Day of formation of units and divisions of the rabbi. Electronic warfare specialist day. Electronic warfare in modern conflicts and warriors

Our Russian fleet has world priority in such a specific field of radio electronics as electronic warfare (EW). The very first steps of introducing radio showed both its undoubted advantages and main drawback- exposure to deliberate external influences. Therefore, the ideas of confrontation in management began to take shape almost in parallel with the development of radio and were formed in Russian Navy already towards the beginning Russo-Japanese War.

IN classical understanding The essence of electronic warfare as a two-way process of suppression of electronic means on the one hand and protection from interference on the other hand contains the dialectic of the development of all radio electronics. The desire to achieve positive result in this confrontation it has and will always advance, on the one hand, the technical process, and on the other, to improve methods of combat use.

April 15, 1904 two Japanese ironclads cruisers, "Nissin" and "Kasuga", went out to carry out the “third throw-over shooting” at the forts and the internal roadstead of the Port Arthur fortress. “Turn-over” was the name given to firing with steep projectile trajectories at targets located somewhere beyond mountainous terrain, in the absence of direct visibility.

Japanese armored cruisers Nisshin (foreground) and Kasuga

Acting Fleet Commander Pacific Ocean Rear Admiral P.P. Ukhtomsky reported: “At 9:11 a.m., the enemy armored cruisers Nissin and Kasuga, maneuvering south-southwest from the Liaoteshan lighthouse, began throwing fire at the forts and the internal roadstead. From the very beginning of the shooting, two enemy cruisers, having chosen positions opposite the passage of the Liaoteshan Cape, outside the shots of the fortress, began to telegraph why immediately battleship "Pobeda" and the Golden Mountain station began to interrupt enemy telegrams with a large spark, believing that these cruisers were informing the firing battleships that they had been hit by shells. The enemy fired more than 60 large-caliber shells. There were no hits to the courts.”

destroyer "Siberian Strelok"

The effectiveness of organized interference was confirmed by the Japanese themselves: “Since communication via wireless telegraph with our observing ships was interrupted by the enemy by an observation station located on the south-east coast of the entrance, it was difficult to correct the shooting and the shells did not hit accurately enough.” Only a year has passed, but the first people awarded for success in this branch of military affairs have already begun to appear: radiotelegraph operator destroyer "Siberian Strelok" Conductor Sinitsa was awarded the St. George Cross for using radio noise to “clog the report of an enemy destroyer about the discovery of the forces of the Russian fleet.” The problems of electronic warfare in that period were solved quite simply because the radio stations used in the Russian and Japanese fleets were approximately the same type - both in principle of operation and in construction: with spark transmitters, sometimes even from the same manufacturers. So the opportunity opened up to “clog” messages with a “big spark” - a more powerful signal from your transmitter.

In 1911, Petrovsky, a professor of radio engineering at the Naval Academy, was the first to theoretically substantiate methods for creating radio interference and protecting radio communications from it. They passed practical testing in the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, measures were developed to allow “...to avoid enemy interference during radio communications". Training began on creating radio interference and training radio operators to work in conditions of interference on ships Baltic Fleet.

In a report at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on November 23, 1917. V. I. Lenin said: “We have information that our radiograms are reaching Europe. Thus, our radio telegram about the victory over Kerensky was intercepted by the Austrian radio telegraph and transmitted. The Germans sent counter waves to delay it.” – This is how the classic of Marxism-Leninism understood the essence of electronic warfare. This situation persisted until the time civil war. When the rebellious Kronstadt forts “Red Hill” and “Grey Horse” became necessary to establish contact with foreign countries, their transmissions were “clogged” by radiation from ship radio transmitters from ships of the Baltic Fleet loyal to the Bolsheviks.

In the period between the world wars, along with the significant development of radio communications, radio direction finding, radio telecontrol, and radar appeared. As a result, the methods of combat use of forces and means of the armies, air force and navy have radically changed, and the effectiveness of combat operations has sharply increased. This, naturally, caused a response and led to a broader development of methods and techniques for countering enemy electronic means.

Thus, the idea of ​​​​the possibility of interfering with radars was first expressed in 1937 when discussing work on radio range finders and radio detectors (as radars were called in the USSR until 1943). One of the first applications for an invention in the field of radar countermeasures was filed in May 1939 by engineer Kabanov (it was called “Method and device for interfering with the operation of radio rangefinders of the “False object” type”).

In the pre-war years, prototypes of radio jamming stations “Storm” in the ultra-short wave, “Storm-2” in the medium wave and “Grom” in the short wave range were manufactured in the Soviet Union to suppress radio communication lines. Professor Klyatskin and others took an active part in their development. During testing, these stations showed high efficiency, but before the start of the Great Patriotic War were not put into mass production.

The prototype jamming station "Grom" was used from September 6 to 12, 1941 when our troops launched a counterattack near Yelnya. In addition, in the first year of the war, enemy radio communications were widely and actively counteracted by creating interference using standard radio stations. And in 1942, during the Battle of Stalingrad, a special suppression group from the standard radio stations of the Red Army Communications Directorate successfully operated. Their targeting to enemy frequencies and determining the effectiveness of disrupting radio communications was carried out by radio intelligence units of the Intelligence Directorate.

During the encirclement of Paulus's 6th Field Army with the aim of its radio blockade, a special radio reconnaissance and radio suppression group is formed as part of the Don Front. It had several powerful radio stations that were aimed at the enemy's radio networks with the help of the 394th separate radio reconnaissance division. To disinformation the headquarters of the 6th Army, a special radio station was allocated with the call signs of Manstein’s troops, who were trying to release the encircled group.

After detailed analysis and generalizing the results of the first experience in creating radio interference, having become convinced of its high effectiveness, at the beginning of December 1942, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria sent to State Committee defense memorandum with the following content:

It is known from war experience that the bulk of German radio stations used to control units on the battlefield operate on ultra-short-wave and long-wave bands.

The Red Army occupies a relatively small number of waves in the long-wave and ultra-short-wave ranges and is not at all engaged in jamming enemy radio stations operating on the battlefield, despite the presence of favorable conditions for this.

In particular, we know that the radio stations of parts German army, surrounded in the Stalingrad area, keep in touch with their leadership, located outside the encirclement, on waves from 438 to 732 meters.

The NKVD of the USSR considers it expedient to organize a special service in the Red Army to jam German radio stations operating on the battlefield.

To carry out these activities, it is necessary to form three special radio divisions with jamming means, designed to jam the main radio stations of the most important enemy groups, as part of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army...

On December 16, 1942, the GKO decree # GOKO-2633SS “On organization in the Red Army” was issued special service to jam German radio stations operating on the battlefield,” and on December 17, 1942, the Chief of the General Staff, Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR Vasilevsky signed directive # 4869948 “On the formation of a special group and special radio jamming divisions.” In accordance with this document, two separate radio divisions (ordn) are created special purpose- 131st (commander Major Petrov) and 132nd (commander Major Bushuev), which became part of the Stalingrad and Don fronts. Later, in 1943 and 1944, the 130th (commander Captain Lukacher) and 226th (commander Major Konstantinov) separate special-purpose radio divisions were formed on the Western and Leningrad fronts, respectively. To coordinate the combat use of these units, a radio interference service was created at the General Staff, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Engineer Rogatkin.

Each radio division had from 8 to 10 car radios of the type RAF-KV, intended for radio interference, 18-20 reconnaissance receivers of the Virazh and Chaika types, four radio direction finders of the 55 PK-3A and Shtor type.

Radio jamming stations were usually located 20-30 km from the front line and 3-5 km from the division's radio receiving center. The main enemy radio networks were monitored around the clock, during which the main and backup frequencies of enemy radio stations, their location, military affiliation and operating modes were identified. In addition, the 131st Special Forces Order had a powerful radio jamming station “Pchela”, which was located on a railway platform and was intended to counter enemy aircraft radio compasses.

Separate special-purpose radio divisions took part in all front-line and army operations of 1943-1945, creating interference, conducting radio reconnaissance, as well as radio disinformation, radio demonstrations in false areas of troop concentration and breaking through enemy defenses. For example, during the Belarusian operation in the summer of 1944, the 131st Order, while suppressing radio communications of enemy groups in the Vitebsk region and southeast of Minsk, disrupted the transmission of 522 urgent and 1665 simple radio transmissions. Particular attention was paid to the disruption of artillery fire control and aviation operations. Simultaneously with the jamming, attacks were carried out on command posts and radar posts of enemy troops.

The control of German formations and associations was very successfully disrupted by radio interference in January-April 1945 during the East Prussian operation, in which Active participation hosted by the 131st and 226th special forces radio divisions. They managed to prevent the enemy from maintaining stable radio communications, although he had 175 radio stations in 30 radio networks and on 300 radio frequencies. In total, reception of about 1200 radiograms was disrupted in the Konigsberg enemy grouping, and 1000 radiograms in the Zemland grouping.

During the assault Soviet troops Fortress of Koenigsberg, the main radio station of the encircled garrison tried to consistently transmit on 43 frequencies for 24 hours, but they all jammed. After this, on April 9, an order was transmitted in open text from the commander of the group of troops defending Koenigsberg, Colonel General Lyash about surrender. In captivity, during interrogation, Lyash testified: “As a result of the terrifying artillery preparation, the wired communications in the fortress were put out of action. I hoped for radio contact with Courland, with the Zemland group of troops and with Central Germany. But the effective actions of Russian jamming radio equipment did not make it possible to use radio equipment to transmit radiograms, and my actions could not be coordinated by headquarters supreme command. This was one of the reasons for my capitulation.”

The effectiveness of the actions of special-purpose radio divisions is also evidenced by the testimony of the communications chief of the Breslau garrison, Lieutenant Colonel Wittenberg, who was captured by Soviet troops: “... the Russians continuously disrupted our radio communications. Due to radio interference, we were forced to switch to different waves, but we were discovered and subjected to jamming. Radio interference delayed the transmission of radiograms for three or more hours, so some of them had to be cancelled.”

In the Berlin operation, electronic warfare reached perfection. It included radio reconnaissance, radio suppression, disinformation, and destruction of radio equipment at enemy command posts. Electronic warfare was conducted by the 130th and 132nd orders, which were part of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts (respectively). In addition, airplanes bomber aviation interfered with German air defense radars. Thus, from April 25 to May 2, 1945, the 132nd Radio Division disrupted the radio communications of the headquarters of the encircled Berlin enemy group, as well as the headquarters of the 9th Army and the 5th Army Corps, which were encircled south of Berlin. Due to radio interference, German radio operators were forced to repeat the texts of transmitted radiograms dozens of times. During the days of fierce fighting, the 132nd Order disrupted the radio transmission of 170 urgent combat orders and instructions, which were not received by enemy formations and units.

It is also necessary to mention the special devices SOL-3 and SOL-3A, which were supplied to the troops since 1942. With their help, it was determined whether our aircraft entered the irradiation zone of the enemy radar. From about mid-1943 Soviet aviation interfered with the operation of the radar by metallized paper tapes scattered from jamming aircraft.

Electronic warfare dates back to April 15, 1904, when for the first time during the Russian-Japanese War, radio transmissions from Japanese fire spotter ships were discovered and suppressed by deliberate radio interference. This historical fact marked the beginning of the formation and development of electronic warfare in the Russian Armed Forces.

Invention by Russian scientist Popov A.S. in 1895, radio and the introduction of radio electronics into the armed forces at the beginning of the twentieth century inevitably led to the creation of means and methods to combat them. As the number, role and scope of tasks solved with the help of electronic means in combat and operations increased, the capabilities of radio reconnaissance and radio interference undoubtedly increased, and more and more new means and methods of conducting electronic warfare were developed. Opposing parties under these conditions, they were forced to take special measures to hide radio equipment from reconnaissance and protect them from suppression by radio interference. In practice, these measures began to be implemented during the First World War.

Electronic warfare developed more intensively during the Great Patriotic War, during which not only radio-electronic means of controlling troops and weapons, but also methods and tactics their reconnaissance and suppression. However, only in the post-war period, as a result of the widespread introduction of radio electronics achievements into military affairs combat capabilities weapons and military equipment began to increase rapidly.

The experience of all local wars and armed conflicts of the second half of the 20th century - beginning of the XXI century shows that electronic warfare is an integral part of operations and combat operations of any scale. Management excellence has become a critical condition for winning strategic initiative.

Electronic warfare today is one of the most important types of combat support. It includes such main areas as the targeted impact of electromagnetic radiation on radio-electronic objects of enemy control systems; protecting their radio-electronic systems from similar impacts; reducing the ability to defeat our missile systems, airplanes, ships precision weapons enemy.

The history of electronic warfare was created by people who dedicated their lives and devoted all their knowledge, all their strength and skills to the cause of improving this important type of operational and combat support. They all have one thing in common - selfless devotion to the Motherland, the Armed Forces, and electronic warfare. With practical deeds, they wrote their pages in the history of electronic warfare. Deep gratitude and appreciation for this to all electronic warfare specialists.

I take this opportunity to congratulate all veterans, personnel of electronic warfare units and units, teachers, scientists, designers, and industry workers on Electronic Warfare Specialist Day. I wish you good health, happiness, family well-being, optimism and further success for the benefit of our Fatherland.

The emblem of the electronic warfare troops depicts a hand in a gauntlet, squeezing a beam of lightning. Perhaps these symbols accurately reflect the modern tasks of electronic warfare - complete control over the main invisible factor of modern war, which determines the border between victory and defeat - the ether.

On April 15, 1904, two days after the tragic death of Admiral Makarov, the Japanese fleet began shelling Port Arthur. However, this attack, later called the “third switch fire,” was not successful. The reason for the failure is revealed in the official report of the acting commander of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral Ukhtomsky. He wrote:

« At 9 o'clock 11 min. In the morning, the enemy armored cruisers Nisin and Kasuga, maneuvering south-southwest from the Liaoteshan lighthouse, began throwing fire at the forts and the internal roadstead. From the very beginning of the shooting, two enemy cruisers, having chosen positions opposite the passage of the Liaoteshan Cape, outside the shots of the fortress, began to telegraph, why immediately the battleship "Pobeda" and the Golden Mountain stations began to interrupt enemy telegrams with a large spark, believing that these cruisers were informing the firing battleships about the hit their shells. The enemy fired 208 large-caliber shells. There were no hits in the courts».

This was the first officially recorded fact in history of the use of electronic warfare in combat operations.

Weak link

Modern electronic warfare, of course, has come a long way from the “big spark,” but the main principle underlying it remains the same. Any organized area human activity provides for a hierarchy, be it a factory, a store, and even more so an army - any enterprise has a “brain”, that is, a management system. In this case, competition comes down to a competition between control systems—information warfare. After all, today the main commodity on the market is not oil, not gold, but information. Depriving a competitor of his “brains” can bring victory. Therefore, it is the command and control system that the military seeks to protect first of all: they bury it in the ground, build layered defense systems for headquarters, etc.

Training class of the Interspecific Electronic Warfare Center

But, as you know, the strength of a chain is determined by its weakest link. Control commands need to be somehow transferred from the “brain” to the performers. " The most vulnerable link on the battlefield is the communication system“, explains Andrei Mikhailovich Smirnov, a cycle teacher at the Interspecific Center for the Training and Combat Use of Electronic Warfare Troops in Tambov. - If it is disabled, commands from the control system will not pass to the performers. This is exactly what electronic warfare does».

From reconnaissance to suppression

But in order to disable a communication system, it must be detected. Therefore, the very first task of electronic warfare is technical reconnaissance, which studies the battlefield using all available technical means. This makes it possible to identify radio-electronic objects that can be suppressed - communication systems or sensors.

Electronic warfare vehicle "Rtut-BM" designed to combat not communication lines, but guided weapons and ammunition with radio fuses. In automatic mode, the system detects ammunition and determines the operating frequency of its radio fuse, after which it creates high-power interference.

The Infauna electronic warfare system protects equipment on the move, suppressing communication lines and radio control of explosive devices.

Suppression of radio-electronic objects is the creation at the receiver input of a noise signal greater than the useful signal.

« People of the older generation probably still remember the jamming of foreign shortwave radio stations, such as the Voice of America, in the USSR by transmitting a powerful noise signal. This is just a typical example of radio jamming, says Andrey Mikhailovich. - Electronic warfare also includes the installation of passive jamming, for example, the release of clouds of foil from aircraft to interfere with radar signals or the creation of false targets using corner reflectors. The area of ​​interest of electronic warfare includes not only the radio, but also the optical range - for example, laser illumination of optical-electronic sensors of guidance systems, and even other physical fields, such as hydroacoustic suppression of submarine sonars».

However, it is important not only to suppress the enemy’s communication systems, but also to prevent the suppression of one’s own systems. Therefore, the competence of electronic warfare also includes radio-electronic protection of their systems. This is a set of technical measures, which include the installation of arresters and locking systems for receiving paths during exposure to interference, protection from electromagnetic pulse(including a nuclear explosion), shielding, the use of packet transmission, as well as organizational measures such as operating at minimum power and the shortest possible time on air.

In addition, electronic warfare also counters enemy technical reconnaissance, using radio camouflage and various tricky types of signal coding that make detection difficult.

Jammers

« The short-wave "enemy voices" were an analog signal with amplitude modulation at known frequencies, so it was not so difficult to drown them out, explains Andrey Mikhailovich. - But even under such seemingly hothouse conditions, if you had a good receiver, listening to forbidden broadcasts was quite possible due to the peculiarities of the propagation of short-wave signals and the limited power of transmitters. For analog signals, the noise level must exceed the signal level by six to ten times, since the human ear and brain are extremely selective and can understand even a noisy signal.

WITH modern methods encoding, such as hopping, the task is more complex: if you use white noise, the hopping receiver simply “will not notice” such a signal. Therefore, the noise signal should be as similar as possible to the “useful” one (but five to six times more powerful). And they are different in different communication systems, and one of the tasks of radio reconnaissance is precisely to analyze the type of enemy signals. IN ground systems Typically, DSSS or frequency spread spectrum signals are used, so the most commonly used universal interference is a signal frequency modulated (FM) with a chaotic pulse sequence.

Aviation uses amplitude modulated (AM) signals because on FM the Doppler effect will be affected by a fast moving transmitter. Pulse interference, similar to signals from guidance systems, is also used to suppress aircraft radars. In addition, you need to use a directional signal: this gives a significant gain in power (several times). In some cases, suppression is quite problematic - say, in the case of space or radio relay communications, where very narrow radiation patterns are used».

One should not think that electronic warfare jams “everything” - this would be very ineffective from an energy point of view. “The power of the noise signal is limited, and if it is distributed over the entire spectrum, then at work modern system communications operating with HF signals will not be affected at all,” says Anatoly Mikhailovich Balyukov, head of the testing and methodological department of the Interspecific Center for the Training and Combat Use of Electronic Warfare Troops. - Our task is to detect, analyze the signal and literally “point” suppress it - precisely on those channels between which it “jumps”, and on no others. Therefore, the widespread belief that no communications will work while the electronic warfare system is operating is nothing more than a misconception. Only those systems that need to be suppressed will not work.”

Future War

In the 1990s, the military different countries the world started talking about new concept conducting combat operations - network-centric warfare. Its practical implementation became possible thanks to the rapid development of information technology.

“Network-centric warfare is based on the creation of a special communication network that unites all units on the battlefield. More precisely, in the battle space, since global satellite constellations are also elements of such a network,” explains Anatoly Mikhailovich Balyukov. - The United States has made a serious bet on network-centric warfare and has been actively testing its elements in local wars since the mid-1990s - from reconnaissance and attack UAVs to field terminals for each soldier, receiving data from a single network.

This approach, of course, allows for much higher combat effectiveness by significantly reducing the Boyd loop time. Now we are no longer talking about days, not about hours or even minutes, but literally about real time - and even about the frequency of individual stages of the loop in tens of hertz. It sounds impressive, but... all these characteristics are provided by communication systems. It is enough to degrade the characteristics of communication systems, at least partially suppressing them, and the frequencies of the Boyd loop will decrease, which (all other things being equal) will lead to defeat.

Thus, the entire concept of network-centric warfare is tied to communication systems. Without communication, coordination between network elements is partially or completely disrupted: there is no navigation, no identification of "friend or foe", no marks on the location of troops, units become "blind", automated fire control systems do not receive signals from guidance systems, and use many types modern weapons it is not possible in manual mode. Therefore, in a network-centric war, electronic warfare will play one of the leading roles, winning the airwaves from the enemy.”

big ear

Electronic warfare methods are actively used not only in the electromagnetic range (radio and optical), but also in acoustics. This is not only anti-submarine warfare (jamming and decoys), but the detection of artillery batteries and helicopters using an infrasound trail that extends far in the atmosphere.

Invisible signals

Amplitude (AM) and frequency (FM) modulation are the basis of analog communications, but they are not very noise-resistant and therefore can be easily suppressed using modern means EW.

Scheme of operation of pseudo-random tuning of operating frequency (PRFC)

Boyd's loop

John Boyd began his career as a US Air Force pilot in 1944, and at the outbreak of the Korean War he became an instructor and earned the nickname "Forty Second Boyd" because none of the cadets could hold out against him in training battle longer than this time.

On April 15, Russia annually celebrates Electronic Warfare (Electronic Warfare) Specialist Day. Like many other military holidays Russian Federation appeared in the calendar on the basis of presidential decree No. 549 of May 31, 2006 “On the establishment of professional holidays and memorable days in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.”

April 15 was chosen as the date for celebrating Electronic Warfare Specialist Day in connection with the events that took place 112 years ago. On this day back in 1904, the Japanese battleships Kassuga and Nissin attempted to shell the forts and the internal roadstead of the Port Arthur fortress. At the same time, there was a continuous telegraph exchange between the Japanese ships.

Japanese armored cruiser "Nisshin"

Russian forces at the Zolotaya Gora station and the battleship Pobeda carried out effective counteraction to Japanese telegraph exchange.

Telegraphy was disrupted by the so-called “big spark.” This is the name of a signal that surpasses and at the same time suppresses the enemy’s frequency signal in its power. Subsequently, the Japanese themselves admitted that the Russian interference did not allow them to exchange information over the radio channel they were using with the required efficiency.

It is noteworthy that about a year before this event, the outstanding Russian engineer, inventor of radio, Alexander Popov, described theses on the high probability of conducting radio reconnaissance and causing interference to disrupt enemy radio traffic. According to his version, which was later confirmed, a more powerful signal at the enemy frequency (or very close to it) is capable of minimizing the effectiveness of radio traffic. And if initially not everyone in the military command understood the productivity of this kind of counteraction to the enemy, then the mentioned events in Port Arthur in April 1904 demonstrated the real significance of “frequency battles” and the rightness of A.S. Popov.

One of the areas of activity of military specialists in “frequency battles” was the area related to the interception of enemy telegrams. The tasks of the commanders of groups working to intercept information included determining, as they would now say, the enemy’s call signs with the possibility of using these call signs for their own purposes, including the purpose of disorienting the enemy on the radio.

Many years have passed since then, and electronic warfare systems have significantly transformed, adding several orders of magnitude in functionality, however, many of the tasks that were posed to specialists of the prototype electronic warfare then remain quite relevant today.

Constant training of electronic warfare specialists allows them to improve their skills in using electronic countermeasures against a mock enemy. During recent exercises, military personnel practiced their skills in using electronic warfare systems of several models. These are “Krasukha-4S”, “Leer-3”, “Murmansk”, “Moscow”. With the help of these complexes, they not only provide electronic cover for their troops, for example, from attacks from controlled air bombs and missiles, but also suppress enemy command and control systems.

The Murmansk-BN complexes are used to intercept enemy signals and suppress them in the shortwave range. For example, reconnaissance aircraft operate in this range. In March last year, these complexes were successfully used for the first time in the Northern Russian Federation. During training maneuvers, “Murmansk-BN” was used to disrupt the command and control of a mock enemy at a distance of over 2 thousand km. The maximum range of action of this complex is 5 thousand km with the ability to simultaneously suppress more than 20 targets.

The use of the Krasukha-4S complex makes it possible to cover command posts, troop groups, air defense systems, and important industrial and administrative facilities. The complex is capable of responding based on analysis of the enemy signal radar station interference radiation.

The number of annual trainings of electronic warfare troops in “field” conditions amounts to hundreds, which seemed impossible just 10-15 years ago.

"Military Review" congratulates the electronic warfare specialists of the RF Armed Forces on the holiday!