reconnaissance aircraft. Aerial reconnaissance. Air reconnaissance methods

The experience of wars and armed conflicts shows that both in conditions of growing tension and in the course of armed struggle, one of the most important tasks is to provide command and staffs at all levels with intelligence data.

One of the most technologically advanced types of reconnaissance is aerial reconnaissance, which is a set of measures to obtain reliable data about the enemy by aviation forces necessary for the preparation and successful conduct of operations (combat actions) of associations, formations and units of all types of the Armed Forces and military branches.

The history of the training of aerial reconnaissance specialists is inextricably linked with the development of domestic manned and unmanned aircraft.

Training is carried out in the interests of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in the specialty - the use and operation of means and systems of special monitoring and its specializations: operation of ground-based aerial reconnaissance facilities, operation of ground facilities and systems of complexes with unmanned aerial vehicles, operation of complexes with unmanned aerial vehicles, technical operation of unmanned aerial vehicles devices and engines, technical operation of radio-electronic equipment of complexes with unmanned aerial vehicles.

Military specialists in the application and operation of means and systems of special monitoring are highly professional (qualified) erudite engineers who have fundamental knowledge in the field of remote sensing of the earth and digital processing of image information, who own the methodology of scientific research, methods for obtaining, processing and analyzing special monitoring data using technical means and systems of manned and unmanned aircraft, capable of effectively operating modern complexes collection and processing of aerospace reconnaissance data as part of a unified automated control system of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The professional activity of specialists is aimed at the study of natural resources and man-made objects by aerospace means, including the use of complexes with UAVs.

The graduate is intended to serve in the air reconnaissance data processing units of the Air Force aviation military formations, ministries and departments of the Russian Federation in the officer positions of an engineer and head of the intelligence information processing group. In addition, a graduate with a specialization related to the use of complexes with UAVs is intended to serve in UAV units in officer positions: operator (observation), operator (decoder), head of intelligence of the group. The faculty includes 2 departments:
department 41 ground systems air reconnaissance systems.
Department of 42 robotic complexes and air-based systems;

The faculty has established close ties with leading universities, research and production and industry organizations, including the intelligence service of the Aerospace Forces, the Directorate (construction and development of the UAV system) of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Sozvezdie concern, the VEGA radio engineering concern , Research Institute of Precision Instruments, Energia Rocket and Space Corporation.

The permanent and variable composition of the faculty actively participates in the activities of the military scientific society of the academy, in experimental design and research work assigned by the Military Scientific Committee of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the intelligence service of the Aerospace Forces, in international and all-Russian scientific and practical conferences, in exhibitions and salons of scientific and technical creativity "Archimedes", "Expopriority", "Interpolitech", "High Technologies", "Innovation Day of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation", and wins prizes.

In the course of studying military professional disciplines, cadets in practice master weapons and military equipment used in information processing departments, aerial photographic service units, as well as UAV companies and detachments, in particular, an automobile mobile aerial photographic laboratory, modern complexes for automation of intelligence information processing, complexes with UAVs short range, short and medium range.

They hone their skills in digital data processing using modern technological platforms of object-oriented modeling.

They participate in inventive and rationalization work, grant activities aimed at creating prototypes of robotic systems for studying the features of image formation in various parts of the electromagnetic radiation spectrum.

They learn to use air-based robotic complexes, decipher images using a unified training complex in a virtual information environment for modeling the situation.

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  Velikanov Alexey Viktorovich, Head of the 4th Faculty of Unmanned Aviation, VUNTS VVS "Air Force Academy named after Professor N.E. Zhukovsky and Yu.A. Gagarin”, candidate of technical sciences, professor, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Transport, Honored Inventor of the Russian Federation.

  In 1987 he graduated from the Voronezh Higher Military Aviation Engineering School. From August 1987 to September 1989 he served in military unit 21265 as commander of an electrogas platoon in Kirovograd.

  From September 1989 to December 1996 he served as a course officer of the Voronezh VVAIU. In December 1996, he entered the full-time postgraduate course at the school, in December 1999 he successfully completed it.

  From December 1999 to December 2009 he served as a teacher, associate professor, deputy head of the department, head of the department of automotive training.

  He is the head of a scientific school and the author of more than 200 scientific, educational and educational works (including: 1 textbook, 16 teaching aids and 46 patents of the Russian Federation for inventions), completed 28 research projects, prepared more than forty graduate students and three candidates of science.

  For the achieved indicators in technical creativity Velikanov A.V. in 2005 he was awarded the title of laureate of the Mikhail Lomonosov Prize. He is the best inventor of the university. Repeatedly took part in the Victory Parade on Red Square in Moscow.

Aerial reconnaissance

Perhaps it should be considered logical that in the post-war period, in almost all cases when questions of military aviation were discussed, the main attention was paid to strategic bombers, aircraft carriers, jet fighters, rocket-propelled and unguided projectiles and anti-submarine warfare. Events such as the Korean War of 1953 and the floods in Holland and Great Britain showed the importance of helicopters. The question of transport aircraft came to the fore during the air resupply of Berlin and in the early tense days of the Korean War, when vital supplies had to be airlifted into the small patch of South Korea that was still in the hands of the United Nations troops. But not a single significant work on air force written after the end of the Second World War, no information about reconnaissance aircraft and reconnaissance operations can be found, with the exception of individual remarks.

It is difficult to understand why reconnaissance aviation began to play a secondary role in most air fleets between the two world wars, and why, despite the experience of the Second World War, no changes occurred in this matter. During the first two years of World War I, aircraft and airships were used primarily for surveillance. Their main task was to be the eyes of the army and navy: Detect cannons and troop movements on land and enemy ships at sea. Naturally, with the advent of new methods of bombing and conducting air combat the issues of aerial reconnaissance began to be given correspondingly less attention. But every stage of the Second World War convinces us more and more that good or bad air patrols or reconnaissance must be the main factor in the air, land and sea situation.

The most striking example of the development and activity of reconnaissance aviation was shown by the German Air Force. In 1939, at the very beginning of the Second World War, 20 percent of the total, approximately 3,750 combat aircraft, were long-range and short-range reconnaissance aircraft, seaplanes and flying boats designed for aerial reconnaissance and patrol. This large percentage of reconnaissance aircraft continued until about 1943, when the deployment of fighter aircraft began on a large scale. In the entire history of military aviation, no other country has devoted such a large proportion of its aviation resources to aerial reconnaissance, surveillance and patrol missions. During the first nine or ten months of the war, German reconnaissance aircraft successfully completed their mission of obtaining information necessary for the effective and economical use of German air power. Seaplanes of the coast guard successfully carried out the tasks of monitoring the coasts of Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea. Meteorological and general reconnaissance was carried out daily over the North Sea and Western Europe; these tasks were carried out by qualified crews of Heinkel twin-engine bombers assigned to each major aviation formation. During the campaign in Norway, they were assisted in these tasks by four-engine long-range flying boats and Focke-Wulf-200 aircraft. Aircraft "Henschel" performed important tasks of tactical reconnaissance in the interests of the ground forces operating in Poland, the Scandinavian countries, France and Flanders. They quickly reported accurate information about the movements of enemy troops, making it possible to quickly use dive bombers on the most advantageous targets. Almost every German tank division had a squadron of Henschel tactical reconnaissance aircraft, which carried out the tasks of detecting tanks, as well as a flight of Fieseler aircraft, which provided communications in combat areas. Each unit of medium or dive bombers had a well-trained flight of reconnaissance aircraft, which performed special tasks of observation and aerial reconnaissance in the interests of its unit. Never before in the history of aviation has the air force had such first-class aerial reconnaissance, which would be able to ensure the use of a minimum number of bombers with maximum efficiency.

But by the summer of 1940, even this number of German reconnaissance units was not enough. In the Battle of England and during the fighting in the Atlantic, the German reconnaissance aircraft passed the first severe tests and showed the first signs indicating the weakness of the German air force in relation to aerial reconnaissance. During the Battle of England, it soon became clear that 300 Henschel aircraft, which had low speed, should be a good target for Spitfire and Hurricane fighters armed with eight machine guns and exceeding them in speed by almost 160 km / h, so that these machines had to be excluded from active operations, although they were partly used for patrols in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe coast of the Bay of Biscay. The remaining long-range reconnaissance aircraft Dornier, Heinkel and Junkers were also vulnerable to Hurricane and Spitfire fighters when they attempted to conduct reconnaissance missions over land. As a result, the Germans failed to conduct reconnaissance of many airfields and factories, which were important targets for Goering's bomber aircraft. German reconnaissance aircraft failed to obtain reliable information about the results of their raids on airfields, radar installations and factories. During the Battle of England, German naval reconnaissance aircraft also began to experience difficulties in the new Atlantic theatre. During operations against ships, mainly in the North Sea or in ports on the east coast of England, German reconnaissance aircraft carried out tasks of meteorological reconnaissance, aerial photographic reconnaissance and observation. When the air action spread further to the West and to the Bay of Biscay, the German reconnaissance aviation was not up to its task. From the end of 1940 it became more and more of a secondary role, and its operations became less effective. In the Mediterranean theater of operations, long-range reconnaissance in the interests of the German air force was often carried out by Italian aircraft. The position of German reconnaissance aviation continued to deteriorate on all three main fronts, because the Germans knew that they had the means to carry out only the most minimal tasks. In the West, during the period from January 1941 to September 1944, the Germans could not conduct a single sortie on aerial photographs of London. In the decisive period before the Allied invasion of France, a lot of information about the plans for the invasion could be obtained by aerial reconnaissance of the ports of the south coast of England, but British patrol fighters drove off most of the German reconnaissance aircraft, and the aerial photographs they received were Bad quality and gave very little information. In the East, the situation was even worse, since after 1943 reconnaissance aviation units were often involved in bombing missions. Of course, the German troops operating against the Soviet Army received little information from aerial reconnaissance, which made it possible to judge the direction and strength of the strikes of the Soviet troops from the end of 1942. At that time, the air support for the Suez Canal zone and the central region of the Mediterranean Sea from the Germans and Italians was also insufficient. The position of the German reconnaissance aviation deteriorated at a time when it was especially necessary to strengthen the reconnaissance activities of the German Air Force. When the enemy is weak, the movements of his troops do not play a big role; but when it is strong, the value of aerial reconnaissance increases.

Air reconnaissance issues have not yet been adequately reflected in modern doctrines of air strategy and air power. Well organized aerial reconnaissance (or information) is the "first line" air defense and the first important condition for successful aviation operations. If guided missiles and bombers are used as means of attack, then first of all it is necessary to know where the enemy is, what his means and strength are. To protect ships from attack submarines need to be detected in a timely manner. In order to evaluate the results of bombing during the war, it is necessary to have the latest information about the destruction caused, the dispersal of industry, restoration work and the construction of new factories. Aerial reconnaissance can completely change the outcome of military operations of ground forces. The German offensive in the Ardennes in the winter of 1944/45 began during the period of fog, as a result of which Allied air reconnaissance was not carried out. Hardly throughout the Pacific theater of operations - from Pearl Harbor to about. Okinawa - held naval battles in which aerial reconnaissance would not play an important role.

Yet the value of aerial reconnaissance is always underestimated. During a war it is impossible to economically distribute forces and resources and use them to the maximum without knowledge of the situation. What Clausewitz wrote about the war a hundred years ago is still being studied and has not lost its force: "Many reports received in the war contradict one another; there are even more false reports, and most of them are not very reliable." It is difficult for a non-specialist to understand that the information available to the high command, which serves as the basis for decision-making, is often insufficient and incomplete. Troop commanders can lead combat operations for months without any information about how many planes, ships, tanks or submarines the enemy is producing. True, there are many sources of intelligence information: prisoners of war, documents captured from the enemy, agents and radio interception. But how to find out what information this or that prisoner of war has? Since it is possible to determine in advance which radiograms can be decrypted and what information they contain, it is not always possible to capture enemy documents containing important information. You can rarely rely on the fact that agents will deliver the necessary intelligence in the form required. Aerial photographic reconnaissance is the only source of reliable and up-to-date information of a military nature. Air reconnaissance activities can be planned and controlled. Almost always, aircraft performing aerial reconnaissance missions bring photographs that provide valuable information, since the objects, time and date of photographing are known. Even visual reconnaissance, although influenced by human error, provides the ability to quickly obtain information that can meet operational requirements. Moreover, to know exactly the time and place of receiving intelligence information is already half of being sure of its reliability.

In Soviet military circles, the words "tactical (military) intelligence" (reconnaissance) and "strategic intelligence" (intelligence) are synonymous. Yet the USSR never attached as much importance to tactical intelligence as the Germans did in the period between the two world wars. The Soviet air force has always had (and still has) reconnaissance aviation regiments of 30-40 aircraft, but they were never enough to meet the needs of the army in reconnaissance information. Has anyone ever heard of the existence of an air reconnaissance command in the air forces of the Western powers, equal in position to the bomber and fighter air commands and the coastal aviation command of the British air forces? Position, dignity and popularity in military life play the same important role just like in civilian life. It is rare to hear that a pilot or navigator of a reconnaissance aircraft became national hero. At the time of the announcement of the Bruneval raid, few had heard of the valuable low-level perspective aerial photographs taken by Air Major Hill. Reconnaissance information obtained from aerial photographs served as the initial data for the raid on Bruneval. Subsequently, he took many aerial photographs of radar stations during flights that required skill, courage and enterprise; but, as was the case with many other reconnaissance pilots who delivered valuable information both during the first and second world wars, his feat was soon forgotten. Apparently, fighter and bomber pilots are considered the aristocrats of the air and the monopoly bearers of the Victoria Cross and the Order of Honor of Congress. This opinion is erroneous, since every pilot or navigator of a reconnaissance aircraft must be a first-class specialist in order to cope with his tasks. With modern radio and radar equipment on bombers and fighters, an average crew can often achieve good results. It is indicative that in the British Air Force the navigator wears only half a wing on his uniform and rarely rises to the rank of colonel. Those who fly know how often the navigator is the most important and authoritative member of the aircraft crew. And yet, did at least one navigator, a participant in the First World War, become an air general or an air marshal during the second world war?

A modern air force must consider organizing aerial reconnaissance on an entirely new basis. At the start of World War II, only the German Air Force was able to provide intelligence for bombing operations. In the US Air Force! the lenses of many aerial cameras met only the requirements of cartographic aerial photography in peacetime. In many cases, their size was insufficient to obtain aerial photographs at the scale necessary for detailed interpretation. There were very few trained codebreakers and reconnaissance pilots.

During the Second World War, aerial reconnaissance of all kinds was widely developed, but the war did not give the main strategic lesson that the conduct of multi-purpose air operations on a large scale requires conducting multi-purpose aerial reconnaissance of the appropriate scale. In modern warfare, the tasks of aerial reconnaissance are very diverse. Coastal aviation conducts reconnaissance on sea lanes, meteorological reconnaissance is carried out over land and sea, radar reconnaissance is carried out in order to detect enemy radar stations, and strategic aviation reconnaissance is carried out in order to determine the results of bombing and obtain reconnaissance data on targets. In addition, there is tactical intelligence, which includes the adjustment of artillery fire, the identification of camouflaged objects and targets, and the observation of the movement of enemy troops along highways and railways. During the Second World War, reconnaissance activities for the solution of each of the above tasks hardly lasted several months. During the first two years of the war, there was no aerial survey of the factories of Japan's growing aviation industry in the Pacific theater. The British conducted insufficient meteorological reconnaissance over German territory. From the captured combat logs, it became known that the days considered by the allies from bad weather in important cities like Berlin and Leipzig were in fact clear, sunny days. Winston Churchill wrote of the British air raids on Berlin that began in November 1943: "We had to wait until March 1944 to obtain sufficiently clear aerial photographs to evaluate the results of the bombing. This was partly due to poor meteorological conditions, as well as insufficient number of reconnaissance aircraft "Mosquito" American aircraft, which carried out raids on oil refineries in Romania in 1943 and subsequently did not have aerial reconnaissance data, both during the planning period of operations and during the evaluation of the results of the bombing.Effective air patrols in coastal zones and good radio communication could thwart the attack Japanese aviation to Pearl Harbor. The German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, during their breakthrough across the English Channel, were accidentally discovered from a Spitfire aircraft performing a combat air patrol mission, and not by reconnaissance aircraft. Many examples can be cited when, at the decisive stages of the Second World War, the organization of aerial reconnaissance was poorly organized.

The tactical lessons of World War II are well learned. It is now clear that reconnaissance aircraft must be the best and their crews the most qualified. Bombers and fighters intended for reconnaissance should be stripped of weapons and replaced with additional fuel tanks in order to increase their range and flight speed. All the best aircraft of the Second World War: Mosquito, Mustang, Lightning, LaG and Messerschmitt jets were used for aerial reconnaissance. In the post-war period, aircraft such as the Canberra, a twin-engine jet aircraft of the design Tupolev, Saber and other jet fighters, as well as B-36 and B-52 strategic bombers have all been specially adapted for aerial reconnaissance missions.There may also be a version of a heavy bomber, from which, when approaching enemy territory, a supersonic fighter will be released - Reconnaissance It is quite clear that in aerial photography, the exact maintenance of the course, altitude and speed of flight is of great importance - which can be carried out by only a few pilots; the choice of the flight route and the exact maintenance of the time spent above the target are also important. At present, they are widely used cameras with lenses having focal lengths from 150 to more than 1500 mm; they provide a large photographic area with large overlap, allowing detailed interpretation of aerial photographs taken from altitudes above 9000 m. All modern air forces use machines that provide fast and efficient interpretation. As soon as the plane lands, the 16- or 35-mm film is quickly delivered to the local mobile interpretation center, where the first stage of processing is carried out within several hours: development, washing, drying, printing and initial interpretation. Using these images, you can quickly estimate the damage caused by the bombing, or calculate the approximate number of vehicles, trains and troops on the move. In order to make maximum use of the aerial photographs obtained after the first processing for operational purposes, it is necessary to have a good file of intelligence information and military maps of the latest editions. In itself, information about the number of ships in the port, aircraft at the airfield or trains at the marshalling yard is of dubious value. It is necessary to know for what purpose certain funds are concentrated. This position can be illustrated by one example from the Second World War. At an airfield in central Norway, photographic reconnaissance discovered a large number of four-engine bombers designed to fight ships. This indicated that the Germans were preparing an attack on ships located off the coast of Scotland or Ireland. The ships were in turmoil. It was decided to take them to a safe place or take other measures. In fact, it turned out that the concentration of a large number of aircraft at one airfield was caused by bad weather around air bases in southwestern France and southwestern Norway, as well as due to the lack of spare parts at bases in central Norway, which caused the failure of several aircraft. It is very often not taken into account that the aircraft photographed at the airfield may turn out to be out of order. A lot of information can be gleaned from each image, but in order to accept this information as facts, it must be supplemented with other data.

At the second and third stages of interpretation of aerial photographs, a more thorough study of them is carried out. The use of a stereoscope increases the accuracy of interpretation. The vague shadows on the hills and in the valleys become clear. Viewing aerial photographs through a stereoscope helps to identify parked aircraft, recognize camouflaged bridges and buildings by determining the difference in the height of an object compared to surrounding objects. The stereoscope allows you to see the relief of an object by its shadow, which is often the last key to recognizing objects when deciphering. By studying the details of aerial photographs, a large amount of intelligence data can be obtained, for example, comparative data on the development of a network of radar stations and firing positions. anti-aircraft artillery, information on the construction and expansion of airfields with a significant lengthening of the runways. With the help of data obtained by aerial photographic reconnaissance, the preparation of the Axis countries for the failed airborne landing on the island was revealed. Malta with about. Sicily, where airfields and runways were specially built for this purpose. It was with the help of aerial photographic reconnaissance that it was discovered that the Germans were developing new weapons in Peenemünde, which in the future could play a decisive role in the war. The role of aerial reconnaissance of strategic targets cannot be overestimated. Accurate and reliable basic intelligence data can be obtained from other intelligence sources. But only with the help of aerial reconnaissance can reliable information be obtained about the best route flight to the target, taking into account the air defense in the area, enemy camouflage and important target areas that have recently undergone reconstruction or restoration.

However, one important question aerial photography is often misunderstood. At the present time, it is still argued that, using aerial photographs, it is possible to determine how long a particular object has been disabled. During the Second World War, based on aerial photographs, the following conclusions were made: "It is assumed that the production capacity of the facility has decreased by 50 percent for a period of two to three months." No one can calculate the percentage of destruction based on aerial photographs with such accuracy. The pace of restoration work depends on many factors: the morale of the population, the sequence of work, the supply of electricity, the availability work force and raw materials. In 1944, the assessment of the destruction of the German aircraft industry, based on aerial photographs, was optimistic because the enemy dispersed industrial enterprises and used production facilities in unknown factories. Estimation of the destruction of the Japanese aircraft industry in 1944-1945 was often pessimistic, as the pace of reconstruction in Japan was slow, and the reassessment of the destruction of German factories in 1944 is probably only too well remembered.

One of the sad lessons of the air war in Korea is that the experience of conducting aerial reconnaissance during the second world war was confused. First, there was a great shortage of qualified codebreakers. The work of deciphering aerial photographs requires a lot of preparation and skill. Many good codebreakers lost their skills while working in civilian institutions. In 1950, the US Air Force had only two air reconnaissance squadrons in Japan and Korea, one of which was engaged in mapping. The second squadron could not be used effectively, as it suffered greatly from a lack of materiel and personnel. When these squadrons began their missions, the tactical lessons of the forties had already been forgotten. They received too many impracticable requests for large-scale aerial photographs, which had to be taken from low altitudes and at high speed. There were various bodies which, despite limited resources, used aerial reconnaissance facilities to meet their own needs; it happened that on the same day, at the request of various organizations, reconnaissance flights were made twice along the same route. Worst of all, there were no decryption specialists. But these difficulties of the initial period were soon overcome. By the beginning of 1952, mobile photo labs were organized, equipped with vans, trailers with power plants and water tanks. There were vans for printing pictures and developing photographic films, workshops for the repair of photographic equipment, a film library - that is, everything necessary for processing aerial photographs in the field. The number of equipment, personnel and aircraft gradually increased. Applications for aerial reconnaissance were coordinated in the US Air Force Intelligence Directorate in the Far East, and the actions of the United Nations troops in Korea became more economical and expedient.

Of the lessons of aerial reconnaissance during the Second World War, one lesson, perhaps, remained unlearned - this is the inadmissibility of underestimating the use of seaplanes and flying boats. During the war, American Catalina flying boats, British Sunderland, Soviet MPs, and German seaplanes and Heinkel and Dornier flying boats carried out coastal and meteorological reconnaissance, carried out anti-submarine patrols and performed other tasks in the interests of naval forces. forces. But after the war, seaplanes and flying boats fell out of fashion in the air forces of the Western powers, although a few such squadrons remained in the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the Communists in Korea had a small bomber force; if the few airfields that the United Nations air force had at the initial period of the Korean War had been attacked even lightly from the air, their aircraft would have had to operate from air bases in Japan, having lost great advantages. In many cases, only seaplanes and flying boats, dispersed at anchorages in case of air attack, can provide important information about enemy movements and changing meteorological conditions. The Germans valued flying boats and seaplanes in 1940 during the campaign in Norway, when there were few airfields at their disposal and meteorological and other information was necessary for the rapid success of the campaign. Undoubtedly, conditions similar to those in the Pacific theater may occur in the future, in which flying boats will play an important role. Flying boats are a convenient and economical means of passenger transportation on civil airlines; they are capable of carrying a large payload and can be quickly adapted for military purposes. Flying boats are more valuable than many people think.

The need for global weather forecasts is now greater than ever before, but the role of aerial reconnaissance in this regard is difficult to define. Should it become necessary to move air squadrons across large areas of water at speeds in excess of 1,100 km/h, as was the case in early 1954, the meteorological service must provide a worldwide weather forecast. At present, thousands of ground and sea meteorological stations have been established in all countries, delivering basic weather data. There are countless previously collected data on weather conditions and climate that can help establish the relationship between current local meteorological data and possible long-term weather trends. Electronic equipment is increasingly being used to predict the weather. VHF radios are used to warn of an approaching storm that poses a danger to aircraft flight. With the help of radar stations determine the nature of the winds in upper layers atmosphere. It would be impractical to employ a large number of weather reconnaissance aircraft when these aircraft are needed for more important missions. It would be more expedient to increase the number of land-based mobile meteorological stations and vessels for reconnaissance of weather at sea, improve meteorological instruments and ensure reliable communication with central bodies that summarize information on the state of the weather.

Of course, there is still a need to use a certain number of aircraft for meteorological reconnaissance, especially with the increasing range of all types of aircraft, when bombers during the flight to the target may encounter a variety of meteorological conditions. It is difficult to foresee the full range of operational requirements in the field of meteorological reconnaissance, as well as in the field of military reconnaissance. As the ability to use expensive nuclear weapons for close air support grows, tactical military intelligence becomes more and more important. Nuclear weapons should not be allowed to be spent on secondary purposes. In the era of atomic projectiles and tactical atomic bombs, which can be used from fighter-bombers, timely and reliable information is extremely important. Expensive tactical guided missiles also cannot be used against small targets. If ground forces operate in Africa, South America, Asia and the Middle East, where many areas have not yet been mapped, then the need for aerial photography will be significant. This is evidenced by the experience of military operations in Malaya. The available maps of Malaya proved useless for military purposes. It was necessary to draw up new military maps, for which it was necessary to make aerial photographs of an area of ​​​​more than 10 thousand square meters. km. Much of this work has been done with helicopters. These machines also proved to be extremely valuable for aerial reconnaissance during the Korean War. But the territories of Korea and Malaya cannot be compared, for example, with the vast expanses of Asia, where there are also no modern large-scale military maps and the compilation of which will require colossal efforts of aerial reconnaissance. It is safe to say that any conflict in the future, during which aerial reconnaissance will be required, will almost certainly cover the whole world. The number of reconnaissance aircraft will be very limited. What can be done in a relatively calm peacetime environment in order to prepare for war as much as possible, with limited resources? The first and most important condition is the conduct of general training of the personnel of the armed forces in visual observation. Part of the time spent on physical training and lectures on current issues is useful for studying meteorology, camouflage, aerial surveillance techniques, geography, terrain features - that is, all issues that develop theoretical and practical skills in the personnel of all branches of the armed forces for conducting reconnaissance. Measures such as showing all personnel special documentaries and post-flight practical checks to see if they were awarded a special observer badge, which entitles them to pay bonuses, will raise the overall level of reconnaissance training. All bomber fighter and transport units of the Air Force must have more pilots specially trained for reconnaissance missions. If the initial training of observers is organized on a large scale in the armed forces, then it will not be difficult to create reconnaissance detachments in combat air units and equip them with personnel. In addition, conditions must be created for more flexible switching of aircraft to aerial reconnaissance. Why not, for example, use an entire aviation wing of bombers and fighters to survey an entire area and thus obtain visual reconnaissance data on this area. But all too often only two or three aircraft are allocated for aerial reconnaissance. Just as a good boxer saves his signature punch until he knows his opponent's strengths and weaknesses, successful offensive operations in the air require detailed knowledge of the enemy's territory, and it is often advisable to delay the start of operations until necessary. information will not be received. Saving manpower and resources for aerial reconnaissance only leads to a waste of resources in bombardment.

If the vast spaces covered modern war necessitate aerial reconnaissance on a large scale, they also require special attention to communications and centralized control. In the USA, Great Britain and the USSR, central intelligence directorates have been created, but they mainly carry out the tasks of strategic intelligence. It is necessary to organize a single intelligence service of the armed forces, which would include a unit of photo decoders who process all intelligence materials coming through all channels: this department should include both military and civilian specialists. Of course, in this department there should be specialized units: technical, scientific, industrial, etc., but these units should be general, without any preference for one of the branches of the armed forces. Intelligence information is valuable to all branches of the armed forces: intelligence on the state of the weather, radar stations, enemy ships and almost all other information is rarely of interest only to any one branch of the armed forces.

Similarly, air reconnaissance units and additionally created observer reconnaissance units should also serve all armed forces, and not just air forces. Air reconnaissance, like strategic bombing, must be carried out in accordance with state military policy determined by the Ministries of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The control of Soviet long-range bomber aviation during the Second World War was carried out by the State Defense Committee, and reconnaissance aviation units were dispersed, being at the disposal of commanding formations land army and the navy. The Anglo-American strategic bomber force was temporarily under the control of the joint chiefs of staff, but it never won the air reconnaissance subordination, which was often the eyes of the strategic bomber force and the evaluator of the results of its actions. Of course, at the present time tendencies are intensifying towards the unification of the branches of the armed forces. Joint intelligence directorates and joint committees have already been organized, and many staff documents are being jointly developed. The time has already come to abolish the various forms of clothing of certain branches of the armed forces and to develop detailed plans the closest association of the army, naval and air forces at all levels, where possible. However, this is a large independent issue, which is dealt with in more detail in Chapter IX. Chapter 3. Reconnaissance Reconnaissance in the mountains is more difficult than on the flat terrain. Mountainous rugged terrain, the presence of mountain spurs and ridges, gorges and valleys between them contribute to the secrecy of enemy movements and the location of his units. In addition, folds