle". Technical project section 1. General characteristics of the Berkut air defense system. 1951
21. Chertok Boris Evseevich."Rockets and people", vol 1. - "Engineering", 1999. - P. 416. - ISBN 5-217-02934-X.

Anti-aircraft missile system "Berkut"

The post-war transition in aviation to the use of jet engines led to qualitative changes in the confrontation between air attack and air defense weapons. A sharp increase in speed and maximum height flights of reconnaissance aircraft and bombers reduced the effectiveness of medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery to almost zero. Release domestic industry anti-aircraft artillery systems in the composition anti-aircraft guns 100- and 130-mm caliber and gun-guided radars could not guarantee reliable protection of protected objects. The situation was greatly aggravated by the presence of nuclear weapons in a potential adversary, even a single use of which could lead to heavy losses. In the current situation, along with jet fighter-interceptors, guided anti-aircraft missiles could become a promising means of air defense. Some experience in the development and use of guided anti-aircraft missiles was available in a number of organizations of the USSR, which from 1945-1946 were engaged in the development of German captured rocket technology and the creation of domestic analogues on its basis. The development of fundamentally new equipment for the country's Air Defense Forces was accelerated by the Cold War. U.S.-developed application plans nuclear strikes on industrial and administrative facilities of the USSR were reinforced by the build-up of the grouping of strategic bombers B-36, B-50 and other carriers of nuclear weapons. The first object of anti-aircraft missile defense, which required reliable defense, was determined by the country's leadership to be the capital of the state - Moscow.

Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the development of the first domestic stationary anti-aircraft missile system for the Air Defense Forces of the country, signed on August 9, 1950, was supplemented by the resolution of I.V. Stalin: "We must receive a missile for air defense within a year." The resolution determined the composition of the system, the parent organization - SB-1, developers and co-executing organizations of several industries. The developed anti-aircraft missile system was given a code name "Golden eagle".

According to the initial project, the Berkut system, located around Moscow, was to consist of the following subsystems and objects:

• two rings of the radar detection system (nearest 25-30 km from Moscow and farthest 200-250 km) based on the all-round radar "Kama". Radar complex 10-cm range "Kama" for stationary radar units A-100 was developed by NII-244, chief designer L.V. Leonov.
• two rings (near and far) radar guidance for anti-aircraft missiles. The code for the missile guidance radar is "product B-200". Developer - SB-1, leading radar designer V.E. Magdesiev.
• anti-aircraft guided missiles V-300, located at the starting positions in the immediate vicinity of the guidance radar. OKB-301 rocket developer, General Designer - S.A. Lavochkin. Starting equipment was instructed to develop GSKB MMP Chief Designer V.P. Barmin.
• interceptor aircraft, code "G-400" - Tu-4 aircraft with G-300 air-to-air missiles. The development of the air interception complex was carried out under the leadership of A. I. Korchmar. Interceptor development stopped at an early stage. G-300 missiles (factory code "210", developed by OKB-301) - a smaller version of the V-300 missile with an air launch from a carrier aircraft.
• Apparently, the D-500 early warning aircraft, developed on the basis of the Tu-4 long-range bomber, was supposed to be used as an element of the system.

The system included a grouping of anti-aircraft missile systems (regiments) with means of detection, control, support, missile weapons storage bases, residential camps and barracks for officers and personnel. The interaction of all elements was to be carried out through the central command post of the System through special communication channels.

Organization of work on the Moscow air defense system "Berkut", carried out to the strictest extent
secrecy, was entrusted to the specially created Third Main Directorate (TGU) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The head organization responsible for the principles of building the System and its functioning was determined by KB-1 - the reorganized SB-1, P.N. Kuksenko and S.L. Beria were appointed the chief designers of the System. For the successful completion of work in a short time, the necessary employees of other design bureaus were transferred to KB-1. German specialists who were taken to the USSR after the end of the war were also involved in work on the system. Working in various design bureaus, they were assembled in department No. 38 of KB-1.

As a result of the hard work of many scientific and labor teams, a prototype of an anti-aircraft missile system, projects and samples of some of the main components of the system were created in an extremely short time.

Ground tests of an experimental version of the anti-aircraft missile system, carried out in January 1952, made it possible to draw up a comprehensive technical design of the Berkut system, which included only ground-based detection equipment, anti-aircraft missiles and their guidance to intercept air targets from the originally planned composition of funds.

From 1953 to 1955, on the 50- and 90-kilometer lines around Moscow, the GULAG "special contingent" was building combat positions for anti-aircraft missile divisions, ring roads to ensure the delivery of missiles to firing divisions and storage bases (total length of roads up to 2000 km) . At the same time, the construction of residential towns and barracks was carried out. All engineering structures of the Berkut system were designed by the Moscow branch of Lengiprostroy, led by V.I. Rechkin.

After the death of I. V Stalin and the arrest of L.P. Beria in June 1953, the reorganization of KB-1 and the change of its leadership followed. By a government decree, the name of the Moscow air defense system "Berkut" was replaced by "System S-25", Raspletin was appointed chief designer of the system. TSU under the name Glavspetsmash is included in the Minsredmash.

Combat position S-25 air defense system

Deliveries of combat elements of the System-25 to the troops began in 1954, in March, equipment was adjusted at most facilities, fine-tuning the components and assemblies of the complexes. At the beginning of 1955, the acceptance tests of all complexes near Moscow were completed and the system was put into service. In accordance with the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of May 7, 1955, the first formation of anti-aircraft missile troops began the phased implementation of the combat mission: the protection of Moscow and the Moscow industrial region from a possible attack by an air enemy. The system was put on permanent combat duty in June 1956 after an experimental duty with the placement of missiles in position without refueling with fuel components and with weight models of warheads. When using all the missile subdivisions of the system, it was fundamentally possible to simultaneously fire about 1000 air targets when pointing up to 3 missiles at each target.

After the adoption of the S-25 air defense system, created in four and a half years, into service with the head office of Glavspetsmash: Glavspetsmontazh, which was responsible for commissioning the regular facilities of the system, and Glavspetsmash, which oversaw the development organizations, were liquidated; KB-1 was transferred to the Ministry of Defense Industry.

To operate the S-25 system in the Moscow Air Defense District in the spring of 1955, a
A separate special-purpose army of the country's Air Defense Forces was deployed under the command of Colonel-General K. Kazakov.

Training of officers for work on System-25 was carried out at the Gorky Air Defense School, personnel - in a specially created training center- UTC-2.

In the course of operation, the System was improved with the replacement of its individual elements with qualitatively new ones. The S-25 system (its modernized version - S-25M) was removed from combat duty in 1982 with the replacement of the anti-aircraft missile systems with a medium
C-ZOO range.

Anti-aircraft missile system S-25

Work on the creation of a functionally closed anti-aircraft missile system of the S-25 system was carried out in parallel for all its components. In October (June) 1950, the B-200 was presented for testing in an experimental prototype of the SNR (Missile Guidance Station) B-200, and on July 25, 1951, the first launch of the V-300 rocket was made at the test site.

To test the complex of the full range of products at the Kapustin Yar test site, the following were created: site No. 30 - a technical position for preparing S-25 missiles for launches; site No. 31 - residential complex for service personnel of the S-25 experimental system; platform No. 32 - launching position for V-300 anti-aircraft missiles; site No. 33 - site of the prototype TsRN (Central Guidance Radar) S-25 (18 km from site No. 30).

The first tests of a prototype anti-aircraft missile system in a closed control loop (polygon version of the complex in full force) were carried out on November 2, 1952, when firing at an electronic imitation of a stationary target. A series of tests was conducted in November-December. Shooting at real targets - parachute targets was carried out after the replacement of the CRN antennas in early 1953. From April 26 to May 18, launches were carried out on Tu-4 target aircraft. In total, during the tests from September 18, 1952 to May 18, 1953, 81 launches were made. In September-October, at the request of the Air Force command, control ground tests were carried out when firing at Il-28 and Tu-4 target aircraft.

The decision to build a full-scale anti-aircraft missile system at the test site for repeated State tests was made by the Government in January 1954 based on the decision of the State Commission. The complex was submitted for State tests on June 25, 1954, during which from October 1 to April 1, 1955, 69 launches were made against Tu-4 and Il-28 target aircraft. Shooting was carried out at radio-controlled target aircraft, including passive jammers. At the final stage, salvo firing of 20 missiles at 20 targets was carried out.

Before the completion of field tests, about 50 factories were connected to the production of components for air defense systems and missiles. From 1953 to 1955, combat positions of anti-aircraft missile systems were built on the 50- and 90-kilometer lines around Moscow. In order to speed up the work, one of the complexes was made the head reference, its commissioning was carried out by representatives of the development enterprises.

Station B-200

At the positions of the complexes, the B-200 station - (TsRN), functionally connected with the missile launchers, was located in a semi-buried reinforced concrete structure, designed to survive a direct hit by a 1000-kg high-explosive bomb, lined with earth and disguised by grass cover. Separate rooms were provided for high-frequency equipment, the multi-channel part of the locator, the command post of the complex, the workplaces of operators and places of rest for combat shifts on duty. Two target sighting antennas and four command transmission antennas were located in the immediate vicinity of the structure on a concreted area. Search, detection, tracking of air targets and guidance of missiles on them by each complex of the System was carried out in a fixed sector of 60 x 60 degrees.

The complex made it possible to track up to 20 targets along 20 firing channels with automatic (manual) tracking of the target and the missile aimed at it while simultaneously aiming 1-2 missiles at each target. For each channel of shelling targets at the starting position, there were 3 missiles on the launch pads. The time for the complex to be put on alert was determined to be 5 minutes, during which time at least 18 firing channels should have been synchronized.

Starting positions with launch pads six (four) in a row with access roads to them were located at a distance of 1.2 to 4 km from the CRN with the removal towards the sector of responsibility of the division. Depending on local conditions, due to the limited area of ​​positions, the number of missiles could be somewhat less than the planned 60 missiles.

At the position of each complex there were facilities for storing missiles, missile preparation and refueling sites, car parks, service and living quarters for personnel.

During operation, the system was improved. In particular, moving target selection equipment, developed in 1954, was introduced at regular facilities after field tests in 1957.

In total, 56 S-25 serial complexes were manufactured, deployed and put into service (NATO code: SA-1 Guild) in the Moscow air defense system, one serial and one experimental complex was used for field testing of hardware, missiles and equipment. One set of TsRN was used to test electronic equipment in Kratov.

B-200 missile guidance station

On initial stage design, the possibility of using narrow-beam locators for accurate target tracking and a missile with a parabolic antenna, which created two beams for tracking the target and the missile aimed at it, was studied (head of work in KB-1 - V.M. Taranovsky). At the same time, a variant of a missile equipped with a homing head, which was switched on near the meeting point, was worked out (head of work N.A. Viktorov). Work stopped at an early design stage.

The scheme for constructing sector radar antennas with linear scanning was proposed by M.B. Zakson, the construction of the multichannel part of the radar and its target and missile tracking systems was proposed by K.S. Alperovich. The final decision to accept sector guidance radars for development was made in January 1952. An elevation antenna 9 m high and an azimuth antenna 8 m wide were located on different bases. Scanning was carried out with continuous rotation of antennas consisting of six (two trihedral) beamformers each. The scanning sector of the antenna is 60 degrees, the beam width is about 1 degree. Wavelength - about 10 cm. early stages project, it was proposed to supplement the beamformers to full circles with non-metallic radio-transparent overlays-segments.

When implementing a missile guidance station to determine the coordinates of targets and missiles, the “C method” and the “AZH” electronic circuit proposed by German designers were adopted using quartz frequency stabilizers. The "A" system based on electromechanical elements and the "BZh" system, an alternative to the "German" system, proposed by the KB-1 employees, were not implemented.

In order to ensure automatic tracking of 20 targets and 20 missiles aimed at them, the formation of guidance control commands, 20 firing channels were created in the TsRN with separate systems for tracking targets and missiles for each of their coordinates and an analog computing device separate for each channel (developer - KB "Diamond", lead designer N.V. Semakov). The shooting channels were grouped into four five-channel groups.

To control the missiles of each group, command transmission antennas were introduced (in the original version of the CRN, a single command transmission station was assumed).

An experimental sample of the CRN was tested from the autumn of 1951 in Khimki, in the winter of 1951 and in the spring of 1952 on the territory of the FRI (Zhukovsky). A prototype of the serial CRN was also built in Zhukovsky. In August 1952, the CRN prototype was fully completed. Control tests were carried out from June 2 to September 20. To control the passage of the "combined" signals of the missile and the target, the onboard missile transponder was located on the tower of the BU-40 drilling rig remote from the CRN (in the serial version of the complex, it was replaced by a telescopic structure with a radiating horn at the top). Fast scanning (scanning frequency of about 20 Hz) antennas A-11 and A-12 for the prototype station B-200 were manufactured at plant No. 701 (Podolsky Mechanical Plant), transmitters - in the radio engineering laboratory of A.L. Mints. After the control tests were carried out in September, the CRN prototype was disassembled and sent by rail to continue testing at the test site. In the fall of 1952, a prototype CRN was built at the Kapustin Yar test site with the instrumentation in a one-story stone building at site 33.

In parallel with the tests of the TsRN in Zhukovsky, a control loop for guiding missiles to targets was worked out on a complex modeling stand in KB-1.

The complex stand included simulators of target and missile signals, systems for their automatic tracking, a calculating device for generating missile control commands, on-board equipment of the missile and an analog computing device - a model of the missile. In the fall of 1952, the stand was relocated to the training ground in Kapustin Yar.

Serial production of CRN equipment was carried out at plant No. 304 (Kuntsevsky Radar Plant), the antennas of a prototype complex were produced at plant No. 701, then for serial complexes at plant No. 92 (Gorky Machine-Building Plant). Stations for transmitting control commands to missiles were produced at the Leningrad Plant of Printing Machines (production was later spun off into the Leningrad Plant of Radio Equipment), calculating devices for generating commands - at the Zagorsk Plant, electronic lamps were supplied by the Tashkent plant. The equipment for the S-25 complex was manufactured by the Moscow Radio Engineering Plant (MRTZ, before the war - a piston plant, later a cartridge plant - produced cartridges for heavy machine guns).

The TsRN adopted for service differed from the prototype in the presence of control devices, additional indicator devices. Since 1957, moving target selection equipment was installed, developed in KB-1 under the leadership of Gapeev. For firing at aircraft, the jammers introduced the "three-point" guidance mode.

V-300 anti-aircraft missile and its modifications

The design of the V-300 rocket (factory designation "205", lead designer N. Chernyakov) was started at OKB-301 in September 1950. A variant of the guided missile was submitted for consideration to TSU on March 1, 1951, and the preliminary design of the missile was defended in mid-March.

The vertical-launch rocket, functionally divided into seven compartments, was equipped with radio command equipment for the control system and was made according to the "duck" scheme with the placement of rudders for pitch and yaw control on one of the head compartments. Ailerons located on the wings in the same plane were used for roll control. Disposable gas rudders were attached to the tail section of the hull, which were used to tilt the rocket towards the target after launch, stabilize and control the rocket at the initial stage of flight at low speeds. Radar tracking of the rocket was carried out on the signal of the onboard radio transponder. The development of a rocket autopilot and on-board equipment for missile sighting - a receiver of probing signals of the TsRN and an on-board radio transponder with a response signal generator - was carried out in KB-1 under the leadership of V.E. Chernomordik.

Checking the onboard radio equipment of the rocket for the stability of receiving commands from the CRN was carried out using an aircraft loitering in the radar field of view and having on board the rocket's radio engineering units and control equipment. On-board equipment for serial missiles was produced at the Moscow Bicycle Plant (Mospribor plant).

Testing of the rocket engine "205" was carried out at the firing stand in Zagorsk (at present - the city of Sergiev Posad). The operability of the engine and radio systems of the rocket was tested under flight simulation conditions.

Training launch of the B-300 SAM

The first rocket launch was made on July 25, 1951. The stage of ground tests for testing the launch and the rocket stabilization system (autopilot) took place in November-December 1951 during launches from site No. 5 of the Kapustin Yar test site (a site for launching ballistic missiles). At the second stage - from March to September 1952, autonomous missile launches were carried out. Controlled flight modes were checked when control commands were given from a software on-board mechanism, later from equipment similar to the standard equipment of the TsRN. During the first and second stages of testing, 30 launches were carried out. From October 18 to October 30, five missile launches were carried out with the implementation of their capture and accompaniment by the equipment of the experimental test site CRN.

On November 2, 1952, after completion of the on-board equipment, the first successful launch of a rocket in a closed control loop (as part of an experimental polygon version of the complex) took place when firing at an electronic imitation of a fixed target. On May 25, 1953, a Tu-4 target aircraft was shot down for the first time by a V-300 missile.

In view of the need to organize mass production and delivery of a large number of missiles for field tests and to the troops in a short time, the production of their experimental and serial versions for the S-25 system was carried out by 41.82 (Tushino Machine Building) and 586 (Dnepropetrovsk Machine Building) plants.

The order to prepare for the mass production of V-303 anti-aircraft missiles (a variant of the V-300 missile) at the DMZ was signed on August 31, 1952. On March 2, 1953, a four-chamber (two-mode) sustainer rocket engine C09-29 (with a thrust of 9000 kg with a displacement
a system for supplying hydrocarbon fuel and an oxidizing agent - nitric acid) designed by OKB-2 NII-88, Chief Designer A.M. Isaev. fire tests engines were carried out on the basis of the NII-88 branch in Zagorsk - NII-229. Initially, the manufacture of C09.29 engines was carried out by the pilot production of SKB-385 (Zlatoust) - now KBM im. Makeev. Serial production of missiles was launched by DMZ in 1954.

The rocket's onboard power sources were developed at the NIIP of the State Planning Commission under the leadership of N. Lidorenko. The warheads of the E-600 (of various types) of the V-300 missiles were developed at the Design Bureau NII-6 of the MSHM in teams led by N. S. Zhidkikh, V. A. Sukhikh and K. I. Kozorezov; radio fuses - in the design bureau, led by Rastorguev. High-explosive fragmentation was adopted for mass production warhead with a blast radius of 75 meters. At the end of 1954, state tests of a rocket with a cumulative warhead were carried out. Some sources give a variant of the missile warhead, which, according to the principle of operation, resembles a 76-mm anti-aircraft projectile of the 1925 model of the year: during the explosion, the warhead was divided into segments connected by cables that cut the elements of the target's airframe when they met.

In the course of many years of operation in the S-25 system and its modifications, various variants of the missiles "205", "207", "217", "219" developed by OKB-301 and the Burevestnik Design Bureau were created and used.

The development of the rocket "217" with LRE S3.42A (with a thrust of 17000 kg, with a turbopump fuel supply system) designed by OKB-3 NII-88, Chief Designer D. Sevruk, began in 1954. Flight tests of the rocket have been carried out since 1958. A modified version of the "217M" missile with the S.5.1 engine developed by OKB-2 (with a thrust of 17000 kg, with a turbopump fuel supply system) was put into service as part of the S-25M complex.

Options for the development and use of the S-25 System

On the basis of the S-25 "Berkut" system, a mock-up sample of the complex with a simplified composition of equipment was developed. The antennas of the complex were located on the anti-aircraft artillery trolley KZU-16, the cabins: the radio path "R", the equipment room "A", the computing facilities "B" were placed in vans. The development and refinement of the prototype led to the creation of the SA-75 "Dvina" mobile air defense system.

RM Strizh based on 5Y25M and 5Y24 missiles. Photo from the site Buran.ru

On the basis of missiles and launch equipment of the S-25 System, in the early 70s, a target complex was created (with control over the flight of the SNR S-75M SAM target) for live missile firing at air defense ranges. Target missiles (RM): "208" (V-300K3, an upgraded version of the "207" missile without a warhead) and "218" (an upgraded version of the 5Ya25M missile of the "217" family) were equipped with an autopilot and flew with a constant azimuth with altitude variation according to the program Depending on the assigned task, the RM simulated targets with different areas of the reflecting surface, speed and flight altitude. If necessary, maneuvering targets and jammers were simulated. For exercises "Belka-1" - "Belka-4" the ranges of flight heights of the RM were: 80-100 m; 6-11 km; 18-20 km; flying around the terrain. For exercises "Zvezda-5" - a target missile - a simulator of strategic cruise missiles and attack aircraft of multi-purpose aviation. The duration of the flight of the target missile is up to 80 seconds, after which it self-destructs. The target complex was operated by ITB - a test technical battalion. RM were produced by Tushino MZ.

Additionally you can read about target missiles based on S-25 anti-aircraft missiles on the Buran.ru website.

Information sources

S. Ganin, MOSCOW'S FIRST NATIONAL ANTI-Aircraft Missile System - S-25 "BERKUT". Nevsky Bastion №2, 1997

Materials on the topic were kindly provided by D. Boltenkov, V. Stepanov and I. Motlik