Military air defense of the Red Army. Air defense of Leningrad during the Great Patriotic War The number of people in anti-aircraft crews

Reorganization of the country's air defense structure in 1941-1942.

Under the conditions of a general retreat, it was necessary to repeatedly regroup the forces and means of air defense to protect new objects of the country that were within the reach of enemy aircraft.

The first period of the war - 1941 (June-December)

With the outbreak of war, the Southwestern and Southern fronts were formed.

By the directive of July 23, 1941, the air defense zones were temporarily curtailed: Northern, North-Western, Kiev and Southern. The commanders of these air defense zones were appointed to the positions of air defense chiefs of the troops of the fronts or their deputies. The headquarters of the air defense zones were temporarily merged into the air defense departments of the fronts.

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE.
RESOLUTION No. GKO-233ss
dated July 22, 1941

To organize air defense of the most important industrial and economic facilities and points of the USSR, it is urgent to cover:

9. Power plants:

a) Zuevka - one division consisting of 4 76-mm guns and 8 MZA guns, (ZuGRES, Donbass);
b) Shterovka - one division consisting of 4 76-mm guns and 8 MZA guns, (near Kharkov).

10. Industrial centers of the Donbass region:

a) Lugansk;
b) Makeevka;
c) Stalino.

Cover each point with one division of 12 76-mm guns and 4 MZA guns.

234 ozad - ZuGRES 4 guns 76-mm and 8 guns MZA (as of September 30, 1941, 1 gun 76-mm mod. 1915).
235 ozad - ShterGRES 4 guns 76 mm and 8 guns MZA (as of 09/30/41, 4 guns 76 mm mod. 1915).
80 ozad - Lugansk. The division was formed in Lugansk on August 2, 1941, from October 27, 1941 it was redeployed to the Lozhka junction under the control of the Stalingrad air defense divisional area. As of 09/30/41, 8 - 37 mm MZA.

Significant forces and means of the country's air defense were attracted to cover Kyiv and the troops of the Southwestern Front defending it from air strikes, as well as crossings across the Dnieper: more than 300 anti-aircraft artillery pieces, 110 fighter planes, more than 120 anti-aircraft machine guns, 81 barrage balloons and about 300 VNOS posts.

On November 9, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) decided to introduce the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Air Defense (he is also the commander of the country's Air Defense Forces).

To ensure the centralized control of these forces, the Kiev air defense region was created, under whose command the 3rd air defense division, the 36th fighter aviation division and units of military anti-aircraft artillery, allocated for the defense of Kiev, were subordinate. Major General of Artillery V.G. Pozdnyakov, who was also the commander of the 3rd Air Defense Division, was appointed commander of the air defense area.

Air defense formations and units that were part of the Kiev, Kharkov and Southern air defense zones, together with the troops of the fronts, retreated in three directions to Voronezh, to the region of Rostov-on-Don, Stalingrad and Crimea.

On November 9, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) decided to introduce the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Air Defense (he is also the commander of the country's Air Defense Forces). Under him, a headquarters was created, the heads of the branches of the air defense troops and services were appointed. All formations and units of the country's air defense were subordinate to the commander of the country's air defense forces, except for the air defense forces and means that covered Leningrad.

The retreating air defense brigade areas are disbanded, change their name to a new location, or turn to recruit new air defense formations.

Instead of the air defense zones that existed in the European part of the USSR, air defense corps areas and new divisional air defense areas were created:

• Voronezh-Borisoglebsky (20.11.41)
• Grozny (24.11.41)
• Krasnodar (09.12.41)
• Stalingrad (26.04.42)

The formations and units of fighter aircraft intended for the country's air defense were operationally subordinate to the commander of the country's Air Defense Forces, and on the ground - to the commander of the corresponding air defense areas.

In accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Defense dated January 22, 1942, all fighter aircraft allocated for air defense purposes became part of the Air Defense Forces. To ensure the combat operations of fighter aviation, 56 airfield service battalions were allocated. In organizational terms, this meant the creation of a new independent branch of the armed forces - air defense fighter aircraft.

Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 056
on changes in the subordination and provision of corps, divisions
and individual regiments of air defense fighter aircraft of the country's territory

1. Corps, divisions and separate regiments of fighter aviation allocated for the air defense of the country's territory, completely subordinate to the commander of the air defense forces of the country's territory.

2. For the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force and the military councils of the districts to leave the obligation to provide these units with all types of allowances and technical supplies.

3. To the commander of the Red Army Air Force, allocate 56 airfield service battalions to provide air defense fighter aviation units and subordinate them to the commanders of the corresponding aviation corps, divisions and individual regiments.

4. Introduce in addition to the Directorate of Air Defense Fighter Aviation of the territory of the country the post of chief of staff, logistics and personnel departments and a transport aviation detachment.

At the beginning of 1942, new formations of the Air Defense Forces of the country were created; additionally, the Ural and Rostov air defense divisional regions were deployed. The Stalingrad divisional area was transformed into an air defense corps area.

Air defense troops in the summer and autumn of 1942

May 1942 - Beg. of the Air Defense Command of the South-Western Front, Major-General of Artillery Dzivin R. A., military commissar of the UPVO of the South-Western Front, battalion commissar Bednov P. I.

In the summer and autumn of 1942, the main enemy grouping was deployed on the southern wing, where there were 97 divisions (900 thousand people, 1.2 thousand tanks and assault guns, more than 17 thousand guns and mortars), supported by 1640 combat aircraft. These enemy forces were opposed by Soviet troops, which had approximately the same number of personnel and tanks, but were significantly inferior to the enemy in aircraft and guns. Thus, the 4th Air Fleet of Nazi Germany, operating in the Stalingrad direction, by July 17 had 1200 aircraft, while the 8th Air Army of the Stalingrad Front and the 102nd Air Defense Fighter Aviation Division had only 539 aircraft.

Enemy aviation concentrated its main efforts on the battlefield to support the offensive of the ground forces in the main directions and to mass operations on the strongholds of the defense of the Soviet troops on the Sevastopol, Voronezh, Rostov, and Stalingrad fronts.

The main task of the Air Defense Forces of the country was to protect the most important administrative, political and economic centers of the USSR from air strikes. Significant forces were brought in to cover front-line communications and front-line rear facilities, as well as areas where strategic reserves were concentrated. To strengthen the air defense on the southern flank in the summer of 1942, the Astrakhan divisional air defense area was created, with the task of defending Astrakhan, the lower reaches of the Volga and the Astrakhan-Upper Baskunchak railway. The anti-aircraft artillery defense of Baku and Krasnovodsk was strengthened.

The technical equipment of the Air Defense Forces of the country has improved due to the entry into service of parts of the Yak-7 fighters, 85-mm anti-aircraft guns and radar stations.

The new offensive of the Nazi troops in the south in the summer of 1942 began with a blow in the Voronezh direction. The advance of the troops was supported by the 4th air fleet, which had about 700-800 aircraft. Before the start of the offensive, enemy aviation conducted intensive reconnaissance in the areas of Gryazi, Voronezh, Liski and Povorino, as well as railway lines in the areas of Marmyzhi-Kastornaya-Voronezh-Gryazi, Kupyansk-Valuiki-Liski-Povorino, Liski-Voronezh.

The air defense of Voronezh, the railway junctions of Povorino, Liski, Valuyki, Kupyansk, Kastornaya, Gryazi and frontline communications was carried out by the troops of the Voronezh-Borisoglebsk air defense region (commander Colonel P. E. Khoroshilov). This air defense area included: the newly formed 3rd air defense division, which defended Voronezh directly; 4th Air Defense Division and separate units covering railway facilities. The 101st Fighter Aviation Division was operationally subordinate to the commander of the air defense area. By the beginning of the offensive of the Nazi troops, these formations included 300 anti-aircraft guns, 3 anti-aircraft armored trains, 150 anti-aircraft machine guns, 50 fighter aircraft and 80 anti-aircraft searchlights.

The direct defense of Voronezh was carried out by the newly formed 3rd Air Defense Division (division commander Colonel N. S. Sitnikov) and the 101st Air Defense Fighter Aviation Division (division commander Colonel N. I. Shvedov).

Medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery was located in two combat sectors: the western one - the head of the sector, the commander of the 254th anti-aircraft artillery regiment, Lieutenant Colonel V. M. Shuyakov, and the eastern one - the head of the sector, the commander of the 183rd anti-aircraft artillery regiment, Major S. Ya. Belavenets.

The 101st Fighter Aviation Division, armed with 47 fighters, repulsed enemy air raids on the outskirts of Voronezh.

Reconnaissance of the air enemy and notification of the air defense forces was carried out by the 4th VNOS regiment, which was part of the divisional area, under the command of Major N. M. Krivitsky. He had an advanced line of observation posts at the turn of Marmyzhi, Gubkino, Korocha at a distance of 125 - 130 km from Voronezh ().

On June 28, 1942, German aviation began an air operation within the boundaries of the Voronezh-Borisoglebsk air defense region. From June 28 to the end of July 1942, units of the 101st Air Division made 2413 sorties and conducted 68 air battles, in which 47 enemy aircraft were shot down. The fire of the anti-aircraft artillery units of the 3rd Air Defense Division during June-July 1942 destroyed 127 aircraft, 46 tanks, more than 20 guns and mortars, and a lot of enemy manpower.

Having met stubborn resistance, the Nazi troops turned south and began to advance along the right bank of the Don. From the second half of July 1942, defensive battles began on the distant approaches to Stalingrad.

By mid-August 1942, the enemy concentrated over 1,400 aircraft, including about 800 bombers, in the Stalingrad direction. The combat operations of the fascist German aviation were in the nature of an air operation.

The air defense of Stalingrad was carried out by the troops of the Stalingrad Air Defense Corps District (commanded by Colonel E. A. Rainin) and the 102nd Fighter Aviation Division operationally subordinate to him (commander Colonel I. I. Krasnoyurchenko, from October 1942 - Colonel I. G. Puntus) . These formations included about 60 fighter aircraft, 566 anti-aircraft guns (440 medium and 126 small caliber), 470 anti-aircraft machine guns, 81 barrage balloons, 165 anti-aircraft searchlights, 50 field guns (76-mm caliber), 220 anti-tank guns.

Organization of air defense of Stalingrad

The air defense system of the city was organized as follows.

The 102nd Fighter Aviation Division had as its main task to ensure the interception and destruction of an air enemy on the distant approaches to the city.

In addition to Stalingrad, the 102nd Fighter Aviation Division covered Astrakhan, railway and water communications within the boundaries of the air defense area, as well as the troops of the Stalingrad Front, escorted bombers, and delivered assault strikes on enemy ground forces. Parts of the 102nd Air Defense Fighter Aviation Division were staffed with young flight personnel and had an insufficient level of combat training. Therefore, in the first battles, the division suffered heavy losses. Already from mid-August 1942, the division began to lead effective fight with an air enemy. In July-December 1942, they destroyed 329 Nazi aircraft.

Anti-aircraft artillery was supposed to provide all-round defense of the city, destroy enemy aircraft on the direct approaches to Stalingrad and above it. To control the fire of anti-aircraft artillery, seven combat sectors were created. Each sector had battle formations one anti-aircraft artillery regiment of medium caliber with the means attached to it. Small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft machine guns were used to cover the most important objects from raids at low altitudes and from a dive. They were located directly at these objects and on the roofs of buildings.

At the end of August, the fascist German command launched an air operation against Stalingrad.

On August 23, 1942, enemy aviation troops launched one of the largest massive raids on Stalingrad. During the day, about 2,000 enemy aircraft sorties were recorded within the boundaries of the Stalingrad air defense corps area.

During the day on August 23, units of the Stalingrad Air Defense Corps, in cooperation with the fighter aircraft of the 8th Air Army, destroyed up to 120 enemy aircraft. Combat operations were carried out by the troops of the Stalingrad Air Defense Corps in close cooperation with military air defense fronts.

However, due to the great superiority of the enemy in forces, it was not possible to protect the city from massive air strikes.

In August 1942, the Astrakhan divisional air defense area was created with the task of protecting Astrakhan from the air, objects located in the lower reaches of the Volga, as well as the Astrakhan-Baskunchak railway. The same decision to improve the defense of Baku and the oil facilities of Absheron provided for the formation of two new anti-aircraft artillery regiments of 100 guns each and one 60-gun regiment.
The air defense fighter aviation regiments were transferred to a three-squadron staff. At the same time, the three-aircraft link was replaced by a link of 4 aircraft, which was divided into two pairs. Three units made up a squadron. Such an organization justified itself throughout the subsequent course of the war. Fighter aviation tactics also changed.

Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0442
on the combat use of army air defense regiments in the armies

For a more successful counteraction to massive enemy air strikes against the combat formations of our troops, for the four armies of the Southwestern Front, two army air defense regiments are attached (12 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 12 heavy machine guns and 8 quadruple 7.62 mm anti-aircraft machine guns each) .

The regiments are subordinate to the deputy chiefs of artillery of the armies for air defense.

The combat mission of army air defense regiments is to cover the most vulnerable airborne groupings and combat formations of ground forces. Regiments should cover ground troops in the areas of active operations of enemy aircraft.

Army air defense regiments should be used in combat, as a rule, massively, having high mobility, they should widely maneuver within the boundaries of armies in order to timely counter enemy aircraft and inflict defeat on it.

Being in the battle formations of their troops, air defense regiments should always also be ready to fire flat fire at ground targets (machine gun companies - to repel enemy infantry attacks and anti-tank batteries - to repel attacks of enemy tanks and manpower).

From July to December 1942, the troops of the Stalingrad Air Defense Corps destroyed over 600 enemy aircraft, which accounted for almost 50% of all aircraft concentrated by the enemy by the beginning of the air operation in the Stalingrad direction.

List of Directorates, military formations and air defense units that took part in the defense of Stalingrad from 07/12/42 to 11/18/42

• Directorate of the Red Banner Stalingrad Air Defense Corps District;
• Anti-aircraft artillery regiments - 73rd Guards, 748, 1077, 1079, 1080, 1082, 1083, 1088, 1078th Air Defense ZAP;
• 43rd searchlight regiment;
• Dep. anti-aircraft artillery divisions - 82, 106, 188, 267, 284, 296, 93rd;
• Dep. anti-aircraft machine gun battalions - 15th, 16th;
• Dep. anti-aircraft machine gun companies - 123, 791st;
• Dep. air defense platoons - 938, 939, 941, 944th;
• 10th separate battalion VNOS and 19th, 70th;
• Separate VNOS platoons - 105, 106th;
• Dep. anti-aircraft armored air defense trains - 72, 122, 126, 132, 137, 141, 142, 136, 181st;
• 63rd separate communications battalion;
• 296th division anti-aircraft artillery division;
• 44th separate battalion VNOS (air surveillance and warning);
• 6th separate division of the balloon barrage;
• Art workshop of the corps district.

Air defense troops in 1943

In the winter campaign of 1942-43, enemy aviation operated most intensively within the boundaries of the Stalingrad and Voronezh-Borisoglebsk air defense regions, which covered communications and other important objects during the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops unfolding near Stalingrad. The main efforts of the fascist German aviation were directed to communications.

In 1943, compared with 1942, the number of fighter planes in the Air Defense Forces of the country increased by 1.6 times, medium-caliber anti-aircraft guns - by 1.4, small-caliber anti-aircraft guns - by 4.7, large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns - by 5.8 times. The growth of the technical equipment of the Air Defense Forces of the country made it possible to create a number of new formations and increase the depth of the air defense system in the European part of the USSR to 1100-1500 km.

During the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, the country's Air Defense Forces covered the combat formations of the troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts, as well as their communications and the most important objects of the rear of these fronts.

A significant role in the fight against German aviation operating in the North Caucasus was played by the troops of the Transcaucasian Air Defense Zone (commanded by Lieutenant General of Artillery P. E. Gudymenko) and the Rostov Air Defense Corps District (commanded by Major General of Artillery N. V. Markov), covering communications and other important objects of the Southern and Transcaucasian fronts.

With the beginning of the offensive of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front, the units of the Transcaucasian Air Defense Zone were regrouped to organize the defense of facilities and communications in the territory liberated from the enemy.

The railway junctions of Bataysk and Rostov, as well as the railway bridge across the Don near Rostov, were subjected to fierce enemy air strikes.

In the summer of 1943, the main military events unfolded in the Kursk region, where the enemy intended to deliver two counter strikes in order to encircle and destroy the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts occupying the Kursk bridgehead.

As part of the German air fleets concentrated in this area there were over 2000 aircraft, including 1200 bombers. This amounted to almost 70% of the fleet of enemy aircraft operating at that time on the Soviet-German front.

The air defense of frontline communications, especially railways, has acquired exceptional importance. Of the 670 bombing raids carried out by the Nazi Air Force in July 1943, 469 (69%) were on major railway stations, bridges and trains en route. The main efforts were focused on the defense of railway junctions.

The forces of the Voronezh-Borisoglebsk air defense divisional area (commanded by Major General of Artillery N.K. Vasilkov) and the 101st Air Defense Fighter Aviation Division (commanded by Colonel A.T. Kostenko) ensured the defense of the most important communications facilities directly on the Kursk salient. A large role was assigned to anti-aircraft armored trains, which were used to independently cover railway stations and bridges, cover objects during the regrouping of anti-aircraft artillery, and escort echelons along the way.

The enemy air operation began on March 1 and lasted until July 4, 1943. At the beginning of the operation, Nazi aviation carried out systematic raids by small groups of aircraft, bombarding large railway junctions and bridges on the railway lines: Uzlovaya-Yelets-Kastornaya-Valuiki-Kupyansk; Ryazhsk-Michurinsk-Gryazi-Liski-Millerovo and on the highways extending from them to the front line: Gryazi-Yelets-Verkhovye; Voronezh-Kastornaya-Kursk-Lgov; Liski-Valuiki-Kupyansk. The Voronezh-Kastornaya-Kursk highway was subjected to especially active influence. Having not achieved significant results, the enemy began to undertake massive layered raids from mid-April. During April-June 1943, 10,283 enemy aircraft sorties were noted, which accounted for 30.3% of the total number of enemy aircraft sorties for the specified period within the operational boundaries of all associations and formations of the country's Air Defense Forces. The Kursk railway junction was subjected to the most severe blows. Only in two massive raids (June 2 and 3) about 900 enemy aircraft participated in this object.

To counter the offensive of our army, the enemy sharply increased the intensity of air strikes against front-line communications. Of the 896 bombing raids by fascist German aviation in July-September 1943, 867 were undertaken against railway installations and river crossings.

By the autumn of 1943, having defeated the Nazi armies near Kursk, in the Left-Bank Ukraine and in the Donbass, Soviet troops crossed the Dnieper and captured operational bridgeheads in the Kiev region, southeast of Kremenchug and in the Dnepropetrovsk region.

The uninterrupted operation of crossings across the Dnieper was one of the conditions that allowed our troops to successfully develop offensive operations in Right-Bank Ukraine. Crossings in the areas of Kyiv, Perevolochnaya, Ulyanivka, Sukhachevka and Kushugumovka were of particular importance. These crossings were covered by the troops of the Kyiv (11/17/43) and Donbass (10/5/43) corps and Kharkov (1.3.43) air defense divisional areas.

At least one anti-aircraft artillery regiment was allocated to cover each crossing area. The largest grouping of the country's Air Defense Forces was focused on protecting the crossings in the Kiev area: 150 fighter aircraft, over 350 anti-aircraft guns, 72 anti-aircraft machine guns and other means of the Kyiv air defense corps area. In addition, the 9th chemical brigade of the 1st Ukrainian Front was operationally subordinate to him, which ensured that the crossings were masked with smoke during enemy air raids.

The order of the commander of the troops of the Belorussian Front dated November 31, 1943 stated:

“Parts of the Kursk Air Defense Corps (06.10.43, renamed from the Voronezh Corps. Air Defense District) of Major General of Artillery Vasilkov N. K. together with the attached 9th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Corps of General S. G. Korol during April -November 1943 acted to cover the communications of the front. During this entire 8-month period, units of the indicated air defense area successfully coped with the assigned combat mission. Enemy air raids were skillfully repulsed by anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aviation, with heavy losses for the enemy. This was the case in May-June when massive enemy air raids on Kursk were repulsed. In the same way, all raids on railway bridges and the stations of Kastornaya, Kshen, Cheremisovo, Shchigry and others were repulsed, always with a great defeat for enemy aircraft. This ensured the uninterrupted supply of front troops with everything necessary for combat and life.
The beginning of a successful offensive by the troops of the front required their increased supply. Hundreds of trains went to the front. They safely arrived at the front thanks to the skillful maneuvering of air defense systems and their successful operation.

Air Defense Forces in 1944-45

By the beginning of January 1944, the largest grouping of forces and means of the country's Air Defense Forces in the frontline zone was created in the South-Western direction, where the main blow was delivered. In the offensive zones of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts and the Separate Primorsky Army, there were four air defense corps areas (Kursk, Donbass, Kiev, Kharkov air defense corps areas) and two fighter aviation corps (9, 10th Iak).

These formations included more than 50% of the anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft that were part of the front-line air defense formations.

For the timely organization of the defense of facilities on the territory liberated from the enemy and to improve the control of the forces and means of the country's Air Defense Forces in the South-Western direction in the second half of January 1944, two new air defense corps districts were formed as part of the Western Air Defense Front - Odessa and Lvov.

In the Crimean operation, the air defense of the crossings across the Kerch Strait and the Sivash, as well as the areas of concentration of our strike groups, played an important role.

During the strategic offensive of the Soviet Army in the winter of 1944, the main blow was delivered in the South-Western theater of operations. The fascist German command concentrated the bulk of its aviation operating on the Soviet-German front against the advancing Ukrainian fronts - 1200-1450 aircraft, 53-56% of all combat aircraft with the main task of counteracting the offensive of the Soviet troops. Air strikes on our communications were considered by the Nazi command as one of the main tasks. To this end, in January-April 1944, the German Air Force conducted an air operation against front-line communications in the South-West direction.

Massive raids were carried out on the most important railway junctions: Darnitsa, Kazatin, Fastov, Zaporozhye, Sarny, Shepetovka, Rovno and Znamenka. Important railway bridges were also subjected to massive air strikes.

The air defense of communications in the South-West direction in the winter campaign of 1944 was carried out by the troops of the Kyiv, Kursk, Kharkov, Donbass, Lvov and Odessa air defense regions. Over 2,000 anti-aircraft guns, about 450 fighter planes, 1,650 anti-aircraft machine guns and 300 anti-aircraft searchlights were concentrated to cover the railway facilities in the south, which accounted for over 50% of all the forces and means of the country's Air Defense Forces operating in the front line. These forces, first of all, covered the most important railway junctions and bridges, and on the main highways - all stations.

During the winter campaign, the troops of the Kiev (commanded by Major General of Artillery N. K. Vasilkov) and Lvov (commanded by Major General of Artillery I. S. Smirnov) air defense corps regions defended the most important railway lines of Ukraine. Within the boundaries of these formations, enemy aircraft carried out intensive reconnaissance and bombardment. Only within the boundaries of the Kyiv air defense corps area during January - May, about 2300 German aircraft sorties were noted.

The troops of the Kyiv air defense corps area defended 14 railway junctions, 18 bridges, 3 crossings, 10 railway stations and 3 long-range aviation airfields. 10 railway junctions, which were of particular importance, were each covered by three or four divisions of medium and small caliber anti-aircraft artillery, one or two anti-aircraft machine-gun companies, and one anti-aircraft searchlight company. The rest of the objects were usually defended by one battery of small-caliber artillery and one or two platoons of anti-aircraft machine guns.
In the Lvov air defense corps area, over 50% of all anti-aircraft forces and assets and 60% of fighter aircraft were concentrated to cover the 8 most important objects out of 35 defended.

Air cover was provided by the duty of fighter forces at airfields in the Kursk, Belopolye, Nizhyn, and Kyiv regions. In addition, mobile anti-aircraft artillery groups escorted trains and several maneuverable anti-aircraft machine-gun units operated along the railway lines.

To strengthen the defense of objects in the Kiev direction, four anti-aircraft artillery regiments, six separate anti-aircraft artillery battalions and ten separate units with a total of about 600 guns and over 100 anti-aircraft machine guns were transferred from the Eastern Air Defense Front to the Western Air Defense Front.

Anti-aircraft armored trains played a large role in organizing the cover of important communication facilities during the winter campaign of 1944.
To direct fighters at air targets in the southern part of the Left-Bank Ukraine and Donbass, radio stations were deployed in the areas of Lozovaya, Dnepropetrovsk, Chaplino, Zaporozhye, Melitopol, Pologi, Krasnoarmeysk. A continuous radar detection and guidance field was created in a vast area.

The air surveillance system was strengthened.

In mid-March 1944, VNOS battalions were deployed in the areas of Proskurov, Rovno, Zhitomir, Vinnitsa, Pervomaisk, and Nikolaev. VNOS battalions, intended for deployment in Kovel, Ternopil, Odessa and Simferopol, were also pulled up to their areas. Priority attention was paid to the organization of alerting fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons that covered the most important railway facilities. As a rule, the company, battalion and main posts of the VNOS had direct communications with the fighter aviation and anti-aircraft artillery units that defended these objects.

Large forces and means of the Air Defense Forces of the country were involved in covering the areas of formation and deployment of strategic reserves from air strikes. For example, for the defense of the deployment points of the Dnieper military flotilla in March 1944, 620 anti-aircraft artillery guns and 340 anti-aircraft machine guns of the Western Air Defense Front were concentrated in the Kyiv-Zaporozhye sector. More than 200 anti-aircraft guns and 150 anti-aircraft machine guns of this air defense front in February - March provided cover for the points of concentration and unloading of troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Zhitomir-Berdichev-Kazatin areas.

In order to improve the management of the forces and means of the country's Air Defense Forces, by decision State Committee Defenses of March 29, 1944. The Western and Eastern fronts, as well as the Transcaucasian air defense zone, were reorganized. Three air defense fronts were created on their basis: Northern, Southern and Transcaucasian.

ORDER ON STRENGTHENING THE AIR DEFENSE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT RAILWAY BRIDGES,
NODES AND STATIONS OF THE FRONT STRIP

In order to strengthen the air defense of the most important railway bridges, junctions and stations of the front line of the Southern and left flank of the Northern air defense fronts, I order:

1. By 20.6.44, form four anti-aircraft artillery regiments according to staff No. 050/74, consisting of 60 40-mm guns each.
2. By 20.6.44, in anti-aircraft batteries of small-caliber artillery, covering the most important railway bridges, junctions and stations, introduce an additional two 40-mm guns.
MZA battery platoons have a three-gun composition, in connection with which to make the necessary changes to the states Nos. 050/119, 050/38, 050/39 and 050/40.
3. By 06/15/44, form 56 batteries of gun-guided stations (SON-2) according to staff No. 050/135, each numbering 41 people.
4. To the commander of the artillery of the Red Army on 25.6.44 report to me for approval the plan for the use of the formed anti-aircraft units.
5. To the head of the Main Department of the Red Army, for staffing the units being formed and servicing the guns additionally introduced in the batteries of the MZA, by 10.6.44, to load at the disposal of the commander of the artillery of the Red Army 13425 privates and sergeants fit for military service.
6. To the head of the rear of the Red Army, for the same purpose, allocate 700 trucks to the commander of the artillery of the spacecraft for the same purpose until 1.7.44.

People's Commissar of Defense
Marshal Soviet Union I. STALIN

F. 4, op. 11, d. 77, l. 432-433. Script.

In July 1944, the front-line formations of the air defense forces repelled a number of massive air raids on railway junctions. In the following months, until the end of 1944, flights of only single reconnaissance aircraft were noted within the boundaries of air defense formations.

To strengthen the defense of railway junctions and other important facilities in the zone of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts in May-June 1944, two fighter aviation divisions and more than forty anti-aircraft artillery units were advanced from the rear areas of the Southern Air Defense Front.

By the end of 1944, all medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery regiments received gun-guided radar stations, and searchlight units received radio searchlight stations. The composition of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery batteries was increased from 4 to 6 guns. The staff of all fighter aviation regiments included radar detection and guidance stations, the staffing of units by January 1, 1945 was 75%.

In December 1944, on the basis of the Northern and Southern Air Defense Fronts, three fronts were formed - the Western, Southwestern and Central Air Defense Fronts. The last of them was intended for the defense of deep rear facilities. The commanders of the air defense fronts were appointed: Western - Colonel General of Artillery D. A. Zhuravlev, Central - Colonel General M. S. Gromadin, Southwestern - Colonel General of Artillery G. S. Zashikhin.

The disaggregation of the air defense fronts was intended to increase the efficiency of command and control of the air defense forces in the context of the general strategic offensive of the Soviet Army and to ensure close interaction between the front-line air defense formations and the fronts of the ground forces. After this reorganization, four air defense fronts became part of the country's Air Defense Forces, which covered the most important strategic air directions.

The main efforts of the front-line formations of the country's Air Defense Forces in the 1945 campaign were directed to cover railway and water communications and other important facilities in the front line.

Sources

1. Anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft missile troops of the air defense, Part One. Moscow - 1982
2. Lists of formations, units and institutions of the Soviet Army with the terms of their entry into the army. List No. 11
3. Svetlishin N. A. Air defense forces of the country in the Great Patriotic War. - M: Science, 1979
4. International Military Forum (International Military Forum)
5. Air defense forces of the country. - M.: Military publishing house, 1968.

And today they rightfully remain at the forefront of the defense of the Fatherland

Every year on the second Sunday of April, the whole country, its Armed Forces, veterans military service celebrate the Day of the Air Defense Forces. This holiday was established by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 20, 1975 in honor of the great merits of the Air Defense Forces in the Great Patriotic War and the fulfillment by them of special important tasks in peacetime.

Domestic air defense has a long and very difficult history. Its beginning can be considered the decision taken by the military command of Russia in December 1914 to deploy anti-aircraft (then called air) defense of the capital - St. Petersburg and the imperial residence in Tsarskoye Selo. In subsequent years, the air defense of Odessa and a number of other cities was created.

At the same time, even then the basic principles of such defense were formulated, which are still relevant today: the integrated use various means, including ground (anti-aircraft) and air (aviation); concentration of the main forces on the defense of the most important objects; circular construction of the defense of objects with its strengthening in the most dangerous directions; the creation of a reconnaissance system in the form of a network of observation points (on the defense of St. Petersburg and Odessa, these points were combined into a "radio-telegraphic air defense").

The beginning of the creation of air defense in the USSR should be considered 1924-1925, when, under the leadership of M.V. Frunze, a military reform began to be carried out in the country. In the course of the reform, a strategically completely correct understanding of the vast prospects for military aviation and the scale of its threat in future wars was developed. And most importantly, it was recognized as important and necessary to organize an active fight against enemy military aircraft.

For this, it was proposed, on the basis of anti-aircraft (anti-aircraft) weapons, to create special forces air defense (from August 1924 the term "air defense" began to be used). These troops were to be used in cooperation with the Air Force fighter aircraft.

Here we should pay attention to one more important aspect: already in those years, the authors of the military reform understood that the rapidly developing military aviation would sharply increase the depth of the zone of armed struggle, cover not only the front, but also the rear of the country; accordingly, the air defense troops must solve the tasks of repelling air strikes both on the active troops and on objects and communications in the rear. Thus, for the first time, the need for the creation and development of military air defense and air defense of the country was declared.

After sudden death MV Frunze, the military reform was essentially curtailed. The development and comprehension of conceptual provisions in the field of building air defense was not completed either. At the same time, part of the developments was put into practice.

In 1925, the Red Army Headquarters developed proposals for organizing the air defense of the USSR and creating bodies to manage it in the center and in the field. In the same year, the directive of the Headquarters of the Red Army announced that the Headquarters of the Red Army was starting to organize the country's air defense. The directive formulated the tasks of the country's air defense in peacetime and wartime, their difference from the tasks in the front line.

With the radar of the P-35/37 family, the creation of the country's radar field began
Photo: Alexey MATVEEV

In 1927, a department was created at the Headquarters of the Red Army, which in 1930 was transformed into the 6th Air Defense Directorate of the Headquarters of the Red Army. Given the ever-increasing importance of air defense, in May 1932 the 6th Directorate was reorganized into the Air Defense Directorate of the Red Army, directly subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense. At the same time, despite the official division of air defense into military air defense and air defense of the country, all air defense forces on the ground were subordinate to the commanders of the military districts.

The basis of the air defense forces were formations and units of anti-aircraft artillery. They also included units and subunits of anti-aircraft machine guns, anti-aircraft searchlights, air barrage balloons, air surveillance, warning and communications troops (VNOS). Fighter aircraft of the Air Forces of the military districts were not included in the Air Defense Forces and were involved in the fight against an air enemy on the basis of interaction.

From the beginning of the 1930s the process of a significant build-up of air defense forces and assets in the border military districts began. In 1932, the first anti-aircraft artillery divisions were formed. In 1937, for the defense of Moscow, Leningrad and Baku, air defense corps were formed, and for the defense of other large cities (Kyiv, Minsk, Odessa, Batumi, etc.) - divisions and separate air defense brigades.

In February 1941, 4 months before the start of the war, the entire border area of ​​the country was divided into air defense zones, the boundaries of responsibility of which were combined with the boundaries of military districts. In total, 13 air defense zones of the country's territory (air defense of the CU) were created. In 9 air defense zones of the CU with large spatial dimensions, brigade areas of the air defense of the CU were created. There were 36 such districts. In a number of air defense districts, air defense points were allocated - separate objects covered by units and subunits of anti-aircraft artillery.

The commanders of the air defense zones of the CU were the assistants to the commanders of the troops of the military districts. The exceptions were the Central (Moscow) and Northern (Leningrad) zones of the air defense of the CU, where the commanders of the 1st and 2nd air defense corps, respectively, were appointed commanders. The commanders of the air defense zones found themselves in dual subordination - the military districts and the Main Air Defense Directorate of the Red Army (the latter was formed in 1940 on the basis of the Air Defense Directorate of the Red Army). Practice has shown that such dual command is ineffective.

In the last pre-war years, the air defense forces were intensively equipped with new weapons and equipment. The anti-aircraft artillery unit began to receive 37-mm automatic and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, artillery anti-aircraft fire control devices - PUAZO-2 and PUAZO-3. Since 1939, the VNOS service began to receive the first domestic detection radars RUS-1 and RUS-2.

The industry mass-produced searchlights, sound collectors and air barrage balloons. From 1940, the Yak-1 and MiG-3 fighters began to enter service with fighter aviation, and from 1941 - LaGG-3.

However, there was not enough time for sufficient rearmament of the air defense forces.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, shortcomings in the organization of the country's air defense were sharply revealed, when all air defense forces were subordinated to the fronts. Already in the first months of the war, the five main air defense zones of the TS - Northern, North-Western, Western, Kiev and Southern, which, according to the plan of the military leadership, constituted the first echelon of air defense, actually ceased to exist.

Bolshoe Savino airfield (Perm). Fighter-interceptor MiG-31
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

German aviation, bypassing scattered groups of anti-aircraft artillery, penetrated 500-600 kilometers into the interior of the country with virtually impunity and bombarded defenseless industrial and communication facilities.

In this regard, the General Staff of the Red Army even issued a special directive dated July 9, 1941, which ordered "to release the commanders of the air defense zones - assistant commanders of the front troops in air defense from the direct leadership of the air defense of the troops of the fronts and turn them to direct duties in the air defense zones."

The directive could not change the state of affairs, since it did not change anything in the air defense organization itself. And only after the devastating German air raids on defense facilities in the city of Voronezh far beyond the front line in August 1941 did I. V. Stalin intervene in air defense.

As a result, on November 9, 1941, the Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 874 “On strengthening and strengthening the air defense of the country's territory” was issued. In this document, modest in name, for the first time, a fundamentally new organization of the air defense of the CU and its structure are outlined.

The pre-war organization of the country's air defense, subordinate to the military districts (fronts), was completely rejected. The air defense forces of the country were withdrawn from their subordination and for the first time transformed into an independent branch of the Red Army, subordinate to the people's commissar of defense and headed by the commander of the air defense forces of the Customs Union - deputy people's commissar of defense for air defense. Major General M. S. Gromadin was appointed the first commander of the Air Defense Forces of the Customs Union.

Somewhat later, the TS was transferred from the Air Force to operational subordination to the Air Defense Forces, and in January 1942, 39 fighter aviation regiments were introduced into the state, more than 1,500 aircraft in total. Now, along with the tasks of defending individual objects, the air defense forces of the CU could solve the tasks of covering the country's regions. The operational construction of a new air defense system of the TS was not tied to the borders of the fronts and military districts, but was determined by the location of the covered objects and communications.

The Moscow air defense system has become a classic example of organizing an effective air defense of a large administrative and industrial center. It included the 1st Air Defense Corps (commander - Major General of Artillery D. A. Zhuravlev) and the 6th Fighter Aviation Corps operationally subordinate to him (commander - Colonel I. D. Klimov).

By the beginning of the massive air raids on Moscow (July 22, 1941), this grouping included more than 600 fighters and 1000 anti-aircraft guns, about 350 anti-aircraft machine guns, over 600 anti-aircraft searchlights, 124 posts of air barrage balloons, 612 VNOS posts. The Moscow air defense system was built on the principle of all-round defense, its depth was 200–250 kilometers.

During the war years, the German Luftwaffe carried out 141 raids on Moscow, a total of about 8,600 sorties. According to official data, 234 aircraft (less than 3%) broke through to the city, almost 1,400 aircraft were shot down. These successes are largely due to the massive use of air defense forces and means and the effective organization of defense: no other capital, including London and Berlin, had such a concentration of air defense forces during World War II.

Unfortunately, the history of Russian air defense knows less brilliant examples. So, in the course of three massive German air raids on the automobile plant. Molotov in the city of Gorky in June 1943, the plant suffered enormous damage, despite the very strong grouping of the Gorky air defense divisional area. The most important defense enterprise was actually put out of action, and it took more than three months and almost 35,000 workers to restore it.

Later in the course of the war, the Air Defense Forces of the Customs Union underwent organizational changes, which were objectively dictated by an increase in their combat strength and changes at the front. In April 1942, the Moscow Air Defense Front was formed, and air defense armies were formed in Leningrad and somewhat later in Baku. Thus, the first operational formations of air defense forces appeared. The transition of the Red Army to broad offensive operations significantly changed the nature of the combat use of the air defense forces. In June 1943, the Office of the Commander of the Air Defense Forces of the Customs Union was abolished, and two air defense fronts were created instead: Western and Eastern. The air defense troops on the cover of Moscow were reorganized into the Special Moscow Air Defense Army.

On-load tap-changer S-300PM and NVO at one of the sites of the Ashuluk test site
Photo: Georgy DANILOV

By the end of the war, all formations that carried out air defense in the rear of the country were consolidated into the Central Air Defense Front with headquarters in Moscow. Forward formations and units of the air defense forces formed the Western and Southwestern air defense fronts. On Far East in March 1945, on the eve of the start of hostilities against Japan, three air defense armies were created: Primorskaya, Amur and Transbaikal, which became part of the fronts.

In general, during the Great Patriotic War, the Air Defense Forces solved a number of the most important operational-strategic and operational tasks, saved many large administrative and industrial centers, hundreds of industrial enterprises and groupings of troops from destruction and destruction. Organizationally, anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft took shape as branches of the air defense forces. The VNOS Service has been greatly developed. Operational formations and operational-tactical air defense formations, formations and units of military branches were created. For merits in the performance of military duty, over 80 thousand soldiers and officers of the air defense forces were awarded orders and medals, 92 soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

With the end of World War II, humanity, alas, did not receive peace and tranquility. Former allies in anti-Hitler coalition once again found themselves on opposite sides of the barricades. A long-term political and military confrontation between the two world systems began, called cold war. Many associate its beginning with the famous speech of W. Churchill on March 5, 1946 in the American city of Fulton (Missouri).

Then the British Prime Minister for the first time voiced the term "Iron Curtain", which divided Europe, and called for relations with the USSR to be built exclusively from a position of strength. At the same time, the United States already possessed nuclear weapons and their means of delivery - strategic aviation, which created a real air threat not only to the groupings of the Soviet Armed Forces, but also to the economic potential of the country, including the strategic rear.

In this regard, despite the general reduction in the Armed Forces and the most difficult post-war economic situation in the country, the Supreme Military Council in July 1946 takes a strategic decision to deploy air defense of the TS throughout the country, even where it was not in the war. Somewhat earlier, in February 1946, the post of Commander of the Air Defense Forces of the Customs Union was re-introduced, who now reported directly to the Commander of Artillery. The command of the Air Defense Forces of the Customs Union was instructed to develop a plan for strengthening air defense in the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia, as well as its creation in Central Asia.

In terms of organizing the country's air defense, the ambitions of the branches of the Armed Forces again escalated: the air defense forces proposed to increase the number of air defense districts and create the country's air defense by analogy with the military air defense of the vehicle, the Ground Forces proposed to return to the pre-war organization, dividing the country's air defense forces into military districts, the Air Force proposed include air defense forces in their composition.

In 1948, an "intermediate option" was adopted: the country's territory was divided into a border strip and an inland territory; in the border zone, responsibility for air defense was assigned to the military districts, in the interior - to the air defense forces of the country, in which instead of the four air defense districts that existed in the first post-war years, 12 air defense districts were created.

On April 4, 1949, a military-political union of 11 states of Europe and the USA was created - the NATO bloc (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). With the creation of this structure, the general political and military tension in Europe and in the world as a whole, as well as the intensity and scale of provocative and reconnaissance flights by NATO aircraft in the airspace of the USSR, increased.

At the same time, the reorganized air defense system of the vehicle proved unable to effectively counter air intruders, which had already reached the regions of Leningrad, Minsk, and Kyiv.

A whole series of organizational transformations of the air defense troops of the Customs Union began. In an attempt to introduce an organized principle into the fragmentation of the air defense system, so-called border air defense zones (BCAA) were formed in the border districts and in the fleets. The organization and leadership of the Air Defense Forces were still assigned to the military districts and fleets. Not getting the expected result military leadership on the basis of the PPVO, it created the "air defense of the border line" (BOPL).

At the same time, the leadership of the VOPL was transferred to the commander-in-chief of the Air Force (the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Air Force was also the commander of the VOPL troops). The direct responsibility for air defense in the VOPL areas (that is, in the military districts) was shifted from the commanders of the military districts to the commanders of the air armies of the Air Force.

However, the remaining fragmentation of the air defense essentially did not change anything. Violations of air borders continued to increase, and the depth of incursions by foreign aircraft reached the Moscow region.

It soon became clear that the VOPL, headed by the Air Force, was an unnecessary and essentially useless structure. Therefore, in June 1953, the VOPL command under the Air Force Commander-in-Chief was disbanded. One part of the VOPL forces was transferred to the military districts and fleets, the other to the air defense troops of the Customs Union. At the same time, overall responsibility for the entire air defense of the country, including within the boundaries of military districts, was assigned to the commander of the air defense forces of the Customs Union.

Such a unification of all the air defense forces of the CU was of a very conditional nature, since in the border areas the forces and means were still part of the military districts and fleets. The interaction between them was weak. This was soon confirmed. On April 29, 1954, three American B-47 strategic bombers violated the state border from the Baltic Sea, penetrated as far as Novgorod, Smolensk and Kyiv, and went west with impunity. 10 days later, on the eve of Victory Day, a new daring violation of the border followed.

These outrageous pre-holiday incidents did not go unnoticed by the country's top political leadership. In the course of an urgent inspection, serious shortcomings in the organization of the entire air defense of the country were revealed, which were based on the fragmentation of the air defense forces.

On May 27, 1954, a special resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On unpunished flights of foreign aircraft over the territory of the USSR” was issued. The same resolution announced a new organization of air defense of the vehicle. Taking into account the rapid development of military aviation, a significant increase in its combat capabilities, as well as the ever-increasing scale of violations of the airspace of the USSR by NATO aircraft, it was considered expedient to deploy the Air Defense Forces of the Customs Union from the armed forces into the form of the Armed Forces - the Air Defense Forces of the country. It included all the main air defense forces and established the boundaries of responsibility along the state border of the country. In the military districts, only parts of the military air defense of land formations remained, and in the fleets - ship assets. In the Air Defense Forces of the country, the generally accepted army military structures created back in 1944 were restored: air defense formations (districts, armies) and air defense formations (corps, divisions). Fighter aviation of the military districts was promptly subordinated to the new structures of the Air Defense Forces of the country.

Simultaneously with the above-mentioned resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On providing the Air Defense Forces of the country with new equipment" was adopted. This decision proved to be very timely, as last years there has been a noticeable lag in the development of air defense weapons from the development of military aviation.

Marshal of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov was appointed the first Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country. However, soon after his death, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.S. Biryuzov became the commander-in-chief. An experienced military leader and a thoughtful organizer, he made a great contribution to the formation and development of a new kind of Armed Forces. It was under him that the foundations of the operational art and tactics of the Air Defense Forces were formed and many of the fundamental principles of the integrated organization of the fight against an air enemy, which are still relevant today, were implemented.

On the initiative of S. S. Biryuzov and under his leadership, military science in the Air Defense Forces was essentially re-created and in 1957 organizationally formalized by combining disparate scientific units of the armed forces into the first in the Armed Forces of the USSR a single integrated research institute of the type of Armed Forces Research Institute -2 air defense (subsequently - the 2nd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, and now - the Air Defense Research Center of the 4th Central Research Institute of the Russian Federation).

In connection with the massive re-equipment of troops with fundamentally new equipment, the need for highly qualified personnel of commanders and military engineers has sharply increased. Therefore, on the initiative of S. S. Biryuzov in the mid-1950s. a number of new higher military air defense educational institutions were created.

Since 1956, the Air Defense Military Academy began training in Kalinin (now Tver). Today it is the Military Academy of Aerospace Defense, which has become a forge of military command and engineering personnel for the Air Defense Forces (VKO) not only of our country, but also of a number of countries near and far abroad.

1950s - truly revolutionary in terms of the development of air defense weapons, the creation of fundamentally new models. It was during this period that the formation of anti-aircraft missile troops, jet fighter aircraft, radio engineering troops.

In August 1950, a decision was made to create an anti-aircraft missile defense Moscow. The project was named Berkut. The lead developer of the system was the specially created Design Bureau No. 1 (KB-1) - the future glorified NPO Almaz, known throughout the world for its anti-aircraft guided systems. missile weapons. A. A. Raspletin became the leader of the development. The air defense system consisted of 10 A-100 all-round radars and two rings around Moscow of stationary sectoral multi-channel air defense systems (56 in total), each consisting of a B-200 guidance radar and V-300 anti-aircraft guided missiles of vertical launch. The air defense system was created in a fantastically short time - less than five years. And this despite the fact that all its elements were developed practically from scratch, and the volume of capital construction was truly enormous. Already in May 1955, the Moscow S-25 air defense system was put into service and served for three decades.

In 1957, the first transportable (that is, non-stationary) S-75 medium-range air defense systems began to enter service with the country's Air Defense Forces. These complexes, like no other, were widely used in real combat operations, including in Vietnam and the Middle East. In Vietnam, in 1972 alone, the last year of the war, 421 American aircraft were destroyed by S-75 systems, including 51 B-52s. Such losses were one of the decisive factors that forced the Americans to withdraw from Vietnam. Upgraded S-75 air defense systems are still in service in a number of countries near and far abroad.

In 1961, the development of the S-125 short-range air defense system was completed, the main specialization of which is the fight against low-altitude targets. For the SAM, the V-600P solid-fuel missile was developed for the first time. The export version of the air defense system ("Pechora") was supplied to 35 countries of the world. The air defense system received its first baptism of fire in 1970 in Egypt. Then there were Syria and Libya. In March 1999, in the skies over Yugoslavia, an American F-117A stealth aircraft was shot down by an S-125 air defense system.

In June 1958, a government decree was adopted on the development of the S-200 long-range air defense system. By January 1960, its draft design was already ready. For the first time in domestic practice, the air defense system implemented the principle of homing missiles at a target. When creating the air defense system, the developers faced a number of technical difficulties, many of which had to be solved during field and state tests. The S-200 air defense system was adopted in February 1967.

Thus, within 10 years, a well-thought-out set of types of anti-aircraft missile weapons was created in the USSR, which made it possible to build effective anti-aircraft missile defense systems for various objects and regions of the country.

The development of fighter aviation proceeded at an impressive pace. The MiG-15 became the first mass domestic jet fighter of the 1st generation. The first air regiments with MiG-15 fighters were formed back in 1949. The debut of the large-scale combat use of these aircraft was the war in the skies of Korea (November 1950 - July 1953), where our MiGs were in no way inferior to the latest American F-86 Saber fighters : in total, Soviet pilots shot down about 1100 enemy aircraft, their losses amounted to 335 fighters.

To replace the 1st generation fighters MiG-15, MiG-17, Yak-25 in the late 1950s - early 1960s. fighters and aviation came missile systems interception of the 2nd generation - Su-9 (1959), Su-11-98 (1961), Su-15-98, Tu-128-S4 and Yak-28 (1965). ARCP Su-15-98 for a long time formed the basis of the fighter aviation of the Air Defense Forces of the country.

In June 1954, the formation of the air defense radio engineering troops was completed. By this time, the domestic industry had mastered the production of a fairly wide range of radar equipment. One of the first mass radars of the post-war period was the P-20 Periscope mobile two-coordinate centimeter-range radar, the P-8 Volga early warning m-range radar (1950) and the PRV-10 Konus radio altimeter.

In 1955–1956 the troops began to receive the P-15 "Tropa" meter range radar for detecting low-altitude targets and the P-12 "Yenisei" radar. The P-12 radar was the first to use the SDC coherent-compensation equipment. This radar gradually replaced almost all previously created meter range radars.

A little later, in 1959, the Oborona-14 mobile early warning radar was put into service, and in 1961, the Altai radar, consisting of four radio altimeters and two range finders. In the same year, the PRV-11 "Vershina" radio altimeter of the centimeter range began to enter the troops. The latest modifications of this radio altimeter are still in service with the RTV of the Russian Air Force and a number of CIS countries.

Gradually for combat control troops began to use automation tools. The first adopted control automation system (ACS) was the warning, control and guidance system for fighter aircraft Vozdukh-1. The command posts of the operational level began to be equipped with a complex of automation equipment (KSA) "Almaz-2".

Under the conditions of the new organizational structure of the country's Air Defense Forces and equipping them with new weapons with sharply increased combat capabilities, the ideology and principles of organizing air defense have changed. It was considered expedient in a number of regions of the country to switch from the object-based to the zonal (zonal-objective) principle of organizing defense. In the border (coastal) areas, anti-aircraft missile defense zones were advanced to the 1st echelon of defense with the creation of anti-aircraft missile defense lanes. Fighter aviation formed the basis of the 2nd echelon, but with the ability, if necessary, to operate in the ZRV zones.

Created in the 1960s. the air defense system was mainly focused on the Western, Southwestern and Southern strategic directions, where the main US and NATO air attack forces were concentrated. In the future, with the growth of the capabilities of US strategic aviation and equipping it with strategic cruise missiles, the North direction became potentially dangerous. In this regard, work began on the organization of air defense in this area (the "Shield" system) on the basis of the long-range interception ARCP.

The organizational structure of the Air Defense Forces of the country itself was changing. By 1960, the operational link was enlarged. Instead of 20 air defense formations and formations, 13 were left: two air defense districts, five air defense armies and six air defense corps, whose areas of responsibility covered the entire country. Soon, changes were made at the operational-tactical and tactical level. Instead of corps and divisions of the military branches, air defense formations (corps, divisions) of mixed composition were created, in which the types of troops (ZRV, IA, RTV) were represented by regimental structures.

The relatively calm and very productive development of the Air Defense Forces of the country under the leadership of Marshal S. S. Biryuzov, and then Marshal P. F. Batitsky ended in 1978. The Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces N. V. Ogarkov put forward the idea of ​​​​creating the so-called Unified Air Defense System of the country and the Armed Forces. The commander-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country, P.F. Batitsky, sharply opposed, but the top political and military leadership (L.I. Brezhnev and D.F. Ustinov) supported N.V. Ogarkov. As a result, Batitsky resigned as commander-in-chief, and in December 1979 a decision was made by the Defense Council, according to which the air defense system essentially returned to the pre-war organization.

The territory of the country was again divided into border and inland regions. In the border areas, the Baku Air Defense District and five separate air defense armies (Minsk, Leningrad, Kyiv, Arkhangelsk, Khabarovsk) were disbanded. The air defense corps and divisions included in them were again subordinated to the military districts. Fighter aviation regiments from these formations were seized and transferred to the Air Force of the military districts. As a result, the unity of command and control of air defense forces and means was disrupted and the unified air defense system of the country actually ceased to exist.

At the end of 1982, after the death of L. I. Brezhnev, P. F. Batitsky managed to draw the attention of the new Secretary General Yu. V. Andropov to the so-called reform of the country's Air Defense Forces. As a result, a commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU was created, which, after two years of work, concluded that the reorganization of N.V. Ogarkov was wrong and "The air defense forces of the country should be returned to their previous state."

The corresponding resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted on January 24, 1986. In the border areas, five former air defense formations were restored, returning them to direct subordination to the commander-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces. Instead of the Baku Air Defense District, a separate air defense army was formed with headquarters in Tbilisi.

At the same time, the dual command over the Air Defense Forces remained: they were operationally subordinate to the commanders-in-chief of the troops of the directions (soon abolished), and in fact - to the military districts.

Despite organizational fluctuations, in the 1970s and 1980s. there was a dynamic process of equipping the Air Defense Forces with new weapons and military equipment.

Since 1979, the Air Defense Forces began to receive fundamentally new S-300P air defense systems (the lead developer was NPO Almaz). At present, modifications of this system (S-300PS, S-300PM) form the basis of the armament of the anti-aircraft missile system. On the basis of this air defense system, the Moscow S-50 air defense system was created, which replaced the previously existing S-25 system.

Fighter aviation continued to develop. In the 1970s the industry has mastered the mass production of 3rd generation fighter-interceptors - MiG-23P and MiG-25PD, and in the early 80s 4th generation fighters - MiG-31 (1981), MiG-29 (1983) and Su-27 (1984).

The MiG-31 long-range fighter was for the first time equipped with a phased array radar and had high capabilities for detecting and destroying cruise missiles. It was considered as the main element of the above-mentioned air defense system in the Northern direction "Shield". Aircraft of the 4th generation currently form the basis of the weapons of the Air Force IA.

The radio engineering troops have almost completely updated their fleet of radar equipment. During the period under review, the RTV received radars and radars ST-68U (UM), Casta 2-1 and Casta 2-2, Periscope-VM, Oborona-14S, P-18, P-37 , "Sky" and "Sky-U", "Desna-M", "Opponent-G", "Gamma-S1", K-66 (M).

EW units and subunits were equipped with new equipment.

Taking into account the high dynamics of the combat operations of the air defense forces, the military leadership paid great attention to the development of means of automation of combat control and equipping the troops with them. At the same time, the process of complex equipment of the KSA of the control points of the operational, operational-tactical and tactical levels of control was underway. The command posts of the operational control level were equipped with Almaz-type KSA. ACS "Luch-1", "Luch-2" were introduced into the operational-tactical level of command. The command posts of formations and units of the military branches were equipped with KSA of the Senezh, Vector-2, Baikal, Rubezh-1, Niva, AKUP-1 types.

In the 1970s the Air Defense Forces of the country included the forces and means of rocket and space defense (RKO). The RKO system combined the missile attack warning system (SPRN), the outer space control system (SKKP), the anti-missile (ABM) and anti-space (PKO) defense systems.

The early warning system officially took up combat duty in 1976 as part of a command post, six early detection nodes (Dnepr radar) and the US-K space echelon. In 1978, the modernized Moscow A-135M missile defense system was adopted as part of the Don-2N radar, a command and computer center and two types of anti-missiles. In November 1978, the PKO IS-M complex was put into service. A few years earlier, a space control center began to function.

The further history of the Air Defense Forces of the country is inextricably linked with the history of the formation and development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Unfortunately, its beginning was far from joyful. Already in 1992, they announced the reform of the Armed Forces.

The reform was carried out in the absence of a coherent military ideology for ensuring the military security of the state as a whole and a clear understanding of the rational image of the RF Armed Forces (“Concept national security Russian Federation” and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation were adopted only at the beginning of 2000).

As a result, the main result of the reform of the Air Defense Forces was a sharp reduction in the combat strength and funding for their maintenance. The troops have practically ceased to receive new weapons, the level of combat training has dropped to a dangerous limit.

In July 1997, a large-scale reorganization of the country's air defense took place. In accordance with the decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the Air Defense Forces were liquidated as a branch of the Armed Forces. The air defense forces from their composition were transferred to the Air Force, and the RKO forces - to the Strategic Missile Forces (later - to the newly formed Space Forces). Among military specialists, disputes about the benefits and harms of these transformations still do not subside.

However, life does not stand still. As Russia's economic position strengthened, so did its Armed Forces. Considerable attention was paid to the air defense of the country.

Military science played a significant role in the development and strengthening of air defense. With her active participation in the early 2000s. a draft "Concept of Aerospace Defense of the Russian Federation" was developed, which in November 2002 was approved by the collegium of the Ministry of Defense. Subsequently, the concept was approved by the President of the Russian Federation and became one of the fundamental documents regarding the development of the country's aerospace defense. At the same time, a system project for the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation was developed, and a little later, a draft design for an integrated system of the aerospace defense of Moscow and the Central Industrial Region.

A large amount of research has been carried out to identify and streamline the most important objects of the Armed Forces, the economy and infrastructure in the interests of improving the organization of their air defense. Active scientific research was carried out in the field of development of the unified air defense system of the CIS, formed in 1996.

In 2010–2011 there have been significant changes in the organization of air defense (VKO) of the country. To date, air defense forces and assets in the Air Force are concentrated in four Air Force and Air Defense Commands, each of which is operationally subordinate to the corresponding military district (in accordance with the new military-administrative division of the country, since December 1, 2010, four military districts have been operating in the Russian Federation - Western , Southern, Central and Eastern). The air defense corps and divisions that existed earlier were transformed into aerospace defense brigades. Fighter aviation has been reduced to air bases.

On the basis of the Space Forces, the Aerospace Defense Troops were formed. They include the Space Command (PRN systems and reconnaissance of the space situation) and the Air Defense-ABM Command, which provides aerospace defense of Moscow and the Central Industrial Region. It includes the Moscow missile defense system and three air defense brigades. On December 1, 2011, the troops of the East Kazakhstan region took up combat duty.

In recent years, the process of re-equipping the Air Defense Forces (VKO) with new equipment has significantly revived. The troops began to receive the latest S-400 air defense systems, Pantsir air defense systems, and 4+ generation fighters. The latest radar equipment is supplied to the radio engineering troops. Control systems are equipped with ever more intelligent and fast automation systems. The country's leadership announced impressive amounts of funding for the Armed Forces, planned for the period up to 2020. The implementation of these plans will significantly increase the rate of rearmament of the troops and ensure a significant increase in their combat capabilities.

The experience of local wars and armed conflicts of recent decades convincingly testifies to the steady increase in the role of aviation in modern war. becomes more potentially dangerous space. Under these conditions, the issues of improving the means and methods of countering potential threats from the air and space are becoming increasingly important.

The modern system of aerospace defense of the Russian Federation is designed to provide a solution to the entire set of tasks of combat in aerospace:

• warning of air, missile and space attacks, reconnaissance of the air and space situation and notification of troops about it;
• protection of the state border of the Russian Federation in the airspace and control of the procedure for using the airspace;
• reflection of aggression in the aerospace sphere, air and missile defense of the most important objects of state and military administration, key objects of the Armed Forces, economy and infrastructure.

The Air Defense Forces have traveled a glorious and difficult path. There were ups and downs, moments of glory and years of disappointments, high achievements and failures. And today they rightfully remain at the forefront of the defense of the Fatherland, strengthening and increasing the military glory of our grandfathers and fathers.

Boris Leonidovich ZARETSKY
Candidate of Military Sciences, Corresponding Member of the AVN, Senior Researcher at the Air Defense Research Center (Tver)

Yuri Timofeevich ALEKHIN
candidate of technical sciences, professor of AVN, senior researcher at the Air Defense Research Center (Tver)

Sergei Glebovich KUTSENKO
senior researcher at the Air Defense Research Center (Tver)

During the war years, severe combat tests fell to the lot of local air defense. She withstood them with honor. Home front workers, fighters and commanders of the air defense did everything to minimize the losses among the population, material damage during the bombing, and quickly eliminate their consequences. Weigh the contribution of local air defense soldiers to the victory over the enemy.

It is estimated that during the war the Nazi aviation made more than 30 thousand group and single raids on cities and rear facilities. At the same time, about 600 thousand high-explosive and almost 1 million incendiary bombs were dropped. A number of large cities were subjected to intense shelling. However, the MPVO warriors managed to minimize damaging effect enemy bombs and shells. The formations of the MPVO provided assistance to 185,000 citizens in the lesions. Over 100,000 lighters alone were extinguished, more than 90,000 fires and ignitions were extinguished, and 32,000 serious accidents at national economy facilities were prevented.

Moscow survived 141 air raids. The Nazis dropped more than 100,000 incendiary and 1,600 high-explosive bombs, but the enemy did not manage to disrupt the city's clear working rhythm for a single day, and losses from raids were reduced to a minimum. During the war, 652 air raid alerts sounded in Leningrad. They lasted a total of 724 hours and 29 minutes. The enemy dropped about 5,000 high-explosive and more than 100,000 incendiary bombs and fired 150,000 artillery shells. The fighters of the Air Defense Forces of the city of Lenin eliminated over 30 thousand lesions, dismantled 6540 rubble, removed over 3000 buildings struck from under the rubble, provided medical care almost 25 thousand wounded. They also built bomb shelters, pillboxes, bunkers, anti-tank ditches, delivered water to bakeries, peat, firewood and coal to power plants, and repaired city utilities. By the end of 1942, almost every second Leningrader was an MPVO fighter.

A huge number of people, both adults and adolescents, were involved in the MPVO of Stalingrad. There was no such family in the city, a member of which would not be in one of the units of the MPVO. On all streets, in courtyards, in city gardens and parks, at tram stops, on the territories of enterprises, cracks were dug, dugouts were built. By the beginning of August 1942, 174 thousand linear meters of cracks had been dug in the city, at least 350 thousand people could hide in them, and 5250 pillboxes and bunkers, about 14 thousand reinforced concrete and armored metal firing points were built on the defensive contours of the city with the participation of the MPVO formations. The fighters of the Sevastopol MPVO units made heroic efforts to eliminate the rubble under which people found themselves, put out fires, restored water supply, electricity, telephone communications, and helped the victims. During the day on June 18, 1942, several hundred high-explosive and more than 10 thousand incendiary bombs were dropped on Murmansk. 800 residential buildings and a large number of industrial and office premises burned down.

The losses were great, and yet the enemy did not reach the goal. He was powerless to break the resistance of the defenders of the city. The bombing had not yet ended, and the formations of the MPVO rushed to eliminate its consequences, to save people. About two and a half thousand MPVO fighters took part in this operation. By evening, the fires were extinguished. It was possible to save a significant part of the city, the port, a shipyard, a fish processing plant, and a railway station. During the years of the war, MPVO pyrotechnicians neutralized over 430,000 unexploded bombs and almost 2.5 million shells and mines. So, officer I. Kharchenko did not go on the attack, did not storm the enemy fortifications, but at every step of his long front-line path he performed feats. In a short time, he neutralized 1245 bombs and 2500 shells and mines. For his work, the brave patriot was the first among the pyrotechnicians of the Soviet Army in November 1944 to be awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Major General M. TUR

Aviation was one of the most powerful means of suppressing the enemy in World War II operations. Its dominance in the air and the possibility of delivering massive strikes was one of the important conditions for the successful solution of tasks by the troops in both defensive and offensive operations.

The creation of an effective anti-aircraft defense capable of repelling massed enemy air strikes and thereby ensuring freedom of maneuver for friendly troops on the battlefield was, for a number of reasons, an exceptionally difficult problem in the first half of the war. The study of some questions of this problem is the purpose of this article. It examines the state of the air defense of the troops at the beginning of the war, the development of air defense means and its organizational forms during the war.

Our pre-war theory of operational art correctly defined the role and significance of the air defense of troops in operations. Much attention was paid to the development of air defense means and its organization in the prewar period. But for a number of reasons, in the operations of the first period of the war, the air defense of the troops did not meet the requirements for it, which had a very hard effect on the combat operations of formations and units and was one of the serious reasons for our failures in this period.

By the start of the war ground troops did not have necessary means fight against enemy aircraft. A rifle division included an anti-aircraft artillery battalion, and each rifle regiment had an anti-aircraft machine-gun company. In total, the division had 8-37-mm and 4 -76.2-mm anti-aircraft guns, 9 heavy-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns and 24 quadruple anti-aircraft machine guns. The rifle corps had an anti-aircraft artillery battalion of 12-76.2-mm or 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. Thus, the rifle corps, consisting of three rifle divisions, had 48 anti-aircraft guns, 27 heavy-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns and 72 quadruple anti-aircraft machine guns.

When defending a corps at a front of 20-25 km, even the regular amount of firepower made it possible to have only two anti-aircraft guns, one heavy machine gun and 3 quadruple anti-aircraft guns per 1 km of the front, which, of course, was very small.

Fighter aviation, like all aviation as a whole, was organizationally dispersed among the armies, which did not allow massing its efforts to cover troops in decisive directions. The fighter aviation was armed mainly with obsolete types of aircraft (I-15, I-16 and others), which were significantly inferior in speed, flight ceiling and armament.

The air surveillance, warning and communication system (VNOS) did not provide a successful solution to the tasks assigned to it. By the beginning of the war, the troops did not have their own regular means of aerial surveillance, warning and communications. It was believed that the task of observing and alerting troops about air danger would be successfully carried out by non-staff observers of units and subunits, and in the army and front-line rear, also by non-standard observers of rear facilities and the air surveillance, warning and communications network (VNOS) of the country's air defense. In the event of the transfer of hostilities outside our territory, it was envisaged to strengthen the fronts and armies with VNOS radio companies. The VNOS system had no means of early detection. Visual observation ensured the detection of enemy aircraft at a distance of only 10-12 km, which the aircraft overcame in 1-2 minutes.

Before the Great Patriotic War, our theory proceeded from the fact that air defense, no matter how strong it may be, cannot completely exclude the overflights of small groups and individual enemy aircraft to the intended targets. Therefore, the main goal of military air defense was to repulse massive raids to ensure freedom of maneuver for their troops at all stages of the operation. This task was supposed to be carried out by the joint efforts of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft, covering the troops and rear facilities, as well as anti-aircraft machine gun installations, which were given a significant place in the air defense of the troops.

The entire front-line area was divided into three air defense zones: military - 30-50 km deep (from the front line to the border of the military rear); the army rear zone and the front rear zone. The military zone of air defense, in turn, was divided into corps, divisional and regimental areas.

The military zone was covered mainly by ground-based air defense systems. Fighter aircraft in this zone acted only sporadically. The first line of meeting enemy aviation by our fighter aircraft was established in the rear of the army at a depth of 50-60 km from the front line. However, here, too, enemy aircraft could meet resistance only from duty shifts of fighters. The massive use of front fighter aviation against invading enemy air forces was envisaged only at a depth of more than 100 km from the front line, i.e., in the front rear area. Thus, the bulk of the troops operating in the first echelon, in the absence of air cover and the lack of anti-aircraft weapons, turned out to be very poorly protected from attacks by enemy air forces.

The control of the air defense system was quite complex. Army ground air defense systems of the USSR were dispersed in units and formations. Fighter aviation was subordinate to the commander of the Air Force. In order to combine the efforts of all means, to organize their better interaction in the field administration of the front (army), there was an air defense department subordinate to the front commander (commander). However, the head of this department could, to some extent, influence the use of only ground-based air defense systems. With regard to fighter aircraft, he had no rights. All this led to the dissipation of the already limited means of air defense, which our troops had at the beginning of the war, and did not contribute to the creation of reliable military air defense.

From the foregoing, we can conclude that by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the organization of the air defense of the troops, as well as the means of air defense, did not provide an effective fight against an air enemy and reliable air cover for the troops.

In the course of the war, the air defense of the troops developed depending on the quantitative and qualitative growth of air defense systems, especially anti-aircraft artillery and aviation.

In the first months of the war (June - October 1941), a significant part of the anti-aircraft artillery, which was part of the air defense forces of the country, was included in the fronts in connection with the general retreat of our troops. This to some extent compensated for the lack of anti-aircraft artillery in the troops, but could not radically improve their air defense. In addition, we had to fight fierce battles with an air enemy in conditions when a significant number of anti-aircraft units were not fully mobilized, and the aviation of the border districts, located at stationary airfields near the border, suffered heavy losses in the very first days of the war and was unable to carry out reliable cover for troops. The air surveillance, warning and communications system was also disrupted. The troops retreated and fought defensive battles under conditions of complete air supremacy of enemy aircraft, which delivered systematic strikes against the combat formations of troops, areas of loading and unloading, military echelons, command posts, airfields, railway junctions, crossings and other objects in groups of 3 to 40 bombers with altitudes 1000-3000 m.

Due to the heavy losses of aviation and the impossibility of massing it, the air defense of the troops was carried out mainly by anti-aircraft artillery and small arms adapted for firing at air targets. The air defense troops during the operations suffered heavy losses in materiel. In addition, a significant amount of anti-aircraft artillery weapons was used to equip anti-tank units. The production of anti-aircraft artillery weapons, in connection with the evacuation of industrial enterprises that had begun, decreased. All this led to a large shortage of firepower in the air defense units. For example, by the end of the second month of the war, the Southwestern Front had only 232-76.2-mm and 176-37-mm anti-aircraft guns, which accounted for 70 and 40 percent, respectively. the regular needs of the front in this artillery.

After the disbandment of the rifle corps, their anti-aircraft artillery battalions were turned to resupply the anti-aircraft battalions of the rifle divisions and air defense battalions of the country. However, this event did not seriously affect the staffing of anti-aircraft artillery units, since the loss of materiel continued to increase. For example, as of September 1, 1941, the staffing of anti-aircraft artillery units of the same Southwestern Front for anti-aircraft guns was about 40 percent, and for anti-aircraft machine guns - about 66 percent. regular needs.

Due to the impossibility of replenishing the material part, the anti-aircraft artillery battalions of rifle divisions in December 1941 were reorganized into anti-aircraft artillery batteries consisting of 6-37-mm anti-aircraft guns. Since that time, the cover of military groupings was carried out, as a rule, only by individual batteries of anti-aircraft artillery of small or medium caliber.

One of the most significant shortcomings of the air defense of the troops in the operations of 1941-1942 was the exceptionally weak fighter air cover. The small number of fighter aircraft covered mainly rear facilities, reserves, second echelons, and command posts. There were very few forces left to cover the battle formations of the troops of the first echelon. Thus, out of 4451 sorties made by the air forces of the Western Front in November 1941, only 325 sorties, i.e. 7.3 percent, were made to cover the battle formations of the troops, while the enemy in front line at the same time made 2500 sorties. For seven days of defensive battle (August 17-23, 1942) 8th air army The Stalingrad Front, in order to cover the troops, made 596 sorties (an average of 85 per day), while enemy aircraft made up to 1000-1500 sorties per day. In view of the insufficient number of fighter aircraft, the remoteness of our airfields (up to 100 km or more), the air cover of the troops of the first operational echelon was very weak, which, with enemy aviation dominating the air, had an extremely difficult effect on their actions.

In the defensive battle of the Stalingrad Front from July 23 to August 7, fighter aircraft covered the concentration of reserves, the unloading of troops and equipment on railway stations. The cover was carried out from the position of "on duty on the ground", in readiness No. 1 and periodic patrols in the air of groups of 4-6 fighters. Fighter aircraft often tied up dogfights with escort fighters, and enemy bombers got the opportunity to attack our troops with impunity.

Another equally significant shortcoming was the incorrect distribution of air defense assets among the facilities, which led to their excessive dispersal. For example, when organizing the air defense of the troops of the Western Front in May 1942, 59 percent of the troops were allocated to cover the troops. anti-aircraft artillery, supply stations - 21 percent, airfields - 12 percent, bridges and crossings - 8 percent. Such a distribution of air defense means did not ensure the massive use of anti-aircraft artillery for reliable cover of the troops of the 1st echelon, against which the main body of enemy bombers usually operated.

Among the shortcomings, one should also include the weak interaction of ground-based air defense systems with aviation, as a result of which there were cases of shelling of one's own aircraft or air strikes on one's own troops; fuzzy operation of the air surveillance, warning and communication system; lack of centralized control of anti-aircraft artillery when repulsing enemy air raids; and finally

the lack of a unified leadership of all means of air defense.

By the summer of 1942, a number of measures were taken to improve the control of mainly ground-based air defense systems. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense of June 2, 1942, all anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft machine guns and air surveillance, warning and communications equipment were subordinated to the artillery commander of the Soviet Army and, accordingly, to the artillery commander of the fronts and armies. By the same order, the leadership of the air defense departments of the armies and fronts was entrusted to the corresponding artillery commanders and the post of deputy front (army) artillery commander for air defense was introduced. At the same time, the formation of army air defense regiments began, consisting of 4 batteries of four 37-mm anti-aircraft guns in each and one anti-aircraft machine-gun company of heavy machine guns (16 machine guns).

In the most important operations of the second half of 1942, the armies operating in the main direction of the front already had several army anti-aircraft artillery regiments. For example, the 33rd Army of the Western Front in an offensive operation southwest of Gzhatsk in August 1942 had five regiments. With the end of the operation, one regiment was left in the army, and four were transferred to other armies of the front. In the offensive operation in November 1942, the 5th Panzer Army of the Southwestern Front had five anti-aircraft artillery regiments, and the 21st Army had four regiments.

Despite a number of measures taken to improve the air defense of the troops, the massing of anti-aircraft artillery on the scale of the front and the army continued to be weak. The order of the NPO dated October 22, 1942 stated that the incorrect distribution of military air defense means, which entails their dispersed use, does not provide the necessary cover for troops and rear facilities in decisive directions. As a result of this, the enemy aviation, acting massively, inflicts systematic strikes on our troops with almost impunity. The order required, in addition to aviation, to use anti-aircraft artillery groups, consisting of army anti-aircraft artillery regiments, anti-aircraft batteries and anti-aircraft machine-gun companies of formations, to cover the main grouping. The anti-aircraft artillery group was required to include from half to two-thirds of all military anti-aircraft weapons of the front (army). The army anti-aircraft group was to be headed by the deputy commander of the army's artillery for air defense. Thanks to the creation of anti-aircraft artillery groups, the anti-aircraft cover of the troops improved somewhat, but it was not possible to solve the entire problem of increasing the effectiveness of air defense only by changing the organization of command and control of ground-based air defense systems. Along with this, it was necessary to sharply increase the number of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft in the troops.

Since the autumn of 1942, there has been a turning point in the work of the country's military production. Troops in increasing numbers began to receive military equipment. For example, if in 1942 the troops received 3499 - 37-mm and 2761-85-mm anti-aircraft guns, then in 1943, respectively, 5472 and 3713.

The quantity and quality of ground-based air defenses increased during almost the entire war, as can be seen from the following table.

The receipt of anti-aircraft artillery from industry during the war

The expansion of the production of anti-aircraft artillery weapons made it possible to start from November 1942 to the formation of large formations of anti-aircraft artillery - anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the reserve of the Supreme High Command. Initially, they were created as part of four regiments of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery (such as an army anti-aircraft artillery regiment). In total, the division had 64-37 mm anti-aircraft guns and 64-12.7 mm anti-aircraft guns. The absence of medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery excluded the participation of such divisions in the fight against enemy aircraft at altitudes of more than 3000 m and was their serious drawback. In addition, the divisions did not have their own rear units, which was one of the reasons for frequent interruptions in the supply of ammunition to the units.

From the second half of February 1943, a control battery was included in the anti-aircraft artillery divisions, and one of the anti-aircraft artillery regiments small caliber was replaced by a medium caliber artillery regiment, which made it possible to fight enemy aircraft at altitudes of more than 3000 meters.

In March 1943, an instruction was approved for the combat use of an anti-aircraft artillery division, which stated that the division could cover troops in an area of ​​63 square meters. km (9 km along the front and 7 km in depth) with a density of 1.5 guns per 1 sq. km. km or 9 guns per 1 km of the front.

In order to ensure greater massing of anti-aircraft artillery in decisive directions in the first half of 1943, individual anti-aircraft artillery batteries were excluded from the state of the rifle division and transferred to staff the anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the reserve of the Supreme High Command. At the same time, part of the already created army anti-aircraft artillery regiments and individual anti-aircraft artillery battalions of the reserve of the Supreme High Command is also focused on the formation of anti-aircraft artillery divisions.

Thus, from May 1943 Almost all anti-aircraft artillery was included in the reserve of the Supreme High Command and was organizationally part of anti-aircraft divisions, separate divisions of the reserve of the High Command and army anti-aircraft artillery regiments. Anti-aircraft divisions, as a rule, covered the troops; separate divisions of medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery - rear objects; army regiments were used to cover the troops and the rear of the army. It became possible to use anti-aircraft artillery massively in decisive directions.

In connection with the significant quantitative growth of anti-aircraft artillery, the effectiveness of the air defense of the troops increased. This was also explained by a sharp change in the conditions in which air defense had to be carried out. The Soviet Air Force, including fighter aviation, grew considerably in quantity and quality, while the air force of the Nazi troops was significantly weakened. The arrival of fighter planes increased from year to year. In 1942, the aviation industry produced 9844 fighters, in 1943 - 14,607, and in 1944 - 17,872. The balance of forces was rapidly changing in favor of the Soviet Air Force. In the fight for air supremacy that has reached highest voltage in the first half of 1943, the Soviet Air Force emerged victorious.

The operations of our troops from the battle of Kursk to the end of the war proceeded under the dominance of our aviation, which greatly facilitated the fulfillment of air defense tasks. Troops were now often covered by large fighter forces. In a number of cases, ground-based air defense systems were already relatively boldly massed in the decisive directions of the front.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, our Air Force had a significant numerical superiority over the enemy, especially in fighter and attack aircraft.

By the beginning of the operation, the 16th Air Army of the Central Front had seven fighter aviation divisions, of which three divisions covered the troops of the front, and the rest covered the actions of bomber and attack aircraft. The 2nd Air Army of the Voronezh Front had five fighter aviation divisions. The cover of the troops at the beginning of the operation was carried out by two fighter divisions. Thus, 40-43 percent were intended to cover the troops. all fighter aviation of the Central and Voronezh fronts.

The Central and Voronezh fronts had a large number of anti-aircraft artillery. The Central Front had five anti-aircraft artillery divisions, ten separate army anti-aircraft artillery regiments and four separate anti-aircraft artillery battalions. The Voronezh Front had four anti-aircraft artillery divisions, eleven separate anti-aircraft artillery regiments and two divisions of medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery of the reserve of the Supreme High Command. To combat low-flying and diving enemy aircraft, small arms were used in significant quantities. Fronts and armies had separate air surveillance, warning and communications companies.

Ground-based anti-aircraft defenses in the zone of the Central Front were massed in a decisive direction. Thus, out of the total number of all anti-aircraft artillery of the front, which covered the troops of the first echelon, 50 percent was concentrated in the 13th Army's 32 km wide zone (slightly more than 10 percent of the total width of the front defense zone). anti-aircraft artillery of the middle and 40 percent. small caliber. This made it possible to create an average density of anti-aircraft artillery in the decisive direction of about 5 guns per 1 km of the front. In total, the main grouping of front troops (48th, 13th and 70th armies) included 100 percent. medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery and about 90 percent. small caliber artillery.

The anti-aircraft artillery allocated to cover the main army groupings was in some cases reduced to one anti-aircraft artillery group, which was headed by the commander of an anti-aircraft artillery division or the deputy artillery commander for air defense.

The air surveillance, warning and communications service was also improved. Non-standard posts were created in rifle regiments, in divisions, at the expense of an army company of air surveillance, warning and communications, two posts each, one of which was located at the forefront of defense, and the other - in the area of ​​​​the division command post. The posts of the VNOS army company were created at the headquarters of the corps, at airfields, in air ambushes and at the army headquarters. In the front, VNOS posts carried an alert service in the area command posts armies and the front, at airfields and at objects of front-line significance. Regimental and divisional posts used only military telephone communications to transmit air raid signals. The posts of the army and front-line companies were connected by radio with the airfields of fighter aviation, and when enemy aircraft appeared, the airfields were first of all notified about this.

Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the air defense of the troops was undoubtedly better organized than in previous operations. Despite this, the combat operations of the air defense forces in the first days of the battle were characterized by exceptional tension. The lack of means of long-range reconnaissance of an air enemy continued to significantly reduce the combat capabilities of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft.

The defensive battles that unfolded on the Central and Voronezh fronts revealed a number of shortcomings in the organization of the air defense of the troops, mainly in terms of fighter air cover. Both fronts provided cover for troops by patrolling in large groups of fighters at the same height. Due to the lack of a reserve of duty fighters at the airfields, the strength of fighter aviation in the air was weakly built up, and the control of aviation by radio from the ground and its interaction with ground-based air defense systems were not sufficiently stable. A significant disadvantage air defense was a poor warning to the troops. The widely developed warning system, which included a large number of non-standard and poorly trained posts that did not have their own means of communication, turned out to be insufficiently stable. With the beginning of the defensive battle, it was broken. However, the main reason for the weakness of alerting the troops was the lack of means of early detection of aircraft.

Despite the presence a large number means, the air defense of the troops, due to the indicated shortcomings in the organizational order, in the first days of the battle was unable to repel the massive attacks of enemy aircraft. Our troops suffered serious losses.

In order to increase the effectiveness of air defense, a number of urgent measures were taken already during the defensive battle: almost the entire fighter aviation of the fronts was involved in covering the troops; the battle formations of the fighters began to be echeloned in height; the control posts of the commanders of the fighter aviation divisions were close to the front line and there were radio guidance stations on them; a maneuver was carried out by anti-aircraft artillery, as a result of which its density in the directions of the main enemy attacks was increased to 9-12 guns per 1 km of the front. The organization of interaction between ground and air air defense systems has also improved. Anti-aircraft artillery began to fire on enemy aircraft before our fighters attacked them, and ceased fire when the latter entered the attack course.

IN In the face of increasing air defense resistance, enemy aviation suffered heavy losses, its activity from the second day of the offensive began to drop sharply and by the end of the battle was limited to flights of only individual aircraft. Dominance in the air was won by our aviation in the Orel-Kursk direction by the end of the third, and in Belgorod-Kursk - by the end of the sixth day of the defensive battle. Losses of enemy aviation in both directions during the defensive battle amounted to over 1,700 aircraft, of which about 1,400 (more than 80 percent) were shot down by our fighter aircraft.

The most important factors influencing the improvement of the air defense of our troops in the offensive operations of 1943 were: a further increase in the quantity and quality of air defense means, the gain and retention of air supremacy by our aviation, and also the growth of the skill of command personnel.

The most important feature of air defense in the operations of 1944 and 1945 was the increase in the effectiveness of warning and fighter air cover. From the second half of 1943, aviation and anti-aircraft artillery of the fronts began to be equipped with radar stations, with the help of which it was possible to detect enemy aircraft at a distance of up to 80-120 km, which made it possible to significantly expand the border of our aviation and meet aircraft at the distant approaches to the front line of our troops. For example, in the Berlin operation of the 1st Belorussian Front, three zones of operations of our cover fighter aviation were organized: hunter fighters; fighter patrols on the outskirts of the battlefield; fighter patrols directly above the combat formations of the advancing troops. Groups of hunter aircraft patrolled over German airfields, fought against enemy aircraft taking off, with its reconnaissance, searched for and destroyed small groups of aircraft in the air and reported on the approach of large groups of enemy aircraft. The zone of fighter patrols on the outskirts of the battlefield extended to a depth of 15 km from the front line, between the front line and the free hunting zone.

Along with the increase in the effectiveness of fighter aviation operations, the anti-aircraft cover of the troops also improved markedly. Skillful maneuvering and redistribution of anti-aircraft artillery, decisive massing of means in the most important directions formed the basis for the combat use of anti-aircraft artillery in offensive operations of 1944-1945.

The armies accumulated experience in anti-aircraft cover for mobile troops with powerful anti-aircraft artillery groups. For example, in the Iasi-Kishinev operation, the 6th Tank Army had an anti-aircraft artillery group consisting of an anti-aircraft artillery division and three separate anti-aircraft artillery regiments. .

However, along with the general improvement in the air situation, the air defense of the troops still had a number of shortcomings. In the course of offensive operations, it was not uncommon for anti-aircraft artillery and airfields to lag significantly behind the troops. As a result, the troops of the fronts carried out the final stage of most operations with weakened anti-aircraft and fighter-air cover. Enemy aviation was given the opportunity to strike at our troops in significant groups, delay their advance, and thereby assist their troops in stabilizing the front. So it was at the final stage of the Belarusian operation, when enemy aircraft delivered massive strikes against the troops of the 1st Baltic Front in the Ielgava, Shauliai area, against the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts at the turn of the Neman River and against the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front on the Vistula river. On July 29, enemy aircraft in groups of 4 to 30 aircraft attacked the 69th Army in the Pulawy area and the 2nd Tank Army of the 1st Belorussian Front east of Warsaw, making about 300 sorties. Our 6th Air Army, which ensured the offensive of the left wing of the front, was able to make only 95 sorties that day. On August 1, enemy aviation in groups of 6-8 and up to 40 aircraft repeatedly bombed the areas of crossings across the Vistula in the zone of the 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, making about 340 sorties, while the 6th Air Army was only able to do 98 sorties. In the last days of July 1944, enemy aircraft, for the above reason, attacked with impunity the combat formations of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps and the 51st Army of the 1st Baltic Front in the Siauliai region. In the course of the Budapest operation, on certain days enemy aircraft attacked the troops of the 6th Guards Tank Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in groups of 4 to 30 aircraft.

In the overwhelming majority of operations of the Great Patriotic War, the air defense of the troops was strengthened at the expense of the forces and means of the air defense of the country's territory. Such a measure played a particularly important role in operations near Leningrad, Moscow, in the battle on the Volga and in the Berlin operation. Carrying out extremely responsible tasks of covering large objects outside the front line and objects of strategic importance in the front line, the air defense forces of the country's territory, at the same time, very often also provided cover for front-line rear facilities, and in some cases front reserves. For example, in the Berlin operation, 1,203 anti-aircraft guns of the Western Front of Air Defense were used to defend rear facilities and crossings of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Such, in brief, is the development of the air defense of troops in operations of the Great Patriotic War.

The experience gained in the course of the Great Patriotic War in the air defense of troops retains its significance in many respects even in modern conditions. The massing of air defense forces and means in decisive axes, the maneuver of these forces in the course of an operation, the precise interaction of all air defense means and their centralized control - all this still lies at the basis of the organization of air defense.

At the same time, the further development of air attack means poses ever more complex tasks for air defense and requires further improvement of air defense means and methods of their use. A deep study and generalization of the experience of air defense of troops in the Great Patriotic War will help to more correctly determine the ways for the further development of forms and methods of air defense in modern conditions.

Military History Journal No. 1/1962

In the initial period of the war, our fighter aviation suffered heavy losses, and often could not cover the Soviet troops at the forefront and in the front line. Taking advantage of this, German fighter-bombers, dive-bombers and attack aircraft inflicted heavy losses on Soviet troops and refugee columns. The infantry units on the march, the trains on the hauls and transport columns suffered especially from the raids. The situation was further aggravated by the acute shortage of anti-aircraft weapons intended to directly cover the troops. The pre-war Soviet industry did not have time to fully equip the troops with the necessary anti-aircraft weapons; as of 06/22/1941, air defense units of the regimental and divisional level were only 61% equipped with anti-aircraft machine gun installations. For the most part, the troops had rifle-caliber installations created on the basis of the Maxim machine gun. The share of large-caliber 12.7-mm machine guns by the beginning of the war was very small.

In 1941 the main military means Air defense was a quad 7.62-mm anti-aircraft machine gun M4 arr. 1931 The installation consisted of four Maxim machine guns mod. 1910/30 g, mounted on an anti-aircraft machine in the same plane. For better cooling of machine-gun barrels during intensive shooting, a forced water circulation device was used. With a good density of fire, the M4 anti-aircraft gun was too heavy. Its mass in combat position, together with a forced water cooling system and a welded frame for installation in a car body, reached 400 kg.

The quadruple installation, as a rule, was installed on cargo lorries, on railway platforms, and even in horse-drawn sledges. In February 1943, 7.62-mm machine guns, as obsolete, were withdrawn from the anti-aircraft regiments and anti-aircraft divisions of the High Command Reserve. They were replaced by more effective 12.7 mm heavy machine guns, but on secondary fronts, the surviving M4s were used until the end of hostilities. Throughout the war, anti-aircraft Maxims were part of machine-gun platoons on anti-aircraft armored trains and were installed on anti-aircraft platforms that covered echelons and individual stations.

Twin anti-aircraft installation arr. 1930

In addition to quad installations, in smaller quantities, by the beginning of the war, the troops had twin arr. 1930 and single anti-aircraft guns mod. 1928. When they were created, Maxim infantry machine guns were also used. All of them were water-cooled, and the rate of fire was 600 rounds per minute per barrel. The tabular range of destruction of air targets was 1500 m. In practice, the effective range of fire on aircraft did not exceed 800 m. Quite often, Maxim machine guns on anti-aircraft mounts were forced to be used on the front line to repel enemy infantry attacks. In this case, rack-mounted sights, standard for infantry machine guns, were used for firing.

Calculation of anti-aircraft installation arr. 1928 firing at an air target in the Stalingrad area

A common drawback of anti-aircraft installations based on the Maxim machine gun was excessive weight and an unacceptably long time for transferring from marching to combat position. Before repulsing an enemy air raid, it was necessary to fill the casing with water, otherwise the barrel would quickly overheat and the machine gun could not fire.

In the 30s, a special anti-aircraft machine was produced for cavalry units, mounted on a machine-gun cart. The disadvantage of such a machine was the limited possible sector of anti-aircraft fire. In this regard, for cover from air strikes, cavalrymen needed anti-aircraft machine guns with circular fire. But since the quad M4 was excessively heavy and bulky, twin installations mod. 1930

For firing at an air enemy at the front, Maxim machine guns mod. 1910/30, on a universal tripod-wheel machine of the S.V. Vladimirov arr. 1931, which allowed firing on both ground and air targets.

Maxim machine gun universal machine S.V. Vladimirov arr. 1931

The machine gun was equipped with an annular anti-aircraft sight, which allowed firing at aircraft flying at speeds up to 320 km / h at an altitude of up to 1500 m. However, at its advanced installation, as a rule, they did not bother and fired at aircraft using a standard rack-mount sight, which of course reduced efficiency anti-aircraft fire. However, the mass production of machine guns on a universal machine began only in 1939. Due to the great complexity of Vladimirov's machines, not so many were produced. For this reason, there were many times fewer of them in the troops than machine guns on a wheeled machine A.A. Sokolova arr. 1910 Nevertheless, Maxim machine guns on a universal machine were used throughout the war.

In order to somehow cover themselves from air strikes, improvised anti-aircraft installations were created in the troops. Most often, Maxim machine guns were used for this, mounted on handicraft swivels or simply cart wheels with an axle dug into the ground.

Machine gun DT-29 in position for anti-aircraft fire on a light armored car BA-64

In the initial period of the war, part of the Soviet armored vehicles were equipped with P-40 anti-aircraft turrets with DT-29 machine guns. The tank version was created taking into account the installation of a machine gun in a cramped fighting compartment. Instead of a wooden butt, there was a retractable metal one. The casing designed to protect the shooter's hands from burns on the barrel was dismantled from the DT-29 machine gun, which made it possible to reduce the dimensions and improve cooling.

According to regulatory documents, one combat vehicle in a tank or armored car company was to be equipped with an additional anti-aircraft machine gun. The first anti-aircraft turrets on T-26 tanks were tested during the fighting in Spain. Due to the ease of installation and simplicity of design, the P-40 turrets have become quite widespread. They were also installed on armored trains, armored cars, motorcycles and off-road vehicles GAZ-64 and GAZ-67. Compared to the DA-27, the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire from the DT-29 turret version was higher, which was due to better stability, the possibility of circular fire, a more capacious disk for 63 rounds and the presence of a special anti-aircraft ring sight. Not the last role was played by the best training of tankers when firing at aircraft.

P-40 turret with a DT-29 machine gun on an armored car

In the fall of 1941, a quadruple anti-aircraft installation of DT-29 machine guns was experimentally created at the design bureau of the Kovrov plant. Machine guns were mounted horizontally in two rows on the Kolesnikov machine. The total rate of fire was 2400 rds / min. However, according to the results of tests, the installation was not transferred to serial production.

By June 1941, a significant amount of obsolete aviation machine guns YES, YES-2 and PV-1. The first two had much in common with the infantry DP-27, and the second is the Maxim machine gun adapted for use in aviation, air-cooled and increased to 750 rounds per minute rate of fire. As for the DA and DA-2, there was no single standard for their installation for use as anti-aircraft guns.

One of the options for anti-aircraft machine gun installation using DA-2

Machine guns were mounted on turrets or simple swivels, created at former civilian enterprises or in weapons workshops in the front line.

The surviving anti-aircraft gun DA-2 in the museum's exposition

The use of Degtyarev aircraft machine guns was facilitated by the fact that they were initially equipped with sights designed to fire at fast-moving air targets.

Since the principle of operation of the DA and DA-2 automation did not differ from the DP-27 and DT-29, surrogate anti-aircraft guns were quickly mastered by the troops. The machine guns were equipped with discs for 63 rounds. A noticeable external difference between the YES and the DT-29 was that instead of the stock, a notched wooden pistol grip and a rear grip were installed. The twin DA-2 had a shortened shoulder rest. Twin machine guns were equipped with large flame arresters to prevent blinding the shooter.

Anti-aircraft installation ShKAS in the weapons workshop

Single and twin ShKASs were mounted on tripod machines made in weapons workshops, providing circular firing and height adjustment. Responsibilities for firing and maintaining machine gun installations, as a rule, were assigned to aviation technicians and gunsmiths.

In 1939, to replace the Maxim machine gun, the troops began to receive easel machine gun DS-39, developed by V.A. Degtyarev. Compared to the Maxim machine gun, the new machine gun was much lighter. For firing at air targets, designer G.S. Garanin developed an anti-aircraft tripod for the machine gun.

DS-39 on an anti-aircraft tripod

Outwardly, the DS-39 resembles a DShK heavy machine gun reduced in size. Compared to the Maxim machine gun, the DS-39 machine gun was much lighter and air-cooled; after intensive firing, its barrel could be quickly replaced with a spare one. The machine gun was equipped with a switch for the rate of fire at ground (600 rds / min) and air targets (1200 rds / min). Before the war, Degtyarev created a quadruple anti-aircraft gun, which was tested in the back of a lorry, but it was not mass-produced.

However, for all its merits, the DS-39 could not displace the obsolete Maxim machine gun. This is partly to blame for the military themselves, who are not ready to abandon fabric machine-gun belts, which ensured unification with the machine guns already in the troops. Initially, Degtyarev designed his easel machine gun for a metal belt, and the transition to canvas had a negative impact on the reliability of the automation. In addition, the DC-39 was more sensitive to low temperatures and dust. Degtyarev guaranteed that his heavy machine gun could be brought up to an acceptable level of operational reliability, but in June 1941, mass production of the DS-39 was stopped and the assembly of Maxim machine guns was returned to.

The Soviet leadership was well aware of the need to replace the Maxim machine guns. Although the existing heavy machine guns allowed for intense fire, were well mastered and loved by the troops, their excessive weight made it difficult to escort the advancing infantry. While our troops were engaged in defensive battles, this was not so critical, but with the transition to offensive operations, all the shortcomings of the outdated machine gun were fully manifested.

In 1943, the SG-43 designed by P.M. won the competition for a new easel machine gun. Goryunov. Unlike Maxim, the new machine gun had a replaceable air-cooled barrel. The machine gun was mounted on a Degtyarev wheeled machine, or on a Sidorenko-Malinovsky machine. Both options allowed firing at ground and air targets.

SG-43, prepared for anti-aircraft fire

The machine gun's accessories included a foreshortened anti-aircraft sight, designed to fire at air targets moving at speeds up to 600 km/h at ranges up to 1000 m.

In addition to domestic anti-aircraft machine guns in the Red Army during the war, foreign samples were used - captured and delivered under Lend-Lease: American 7.62 mm Browning М1919А4, 12.7 mm Browning М2, 7.62 and 7.7 mm British machine guns Vickers , as well as captured 7.92-mm machine guns MG-13, MG-15, MG-34 and MG-42.

Red Army soldiers capture a Bf 109 pilot who made an emergency landing

To reduce losses, German pilots were forced to increase the height of the bombing, and in case of strong rifle and machine gun fire from the ground, to avoid attack using machine gun and cannon weapons.

Fw 190, which made an emergency landing in the Soviet near rear

Anti-tank rifles significantly exceeded all other types of infantry in terms of firing range and destructive effect if they hit the target. small arms. Even the heaviest armor of the Hs-129 and Fw 190F attack aircraft did not save from heavy 14.5-mm bullets. Noticeable losses from the fire of Soviet anti-tank missiles in 1942 were carried by Ju 87 dive bombers.

Downed Ju 87

From anti-tank rifles, it was repeatedly possible to shoot down Fw 189 reconnaissance spotters, especially hated by our infantry, whose pilots kept an altitude of more than 1000 m - outside the zone of effective fire from rifles.

Here is how the war correspondent Lieutenant P. Kozlov described such an episode in the newspaper of the 236th Infantry Division “For the Glory of the Motherland” dated May 25, 1944:

“All the fighters quickly dispersed and lay down. Machine gunners, armor-piercers all. Whoever had a weapon adapted it for firing at an aircraft. Having made a circle over the bridgehead, the “frame” continued its course. Red Army soldiers vol. Drozhak and Lebed set up an anti-tank rifle designed by Simonov on a hillock and waited for the right moment to open fire. The Focke-Wulf was approaching their defense area.
Taking a lead of 3 figures, Drozhak fired several shots. The haze of thermite bullet explosions lay ahead of the fascist vulture.
Then Drozhak took the lead by 1.5 pieces less and fired.
The enemy aircraft shuddered slightly and squinted. And after a few seconds, the “frame” smoked and flew down like a burning torch.
- Hooray! - the fighters shouted with joy, - “Focke-Wulf” is on fire ...
This example convincingly shows that infantry weapons can successfully repel enemy air raids. In this case, the following requirements must be observed: be calm, take cover in a gap in time, disguise yourself. And as soon as the plane descends, conduct aimed fire at it.
Armor-piercers Drozhak and Lebed received gratitude from the commander of the unit and were presented for government awards.