Phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz. Alfred Schutz structure of everyday thinking Schutz structure of everyday thinking briefly

Tatiana Tyagunova*

View ethnophenomenologically

Annotation . The article makes an attempt, starting from those conceptualizations of everyday reality contained in the works of Schutz, to look at everyday life from an empirical perspective - from the perspective of how everyday life is practiced. The consequence of this empirical view is a reconceptualization of the concept of everyday life - everyday life is considered not as an attribute of the life world of everyday life as the “ultimate area of ​​meaning”, but as a formal feature of any social practice, which, in turn, requires a change in the research setting.

Keywords . Phenomenology, everyday life, life world, routine actions, social practices, practical reflexivity, intersubjectivity.

With the “light hand” of Alfred Schutz, or more precisely, Edmund Husserl, the everyday life world is the world in its unproblematic reality. In his last job“The Structures of the Lifeworld,” published posthumously,1 Schutz gives the following definition: “The everyday lifeworld is to be understood as that area of ​​reality which the waking, normal adult individual, in the common sense attitude, discovers as simply given. “The ‘merely given’ designates everything that we experience as beyond doubt, any state of affairs that for the time being appears as unproblematic.” But what does “unproblematic” mean? The unproblematic, as not subject to doubt, as a matter of course, has become a common (primarily in sociological language) attribute of everyday life. The self-evident consequence of such a characterization is, among other things, the definition of everyday action as an action that is fundamentally unreflective. Undoubtedly, Schutz fully inclines towards this when he writes: “the self-evident (das Fraglosgegebene) always represents a level of perception that does not seem to require further analysis.” I propose to dwell on this given-as-not-need-to-question—but not in order to once again subject (theoretical) reflection to (non-reflective) everyday action (Schütz perfectly

* Tyagunova Tatyana Vasilievna– Researcher at the Center for Educational Development Problems of the Belarusian State University.

© Tyagunova T., 2009.

© Center for Fundamental Sociology, 2009.

1 The book was written by Schutz's student Thomas Luckmann, based on the plan and drafts prepared by Schutz shortly before his death for the project "Structures of the Lifeworld", conceived as a continuation of the book "Meaning Structure" published in Springer-Verlag in 1932 social world"(the only one published by Schutz during his lifetime, if you do not take into account his numerous articles). In the preface to the new edition of Structures... in 2003, Luckman writes that he followed exactly the plan drawn up by Schutz, except for two “significant” deviations. The first is associated with a change in the internal structure of the third chapter, devoted to the consideration of the subjective stock of knowledge, which entailed the need to add a new chapter (it is listed at number 4 as “Knowledge and Society”). The second change concerns the final (in Schutz's original plan) chapter on the methodology of the social sciences - Luckman excluded it from the final version, since, as he writes, it basically did not go beyond what was formulated in the essay “Ordinary and Scientific Interpretation human action"

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did this work) or perhaps to explicate the “self-evident” of sociological understanding itself (which would be no less presumptuous). My goal is somewhat different: starting from those conceptualizations of everyday reality contained in Schutz’s works, to look at everyday life from an empirical perspective - from the perspective of how everyday life is practiced. I will try to show that this task will require, in turn, a reconceptualization of the very concept of everyday life, on the one hand, and a change in the research setting, on the other.

Ontological lining of everyday life

For Schutz, the everyday life world represented the supreme reality: the world of everyday life is the generic space of all possible areas of meaning. The everyday world is the world of routine activities, or the world of work2. However, Schutz notes, “routine is a category that can be found at any level of activity, not just in the world of work, although it plays a decisive role in the supreme reality - at least because the world of work is the locus of all possible social relationships , and acts of work are prerequisites for all types of communications.” Let's dwell on this passage for now. In what sense are routines found in any activity? Doesn't it follow from this that any activity is fundamentally everyday? For Schutz, of course not. Although routine actions are everyday actions, everyday reality and routine are by no means identical concepts. Moreover, Schutz argues, none of the alternative domains of meaning are compatible with meaning Everyday life: the actions (theorizing) of a scientist and the actions of a direct participant in everyday interaction situations (or the actions of a scientist as a direct participant in these situations) are mutually exclusive. Schutz masterfully tries to get around the ambiguity hidden in the stated thesis, firstly, by conceptualizing the “action” itself in a special way (1), and secondly, through a scrupulous elaboration of one of the key concepts in his theory - the concept of “relevance” (2)3.

(1) Schutz strictly distinguishes between the concepts of “behavior”, “action”, “work”, “execution” and simply “thinking”. In particular, “behavior that is planned in advance, i.e., based on a pre-formulated project ... will be called action, regardless of whether it is external or hidden.” Purposeful action, characterized by the intention to implement a project, is execution, which can also be either external or hidden; an example of the latter is attempting to mentally solve a scientific problem. Finally, work should be understood as external performances (as opposed to (hidden) performances of mere thinking) requiring bodily movements. Thus, it is one thing to think, another thing, for example, to build a garage. The conclusion is banal, and it would not be worth focusing on if not for two important points with which the initial distinction is connected. Firstly, Schutz considers thinking from an egological perspective, as a purely private act, an internal process that has an external plane of expression. (This is not the place to dwell on how the demystification of this privacy, begun primarily by G. Ryle and L. Wittgenstein and continued by conceptual analysts, showed the social - external - lining of this "internal" matter, i.e. on what, like language , so thinking should be considered rather as socially organized things, and not in the categories of mental processes). Secondly, and more importantly, thinking, just like acts of work, is an action (but executed, unlike the latter, on an internal level) and, just like acts of work, can be routine, i.e. habitual,

2 Routine activities, writes Schutz, are “a set of tasks habitually performed almost automatically in accordance with instructions that have been learned and successfully practiced until now.”

3 Of course, Schutz's line of reasoning does not coincide with the way it is presented here, but for the present discussion this difference is not significant.

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unproblematic character. However, actions categorized as scientific (and scientific actions proper for Schutz are precisely the actions of thinking, or more precisely, the actions of theoretical contemplation) are not routine in the sense in which acts of work in the world of everyday life are. Although not routine actions, they can nevertheless also be carried out in a familiar, unproblematic manner; moreover, they involve the implementation of routine acts of work. What is the matter here is explained by the second Schutzian concept, namely, the concept of relevance systems.

(2) Schutz points out that “routine activity at each level is characterized by a special transformation... structures... relevances.” Constitutive of the reality of the world of everyday life are the routine actions of work - i.e. such actions in the external world, which are based on a project and are characterized by the intention to implement the projected state of affairs with the help of bodily movements, are included in any activity, be it the activity of a scientist carrying out his scientific research, a composer composing another sonata, or, of course, a visitor grocery store or subway passenger. However, if for a grocery store visitor his acts of work (for example, the act of buying a pack of tea or salt) form “both the scene and the object” of his activity, then for a scientist his acts of work (for example, carrying out experimental measurements or writing an article) form no more than as a background, the material basis of scientific actions themselves, determined by another system of (motivational, thematic and interpretative) relevances, which is given by its theoretical setting and, being accepted, is considered as an unproblematized given. “All these activities,” writes Schutz, “works performed in the world and belonging to it, are either conditions or consequences of theorizing, but do not belong to the theoretical attitude as such, from which they are easily separable.” Here, however, the following methodological problem arises, which J. Habermas rightly points out. If a change in the system of relevances due to the adoption of a theoretical attitude should guarantee “the compatibility of the constructs of the social scientist with the constructs of ordinary experience of social reality,” then, says Habermas, Schutz would have to explain the methodological role of the relevances associated with the scientific system with special value orientations. “He would have to show why exactly they help solve the problem of relating theory building to the communicatively clarified pre-theoretical knowledge that the social scientist discovers in his subject area, without at the same time linking the significance of his statements to (discovered or the context of the life world brought by him." From Habermas’s point of view, the change from a natural attitude to a theoretical one, as a result of which the actions of theorizing form a kind of figure against the background of the actions of work (presuming included participation in the situation under study), cannot guarantee the objectivity of understanding the processes under study, since this objectivity is achievable only on the basis of intersubjectivity, which means - based on the position of (even a virtual) participant, and not a detached observer.

Thus, routine activities form the background for other activities. She is essentially marginal. Routine actions are always performed “in the name” of other actions, they serve to perform activities defined, in Schutz’s terms, by a system of higher-order relevances. In this sense, they are more than unproblematic: not problematized not only in relation to ends (motivational relevance) and means (interpretive relevance), but also as such, that is, thematically. More precisely, they are thematically relevant, but in a paradoxical way, representing, so to speak, a “tamed topic” (topic-in-hand)4. A “tamed topic” is a non-thematizable problem, i.e. something that represents a problem, but not as such, but only in relation to

4 Routine knowledge, says Schutz, is a kind of “knowledge-in-hand”.

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this state of affairs. Thus, the organization and conduct of an interview by a researcher within the framework of the scientific problem he is solving will be such a tamed topic, subordinated to another thematic relevance, serving as a scheme for selecting and interpreting data; it forms a non-thematizable problem (I know how to solve it in a typical situation using typical means) - until, say, the recorder breaks down; then from a non-thematizable background it turns into a thematizable problem (replacing or repairing a voice recorder). Routine for Schutz forms the ontological basis of any activity in general, be it solving current everyday affairs, carrying out scientific research or immersion in the world of art5. In addition, this is also a category that has a gradual characteristic: the reality of the everyday is the reality of the typical, while the routine reality of the everyday is the reality of the highly typical, in fact “standardized and automated.”

Typical vs. orderly

Schutz's understanding of routine is remarkable primarily in two respects. Firstly, the self-evident, unproblematic character is not an attribute exclusively of the everyday world: it is inherent in any theoretical and practical activity (moreover, this feature applies not only to actions within the framework of the corresponding system of relevances, but also to the systems of relevances themselves, which, however, it brings us back to the question posed by Habermas regarding the privileged status of the scientific system of relevances and the value orientations associated with it in comparison with the systems of relevances of practical figures). Secondly, the world of everyday life is a world not only of the unproblematic, but also of the constantly problematized (the tamed topic every now and then “falls out of hand”). It is the latter circumstance that I intend to take further as a starting point and show that everyday life is fundamentally detectable in any activity, but not as an ontological lining of routine acts and a set of typified action patterns, but as

essential feature of any socially organized practice . The question, then, sounds like this: how exactly there is an unproblematic solution to current tamed problems asproblems-related-to-this-state-of-affairs?Let's analyze two fragments of the transcript, which is a transcript of the recording of the academic exam. 6 .

Fragment 1

5 Schutz, however, is far from postulating ontology boundaries between different areas of the lifeworld; these are just different levels of reality, and real to the extent that they are given the accent of reality.

6 The recording was made during the winter examination session of 2008 at one of the universities in Minsk; The original audio file is stored by the author of this article and can be provided upon request to anyone.

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12 Art. Well, this feeling is =a: (2.0) some kind of thing, probably some kind of

13 chus/sensitivity of the body to influences =

14 Etc. = this sensation [mental process

16 occurs when exposed to some irritants↓

17 a:: (2.0) and

18 Etc. what is the impact

19 Art. on::: person.

20 (2.0)

21 Ave. and more specifically

22 Art. a: n on the human body/well=on: the human body. (.) skin.

23 Etc. [to the senses

24 Art. [to the human senses

As you can see, the student is faced with a certain problem, namely: to define “sensation”, and, accordingly, with the need to solve this problem. Let's look at how this happens.

The difficulty clearly revealed by the student’s actions is related to the teacher’s request for a definition of “sensation.” With his request, the teacher shows what the structure of the answer should be in this case (pp. 03–04) and, by saying “let’s start over,” indicates this structural incompleteness in the student’s answer. “At first” here in no way refers to the astronomical flow of time, it is organizational moment current interaction, labeling the latter as an “exam answer”, suggesting a certain sequence: “first” is defined.

The student tries to give a definition, which, however, turns out to be unsatisfactory, and with her laughter she demonstrates that she herself recognizes its unsatisfactoryness. In its tautology, the answer can be accepted as quite sufficient, for example, in a situation of non-institutional interaction, in a conversation between non-professionals, but it is not correct in the situation of a student’s answer on an exam formulating “the definition of a mental process.” The latter presupposes that the answer must be formulated in terms of professional language; moreover, their professional relevance is created, as can be seen from lines 12–24, thanks to a specific discursive order. In other words, the formulation of the definition must demonstrate not just knowledge of professional terminology (i.e., the use of the words “sense organs” instead of the words “organism” or “skin”), but specific speech practice corresponding to what is considered to be the “formulation of the definition of a mental process " In this regard, the replacement of “what a person feels” with “the sensitivity of the body to influences” is considered by the teacher as inadequate (which means: it does not reproduce the formal beginning of the definition, which should begin with the words “this is a mental process ...”), which he shows by her correction of the student's answer in line 14.

Lines 09–14 also provide insight into what the teacher is saying: the student must “concentrate and think.” To think means demonstrate that specific order of statements that corresponds to the practice of formulating a “definition”. When a teacher corrects a student’s answer by defining sensation as “the body’s sensitivity to influences,” does this mean that the student “didn’t think”? Rather, it indicates that the teacher still does not detect in her response an adequate speech structure that she is expected to know and actualize in relation to the current situation in such a way that her “knowledge” is evidenced from the very way she speaks, those. she must use professional terms and reproduce a specific speech pattern. J. Coulter, considering the process of “understanding,” writes in this regard: ““Understanding”...

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can mean knowing how to act, knowing how to use a word, tool, map or any other contextually relevant object, knowing how to behave, knowing what will happen next, and a variety of other things." Like “understand,” “think” means publicly demonstrating a certain (speech) practice that is consistent with the occasional circumstances of its contextual implementation. The student’s actions in the fragment under consideration clearly reveal a discrepancy with what is expected of her in this situation.

For both the student and the teacher, the use of specific terms of professional language means formulating an answer to exam question, i.e. their use is carried out internally and is subject to a specific educational task. In this regard, the student's use of professional words and expressions is embedded in her demonstration of her preparedness. The student demonstrates this preparedness in the first two lines: she shows that she “knows” how to answer the question on her exam card, using the terms “psychophysiological” and “psychophysical”, which should serve as visible evidence of her knowledge. Her knowledge of the meaning of these terms is knowledge of the way they are used to-answer-a-student-on-an-exam. In this sense, through the definition she gives of the word “sensation” (“sensation… is what a person feels,” pp. 05–06), the student discovers that she was not prepared for this issue. At the same time, she demonstrates her understanding of the meaning of this word as a word of natural language, used equally (as opposed to the words “psychophysiological” or “mental process”) by professional psychologists and ordinary members of society. However, the demonstration turns out to be problematic - not as such, but in relation to a given situation that requires a “different” understanding, or a different language game, as Wittgenstein would say - “understanding” is as varied as the practices of linguistic use.

What does this example show us? First of all, how within and through the actions carried out, i.e. within the corresponding context, there is an ordering and endowment of meaningfulness with what is carried out as an “answer to an exam”, thereby giving the situation a reproducible, recognizable, in short, routine character of an “answer to an exam”. exam." And although this implementation is unproblematic in general, it is fundamentally problematizable in its specific implementations. Neither the student nor the teacher question what is happening. However, the certainty of what is happening as an answer-to-exam is ensured not by each participant having a typified idea of ​​what the exam means, but by an ordered sequence of mutually oriented actions. The answer on the exam is a situation of mutual agreements that are of an occasional nature. Of course, this situation is defined: the student answers, the answer is accepted and the teacher evaluates it. However, the method of carrying out these actions is quite dynamic and variable: it does not embody a certain given answer-on-exam pattern, but is implemented at each moment in time based on and taking into account specific circumstances. The answer on the exam, to use the expression of D. Zimmerman, is the “temporary achievement of the participants in the situation”7. In other words, answering an exam is practiced, and this practice

7 Wed: “ Character traits The settings perceived by its participants include, among other things, its historical continuity, its structure of rules and the relationship of the actions performed in it to those rules, as well as the ascribed (or achieved) statuses of its participants. Viewed as a temporary achievement of the participants in the setting, these features will be called the occasional corpus of setting features. Using the term “occasional corpus”, we want to emphasize the fact that the features of socially organized activity are particular, contingent implementations of the production and recognition of the work of participants in the activity. We emphasize the occasional character of this corpus in comparison with the corpus of knowledge of the members, their skills and beliefs, always prior to and independent of any actual circumstances in which this knowledge, skills and beliefs are manifested or recognized. The latter is usually called “culture.”

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is occasional in its implementation - not in the sense that there is a filling of a certain abstract (typical) pattern or form with the features of a specific situation and the structuring of the latter according to this form; rather, this form itself turns out to be the resulting effect of the local implementation of an ordered, coordinated

And mutually identifiable activities. In the case discussed above, the answer to the exam takes the form of a consistent coordination of two speech practices: not just two languages, relatively speaking, ordinary (“sensation is what a person feels”) and professional (“sensation is a mental process...”) , but two different practices of using words intersecting in an academic exam situation. Likewise, the student turns out to be an unprepared student(not-knowing-the-definition-of-sensation) not before the answer, but during and as a result of the local configuration of the joint actions of a given teacher taking an exam and a given student taking this exam.

Typical knowledge of what it means to take an exam - for example, take an exam ticket, sit down at a table, write down on a piece of paper what will constitute the answer to the question on the ticket, voice what is written to the teacher, answer the teacher's questions - may well give some idea of ​​​​what is happening and at the same time say nothing about what is happening. And it’s not so much that everything depends on specific details, but that the “what” of what happens lies in its “how.” One

And the same action, for example, answering a question, can be carried out by both the student and the teacher and, accordingly, can be ordered in completely different ways. In the passage below (Fragment 2), not only the student, but also the teacher “answers.” But these are different answers.

Fragment 2

09 Art.: e=m::

10 (17.0)

11 St.: I don’t remember anymore

12 Ex: well, you just named the first four words

13 (2.0)

14 St.: well, unrestrained, right? (1.0) yes?

15 Ex: no, when you said there was such and such a type (2.0) according to Pavlov

16 (1.0)

17 Art.: yes?=

18 Ex: =yes

19 Art.:<<смеётся>>

20 (1.0)

21 St.: yes. strong type

22 Ex: so he put what is the first property of the nervous system

23 (2.0)

24 St.: well:: (1.0) well, not strength of character but

25 (1.0)

26 Ex: strength (1.0) [nervous system

32 (1.0)

33 Art.: e:::: (1.0) a=calm yes?=

34 Ex: =no

35 (11.0)

36 Art.: maybe emotional

37 (1.0)

38 Ex: we are talking about the properties of the nervous system and not about: (.)

39 characteristics of a person (2.0) and these properties relate

40 to two main processes that are characteristic of the nervous

41 systems are processes (2.0) excitation and (4.0)

42 Art.: excitement and (2.0) well, you can’t say calm↓

43 Ex: [braking

The teacher asks the student to name the properties of the nervous system (p. 07), which causes obvious difficulties for the latter (p. 08–10). The student justifies his inability to answer by saying that “he no longer remembers” (p. 11). The situation is constituted as a situation of both an answer and a non-answer: the student does not remain silent and does not say that he does not know, but answers in a way that allows him to position himself as potentially knowing, but not remembering, and the word “already” should be emphasized, that he was preparing. Thus, the student expands the scope of the current situation as a situation of answering an exam, connecting it with the previous situation of preparation. This does not mean that in other cases the answer in the exam is strictly limited to what is happening here and now. On the contrary, the actual examination situation always includes a reference to what precedes it as “preparation for the examination” and is constituted on the basis of the unspoken and mutually implied assumption that before coming to the examination, the student is preparing for it, so that the exam itself becomes visible evidence of preparation. However, in this case, reference to the situation preceding the preparation is used as a resource to justify the inability to demonstrate the knowledge that is expected of the student. The word “already” in the student’s answer is contrasted with “just” in the teacher’s statement following it (p. 12). Thus, the teacher returns the relevance of what is currently happening, emphasizing what was said by the student here and now: “just now.” He contrasts the student’s strategy of “demonstrating knowledge means remembering and updating what has been learned,” as further exchange shows, with the strategy “demonstrating knowledge means reasoning” (pp. 22, 38–41): objecting to the student’s words “I don’t remember anymore,” the teacher with his remark “well, you just named the first four words” indicates that the student still knows, but not in the sense that he remembers, but rather in the sense that he must draw a conclusion from what was “just” said (in the line 22 this expectation is demonstrated most clearly: “so what did he put…”). This appeal to what was actually said deprives the student of the opportunity to appeal to memory as a resource of knowledge (pp. 14–20). The student begins to use the “guessing” strategy (p. 14). However, the failure of its application, revealed by the teacher’s subsequent remark (p. 15), forces the student to adjust his further actions and, as can be seen from lines 24 and 42, he subsequently uses another strategy, which can be characterized as the strategy of “preempting the wrong answer” (“well, not strength of character,” p. 24; “well, you can’t say calmness,” p. 42), allowing him, on the one hand, to present the answer as the result of his current thoughts, on the other hand, to mitigate the possible negative effect if the answer turns out to be incorrect.

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Unlike the teacher, the student demonstrates a much wider repertoire of behavior. His actions are aimed at assuring the teacher that he not only follows the proposed rules of the game (demonstrates knowledge), but also does it in the way expected of him (to know means to reason), flexibly changing the strategy of behavior in case of detection its ineffectiveness in the current situation (to know means to remember). At the same time, the student does not simply adapt to the expectations of the teacher, but, focusing on the line of behavior that the teacher adheres to, structures his actions in such a way as to induce, in turn, the teacher to take the actions he desires - ultimately, the teacher himself gives the necessary answers.

By managing an exam response, students create and manage their membership in the "student" category. In other words, students, as British researchers B. Benwell and E. Stokoe note, “not only “educate,” but also “practice themselves as students.” The same is true for teachers. From the above fragment it is clear how, during the examination answer, the student’s attempt to construct himself as someone who “remembers and reproduces” is contrasted with the teacher’s systematic construction of the student as someone who “reasons.” And, as can be observed, for a student “being a student” does not at all mean “thinking in terms of professional language.”

What, however, allows one to recognize a certain activity as, for example, an answer-on-an-exam (not only from the point of view of the researcher, but also from the point of view of the participants in the activity themselves)? Carrying out a certain activity as a given activity means precisely orderly and oriented implementation, taking into account existing and emerging circumstances. And in this sense - unproblematic and everyday implementation. Everyday-as-orderly must be understood in three senses: how

agreed upon, as following in the ordinary course and as being duly carried out8 . In other words, the daily performance of an activity also means its competent implementation. However, competence is a practical thing, not a set of rules and regulations. There is no “cookbook” for the practice of giving a lecture, passing an exam, etc. Competently performing a lecture, passing an exam, or any other activity is a practical achievement.

Everyday practice and reflexivity of action

“Everyday”, understood as the coordinated, ordinary, competent implementation of any socially organized activity, disperses the lifeworld of everyday life, transforming it from an autonomous supreme region or “ultimate region of meaning” into a multiplicity of different intersecting and interpenetrating practices. This transformation is a trace of a certain refocusing in the study of social reality carried out in the 70s of the twentieth century. a number of researchers who can conditionally be united as representatives of the theory of practices. Today, notes V. Vakhshtain, we are witnessing a revival of interest in the study of everyday life, characterized by some change in the definition of the latter: “If in previous - phenomenological and neo-Marxist - theoretical projects we were talking about the stratum of the “life world” (Lebenswelt), which represents the “supreme reality" human existence, then now everyday life returns in the form of a container for routine practices, a kind of arena for unreflective actions” 9. Two points, however, require clarification.

I think the question should be formulated a little differently. It's about

8 The German “ordentlich”, by the way, provides for use in precisely these three meanings: simultaneously and as ordered and how ordinary, permanent, regular, regular And How in proper order, neatly, decently, decently, as expected.

9 It should be noted, however, that Vakhstein makes this statement in a critical mode.

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to consider not just the multiplicity of everyday practices, but the many different social practices in their everyday implementation. Everyday life permeates all social practices. But not in the sense that it constitutes the ontological basis of any activity and appears in the form of typified patterns of action, as Schutz believed, but insofar as it consists in organized, coordinated, orderly, reproducible ways of carrying out any activity. In short, we should consider not everyday and non-everyday practices, but different practices in their everyday implementation.

The second point concerns the identification of the everyday and the unreflective. Undoubtedly, both aspects are closely related to each other: the division into everyday and non-everyday practices is based on the distinction between reflexive and non-reflective or pre-reflective actions, which in turn goes back, as Vakhstein points out following V. Volkov, to the Humean distinction between practical action and reflexive action. In this sense, Schutz only follows tradition, defining the activity of scientific theorizing as the area of ​​reflexive action itself. This does not mean, of course, that when deciding his daily affairs, a practical worker does not comprehend (does not reflect) his actions, however, the adoption of a reflexive attitude presupposes, according to Schutz, stopping the action: to grasp the action in reflection, he says, means “to stop and think” . Reflection involves withdrawal from participation. Of course, the scientist, carrying out his scientific activity, not only reflects from the position of a detached observer, but also participates in social interaction, communicating with other researchers, taking measurements, etc., in short, supporting the reproduction of the corresponding scientific tradition. However, “science as a social phenomenon” is one thing,

And quite another is “the specifically scientific position of the scientist in relation to his object,” notes Schutz. The opposition between theory and practice thus creates the preconditions for removing reflexivity not only from everyday practices, but

And generally from the field of practice as such.

Another connotative series sets the contrast between the everyday and the unconscious: everyday actions are unreflective, since they are based on a taken-for-granted, unconscious way of implementation. Of course, this is not to say that they are unconscious; they are rather outside, or before, awareness. They are not thematized, Schutz would say. However, we observe exactly the opposite. Practical actions are continuously thematized because they require constant coordination and ordering. Routine is not the basis or condition of everyday practices, but a consequence of their orderly implementation. Routine is produced in a meaningful way. Therefore, practical actions are not pre-reflective, they are reflexive in the sense that, as P. Auer points out, “they themselves form a context which they make interpretable-for-all-practical-purposes-of-a-given-moment.” It is clear that reflexivity so understood does not coincide with what theoretical reflection implies. The latter - if we take reflexive analysis in its (Husserl's) phenomenological version as a basis - presupposes a directed intentional relationship through which the act of consciousness grasps what the act is directed towards, be it another act or a specific object that is not a state of consciousness10. Practical reflexivity - and I think it is quite justified to use just such a term - is a feature of practical demonstrations, descriptions and explanations themselves, directly related to the irreducible indexicality of social actions11. V. Patzelt characterizes indexicality and reflexivity as “paired

10 Strictly speaking, in the phenomenological sense, the object of a reflexive attitude is always precisely another act of consciousness (see:), however, in the context of the present discussion, these subtleties can be neglected.

11 Indexicality is a term used by linguists to denote the property of natural language expressions that enables participants to understand what they are doing in an interaction.

To watch this PDF file with formatting and markup, download it and open it on your computer.
STRUCTURE OF EVERYDAY THINKING

// Sociological research.
-

Everyday thinking as a system of const
rutable types

Let us try to show how a waking adult perceives
the intersubjective world of everyday life, on which and in which he
acts as a person among other people. This world existed before ours
birth, experienced and interpreted
mentioned by our predecessors as
organized world. He appears before us in our own
experience and interpretation. But any interpretation of the world is based on
previous acquaintance with him
-

ours personally or transmitted to us
parents and teachers
mi. This experience in the form of "present knowledge" (knowledge
at hand) acts as a scheme with which we relate all our perceptions and
experiences.

Such experience includes the idea that the world in which we
we live,
-

it is a world of objects with more or less op
rare qualities.
We move among these objects, experience their resistance and can
influence them. But "none of them are perceived by us as
isolated because it is initially associated with previous experience.
This is the cash reserve

knowledge, which for the time being
is taken for granted, although at any moment
it can be called into question.

Undoubted prior knowledge is given to us from the very beginning as
typical, which means that it carries with it
e open horizon similar
future experiences. The outside world, for example, we do not perceive as
a collection of individual unique objects scattered in
space and time. We see mountains, trees, animals, people. I may
be, never before
I wanted an Irish Setter, but it costs me
take a look and I know what it is
-

animal, more precisely, a dog. Everything is in it
familiar features and typical behavior of a dog rather than a cat, for example. Can,
Of course, ask: “What breed is she?” This means that the difference
not this
a certain dog from all others known to me, arises and
problematized only due to the similarity with the undoubted typical
a dog that exists in my mind.

Speaking in the specific language of Husserl, whose analysis of the typical structure
m
ira of everyday life we ​​have summarized, the features that appear in
actual perception of an object, are apperceptively transferred to any
another similar object, perceived only in its typicality.
Actual experience confirms or does not confirm my expectations

typical matches. If confirmed, the contents of the type
enriches; in this case, the type is divided into subtypes. On the other side,
a concrete real object reveals its individual
characteristics that nevertheless appear in the form of typicality.

Now
-

and this is especially important
-

I can consider this one, in its typicality
perceived object by representative general type, I can afford
formulate the concept of a type, but I don’t need to think about a specific one at all
dog as a representative of the general concept of "dogs"
a". Basically, mine
Irish Setter Rover displays all the characteristics related to,
according to my previous experience, to the type of dog. However, what is common
What he has with other dogs is not at all interesting to me. For me he
Rover
-

friend and companion;
this is what distinguishes him from other Irish setters,
with which he is related by certain typical characteristics of appearance and
behavior. I
-

for no particular reason
-

not inclined to see in Rover
mammal, animal, object of the external world, although I know that everyone

this
he is also.

Thus, in the natural attitude of everyday life, we are occupied
only some objects that are in relation to others, previously
perceived, forming a field of self-evident, not subject to
doubt experience. Result
selective activity of our consciousness
-

highlighting individual and typical characteristics of objects. At all
speaking, we are interested only in certain aspects of each special
typed object. The statement that a given object S has
characteristic
property p, in the form "S is p"
-

this is an elliptical proposition. For
S, taken no matter what it looks like in my eyes, represents
not only p, but also q, and r, and much more. Full Judgment
should read: "S is, along with the fact that it

and q, and r, and also p". If according to
towards an element of the world that is taken for granted, I
I say: "S is p", I do so because under the circumstances
S interests me as p, and I ignore its being as q and r
How
irrelevant.

The terms "interest" and "relevance" just used
-

This
designating a number of complex problems that we will not be able to discuss now.
We have to limit ourselves to just a few comments. A person in any
moment of his daily life

is in biographically
deterministic situation, i.e. in a physical and
sociocultural environment. In such an environment he takes his position. Is not
only position in physical space and external time, not only
status and role in ra
mkah of the social system, it is also moral and
ideological" position. To say that the definition of the situation is biographical
determined means to say that it has its own history. This
deposition of all previous experience, systematized in
familiar

forms of available knowledge stock. As such it is unique
given to this person and no one else. Biographically determined
the situation suggests certain possibilities for future practical
or theoretical activities. Let's call it the "present goal"
" (purpose at
hand). This goal precisely determines the elements that are
relevant to it. The relevance system in turn
defines the elements that will form the basis of the general typing, and
traits of these elements that will become x
characteristically typical or, conversely,
unique and individual. In other words, it determines
how far we have to penetrate into the open horizon
typicality. Recall the example above: changing my cash
goals and related
system of relevances, shift of “context”, in
which S stands for me can induce me to resort to the predicate
q, but that S is also p
-

now for me" is irrelevant.

The intersubjective nature of everyday knowledge and its implications

Analyzing
the first constructions of everyday thinking, we behaved
as if the world
-

this is my private world, while ignoring the fact that with
from the very beginning it is the intersubjective world of culture. He
intersubjective, since we live among other people, we are connected
happens
community of care, labor, mutual understanding. He
-

the world of culture, because from the very
from the beginning, everyday life appears before us as a semantic universe,
a set of meanings that we must interpret in order to
to find support in this world, to come to

agreement with him. However, this
set of values
-

and this is the difference between the kingdom of culture and the kingdom
nature
-

arose and continues to be formed in human actions:
our own and other people, contemporaries and predecessors. All
cult objects
urs (tools, symbols, language systems, works
art, social institutions etc.) by its very meaning and
origins point to the activities of human subjects.
Therefore, we always feel the historicity of culture when encountering it in
R
various traditions in. customs. Historicity
-

sediment activity, in
through which history is revealed to us. So I can't understand the object
culture without relating it to the activity through which it arose.
For example, I don't understand a tool without knowing
the purpose for which he
intended; sign or symbol
-

not knowing what it represents in a person's mind,
using it; institute
-

not understanding what it means to people,
orienting their behavior towards it. Here is the basis of the so-called
postulate of subjective and
interpretation in the social sciences, about which we
we'll talk later.

We now have to consider additional structures that arise
in everyday thinking, taking into account not the private, but
intersubjective world, and what ideas about it
-

Not
just my personal
case; they are initially intersubjective and socialized. We'll consider
briefly three aspects of the problem of knowledge socialization: reciprocity of perspectives
or structural socialization of knowledge; social origin of knowledge
or his genetic sociality
tion; social distribution of knowledge.

Reciprocity of perspectives.

In the natural attitude of everyday thinking, I take it for granted
it goes without saying that other intelligent people exist. This
means that the objects of the world, in principle, are knowable to them
more relevant
or potentially. This I know and accept without proof or doubt. But
I also know and take for granted that the "same" object
must mean something different to me and to every other person.
This happens because
that: 1) I, being “here”, am on another
distance from objects and perceive them in a different typicality than another
the person who is "there". For the same reason, some objects
-

beyond my reach (my seeing, hearing,
manipulated
iya), but within his reach, and vice versa; 2)
biographically determined situations, mine and another person’s,
corresponding available goals and the systems they define
relevances (mine and others) must differ at least up to
some
degrees.

Everyday thinking transcends individual differences
prospects resulting from these factors, using two
main idealizations: 1) interchangeability of points of view (I consider it
taken for granted and I assume: the other thinks so

what if I
I’ll change places with him and his “here” will become mine, I’ll be on that
the same distance from objects and see them in the same typicality as
and he is at the moment. Moreover, within my reach there will be
be the same

the same things he has now. Indeed also
inverse relation); 2) coincidences of the system of relevances. Until then,
Until proven otherwise, I take it for granted
-

And
I guess someone else thinks the same
-

that the differences in perspectives
expected
our unique biographical situations, are insignificant from the point of view
view of the actual goals of any of us. And that he, like me, i.e. “we” believe,
that they selected and interpreted actual and potentially common objects and
their characteristics are the same
m or at least "empirically the same
the same", i.e.: the same, from the point of view of our practical purposes,
way.

It is obvious that both idealizations of the interchangeability of points of view and
coincidences of relevances, together forming a general thesis of mutual
Persian
pective, are typing constructs of objects
thinking that overcomes the uniqueness of objects personal experience mine or
any other person. Thanks to the action of these constructs, it is possible
assume that the sector of the world that takes into account itself
both
taken for granted by me, is perceived in the same way by others, my partner, more
that is taken for granted by "us". But this "we" does not include
only "you" and "me", but "everyone who is one of us", that is, everyone
whose system of relevances
about the essence (to a sufficient extent) coincides with
"yours" and "mine". Thus, the general thesis of mutual perspectives leads to
formation of such knowledge about objects and their characteristics (relevant
known by "me" and potentially known by "you"), which is highest
gets stupid
as the knowledge of "everyone". It appears to be objective and anonymous, i.e.
separated self, independent of individual definitions of the situation with
with all their unique biographical details, current and
potential current goals.

Terms "about"
object" and "characteristics of the object" we must interpret in
in the broadest sense, meaning objects of course
taken-for-granted knowledge. Then we will understand how important
intersubjective constructs of objects of thinking that arise in the course of
structural social
realization of knowledge of many problems studied, but
not sufficiently thoroughly analyzed by outstanding
social scientists. What is considered familiar to everyone who shares our
relevance system,
-

it is a way of life viewed as
natural, normal
flat, correct members "we"
-
group". As
as such, he is the source of many recipes for handling things and
people in typical situations, it is the source of habits and “mores”,
"traditional behavior" in the Weberian sense, self-evident

truths
existing in "we"
-
group", despite their inconsistency, in short,
-

Total
"concerning the natural aspect of the world." These words also apply to
constructs of typified knowledge that has
highly socialized structure, thanks to which it overcomes
is possible
the specificity of individual, self-evident "ideas about
world. But this knowledge also has its own history. It
-

part of our "social"
heritage", and this prompts us to turn to the second aspect of the problem
socialization of knowledge, to its genetic
oh structure.

Social origin of knowledge.

Only a very small part of knowledge about the world comes from personal experience. Big
part has a social origin and is transmitted by friends, parents,
teachers, teachers teachers. I am taught not only to determine
surroundings
living environment (i.e. typical features regarding the natural aspect
world" perceived "we
-
group" as a self-evident totality of all
(for the time being certain things, which, however, can always be
questioned), but also build ti
typical constructs according to
system of relevances corresponding to the anonymous unified
point of view "we"
-
groups." This includes lifestyles, ways
interactions with the environment, practical recommendations for use
typical means to achieve

typical goals in typical situations.
The typifying medium par excellence, through which it is transmitted
Social knowledge is the vocabulary and syntax of everyday language.
Everyday dialect
-

it is primarily a language of names, things and events.
And I love
the combat name presupposes typification and generalization in the light of the system
relevances prevailing in the linguistic "we"
-
group" which
considers a thing significant enough to have a special term for it.
Pre-scientific dialect
-

a treasure trove of ready-made, already constructed
roved types and
characteristics that are social in origin and carry an open
a horizon of contents not yet found.

Social distribution of knowledge.

Knowledge is socially distributed. Thanks to the general thesis of mutual
prospects are undoubtedly overcome
The difficulty lies in the fact that
what is my current knowledge
-

just potential knowledge of my
partner, and vice versa. But the stock of current knowledge available to people
is different, and everyday thinking takes this fact into account. Not only that
the person knows
, different from his neighbor's knowledge, but also how they both know "the same
the same facts.

Knowledge is diverse in terms of clarity, distinctness, and accuracy. Let's take it
for example, W. James’s well-known distinction between “knowledge
hearsay" (knowledge at acquaitance) and
"knowledge as such"
-
about). Obviously, about many things I'm just where
-
then what
-
then I heard, then how did you
have a clear understanding of them as such. It may be fair
reverse attitude. I
-

"expert" in a narrow field and an "amateur" in many
d
others, just like you. Any individual stock of available knowledge at that
or another moment of life is delimited into zones of varying degrees of clarity,
clarity, accuracy. This structure is generated by the system of prevailing
relevances and thus biogr
aphically determined. Knowledge
These individual differences are, in themselves, already an element of everyday experience:
I know who and under what typical circumstances I should contact
as to a competent doctor or lawyer. In other words, in everyday
life

I construct a typology of another’s knowledge, its volume and structure.
In doing so, I assume that he is guided by
a certain structure of relevances, which is expressed in him in
a set of constant motives that induce him to a special type of behavior
leniya and
even determining his personality. But we have already gotten ahead of ourselves by starting
analysis of everyday constructions related to the understanding of other people, that
is the purpose of the next section (1).

The structure of the social world and its typification in the constructs of everyday life
thinking

a human being born and living in a social world with its
everyday life, I perceive it ready-made, built before me,
open to my interpretation and action
I, always related to mine
actual biographically determined situation. Only by
towards me certain type he acquires connections with others
a special meaning that I denote by the word “we”. Only in relation to
"to us", where I am the center

I, others act as “you”. And in relation to
“you”, in turn corresponding to me, is allocated a third party
-

In the temporal dimension, in relation to me at the present moment of mine
biographies, there are "contemporaries" with whom I can
mutually
influence, and the “predecessors” on whom I do not influence
condition, but whose past actions and their consequences I can interpret;
they, in turn, can influence my own actions. Finally,
there are "successors" inaccessible to experience, but

which you can focus on
in their actions in more or less empty expectation. In these respects
embodied the most various forms intimacy and anonymity, knowing
-
coarseness and alienness, intensity and extensiveness.

Here we will limit ourselves to the relationship
communication between contemporaries.
Since we are talking about everyday life, let’s say it goes without saying
it goes without saying that one person can understand another person and his actions
and that he can communicate with others because he assumes that they understand
his own
behavior. We also take it for granted that
this mutual understanding is limited, although it is sufficient for many
practical purposes.

Among my contemporaries there are those with whom I share as long as our
relationships, not only time, but also space
ness. For the sake of simplicity of terminology
we will call such contemporaries partners (consotiates), and the relationship
between them
-

direct interpersonal relationships. This term we
we understand, however, differently than C. Cooley and his followers, denoting by them
exclusively
formal aspect social relations, equally
applicable to both an intimate conversation between friends and a chance meeting of strangers
in a railway compartment. Community of space means here that a certain
aspect of the outside world is equally accessible to each partner
ra and contains equal
objects that are interesting and relevant to them. Each sees the other's body, his
gestures, gait, facial expressions and does not simply perceive them as things or events
in the external world, but in physiognomic meaning, as evidence
thoughts of another.

Temporary
community
-

here we mean not only the external
(chronological), but also internal time
-

means that everyone
the partner participates in the immediate life of the other, which he can
grasp in the living present the thoughts of another step by step, according to the
re them
shifts. Events happen, plans are made for the future, hopes arise,
anxiety. In short, each partner is included in the biography
another; they grow up and grow old together; they live in pure "we"
-
attitude."

In such a way, no matter how
It was neither fleeting nor superficial,
the other is perceived as a unique individual, albeit
revealed only fragmentarily, revealing only one aspect of its
personality in a unique biographical situation. In all other forms
social relations
relationships (and even in relationships between partners, while we are talking
is about the undisclosed sides of the other person’s personality) the “I” of another person can
be captured only through the "imaginary introduction of a hypothetical
phenomena of meaning" (to use Whitehead's expression). Ina
what can we say
understand the other, constructing a typical way of activity, typical,
underlying motives, personality type settings. The other and his
actions beyond my direct observation are explained
at the same time as simple examples, image
chicks of this type personality.

We cannot compare here the classification of structures of the social world,
types of action and personality types necessary to understand the "other" and
his behavior. Thinking about absent friend A, I construct the ideal
his personality type

and behavior based on my past perception of L as
partner. When I drop a letter into my mailbox, I expect that strangers
people called postal workers will act in a typical
way (not entirely clear to me), as a result of which the letter will reach
before
addressee within a typically reasonable time. Without even meeting a Frenchman or
German, I understand “why France is afraid of German rearmament.”
Obeying the rules English grammar, I follow the accepted
society modeled the behavior of my contemporaries, saying
on
-
English
I must adapt my behavior to them in order to be understood. Finally,
any artifact, any tool points to some nameless
the person who created it so that other nameless people
used it to achieve
the creation of typical goals by typical means.

These are just a few examples, ordered by degree of gain.
anonymity of relations between contemporaries, and thereby constructs,
used to understand another and his behavior. Obviously, the increase
anonymity
This entails a decrease in the completeness of the content. The more
anonymous is the typing construct, the less unique is reflected in it
individuality of the person being described, the fewer aspects of his personality and
behaviors are typified as relevant from the point of view of cash
personal purpose, for the sake of
which, in fact, the type is constructed. If we identify personality types
(subjective) and types of action (objective), then we can say that
increased anonymity of constructs leads to the predominance of the latter. IN
in case of complete anonymization of people

are considered interchangeable, and the types
actions denote "whoever's" behavior as it is predetermined
construct.

Therefore, it can be said that, with the exception of the pure "we
-
relationships" of partners, we never manage to "grab" individual
t
a person in his unique biographical situation. In constructs
everyday thinking the other appears at best as a partial
"I", and even in pure "we"
-
respect" he reveals only a few
aspects of your personality.

This idea is important for many
relationships. She helps G. Simmel
overcome the dilemma of individual and collective consciousness, so
clearly seen by E. Durkheim. It forms the basis of the theory of C. Cooley
about the emergence of the “I” due to the “mirror effect”. D. G. Mida she
led to many
the promising concept of the “generalized other.” Finally she
was decisive in clarifying such concepts as “social function”,
"social role" and "rational action".

However, this is not all when I construct the "other" as a private
personality, perform
body of typical roles and functions, in interaction with
in which I myself participate, the process of self-typing develops in parallel. IN
In this respect, I participate not as a complete person, but fragmentarily.
By defining the role of the “other,” I accept my role. Typing POV
eating
“other”, I also typify my own behavior associated with him. I
I turn into a passenger, consumer, taxpayer, reader, onlooker
etc. This self-typing underlies the identification by W. James and D.G.
Mead of elements denoted by ter
mines "I" and "Me" intact
social personality.

It must be remembered, however, that the common sense constructs used
for typing the “other” and for self-typing, have predominantly
social origin and socially sanctioned. Within the framework of "we"
-
groups" most personal and behavioral types of action
taken for granted (there is no evidence yet
about the opposite)
-

as a set of rules and regulations that have not been refuted until
still and, it is assumed, will not be refuted

in future. Moreover,
typical constructs are often institutionalized as standards
behavior supported by custom and tradition, and sometimes by special
means of so-called social control, for example, law.

Types of actions and types of personalities
awns

We will now briefly look at the model of action and social
interaction underlying the construction of action types and types
personality in everyday thinking.

Action, project, motive.

The term "action" as used in this work
, we denote
thoughtful human behavior, i.e. behavior based on
a project drawn up in advance. We will use the term "act" to mean
result of an unfolding process
-

i.e. a completed action.
The latter may be hidden (for example, m
a strong attempt to solve
scientific problem) or open, included in the outside world. It can
to be action and idleness, deliberate abstinence from action
-

in that
in this case it is considered an action in itself.

Any design lies in the imagination of the future.
knowledge.
However, the starting point of any design is not
an unfolding process of action, but an act completed in the imagination.
Before planning stages future activities, I must introduce
imagine that completed state of affairs to which
they will bring you. Figuratively
speaking, before I start drawings, I must have a plan in my head
building project. Therefore, in my imagination I transfer myself to the future, that is, to where
where the action will already be completed. And only then do I reconstruct in
imagination department
nal stages of an act taking place in the future.

According to our terminology, not a future action, but a future act
anticipated in the project. Its time
-

future perfect (modo futuri)
exacti). This project-specific time perspective entails
V
important conclusions

1. All projects of upcoming acts are based on my knowledge in
moment of design. This includes the experience of previously committed acts,
typically similar to those being designed, and therefore a special role plays a role
idealization that Gousset
rl called idealization "I
-
Can
-
This
-
again".
According to this assumption, in typically similar circumstances, I
I can act in essentially the same way as I acted before for
achieving a typically similar result.

It is clear that this idealization requires
construction of a special kind. My
the available knowledge during design, strictly speaking, should be different
from existing knowledge after the act, if only because I “became
older,” and the implementation of the project itself modified my biographical
circumstances
flattery, gained experience. So "repeat" the action
-

is not
.just reproducing it. The first action D" began at
circumstances O" and led to situation C". Repeatable action D"
begins in circumstances O" and will have to end in situation
tion C".
C" will inevitably be different from O", since the knowledge that D" is simply
led to C", became an element of the circumstances of the new action O". Previously,
when I planned the first action, there was only an empty
anticipation of a future situation. C" also
e will differ from C", as well as D"
from D". This happens because O", O", D", D", C", C" we ourselves denote by
unique and inimitable phenomena. However, precisely those features that
make them unique and inimitable, everyday thinking is simply
-
on
simply discards them, because they are irrelevant from the point of view of the existing goal.
When I construct the idealization "I
-
Can
-
This
-
again" (I
-
can
-
do
-
it
-
again), me
typicality of O, D, C is important
-

and without any "notes". Figuratively speaking,
construction consists in suppressing "at
m" because of their
irrelevance, which, by the way, is typical for typing in general.

This point is especially important for analyzing the concept of the so-called
rational action. Obviously, in the routine of daily activities we
we resort to a similar design,
following conventional rules only
because so far they have not let us down, and thereby we connect the goals and
means, regarding the actual interaction of which it is not at all
we have a clear idea. It is in everyday thinking that we
constructing the world fact
s that seem interconnected, the world,
containing only those elements that are considered relevant from the point of view
present goal.

2. The specific time perspective of the project sheds light on the relationship
project and motive. In everyday speech, the word “motive” denotes
two different ones appear
systems of concepts that should be distinguished.

It can be said that the killer's motive was to rob the victim. Here under
"motive" is understood as a goal, a state of affairs that is intended to realize
action taken. We will call this motive “for
-
Togo
-
h
toby" (in
-
order
-
to
-
motive). From the point of view of the agent, this class of motives appeals to the future.
A state of affairs that should arise in the future, imagined in
project, and there is a motive for performing an action. You could say it's a killer project
was motivated by him

difficult childhood, surrounding social environment, etc.
n. We will call such a motive the “because” motive
-
what" (because
-
motive). From the point
from the perspective of the actor, this motive correlates actions (2) with past ones
experiences that prompt him to act in this way
. IN
form "because"
-
what motivates the action project itself (for example, to get
money by killing a person).

We can't enter here detailed analysis theories of motives. Should
just note that a person in the process of activity motivates it only by
type "for
-
Togo
-
so that", meaning the state of affairs for the implementation of which
its current activities are oriented. Just by looking back
-

on already
the act completed or the initial stages passed
unfolding action, or even on an already created project,
advance
stealing act (modo futuri exacti),
-

can be grasped in retrospect
motive "because"
-
what", prompting to do what is done or
designed. But in this case the person no longer acts, he observes
yourself. The distinction between the two types of motives is vital for
I'm analyzing
human interaction, to which we now turn.

Social interaction.

Any form of social interaction is based on the already described
constructs with the help of which the “other” and the model of action are understood
at all. Let's take mutual
the action of the partners: the questioner and the answerer.

When designing a question, I anticipate that the “other” will understand my action
(for example, saying interrogative sentence) as a question, and this
will encourage him to act in such a way that I understand his reaction as adequate (I:
"Where's the ink?" The partner points to the table). "For
-
Togo
-
so that" (the motive of my
actions) is designed to obtain adequate information; in this
situation it is assumed that understanding my motive "for
-
Togo
-
to"
will become a motive for the “other” because
-
what" and he will perform the action "for
-
Togo
-
to give me this

information. All this is true, of course, if
provided that he wants and can do what I, for my part, from him
I'm waiting. I predict that he understands
-
English, knows where they are stored
ink, and what will he tell me if he knows, etc. In general,
I am waiting,
that he will be guided by the same types of motives that
past
-

as my present knowledge testifies
-

I was guided by myself
and many others in typically similar circumstances.

Our example shows that even the simplest interaction
action in everyday life
life uses a set of everyday constructs (in this case,
constructs of expected behavior of the “other”), based on
idealization, according to which the motive "for
-
Togo
-
to "one figure
becomes the motive "because
-
what" his partner
era, and vice versa. We'll call it
idealization of reciprocity of motives. Obviously, it is due to the general
the thesis of reciprocity of perspectives, since it assumes that the motives
attributed to "another", typically the same as mine or others typically
the same circumstances
twah. All this corresponds to socially conditioned
existing knowledge.

Now suppose that I am looking for ink to fill a fountain pen, so
to write an application to the fund committee to provide funds for
implementation of a scientific project. If statement b
will be satisfied, will change
my whole lifestyle. I
-

the character (the questioner), and I alone know about
my plan, which is the ultimate motive "for
-
Togo
-
to" my
actual action, I know the state of affairs that lies ahead
come true. Co.
Of course, this can only be done gradually1 (need
write a statement, find writing materials, etc.), and
Each of the stages must be materialized in “action” in a special way
project, with a special "for
-
Togo
-
"to" motive. However, all these
"microde
actions"
-

only phases of integral action, and all intermediate
the steps embodied in them,
-

these are just means to achieve the final goal,
defined by the original project. Its scope connects microprojects in
single chain. This becomes clear if we take into account
I think it's in the chain
interconnected partial actions that give rise to situations that
just “means” to achieve the designed goal, just links
can be replaced with others or simply omitted. In the original draft
nothing will change. If I'm not on
I'm running out of ink, I can use a writing pen
typewriter, and the application will be written.

In other words, only the actor knows "when his action
begins and where it ends,” i.e., why it will be carried out.
It is the length of the projects
shares unity of action. The partner is not
knows neither about the project that preceded the action, nor about the scope of the context, in
which it is included. He knows only that fragment of the action that
unfolded in front of him, namely: the committed act he observed or
passed
th phases of the current action. If my partner were asked why
I wanted him to answer that I was asking where to find ink. That's all he is
knows about my project and its context, he sees it as independent
separate action. To "understand" the meaning of my
his actions, he would have to,
starting with the observed act, construct the underlying “for
-
Togo
-
"to" motive, i.e. to determine why I did what he witnessed.

Now it is clear that the meaning of the action will inevitably be different: a) for
himself
incumbent; b) for the partner interacting with him, with
which it has a common set of goals and relevances: c) for the observer,
not included in this relationship. Two important conclusions follow from this. In
-
first, everyday thinking gives us only probable
this opportunity
understand the action of the “other” to the extent that is sufficient for our
present goal. In
-
secondly, to increase the probability, we must look for
the meaning that an action has for the actor himself. So
postulate of "subjective semantic int
interpretations" how unsuccessful he was
is called, is not distinguishing feature sociology of Max Weber or in general
methodology of social sciences. This
-

type design principle
actions in everyday experience.

Subjective interpretation is possible only as an identification
motives,
determining a given course of action. Correlating the type of action with those lying in
based on typical motives, we begin to construct a personality type.
The latter may be more or less anonymous, i.e., deprived
content. In "we"
-
regarding" partners
the "other's" personality, his motives
(as they manifest) and his personality (as it is involved in
explicit action) are perceived in immediacy; listed here
types show a low degree of anonymity and significant completeness
content. I design
I are the types of actions of contemporaries (not partners), we
we assign to more or less anonymous participants a set of invariant
motives that govern their actions. This set itself is a construct
typical expectations from the behavior of the “other”, it is often studied with that
glasses
in terms of social role, function or institutional behavior. IN
in everyday thinking, such a construct is especially important in design
actions focused on the behavior of contemporaries (but not partners). IN
what are its functions? 1. I believe

it goes without saying that
my action (say, putting into a box labeled and correctly
labeled envelope) will prompt people anonymous to me (postal
employees) perform typical actions (process mail) in accordance with
typical "for
-
T
Wow
-
so that" motives (fulfillment of professional
responsibilities), as a result of which the projected by me will be achieved
state of affairs (delivery of the letter to the addressee on time). 2. Me too
I take it for granted that my construct is like "act
twiya
another" essentially corresponds to his own self-typing, and that in
the latter includes a typical idea of ​​my (his anonymous
partner) typical behavior based on typical and
presumably invariant motives (whoever
you didn't lower it properly
a properly labeled and stamped envelope in the mailbox,
it is assumed: it will be delivered to the address at a certain time). 3. And,
Moreover, in my own self-typing (as an email client
services) I have to design
define my action according to the type that I
I assume will meet the expectations of a typical postal employee according to
towards a typical client. This interconnected design
behavioral models turns out to be a construct of intertwined
"For
-
T
Wow
-
so" and "because
-
what" motives perceived as
invariant. The more institutionalized and standardized such
model, i.e. the more it is typified and socially sanctioned with
with the help of laws, rules, norms, customs, traditions, etc.,
the more
the likelihood that my own self-typed behavior
will achieve the desired goal.

1. With the exception of some economists, the problem of social
distribution of knowledge has not attracted due attention from specialists in
social sciences
Oh. But it opens up a new field for theoretical and
empirical studies that would really deserve
names of the sociology of knowledge, which is now preserved in an indefinite
a discipline that takes on faith the very social distribution
know
theory on which it is based. I would like to hope that systematic
Studying this area will make a significant contribution to solving such problems,
as a problem of social role, social stratification,
institutional or organized behavior, social
occupational ology and
professions, prestige, status, etc.

2. The concept of “action” includes all human behavior, when and
because the acting individual gives it a subjective meaning...
Action is social, because by virtue of giving it action
those who are talking
(or valid) subjective meaning it takes into account behavior
others, and thereby focuses on him.

Alfred Schutz
The structure of everyday thinking

Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) - Austrian philosopher and sociologist, one of the founders of social phenomenology. He studied law at the University of Vienna and worked as a bank employee. In 1939 he emigrated to the USA. Headed the Department of Sociology and social psychology New York New School for Social Research.
Author of a number of monographs in German and English languages: “The semantic structure of the social world” (1932), “Collected articles.” Volumes I-III (1962-1966), "Structures of the Lifeworld" (1972), "Theory life forms"(1981), "The Problem of Relevance" (1982), "Correspondence between A. Schutz and A. Gurvich" (1984).
The published article is a fragment of a large article by A. Schutz “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action // Collected, Papers. V. 1. The Problem of Social Reality. The Hague, 1962. P. 7-26? Translation from English by E. D. Rutkevich.
Source: Sociological research. 1988. No. 2. P. 129-137. The title of the fragment belongs to the editors of this magazine.
Then there is

[Full text]

We will try to show how a waking adult perceives the intersubjective world of everyday life, in which and in which he acts as a person among other people. This world existed before our birth, was experienced and interpreted by our predecessors as an organized world. It appears to us in our own experience and interpretation. But any interpretation of the world is based on previous acquaintance with it - ours personally or transmitted to us by parents and teachers. This experience, in the form of “knowledge at hand,” acts as a schema with which we relate all our perceptions and experiences.

Such experience includes the idea that the world in which we live is a world of objects with more or less definite qualities. We move among these objects, experience their resistance and can influence them. But none of them are perceived by us as isolated, since they are initially associated with previous experience. This is also a network of available knowledge, which for the time being is taken for granted, although at any moment it can be called into question. Undoubted prior knowledge is given to us from the very beginning as typical, which means that it carries within itself an open horizon of similar future experiences. We do not perceive the external world, for example, as a collection of individual unique objects scattered in space and time. We see mountains, trees, animals, people. I may have never seen an Irish Setter before, but as soon as I look at it, I know that it is an animal, or more precisely, a dog. It has all the familiar features and typical behavior of a dog, not a cat, for example. You can, of course, ask: “What is she like? breed? This means that the difference between this particular dog and all others known to me arises and is problematized only by its resemblance to the undeniably typical dog that exists in my mind. Speaking in the specific language of Husserl, whose analysis of the typical structure of the world of everyday life we ​​have summarized, the features that appear in the actual perception of an object are apperceptively transferred to any other similar object, perceived only in its typicality. Actual experience confirms or does not confirm my expectations of typical correspondences. If confirmed, the content of the type is enriched; in this case, the type is divided into subtypes. On the other hand, a specific real object reveals its individual characteristics, which nevertheless appear in the form of typicality. Now - and this is especially important - I can consider this perceived object in its typicality to be a representative of a general type, I can allow myself to formulate the concept of a type, but I do not at all need to think about a specific dog as a representative of the general concept “dog”. In principle, my Irish Setter Rover exhibits all the characteristics associated, according to my previous experience, with the type of dog. However, what he has in common with other dogs is not at all interesting to me. For me he is Rover - a friend and companion; This is what distinguishes him from other Irish setters, with whom he shares certain typical characteristics of appearance and behavior. - for no particular reason - I am not inclined to see in Rover a mammal, an animal, an object of the external world, although I know that he is all of this too. Thus, in the natural setting of everyday life, we are occupied with only some objects that are in relation to others, previously perceived, forming a field of self-evident, unquestioned experience. The result of the selective activity of our consciousness is the selection of individual and typical ones. characteristics of objects. Generally speaking, we are only interested in certain aspects of each particular typed object. The statement that a given object S has a characteristic property p, in the form "S is p" is an elliptical proposition. For S, taken no matter how it appears in my eyes, represents not only p, but also q, and r, and much more. The complete proposition should read: S is, in addition to being both q and r, also p.” If, in relation to an element of the world taken for granted, I assert: “S is p,” I do so because, under the circumstances, S interests me as p, and I ignore its being as q and r as irrelevant. . The terms “interest” and “relevance” just used are references to a number of complex problems that we cannot discuss now. We have to limit ourselves to just a few comments. A person at any moment of his daily life is in a biographically determined situation, that is, in a physical and sociocultural environment determined by himself. (On the concept of “definition of a situation,” see the works of W. Thomas included in the collection.) In such an environment, he occupies your position. It is not only a position in physical space and external time, not only a status and role within a social system, it is also a moral and ideological position. To say that the definition of a situation is biographically determined is to say that it has its own history. This is the deposition of all previous experience, systematized in the usual forms of the available stock of knowledge. As such it is unique, given to this person and no one else. A biographically determined situation presupposes certain possibilities for future practical or theoretical activity. Let's call it “purpose at hand”. This goal precisely determines the elements that are relevant in relation to it. The system of relevances, in turn, determines the elements that will form the basis of the general typing, and the features of these elements that will become characteristically typical or, conversely, unique and individual. In other words, it determines how far we have to penetrate into the open horizon of typicality. Let us recall the example given above: a change in my present goal I am associated with scenes: a system of relevances, a shift in the “context” in which S appears for me can prompt me to turn to the predicate q, and the fact that S is also p is now irrelevant for me.

In analyzing the first constructs of everyday thinking, we behaved as if the world were my private world, while ignoring the fact that from the very beginning it was the intersubjective world of culture. It is intersubjective, since we live among other people, we are connected by a community of concerns, work, and mutual understanding. He is the world of culture, because from the very beginning everyday life appears before us as a semantic universe, a set of meanings that we must interpret in order to find support in this world and come to terms with it. However, this set of meanings - and this is the difference between the kingdom of culture and the kingdom of nature - arose and continues to be formed in human actions: our own and other people, contemporaries and predecessors. All cultural objects (tools, symbols, language systems, works of art, social institutions, etc.) by their very meaning and origin indicate the activity of human subjects. Therefore, we always feel the historicity of culture when we encounter it in various traditions and customs. Historicity is the sediment of activity in which history is revealed to us. Therefore, I cannot understand a cultural object without relating it to the activity through which it arose. For example, I do not understand a tool without knowing the purpose for which it is intended; a sign or symbol - without knowing what it represents in the mind of the person using it; institution - without understanding what it means for people who orient their behavior towards it. This is the basis of the so-called postulate of subjective interpretation in the social sciences, which we will talk about later.

Now we have to consider additional constructions that arise in everyday thinking, taking into account not the private, but the intersubjective world, and the fact that ideas about it are not only my personal business; they are initially intersubjective and socialized. We will look briefly at three aspects of the problem of knowledge socialization: mutuality of perspectives or structural socialization of knowledge; social origin of knowledge or its genetic socialization; social distribution of knowledge.
Mutuality of perspectives

In the natural attitude of everyday thinking, I take it for granted that other intelligent people exist. This means that the objects of the world, in principle, are knowable to them either actually or potentially. This I know and accept without proof or doubt. But I also know and take for granted that the “same” object must mean something different to me and to every other person. This happens because:

1) I, being “here”, am at a different distance from objects and perceive them in a different typicality than another person who is “there”. For the same reason, some objects are beyond my reach (my seeing, hearing, manipulating), but within his reach, and vice versa; 2) biographically determined situations, mine and the other person, the corresponding present goals and the systems of relevances determined by them (mine and the other) must differ, at least to some extent. Everyday thinking overcomes the differences in individual perspectives that result from these factors by means of two basic idealizations: 1) interchangeability of points of view (I take for granted and assume: the other believes the same, that if I switched places with him and his “here” becomes mine, I will be at the same distance from objects and see them in the same typicality as he does at the moment. Moreover, within my reach there will be the same things that he has now. Indeed. also the reverse relationship); 2) coincidences of the system of relevances. Until proven otherwise, I take it for granted—and I assume others do as well—that the differences in perspective generated by our unique biographical situations are immaterial from the point of view of the present goals of either of us. And that he, like me, i.e. “we” believe that we have selected and interpreted actually and potentially common objects and their characteristics in the same or at least “empirically the same” way, that is, in the same way, from the point of view of our practical purposes. It is obvious that both idealizations of the interchangeability of points of view and the coincidence of relevances, together forming the general thesis of mutual perspectives, represent typifying constructs of objects of thought that overcome the uniqueness of the objects of my or any other person’s personal experience. Thanks to the action of these constructs, it can be assumed that the sector of the world that is taken for granted by me is also perceived by another, my partner, and, moreover, is taken for granted by “us.” But this “we” includes not only “you” and “me”, but “everyone who is one of us,” that is, everyone whose system of relevances essentially (to a sufficient degree) coincides with “yours” and “ mine." Thus, the general thesis of mutual perspectives leads to the formation of such knowledge about objects and their characteristics (actually known by “me” and potentially known by “you”), which acts as knowledge of “everyone”. It appears to be objective and anonymous, that is, separate and independent from individual definitions of the situation with all their unique biographical details, actual and potential current goals. We must interpret the terms “object” and “characteristic of an object” in the broadest sense, meaning objects of taken-for-granted knowledge. Then we will understand how important are the intersubjective constructs of the objects of thought that arise in the course of the structural socialization of knowledge of many problems studied, but not thoroughly analyzed by outstanding social scientists. Something that is considered familiar to everyone who shares ours. system of relevances is a way of life considered as natural, normal, correct by members of the “we-group”. As such, it is the source of many recipes for dealing with things and people in typical situations, it is the source of habits and "mores", "traditional behavior" in the Weberian sense, self-evident truths that exist in the "we-group", despite their contradictions. in short, everything “relative to the natural aspect of the world.” These words also refer to constructs of typified knowledge, which has a highly socialized structure, thanks to which the specificity of individual, self-evident ideas about the world is overcome. But this knowledge also has its own history. It is part of our “social heritage,” and this prompts us to turn to the second aspect of the problem of the socialization of knowledge, to its genetic structure.
Social origin of knowledge

Only a very small part of knowledge about the world comes from personal experience. The majority are of social origin and change their ways; friends, parents, teachers, teachers of teachers. I am taught not only to define the environment (that is, the typical features of a relatively natural aspect of the world perceived by the “we-group” as the self-evident totality of all things that are for the time being certain, which, however, can always be questioned), but also build typical constructs according to a system of relevances corresponding to the anonymous unified point of view of the “we-group”. This includes lifestyles, ways of interacting with the environment, practical recommendations for using typical means to achieve typical goals in typical situations. The typifying medium par excellence through which social knowledge is transmitted;. are the vocabulary and syntax of everyday language. The dialect of everyday life is primarily the language of names, things and events. And any name implies typification and generalization in the light of the system of relevances prevailing in the linguistic “we-group”, which considers the thing significant enough to find a special term for it. A pre-scientific dialect is a treasury of ready-made, already constructed types and characteristics, social in origin and carrying an open horizon of not yet found contents.
Social distribution of knowledge
Knowledge is socially distributed. The general thesis of mutual perspectives certainly overcomes the difficulty that my actual knowledge is only my partner's potential knowledge, and vice versa. But the stock of actual available knowledge varies among people, and everyday thinking takes this fact into account. Not only is what a person knows different from his neighbor's knowledge, but also how they both know the "same" facts. Knowledge is diverse in terms of clarity, distinctness, and accuracy. Let us take, for example, W. James’s well-known distinction between “knowledge at acquaitance” and “knowledge as such” (knowledge-about). Obviously, I simply heard something about many things somewhere, while you have a clear idea of ​​them as such. The opposite may also be true. I am an “expert” in a narrow field and an “amateur” in many others, just like you. Any individual stock of available knowledge at one time or another in life is delimited into zones with varying degrees of clarity, distinctness, and accuracy. This structure is generated by the system of prevailing relevances and is thus biographically determined. Knowledge of these individual differences is in itself an element of ordinary experience: I know to whom and under what typical circumstances I should turn as a competent doctor or lawyer. In other words, in everyday life I construct a typology of another’s knowledge, its volume and structure. In doing so, I assume that he is guided by a certain structure of relevances, which is expressed in him in a set of constant motives that impel him to a special type of behavior and determine even his personality. But we have already gotten ahead of ourselves by starting to analyze everyday constructions related to understanding other people, which is the purpose of the next section. (With the exception of some economists, the problem of the social distribution of knowledge has not attracted due attention from specialists in the social sciences. But it opens up a new field for theoretical and empirical research that would truly deserve the name sociology of knowledge, which is now reserved for an indefinite discipline that takes on board that same social distribution of knowledge on which it is based. It would be hoped that systematic change in this area will make a significant contribution to the solution of such problems as the problem of social role, social stratification, institutional or organized behavior, the sociology of occupations and professions, prestige, status, etc. d.)

The structure of the social world and its typification in the constructs of everyday thinking

I am a human being, born and living in the social world with its everyday life, I perceive it ready-made, built before me, open to my interpretation and action, always correlated with my current biographically determined situation. Only in relation to me does a certain type of connection with others acquire that special meaning that I denote by the word “we”. Only in relation to “us”, where I am the center, others act as “you”. And in relation to “you”, which in turn correlates with me, a third party stands out - “they”. In the temporal dimension, in relation to me at the present moment of my biography, there are “contemporaries” with whom I can interact, and “predecessors” whom I am not able to influence, but whose past actions and their consequences I can interpret; they, in turn, can influence my own actions. Finally, there are “successors”, inaccessible to experience, but on whom one can orient one’s actions in more or less empty expectation. These relationships embody a wide variety of forms of intimacy and anonymity, familiarity and strangeness, intensity and extensiveness. . Here we will limit ourselves to the relationship between contemporaries. Since we are talking about everyday life, let us assume as a matter of course that one person can understand another person and his actions and that he can communicate with others because he assumes that they understand his own behavior. We also take it for granted that this mutual understanding is limited, although it is sufficient for many practical purposes. Among my contemporaries there are those with whom I share, as long as our relationship lasts, not only time, but also space. For the sake of simplicity of terminology, we will call such contemporaries partners (consotiates), and the relationship between them - direct interpersonal relationships. We understand this term, however, differently than C. Cooley and his followers, denoting with it an exclusively formal aspect of social relations, equally applicable to an intimate conversation between friends and a chance meeting of strangers in a railway compartment. Community of space means here that the penny aspect of the external world is equally accessible to each partner and contains equally interesting objects relevant to them. Each sees the other’s body, his gestures (gait, facial expressions, and not only perceives them as things or events in the external world, but in a physiognomic sense, as evidence of the other’s thoughts. Temporal community - here we mean not only external (chronological), but also internal time means that each partner participates in the immediately current life of the other, that he can grasp the thoughts of the other in the living present, step by step, as they change. Events happen. Plans are made for the future, hopes and worries arise. In short, each partner is included in the biography of the other; they grow up and grow old together; they live in a pure “we-relation.” In such a relationship, no matter how fleeting and superficial it may be, the other is perceived as a unique individuality, albeit revealed only fragmentarily, revealing only one aspect of his personality in a unique biographical situation. In all other forms of social relationships (and even in relationships between partners, as long as we are talking about the undisclosed sides of the other person’s personality), the “I” of the other person can be captured only through the “imaginative introduction of a hypothetical phenomenon of meaning” (to use Whitehead’s expression). In other words, we understand another by constructing a typical way of activity, typical underlying motives, and attitudes of a personality type. The other and his actions, inaccessible to my direct observation, are explained as simple examples, examples of a given type of personality. We cannot compare here the classification of structures of the social world, types of action and types of personality necessary for understanding the “other” and his behavior. Thinking about absent friend A, I construct an ideal type of his personality and behavior based on my past perception of A as a partner. When I put a letter in a mailbox, I expect that people I don't know, called postal workers, will act in a typical manner (not entirely clear to me), with the result that the letter will reach the addressee within a typically reasonable time. Even without meeting a Frenchman or a German, I understand “why France is afraid of German rearmament.” By obeying the rules of English grammar, I follow the socially accepted pattern of behavior of my English-speaking contemporaries. I must adapt my behavior to them in order to be understood. Finally, any artifact, any tool points to some nameless person who created it so that other nameless people would use it to achieve typical goals by typical means. These are just a few examples, ordered by the degree to which the anonymity of the relationship between contemporaries increases, and thus the constructs used to understand the other and his behavior. Obviously, an increase in anonymity entails a decrease in the completeness of the content. The more anonymous the typing construct, the less it reflects the unique individuality of the person being described, the fewer aspects of his personality and behavior are typified as relevant from the point of view of the present purpose for which, in fact, the type is constructed. If we distinguish between personality types (subjective) and action types (objective), then we can say that increased anonymity of constructs leads to the predominance of the latter. In the case of complete anonymization, people are considered interchangeable, and action types denote "whoever's" behavior as determined by the construct. Therefore, we can say that, with the exception of the pure “we-relationship” of partners, we never manage to “grab” the individuality of a person in his unique biographical situation. In the constructs of everyday thinking, the other appears at best as a partial "I", and even in a pure "we-relation" he reveals only some aspects of his personality. This idea is important in many ways. It helps G. Simmel overcome the dilemma of individual and collective consciousness, so clearly seen by E. Durkheim. It forms the basis of C. Cooley’s theory about the emergence of the “I” thanks to the “mirror effect”. It led to the promising concept of the “generalized other” by D.H. Mead. Finally, it was decisive in clarifying such concepts as “social function”, “social role” and “rational action”. However, that's not all. When I construct the “other” as a private person, a performer of typical roles and functions, in interaction with whom I myself participate, the process of self-typing develops in parallel. In this regard, I do not participate as a whole person, but in fragments. By defining the role of the “other,” I accept my role. By typing the behavior of the “other,” I also typify my own behavior associated with him. I turn into a passenger, a consumer, a taxpayer, a reader, an onlooker, etc. This self-typing underlies the identification by W. James and D. H. Mead of the elements designated by the terms “I” and “Me” in the integrity of the social personality. It must be remembered, however, that the common sense constructs used to typify the “other” and to self-type are primarily of social origin and socially sanctioned. Within the “we-group”, most personality and behavioral types of action are taken for granted (until there is evidence to the contrary) - as a set of rules and regulations that have not yet been refuted and, it is assumed, will not be refuted in the future. Moreover, typical constructs are often institutionalized as standards of behavior, supported by custom and tradition, and sometimes by special means of so-called social control, for example, law.

We will now briefly look at the model of action and social interaction that underlies the construction of action types and personality types in everyday thinking.
Action, project, motive
By the term "action" as it is used in this work, we designate deliberate human behavior, that is, behavior based on a pre-designed plan. By the term “act” we will denote the result of an unfolding process - that is, a completed action. The latter can be hidden (for example, a mental attempt to solve a scientific problem) or open, included in the outside world. It can be action or idleness, deliberate abstinence from action - in this case it is considered an action in itself. Any design involves imagining future behavior. However, the starting point of any design is not the unfolding process of action, but the act completed in the imagination. Before planning the stages of future activity, I must imagine the completed state of affairs to which they will lead. Figuratively speaking, before I start drawing, I must have the design of the building in mind. Therefore, in my imagination, I transfer myself to the future, that is, to where the action will already be completed. And only then do I reconstruct in my imagination the individual stages of the act taking place in the future. According to our terminology, it is not the future action, but the future act that is anticipated in the project. Its time is future perfect (modo futuri exacti). This project-specific time perspective entails important implications. 1. All projects of upcoming acts are based on the availability of my knowledge at the time of design. This includes the experience of previously committed acts, typically similar to those being projected, and therefore, a special idealization, which Husserl called “I-can-do-it-again” idealizations, also plays a role. According to this assumption, in typically similar circumstances I can act essentially like this. the same way I acted before to achieve a typically similar result. It is clear that this idealization requires a special kind of construction. My existing knowledge during the design, strictly speaking, should differ from the existing knowledge after the act was completed, if only because I “became older”, and the implementation of the project itself modified my biographical circumstances and expanded my experience. So "repetition" of an action is not simply its reproduction. The first action D" began in circumstances O" and led to situation C. The repeated action D" begins in circumstances O" and will have to end in situation C." C" will inevitably be different from O" since the knowledge that D "simply led to C" has become an element of the circumstances of O's new action." Previously, when I planned the first action, there was only an empty anticipation of the future situation. C" will also differ from C", as will D" from D". This happens because O", O", D", D", C", C" we denote unique and inimitable phenomena in themselves. However, it is precisely those features that make them unique and inimitable that everyday thinking simply discards, because they are irrelevant from the point of view of the goal at hand. When I construct the I-can-do-it-again idealization, typicality is important to me; O, D, C - and without any “notes”. Figuratively speaking, construction consists of suppressing “prims” due to their irrelevance, which, by the way, is characteristic of; typifications in general. This point is especially important for the analysis of the concept of so-called rational action. Obviously, in the routine of everyday activity, we resort to such construction, following conventional rules only because they have not failed us so far, and thereby connect goals and means, regarding the actual interaction of which we have no clear idea at all. It is in everyday thinking that we construct a world of facts that appear to be interconnected, a world containing only those elements that are considered relevant from the point of view of the goal at hand. 2. The specific time perspective of the project sheds light on the relationship between project and motive. In everyday speech, the word “motive” denotes two different systems of concepts that should be distinguished. It can be said that the killer's motive was to rob the victim. Here, “motive” refers to the goal, the state of affairs that the action taken is intended to realize. We will call such a motive “in-order-to-motive”. From the point of view of the agent, this class of motives appeals to the future. The state of affairs that should arise in the future, imagined in the project, is the motive for performing the action. We can say that the killer’s project was motivated by his difficult childhood, the surrounding social environment, etc. Let’s call such a motive the “because-motive”. From the point of view of the actor, this motive correlates actions (The concept of “action” includes all human behavior when and insofar as the acting individual gives it subjective meaning... An action is social because, by virtue of the actors (or actors) giving it subjective meaning, it takes into account the behavior of others, and thereby focuses on it) with past experiences prompting him to act in this way. In the “because” form, the action project itself is motivated (for example, to get money by killing a person). We cannot enter into a detailed analysis of the theory of motives here. It should only be noted that a person in the process of activity motivates it only according to the “in order to” type, meaning the state of affairs towards the implementation of which his current activity is oriented. Only by looking back - at an act that has already been completed or at the initial stages of an unfolding action that have already been completed, or even at an already created project that anticipates the act (modo futuri exacti) - can one retrospectively grasp the motive “because” that prompted one to do what was done or designed. But in this case, the person is no longer acting, he is observing himself. The distinction between the two types of motives is vital to the analysis of human interaction to which we may now turn.
Social interaction
Any form of social interaction is based on the constructs already described, with the help of which the “other” and the model of action in general are understood. Let's take the interaction of partners: the questioner and the answerer. By designing a question, I anticipate that the “other” will understand my action (for example, uttering an interrogative sentence) as a question, and this will encourage him to act in such a way that I understand his response as adequate (Me: “Where is the ink?” Partner points to the table) . “In order to” (the motive of my action) is designed to obtain adequate information; in this situation, it is assumed that understanding my “in order” motive will become a “because” motive for the “other”, and he will perform an action “in order” to give me this information. All this is true, of course, provided that he wants and can do what I, for my part, expect from him. I anticipate that he understands English, knows where the ink is kept, and what he will tell me if he knows, etc. In general, I expect him to be motivated by the same types of motives that he had in the past. - as my existing Knowledge testifies - I myself and many others were guided in typically similar circumstances. Our example shows that even the simplest interaction in everyday life uses a set of everyday constructs (in this case, constructs of the expected behavior of the “other”), based on the idealization according to which the “in order” motive of one actor becomes the “because” motive » his partner, and vice versa. We will call this the idealization of reciprocity of motives. Obviously, it is motivated by the general thesis of mutuality of perspectives, since it assumes that the motives attributed to the “other” are typically the same as those of me or others in typically the same circumstances. All this corresponds to socially determined existing knowledge. Now suppose that I am looking for ink to fill a fountain pen in order to write an application to the foundation committee for funds for a scientific project. If the application is granted, my entire lifestyle will change. I am the actor (the questioner), and I alone know about my plan, which is the final motive “in order” of my actual action, I know the state of affairs that is about to be realized. Of course, this can only be done gradually (you need to write a statement, find writing materials, etc.), and each of the stages must materialize in “action” on a special project, with a special “in order” motive. However, all these “micro-actions” are just phases of a holistic action, and all the intermediate steps embodied in them are just means. achieving the final goal defined by the initial project. Its scope connects microprojects into a single chain. This becomes clear if we take into account that in a chain of interconnected partial actions that give rise to situations that are just “means” to achieve the projected goal, some links can be replaced by others or simply omitted. Nothing will change in the original draft. If I can’t find ink, I can use a typewriter and the application will be written. In other words, only the actor knows “when his action begins and where it ends,” that is, why it will be carried out. It is the length of projects that determines the unity of action. The partner is unaware of the project that preceded the activity, nor of the scope of the context in which it is embedded. He knows only that fragment of the action that unfolds in front of him, namely: the completed act he observed or the past phases of the current action. If my partner had been asked what I wanted, he would have replied that I was asking where to find ink. This is all he knows about my project and its context, he sees it as an independent separate action. To “understand” the meaning of my action, he would have to, starting with the observed act, construct the underlying “in order” motive, that is, determine why I did what he witnessed. Now it is clear that the meaning of the action will inevitably be different: a) for the actor himself; b) for the partner interacting with him, with whom he has a common set of goals and relevances: c) for an observer who is not included in this relationship. Two important conclusions follow from this. Firstly, everyday thinking gives us only a probable opportunity to understand the action of the “other” to the extent that is sufficient for our present goal. Secondly, in order to increase the probability, we must look for the meaning that the action has for the actor himself. So the postulate of “subjective semantic interpretation,” as it is unfortunately called, is not a distinctive feature of the sociology of Max Weber or the methodology of the social sciences in general. This is the principle of constructing types of action in everyday experience. Subjective interpretation is possible only as an identification of the motives that determine a given course of action. By correlating the type of action with the typical motives underlying it, we begin to construct a personality type. The latter may be more or less anonymous, that is, devoid of content. In the “we-relationship” of partners, the action of the “other,” his motives (insofar as they are manifest) and his personality (insofar as it is involved in overt action) are perceived in immediacy; the types indicated here exhibit a low degree of anonymity and significant completeness of content. By constructing types of action of contemporaries (not partners), we attribute to more or less anonymous participants a set of invariant motives that govern their actions. This set is itself a construct of typical expectations of the behavior of the “other,” and is often studied in terms of social role, function, or institutional behavior. In everyday thinking, such a construct is especially important in designing actions focused on the behavior of contemporaries (but not partners). What are its functions? 1. I take it for granted that my action (say, dropping a stamped and correctly labeled envelope into a box) will cause people anonymous to me (postal workers) to perform typical actions (process mail) in accordance with typical “in order” » motives (fulfillment of professional duties), c. as a result of which the state of affairs I designed will be achieved (delivery of the letter to the addressee on time). 2. I also take it for granted that my construct of the “action of the other” type corresponds essentially to his own self-typing, and that the latter includes a typical idea of ​​my (his anonymous partner’s) typical way of behaving, based on typical and supposedly invariant motives (whoever places a properly labeled and stamped envelope in the mailbox is expected to be delivered to the address at a certain time). 3. And, moreover, my own self-typing (as a client postal service) I must design my action to be of a type that I expect will meet the expectations of a typical postal worker in relation to a typical customer. This construction of interconnected behavioral models turns out to be a construction of intertwined “in order” and “because” motives, perceived as invariant. The more institutionalized and standardized such a pattern is, that is, the more it is typified and socially sanctioned through laws, rules, norms, customs, tradition, etc., the more likely it is that my own self-typed behavior will achieve the desired goal.

Translation from English by E. D. Rutkevich

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[Abstract]

Everyday thinking as a system of constructed types

The intersubjective world existed before our birth, experienced and interpreted by our predecessors as an organized world. It appears to us in our own experience and our interpretation.
We perceive the world in its typicality (and not in the aggregate of individual unique objects). Prior knowledge contains a horizon of similar future experiences. At the same time, we do not think of a particular dog as representative of the entire class of “dogs.”
At any moment a person is in a biographically determined situation, i.e. in a certain physical and sociocultural environment, which is characterized by experience and a stock of knowledge.

The intersubjective nature of everyday knowledge and its implications

The social world is not just someone's private world, it is the intersubjective world of culture. The world is intersubjective, since we live among other people: we are connected by a community of concerns, work, and mutual understanding. It is the world of culture, because from the very beginning everyday life appears before us as a semantic universe, a set of meanings. However, this set of meanings - and this is the difference between the kingdom of culture and the kingdom of nature - arose and continues to be formed in human actions: our own and other people, contemporaries and predecessors.

Three aspects of the problem of knowledge socialization:

1. reciprocity of perspectives or structural socialization of knowledge. Its factors:

interchangeability of points of view;
coincidence of relevance systems (interpretation of an object in a similar way, sufficient for practical purposes);
knowledge about an object as knowledge of “everyone”.
2. social origin of knowledge. Only a small part of knowledge comes from personal experience;
3. social distribution of knowledge. My actual knowledge is only the potential knowledge of my partner, and vice versa, everyone is an “expert” in his own narrow field and an amateur in many other fields of knowledge.

Action types and personality types

Action, project, motive
Action is behavior based on a pre-constructed blueprint.
An action is a completed action, maybe
hidden (mental activity) or
open, directed to the outside world.
In designing an action there is contained future behavior (the starting point of design is not the process of action, but the act completed in the imagination. Before I start drawing, I must have the design of the building in mind).
According to the accepted terminology, the project anticipates not a future action, but a future deed. This project-specific temporal perspective entails the following important conclusions:

1. All projects for upcoming actions are based on my existing knowledge at the time of design. This includes the experience of previously committed actions (“I can do it again”). Construction consists of suppressing “notes” because of their irrelevance (discarding those features that make phenomena unique and inimitable);
2. there is a relationship between project and motive.

Social interaction

Social interaction in everyday life uses a set of everyday constructs (in this case, constructs of the expected behavior of the “other”), based on the idealization according to which the “in order” motive becomes for the other the “because” motive, and vice versa. We will call this the idealization of reciprocity of motives. Obviously, it is conditioned by the general thesis of mutuality of perspectives, since it assumes that the motives assigned to the “other” are the same as those of me or of others in the same circumstances.
Only the actor himself knows when his action begins and where it ends. His partner only knows a fragment of the action. This leads to the following conclusions:

1. everyday thinking provides only a probable opportunity to understand the actions of another;
2. to increase the likelihood of understanding, we must look for the meaning that the action has for the actor himself.
3. The more behavior is typified, socially sanctioned through laws, rules, norms, customs, the greater the likelihood that my own self-typed behavior will achieve the desired goal.

1.What is “present knowledge”? Show that it acts as a blueprint for our everyday interpretations.

2. How are we given typical knowledge in everyday life? Give examples of “expecting typical matches.”

3. What does the selective activity of our consciousness depend on in the course of everyday “determining the situation”?

4.What does Schutz call the “present goal” and the associated system of relevances?

5.Why is “typicality” an open horizon?

6. Is the everyday world private or intersubjective in nature? What are its essential features?

7.What does “reciprocity of perspectives” mean as a structure of everyday knowledge?

8.What kind of world emerges as a result of everyday socialization of knowledge? Do you agree that it is anonymous (“our”) everyday life that is the source of recipes, truths, rules, etc.?

9.Who and how is knowledge about the world transmitted? Do you agree that “only a small part of knowledge about the world comes from personal experience”? Does all knowledge have a social genesis?

10.Show that knowledge is socially distributed. What determines the “stock of actual available knowledge” in everyday life?

11.What basic typifications of “others” (you, us, them) do I carry out in time? O m dimension of everyday experience?

12.What determines the degree of generalization and increase in anonymity in the relationships of contemporaries? Is it possible to “capture” the individuality of the “other”? What does Schutz call those relationships in which this is possible?

13.How does the process parallel the typification of the “other”? What is its genesis?

14. How does Shutsu see time A am I the specificity of ordinary human action? What are the action projects based on? Is absolute repetition of actions possible?

15.What two meanings of the concept of motive does Schutz give? Which one does he believe characterizes the process? human activity?

16.Which social thinker before Schutz interpreted human action in a similar way?

17. Using what example of the simplest interaction between people does Schutz show how the “in order” motive of one actor becomes the “because” motive of his partner and vice versa? What does Schutz call the constructs at play here?

18. Why is the meaning of an action always different: a) for the actor himself, b) for his partner, c) for an outside observer?

19. Is it then possible to understand the action of the “other”?

20. Why (for what and for whom) is the construct of typical expectations from the behavior of the “other” especially important?

21.Read the first paragraph immediately after the subtitle “The structure of the social world and its typification in...”, starting with the words “I am a human being...”. Do you think Schutz's phenomenology of everyday life is closer to social atomism or organicism?

22. Think about whether everyday life has boundaries? What do Schutz’s words mean: “This is the stock of available knowledge, which for the time being is taken for granted, although at any moment it can be called into question” (P. 129)? Can doubt take a person beyond the limits of everyday life?

Alfred Schuetz

We will try to show how a waking adult perceives the intersubjective world of everyday life, in which and in which he acts as a person among other people.

A person at any moment of his daily life is in a biographically determined situation, that is, in a physical and sociocultural environment determined by himself. In such an environment he takes his position. It is not only a position in physical space and external time, not only a status and role within a social system, it is also a moral and ideological position. This is the deposition of all previous experience, systematized in the usual forms of the available stock of knowledge. As such it is unique, given to this person and no one else.

In analyzing the first constructs of everyday thinking, we behaved as if the world were my private world, while ignoring the fact that from the very beginning it was the intersubjective world of culture. It is intersubjective, since we live among other people, we are connected by a community of concerns, work, and mutual understanding. He is the world of culture, because from the very beginning everyday life appears before us as a semantic universe, a set of meanings that we must interpret in order to find support in this world and come to terms with it. However, this set of meanings - and this is the difference between the kingdom of culture and the kingdom of nature - arose and continues to be formed in human actions: our own and other people, contemporaries and predecessors. All cultural objects (tools, symbols, language systems, works of art, social institutions, etc.) by their very meaning and origin indicate the activity of human subjects. Therefore, we always feel the historicity of culture when we encounter it in various traditions and customs.

Now we have to consider additional constructions that arise in everyday thinking, taking into account not the private, but the intersubjective world, and the fact that ideas about it are not only my personal business; they are initially intersubjective and socialized. We will look briefly at three aspects of the problem of knowledge socialization: mutuality of perspectives or structural socialization of knowledge; social origin of knowledge or its genetic socialization; social distribution of knowledge.

In the natural attitude of everyday thinking, I take it for granted that other intelligent people exist. This means that the objects of the world, in principle, are knowable to them either actually or potentially. This I know and accept without proof or doubt. But I also know and take for granted that the “same” object must mean something different to me and to every other person. This happens because:

1) I, being “here”, am at a different distance from objects and perceive them in a different typicality than another person who is “there”. For the same reason, some objects are beyond my reach (my seeing, hearing, manipulating), but within his reach, and vice versa;

2) biographically determined situations, mine and the other person, the corresponding present goals and the systems of relevances determined by them (mine and the other) must differ, at least to some extent.

Everyday thinking overcomes the differences in individual perspectives that result from these factors through two basic idealizations:

1) interchangeability of points of view (I take it for granted and assume: the other person also believes that if I change places with him and his “here” becomes mine, I will be at the same distance from objects and see them in that the same typicality that he has at the moment. Moreover, within my reach there will be the same things that he has now. The opposite relationship is also true);

2) coincidences of the system of relevances. Until proven otherwise, I take it for granted—and I assume others do as well—that the differences in perspective generated by our unique biographical situations are immaterial from the point of view of the present goals of either of us. And that he, like me, i.e. “we” believe that we have selected and interpreted actually and potentially common objects and their characteristics in the same or at least “empirically the same” way, that is, in the same way, from the point of view of our practical purposes.

It is obvious that both idealizations of the interchangeability of points of view and the coincidence of relevances, together forming the general thesis of mutual perspectives, represent typifying constructs of objects of thought that overcome the uniqueness of the objects of my or any other person’s personal experience. Thanks to the action of these constructs, it can be assumed that the sector of the world that is taken for granted by me is also perceived by another, my partner, and, moreover, is taken for granted by “us.” But this “we” includes not only “you” and “me”, but “everyone who is one of us,” that is, everyone whose system of relevances essentially (to a sufficient degree) coincides with “yours” and “ mine." What is considered familiar to everyone who shares our system of relevances is a way of life considered natural, normal, correct by members of the “we-group”.

Any individual stock of available knowledge at one time or another in life is delimited into zones with varying degrees of clarity, distinctness, and accuracy. This structure is generated by the system of prevailing relevances and is thus biographically determined. Knowledge of these individual differences is in itself an element of ordinary experience: I know to whom and under what typical circumstances I should turn as a competent doctor or lawyer. In other words, in everyday life I construct a typology of another’s knowledge, its volume and structure. In doing so, I assume that he is guided by a certain structure of relevances, which is expressed in him in a set of constant motives that impel him to a special type of behavior and determine even his personality.