The final figures were achieved by the United States not only thanks to real arms reductions, but also due to the re-equipment of some Trident-II SLBM launchers and B-52N heavy bombers, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated in a statement. The Russian department clarifies that it cannot confirm that these strategic weapons are rendered unusable as provided for in the treaty.

How many charges are left

— 527 units for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers;

— 1,444 units of warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;

— 779 units for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

The United States, according to the State Department, as of September 1 last year, had:

— 660 units for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers;

— 1,393 units of warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;

— 800 units for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

Invitation to negotiations

State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert, in a statement on the implementation of the New START treaty, noted that “implementation of New START enhances the security of the United States and its allies, makes the strategic relationship between the United States and Russia more stable,<...>critical at a time when trust in relationships has declined and the threat of misunderstandings and miscalculations has increased.” The United States, Nauert said, will continue to fully implement New START. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its statement also confirmed its commitment to the agreement.

However, politicians and experts point out that it is time to start discussing the future of the treaty. “We must now decide what to do with the agreement,<...>it seems to end soon. We must think about how to extend it, what to do there,” Russian President Vladimir Putin noted on January 30 of this year at a meeting with trusted officials. There was no direct answer from US President Donald Trump to this question.

The current START expires in 2021; by agreement of the parties, as indicated in the text, it can be extended for five years. If the agreement is not extended or a new document is not concluded instead, the United States and Russia will lose a unique instrument of mutual control, American experts note. According to the State Department, since the beginning of the treaty, the parties have exchanged 14.6 thousand documents on the location and movement of weapons, conducted 252 on-site inspections, and 14 meetings within the framework of the treaty commission.

In order to extend START III for another five years, as the text of the agreement implies, Moscow and Washington only need to exchange diplomatic notes. Chairman of the PIR Center Council, Reserve Lieutenant General Evgeny Buzhinsky, told RBC that due to the current political disagreements between Russia and the United States, it will be extremely difficult for the parties to agree on a fundamentally new agreement, so extending START-3 for five years looks like a much more possible scenario. .

Preparation of a new agreement is a realistic and even desirable option if there is political will in Moscow and Washington, but if it is not there, the parties will agree to extend the current version, the head of the Center assures international security IMEMO RAS Alexey Arbatov.

What to negotiate

Russia and the United States have been reducing strategic weapons for three decades, but fulfilling the terms of the START treaty will most likely put an end to the process of reducing nuclear arsenals, the newspaper writes. The New York Times. The priorities for the development of nuclear weapons and the creation of new low-yield nuclear warheads specified in the US Nuclear Forces Review adopted on February 2 will lead to a new nuclear arms race, but countries will now compete not by their number, but by tactical and technical characteristics, writes the publication.

The new American nuclear doctrine proclaims the concept of selective nuclear strikes and the introduction of systems with reduced explosive power and high precision, which potentially sets the stage for the escalation of a nuclear conflict, Arbatov warns. That is why, the expert believes, a new, comprehensive agreement is needed that would address the problems of developing high-precision non-nuclear systems.

Even during the preparation of the current treaty, experts from both sides pointed out that the treaty base between Russia and the United States needs to be expanded to non-strategic nuclear weapons, missile defense and other sensitive issues.

Still in charge of arms reduction issues at the State Department with the rank of acting. Assistant Secretary of State Anna Friedt said back in 2014 that the United States, together with NATO, should, in the future, when political conditions allow, develop and offer Russia its position on non-strategic nuclear weapons. Non-strategic (tactical) weapons are characterized by low power, such weapons include aerial bombs, tactical missiles, shells, mines and other local-range ammunition.

For Russia, the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons is as fundamental as the topic missile defense for the USA, notes Buzhinsky. “There are mutual taboos here, and none of them is ready to concede in areas where one of the parties has an advantage. Therefore, in the foreseeable future we can only talk about further quantitative reduction. Discussion of the qualitative characteristics of weapons in the negotiation process is a long-standing proposal, but in the current conditions it borders on fantasy,” he says.

Former US Defense Secretary William Perry told RBC that the next START treaty should introduce restrictions on all types of nuclear weapons - not only strategic, but also tactical: “When people talk about what the nuclear arsenal is today, they mean about 5,000 warheads in service, which is already bad enough. But in the USA we have a couple of thousand more nuclear shells in warehouses that can also be used. And such shells are available not only in the USA, but also in Russia, the so-called tactical nuclear weapons.”

Expanding the number of parties involved in reducing nuclear arsenals, according to Buzhinsky, is unlikely, since other nuclear powers - Great Britain, France, China - will logically demand that Moscow and Washington first reduce the number of warheads to their level before entering into any agreements .

The new agreement, according to Arbatov, should take into account topics that the drafters of START III ignored. First of all, these are missile defense systems and the development of high-precision long-range non-nuclear systems. “Three years are enough for diplomats to prepare a new agreement on the basis of the existing one: START-3 was agreed upon in a year, START-1 was signed in 1991 after three years of work practically from scratch,” Arbatov sums up.

In 1991 and 1992 The presidents of the USA and the USSR/Russia put forward unilateral parallel initiatives to withdraw from combat personnel a significant part of the tactical nuclear weapons of both countries and their partial elimination. In Western literature, these proposals are known as "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives" (PNI). These initiatives were voluntary, non-legally binding, and were not formally linked to the retaliatory steps of the other side.

As it seemed then, on the one hand, this made it possible to complete them quickly enough, without getting bogged down in a complex and lengthy negotiation process. The projects of some initiatives were prepared by experts in Voronezh on the basis of one research institute, for which the employees needed to rent a one-room apartment in Voronezh for several months. On the other hand, the absence of a legal framework made it easier, if necessary, to withdraw from unilateral obligations without carrying out legal procedures for denunciation international treaty. The first PNA was put forward by US President Bush on September 27, 1991. USSR President Gorbachev announced “reciprocal steps and counterproposals” on October 5. His initiatives received further development and specification in the proposals of Russian President Yeltsin of January 29, 1992.

The decisions of the US President included: the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear warheads intended to arm ground-based delivery vehicles (nuclear artillery shells and warheads for tactical missiles"Lance") to the United States, including from Europe and South Korea, for subsequent dismantling and destruction; decommissioning of surface combatants and submarines all tactical nuclear weapons, as well as depth charges of naval aviation, their storage on US territory and the subsequent destruction of approximately half of their quantity; termination of the development program for a short-range missile of the Srem-T type, intended for armament of tactical attack aircraft. Counter steps on the part of the Soviet Union, and then Russia, consisted of the following: all tactical nuclear weapons in service with the Ground Forces and Air Defense would be redeployed to the pre-factory bases of the enterprise for assembling nuclear warheads and to centralized storage warehouses;

all warheads intended for ground-based weapons are subject to destruction; a third of the warheads intended for sea-based tactical carriers will be destroyed; it is planned to eliminate half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles; it is planned to reduce by half the stockpiles of aviation tactical nuclear weapons by eliminating them; on a reciprocal basis, it was proposed to remove nuclear weapons intended for strike aircraft, together with the United States, from combat units of front-line aviation and place them in centralized storage warehouses 5 . It seems very difficult to quantify these reductions, since, unlike information on strategic nuclear forces, Russia and the United States have not published official data on their stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons.

According to unofficial published estimates, the United States must have eliminated at least about 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons (1,300 artillery shells, more than 800 Lance missile warheads, and about 900 naval weapons, mainly depth charges). They were still armed with free-fall bombs intended for the Air Force. Their total number in the early 1990s was estimated at 2000 units, including about 500-600 aerial bombs in warehouses in Europe 6 . The general assessment of the US tactical nuclear arsenals at present is given above.

According to the estimates of a Russian authoritative study, within the framework of the NPR, Russia had to reduce 13,700 tactical nuclear warheads, including 4,000 warheads for tactical missiles, 2,000 artillery shells, 700 ammunition of engineering troops (nuclear landmines), 1,500 warheads for anti-aircraft missiles, 3,500 warheads for front-line aviation, 1,000 warheads intended for Navy ships and submarines, and 1,000 warheads for naval aviation. This amounted to almost two-thirds of the tactical nuclear warheads in service with former USSR in 1991. 7 The scale of the PNP is difficult to overestimate. First, for the first time, a decision was made to dismantle and dispose of nuclear warheads, and not just their delivery vehicles, as was done in accordance with agreements on reductions of strategic offensive arms. Several classes of tactical nuclear weapons were subject to complete elimination: nuclear shells and mines, nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, nuclear landmines 8 . Secondly, the scale of the reductions significantly exceeded the indirect restrictions contained in the START agreements. Thus, according to the current START Treaty of 1991, Russia and the United States were supposed to remove 4-5 thousand nuclear warheads from combat service, or 8-10 thousand units together. Reductions within the framework of the PNA opened up prospects for the elimination of more than 16 thousand warheads in total.

However, the implementation of the PNP encountered serious difficulties from the very beginning. At the first stage in 1992, they were associated with Russia's withdrawal of tactical nuclear warheads from the territory of a number of former Soviet republics. The withdrawal of this type of weapon was agreed upon in the founding documents for the dissolution of the USSR, signed by the leaders of the newly independent states in 1991. However, some former Soviet republics began to obstruct these measures. In particular, in February 1992, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk banned the export of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. Only the joint demarches of Russia and the United States forced him to resume the transportation of this type of weapons. In the spring of 1992, all tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn. The redeployment of nuclear weapons for strategic delivery vehicles was completed only in 1996.

Another difficulty was that in the extremely difficult economic situation of the 1990s, Russia experienced serious difficulties in financing the disposal of nuclear weapons. Disarmament activities were hampered by the lack of sufficient volumes at storage facilities. This led to overcrowding of warehouses and violations of accepted safety regulations. The risks associated with unauthorized access to nuclear warheads during their transportation and storage forced Moscow to accept international assistance on ensuring nuclear safety. It was provided mainly by the USA famous program Nunn-Lugar, but also other countries including France and the UK. For reasons of state secrets, Russia refused to accept assistance directly in the dismantling of nuclear weapons. However, foreign assistance was provided in other, less sensitive areas, for example, through the provision of containers and wagons for the safe transportation of nuclear warheads, protective equipment nuclear storage facilities etc. This made it possible to free up the financial resources necessary for the destruction of ammunition.

The provision of foreign assistance provided partial unilateral transparency not provided for by the PNA. Donor states, primarily the United States, insisted on their right of access to the facilities they supported to verify the intended use of the supplied equipment. As a result of long and complex negotiations, mutually acceptable solutions were found, on the one hand, guaranteeing the observance of state secrets, and on the other - required level access. Similar limited transparency measures also covered such critical facilities as the nuclear disassembly and reassembly facilities operated by Rosatom, as well as nuclear weapons storage facilities operated by the Ministry of Defense. The latest officially published information on the implementation of the NPR in Russia was presented in the speech of Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov at the Conference to Review the Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on April 25, 2000.

According to him, “Russia... continues to consistently implement unilateral initiatives in the field of tactical nuclear weapons. Such weapons have been completely removed from surface ships and attack submarines, as well as land-based naval aircraft and placed in centralized storage areas. One third of nuclear weapons have been eliminated total number for sea-based tactical missiles and naval aviation. Destruction completes nuclear warheads tactical missiles, artillery shells, and nuclear mines. Half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and half of nuclear warheads were destroyed aircraft bombs" 10 . Assessments of Russia's implementation of the PNA are given in Table. 9. Thus, as of 2000, Russia has largely complied with the PNA. As planned, all naval munitions were moved to centralized storage facilities, and a third of them were destroyed (however, there remains considerable uncertainty regarding the removal of all such weapons from naval bases to centralized storage facilities due to inconsistent official wording). A certain number of tactical nuclear warheads still remained in service with the Ground Forces, Air Force and Air Defense. In the case of the Air Force, this did not contradict the PNA, since, according to the January 1992 initiatives of President Yeltsin, it was envisaged to remove tactical ammunition from combat service and destroy it together with the United States, which did not do this. As for the elimination of Air Force warheads, by 2000 Russia's obligations were fulfilled. In terms of air defense means, the PNAs were carried out in terms of liquidation, but not in the area of ​​complete withdrawal from the anti-aircraft missile forces.

Thus, during the 1990s, Russia carried out PNA in the field of air force and possibly naval warheads, as well as partially air defense. IN Ground forces Some tactical nuclear weapons still remained in service and were not eliminated, although the PNA provided for their complete withdrawal to centralized storage facilities and their complete destruction. The latter was explained by financial and technical difficulties. Implementation of the NPR became one of the requirements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Their implementation became integral part 13 Step Plan for Implementation of Commitments nuclear powers in accordance with Art. VI Treaty. The “13 Steps” plan was adopted at the Review Conference by consensus, i.e. representatives of Russia and the United States also voted for its adoption. However, 19 months later, Washington announced a unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Russian-American Treaty on the Limitation of Missile Defense Systems, which was considered the cornerstone of strategic stability. This decision was made contrary to the United States' commitments under the 13 Step Plan, which required compliance with the treaty.

The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 upset the very delicate balance of mutual obligations between Russia and the United States in the field of nuclear disarmament, including with regard to tactical nuclear weapons. It is obvious that the violation by one of the NPT members of its obligations on a number of points of the decisions adopted by the 2000 Review Conference (including the 13 Steps Plan) made full compliance with these decisions by other parties unlikely. During the 2005 NPT Review Conference, no provisions on the 13 Step Plan were adopted, which in fact indicates that it has lost force. This could not but affect the implementation of the PNA. Thus, on April 28, 2003, in a speech by the head of the Russian delegation at the session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, the following was stated: “The Russian side proceeds from the fact that consideration of issues of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be carried out in isolation from other types of weapons. It is for this reason that the well-known unilateral Russian disarmament initiatives of 1991-1992 are complex in nature and, in addition, affect tactical nuclear weapons and other important questions that have a significant impact on strategic stability."

Russia's official reference to the fact that nuclear weapons address, in addition to tactical nuclear weapons, other important issues affecting strategic stability, clearly comes from the idea of ​​​​the interconnection of the implementation of the initiatives of 1991-1992. with the fate of the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability. In addition, the statement that the issue of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be considered in isolation from other types of weapons is obviously an allusion to the situation that has arisen since the entry into force of the adapted version of the CFE Treaty. This agreement was signed back in 1990 and provided for maintaining the balance of power in Europe on a bloc basis across five types of conventional weapons (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters and aircraft). After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR itself, with the expansion of NATO to the east, it became completely obsolete.

In order to preserve the system of limiting conventional weapons, the parties held negotiations on its adaptation, which culminated in the signing of an adapted version of the CFE Treaty in Istanbul in 1999. This option took more into account the military-political realities that had developed in Europe after the end of the " cold war"and contained certain security guarantees for Russia, limiting the possibility of deploying NATO troops at its borders. However, NATO countries refused to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty under very far-fetched pretexts. In the context of the admission of the Baltic states to NATO, the increasing imbalance in conventional weapons to the detriment of Russia and in the absence of ratification of the adapted Treaty by the West, Russia in December 2007 announced a unilateral suspension of compliance with the basic CFE Treaty (despite the fact that the adapted Treaty, as a superstructure over the basic one, never came into force ).

In addition, Russia faced with new urgency the question of the role of nuclear weapons, primarily tactical ones, as a means of neutralizing such an imbalance. It is obvious that fears associated with NATO's advance to the east in the absence of adequate international legal security guarantees, in the eyes of Russia, call into question the advisability of implementing the PNA in full, especially taking into account the political and legally non-binding nature of these obligations. As far as one can judge from the lack of further official statements about the fate of the PNA, they were never fully implemented.

This fact clearly shows both the advantages and disadvantages of informal arms control regimes. On the one hand, significant reductions in tactical nuclear weapons were carried out as part of the PNA, including the destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons. However, the lack of verification measures does not allow the parties to confidently assume what kind of reductions actually took place. The lack of legally binding status has made it easier for parties to effectively refuse to implement initiatives without announcing it at all.

In other words, the advantages of the “informal” approach to disarmament are tactical in nature, but in the long term it is not sustainable enough to serve as a stabilizer in the changing political and military relations of the parties. Moreover, such initiatives themselves become easy victims of such changes and can become a source of additional mistrust and tension. Another thing is that after the end of the Cold War, former adversaries could afford much more radical, faster, less technically complex and less economically burdensome disarmament agreements.

Over the past 50 years, the central link of Russian-American interaction has been relations in the military-strategic field and in the area directly related to it international control over weapons, primarily nuclear ones. It seems that from now on bilateral, and therefore multilateral, control over nuclear weapons is becoming a historical monument.

Today the United States does not intend to tie its hands with any agreements on issues of arms limitation and reduction.

There are noticeable changes in US military policy for reasons deeper than the need to combat transnational terrorism. The START II and CTBT (on nuclear testing) treaties, which they did not ratify, have long been forgotten. Washington announced its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The Pentagon budget has been increased sharply (by almost $100 billion). A new nuclear doctrine has been adopted, providing for the modernization of strategic offensive weapons, the creation of low-yield penetrating nuclear warheads that can be used in combination with high-precision conventional weapons, as well as the possibility of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

In addition to the political component - the continuation of the US line of global military-political dominance in the 21st century - this course also has technological and economic dimensions related to the interests of American military-industrial corporations, as well as the intention of the American leadership through massive financial injections into large military-technological programs ensure an increase in the scientific and technical level of American industry.

According to a number of our experts, changes military policy Washington do not pose an immediate threat to Russia’s national security, at least for the next 10-15 years, until the actual deployment by the Americans strategic system PRO. However, these changes, primarily the termination of the ABM Treaty, call into question the international arms control regime, may cause a new round of the arms race, and give additional impetus to the process of proliferation of WMD and their delivery vehicles.

Russia's tactical line regarding US actions appears to have been correct: the Russian leadership did not panic, did not take the path of rhetorical threats, and did not declare a desire to compete with the United States in the field of offensive and defensive weapons. At the same time, it is also obvious that the steps taken by the Americans are considered strategic and therefore require us to make strategic decisions regarding our own nuclear policy.

The following factors seem to be important in determining our future line.

Despite the significant improvement in the international situation and the minimization of the likelihood of major wars and military conflicts between leading states, there has not been a dramatic decrease in the role of nuclear weapons in their policies. On the contrary, the unprecedented September terrorist attacks and changing threat priorities are leading, judging by the new US nuclear doctrine, to lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons with the emergence of the possibility of poorly controlled escalation. This is also facilitated by the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as increasing regional instability.

Whatever direction the political relations between Moscow and Washington develop, as long as nuclear weapons remain in their arsenals, the military departments will be forced to develop plans for using them against each other, at least “as a last resort.”

The peculiarity of the period after the end of the Cold War lies in the unpredictability of the development of the military-political situation in the world. In this situation, the United States continues to modernize its nuclear forces and maintains the ability to rapidly increase them; At the same time, the question of concluding new legally binding and verifiable agreements with Russia on irreversible reductions in strategic offensive arms continues to remain open.

The technological backlog accumulated in the United States and the results of full-scale tests of individual missile defense components indicate the possibility, already in the medium term, of deploying a fully operational limited anti-missile system, the density of which can be constantly increased in the future.

Based on this, Russia has no choice but to remain a powerful nuclear power for the foreseeable future. The current plans for the development of Russian strategic nuclear forces, on the one hand, were designed for the entry into force of the START-2 Treaty and the preservation of the ABM Treaty, and on the other hand, were aimed at their transformation into a semblance of the American “triad” with an increase in the contribution of naval and aviation components to the detriment of the ground group of ICBMs.

In the new strategic situation created by the United States, it becomes necessary to urgently revise our plans in the field of strategic nuclear forces in the direction of maximizing the service life of the ground-based group of ICBMs with MIRVs; maintaining the planned combat strength of the naval part of the “triad”, as well as the aviation component, capable of solving both nuclear and non-nuclear tasks. Neither from a military nor from an economic point of view would it be justified to preserve the old plans developed for a qualitatively different situation. The relevance of the development of information and control systems for Russia's strategic nuclear forces is also increasing.

A nuclear balance with the United States over a relatively wide range of total warheads and combat capabilities (we are not talking about an unrealistic restoration of parity) would continue to ensure a special strategic relationship with the United States and a politically significant role for Russia in the world. At the same time, the US interest in continuing the dialogue on offensive and defensive weapons, across the entire complex of political and economic relations, would be maintained. The relevance of the development of information and control systems for Russia's strategic nuclear forces is also increasing.

Diplomatically, everything possible must be done to preserve the negotiated arms control regime, including the task of concluding a new START treaty with the United States.

At the same time, the analysis shows that the United States will most likely not agree to a full-scale agreement providing for irreversible and controlled reductions in strategic arms, which the Russian side initially insisted on. In addition, despite previously repeatedly given assurances that the American missile defense system being developed will be limited (capable of intercepting only a few dozen warheads), Washington is clearly not yet inclined to record such restrictions. If behind this are US plans for the active use of space systems, then it becomes all the more obvious that the future American missile defense system could potentially threaten Russia as well.

The Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Capabilities (SATR), concluded in May 2004 in Moscow, does not satisfy the fundamental requirements for the irreversibility and controllability of reductions and, moreover, does not provide for restrictions on the capabilities of the missile defense system. Essentially, it means that the United States is not actually reducing either strategic delivery vehicles or nuclear warheads for them. By conditionally dividing their strategic offensive forces into operationally deployed and reserve ones, they only transfer part of the currently deployed assets into the operational reserve, thereby increasing the return potential. This means that at any time the Americans can increase their operationally deployed strategic weapons to almost the current level. We, taking into account the characteristics of our strategic offensive weapons, their remaining service life, the collapse of previously existing cooperation among manufacturers and a number of other factors, are forced to actually reduce our strategic offensive weapons. At the same time, the economic costs of their liquidation and disposal are quite significant for us.

Under these conditions, the United States, especially taking into account the creation of an anti-missile potential in the near future, will gain absolute strategic dominance in the world, the ability to act without any hesitation from a position of strength in resolving any international issues, including in relation to Russia.

On our part, it is advisable to move towards signing a new agreement that includes the following fundamental elements:

An agreed upon maximum level of warheads (in the range of 1700-2200 units), achieved within 10 years, combined with the freedom to place warheads on carriers and the irreversibility of strategic offensive arms reductions;

Maintaining the control measures established under the START-1 Treaty in a “light” mode;

Fixing the provisions on the limitations of the future missile defense system, which the American side talks about, by establishing a maximum agreed upon number of warheads that such a missile defense system will be able to intercept;

Ban on the deployment of space-based systems;

Ensuring transparency and a strengthened regime of confidence-building measures in the field of strategic weapons.

With this option, Russia would largely retain the independence of its nuclear policy and at the same time seek acceptable restrictions on the development of strategic offensive and defensive weapons.

If it is not possible to reach an agreement on this basis, then the Americans could be invited to sign a joint statement on the readiness of the parties to conclude consultations (negotiations) on the issue of strategic weapons in the near future. Such a decision would allow us to more carefully and comprehensively analyze the current situation, including taking into account the long-term consequences of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, as well as calculate various options development of our strategic nuclear forces in new conditions, not limited by contractual obligations.

At the same time, it is advisable to put forward our deeply thought-out and well-reasoned proposals for cooperation with the United States in the field of missile defense that does not undermine strategic stability, including the joint creation and use of global information systems, as well as for a new generation of confidence-building measures in the field of nuclear weapons - how strategic as well as tactical. The political benefit of such a step for Russia is obvious.

In particular, it would be possible to propose joint development of a Russian-American information system space-based (now the Americans themselves are working on such a low-orbit system, called SBIRS-Low, which for us is one of the most critical components of the future American missile defense system). This idea of ​​ours can be motivated by the new nature of Russian-American relations, the readiness of the United States for cooperation between our two countries, including in the field of missile defense, the strengthening of trust and the fact that the future missile defense system, according to the US President, will not be directed against Russia. The attitude of the Americans towards our proposal will clearly demonstrate how fair the statements of the American officials about the absence of a Russian orientation to the missile defense system being developed in the United States.

At the same time, it would be highly desirable to involve the American leadership in a broader political and strategic dialogue. For these purposes, a proposal could be made on the need to jointly seek ways to minimize the risks emanating from the objectively existing situation of mutual nuclear deterrence.

If the Americans show no interest at all in developing any mutually acceptable agreement that takes into account Russia's security interests, we, in all likelihood, will have no choice but to move on to an independent nuclear policy. In the new situation, Russia could independently determine the quantitative and qualitative composition of its nuclear forces, placing the traditional emphasis on ground-based ICBMs, and primarily with MIRVs, which would provide it with the ability to guarantee the preservation of the US nuclear deterrent potential in any development of the military-political situation. As estimates show, we have economic opportunities for this.

Under these conditions, it is necessary to weigh the advisability of resuming work on means that provide effective counteraction to the American missile defense system, including various methods of both overcoming and neutralizing it. It is also important to outline a set of measures for active and passive protection domestic strategic nuclear forces. This is estimated to be the most cost-effective way to counter US missile defense plans. In addition, here we have a solid reserve that would be advisable to claim.

When developing Russia's long-term line in the nuclear field, it seems that we need to proceed from the following obvious provisions:

The previous understanding of strategic stability, based primarily on the nuclear balance of Russia and the United States, is outdated, and in this sense, the ABM Treaty has lost its quality as a “cornerstone” of strategic stability;

The doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence, based on the parties' ability to achieve mutually assured destruction, fundamentally contradicts the proclaimed principle of partnership in bilateral relations;

The ABM Treaty is also outdated in the sense that it was an integral part of the strategic relationship between the USSR and the USA during the Cold War era, a kind of instrument for managing the nuclear arms race during a period of acute confrontation between the two superpowers;

Although the emphasis on nuclear deterrence is proclaimed in the military doctrines of the leading countries of the world, it should be clear that nuclear weapons are not weapons of the 21st century: they will inevitably be devalued by the deployment of missile defense systems, high-precision conventional weapons and other latest military technologies. We must be prepared for the fact that the United States certain moment will raise the question about complete elimination nuclear weapons - at least for propaganda purposes. In this sense, “nuclear greatness” will not be able to provide great power status to anyone after some time. Moreover, those countries that continue to focus on nuclear weapons may find themselves morally defeated over time.

Therefore, the point is that, taking into account these strategic paradigms for the development of world military policy, which are objective in nature and do not depend on the will of certain political figures, to calculate the most optimal nuclear policy of Russia essentially for the transition period - from nuclear to post-nuclear (non-nuclear) ) to the world. Even if such a transition drags on for decades, a meaningful line of behavior in this matter is needed now - at least taking into account the duration life cycles modern nuclear weapons systems (from 10 to 30 years or more).

At the same time, it would be possible to invite the Americans to begin a broad political dialogue about transferring the partnership from the declarative phase to the real one. For example, invite them to conclude a new large-scale agreement of a political nature, similar to the “Fundamentals of Relations between the USSR and the USA” (1972), but corresponding to new realities, challenges and threats to international security and a new partnership level of bilateral relations. (It is clear that the Declaration on the Strategic Framework of Russian-American Relations, adopted in Sochi on April 6, 2008, does not solve this problem.) It would be possible to include in this kind of document a provision on the need to jointly seek a way out of the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence, confirming previously assumed commitments to work towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This commitment, in particular, could be concretized by an agreement to begin consultations on ways of a joint and balanced step-by-step movement towards a nuclear-free world and the conditions for maintaining it.

If a substantive dialogue begins in this area, then the mutual concerns of the parties regarding offensive and defensive weapons will fade into the background, if not eliminated altogether. And then the relationship between the parties in the military-strategic field will finally cease to be the dominant feature of bilateral interaction, giving way to cooperation in other areas that are more responsive to the challenges and threats of the 21st century

On May 26, 1972, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement (SALT). In connection with the anniversary of this event, Le Figaro offers you an overview of the main Russian-American bilateral agreements.

Disarmament or limiting the buildup of strategic weapons? The nuclear deterrence policy of the Cold War led to a frantic arms race between the two superpowers that could have led to disaster. That is why 45 years ago the United States and the USSR signed the first strategic arms reduction treaty.

Treaty 1: The first bilateral arms reduction agreement

On May 26, 1972, US President Richard Nixon and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev signed an agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons. The signing took place in front of television cameras in the Vladimir Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow. This event was the result of negotiations that began in November 1969.

The treaty limited the number of ballistic missiles and launchers, their location and composition. An addition to the 1974 treaty reduced the number of missile defense areas deployed by each side to one. However, one of the clauses of the contract allowed the parties to terminate the contract unilaterally. This is exactly what the United States did in 2001 to begin deploying a missile defense system on its territory after 2004-2005. The date for the final withdrawal of the United States from this agreement was June 13, 2002.

The 1972 treaty includes a 20-year temporary agreement that bans the production of land-based intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and limits submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers. Also, according to this agreement, the parties undertake to continue active and comprehensive negotiations.

This “historic” agreement was especially intended to help restore the balance of deterrence. And this does not apply to the production of offensive weapons and restrictions on the number of warheads and strategic bombers. The striking forces of both countries are still very large. First and foremost, this treaty allows both countries to moderate costs while maintaining the capability of mass destruction. This prompted André Frossard to write in a newspaper on May 29, 1972: “Being able to arrange approximately 27 ends of the world - I don’t know the exact number - gives them a sufficient sense of security and allows them to spare us many additional methods of destruction. For this we have their kind hearts to thank.”

Treaty 2: Easing tensions between the two countries

After 6 years of negotiations, a new treaty between the USSR and the USA on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons was signed by American President Jimmy Carter and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. This complex document includes 19 articles, 43 pages of definitions, 3 pages listing the military arsenals of the two countries, 3 pages of protocol that will enter into force in 1981 and, finally, a declaration of principles that will form the basis of the SALT III negotiations. .

The treaty limited the number of strategic nuclear weapons of both countries. After the treaty was signed, Jimmy Carter said in a speech: “These negotiations, which have been going on continuously for ten years, give rise to the feeling that nuclear competition, if not limited, general rules and restrictions can only lead to disaster.” At the same time, the American president clarified that “this agreement does not take away the need for both countries to maintain their military power.” But this treaty was never ratified by the United States due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

On December 8, 1987, in Washington, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan signed the open-ended Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which entered into force in May 1988. This “historic” treaty for the first time provided for the elimination of weapons. We were talking about medium- and short-range missiles with a range from 500 to 5.5 thousand km. They represented 3 to 4% of the total arsenal. In accordance with the agreement, the parties, within three years from the moment it came into force, all medium and short-range missiles were to be destroyed. The agreement also provided for procedures for mutual “on-site” inspections.

At the signing of the treaty, Reagan emphasized: “For the first time in history, we have moved from a discussion of arms control to a discussion of arms reduction.” Both presidents specifically pushed for a reduction of 50% of their strategic arsenals. They were guided by the future START treaty, the signing of which was originally scheduled for the spring of 1988.

START I: the beginning of real disarmament

On July 31, 1991, US President George W. Bush and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Moscow. This agreement marked the first real reduction in the strategic arsenals of the two superpowers. According to its terms, countries were to reduce the number of the most dangerous species weapons: intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles.

The number of warheads was supposed to be reduced to 7 thousand for the USSR and 9 thousand for the USA. A privileged position in the new arsenal was given to bombers: the number of bombs was supposed to increase from 2.5 to 4 thousand for the USA and from 450 to 2.2 thousand for the USSR. In addition, the treaty provided for various control measures, and it finally came into force in 1994. According to Gorbachev, it was a blow to the “infrastructure of fear.”

New START: radical cuts

Context

The end of the INF Treaty?

INF Treaty Dead?

START-3 and Russia's nuclear push

The US will discuss with Russia nuclear disarmament

The contract also included one more important point: Elimination of missiles with multiple warheads. Russia refused precision weapons, which formed the basis of its deterrent force, while the US removed half of the submarine-mounted missiles (virtually undetectable). New START was ratified by the United States in 1996 and Russia in 2000.

Boris Yeltsin saw it as a source of hope, and George W. Bush considered it a symbol of “the end of the Cold War” and “a better future free from fear for our parents and children.” Be that as it may, the reality remains less idyllic: both countries can still destroy the entire planet several times over.

SNP: a point in the Cold War

On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) in the Kremlin. The talk was about reducing arsenals by two-thirds in ten years.

However, this small bilateral agreement (five short articles) was not precise and did not contain verification measures. Its role from the point of view of the parties’ image was more important than its content: this was not the first time that reduction was discussed. Be that as it may, it nevertheless became a turning point, the end of military-strategic parity: not having the necessary economic capabilities, Russia abandoned its claims to superpower status. In addition, the treaty opened the door to " new era" because it was accompanied by a statement about a "new strategic partnership." The United States relied on conventional military forces and understood the uselessness of most of its nuclear arsenal. Bush noted that the signing of the agreement allows one to get rid of the “legacy of the Cold War” and hostility between the two countries.

START-3: protecting national interests

On April 8, 2010, US President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev signed another agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive arms (START-3) in the Spanish drawing room of the Prague castle. It was intended to fill the legal vacuum that arose after the expiration of START I in December 2009. According to it, a new ceiling was established for the nuclear arsenals of the two countries: a reduction in nuclear warheads to 1.55 thousand units, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers - to 700 units.

The agreement also calls for a review of the figures by a joint team of inspectors seven years after it enters into force. It is worth noting here that the established levels are not too different from those specified in 2002. It also does not talk about tactical nuclear weapons, thousands of deactivated warheads in warehouses and strategic bombs. The US Senate ratified it in 2010.

START-3 was the last Russian-American agreement in the field of nuclear weapons control. A few days after taking office in January 2017, US President Donald Trump said he would offer Vladimir Putin the lifting of sanctions on Russia (imposed in response to the annexation of Crimea) in exchange for a nuclear weapons reduction treaty. According to the latest data from the US State Department, the US has 1,367 warheads (bombers and missiles), while the Russian arsenal reaches 1,096.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.

Reducing the number of nuclear warheads does not improve the security situation in the world. Experts from the International Swedish Peace Research Institute have found that the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons has led to a significant increase in the quality of the remaining arsenals. Observers were also concerned about the emergence of a new type of military conflict.

Despite the countries' declared desire for nuclear disarmament, the reduction in the number of weapons of mass destruction is happily offset by an increase in their quality.

Such conclusions are contained in the annual report released on Monday by the International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). According to the conclusions of the institute's experts, the arsenals of eight countries - the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel - are in total Today they contain about 19 thousand nuclear weapons, which is about one and a half thousand less compared to 2011.

At the same time, 4.4 thousand nuclear weapons are ready for use, half of which are in a state of high alert.

Quantitative and quality parameters restrictions on strategic offensive weapons of Russia and the United States in the START-1 and START-3 treaties

Institute analysts see the main reasons for the reduction of nuclear warheads in the steps taken by Russia and the United States within the framework of the START treaty. Let us recall that the treaty provides that each of the parties reduces strategic offensive weapons in such a way that seven years after its entry into force and thereafter their total quantities do not exceed: 700 units for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy missiles; 1550 units for warheads on them; 800 units for deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and TB.

According to official data as of April of this year, Russia had 1,492 deployed nuclear warheads, and Washington had 1,737. According to a certificate published six months ago, Washington had 1,800 operationally deployed warheads, and Moscow had 1,537. Thus, in about six months, Russia destroyed 45 warheads, and the United States - 63. However, the reduction in the number of warheads, SIPRI experts state, only led to the improvement of the remaining arsenals. The five officially recognized nuclear powers - China, France, Russia, Great Britain and the United States, the report notes, are either deploying new nuclear weapons delivery systems or have announced similar programs.

India and Pakistan continue to develop new nuclear weapons delivery systems. According to the Stockholm Institute, the first has from 80 to 110 nuclear warheads, in Pakistan their number can vary from 90 to 110, and about 80 more units are in Israel.

The latter, in particular, as the German media wrote the other day, intends to place nuclear warheads on submarines purchased in Germany.

“Despite the world's renewed interest in disarmament efforts, none of the nuclear-weapon states has yet shown more than a rhetorical willingness to give up their nuclear arsenals,” states one of the report's authors, Shannon Kyle.

However, both Russia and the United States, when signing the START treaty in 2010, did not hide their intentions to modernize their nuclear potential. In particular, this right was assigned to Moscow during the ratification of the document in the State Duma. Moreover, as Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov noted at the time, after the treaty comes into force de facto, Russia will not eliminate a single missile, since the country will not be able to reach the level of warheads specified in the treaty until 2018. installations, we will reach the level specified in the agreement only by 2028. As for warheads, we will reach the level of 1.55 thousand units by 2018. I say again that we will not cut a single unit,” he emphasized.

Another point that SIPRI experts draw attention to in their report is the emergence of a new type of military conflict in general. Experts made this conclusion based on recent events in the Middle East and North Africa.

The Arab Spring, the report notes, demonstrated the growing complexity of armed conflict. “The events of the past year are not isolated when it comes to trends modern conflict. In fact, they echo changes that have taken place during decades of armed conflict. All these changes suggest the emergence of a new type of conflict, which is increasingly complicating international intervention,” explained Neil Melvin, director of the institute’s program on armed conflict, in this regard.