03.05.2020

Infantry fight. Infantry tactics in the offensive. In the offensive, the features of firing from small arms are firing on the move and from short stops.

Infantry defensive tactics

In defense, the possibilities can be used to the fullest. small arms, since the fire, as a rule, is fired from prepared positions from stable positions. In advance, the lines of opening fire are outlined and the ranges to landmarks and local objects are determined, corrections are calculated in the initial settings of sighting devices for firing conditions, areas of concentrated fire of subunits are sighted in, the areas of fire and sectors of fire are specified on the ground and tasks for machine gunners, machine gunners, grenade launchers and all commanders of crews of other fire weapons. Strongholds are being equipped in terms of engineering, the main and temporary (reserve) positions for firing are being prepared; cartridge belts and stores are equipped with cartridges with the necessary types of bullets. All this makes it possible to reliably hit ground targets at the maximum range of effective fire: from machine guns and concentrated fire of motorized rifle squads - up to 800 m, from machine guns - up to 500 m, as well as to successfully combat air targets at low altitudes.

Prior to the start of the enemy offensive, platoons are assigned fire weapons on duty, whose personnel are in constant readiness to open fire. During the day, duty assets occupy temporary or reserve positions. From them, individual enemy groups trying to conduct reconnaissance or engineering work are hit by small arms fire. Snipers destroy officers, observers, snipers of the enemy at his location.

At night, two-thirds of the personnel of each squad of motorized rifle platoons are in position ready to open fire with night sights or at illuminated targets. For shooting at night, ribbons and magazines are equipped with cartridges with ordinary and tracer bullets in a ratio of 4: 1. In advance, before the enemy approaches, the lines of opening fire for each type of weapon are outlined, areas of concentrated fire of subunits are prepared. The distances to them should not exceed the range of effective fire against the advancing enemy manpower. All personnel of the subunits must know on the ground in their lanes and sectors of fire the line of 400 m in front of the forward edge: frontal, flank and cross fire is being prepared in the zone of this line.

With the transition of the enemy to the attack on armored vehicles without dismounting, his armored targets are destroyed by the fire of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and anti-tank weapons. Small-arms fire hits infantry and crews leaving wrecked vehicles. If enemy armored vehicles approach at a distance of up to 200 m, small arms fire can be fired at their viewing devices. When attacking the enemy on foot with fire from machine guns and machine guns, the enemy infantry is cut off from the tanks and destroyed together with the flamethrowers attached to the unit and other means. From the line of 400 m from the front line of defense, grenades are used to hit the advancing infantry from submachine guns with underbarrel grenade launchers at the command of squad commanders. As the enemy approaches the forward edge, the fire of all types of weapons is brought to the highest voltage.

An enemy who breaks into a stronghold is destroyed by point-blank fire, grenades and in hand-to-hand combat with a bayonet and butt, fire from pistols. At all stages of the battle, commanders direct the fire of their subunits, setting fire missions, giving commands and established signals for the concentration and transfer of fire. In this case, the ability of a soldier to independently select the most important targets and open fire on them from a range that ensures their reliable defeat, as well as skillfully adjust the fire, is of paramount importance. Subunit commanders must apply fire maneuvers in time, concentrating most of the firepower to engage the enemy in a threatened sector, or dispersing fire on several important targets. During air raids, part of the means of motorized rifle platoons from less threatened areas can conduct concentrated fire on helicopters and aircraft at ranges of up to 500 m, and on helicopters in a hovering position of up to 900 m. It should be noted that for the successful use of small arms in defense, as in other types of combat, timely replenishment of ammunition, equipment with cartridges for machine gun belts and magazines for machine guns and light machine guns is important.

Infantry in modern armies is the backbone of the armed forces. Despite the rapid introduction high technology in military equipment, the increase in its firepower and mobility, the outcome of the war is still decided on the battlefield by the infantry in cooperation with other branches of the armed forces and branches of the armed forces. As combat experience shows, the infantry single genus troops, capable of acting completely independently in case of emergency. The history of wars knows cases when they tried to achieve the goals of the war without involving infantry, even corresponding military theories appeared (“air warfare”, for example), but combat practice showed all the inconsistency of such approaches.

Today, abroad, and in Russia, among some "armchair" strategists, old theories are being revived under the new sauces of "high-precision weapons", "high technologies", "excessive firepower", etc. large masses infantry and tanks with reinforcements.

We must pay tribute to the military specialists who are empowered to make decisions about the direction of the development of the armed forces - almost all of them are very distrustful of newfangled theories. Infantry in the armies of even the most developed countries continues to be the basis of the armed forces, its structure and weapons are being improved, modern ways combat use.

Today, the infantry has a different organizational structure depending on the nature of the combat missions. The infantry, operating on armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, has been reduced to mechanized, motorized, motorized infantry and motorized rifle subunits, units, and formations. Infantry operating on light vehicles and having additional equipment is included in light infantry and mountain infantry formations. Infantry, adapted for airlift and landing, is included in the airborne troops, airborne assault, airmobile formations and units. Finally, the infantry, intended for landing from the sea on the coast, was called marine.

Thus, the infantry today is many-sided and multifunctional. Until recently, the battalion was considered the main infantry unit. However, now it is increasingly evolving towards a combined arms structure. It includes tanks, artillery, etc.

Today, a company remains a comparatively “clean” infantry unit, but more and more heavy weapons appear in it. Apparently, over time, the “heavy” type infantry operating on armored combat vehicles will practically merge organizationally and technically with tank troops, close fire support artillery, military air defense and other first-line means operating on the battlefield under enemy direct fire. There will also be "light" type infantry, designed to solve specific tasks (landing from the air and sea, operations in mountainous and other terrain difficult for vehicles, participation in low-intensity conflicts).

The organizational structure of infantry units in the developed armies of the world is very similar. The primary organizational unit is a department (group) of seven to twelve people. The basis is the arrows, armed with a standard assault rifle (automatic). In "heavy" infantry, crew members of combat vehicles (infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers) on which the squad is transported are equipped with pistols, submachine guns or shortened versions of an assault rifle (machine gun). Usually several people in the squad have underbarrel grenade launchers on their main weapons. Each squad must be equipped with at least one anti-tank melee weapon. These can be rocket-propelled anti-tank grenades or grenade launchers. As a rule, the department has a light machine gun. In the Russian and some other armies, each squad has a sniper. Almost all soldiers in the squad are equipped hand grenades.

Depending on the tasks to be solved, the squad may receive additional sets of weapons. For example, an underbarrel grenade launcher can be installed on each rifle (machine gun), an RPG can be issued to each soldier, etc. In addition, in war, infantry quickly adapts to the characteristics of hostilities and adapts a standard set of weapons in relation to local conditions, not disdaining and successful trophy samples.

The next step in the infantry organization is the platoon. Usually the position of his commander is primary for an officer (although in some armies platoons are commanded by non-commissioned officers or non-commissioned officers). A typical group weapon appears in the platoon - an easel machine gun. In many armies, a platoon has short-range ATGM crews.

In the infantry, a company is considered the main link in training, combat coordination, and organizing the routine of army life. In combat conditions, it is able to act relatively independently, as it has units in its structure equipped with heavy weapons. As a rule, depending on the views of the national command on combat tactics, these are mortars, short-range or medium-range anti-tank guided missiles, automatic mounted grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, etc.

A battalion in foreign armies, unlike the Russian one, is already considered an independent unit (in our country this only applies to individual battalions). It has its own fire support units (mortar battery or company, fire support company), closely interacts with units of other military branches. In some armies, infantry battalions (whatever they are called) organizationally include tanks, air defense, reconnaissance and other units that enhance the tactical independence of the battalion. As mentioned above, the battalion today has become the organizational core around which modern combat tactics are being formed. Unfortunately, in the Russian army this process is far from complete; here, due to well-known difficulties, we are significantly behind the most developed countries.

The basis for defeating the enemy in combined arms combat is his destruction by fire of all types of weapons. Naturally, the infantry mainly uses small arms fire, as the most widespread and quite effective in close combat. Below are the basics of the tactical use of infantry weapons in various types of combat in accordance with the views prevailing in the Russian army.

In defense, the capabilities of small arms can be used to the fullest extent, since fire, as a rule, is fired from prepared positions from stable positions. In advance, the lines of opening fire are outlined and the ranges to landmarks and local objects are determined, corrections are calculated in the initial settings of sighting devices for firing conditions, areas of concentrated fire of subunits are sighted in, areas of fire and sectors of fire are specified on the ground and tasks for machine gunners, submachine gunners, grenade throwers and all commanders of crews of other fire weapons. Strongholds are being equipped in terms of engineering, the main and temporary (reserve) positions for firing are being prepared; cartridge belts and stores are equipped with cartridges with the necessary types of bullets. All this makes it possible to reliably hit ground targets at the maximum range of effective fire: from machine guns and concentrated fire of motorized rifle squads - up to 800 m, from machine guns - up to 500 m, as well as to successfully combat air targets at low altitudes.

At night, two-thirds of the personnel of each squad of motorized rifle platoons are in position ready to open fire with night sights or at illuminated targets. For shooting at night, belts and magazines are equipped with cartridges with ordinary and grass bullets in a ratio of 4: 1. In advance, before the enemy approaches, the lines of opening fire for each type of weapon are outlined, areas of concentrated fire of subunits are prepared. The distances to them should not exceed the range of effective fire against the advancing enemy manpower. All personnel of the subunits must know on the ground in their lanes and sectors of fire the line of 400 m in front of the forward edge: frontal, flank and cross fire is being prepared in the zone of this line.

Let us give examples of the use of small arms in defensive combat. In July 1943, German troops launched an offensive on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge. On one of the sectors of the front, a strong point at a height was defended by a rifle platoon. It was reinforced with two crews of heavy machine guns. The platoon commander set tasks for the machine gun squads and crews, indicated the fire lanes and additional sectors of fire, the platoon's areas of concentrated fire, and the lines of opening fire for machine guns and submachine gunners. He paid special attention to the interaction of machine gunners and submachine gunners in order to create the highest density of fire at the turn of 400 m from the front line of defense.

With the beginning of the enemy offensive, his tanks fired at the positions of the platoon from cannons, and artillery opened fire on the stronghold. At the command of the platoon commander, the personnel ran across the trench encircling the height to its eastern side. This section was covered from fascist shells by a height ridge. The platoon commander and observers remained on the ground. When the fascist infantry approached 400 m, the soldiers, at the signal of the commander, took up positions and opened fire: machine guns from the flanks, submachine gunners from the front. Under crossfire, the attackers rolled back. The artillery of the enemy again opened fire on the strong point, his tanks began to bypass the height from the flanks. Now the platoon commander did not begin to take people over the height, but ordered them to take cover in niches dug in the walls of trenches and communications.

When the enemy stopped the fire raid and his infantry again went on the attack on the stronghold, the platoon commander ordered to open fire on the infantry from light machine guns and machine guns. Machine guns he ordered not to fire for the time being, since the tanks could quickly suppress them with their fire. When two tanks were hit by the battalion's anti-tank guns, heavy machine guns, which had been silent until that time, opened fire on the enemy infantry. The enemy did not expect this, suffered heavy losses from their flanking fire and retreated again. The task of the platoon was accomplished thanks to the skillful use of small arms fire and, mainly, the power of heavy machine gun fire.

Captain I. N. Sukharev, a participant in the events, tells about the use of small arms in combat operations in Afghanistan. In 1986, he was the head of an outpost in one of the mountainous regions. Outpost with mortar fire, heavy machine guns NSV, PK machine guns and machine guns covered the mountain road junction from the penetration of the Mujahideen. NSV machine guns were used as stationary weapons to destroy enemy groups on open sections of roads at a distance of about 1800 m. They were placed in strong shelters made of stones, the legs of the machine guns were half buried in the ground and strengthened in it for better stability. The assigned area was constantly monitored, fire was immediately opened on the groups of dushmans found there. The sudden use of NSV machine guns, as a rule, reached the goal. The fire of mortars did not bring success - having heard the shots, the Mujahideen managed to escape.

PK machine guns were used at the outpost as a maneuverable weapon. For them, several positions were equipped in various directions of fire. If necessary, the crews quickly occupied the designated places in order to destroy the enemy in the threatened direction with concentrated fire.

For some time, the outpost was subjected to systematic shelling by snipers from the area of the destroyed village. The range to it was about 800 m. However, it was not possible to detect snipers. At the request of the chief of the outpost, two sniper SVD rifles. After checking their fight and shooting one of them personally, Sukharev carefully studied the outskirts of the destroyed village through binoculars, made a diagram of the location of suspicious places where the shooters could hide. As the sun rose, the outskirts of the village were brightly illuminated, and in the optical sight sniper rifle dark spots of breaks in the walls of houses and duval were clearly visible. It was in them that Sukharev discovered the Mujahideen. Just a few shots and the enemy, carrying the dead and wounded, fled. As a result, the shelling of the outpost by snipers stopped.

Such combing by fire of suspicious places where enemy ambushes could hide was carried out from mortars, machine guns and grenade launchers. So, before sending people for drinking water to a source located about 400 m from the outpost, bushes located along the road to the source and near it and an impenetrable section of the path bend were fired upon. Only after that did the soldiers head for water. Such actions of the chief of the outpost made it possible to avoid the death of personnel.

On the offensive, the features of firing from small arms are firing on the move and from short stops, from armored vehicles or on foot. order of battle. These conditions make it difficult to carry out combat missions and reduce the effectiveness of fire. Of great importance here are not only fire skills, but also the ability of personnel to get in and out of vehicles, take up and change positions in the shortest possible time, that is, make full use of the maneuverability of weapons. On the offensive, you often have to operate on unfamiliar terrain. This makes it difficult to navigate, especially when driving in cars; the questions of fire control, observation of the battlefield and detection of targets, determination of distances to them, target designation and correction of fire are becoming more complicated. Therefore, the independence of soldiers in finding and hitting targets, taking into account the position of neighboring subunits, is of particular importance, especially when fighting in the depths of enemy defenses.

Consider the question of the combat use of small arms but the main stages of the actions of motorized rifle units in the offensive. In an offensive from a position of direct contact with the enemy, motorized rifles are located in the first trench of the subunit's starting position, and combat vehicles are located next to their squads or at a distance of up to 50 m from them. During fire preparation of an attack, when our artillery fire is transferred to the depth, fire weapons and manpower of the enemy in the direction of the platoons' advance are hit by automatic and machine gun fire. Subunit commanders control the fire of subordinates, issuing commands to destroy detected targets to individual fire weapons or concentrating the fire of a squad (platoon) on the most important target.

When attacking on the move, motorized rifles during the period of fire preparation of attacks advance to the line of transition to the attack in columns on infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers). With the approach to the line of transition to the attack, the platoons, at the command of the company commander, deploy in battle formation. From that moment on, small arms fire through loopholes and over hatches hit targets on the front line of enemy defenses.

When approaching the established dismounting line (when attacking on foot), infantry fighting vehicles catch up with the tanks, the personnel put the weapon on the safety lock, take it out of the loopholes and prepare for dismounting. After it, motorized rifle platoons deploy in a chain and advance directly behind the battle line of tanks. Submachine gunners and machine gunners, acting in a chain, fire on the move and from short stops at the enemy in the trenches of the unit's object of attack.

For the convenience of firing and better application to the terrain, soldiers in a chain can move somewhat forward or to the side without violating the general direction of the subunit's offensive. When overcoming the obstacle in front of the front line of the enemy’s defense, the personnel of motorized rifle subunits, following the commands of platoon commanders, put their weapons on the safety lock and, in columns in twos (threes), following the tanks along their ruts, run along the aisles in mine-explosive barriers.

Having overcome them, motorized riflemen deploy in a chain, open massive fire from their weapons and swiftly attack the enemy. Soldiers conduct fire, as a rule, independently choosing a target in the area of the enemy stronghold indicated by the commander before the attack. Approaching the enemy trench at 25–40 meters, the personnel throw grenades at him, destroy him with point-blank fire from machine guns, machine guns, and pistols, and unceasingly continue the attack in the indicated direction.

When attacking on infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers), their battle line operates behind tanks at a distance of 100–200 m. Machine gunners and submachine gunners fire through loopholes (over hatches) at targets on the front line of enemy defense in the gap between their tanks. The range of effective small arms fire from short stops is 400 m, from the move 200 m.

For shooting, cartridges with armor-piercing incendiary and tracer bullets (in a ratio of three to one) are used, especially for destroying fire weapons, primarily anti-tank ones. Following the tanks, combat vehicles break into the front line of the enemy's defense and, using the results of fire damage, quickly advance into the depths.

When fighting in the depths of the enemy's defenses, the advance of subunits occurs unevenly, so small arms fire usually has to be fired at intervals and from behind the flanks of one's own subunits. At the same time, it is necessary to follow the rules of shooting, which ensure the safety of their troops. So, the obligatory rule of firing from behind the flanks are two conditions.

Firstly, the smallest angle between the directions to the target and the nearest flank of friendly troops should be 50 thousandths in order to exclude direct hit bullets to his troops due to errors in aiming and lateral dispersion. Secondly, when removing friendly troops ahead of firing up to 200 m, the target must be selected at a distance of at least 500 m. This is necessary to prevent bullets from hitting friendly troops in the event of possible ricochets. Shooting from behind the flanks is allowed only from a place.

In an offensive on hard-to-reach areas of the terrain where motorized rifles operate ahead of tanks, anti-tank grenade launchers, recoilless rifles and other close combat anti-tank weapons should be hit first of all with small arms. Directed fire from machine guns and machine guns should be fired at bushes and various masks, behind which one can assume the presence of fire weapons.

During an enemy counterattack, small arms fire is conducted in cooperation with the fire of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Submachine gunners and machine gunners destroy groups of infantry and crews of fire weapons, starting from a range of 800 m (with concentrated fire from squads). Snipers hit officers, ATGM crews and other important targets. Then the defeat of the enemy ends with an attack. At the same time, small arms fire is carried out on the move at its lying down and retreating groups.

When pursuing, motorized riflemen usually take up positions in infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) and fire from their weapons through loopholes (over hatches) at groups of infantry and anti-tank weapons on the move and from short stops.

During the operation of motorized rifle units as part of tactical airborne assault forces, small arms can be used in flight, for example, from helicopters against ground targets. As the landing force approaches the landing site, the enemy is destroyed on it by airborne weapons fire, and from a range of 400–500 m by small arms fire through viewing windows and entrance doors helicopter.

A variety of tasks had to be solved with small arms during the offensive of our troops during the Great Patriotic War. So, for example, in January 1944, a rifle company of the 155th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division received the task of capturing the enemy's fortified height. It was planned to provide the attack of the company with a 15-minute artillery raid, and to support the offensive with a sufficient number of artillery units. In order to better camouflage in winter conditions, the personnel were dressed in white camouflage coats, weapons were wrapped in white linen, machine guns were painted white and mounted on skis. At dawn, a fire raid of our artillery began, direct fire from 45-mm guns was fired at targets on the front line. Rifle subunits and machine gun crews began advancing from the starting line to the line of attack. After the volley of the rocket battalion, the artillery moved the fire into the depths, and the rifle platoons began to overcome the obstacles along the aisles.

After that, turning into a chain, firing on the move and from short stops on the first trench of the strong point, the arrows attacked the enemy. Heavy machine guns, acting on the flanks of the platoons, fired from stops at the fire weapons found in the stronghold. Suddenly, a machine gun from the enemy's bunker opened fire on the attackers. The platoon operating in this direction suffered losses and lay down. The platoon commander set the task of calculating the easel machine gun, using tracer bullets, to fire at the embrasure of the bunker and in front of it, so that snow dust from falling bullets into the snow would interfere with enemy observation.

Indeed, after that, the machine gun fire became less effective and the platoon commander raised the lying squads to attack. In dashes, they approached the bunker by 150–200 m and also opened fire from light machine guns and submachine guns at its embrasure. Under cover of fire, sappers crawled up to the bunker and blew it up. At this time, other platoons of the company were fighting in trenches and communication passages, successfully using point-blank fire from submachine guns to defeat the enemy. So, by the combined efforts of artillerymen, machine gunners, machine gunners and sappers, the company captured the enemy stronghold.

On the march, in anticipation of entering combat, motorized rifle subunits move in columns with distances between vehicles of 25–50 m, and, if necessary, can move on foot or on skis. At the same time, personnel and weapons must be in constant readiness to repulse enemy airborne assault forces, airmobile and sabotage and reconnaissance groups of the enemy with fire.

The attack of an air enemy is reflected by means air defense and small arms fire. Submachine gunners and machine gunners assigned to fire at low-flying aircraft, helicopters and other air targets, upon a warning signal, are made to fire through the hatches of combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers). Fire is fired at the commands of squad commanders at targets on the opposite course from machine guns and machine guns with continuous fire for 3–4 seconds (the time the target is in the affected area).

When moving on foot during an enemy air raid, a motorized rifle unit, on the orders of commanders, occupies the nearest shelter and opens fire on low-flying aircraft and helicopters.

On halts in the vehicles, duty machine gunners (gunners) remain, fire weapons are assigned to repel an air enemy, including small arms.

Motorized rifle subunits assigned to the march to field guards use small arms in conjunction with the armament of infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers). When meeting with an enemy superior in strength, they ensure the holding of the occupied position, the deployment and entry into battle of the guarded column.

When engaging and conducting a meeting engagement, small arms are used together with all other fire weapons to create fire superiority over the enemy. At the same time, small arms, as the most maneuverable, make it possible to open fire on the enemy in the shortest possible time, destroy his forward infantry groups, foot reconnaissance groups and other targets with fire on the move from loopholes.

When meeting with an enemy superior in strength, the head marching outpost occupies an advantageous line, using all means to ensure the deployment of the main forces of the avant-garde (forward detachment). From small arms, infantry groups advancing behind slippers, crews of fire weapons, and infantry in vehicles are hit.

With the transition of the main forces to the attack, motorized rifle subunits with fire from the armament of infantry fighting vehicles and small arms destroy enemy marching guards.

In the event that the enemy, with superior forces, has forestalled our head outpost in deployment and is advancing, motorized rifle subunits dismount and defeat the enemy with fire from a place, together with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, which take up positions behind the nearest shelters.

During air raids, submachine gunners and machine gunners, appointed by commanders for firing at low-flying aircraft and helicopters, take part in their reflection.

In general, small arms remain the most important fire weapon in modern combined arms combat. Its role is especially great in operations in special conditions, when the capabilities of other fire weapons are limited. For example, in the city, in the forest, in the mountains, etc.

Equally important is the importance of small arms in “low-intensity conflicts”, which refers to local wars, counter-guerrilla actions, the fight against terrorists and other types of armed clashes in which heavy weapons are not used much due to their inefficiency or the limited number of opposing sides. In the future, the important role of infantry weapons will continue.

| |

I am quite sure that no one should hesitate for a moment to resort to arms to protect the priceless gift of freedom, on which all good and evil in life depend, but weapons, I dare add, are the last resort.
George Washington

An interesting article about the "Martial Arts Program of the United States Marine Corps" - the predecessor of the modern one (Marine Training Program for Martial Arts) published in the eighth issue of the magazine "Foreign military review» for 2008. That is, by and large it turns out that the program MCMAP - Marine Corps Martial Arts Program- this is not some kind (or invention) of American military specialists in hand-to-hand combat, but rather just the next stage in the evolutionary development of an applied hand-to-hand combat system for special units.

United States Marine Corps Martial Arts Program

B. Bogdan, candidate of technical sciences

The combat training program for marines, including freshly drafted recruits, traditionally included in the last century and currently provides for training in bayonet and hand-to-hand combat. She was given great importance in terms of educating the necessary fighting qualities of a fighter: endurance, fearlessness, aggressiveness, reaction, dexterity, etc. Over time, this was not enough, and the command of the MP came to the conclusion that it was necessary to further develop and expand this program.

In 1999, the commandant of the US Marine Corps, General D. Jones, ordered the development, and in 2001, to introduce the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) into the recruitment training process. The commandant of the MP borrowed the idea of creating such a program from the Korean marines, with whom he fought together in Vietnam as a lieutenant. He saw their behavior in the fight and their training after the fight. All Asian martial arts, except for the arsenal of fighting techniques, are based on certain philosophical knowledge and moral foundations, which also need to be mastered in order to move to a higher level of skill.

The US Marine Corps martial arts program consists of three disciplines: intellectual training, education of fighting qualities, and direct physical training for combat. The system of colored belts, which determines and stimulates the skill of a warrior, was also borrowed from oriental martial arts.

Unlike the Oriental arts, where archaic weapons are used, the physical fitness of the Marines involves mastering techniques with a knife, improvised objects, a rubber club, a rifle with a bayonet, and with bare hands. All these techniques are accompanied by psycho-emotional, tactical and combat training. Fire training, like many military disciplines, is also considered a martial art, but was not included in the PBMP.

The US Marine Corps has taken advantage of the huge popularity of Eastern martial arts among young people who cannot master them due to lack of free time or financial situation. PBIMP allows you to serve in prestigious landing troops, be financially secure and learn the modern martial arts system, which is a necessity and guarantees promotion.

The implementation of this program began in 2001. In advance, on the basis of the MP Quantico (Virginia), a center for improving the martial arts of the MP was organized. He prepared all the guidance and methodological literature, as well as martial arts instructors from MP sergeants who mastered the techniques of karate, judo, sambo, aikido, freestyle wrestling and other martial arts. By 2001, the center had equipped 150 training sites and trained 700 certified instructors, and in 2002 their number doubled accordingly.

A training place is a platform equipped with all the equipment necessary for training a platoon. The inventory includes: boxing bags, gloves, paws, mouth guards, shells, weapons models, as well as a wrestling pit with a diameter of at least 10 m with sawdust or sand, lined with sandbags along the parapet. Regular MP platoon consists of 45 people, and in training center There are more than 70 people in a platoon.

Intellectual preparation includes two subjects: tactical training and professional military self-education. Tactical training involves the study of the history of military art, techniques and methods of action in combat units corresponding to the rank and position of the trained soldier, the development of skills to take command, make decisions in stressful situations in a combat situation, as well as during leisure and recreation. PBIMP covers military personnel from private to colonel, and the slogan "Every corporal is a strategist" operates in the US MP. Self-education comes down to the study of professional military literature, memoirs, life histories of outstanding military forces of the US and other countries, fiction according to lists compiled by the command of the MP.

Discipline "Education of the character of a warrior-defender" also includes two sections: the core moral and spiritual values of the US MP; development of a team leader. It is aimed at shaping the moral character of the Marine, creating a self-disciplined and self-confident warrior-defender, faithful to the precepts of the US Marine Corps: honor, courage, reliability.

Together with intellectual preparation, this discipline contributes to making the right decisions both in combat and in peacetime (for example, when on vacation).

The command of the MP proceeds from the fact that any private, after several months of service, will find himself in a situation where he will be appointed junior commander of less experienced military personnel. The program "Education of a leader" involves the study of the basic principles of team management, and first of all, such - "do as I do, not as I say."

Discipline "Physical readiness" includes three components: attack and self-defense techniques, combat physical training, combat sports. Techniques of attack and self-defense, in turn, are divided into four topics: bayonet fighting, possession of a knife, the use of improvised objects, combat without weapons.

All three disciplines are divided into blocks, and they are studied at the corresponding level of the color belt. But in the arsenal of any belt there are tricks from all four themes.

Color belt system includes five levels: initial - yellow-brown, then go gray, green, brown and black. A black belt has six degrees. The colors of the belts differ from those adopted in traditional martial arts and are determined by the requirements of the field uniform camouflage manual. The belt itself has a black buckle with the emblem of the US MP and is worn as a trouser belt of a combat field uniform.

Recruits begin training in PBMP at the training center, and they will be able to leave it as Marines when they pass the exams for the right to receive tan belt. Under the guidance of a martial arts instructor, recruits must learn the appropriate program, consisting of basics and 32 techniques, in 27.5 hours and devote another 7 hours to consolidating the acquired skills.

The main requirements at this stage come down to the ability to show a boxing stance and movements, demonstrate your striking surfaces on your arms and legs, indicate points of defeat on the opponent’s body, demonstrate stretching exercises, as well as exercises to strengthen the muscles of the body (exchange of blows to the chest, stomach, arms and legs with a partner).

The yellow-brown belt complex includes: all boxing-style punches; falls and somersaults; all blows with a bayonet and butt; participation in bayonet fights with a boxing stick imitating a rifle with a bayonet, one on one, one against two, two against two; karate-style palm, fist and elbow strikes; kicks and knees, strangulation techniques; tripping throw; protection: from kicks and hand strikes, from suffocation from behind, from capturing the head or over the hands, from capturing a rifle when a fighter is in a cordon; pain holds on the arm and hand; knife strikes, the use of improvised items in combat.

This is followed by 14 topics on which theoretical classes are conducted. The list of topics includes: "Recognition and prevention of suicide of a colleague", "Fundamentals of management science", "Prevention and consequences of sexual harassment" (immediate dismissal from the military, the same in civilian work), "Combating drug use", "MP for equal opportunities for all", "Personal combat readiness and combat readiness of family members", "Brotherly relations between military personnel", "Sexual responsibility". Candidates for the yellow-brown belt have an indulgence: there is no discipline "Intellectual training" - it is replaced by communication with drill sergeants.

gray belt(29 + 14 hours) Marines must receive during training a military registration specialty (VUS) in training battalions. This will require 29 hours plus 14 hours to repeat the techniques of the tan belt and improve. For aviation specialists and representatives of rear services (musicians, cooks, etc.), such a belt is enough. But no one will forbid a marine to continue to improve in PBIMP further, since the presence of a high-rank belt contributes to career advancement.

Green belt(30 + 21 hours) is necessary for tankers, artillerymen, signalmen, sappers - everyone except infantrymen. He ensures the rank of lance corporal in the rear units.

brown belt(35 + 28 hours) is the minimum required in infantry and reconnaissance. The command of the MP believes that the scout is not always obliged to engage in close combat with the enemy, and the infantryman "must get close to the enemy and destroy him in hand-to-hand combat." In other branches of the military, except for the infantry, such a belt is the basis for obtaining the rank of corporal.

Owner black belt 1st degree (34.5 + 35 hours) can apply for the rank of sergeant. All black belt holders must take part in martial arts competitions held by civilian athletes. The 2nd degree can be obtained in a year, the 3rd and 4th in three, and the 5th and 6th in five years. The rank of lieutenant corresponds to a black belt of the 2nd degree, captain - of the 3rd degree, major - of the 4th degree, lieutenant colonel and above - of the 5th and 6th degrees. Accordingly, the ranks of the sergeants are distributed. In addition, to obtain the 5th and 6th degrees, one must have a rank in karate, judo, sambo, aikido or other throwing and shock sports.

Training is carried out mainly in combat uniform, including: a helmet, body armor, unloading belts, two flasks in covers, two pouches for six magazines for the M16A2 rifle or for magazines for the M9 pistol, a cover with a dressing bag. Protective equipment (caps, shells, goggles, shields) must be worn.

Weekly physical training is allotted from 3 hours in rear units to 5 hours in combat units, and 2 hours for PBIMP classes. free time) and weekends. Trainings are conducted under the guidance of martial arts instructors. They can be junior commanders, starting with a junior corporal, who have a green belt. It is accepted that the holder of a belt of a higher degree can be an instructor for those military personnel who have a belt of a lower degree. Instructors become after 40 hours of training and receive a certificate that is considered valid for three years. The minimum number of hours of training per year that an instructor must conduct is 30. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his license. Black belts can be certified as martial arts instructors.

Conducting classes on PBIMP is regulated by several instructions. The most difficult task is to overcome the combat course, the length of which is 12 km. Two teams enter the course, which compete among themselves in the one who will pass the trail faster and at the same time score fewer penalty points. Each team has its own obstacle course. The combat course begins with an accelerated descent from the tower along the rope. After that, half of the team puts on paws, other gloves and performs 10 all types of strikes with each hand. Then the team members switch roles.

Having finished the exercise, the group moves at an accelerated pace to the next training place. On the way, on the instructions of the instructor, she performs rebuilding, overcomes wire obstacles by crawling on all fours. Open areas of terrain, roads intersect, as in a combat situation. Thus, all movements between training places are carried out.

The next exercise is cleaning the house with the use of combat grenades. The house (several rooms without a roof) is made from old car tires. Blank cartridges are used for shelling the premises.

A new training place is a bayonet fighting zone. Each team has its own track, where targets are set up - old tires with a stick fixed on a movable hinge, imitating a weapon that must be beaten off, and then an attack is performed. After running the strip, the Marine returns to the start. After all team members pass the strip, all together they do it again with "frog" jumps.

At the new place, the team again performs 10 punches of all types with their hands. This is followed by an obstacle course, between which there are minefields with mines of pressure and tension action. At the same time, tension mines must be bypassed, and mines buried in the ground should be detected using improvised probes. If the training mine works, then the team is awarded penalty points, and the “wounded” must be dragged to the end of the obstacle course. Pillboxes are installed between the obstacles, which must be detected and tactically competently attacked using blank cartridges and training grenades. At the end of the obstacle course, fighting pits are equipped. Here everyone needs to perform all types of throws (there are three of them) 10 times, after which the team must take the log and take it to the next training place.

Next comes the crossing of a river, pond or lake on improvised swimming facilities. After leaving the water, a fight with a member of the opposite team is planned for 1 minute, and then crossing the river along one rope using the “top” method. After its completion, the weapons are placed in the goats, the marines receive boxes of food and canisters of water, which must be delivered to the "refugees". On the way, "hungry refugees" attack in order to take away food and drink. The team needs to use non-injury techniques to prevent food from being captured and deliver it to the site. Then one more crossing has to be overcome, but already on two ropes, after which each infantryman performs six times the methods of release from suffocating holds.

A team crawls to a new training site, and then competes with another team in a bayonet fight. Further, each participant jumps on a vertical rope hanging over the ditch and must, by the force of inertia, be transferred through the ditch, climb onto the ship's cargo net and go down the drainpipe. Here the team receives a "wounded" who must be processed and carried on a stretcher to the "sanitary" unit. Having moved to a new training site, the teams will have to meet in a bayonet fight in a trench. Then it is necessary to overcome an underground tunnel filled with water without weapons. When overcoming the tunnel, the cadet uses the guide rope. Upon exiting it, a fight with a member of the opposite team is planned for 1 minute. The task is to knock the enemy to the ground without using blows. Next, the teams crawl through the enemy defenses, attacking pillboxes and other fortified points using training grenades and blank cartridges. Wearing protective equipment, team members, armed with improvised weapons, face each other in hand-to-hand combat. From here, by tactical movement, the teams, overcoming obstacles, are sent to a new training place, where they will have one-on-one training fights with bayonet-knives.

The next training place is called "Kosovo". This is a three-rope bridge over a water barrier. Before crossing it, team members put on safety belts and receive a zinc can of cartridges to be delivered to the other side. On the other side, the cadet is met by several "Serbs" who want to cross over to the "Albanian" side. It is necessary, using techniques with and without weapons, to stop them. Then each team member receives a pair of trays with 81mm mines to be delivered to a new training site. Once there, they put on protective equipment and engage in hand-to-hand combat with representatives of the other team, using "boxing" sticks.

Then the cadets will again have to go down the rope from high tower, after which - a wrestling bout for 1 min. Further, overcoming obstacles, they move to a training place called "Ku-Chi". This is a system of underground tunnels and rooms that must be overcome in turn by each member of the team. Historically, the MP faced these obstacles in the 60s and 70s in South Vietnam. Specifically, the tunnel "Ku-Chi" was laid under the headquarters of the 25th Infantry Division. Mines, traps come across in the tunnel, gas and smoke screens are placed, noises are created. Part of the path must be overcome in a gas mask. Upon exiting the tunnel, each cadet meets with an instructor in a boxing match with the task of holding out for 1 minute.

Having finished the boxing fights, the members of the team are tied with a rope and run to the helipad. Here they are released from the rope and perform 10 falls forward, backward and sideways. The space in front of the drop zone is pollinated with pepper gas, which forces the cadet to make a jump before falling. Then the teams are equipped with protective equipment and meet one on one in the "octagon" (a wooden shed with two gates and a horizontal slot around the perimeter), where hand-to-hand fights are held with boxing sticks that mimic rifles with a bayonet. Despite the protective equipment, in the absence of clear control with a boxing stick, you can knock out an opponent. Repeated blows during an unstopped fight can be fatal.

The last training place is the shooting range. Teams remove devices for firing blanks, receive live ammunition and advance to the firing line. After completing the exercise, weapons are checked and unused cartridges are handed over.

Testing. In order to receive the next belt, the applicant must:
know 90 percent all theoretical disciplines;
- master 70 percent. fighting techniques of the next belt;
- attend all theoretical classes and discussions necessary to obtain the desired belt;
-completely complete a self-education program;
- spend the number of hours specified by order in order to master and consolidate new techniques and improve old ones.

Each applicant receives a personal record of the time spent on learning and mastering new ones, as well as on practicing previously learned techniques. The martial arts instructor personally writes on the card the number of the session or topic and the number of hours spent on his/her study or mastery. He confirms his entry by indicating his rank and surname, securing the entry with his signature. This allows you to study according to the program while on business trips, etc. The applicant presents his list, the recommendation of his commander, a certificate stating that he has read the required books and discussed their content to the qualification commission. All this is necessary for admission to the exam. The exam begins with the fact that, at the choice of the commission, the applicant must perfectly perform five tricks from the arsenal of his belts. So, when surrendering to a gray belt, you need to demonstrate five tricks, and when surrendering to a brown one, 15. If the technique is performed technically incorrectly, there is no speed, no effort, then the applicant is not allowed to qualify. If this stage is passed, he must perform all the moves required to obtain the desired belt.

This is followed by theoretical exams. Here, the applicant must not only give definitions, but also be able to prove that the policy of the Marine Corps on this issue is the only true, fair and proven practice over the years. After successfully passing all the disciplines, he is awarded the earned belt and the designation of his VUS changes. If a cadet received a yellow-brown belt, then three letters are added to the designation of his VUS - MMV, when he receives a gray belt, the designation will be MMS, etc. In addition, he can be awarded the next military rank after receiving a belt corresponding to this rank.

Undoubtedly, any of such martial arts as judo, karate, wushu and sambo contains a much richer and more complex arsenal of throwing and striking techniques than PBIMP, but they fight in sportswear. Classes under this program are accompanied by carrying the wounded, ammunition, overcoming obstacles, repeated repetitions of techniques. Some methods of preparing for hand-to-hand combat are clearly borrowed from the practice of the Airborne Forces.

PBIMP has been operating for more than seven years. During this time, it has been repeatedly changed and improved in order to achieve optimal results. The program combined the elements of psychological preparation for combat into a single block, raised the moral and ethical level of the marines, and improved combat and physical training. The Navy has also adopted a similar program for its medical officers, who traditionally provide medical care to the Marines at the landing site. The MP command believes that it has managed to develop a training program for modern, namely martial art, which is a reliable tool in the education and training of marines.

Foreign military review No. 8 2008 P. 62-67

With all the variety of combat situations, the solution of any tactical task is based on three main elements: the movement of infantry while suppressing enemy fire, fire to kill and to suppress and support.

Infantry movement while suppressing effective enemy fire

The infantry solves problems at close distances from the enemy. This may be the range of a grenade, the distance to the next bend in the trench or to the nearest building, or the maximum effective range of small arms fire when operating on treeless flat terrain, and so on. This implies the main condition for the infantry to fulfill its tasks - the need to approach the enemy at a short distance for a given situation.

Closing with the enemy means that the infantry, with rare exceptions, is forced to operate within the range of enemy fire.

Fire modern weapons, if nothing interferes with it, is capable of completely destroying the enemy infantry located in its area of \u200b\u200boperation. Neither the speed of approach nor the number of attacking soldiers matter under these conditions. One machine gun under certain conditions is able to stop the advance of an infantry battalion.

Movement in the zone of action of enemy fire is possible only if this fire is made ineffective or if its conduct is completely stopped.
Thus, the main principle of infantry action is that it is possible to move across the battlefield (approach, retreat, etc.) only by significantly complicating enemy fire, making it ineffective, or eliminating it completely.
At every moment of the battle, the infantryman must look for an answer to the question of what needs to be done in order to make it difficult for the enemy to conduct effective fire.
When planning actions for each moment of time, a procedure should be developed to prevent enemy fire.

Ways to prevent enemy fire a bunch of. These include such different tactics, How:

Shelter from the fire behind an obstacle impenetrable by enemy weapons, in particular, in the folds of the terrain, in buildings or in prepared positions - enemy fire is not effective, because even with proper aiming it hits the barrier, and not the soldier.
obstruction of surveillance the enemy by hiding behind an opaque barrier, by placing smoke, camouflage, etc. - the enemy does not see or sees poorly where he is shooting, it is difficult for him to aim and adjust the fire, which means that the probability of his miss increases. At night, blinding can be used by directing a strong light directly at the enemy, or parallel to his trench, in front of the attacking soldiers. As a very exotic way, one can mention approaching the enemy along the bottom of a reservoir (river) with a bag of stones over his shoulder, a weapon hermetically packed in polyethylene and a breathing tube on the surface.
Reduction of the time given to the enemy to organize fire. Sudden actions and short dashes across the battlefield can be attributed to this method - the enemy does not have time to aim or even take up arms to open fire.
Impact on the psyche the enemy by arousing fear and / or desire in him not to open fire and even stop resistance. This includes the tactics of sniper terror, when the sniper does not allow to stick out of the trench, the impact of a loud sound, and even propaganda.
Distraction actions. Depicts activity in one place while another object is being attacked.
Finally, the main method in the actions of the infantry is the method of suppression by fire. Its essence is that the enemy is fired on in such a way that the enemy is forced to hide behind cover and not protrude from behind him to aim, or his aiming should be prevented by gaps or bullet impacts around him.

Enemy fire can also be hindered as a result of its "self-suppression", that is, the actions of the enemy himself. The most common example of "self-suppression" is movement on the ground, such as moving a machine gun to another place and the usual reloading of weapons. Especially at the beginning of combat contact, the need for reloading occurs almost simultaneously for most of the enemy unit, since the fire is fired at approximately the same intensity from the same type of weapon, and the cartridges in the magazine run out at approximately the same time. There is a sharp short-term decrease in the intensity of the fire.
Such pauses can also be used for movement. Of course, the enemy seeks to avoid "self-suppression" by establishing a firing order "one shoots - the other reloads", but it is not so easy to withstand it.

The principle of combining fire and maneuver, often mentioned in regulations and instructions, cannot be perceived simply as the simultaneous performance of two actions - firing at the enemy and moving across the battlefield. Your fire must suppress the fire of the enemy.
Of course, 100% suppression of all enemy fire weapons without exception cannot be achieved in most cases, although this should be strived for, but enemy fire must be suppressed to such an extent that its impact is minimal.

In particular, in connection with the principle under discussion, I would like to highlight tactics of attacking infantry with chains, enshrined in Soviet combat regulations. Let me remind you that outwardly this tactic does not fully comply with this principle. Indeed, memory paints a picture of a full height infantry firing from machine guns approximately in the direction of the enemy. It would seem, what combination of movement with the suppression of enemy fire in question in this case?!. Only the simple simultaneity of the actions performed is obvious. It seems that the task of effectively suppressing enemy fire is not set at all.

In fact, it must be remembered that Soviet combat regulations were written for the situation of combined arms combat taking place in the breakthrough sector, when artillery and aircraft, as well as tanks, carry out the main fire suppression of the attacked position, and the infantry only gets to suppress individual pockets of enemy fire. In this situation, the automatic fire of a mass of infantry concentrated on a narrow section was considered as a sufficient means to complete the task of final suppression of the enemy.

In addition, this tactic made it possible to use poorly trained infantrymen, and simplified control over the attack. It must be remembered that the use of this tactic in the absence of two essential conditions for its use - a) effective suppression of enemy fire by other branches of the armed forces and b) significant quantitative superiority over the enemy in the attacked sector - leads to significant losses in personnel.
The rule remains the same - first suppress, then move.

If a significant part of the task of suppressing the enemy falls on the infantry, then the most obvious solution would be to assign a special group of infantrymen who suppress enemy fire (fire group) so that another group can move at this time (maneuvering group). During the course of the battle, their role may change. Here is the basis of the tactics of battle groups, which consists in the division of functions, not only between types of weapons, but also between soldiers who have the same weapons. One covers - the other runs.

Fire to kill and to suppress

In combat, it is necessary to evaluate the effect actually achieved by fire - the destruction of an enemy group / subunit or the suppression of its fire weapons and the deprivation of the opportunity to maneuver. After a cessation of suppressive fire, the enemy, as a rule, is able to return to approximately the same level of influence on our troops that he had before. Of course, suppressive fire can knock out individual enemy soldiers and destroy some of his fire weapons, but it cannot disable the enemy combat unit as a whole. The practical consequence of this is the following rule: suppressive fire should be fired only when its effect can be somehow used during its conduct or immediately after its end; and the same rule, stated from a slightly different point of view - while suppressing fire is being carried out, something must be done to exploit its effect. Otherwise, this is a little effective waste of ammunition and chatter, affecting the enemy mainly only psychologically.

You can not mix the suppression of the enemy and the partial loss of his combat capability. If, let's say, 20 or 30% of the enemy's personnel have been knocked out, this does not mean that he will not be able to conduct effective fire, and, accordingly, the enemy may not be suppressed, although the decrease in his combat capability is obvious.
The infantryman must understand that the bulk of the fire that falls on the enemy only suppresses him, inflicting some losses on the enemy, but does not completely destroy him. Even artillery fire on enemy positions, as a rule, allows the enemy to restore the strength of his position after the shelling has ceased, especially if the artillery hits areas, and does not try to fire at previously opened targets. Artillery is capable of destroying the enemy only when he is in an open position.

In essence, in most combat situations for a specific fire weapon, only shooting at small distances for a given type of weapon can be considered fire to destroy: 50-70 meters for machine guns, 100 meters for machine guns. For artillery, this distance is measured in hundreds of meters, but not in kilometers. That is, this is such a distance when a bullet or projectile practically cannot miss, hit the target. And only long-term and / or concentrated firing at long distances can make shooting from this type of weapon a fire to destroy. The effective fire range figures given in the manuals can be taken into account only in cases where the enemy is on an ideally fireable and observable area, that is, in conditions - a target at a shooting range. At medium and long ranges for this type of weapon, the effect of firing for the most part will only be suppression of the enemy.

The range of effective fire is somewhat increased when conducting concentrated fire of an entire unit on one target according to the principle of "heap on one". But even concentrated fire from a certain range becomes only suppressive fire.

If the tactical situation says that suppression of the enemy cannot be used, or it is pointless and will not give any tactical effect, it is better not to fire at all, or to fire a rare harassing fire. The latter does not even suppress the enemy, although it somewhat fetters his actions. The same rule, stated from the point of view of the one under fire: if the enemy fires at suppression, but obviously cannot take advantage of its effect, then such fire can not be answered.

It is also possible not to respond to harassing fire when it comes under fire. This shelling is relatively harmless and the response to it will only give the location of our firepower to the enemy, and will not have a significant effect on the battle. It is recommended to respond only to effective enemy fire. Of course, depending on the situation, a decision may be made to take cover from effective enemy fire (for example, during shelling), but this should not be allowed to ultimately lead to passivity and inaction.

On a misunderstanding of the difference between suppressive fire and destructive fire, one of the "hazing" types of combat is built - combat to deplete the enemy's ammunition.
Its essence is as follows. One of the sides, which has more ammunition or a better ammunition supply system, fires at the enemy from a distance when enemy return fire will not be able to complete the tasks of destroying the attackers. The enemy is lured into conducting a full-fledged firefight. Psychologically, I want to respond with fire of the same intensity. If this succeeds, the enemy begins to quickly use up ammunition and does this until his ammunition runs out. And only after that, the side with the best ammunition supplies approaches and destroys the practically helpless enemy. Often, only after the ammunition is close to exhaustion, the enemy tries to get out of the battle (break through the encirclement, move away). The side with the best ammo supply tries to use this attempt to destroy the enemy. In a situation where the attacker has a clear advantage in ammunition, it is more correct to respond with intense fire only directly to the attack on the position taken, the rest of the time to conduct rare harassing fire.

Security

The essence of the provision is simple. The infantryman must make every effort to:

replenish stocks of ammunition in a timely manner, timely repair weapons and equipment (or replace them with serviceable ones)
receive (obtain) information about the enemy, receive timely information about the actions of your unit and neighboring units, bring information about your actions to neighboring soldiers (groups of soldiers), and, depending on the situation, to neighboring units
understand (establish) the procedure for exchanging messages and using the means of their transmission (radio, flares, field telephones, whistles, signal lights, shots in the air, etc.)
receive (produce) water, food, clothing, medicines, fuels and lubricants for equipment, and do everything possible to organize living at the location in normal sanitary conditions.

The better the support, the easier it is in a combat situation. You can not count on the fact that someone will provide this "security". Where possible, personal contact should be established to obtain support from other units. It helps you get what you want. However, everyone must take care of their own provision. Of course, if someone suddenly helps, then it will be nice, but still you need to rely on your own strength. If one or another type of security should be provided from above, but for some reason, it is not provided, then it is necessary to obtain what is required on an initiative basis, including by independent actions. The principle of self-sufficiency must be respected. For example, it is necessary to establish the exchange of information with neighboring groups of soldiers or, if necessary, even with neighboring units and establish the procedure for transmitting messages to them on your own, without waiting for special instructions from above.

Concluding the review of the three main elements that make up the solution to almost any tactical infantry task, I would like to dwell on one more thing - the concept of combined arms combat. Yes, indeed, interaction with other branches of the armed forces - artillery, tanks, aviation greatly increases the effectiveness of infantry operations. The fact is that each type of weapon has its advantages and disadvantages, its strengths and weak sides, and when used together, mutual reinforcement and mutual compensation of the shortcomings of different types of weapons occur. A classic example is the interaction of infantry with tanks. Tanks suppress enemy firing points, and infantry protects tanks from being destroyed by the enemy, who is trying to take advantage of the presence of dead space around the tank and the fact that the tankers have a narrowing field of view.

However, the infantry must be prepared for the fact that it will have to act without the support of other branches of the military, that is, be ready not only for combined arms, but also for anti-personnel, anti-tank, anti-aircraft combat. As practice shows, the ability of the command to leave the infantry without real support from other branches of the military is limitless: artillery preparation and air bombardment are carried out for show, without real targets, over areas; tanks and artillery are not put on direct fire in order to avoid damage to the sights; during the battle, tanks fight tanks, artillery fights artillery, etc.
The infantry must be prepared to act independently.


[ all articles ]

The doctrine of the fight against tanks in most armies of the countries of the world before the war was a speculative construction that did not have any experience under it. Pre-war conflicts in which tanks were used (the war in Spain, the Italian expansion in Ethiopia) provided little information for analysis when only light tanks were used, and in relatively small quantities. There were also too few anti-tank weapons to evaluate their effectiveness. The results of the maneuvers turned out to be uninformative, since it is very difficult to accurately simulate the actions of enemy tanks. Obviously, real experience in the massive use of tanks was required.

There were two schools of thought regarding the use of the tank in different ways. Some specialists insisted on carrying out massive breakthroughs in the enemy's defenses, followed by a quick and deep wedging into the enemy's territory. Other specialists they saw in the tank just a means of supporting the infantry. Practice has shown that both schools were right. However, a tank is an expensive weapon, so in all armies there was a tendency to save tanks. Even in the German army, where the absolute predominance was in the first school, it was supposed to keep the tanks 100 meters behind the infantry line, from where they should support the infantry with fire from machine guns and cannons.

The evolution of anti-tank tactics

1939-42

Infantry anti-tank tactics developed in different ways in different armies, which was determined by local specifics. In general, there are two approaches to this issue.

Passive protection. It includes patrols and outposts designed to warn of the appearance of tanks, anti-tank barriers and minefields, the use of artificial barriers to natural barriers, the use of other factors that can delay the movement of tanks, strengthen anti-tank protection, and camouflage.

active defense. The choice of good positions for anti-tank weapons, the definition of sectors of fire, the use of anti-tank weapons, the formation of infantry detachments of tank destroyers, the use of reserves for a counterattack.

Since mobility is an inherent property of a tank, and infantry anti-tank defense is usually of a static nature, the initiative always belongs to tanks. According to J.F.K. Fuller: " Tanks conquer, infantry hold". As a rule, this principle is correct, but anti-tank defense has a certain offensive potential. Even the very first primitive self-propelled anti-tank guns mounted on the chassis of trucks or obsolete tanks could conduct offensive operations to some extent.

Click image for a larger view:

Regardless of the country, an infantry company built its defensive positions in the same way.

Regardless of the country, an infantry company built its defensive positions in the same way. The differences were caused only by what anti-tank weapons and in what quantities were available. Usually two platoons of the company moved forward, and the third was in reserve. However, the formation could change depending on the tactical situation.

Combat guards (1) are advanced far ahead in order to notice the approaching enemy in advance and prevent him from conducting reconnaissance. The forward posts of the battalion, regiment, and division were pushed even further forward. Most anti-tank weapons (2) cover the tank-dangerous direction, and machine guns (3) keep the area impassable for tanks at gunpoint, where enemy infantry can appear. Anti-tank barriers (4) are presented here in the form of gouges. These barriers are erected, if time permits, and applied to natural barriers (5). The bridge across the river was blown up (6), a minefield was organized at a key point (7), the road was blocked by a blockage (8) of fallen trees. Infantry anti-tank weapons - anti-tank rifles, bazookas or PIATs - are available one for each platoon, but the company commander can concentrate them in one place. The defensive positions of a company can be reinforced with one or more anti-tank guns (9), especially if there is a tank-dangerous direction here. This area is additionally targeted by field artillery and mortars, the fire of which helps to cut off the infantry from the tanks. Anti-tank defense is echeloned in depth. To do this, some infantry anti-tank weapons are left in the rear or on the flank. One or more teams of armor-piercers (10) are preparing to intercept the tanks that managed to break through the forward positions of the company. Sometimes anti-tank mines cover the nearest approaches and flanks (11).

Spoiler: Company anti-tank defense

Infantry mobility is limited, it is especially limited when repelling a tank attack. Motorized infantry differs little from conventional infantry, as trucks or armored personnel carriers are too vulnerable to tank fire, and also have limited cross-country ability compared to tanks. The armament of motorized infantry differs little from the armament of ordinary infantry. Tank destroyer infantry units can move only within limited limits, their actions are purely defensive.

Anti-tank defensive measures were carried out during the organization of any defense. The determining factors were the scope of tank operations carried out by the enemy, the known tactics of using tanks by the enemy, the number and type of anti-tank weapons available, as well as terrain conditions. Infantry Regiment (in English army infantry brigade), as a rule, took up defense, having two battalions in the first line and one battalion in reserve. In each battalion, two rifle companies were in the front line and one company in reserve. The same construction scheme was used at the company-platoon level. That is, about a third of the available forces were in reserve. This provided the proper depth of defense. The effectiveness of anti-tank weapons depended largely on infantry support. This required a high degree of coordination.

German Panzerkampfgruppe in ambush (1944-45):

Click on the diagram to enlarge

Toward the end of World War II, the German army found itself in a difficult position. The Germans increasingly had to resort to infantry tactics to fight the Allied tanks. The situation was saved a little by the fact that a very effective anti-tank weapon appeared at the disposal of the German infantry. This diagram shows the positions of the battle group (vorgeschobene Stellung) covering one of the marches to the anti-tank defense strong point (Panzerabwehrgeschutz) located in the village outside the picture. Usually such groups had the task to hold out until the order to withdraw was received or until a predetermined time. This tactic very often put the allies to a standstill., as the fierce battle suddenly stopped, and the enemy disappeared. As a rule, the abandoned positions were immediately covered by German artillery. In order to hold back the advance of the British tanks (1), the Germans laid minefields (2) where anti-tank mines are used along with anti-personnel mines.

Anti-personnel mines not only made it difficult for sappers to work, but also interfered with the evacuation of blown up tanks, and prevented infantrymen from using tank hulls as cover. The few anti-tank guns available, in this case the 5 cm Pak 38 (3), are used singly rather than concentrated. The flank was covered with a 20 mm anti-aircraft gun (4). A squad with six 8.8 cm RP 54 Panzerschrecks were positioned in the center (5). Each calculation dug itself a V-shaped cell, directed with two ends forward. The trench was usually dug around the trees. If it was necessary to dig a trench in an open field, it was additionally masked. This form of trenches allowed the calculation to fire on tanks, regardless of the direction of their approach. If the first calculation number occupied one shoulder of the trench, then the second one hid in the second shoulder. In a few buildings, snipers take up position (6). Buildings attracted allied fire. Pairs of panzergrenadiers armed with panzerfausts scattered across the entire depth of the defense (7). Their task is to intercept the tanks that managed to break into the depth of the position. The shortage in manpower was partially compensated for by rapid-fire machine guns MG 34 or MG 42 (8), capable of maintaining an unusually dense fire along the front. Machine guns cut off the infantry from the tanks. English tankers joked that as soon as machine-gun bullets click on the armor, the infantrymen hide in holes like rabbits.

For support, the German infantry was often given other types of weapons. For example, the foreground of the German defense was shot down with 80-mm and 120-mm mortars, which will cover the enemy with fire, as soon as he approaches the positions (9). In the rear, assault guns (10) occupy positions, which are dug in and are waiting for an order to join the battle in the event of a deep breakthrough of the enemy. The Americans estimated that permanent fortifications such as the "Siegfried Line" strengthened the German defenses by only 15% relative to their usual field fortifications. Digging in German tanks and self-propelled guns increased their effectiveness by 40%, they represented more difficult goal than dot.

When a division has established defensive positions, the division's reconnaissance units, as well as units detached from the reserve, provide cover. The units advanced forward do not allow enemy patrols to move forward, monitor its activity, prevent a surprise attack, warn about the start of an attack, and are also the first to engage the enemy. This outpost can use anti-tank weapons allocated from regimental and divisional reserves. After the main line of defense is equipped, part of the outpost moves back, but the cover is not completely removed. Each regiment and battalion also provides itself with additional cover by organizing forward posts, observation and listening posts, and sending out patrols. Anti-tank guns can be pushed forward if there is a very high danger of enemy tanks being used. However at the beginning of the second world war, anti-tank weapons were too scarce to put them at risk by pushing forward.

Ideally anti-tank obstacles should be located in front of the main front of the defenders. These can be minefields, anti-tank ditches, natural barriers (rivers, swamps, ravines). It is also possible to create simplified obstacles: blockages, separate mines installed at key points, blown up bridges. Lack of time often prevents the organization of serious anti-tank obstacles.

The infantry battalion had two to six anti-tank guns. These guns were attached to rifle companies and installed in areas where there was danger of tanks. The reliability of the defense depended on its depth. Several enemy tanks could easily break through, so a reserve was needed. Anti-tank rifles, which were in battalions and companies, were usually located along with rifle platoons. The effectiveness of anti-tank guns could be increased by concentrating fire from several guns on one tank. The infantry also prepared hand and rifle anti-tank grenades, anti-tank hand mines, and improvised anti-tank weapons for combat.

The actions of the English armor-piercers (1943-44),
Click image for a larger view:

Highlands of Italy

The mountainous terrain of Italy did not favor the use of tanks. Settlements here are located on mountain ranges, usually the only road leads to them, easily blocked by mines and rubble. However, blockages were rarely used, as they warned the enemy of an impending ambush. Instead, infantrymen who had taken refuge in an ambush disabled the lead vehicle of the column. As a result, the entire column lost its course and became the target for an artillery raid. In this illustration, a 7.5 cm StuG III assault gun and an SdKfz 251/1 armored personnel carrier will be ambushed.

There was no way to dig in the rocky ground. Therefore, soldiers use the available shelters: rocks, the remains of a stone wall, as well as piled stones. The last shelter of the British was called "sangar". Outwardly, the sangar looked like a simple pile of stones. In the middle of 1943, the RIAT (1) grenade launcher was adopted by the British army, which replaced the Boys anti-tank guns and rifle grenades No. When fired, the spring pushed the rocket out and pierced the primer of the rocket engine. The recoil of the rocket engine again cocked the spring into firing position, but sometimes this did not happen. Then the soldier had to manually cock the spring. Under fire, it was almost impossible to do this, since it was necessary to pile on with the whole weight of the body. The 3.5-inch Mk 1A missile with a HEAT warhead (2) weighed 1.2 kg and penetrated armor up to 100 mm thick. However, the design of the rocket was imperfect.

The No. 75 (3) Hawkins anti-tank grenade was actually a small mine that was buried in the ground or thrown like a grenade. Five or six of these grenades are tied to a rope tied across the road. Heavier anti-tank mines could also be used in a similar way. One infantryman holds a No. 77 phosphorus smoke grenade (4) and a No. 73 anti-tank grenade (5) at the ready. Grenade No. 73 was a one and a half kilogram charge of ammonal or nitrogelatin. Such a grenade pierced armor up to 50 mm thick, but was especially effective against tank tracks. With a total weight of 2 kg and dimensions of 30x8 cm, this grenade could be thrown only 10-15 meters. The grenade was equipped with an Allways impact fuse. In flight, a fixing tape was unwound from the fuse, after which a check fell out. The actions of the group are covered by the calculation of the light machine gun "Bren" (6), which took an armored personnel carrier under the gun.

Slider: Description of the actions of the English armor-piercers

If the defensive position passed through the forest, it was organized in the depths of the forest, and not along the edge. As a result, the enemy lost the ability to fire direct fire. In the forest, the mobility of tanks was limited, and there were also shelters that facilitated the actions of infantry detachments of tank destroyers and the camouflage of anti-tank weapons. The infantry dug into the ground as deep as possible. The trench or rifle cell allowed the soldier to lie down, having at least half a meter above him. Separate firing positions were interconnected by trenches, allowing infantry to move safely through positions depending on the tactical situation. For a sustainable defense, it was important so that the infantry knows the weak points of the tank, had confidence that tanks could be fought. Otherwise, the infantry will simply scatter when tanks appear. Infantrymen must be able to let the tank pass over them, lying between the tracks on the ground or at the bottom of the trench. Infantrymen should be aware that the closer a tank is, the less dangerous it is to a person and becomes more vulnerable to hand-held anti-tank weapons. In the immediate vicinity of the tank there is a dead zone that is not shot through by tank machine guns. Depending on the situation, the infantryman can either let the tank pass him or attack him with hand grenades. In any case, the task of the defending infantry is to fight the enemy infantry accompanying the tanks.

Infantry anti-tank guns are sometimes advanced to the front line, but more often they are kept in the depths of the defense: in a tank-dangerous direction or where it will be more convenient to advance in one direction or another. Early defensive doctrines usually assumed that enemy tanks should be engaged at the greatest possible distance. However, the experience of the first battles showed that it is much more efficient to wait until the tanks approach the minimum distance may be up to several hundred meters. Fire at short distances is characterized by increased accuracy. This principle proved to be effective even for the flat North African desert. Machine guns and mortars should concentrate their fire on the infantry, cutting it off from the tanks.

Anti-tank guns are located in the depths of the defense, taking on tanks that have broken through the front line of defense. If necessary, regimental reserves should be brought into battle. If the battle is fought in a closed area, it is convenient for infantry to fight tanks with the help of hand-held anti-tank weapons. A divisional tank destroyer battalion is usually held in reserve, although individual guns can be used to reinforce rifle units. If a division is reinforced with tanks, they are kept in reserve in case of a possible counterattack. In the offensive, anti-tank crews accompany the infantry, keeping a little behind. If enemy tanks are encountered, anti-tank guns roll forward and engage in combat. Anti-tank guns can also be used to deal with enemy pillboxes and bunkers, as well as to cover the flanks.

< Назад		Next >

Stylish things

1 0 0

If you find an error, please select a piece of text and press Ctrl+Enter.