Nuclear powers of the world. Belarus and nuclear disarmament Does Belarus have nuclear weapons

Veteran rocket officers told a ZARYA.BY correspondent about the events of those years and their service in the Strategic Missile Forces.

Vladimir KORSAKOV, retired colonel, in the 90s, chief engineer - deputy commander for armaments of the 31st missile division:

In Soviet Belarus there were 4 missile divisions. Until the end of the 80s, they were armed with R-12, R-14 and RSD-10 missiles. It was a powerful destructive force. For example, the RSD-10 missile of the Pioneer mobile ground missile system carried a multiple warhead with three warheads with a capacity of 150 kt each with individual guidance on its own targets.

One launcher solved the problems of a combined arms division during the Second World War. And there were eight of these in the missile regiment alone. With the power, accuracy, range of Soviet missile systems in the NATO leadership were forced to take it into account, and as a result, the West entered into negotiations with the Soviet Union on ending the production of mobile SRCs and their complete elimination, which in itself was an indirect recognition of the military superiority of the USSR.

When the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles was signed between the USSR and the USA on December 8, 1987 in Washington. According to this document, missiles of these classes located on the territory of Belarus were subject to destruction. Very strict schedules were drawn up for their elimination. At the Lesnaya missile base from 1988 to 1991. 155 R-12 and R-14 missiles, 72 launchers, 60 warheads and 246 pieces of auxiliary equipment were eliminated. Instead of medium- and shorter-range missiles, the 32nd, 33rd and 49th missile divisions began to receive a new mobile ground complex "Topol", which had no equal in any of the most developed countries peace. It was armed with a three-stage solid propellant intercontinental ballistic missile, capable of hitting enemy targets right up to US territory, and created a real threat to NATO troops both in Western Europe, and overseas.

The complex's missile can be launched from any point along the route combat patrol. Preparation time for the start is about two minutes. By 1991, the missile divisions near the cities of Lida, Mozyr and Postavy had the 81st such launcher. It seemed that global military parity had been achieved. But, as it turned out later, the liquidated complexes often included the most advanced equipment “quite by accident.” Soviet weapons, new developments were frozen. The unrestrained multi-stage demilitarization of the USSR destroyed not only the arms race and “ iron curtain“, but destroyed the military-industrial complex, which formed one of the foundations of the Soviet economy.

As a result of the collapse of the USSR, the number of nuclear powers increased, since at the time of the signing of the Belovezh Accords the Soviet nuclear weapon was stationed on the territory of four union republics: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Through diplomatic efforts, Russia and the United States ensured that Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan renounced their status as nuclear powers and transferred to Russia all the military atomic potential found on their territory. On August 13, 1993, the withdrawal of missile systems began strategic purpose"Topol" from Belarus to Russia.

Valentin POPOV, retired colonel, commander of repair and technical bases in the 90s:

I had to command repair and technical bases, which were special units for the operation of nuclear and thermonuclear ammunition. It was a very dangerous and responsible job, which was performed only by highly qualified specialists. Our task was to receive, transport, unload, transfer to the highest level of combat readiness, carry out regulations, store, carry out combat duty missions using missile warheads. The maintenance of ammunition warheads required special measures to comply with the temperature and humidity conditions in the structures where they were located.

It was a whole complex of events. Each operation during the operation of ammunition was performed by at least three people. A mistake by any soldier could lead to serious, or even catastrophic, consequences. After all, only one thermonuclear charge carried the power of hundreds atomic bombs, dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki!

Before working with the knots and the product itself, all performers wore special clothes and slippers with leather soles stitched with copper wire. This was necessary to remove static electricity on the ground loop, the resistance of which was systematically controlled. It was forbidden to work in non-cotton clothes, without head caps, or to have combs, rings, watches and other items that could become electrified or impale charge units and products.

Special security measures were taken during the liquidation launchers. We worked in winter, summer and in the heat, and in snow and rain, at night and during the day in any conditions, wearing rubberized protective equipment, rubber boots and gloves, and gas masks. The missiles were delivered to the regiment closest to its deployment railway station, the fuel components were drained from them, loaded with 8T26 cranes onto the MoAZ-546 chassis into wagons that looked like mail cars, and taken to the Lesnaya missile base near Baranovichi, where the liquidation of the R-12 and R-14 was organized. RSD-10s were taken to the Kapustin Yar training ground, where they were destroyed by detonation or launch.

The combat units were transported to the loading site in compliance with even greater safety measures in specially equipped thermal insulation rooms, ensuring temperature regime and specified humidity in Ural car bodies. The drivers of these cars passed special training. The warheads were loaded into isolated wagons and sent partly for processing to specialized plants, partly to a central storage base.

Yuri KUZNETSOV, reserve major, in the 90s, senior assistant to the head of the personnel department of the 32nd missile division:

Reduction, elimination of missiles, withdrawal missile forces from Belarus this is for many veterans tragic event. Imagine what it was like for the rocket officers, who spent hundreds of hours day and night on combat duty, draining fuel, cutting off rocket engine nozzles and cutting the tanks of their rockets.

And what was it like to be laid off in the prime of your life, to find yourself out of work, to lose your favorite job, to be uprooted from your acquired positions, or to literally start your life from scratch. But we coped with these difficulties, preserving the memory of battle path missile divisions of the Strategic Missile Forces group in Belarus.

Decay Soviet Union unexpectedly turned Belarus into a nuclear power. But the warheads located on the territory our country, fact was physically controlled by Moscow. The last rocket left Belarus on November 26, 1996. This event was preceded by long and difficult negotiations with Russia and the West.

The nuclear button remains in Russia

Belarus in Soviet times was an outpost Soviet army, aimed at the West, there were a lot of weapons in the country. Even ex-Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich, who can hardly be suspected of criticizing the Soviet order, stated in his memoirs: in terms of the number of tanks per capita, the BSSR was the most militarized in the world. Belarus also had enough nuclear weapons, which appeared in the country in the 1960s. As of 1989, there were about 1,180 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads on the territory of the BSSR. Four missile divisions, which were based near Pruzhany, Mozyr, Postavy and Lida, were responsible for their maintenance. The areas near the bases resembled a desert that stretched for tens of kilometers. But the nuclear weapons control system was in Moscow, which means that Belarusians became hostages of the all-Union leadership.

After Chernobyl, society was seriously opposed to the atom, which no longer seemed peaceful to anyone. Therefore, the document adopted on July 27, 1990 stated: “The Belarusian SSR aims to make its territory a nuclear-free zone, and the republic a neutral state.” This desire met with sympathy from abroad: things were heading towards the collapse of the USSR, and America was interested in ensuring that the composition of the “nuclear club” remained unchanged. According to Petr Kravchenko(in 1990–1994 - Minister of Foreign Affairs of the BSSR, and then of the Republic of Belarus), already in September 1991, meeting with US Secretary of State James Baker, he talked about the nuclear-free status of the republic.

The implementation of these plans became possible only after Belovezhskaya Pushcha. The leaders of the republics understood the risks of losing control over the “nuclear button,” therefore, the agreement on the creation of the CIS on December 8, 1991 guaranteed that the members of the Commonwealth “ensure unified control over nuclear weapons and their non-proliferation.”

Subsequent agreements adopted at the turn of 1991-1992 determined the temporary status of nuclear weapons, which by the time of the collapse of the USSR were located on the territory of four republics: Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. A unified command was created to control nuclear weapons strategic forces, which was to be headed by Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, who had previously been the Minister of Defense of the USSR. Ukraine and Belarus were to abandon the warheads stationed on their territories and join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Until this time, the decision on its use had to be made by the President of Russia “in agreement with the leaders of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in consultation with the heads of other member states of the Commonwealth.” Tactical nuclear weapons were to be transported to Russia and dismantled there under joint control. All four countries were to jointly develop nuclear weapons policies.

The situation turned out to be ambiguous. At first glance, the parties declared universal control over weapons. On the other hand, Russia continued to play first fiddle: in 1993, the Chicago Tribune stated: “In practice, this means that only Yeltsin knows the code to control their [missiles] launch, but it is assumed that he will not order the launch without the consent of Ukraine , Kazakhstan and Belarus". Of course, this situation was not very encouraging.

Belarus and Ukraine: different strategies

The question remained as to what compensation countries would receive for giving up nuclear weapons. Position Stanislav Shushkevich was simple: we need to get rid of the missiles as soon as possible. As the ex-speaker later said, “Belarus was actually a hostage to Russia. There were so many nuclear weapons on its surface that it was possible to destroy all of Europe. I considered this a very dangerous matter, and as soon as we signed the Belovezhskaya Agreements, I said: we will withdraw nuclear weapons without preconditions, compensation, and we will do this immediately, because this threatens the death of the Belarusian nation, Belarus.”

But other politicians argued that serious compensation could be received for abandoning the missiles. “I consider the biggest mistake in the early 90s to be the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus according to the model that the West imposed on Shushkevich, and Shushkevich on the Supreme Council,” wrote one of the leaders of the Belarusian Popular Front, a deputy of the Supreme Council. Sergey Naumchik. – Yes, the weapons had to be withdrawn (and the line about nuclear freedom in the Declaration of Sovereignty is mine), but on conditions favorable to Belarus (among which, it is possible, visa-free or facilitated entry). But at the end of December 1991 in Alma-Ata, Shushkevich, without consulting the members of the Belarusian delegation, agreed without any conditions to recognize Russia as the legal successor of the USSR in the UN and the owner of nuclear weapons.”

From the memoirs of Pyotr Kravchenko “Belarus at a crossroads. Notes of a politician and diplomat":“We experienced a real shock. It turned out that Shushkevich simply betrayed us! Surrendered the national interests of Belarus, which in one fell swoop lost its main trump card in negotiations with Russia,<…>. Of course, he had no right to make such decisions without consulting the entire delegation.<…>The second person who fully realized the drama of what was happening was my long-time opponent Zenon Poznyak. He gloomily watched our skirmish and, sighing sadly, dropped the following phrase: “Shushkevich does not care about the state interests of the Motherland!”<…>As part of the Belarusian-Russian agreements, 87 SS-25 class missiles were removed from the territory of Belarus. They were dismantled at the Arzamas-3 enterprise. From them it turned out<…>uranium, which Russia later sold to the United States. As a result of this deal, Russia received more than ten billion dollars. These are official data, although the Russian opposition press claimed that the transaction price was several times higher.”

At the same time, Ukraine took a completely different position. In March 1992, the president of this country Leonid Kravchuk stopped the export of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. As the leader of Ukraine stated, “due to the current political instability and confusion, we cannot be sure that the missiles we export are destroyed and do not fall into the wrong hands.<…>Ukraine considers the capacity of the nuclear arsenal destruction plant located in Russia to be insufficient. Therefore, it has the right to have a similar enterprise on its territory.<…>It can also take on the processing of waste from nuclear power plants republics."

Ukraine also proposed that the removal of nuclear weapons from its territory and their destruction be carried out under international control. According to researcher Denis Rafeenko, this policy was explained by Ukrainian-Russian contradictions over Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. “Under these conditions, the nuclear card was used by the leadership of Ukraine as a response to certain actions of the Russian side.”

Whose compensation will be greater?

The Ukrainian position caused certain problems. On July 30-31, 1991, the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1) was signed in Moscow. According to the document, the USSR and the USA were to reduce their nuclear arsenals. At the same time, each side was supposed to have no more than 6 thousand weapons left. As noted Denis Rafeenko, “the US view of the events taking place in Ukraine at that time was that if Ukraine failed to ratify the START I Treaty, then this treaty would lose its force. Congress people's deputies Russian Federation“has decided to ratify the START I Treaty, but not to exchange instruments of ratification until Ukraine accedes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” It was necessary to look for a compromise.

As the economies of Ukraine and Belarus struggled, both countries hoped for support from the West and Russia. But Ukraine, which did not completely renounce weapons, used them as an argument, and Belarus acted as a supplicant.

As Pyotr Kravchenko recalls, in January 1992, Belarus announced that it would not only fulfill all its obligations, but also accelerate the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the country. This became a trump card in negotiations with the Americans, who in the spring of that year extended the Nunn-Lugar program to our country. It provided for the allocation of $250 million for purposes related to ensuring nuclear safety during dismantling, relocation and destruction nuclear warheads. Belarus received more than $100 million. Let us note that later, in 1993, during the visit of the Belarusian delegation led by Stanislav Shushkevich to the United States, Belarus received another 59 million.

At the same time, negotiations were ongoing between Western countries and former Soviet and now independent republics. On May 23, 1992, the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty was signed.

The transfer to Belarus of one or several brigades of Iskander operational-tactical missile systems, which can be armed with 50 megaton nuclear warheads, will be the cheapest and fastest response to the emergence of tank division USA in Poland.

Nuclear weapons could return to Belarus as a last resort, says military observer Alexander Alesin .

On October 24, a meeting of the joint board of the Ministries of Defense of Belarus and Russia took place in Minsk. The heads of the military departments of the two countries, Andrei Ravkov and Sergei Shoigu, discussed the implementation of the Plan of Joint Actions to Ensure the Military Security of the Union State

“The Polish government’s plans to permanently station a division of the US Armed Forces on its territory are counterproductive and do not contribute to maintaining stability and strengthening regional security,” said Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. “Under these conditions, we are forced to take retaliatory measures and must be ready to neutralize possible military threats in all directions.”

What might be the Russian response to the appearance of a tank division in Poland? Possible options answer with a military expert Alexander Alesin.

Russia is not going to take preventive measures - we are talking specifically about the response. But the response will be quick and adequate to the degree of threat, which, according to Russian minister defense, will arise in this case: the threat of destabilization of the situation in our region. Simply put, if the balance of power changes seriously.

The US tank division, according to various estimates, has up to 300 Bradley tanks with all means of reinforcement: and jet systems volley fire, and self-propelled artillery installations. Since the tank division will operate on the outskirts of the US Army, then, naturally, the division will be provided with everything necessary to conduct independent military operations. A tank division seems to be a fairly formidable combat unit with a strength of no less than 10 thousand people.

Russia believes that a tank division may appear on the border with the Russian Federation; however, Belarus has a larger common border with Poland than Russia. Therefore, Belarus may consider the deployment of a tank division in Poland a threat to itself, as Makei stated in Brussels more than a year ago. Recently, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeated the thesis that this will lead to an imbalance, and Belarus will take measures to ensure its security.

-What quick and adequate measures are we talking about?

I believe that such a response could be the transfer to Belarus of one or several brigades of Iskander operational-tactical missile systems, which are armed with the Russian ground forces in the Western Military District, and perhaps in the Central. At a speed of 70 kilometers per hour with a power reserve of a thousand kilometers, in 12-15 hours, Iskander complexes from the territory of the Western Military District can arrive on the territory of Belarus under their own power and can be prepared for firing within a few tens of minutes. It turns out “cheap and cheerful.”

If this is not a temporary raid, but placement on a permanent basis, then hangars will be needed to accommodate military equipment, repair areas will be needed, and most importantly, a barracks fund to accommodate personnel. The remaining infrastructure (an extensive network of paved and dirt roads) is present in Belarus, which provides ample room for maneuver.

If we assume that the complexes will receive nuclear weapons (the Iskander may be armed with warheads with a yield of 50 kilotons), then storage facilities for warheads will also be needed; V Soviet time There were such storage facilities, but I suspect that it is unlikely that any of them meets modern requirements and is capable of accepting warheads for storage.

Before Russia takes retaliatory steps (provided that the transfer of Iskanders occurs after the creation of the base), the preparation of infrastructure for the deployment of Iskander operational-tactical systems could well be discussed at a joint board of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and Belarus.

Naturally, at the political level there should be preparatory work on legislative registration of the presence of Iskanders; an interstate agreement on the deployment of Russian military personnel in the form of a military base in Belarus should be prepared.

Question: what status can he get? military base? If Russian base will receive extraterritorial status, it is quite possible that nuclear warheads will appear here. That is, the military base will be considered Russian territory on which it will be possible to deploy nuclear warheads. If the military base is under the jurisdiction of Belarus, then there will be no nuclear weapons there: Belarus is not a nuclear power.

Another option is possible: Belarus and Russia have a joint group ground forces. It is possible to carry out a legal maneuver and temporarily transfer the Russian brigade to Belarus; although it will be Russian, for a certain time it may be on the territory of Belarus at the disposal of the command of the Unified Group ground forces. But then you will still have to formalize her presence in Belarus legally.

The transfer of aviation squadrons to Belarus is a complex matter, requiring very serious preparation: runways, airfield facilities, and navigation equipment. This is a long process that will be accompanied by resistance both within the country and outside. I think this option is unlikely.

Deploying a Russian mechanized or tank division in Belarus seems just as difficult.

I think the cheapest, fastest answer (no one will have time to get scared) is the transfer of one or several brigades of Iskander operational-tactical systems. Moreover, our neighbors are very sensitive about the deployment of Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region, and even more so in Belarus. And if it becomes possible to provide the Iskanders with nuclear weapons, then, of course, their appearance will be a serious and resonant step.

If the treaty on smaller and smaller missiles is destroyed, medium range, it is very likely that the Iskanders will receive new ammunition, the range of which exceeds 500 kilometers, which means they will be able to hit targets not only throughout Poland, but also in a significant part of Europe. The missiles have not been tested because the INF Treaty prohibits this. But in the event of denunciation of the treaty, the missiles will be tested, put into production and, it is possible, will become part of the ammunition of the Iskander complex.

-So, nuclear weapons can de facto return to Belarus?

As a last resort - if the situation escalates to such an extent that some European countries give permission to host American missiles medium range. Or the American group in Poland will turn out to be larger than declared.

As a response to the nuclear shield that the United States is about to deploy over Eastern Europe, Russia may locate part of its nuclear facilities on the territory of Belarus. This statement was made today by the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Belarus, Alexander Surikov, clarifying, however, that this depends “on the political integration of the two countries.” Previously, Alexander Lukashenko emphasized that he regrets the removal of nuclear facilities from the territory of the republic in the early 90s and that now he would act differently.

Russian Ambassador to Belarus Alexander Surikov did not rule out the deployment of new Russian military facilities in Belarus as a response to the deployment of the Eastern European missile defense system by the United States. Moreover, Surikov especially emphasized that he was talking “about objects related to nuclear weapons,” the Interfax agency reports.

The statement was made by Surikov today. “It all depends on the level of our political integration,” the ambassador clarified, as well as “on the opinions of experts, diplomats and military personnel: necessary, possible, when, how.”

The words of the Russian ambassador have already caused a significant stir in the Belarusian media, and a number of politicians (albeit former ones) hastened to comment.

Thus, in an interview with the Belarusian resource “Charter’97” former minister Defense of the Republic Pavel Kozlovsky stated that he personally does not understand “what Mr. Surikov is basing this on.”

"Relations between Russia and Belarus in Lately are only getting worse. There is obvious disintegration underway. I think that Lukashenko, despite his previous regrets about the withdrawal nuclear missiles, is not interested in the deployment of Russian nuclear facilities,” Kozlovsky emphasized.

Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Andrei Sannikov commented on the diplomat’s words in even harsher intonations: “Ambassador Surikov apparently forgot that he is not somewhere in the Altai Territory, but in independent Belarus. Such statements, firstly, are not typical of diplomats, and secondly, they can be regarded as an encroachment on the sovereignty of the state.”

"Russia in Once again confirms that it is for independent state a source of decreased security, both energy and military,” notes Sannikov, who in the early 90s participated in negotiations on the withdrawal of nuclear facilities from Belarus.

Let us recall that in 1990–1991 Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, on whose territory part of the nuclear weapons USSR, transferred it to the Russian Federation, and after signing the Lisbon Protocol in 1992, they were declared countries without nuclear weapons.

This protocol is an addition to the Soviet-American Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Thus, Russia became the legal successor of the USSR, retained its status as a nuclear power, its place as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and assumed many common obligations with the union republics, including the payment of debts.

Subsequently, Alexander Lukashenko expressed regret that all missiles were removed from the territory of Belarus. Last year, he even suggested the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons if there was an immediate threat to the Union State.

He also emphasized that his country at one time, without any preconditions, renounced the possession of nuclear weapons. However, if the question of giving up nuclear weapons “had been raised now,” he “wouldn’t have done that.”

However, he also noted that “now there is no need to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in the first strike zone” and “there are enough necessary weapons in the Russian Federation, which, if necessary, can be used in Belarus.”

All these words were spoken by Alexander Lukashenko in June 2006, that is, before relations between the union republics became noticeably more complicated due to the “oil and gas war.”

Belarus threatened the West possible way out from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to official Minsk, the United States and Great Britain, by applying economic sanctions against Belarus, violated their obligations towards the country. And therefore, in Minsk they may stop observing these conditions. At least this was stated by the Belarusian delegation in Geneva at the second session of the Preparatory Committee of the NPT Review Conference.

The Belarusian side emphasized that it is very important for it that the tripartite security guarantees provided in accordance with the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in connection with Belarus’ voluntary renunciation of the right to possess nuclear weapons work. “Three states - Great Britain, Russia and the USA - have committed themselves to respect the independence and sovereignty of Belarus, including not to use measures of economic coercion,” the Belarusian delegates emphasized. And since there are sanctions, it means Western partners encroach on the independence of Belarus.

“A reasonable question arises as to why, despite recorded and repeatedly confirmed commitments, some nuclear powers in practice they are ignored, continuing to apply measures of economic and political pressure. The measures of economic coercion in the form of sanctions taken by the UK and the US against Belarus must be cancelled. The Budapest Memorandum was registered with the UN in November 2012 as international treaty. Violation of accepted legal obligations is an unacceptable norm of behavior of states from the point of view international law", the Belarusian side emphasized.

The irritation of official Minsk is understandable. The USA and the EU apply to Belarus a whole range of political and economic sanctions. The EU blacklist currently includes 243 individuals and 32 companies providing support to the “Lukashenko regime”. The number of those on the US “blacklist” is unknown, but perhaps it is even larger. It's about about budget-generating companies - such as "Belspetsexport", "Belneftekhim", "Belaruskali". They sell their products mainly in foreign countries. This means that sanctions are a direct blow to the country’s budget.

Along the way, Belarus reached a new – almost Soviet – level of military integration with Russia. In May, the allies will hold large-scale exercises "Zapad-2013", where they will practice possible nuclear strike in Warsaw. The exercises will take place in close proximity to the Polish borders. In addition, Russia for the first time announced that it plans to permanently deploy its air regiment with fighter jets in Belarus by 2015. As Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said, the start of work on this project is planned for this year: Moscow will locate an aviation commandant’s office with its neighbors and supply the first duty unit of combat fighters. “We intend to continue to consider issues necessary to strengthen the defense capability of our Belarusian colleagues and brothers,” Shoigu emphasized.

Director of the Minsk Center for European Integration Yuri Shevtsov believes that for the Belarusian foreign policy a significant event happened. “To relocate an entire air regiment to Belarus in less than two years is very fast. And this reflects high degree military anxiety regarding NATO or individual NATO countries. Polish games of greatness have always ended badly for Poland,” the expert explains. And he adds: “It is unlikely that opposition to Polish activity regarding Belarus will be limited to one Russian air regiment. At a minimum, the saturation of the Belarusian army with new weapons and equipment will now proceed faster. And if it comes to the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus in the event of the collapse of the Budapest Memorandum system, then the militarization of the region will increase by orders of magnitude."

Of course, such activity on the part of official Minsk will inevitably affect the eastern borders of the EU. Poland and Lithuania will begin to rapidly increase military spending. And while for Poland they are unlikely to become too much of an economic burden, for Lithuania geopolitical changes will definitely mean additional problems in getting the country out of the economic crisis. Shevtsov also believes that Russia will increase pressure on Lithuania - both economic and informational. “The EU will not compensate Lithuania for these losses. There will still be no war between Russia and NATO, but the losses from the current Polish activity in the east could be quite serious for Lithuania,” the political scientist sums up.

Experts believe it is quite likely that the Belarusians’ threats will not be an empty shake of the air, and that the country will respond to the sanctions by withdrawing from the Budapest Memorandum. “The United States has actually already withdrawn from it. Recently there was a statement, it seems, from the US Embassy in Belarus that the United States does not consider this Memorandum as a document binding on them,” comments Shevtsov.

All this means that Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan may soon receive a legal basis to return to their nuclear status. And in the end, someone, but Belarus, will definitely be able to count on the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on its territory. Moreover, the Belarusian government already possesses approximately 2.5 tons nuclear materials, some of which have a high degree of enrichment, sufficient, for example, for the rapid production of a “dirty” atomic “bomb”.

In addition, “a number of threshold countries will receive an additional impetus to create nuclear weapons, because they will see the unreliability of security guarantees from the United States. Most likely, Iran will officially try to become the first of these countries,” Shevtsov describes the more distant consequences of these changes.

All this, undoubtedly, plays into Lukashenko’s hands. The author of the nuclear disarmament program for Belarus, Stanislav Shushkevich, says that “Lukashenko will soon begin to more actively blackmail the United States with a return to a nuclear status.” He will do this in order to achieve the lifting of economic sanctions from Belarus. And Old Man can return to him every time he doesn’t like something in the behavior of NATO member countries. Whether Lukashenko will get nuclear weapons, which he has long dreamed of, will depend only on Russia in the next few years.

The United States will obviously have to react to this somehow. An attempt to pacify the intractable Lukashenko could result in new conflicts for NATO member countries. What is especially unsafe against the backdrop of growing military power China and angry rhetoric towards the West from Russia.