Soviet post-war anti-tank artillery. Post-war Soviet anti-aircraft artillery Artillery of the Soviet army after the war

During the war, BS-3 was produced in small quantities and could not play a big role. At the final stage of the war, 98 BS-3s were assigned as a means of strengthening five tank armies. The gun was in service with light artillery brigades of 3 regiments.

As of January 1, 1945, the RGK artillery had 87 BS-3 guns. At the beginning of 1945, in the 9th Guards Army, one cannon artillery regiment of 20 BS-3s was formed in three rifle corps.

Mainly thanks to long range firing range - 20,650 m and a fairly effective high-explosive fragmentation grenade weighing 15.6 kg, the gun was used as a hull gun to combat enemy artillery and suppress long-range targets.

BS-3 had a number of disadvantages that made it difficult to use as an anti-tank weapon. When firing, the gun jumped strongly, which made the gunner’s work unsafe and confused the sighting mounts, which, in turn, led to a decrease in the practical rate of aimed fire - a very important quality for a field anti-tank gun.

The presence of a powerful muzzle brake with a low height of the line of fire and flat trajectories characteristic of firing at armored targets led to the formation of a significant smoke and dust cloud, which unmasked the position and blinded the crew. The mobility of a gun with a mass of more than 3500 kg left much to be desired; transportation by crews to the battlefield was practically impossible.

After the war, the gun was in production until 1951 inclusive; a total of 3,816 BS-3 field guns were produced. In the 60s, the guns underwent modernization, this primarily concerned sights and ammunition. Until the early 60s, the BS-3 could penetrate the armor of any Western tank. But with the advent of: M-48A2, Chieftain, M-60 - the situation has changed. New sub-caliber and cumulative projectiles were urgently developed. The next modernization took place in the mid-80s, when the 9M117 Bastion anti-tank guided projectile was added to the BS-3 ammunition load.

This weapon was also supplied to other countries and took part in many local conflicts in Asia, Africa and the Middle East; in some of them it is still in service. In Russia, until recently, BS-3 guns were used as a coastal defense weapon in service with the 18th Machine Gun and Artillery Division stationed on the Kuril Islands, and quite a significant number of them are in storage.

Until the late 60s and early 70s of the last century, anti-tank guns were the main means of fighting tanks. However, with the advent of ATGMs with a semi-automatic guidance system, which only requires keeping the target in the sight's field of view, the situation has largely changed. Military leadership Many countries considered metal-intensive, bulky and expensive anti-tank guns an anachronism. But not in the USSR. In our country development and production anti-tank guns continued in significant numbers. And at a qualitatively new level.

In the second part of my article, I want to briefly consider the development of Soviet self-propelled artillery, including self-propelled mortars, self-propelled guns, and flamethrower systems.

The purpose of my article is to briefly highlight controversial military-technical decisions and mistakes made in the development of Soviet self-propelled artillery. Show that sometimes very dubious, illogical decisions were made, because of which until the 70s the USSR did not have normal self-propelled artillery.

Then, in just 7 years, perfect samples were created that are still actively used today. I tried to show what could have been changed in this industry if the USSR had taken into account the experience of both NATO designers and Socialist camp specialists. In addition, I will show that some design solutions were simply in plain sight, but for some reason the Soviet designers and/or the military did not appreciate or notice them.

To make things easier to understand, I’ll tell you briefly about the structure of Soviet post-war artillery. As part of the division of the 70-80s, artillery was available at 3 levels: the divisional level itself - an artillery regiment of 3 divisions of 152mm self-propelled guns or howitzers, an MLRS division, as well as an anti-aircraft missile or anti-aircraft artillery regiment, and an anti-tank fighter division. Regimental level - 122mm howitzer division, anti-aircraft division or battery, anti-tank battery, sometimes an MLRS battery was added.

Battalion level - a company of 120mm mortars, sometimes some of the mortars were represented by 82mm Vasilki.

Since the 80s, airborne divisions have had a Nona self-propelled gun division in each regiment, and at the divisional level an artillery regiment consisting of Nona self-propelled guns, D-30 howitzers, a MLRS battery and an anti-tank division.

It is clear that in different years the states differed significantly, there were too many divisions in the USSR. Let's say that the artillery of the post-war divisions was quite weak: 76-85mm divisional guns and 122mm howitzers, as well as a relatively small number of mortars and MLRS.

Anti-aircraft armament regiment of 24 37mm anti-aircraft guns. The tank division's strengths were different: for example, the artillery armament of one of the TDs for 1955: 4 57, 76, 85 mm guns, 37 122 mm howitzers, 4 120 mm and 13 160 mm mortars, 9 MLRS, 4 ZSU-37, 6 DShK machine guns, 6 ZPU-2, 3 ZPU-4, 2 25 mm, 29 37 mm, 6 85 mm anti-aircraft guns. Honestly, such states slightly shocked me; for me, the artillery weapons are very weak.

At the level of armies and districts there were separate artillery divisions and brigades, armed, as a rule, with corps guns, high-power guns, heavy MLRS and mortars.

The importance of artillery of various types is enormous; it is necessary to understand that real combat experience has shown that artillery, along with tanks, is the main striking force ground forces, or even the main striking force.

The importance of anti-aircraft artillery has fallen, but ZSU and ZU confidently occupy their niche, becoming at the same time an important means of fire support for troops. Another advantage of artillery is its conservatism and slow obsolescence.

For example, mortars and many WWII artillery systems are quite combat-ready for local conflicts of our time, while armored vehicles, especially pre-war ones, are hopelessly outdated. The 120mm mortar model 1938 or the 122mm howitzer M-30 still look menacing, remaining in service with a number of countries, but tanks developed in 1938 have been preserved only in museums.

I also want to note that the purpose of the article is not digging through the trash, or savoring the mistakes of the Soviet military and designers, the author is a patriot of the USSR and a fan of Soviet weapons, but for me, separate criticism is still necessary.

For convenience of the problem Soviet weapons are considered by type of military equipment. I also consider some systems to be masterpieces of military-technical thought that have no analogues to this day, for example, 2S7 “Peony”, 2S4 “Tulpan”, 2S6 “Tunguska”, TOS-1.

1. Airborne self-propelled guns.

The first and most widespread airborne self-propelled gun was the ASU-57, adopted by the Airborne Forces in 1951 and produced until 1962. At first, the airborne division received a division of 35 self-propelled guns (essentially a battalion), then the self-propelled guns were transferred to the regimental level: each regiment had a battery of 10 self-propelled guns.

The car was compact and quite reliable and off-road. Its low weight made it possible to effectively land it with the advent of the An-8/12, as well as Mi-6 helicopters. It is clear that the vehicle had weak armor, protecting only from small fragments, as well as ordinary bullets, but this was the price to pay for the low weight. The only question for the self-propelled guns is how optimal was the choice of weapons?

The fact is that self-propelled guns had to solve a whole range of tasks, from fighting armored vehicles to hitting enemy firing points and destroying enemy infantry. In my opinion, the optimal weapon for solving such problems would be an automated control system with a 76mm gun. Moreover, it was developed simultaneously with the ASU-57, but they chose the system with a 57mm gun, guided by its better armor penetration: a 57mm gun at a distance of 500/1000/1500/2000 meters penetrated 115/105/95/85 mm of armor with a caliber projectile, and with a post-war sub-caliber projectile 155/140/125/100mm of armor.

For comparison, a 76mm cannon penetrated 95/80/70/60mm with a caliber projectile, and 125/110/90/75mm with a sabot projectile. It would seem that the advantage of the ASU-57 is obvious, and there is nothing to discuss, but at the same time you need to remember at least 3 factors: firstly, that the 57mm gun and the 76mm could not effectively fight the NATO medium tanks M-47/48, Centurion, and also the first MBT M-60.

If the first modifications of these tanks were still hit by BPS head-on from 500m, then the subsequent ones were invulnerable in the frontal projection. The sides were confidently hit by shells of both calibers.

Airborne self-propelled guns were not intended for open combat with enemy MBTs, but were supposed to operate from ambushes, where the main thing was to confidently penetrate the enemy tank into the side and have small dimensions for stealth. Secondly, a cumulative projectile was developed for the 76mm gun, which penetrated 180-200mm of armor. Thirdly, the mass of the OFS 57mm cannon is only 3.75 kg, and the 76mm 6.2 kg, i.e. more than one and a half times heavier, which is especially important for destroying infantry targets.

However, there was an even more interesting option proposed by the designers in the mid-50s, the re-equipment of the ASU-57 with a 107mm recoilless rifle. By the way, a similar self-propelled gun was created in the USA, “Ontos”, armed with 6! 106mm recoilless rifles, it is clear that the Soviet Airborne Forces did not need such a perversion, but it is not clear why the military abandoned such rearmament?

The B-11 penetrated 380mm of armor (i.e., it hit any tank of the 50-60s), and its OFS weighed about 8 kg. Thus, such a self-propelled gun could effectively fight both armored vehicles and unarmored targets. But, for unknown reasons, ASU-107 was also rejected.

The second airborne self-propelled gun of the USSR was the ASU-85 (officially SAU-85 or Su-85). In fact, the Soviet “Hetzer”, armed with a long-barreled 85mm cannon, i.e. In terms of firepower, he caught up with the JagdPanther.

When creating the self-propelled guns, it was used chassis PT-76. A battalion of 31 self-propelled guns was assigned to the Airborne Forces. What can you say about this system? It is quite well armed for its weight and is well armored: 90mm of frontal armor, 20mm of side armor. It had a self-propelled gun and an anti-aircraft machine gun, which increased its survivability.

However, the devil is in the details. Let's start with what is not clear: how was it planned to use the ACS-85 for its intended purpose? System weight 15.5 tons. Those. The An-8 and Mi-6 cannot physically lift it, just like the first modifications of the An-12. For more advanced modifications of the An-12, it is also too heavy, their maximum load capacity is 20 tons, but the weight of the monocargo is less.

So, in reality, the ASU-85 began to be transported by air 8 years after it was put into service, and such a rare aircraft as the An-22, then the Il-76 was able to lift it. So at the beginning of its service, the ASU-85 was unsuitable for landing forces due to its excessive weight.

Was there a way out? Apparently, it was necessary to abandon the creation of the landing Hetzer, and return to the roots. If the ASU-57/76 was preceded by the wartime development of the OSU-76, then the Su-85B (a development of the famous Su-76M) could be taken as the basis for the 85mm amphibious self-propelled gun.

It is clear that the landing version would be much lighter, due to the reduction of armor, to a bulletproof, denser layout. But the new self-propelled gun would weigh about 8 tons (like the BMD-2) and would be fully amphibious.

It is clear that armor penetration would have dropped: an 85mm cannon with post-war shells would penetrate at a distance of 500/1000/1500/2000 m, respectively, 135/120/110/100 mm with an armor-piercing shell and 210/180/150 mm with a sub-caliber projectile. But, firstly, such a self-propelled gun could support our landing not in theory, but in reality.

Secondly, with the adoption of a cumulative projectile, armor penetration increased to 250mm, and the capabilities of the BKS do not depend on the length of the barrel, and thirdly, such a self-propelled gun should not have entered into open battles with enemy MBTs, but acted from ambushes. It could easily hit any NATO tank on the side from 2 km, and, for example, an M-48 could hit an M-48 in the turret from 1000m, in the lower frontal part of the hull from 1200 meters or more, and a well-armored forehead from 400m.

Finally, let me remind you that the artillery regiment of the Airborne Forces, until the mid-80s, was armed with SD-44, 85mm divisional guns, whose carriage was crossed with a motorcycle, and they became self-propelled. If such a system suited the Airborne Forces, then why would a similar gun, only as part of an armored self-propelled gun, be worse?
As for the original ASU-85, with a long-barreled 85mm cannon, the reinforced version of this machine for the ground forces is interesting. But more on that in the next chapter.

2. Turretless tanks (tank destroyers and assault guns).

Self-propelled guns of this type showed themselves very clearly during WWII. Thanks to their design features, they made it possible to install more on the chassis of the corresponding tank. powerful weapons than the base model had, in addition, such self-propelled guns were cheaper and easier to produce tanks.

As the experience of WWII, especially German, showed, it was precisely such vehicles that were the most effective means of anti-tank defense and support for infantry, and even tanks. The advantages of a tank destroyer over an anti-tank self-propelled gun like the Su-76M or Marder are obvious; tank destroyers are better protected, although they are significantly heavier and more expensive.

Well, there’s no need to talk about towed anti-tank missiles. Of course, they are much cheaper and more compact, so they outnumbered self-propelled guns many times over, but they also suffered huge losses: for example, in 1944-45, the victorious Red Army lost -11,700 45 mm guns, 1,600 57 mm ZIS-2, 16,600 76 mm guns (though some of them are regiments) and about 100 BS-3. And in total, excluding regimental guns, up to 27,000 anti-tank guns and divisional guns.

Let's add to them another 8,000 light self-propelled guns, mainly Su-76. To compare medium and heavy self-propelled guns, 3,800 units were lost. What is the reason for such large losses of towed anti-tank missiles? The thing is that a competent enemy very rarely sent tanks into battle without strong artillery and/or air support, so that a significant part of the anti-tank tanks were destroyed or suppressed before they even had time to enter the battle.

And then, due to its low mobility on the battlefield and lack of protection, such a anti-tank missile system was very vulnerable to return fire from enemy tanks and self-propelled guns. To disable an anti-tank missile, a close rupture of the general explosive potential is sufficient, while a tank destroyer can only be disabled by a direct hit from a projectile, either a very powerful one, or in vulnerable places. It was the German Stugas and tank destroyers, as well as the Soviet Su-85/100 and heavy St. John's Worts that best cemented the defense.

Unfortunately, this direction of development of armored vehicles in the post-war USSR frankly stalled. Yes, separate models were created, some, like the SU-122-54, were even produced in small series; the ASU-85, which physically could not be airborne until the end of the 60s, fully met these criteria.

In reality, until the end of 1979, the basis of such equipment remained the self-propelled guns of the Great Patriotic War– SU-100 and ISU-152. These systems were the best in the world for 1946, and remained adequate until the mid-60s. The thing is that until 1965, the Soviet army actively used the T-34-85, T-44, and IS-2/3 to provide support for which these self-propelled guns were needed. The produced T-54/55 and T-10 tanks were only enough to equip tank divisions, as well as MSDs of constant combat readiness. And the rear rifle and motorized rifle divisions were mainly armed with WWII equipment.

It is clear that the ASU-85 in its original form was not needed by the ground forces. In terms of armament, security, and mobility, it was inferior to the good old Su-100. Was it possible to create a tank destroyer worthy of the ground forces? I think so, here we could anticipate the Bundeswehr, for which they created the Jaguar tank destroyer, armed with a 90mm cannon.

To do this, instead of the ACS-85, it was necessary to create a vehicle weighing up to 20 tons with a reinforced chassis and a powerful V-105-V engine, thanks to which the new self-propelled gun could accelerate to 65 km/h, in addition, it had to be possible to install it in the self-propelled gun more powerful promising weapons.

But the main thing is to enhance security: the side armor should be strengthened to 25/30mm, the upper and lower armor plates, which correspond to 33/30mm of the given armor, allowing to protect the sides of the self-propelled guns from fragments and fire from 12.7mm heavy machine guns, and the forehead should be increased to 70mm of armor , which corresponds to 140mm of armor given.

Such a self-propelled gun would be somewhat inferior to the SU-100 in firepower (slightly, armor penetration is 10mm lower, and OFS power is lower, but it would have a faster rate of fire). At the same time, the Su-85 would be better protected in the frontal projection (140mm of armor versus 115mm) of the SU-100, at a lower altitude, although it would have weaker side protection; but it was superior to the Su-100 in maneuverability and efficiency.

But this is the first modification of the self-propelled guns, a trial one, and the main one could receive a 100mm T-19 “Rapier” smoothbore gun as its main armament, which would allow the self-propelled guns to confidently hit all enemy tanks of the 1st-2nd generation. For me, the 100mm tank destroyer is much more effective than the conventional Rapiers that were carried by the AT-P and MTLB armored tractors.

Its survivability is much higher than that of a towed anti-tank missile, and its mobility is higher than that of an MTLB with an attached gun. Like the German Jaguar, it is also possible to create an ATGM on a similar chassis for the Phalanx or Sturm-S ATGMs. Moreover, such an ATGM would be much better protected and carry more ammunition.

Medium self-propelled guns on the T-54 chassis were represented by the low-volume Su-122-54 self-propelled guns. The fact that this vehicle did not go into large production is quite understandable and fair: its armament is the D-49 cannon, a modernization of the ISovskaya D-25, which at distances of 500/1000/1500/2000 m penetrated 155/145/135/125mm, respectively armor.

That is, a self-propelled gun created to support a medium tank had less armor penetration than the main one medium tank T-54 at a distance of 500-1000m, while before the adoption of the SU-122-54, a new 100mm armor-piercing projectile BR-412D appeared, which provided greater armor penetration than 122mm at all firing distances.

The D-25 simply did not penetrate the American M-47/48 tanks head-on. The need for a more powerful OFS is also controversial, because assault guns with 122mm guns were relevant when the main tanks were T-34-76 and T-34-85.

Their 21 kg shells were several times heavier than 76-85mm shells, but the gap between 100 and 122 mm shells was only 60%. Then, the self-propelled gun was worse protected, only about 160mm of frontal armor, versus 200mm for the T-54. So we are not talking about any quality enhancement.

Here it was necessary to decide what to get: a tank destroyer or an assault gun? If it’s an assault weapon, then the easiest way is to make a self-propelled gun based on the 152mm D-1 howitzer; 40 kg OFS was 2.5 times heavier than a 100mm projectile, and the presence of a concrete-piercing projectile in the ammunition made it possible to effectively break through enemy missile defenses.

Such a self-propelled gun in a modernized version (chassis to the level of the modernized T-55, reinforced armor and remote protection) would be quite relevant for both Afghanistan and Chechnya, a powerful 152mm projectile could sweep away militants holed up in any building, and enhanced protection would provide protection from fire anti-tank light weapons. In reality, we had to use the 2S3 Akatsiya, which is very poorly protected, for direct fire.

If the military needed a tank destroyer, then it would have to wait until 1957, when the new 122mm M-62 gun appeared. It weighed only 380 kg more than the D-25, but at the same time it penetrated 214 mm of armor at a distance of 2000 m. This armor penetration was enough for all American tanks until the advent of the M-60A1. She could only hit this tank from 1000m.

When the BKS and BPS were created for the M-62, it was able to effectively hit the M-60A1 head-on. So, a sub-caliber projectile, for example, penetrated 320mm armor at 2000m, i.e. It practically matched the armor penetration of a 125mm projectile, and was superior to 115mm projectiles of the late 60s. In the 70s, this self-propelled gun could have been re-equipped with a 125mm gun with an AZ, which would have made it possible to support Soviet T-54/55 and T-62 with fire.

By the way, it was possible to smoothly switch to the production of vehicles based on the T-55, and due to the powerful engine, increase the weight of the self-propelled guns and increase security. In some ways, such self-propelled guns would be similar to the Swedish turretless tank Strv 103; the SU-125-55 is more powerful in firepower, the Swede is better in protection, and the mobility is approximately equal.

Where is the place for such a self-propelled gun? Logically, IT looked good as part of self-propelled tank regiments, where one of the battalions was rearmed with self-propelled guns. Well, it would be better to concentrate assault guns as part of self-propelled breakthrough regiments, attaching them to armies.

Now let's talk about heavy tank destroyers and assault guns. There was no need for new assault guns; numerous ISU-152s were enough, into which even ISU-122s were converted.

But new tank destroyers could well be useful, the fact is that at the end of WWII the Germans created well-protected tanks and self-propelled guns: Royal tiger and "YagdTiger", which were low-vulnerability in the frontal projection.

After the war, the USA and Great Britain actually abandoned medium tanks, putting into mass production the actually heavy Pattons and Centurions, as well as super heavy tanks M-103 and "Concorror". It was extremely difficult to fight them with conventional Soviet tank guns.

It is interesting that at the end of the war the USSR created a new tank destroyer, the ISU-130, but did not put it into mass production.

This decision was played by the end of the war factor, the discontinuation of the IS-2, the enormous length of the tank barrel, and, finally, frankly stupid arguments that the 130mm caliber was foreign to the army, difficulties would arise with ammunition, etc. .

The last argument can be easily destroyed: isn’t the 100mm caliber a naval caliber?
Did the 85mm caliber appear so long ago? In reality, of course, the army needed a 130mm self-propelled gun; another question is that the self-propelled gun could be rearranged like Ferdinand, Su-101, i.e. place the gun cabin in the stern of the self-propelled gun, and make the vehicle itself on the IS-3 chassis.

Use the 130mm S-70 cannon developed for the IS-7 as a weapon. This gun at a distance of 500/1000/1500/2000m had armor penetration of 217/207/197/188mm, and its OFS were a third heavier than 122mm shells. In addition, one must understand that these data refer to shells from the 40s, while shells with better capabilities were adopted in the 50s.

So, for example, armor penetration increased to 250/240/225/210mm, even 180mm armor was hit at 3 km! But instead of this logical step, they tried to create a self-propelled gun - a monster on the IS-7 chassis, object 263. Why the army needed a tank and self-propelled guns with the same gun is not clear.

A similar 130mm self-propelled gun had to be created on the T-10 chassis, but then it was possible to produce an even more powerful self-propelled gun on the T-10M chassis. Ironically, such a self-propelled gun was created on the original T-10 chassis, object 268, armed with a powerful 152mm M-64 rifled cannon.

But for me, it was the T-10M chassis that was best suited, thanks to its powerful engine and perfect chassis, because the production of the initial modifications of the T-10 was ending, and if the self-propelled gun entered service, then in any case, it should have been produced on a new chassis.

Such a SU-152-10M would become the most powerful Soviet assault gun and tank destroyer. In terms of power, the new gun was significantly superior to the ML-20, which was armed with the ISU-152, the military argued that its power was insufficient against Western MBTs, but who prevented the creation of a BPS or BKS for this weapon, and that being hit by 43 kg OFS is dangerous for any tank , even without breaking through the armor.

The armor protection of the 268M object is also quite strong: frontal armor is 187-248mm, wheelhouse armor is about 200mm, side armor is about 110mm. For comparison, the ISU-152 had frontal armor of about 105mm, side armor of 80-90mm, which is just ridiculous for the level of anti-tank equipment of the late 50s. And the speed of the 268M object allowed it to move on equal terms with the T-54/55.

However, there was another option: creating a tank destroyer on the T-10M chassis with a completely new gun - the 152mm M-69 smoothbore gun was developed, which weighed only 200 kg more than the 130mm systems.

At the same time, its sub-caliber projectile had monstrous armor penetration for the late 50s: at a distance of 1000/2000/3000m it penetrated 370/340/310 mm of armor, respectively.

Thus, it could hit the M-60A1 from almost 5000m. And the most powerful OFS was dangerous to any MBT. For comparison, the first 125mm BPS penetrated 300mm armor from 2000m.

Accordingly, a 152mm sub-caliber projectile, which would have been put into service in the 70-80s, would have had significantly greater armor penetration, surpassing 125mm projectiles.

Unfortunately, they wanted to install this miracle gun on a weakly armored self-propelled gun - object 120. Object 120 was a typical anti-tank self-propelled gun, with thin anti-fragmentation armor, and would be very vulnerable to fire from NATO MBTs, 90-120mm cannons hit it from almost any firing distance, and 90-155mm OFS were very dangerous if hit directly.

So, unlike a tank destroyer on the T-10M chassis, object 120 was contraindicated from engaging in open battle with enemy tanks.

3. Classic self-propelled guns - self-propelled artillery systems.

Almost all modern self-propelled guns belong to this type - self-propelled artillery systems. This is, as a rule, an ordinary howitzer or cannon mounted on a lightly armored chassis and intended for fire support and escort of troops, firing from closed firing positions (with the exception of some anti-tank self-propelled guns).

Unlike turretless tanks, its armor is not capable of withstanding shell hits, but is bulletproof and anti-fragmentation in nature, so the self-propelled carriage should not engage in open combat with enemy armored vehicles.

The first such self-propelled guns were created back in WWII, when heavy guns began to be installed on the chassis of heavy tractors, which is why the USSR produced a small series of 122mm self-propelled howitzer SU-5, on the T-26 chassis. Wheeled self-propelled guns SU-12 were also created. But the Soviet military did not appreciate the enormous potential of such systems, and this stupidity continued until the end of the 60s.

The massive use of self-propelled artillery systems, or as the Germans also called them self-propelled carriages, or self-propelled guns, began during WWII by the Germans and Americans.

The Germans produced a fairly large series of 105mm Vespe howitzers, 150mm Hummel howitzers and 150mm Grille mortars. The Yankees created the following systems: 105mm self-propelled howitzer, 155mm self-propelled howitzers and guns, 203mm howitzers. This was the first generation of American escort self-propelled guns. As we see, the Germans essentially created self-propelled divisional artillery, and the Yankees, in addition, created corps artillery.

The idea of ​​​​creating such systems is quite logical, and was proposed by Guderian. It was he who proposed the thesis that tank forces only become such when, in addition to tanks, they include a combination of infantry, reconnaissance forces, artillery, air defense, sappers, and rear services with increased mobility, maneuverability, and preferably security.

The advantages of self-propelled guns over towed ones are obvious: they are significantly less vulnerable to enemy fire, thanks to the presence of armor, as well as the ability to quickly occupy and then leave firing positions.

It is clear that it is impossible to completely abandon towed guns, and it is not necessary, but, of course, it is self-propelled guns that dominate the battlefield.

Unfortunately, the Yankees realized this very quickly, and during 1943-1963 they replaced 3 generations of self-propelled artillery systems, and one of the 3rd generation self-propelled guns, the M-109, is the most popular self-propelled gun in the world, and is still in service with many countries. and, by the way, forms the basis of US artillery.

In the USSR, there were no such self-propelled guns until the 70s; the country had the most tanks in the world, but was quite far behind the enemy in saturating the troops with armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery. But in the 70s, a whole series of “flowers” ​​was created: “Carnation”, “Acacia”, “Hyacinth”, “Peony”, which was the best in the world at the time of its creation.

The first post-war self-propelled artillery systems were created in the USSR in 1949: SU-100P and SU-152T. SU-100P, in my opinion, is very interesting for two reasons.

Firstly: the military did not see its enormous potential, considering it as an anti-tank self-propelled gun; secondly: the suspension of the SU-100P was unique for its time; subsequently, on its basis, self-propelled guns “Akatsia”, “Gyacinth-S”, “Tulpan”, as well as a whole range of vehicles were developed.

Why didn’t the self-propelled gun go into production? I’ll quote Shirokorad: “Despite all the advantages of the SU-100P, one can say about it: “neither a candle to God nor a poker to the devil.” As an anti-tank weapon, it was not superior to the T-54 tank, it was not suitable for howitzers, and for a long-range gun it had a short firing range and a weak projectile.”

Is the master right? Yes and no. It is clear that the Soviet army did not need an anti-tank self-propelled gun; medium and heavy tanks and self-propelled guns were enough for these tasks, especially since it was inferior in protection to the SU-76M. The question is, what is the survivability of such an anti-tank self-propelled gun if its frontal armor did not exceed 30mm?

Yes, Sherman could hit her from the maximum distance, and right through. Our self-propelled gun was closest to the German Nashorn; it would have appeared in 1943-44, but it was very necessary for post-war tasks. But at the same time, this system could become very relevant.

To do this, it was necessary to stop looking at the SU-100P as a anti-tank gun, and make it a self-propelled divisional gun. To begin with, it was necessary to install the BS-3 instead of the D-10/50 tank gun, the whole point is that the tank gun had a maximum firing range of 15800m, while the BS-3, thanks to its large tilt angles, could fire at 20600m, which is longer than the Akatsiya. .

As for the weak projectile, let me remind you: in terms of performance characteristics, the BS-3 was superior to the German 105mm hull gun, with which the Germans fought the entire Second World War.

The SU-152G is even more promising, this is actually our “Hummel”, it is not clear why this modification of the SU-100P, armed with the 152mm D-1 howitzer, was not accepted into service?!

Logically, it was necessary to review the armament of tank and mechanized divisions of the SA, instead of a regiment of 36 towed 122mm howitzers, it was necessary to create a regiment of 24-122mm self-propelled guns, 12 SU-100P, 12 SU-152G. And in the 60s, make artillery regiments from 24 (36) SU-152G and 12 (18) SU-100P, making all the artillery of tanks and parts of motorized rifle divisions self-propelled. At the same time, 122mm self-propelled guns are transferred to the regimental artillery.

The question arises, where can I get a 122mm light self-propelled gun? Here in Once again there is no need to reinvent the wheel, but by analogy with the German Vespe self-propelled gun, create a system on the SU-85B chassis, which is a development of the SU-76M.

I think that before the advent of the 122mm D-30 howitzer and the Gvozdika, such a system would have been very relevant. Then, as an intermediate option, it was possible to build a 122mm self-propelled gun with the D-30, on the BTR-50 chassis. By the way, the DPRK and China have created a whole range of self-propelled guns on the chassis of clones of this armored personnel carrier, including 122mm howitzers.

In the 50-60s, 152mm self-propelled guns were developed on the reinforced SU-100P chassis; I wrote about object 120 above; more interesting is the SU-152P, for which they created the M-53 gun, which was approximately equivalent in ballistics to the M-47.

In my opinion, it was necessary to go further and create a whole range of self-propelled guns on a reinforced chassis, the predecessors of the Akatsiya and Hyacinth, installing the Soviet D-20/74 and M-46/47 systems on the self-propelled guns. Such self-propelled guns could be used to strengthen tank armies, as well as Soviet troops in Europe and Western districts.

But the T-54/55 chassis could well be used to create self-propelled guns of special power: 180mm cannon, this is the Grabin S-23. Firing range with a conventional projectile is 30.4 km, ARS – 43.8 km. This formidable system was designed to replace the 152mm high power BR-2 gun, but due to lobbying by Khrushchev missile weapons The re-equipment of the SA with new guns slowed down greatly, and the heavy guns never went into production.

We resumed production of such systems in the early 70s for export, so that our allies would be able to resist the American 175mm self-propelled gun M-107. Our proposed self-propelled gun on the T-55 chassis would be structurally close to the North Korean M-1978 Kokusan, but superior to it in the quality of the artillery system and power, ours has a caliber of 180mm, versus 170mm for the Kokusan.

As for the M-107, the SU-180-55 would be superior to it with a projectile mass of 88 kg OFS and 84 kg of ARS, versus 66.8 kg for the American system, as well as in range, because The American system did not have ARS, but fired a conventional projectile at 32.7 km. In terms of the power of a conventional OFS, our system is superior to the American 203mm M110 self-propelled gun, which fired 90.7 kg of shells.

It makes no sense to make a 203mm self-propelled gun based on the famous B-4: its OFS is only 12 kg heavier than the 180mm, and in terms of range it is inferior by more than 1.5 times. In addition, logically, the self-propelled gun could also use naval 180mm shells weighing up to 97.5 kg.

So technically it was quite possible to create strong self-propelled artillery 15-20 years earlier. She would look like North Korean or Chinese self-propelled artillery 70-80s. Their systems are essentially our unborn self-propelled guns from the 50s and 60s.

Soviet self-propelled artillery of the 70-80s was generally optimal; in a fairly short period of time, a whole series of excellent self-propelled guns were created, and the Msta-S became the crown of Soviet technical thought and at the time of creation the best 6-inch self-propelled gun in the world. Was it possible to add anything to this self-propelled gun flower garden?

If we talk about vehicles on tracked chassis, then two systems are interesting. The first is the 2S15 “Norov”, a 100mm anti-tank self-propelled gun, created on the basis of the chassis of the famous “Gvozdika”, in fact it is a self-propelled “Rapira-R”, equipped with a complex fire control system. Did such an anti-tank self-propelled gun have a right to exist?

With all my dislike for lightly armored anti-tank self-propelled guns, I must admit that there was a certain reason for creating such a self-propelled anti-tank gun.

Such a self-propelled gun had better fire accuracy than a conventional towed gun; The cross-country ability was also better than that of the towed version, simply attached to the MTLB; the crew was at least protected from shrapnel and bullets, which increased its survivability.

Finally, the self-propelled gun could quickly leave the firing position, avoiding enemy artillery fire. Unfortunately, work on the creation of this system began only in 1976, and the prototype was ready already in 1983, the machine was ready for production in 1985, but then the Rapier was already considered obsolete
system and its release was completed, so 9 years of work went into the archives...

What should have been done? To begin, immediately develop a duplex of two vehicles: a 122mm self-propelled howitzer and a 100mm anti-tank gun immediately after the creation of the 2S1, which would allow the 2S15 to be accepted for production 10 years earlier. If possible, the Rapier-S control system should be unified with the tanks of that time, for example the T-64B.

Since 1981, release a modification with a radar sight, which in reality was created this year. Regarding the obsolescence of the Rapier, let me remind you that 30 years have passed since its production ceased, but the 2A29 anti-tank gun is still in service and firmly included in the staff.

But I can’t resist criticizing the towed gun itself; the “Rapier” is known to be a modification of the PTO 2A19, which differed from it only in a new carriage, adapted for faster towing. The question arises, why couldn’t it be possible to install the anti-tank gun on the carriage of the legendary D-30A howitzer?

It’s interesting that such a PTO was developed by OKB No. 9, but the D-60 lost to the 2A29, so who stopped you from making a hybrid design, or is it even easier to give the command to unify the carriages of the two mass systems?!

The most annoying thing is that in the 80s, the Yugoslavs did just that, converting their anti-tank guns to the D-30 carriages (modification of the M87 TOPAZ). In addition to making operation easier, the D-30 carriage allows all-round fire, which is very useful for anti-tank guns. And the North Koreans created a self-propelled 100mm anti-tank self-propelled gun

The second alternative self-propelled gun is a 122 mm self-propelled gun, created together with the 2S3 Akatsiya, based on the towed D-74. This gun was developed in tandem with the 152mm howitzer-cannon D-20, the new guns were supposed to replace the veterans A-19 and ML-20, but in the 60-70s the main hull guns of the SA became 130mm M-47 and 152mm "Gyacinth- B", so the D-20 became the main divisional system of Soviet motorized rifle divisions.

Unfortunately, the D-74 was produced in small quantities and mostly went for export, and most of it was produced by the Chinese. It is clear that the need for such a hull gun has disappeared, but who prevented the D-74 from being made into a divisional gun? By analogy with D-1 and BS-3, the stereotyped thinking of our generals deprived the divisional artillery of an excellent system.

The main advantage of the D-74 is its enormous range by the standards of the 60-70s - 23900m; it shoots 6.5 km further than the D-20/2S3 and 3.3 km longer than the Grad. Even the 152 mm Msta-B howitzer, which appeared 30 years later, shoots only 800 meters further than the D-74, despite the fact that it weighs 1.5 tons more.

So a very relevant system and the creation of self-propelled guns similar to “Acacia” for it. It’s sad that such a system was created, but again our brothers in the socialist camp - in the DPRK, both visually and in characteristics it resembles the 2S3, but is armed with the D-74. This is the M-1991 system.

As for the 2S18 Pat-S self-propelled gun on the BMP-3 chassis, I consider the abandonment of this self-propelled gun quite reasonable. The only good thing about this self-propelled gun is the excellent chassis, but the artillery part is surprising, the new 152mm howitzer has worse ballistics than the outdated D-20/Acacia, the range does not exceed the D-30/Gvozdika, the only advantage is the powerful 152mm projectile.

But in the realities of the late 80s, the Msta became the main divisional howitzer, and numerous Acacias were transferred to the regiments, for example, they armed the “ceremonial” divisions near Moscow.

Now let's talk about wheeled self-propelled guns. For the 50s, the most relevant thing was to install a 107mm recoilless rifle on the BTR-40 chassis. I wrote about the advantages of this weapon above; all that remained was to combine it with a fairly successful and cheap armored personnel carrier.

In the next period, the 2S14 “Sting-S” system, a light anti-tank self-propelled gun on the BTR-70 chassis, armed with a unique 85mm 2A62 smoothbore system, is very interesting.

Apparently, it was planned to adopt both a self-propelled and towed system, which was supposed to solve anti-tank missile missions at the battalion level in motorized rifle troops and marines, and the towed version was intended for air assault brigades. It is believed that the “Sting-S” did not go into production due to insufficient armor penetration, which was 1.5 times inferior to a 125mm tank gun.

What can I say? The armor penetration of Soviet 125mm shells of the 60-70s was in the range of 300-420mm at a distance of 2000m, so an 85mm shell of the mid-70s could penetrate up to 280mm at the same distance. Thus, he confidently hit all NATO tanks head-on at a long distance except the latest modifications of the Chieftain.

However, the Soviet military was afraid of 3rd generation tanks: Abrams, Leopard 2, Challenger. Nevertheless, there are still many reasons to defend the 2S14: firstly, 85mm shells would be improved, reaching 360-400mm, while the rate of fire of the self-propelled guns was 2 times higher than that of the MBT.

Secondly, for some reason the military likes to take extreme situations, it’s just like seeing hordes of “Abrams” or “Leo-2” going to the poor “Sting-S”, in fact, even in 1990. tanks of the 1st-2nd generation dominated in the arsenal of NATO countries, and the PLA was represented mainly by clones of the T-54/55 and light tanks.

Then, why would a light self-propelled gun conduct open battles with modern MBTs? Its destiny is to operate from ambushes, hitting NATO carcasses on the side and stern. Thirdly, for the Zhalo-S there were many tempting targets besides tanks - infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armored vehicles.

Personally, the only thing that confuses me about this system is the need to adopt new types of ammunition and weapons. Can this be avoided? Yes, of course: the self-propelled guns had to be armed with the good old Rapier.

Is it possible? Previously, I considered such a move an adventure, but again the decisions were suggested by the brothers in the Socialist Camp, now Cubans. The Cubans created self-propelled guns on the BTR-60 chassis, installing on them... 100mm guns from the T-54/55, of course, modernizing them.

If the Cuban “Kulibins” succeeded in this, then what prevented our most powerful military-industrial complex from installing the lighter 100mm smoothbore “Rapier” on the more powerful BTR-70/80 chassis?

I think it's just a lack of imagination. What place does such a self-propelled gun or cannon armored car? Logically, this is a strengthening of motorized rifle battalions by including platoons of such vehicles; in addition, the reconnaissance battalions could also include a Zhalo-S company; there is also a reason to transfer some anti-tank units from motorized rifle brigades to these self-propelled guns, as well as strengthen Marine Corps.

Now let's look at wheeled self-propelled guns on automobile chassis. The first self-propelled gun, which actually could become the base one, is the famous Czech “Dana”; it was tested in the USSR and adopted to a limited extent by the TsGV.

Moreover, the GRAU opposed the adoption of this system, not seeing the advantages of the Dana over the Akatsiya. For me, the advantages of “Dana” for the European theater of operations are obvious:

- “Dana” had greater speed and range than “Acacia”, therefore, it was much more mobile, which is important for a rapid breakthrough to the English Channel. The worst cross-country ability is not critical, the roads of the Central and Western Europe by Soviet standards they are simply incomparable.

And in the shroud of Africa such a self-propelled gun is preferable. Then, for some reason, no one discusses the maneuverability of Soviet MLRS, they are all wheeled, but at the same time they served in all climate zones and are now serving successfully.

- “Dana” has a significantly higher rate of fire than “Acacia”, 8 rpm, compared to 3 rpm for our self-propelled gun.

- "Dana" is significantly cheaper and more economical to operate. Per 100 km it consumes 65 liters of fuel, and Akatsiya 165 liters. Finally, the chassis life of wheeled vehicles is significantly higher than that of tracked vehicles.

There were, of course, advantages of our “Acacia”: its chassis is stronger, it can withstand heavy loads more easily, its maneuverability is higher, its ability to fire shells fired from the ground is not unimportant, and the Tatra chassis is still alien to our army.

For me, it was necessary to organize a barter with the Czechs in order to supply a large number of self-propelled guns for parts of the Soviet troops in Europe in exchange for the supply of air defense systems and tanks, and "Acacia"
preserve it for troops on the territory of the USSR and seriously approach the creation of self-propelled guns on Soviet chassis.

IN real story one brigade of 120 “Dan” was formed as part of the Central Military Command. But for me this is a wrong decision: individual artillery formations were armed with more powerful systems, but “Dana” is still a divisional self-propelled gun.

The Soviet automobile self-propelled guns began to be created in the mid-80s, based on the Msta-B howitzer and the KrAZ-6130 or KamAZ-5320 chassis. Officially, this work was carried out for 2 years (1985-87), but in fact they began back in 1983

Why was all work stopped in 1987? Here is the reluctance of the Ministry of Automotive Industry to deal with new chassis, making changes to existing designs, and the indifference of the military to this topic.

For me, the retrograde behavior of our military and officials was clearly evident here; having the example of the successful “Dana,” they did not bother to create its Soviet analogues. Work should have begun back in 1980, with the maximum use of Czech design solutions, subject to due persistence of military customers, by 1987 our Msta-K variants should be ready for serial production, which would be a serious addition to the towed and tracked option.

The advantages over tracked ones are the same as those of the Dana over the Acacia. Cheap chassis, with many times more mileage before major repairs; greater mobility - speed of 85 km/h and range of 1000 km, versus 60 km/h and 500 km for the Msta-S, and finally, efficiency - fuel consumption of 45 liters per 100 km versus...260 liters for the tracked version.

The most annoying thing is that subsequently many countries created their own wheeled self-propelled guns: G6 - South Africa, Nora-B Yugoslavia, Caesar France, Archer Sweden, SH1 China. Fortunately, there is great hope that a wheeled “Coalition” will be created.

At the end of this topic, I want to say that it made sense to create a 122mm wheeled self-propelled gun on the Ural-4320 chassis. Such a self-propelled gun would occupy an intermediate niche between a towed howitzer and a tracked self-propelled gun. Already in our time, such a system was created jointly by Israel and Kazakhstan, however, on the KAMAZ-63502 chassis.

You can ask, maybe it’s easier to tow the D-30? The advantage of such an installation is the ability to quickly open fire on the enemy and quickly leave the position before return fire.

A towed howitzer takes about 3 minutes to deploy and return to its stowed position. Then the self-propelled guns can automate some processes, which would increase the rate of fire and accuracy of fire.

4. Self-propelled mortars and combined guns.

Mortars are the cheapest, lightest with the same caliber, easy to use and at the same time very effective artillery pieces.

Thanks to their cheapness, lightness and simplicity, they have penetrated many military levels: from company armament to equipping RGK units.

The USSR was the leader in the creation of mortars: during the Second World War its 120mm was so good that the Germans simply copied it, but the 160mm mortars simply had no analogues (except for the German 150mm infantry gun, but these are different systems, the German mortar gun), after the war there were created new type 160mm mortar and heavy duty 240mm mortar.

Unfortunately, because of Khrushchev, the development of mortars was abandoned. In the 70-80s, the situation somehow improved, the automatic 82mm mortar “Cornflower” and the first self-propelled mortar “Tulip” appeared, but at the same time there was complete stagnation with conventional mortars, the army used 120mm mortars from the Second World War, 160mm were gradually withdrawn from service, and 82mm wartime mortars were replaced with “Vasilki” and automatic grenade launchers.

Only when the “cock pecked”, or rather Afghanistan began, new 82mm and 120mm mortars appeared. Unfortunately, apart from the Tulip, the Soviet Army did not receive self-propelled mortars, although its NATO opponents used 81 and 106mm, and then 120 self-propelled mortars, on armored personnel carrier chassis. Moreover, self-propelled mortars appeared during WWII in Germany and the USA, on the chassis of half-track mortars.

What kind of self-propelled mortars could be created in the USSR? In the post-war years, the most urgent thing was the creation of a whole range of mortars.

For an 82mm mortar, the BTR-40 chassis is most convenient, while a 160mm mortar is wiser to install on a chassis from the SU-85B; for a 240mm mortar, the installation from the SU-100P is suitable (especially since in 20 years the “Tulip” will be created on these chassis). The Airborne Forces were armed with a 107mm mountain mortar, the ASU-57 chassis would be suitable for it, the most effective remains the 120mm mortar, the BTR-50 chassis would be guaranteed to be suitable for it, but the main question was, of course, installing this mortar on the BTR-152 chassis.

Outwardly, it may seem that this mortar is too heavy for the BTR-152, since only 81mm mortars were installed on half-tracks; on the other hand, much heavier ZPU-2, and even ZPU-4, were installed on the BTR-152. Well, the Cubans have created a modification of the 120mm mortar on the chassis of the much lighter BRDM-2, so by strengthening the chassis of this armored personnel carrier, you can get a completely perfect 120mm self-propelled mortar.

In the 60s, it was possible and necessary to create 120mm self-propelled mortars on the BTR-60 and MTLB chassis. By the way, in Bulgaria in 1981 they created and put into mass production a 120mm self-propelled mortar on the Tundzha MTLB chassis, which turned out to be very successful; for unknown reasons, this mortar did not enter service with the Soviet army, although its modification with the 120mm Sani mortar was created. .

Obviously, they planned to arm the Soviet army with combined self-propelled guns, so such a cheap and simple self-propelled mortar was not needed. But such self-propelled guns began to enter service with motorized rifle units only recently, the 2S34 Khosta self-propelled guns, and our motorized riflemen did not receive a 120mm self-propelled mortar for several decades.

I think there is no need to prove that when receiving the task, our designers created a similar mortar 10 years earlier than the Bulgarians, and the mortar on the BTR-60 chassis back in the 60s. In the 2000s in Russia, for some reason, they created an 82mm self-propelled mortar 2K32 “Deva”.

To me, it looks like a mockery of common sense; it is stupid to install such a weak mortar on an MTLB chassis. The brothers created a similar mortar 30 years earlier, only it fires pound mines, although it has a slightly smaller ammunition load of 60 minutes, instead of 84 for the “Virgin”, but also a smaller crew - 5 people, instead of 6.

In the 70s in the USSR they tried to create a 120mm mortar on the BMP-1 chassis, and in 2 versions - the usual one - muzzle-loading, and breech-loading, with installation in the turret. But for some reason the first, simple option did not go into production, although it is directly requested to be used in the arsenal of a mortar company of a motorized rifle battalion on an infantry fighting vehicle, and a combined gun was preferred to a breech-loading mortar.

And here the question arises: why weren’t self-propelled mortars based on the Vasilka created? Usually, ersatz self-propelled guns were created on the MTLB or BTR-D chassis, where the Cornflower stood openly on the roof of the vehicle.

Logically, it would be necessary to create a self-propelled company mortar, respectively, on the BMP-1, BTR-70, BRDM-2 and BMD-1 chassis, with a “Vasilka” installation in the turret. It turns out to be a mini-Nona, but such a mortar is not its replacement, but an addition; 2 self-propelled automatic mortars per motorized rifle company would greatly improve it combat capabilities, especially in the fight against entrenched enemy personnel. Such a machine is very relevant today.

Now let's move on to our unique combination weapons. I believe that the 120mm Nona was a masterpiece of design, and only the inertia of the military did not allow us to correctly assess its universal capabilities.

This self-propelled gun is at the same time a light howitzer, and its OFS have a very strong high-explosive effect due to a powerful explosive charge of -4.9 kg, surpassing a 122mm howitzer projectile; the Nona ammunition also included cluster, volumetric detonating and other projectiles. At the same time, “Nona” is also a mortar capable of using all 120mm mines.

And, finally, it can play the role of a anti-tank missile, having cumulative shells in its ammunition load. The Nona has all these capabilities at a low weight; its towed version weighs 1200 kg, 2.5 times less than the D-30, which makes it easier to install on different chassis.

In 1981, the Nona-S on the BTR-D chassis entered service with the Airborne Forces and went into mass production, becoming the basis of the airborne artillery; the Airborne Forces required 72 new self-propelled guns.

The ground forces and marines quickly appreciated the new system, enthusiasts proposed starting a wide range of R&D to saturate motorized rifle battalions with Nona batteries, at the rate of 6 self-propelled guns, instead of 8-120mm towed mortars.

Work began on the “Nons” on the 2S1 “Gvozdika” chassis, BRM-1K and BTR-70, the so-called. 2S17, 2S17-2 and Nona-SV. But, unfortunately, the first two vehicles were not even created in metal, the second was ready for mass production by 1984, but it was decided to develop a new Nona-SVK system on the chassis of the new BTR-80. Why didn't these excellent systems go into series? The principle “The best is the enemy of the good” worked.

It was decided to create a new generation combined weapon, with improved ballistics and automated. This system was to be created on a chassis from the future BMP-3 and BMD-3 systems.

As a result, all work dragged on for a long time; new systems were created by 1995 and 1990, respectively! The system for the Airborne Forces “Obzhimka” remained in a single copy; the 2S31 “Vena” took a long time to be perfected, but has not really entered service with the army until now. Instead, a simplified 2S34 “Hosta” system based on the 2S1 was recently developed.

Logic dictates that the GRAU, on the contrary, should have given the task of creating new combined self-propelled guns as soon as the process of adopting the Nona-S into service reached the finish line, i.e. since 1980, and in 3 versions at once, to equip motorized rifle battalions armed with the appropriate type of armored vehicles.

Already in 1984, it was possible to launch mass production of 2S17, 2S17-2 and Nona-SV, and they could be produced until the collapse of the USSR, regularly modernizing, the only thing being that the production of “Nona-SV” would smoothly transition into the production of “ Nony-SVK", already in 1987.

Soviet and then Russian motorized riflemen and marines would have found these self-propelled guns very useful in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and in the 2000s the army would have received various modifications of the Vienna.

5. Flamethrower systems.

By flamethrower systems we mean flamethrower tanks and flamethrower MLRS. It should be noted that it was the USSR that was the leader in the creation of flamethrower tanks; before the war, the Red Army had more than 1000 flamethrower tanks on the T-26 and T-37 chassis.

During the Second World War, medium flamethrower tanks OT-34 and OT-34-85, as well as heavy KV-8, appeared, and 1640 Soviet flamethrower tanks were produced, more than any other country.

Soviet flamethrower tanks differed favorably from their German and American counterparts by retaining the main cannon armament. In the post-war years, for obvious reasons, the importance of flamethrower armored vehicles began to decline, although it was sometimes used very actively in local conflicts.

The strengthening of anti-tank weapons of the infantry had an impact here: if the flamethrowing range remained within 200 m, then the saturation of the infantry with RPGs and recoilless rifles made the use of flamethrower tanks quite difficult, however, for counter-guerrilla operations, flamethrower tanks were very effective, but again the appearance and massive use of napalm , sent them to second roles.

In the USA, after the war, they created the M-67 (based on the M-48) and M-132 (based on the M-113 armored personnel carrier) flamethrower tanks, which were built in small series; they performed well in Vietnam, but very few of them were produced, and The massive appearance of the RPG-7 made it difficult to use, so after this war they quickly disappeared from the scene.

The USSR created flamethrower tanks OT-54 and TO-55. And this is where the mysteries begin: very few of these cars were produced. As I wrote above, the main difference between Soviet flamethrower tanks and American tanks there was a standard cannon armament, located instead of a coaxial machine gun.

So our vehicles were universal and could fight like regular tanks, which is especially important when breaking through enemy defense lines or fighting in populated areas, and they could fight enemy tanks on equal terms. Therefore, nothing prevented the creation of strong flamethrower units in every tank and motorized rifle unit.

Logically, it was possible to have a company of 10-13 flamethrower tanks in each tank or motorized rifle division, and form breakthrough tank flamethrower regiments as part of the armies. Such units could effectively interact together with heavy tanks and self-propelled guns when breaking through the enemy front. Well, light flamethrower companies could have flamethrower armored personnel carriers based on the BTR-152 and BTR-60, armed with a TPO-50 flamethrower.

This would be a very versatile weapon, equally good in the event of a rush to the English Channel, grinding down hordes of Chinese infantry, or destroying dushmans. However, only 110 OT-54s were produced, which means that for the entire army, taking into account the OT-34-85, there were about 300-400 flamethrower tanks left, despite the fact that an order of magnitude more was needed. Much more TO-55s were produced, but also not enough, only 830 vehicles.

Although it was necessary and possible to release 2-3 times more. At the same time, taking into account the increased engine power compared to the original T-54 tank, as well as the fact that the flamethrower tank is a weapon for a methodical breakthrough, it was necessary to increase the mass of the tank to 40 tons, adding 3.5 tons of armor.

This would make it possible to increase the frontal protection to 300mm, which would make the tank invulnerable to the use of RPG-2 and 82mm recoilless rifles, and even the first modifications of the RPG-7 would penetrate the TO-55M to the limit.

Vulnerability to fire from tank guns, especially 90mm, would also be reduced. The first combat test of the OT-54 could have been carried out in Budapest-56, greatly demoralizing the local Salashists; of course, our OT-54 and TO-55M tanks could have shown themselves effectively in Damansky and in Afghanistan, and in other local conflicts.

They would also be useful in Chechnya (of course, with reinforced engines and emergency protection), by the way, ordinary T-55 and T-62 fought on our side in the Second Chechen Company, and it was these tanks that stormed Grozny in 2000. It seems that additional flamethrower weapons would not hurt them. But in reality, our OT-54 and TO-55 were withdrawn from service in 1993.

However, all this is a saying. In the 70s, the USSR began to develop a new flamethrower weapon: the heavy flamethrower system. Essentially, this is an armored MLRS on a T-72 chassis that fires missiles with incendiary or thermobaric filling at short distances.

The predecessor of this system can, to some extent, be considered the Sturmtiger, whose 380mm gun was a rocket launcher that fired 350 kg rocket bombs filled with 125 kg of TNT. It is clear that in street battles this monster could sweep away entire neighborhoods.

The Germans were let down by excessive armor, the self-propelled gun was overloaded and often broke down, and it was a couple of years late.

In our country, we took a different path and created a 30-round MLRS on the chassis of a mass-produced tank. Surprisingly, already in 1980, TOS-1 successfully completed military tests and was recommended for mass production. And silence…

The unique combat model was forgotten at the training ground for several years! They got around to releasing the first experimental batch only in 1987, and one vehicle was sent for combat testing in Afghanistan the following year, 1988.

To be honest, these facts shocked me: by 1981 the USSR already had an ideal weapon for counterinsurgency warfare, but they forgot about it for 7 years and threw it into battle at the end of the war, then, despite successful tests, it was not put into mass production . Why?

Here, in my opinion, two factors played a role: creating new weapons for war, with some spooks they considered it unnecessary, ordinary equipment should have been enough; For the war with NATO and the PLA, these weapons were considered unnecessary; it was planned to break through their defenses with strikes from tactical nuclear weapons, masses of T-64/72/80. Why else, some kind of TOS?

The Soviet army had little interest in local wars and could not overcome stereotypes. Then, the range of TOS-1 is only 3500m, in order to suppress enemy positions, it had to approach 2000-3000m, which made it vulnerable to enemy ATGM and MBT fire, but it did not take into account that the terrain often does not allow a direct shot further than 1500-2000m, while TOS-1 is capable of firing from closed positions.

And in urbanized areas, especially ATGMs cannot be fired at extreme ranges, but to support an assault settlement CBT is perfect. In Afghanistan, the TOS-1 had simply unique capabilities: the dushmans practically did not use ATGMs, from 2000-2500 m RPGs and recoilless rifles are practically not dangerous, armor at the level of the T-72 made it generally invulnerable, but a volley of 30 AP or incendiary rockets demolished any village with militants.

It is clear that TOS had to be used en masse, one battery for each regiment or brigade. Due to the late adoption of TOSs, they did not get into the First Chechnya, and only in the Second Chechnya did they finally deserve recognition.

But they could be mass produced and used since 1981, and even exported. I think that TOS-1 would have played a big role in the Iran-Iraq War, Eritrea, Angola. By the way, for export it was possible to create a lightweight system on the T-55 chassis. But it’s just a shame that this car was stolen from the army for almost 20 years.

6. Anti-aircraft self-propelled guns.

The ZSU is a fairly massive and effective air defense weapon, and unlike the air defense system, it is universal, since it can be effectively used to support infantry and tanks, combat enemy personnel, firing points and armored vehicles. Anti-aircraft self-propelled guns are especially effective during operations in mountainous areas, as well as during an assault on a populated area.

During the war, the USSR had only anti-aircraft guns and machine guns mounted on trucks or armored trains. Real ZSUs were in service with the Reich, the USA and Great Britain, both on the chassis of tanks and armored personnel carriers, half-track tractors.

Lend-Lease anti-aircraft self-propelled guns based on half-tracks were very popular in the Red Army.

In the first post-war years, for reasons that are difficult for me to explain, the Soviet army did not receive a sufficient number of self-propelled guns on tank chassis. Only 75 were produced! ZSU-37 on the SU-76M chassis.

It’s not clear what prevented us from releasing 10 times more of them? The SU-76 was well studied by the troops, and there should be no problems with operation; the 37mm 61-K anti-aircraft gun also fully justified itself, moreover, in the post-war years it was responsible for hundreds of downed American aircraft in Korea and Vietnam. So why was this symbiosis not put into mass production?

It can be assumed that it was decided to curtail chassis production; the army was downsized and received mainly medium and heavy tanks. But then what prevented us from making a large number of ZSUs on the T-34-85 chassis, or even simpler, converting part of the large number of remaining T-34-76, produced in 1943-44, into self-propelled guns, which were anyway outdated and were mainly used for tractors or remelting?!

In the 60s, the PRC, and from China to the DPRK and Vietnam, received the “63” type ZSU, which was a conversion of the serial T-34, with the installation of a twin 37mm V-11 cannon. These systems performed well in Vietnam War, I think that nothing prevented them from being created in the USSR 15 years earlier and tested in Korea and Budapest. But, unfortunately, until 1955, there was no mass-produced tracked anti-aircraft self-propelled gun in the USSR, despite the fact that it was extremely necessary.

In 1955, the ZSU-57-2 on the T-54 chassis was finally put into relatively mass production; about 830 of them were produced, which was enough to create regimental air defense for tank divisions with 4 vehicles for each tank and motorized rifle regiment, as well as arm part of the tank regiments of motorized rifle divisions.

Ideally, of course, there would be all MSD tank regiments, and, if possible, motorized rifle regiments, and also think through the issues of modernizing the ZSU-57-2. The question of its effectiveness is debatable, the accuracy of fire on jet aircraft was low, there was no radar, on the other hand, for 1955 it was a completely perfect anti-aircraft gun.

You need to understand that in addition to its division, there were many anti-aircraft weapons covering it: an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, anti-aircraft guns on an armored personnel carrier chassis (more on them below) and, finally, heavy machine guns on armored vehicles, and small-arms fire from infantry at low altitudes is very dangerous. Then, you need to take into account the power of Soviet fighter aircraft.

However, the ZSU-57-2 was considered insufficiently effective, its production was stopped in 1960, before the Shilka was put into production, although it was possible to continue production on the T-55 chassis for another 3 years, having carried out modernization according to Project 520.

The modernization consisted of installing 57-mm SV-68 "Berezina" cannons and small-sized radio-optical instrument systems for autonomous fire control "Desna". "Desna" combined optical sighting of the target - and a radar system for measuring the range and flight parameters of the aircraft, with automatic corrections to the position of the gunner's sights.

It is clear that the firing accuracy of such a vehicle is many times higher than its predecessor, and it could dramatically increase the capabilities of divisional air defense. And there, as an option, giving the ZSU-57-2 battery a mobile radar.

Such machines could already be produced for quite a long time, right up to the 80s, both for the SA and for export. With the advent of the Shilka, the ZSU-57-2M had to be transferred to anti-aircraft artillery regiments to replace the towed S-60s; in any case, their accuracy and security were higher. But, unfortunately, such modernization was not carried out and most of these vehicles were transferred to allies in the Socialist Camp and countries of socialist orientation. By the way, the firing range of the 57mm ZSU is 6000m, which allowed them to hit helicopters of the 70s equipped with ATGMs, the only question is target designation.

Now let's talk about wheeled ZSUs of the 50s. There are no questions about the BTR-40A, it is a successful anti-aircraft gun, the main armament is a 2x14.5mm ZPTU-2 machine gun, it’s a pity that few of them were produced, but questions arise about its older brother BTR-152A.

Why is the armament of an armored personnel carrier twice as heavy as that of its light counterpart? After all, a version of this vehicle with ZPTU-4 was being developed, but for unknown reasons it did not go into production. Was it even possible to double the mass of weapons on our anti-aircraft armored personnel carrier?

We look at the Czech neighbors, they created their Prague-53/59 ZSU on a chassis close to our ZIS-151/ZIL-157, only the armament of the Czech vehicle is a 30mm twin cannon, whose towed version weighed the same as our quad anti-aircraft gun . Well, the Arabs and Vietnamese installed without any problems a quad installation based on the DShK, which is not much lighter. So, the BTR-152A should be armed with a 4x14.5mm mount.

Other weapon options are also possible: for example, a 2x25mm anti-aircraft gun, based on the 2M-3 ship system, but the quad ZPU is still more interesting due to its higher rate of fire, the mass of a second salvo of the ZPU-4 is only 10% less than the 2M-3, armor-piercing almost the same. But the probability of being hit by 40 bullets per second is higher than that of 10 shells.

By the way, similar systems were developed on the BTR-50 chassis, for example the BTR-50P4, armed with ZPU-4. The division's air defense option looks like this: a tank division has in each regiment 4 ZSU-37-2 or ZSU-57-2, as well as 4 BTR-152A-4 or BTR-50A-4, and the anti-aircraft regiment is armed with 32 57mm S- anti-aircraft guns 60. In the MSD, only the tank regiment is so armed, and 3 MRR have 4 BTR-152A-4 and 4 BTR-40A, and the division's anti-aircraft regiment is equipped with 32 37mm 61-K anti-aircraft guns. The airborne division has an anti-aircraft division of 18 BTR-40A.

The next interesting ZSUs are “Shilka” and “Yenisei”. If “Shilka” is well known, then “Yenisei” is worth telling about. This is a twin 37mm anti-aircraft self-propelled gun, created on the SU-100P chassis. In terms of firepower, “Yenisei is more powerful than the best Western ZSU “Gepard”.

It was planned that the Yenisei would become the basis of air defense for tank divisions, and the Shilka for motorized rifle divisions, and the ZSU-37-2 variant should cover the Krug air defense system, covering their dead zones. The Shilka has advantages in shooting at targets flying at low altitude, up to 1000m, as well as lower weight and cost. The Yenisei has better range and height reach, 4 times heavier projectiles, and is 10 km/h faster.

For me, the abandonment of the Yenisei was far-fetched; both ZSUs had the right to exist and complemented each other. But there was also a more reasonable, compromise option, the creation of a ZSU based on the Shilka, but with the artillery part of the excellent naval installation AK-230.

Its 30mm projectile weighed 390g. versus 190g. for 23mm Shilka assault rifles, the firing range was not much inferior to the capabilities of the Yenisei, and the AK-230 could be immediately installed on the ZSU-23-4 chassis, which, by the way, was done in the DPRK. The mass of a second salvo is the largest for the AK-230 (13 kg), why is the Yenisei (12.8 kg), for the Shilka 10.8 kg. I think that such a ZSU would deserve fame and respect even more than the original Shilka.

However, the 23mm caliber would not be forgotten either: the whole point is that in 1960 the USSR created the even more legendary ZU-23-2 system. This system, with a mass of about 1 ton, had a rate of fire of 2000 v/m, i.e. her second salvo is 6.3 kg! For comparison, the ZPU-4 installation, twice as heavy, had a second salvo of 2.56 kg.

Almost Soviet anti-aircraft guns of those years lost to the ZU-23. At the same time, the system turned out to be quite reliable and easy to manufacture. The ZU-23 was actively exported, but in the Soviet army it played a small role, being essentially a standard anti-aircraft gun only for the Airborne Forces, as well as providing cover for anti-aircraft missile units.

Glory came to the ZUshka in Afghanistan, it quickly became clear that Soviet armored vehicles were not very suitable for war in the mountains; the angles of inclination of the guns and machine guns of the BMP-1, BMD-1, BTR-60, BRDM-2 did not allow them to effectively hit targets on mountain peaks , due to the small elevation angle.

In a slightly better situation, there were only BTR-60s and T-62s, which had anti-aircraft machine guns. In addition, the constant task of defending vehicle convoys arose. So we had to use the Shilka and ZU-23 for these tasks. Anti-aircraft guns mounted on trucks of all types turned out to be a necessary weapon, moreover, ZU-23s were actively installed on MT-LB, BTR-D, BTR-60P, in fact, the army received hundreds of ersatz ZSUs. In modern wars, this anti-aircraft gun is used massively, often on both front lines.

It turned out to be a very versatile weapon; even in its non-modernized version, the ZU-23 shot down a lot of aircraft, they are especially dangerous for helicopters, and even for medium-sized UAVs. But at the same time, the 23mm anti-aircraft gun has become the most important means of combating enemy manpower and light armored vehicles, being a de facto battalion weapon.

Almost all self-propelled guns based on it have a serious drawback: the calculations and the installation itself are poorly protected, or are generally located openly. Logic dictates that from its very creation, the ZU-23 could and should have been installed on the BTR-152A/BTR-40A instead of the ZPU-2.

I already wrote in the first part of the article that, in my opinion, the production of these armored personnel carriers, as well as vehicles based on them, was stopped prematurely. The SA lost a large number of cheap and very capacious armored personnel carriers, and therefore the self-propelled guns on their chassis.

For me, such vehicles are better than ordinary unarmored trucks with anti-aircraft guns in the back. As an option, this is the release of simple anti-aircraft self-propelled guns on the BTR-60/70, MTLB and BTR-D chassis, equipped with ZU-23-2, but this is a specialized ZSU, with the installation of an anti-aircraft gun in the body of an armored vehicle, with a crew and ammunition covered by armor, with additional equipment for air defense tasks.

This could be a tablet for illuminating the air situation, like the MANPADS crews, and a radio direction finder, like the Strela-10. The classic installation of the ZU-23-2 on a truck is also possible. The only question is the number of ZU-23s used and their place in military air defense. In my opinion, ideally it was necessary to have an anti-aircraft platoon of 4 ZSU-23-2s as part of each motorized rifle battalion, as well as the engineering and reconnaissance battalions of the division.

In addition, a battery (8 ZU-23) should be assigned to the division's anti-aircraft regiment and an automobile supply battalion. The MSD in this version receives 64 ZSU/ZU-23-2, and the tank division receives 48 anti-aircraft guns. VDD should receive a battery of 6 ZSU-23-2 on the BTR-D chassis in each airborne regiment and a division of 18 similar self-propelled guns per division.

Moreover, the air defense missiles of motorized rifle battalions must be placed on armored chassis. This will strengthen the division's air defense (they write that the probability of hitting a target is 0.023% in one flight, with a target speed of up to 50 m/s), I think there is an error in the text, the target speed is 250 m/s, not 50 m/s , the accuracy of fire on helicopters is many times higher.

Then, the barrage fire of dozens of ZU/ZSU-23-2 is capable of disrupting enemy raids at low and ultra-low altitudes, forcing enemy aircraft to rise above 2-2.5 km, which will reduce the accuracy of strikes and increase losses from the use of air defense systems. In addition, the massive use of these installations was equally dangerous for the motorized armies of NATO, for the masses of PLA infantry, and for militants like dushmans.

The only drawback of the ZU-23 is its rather weak armor penetration: at a distance of 500/1000m it is only 25/20mm. But here is a question for the military-industrial complex, which was supposed to give our army powerful armor-piercing shells for 23mm guns.

Even before the collapse of the USSR, such shells were created first in Finland, they hit 40mm armor from 500m, then Bulgaria, whose shells penetrated 40mm from 1000m. It is clear that with such shells, the 23mm cannon became a dangerous adversary for any NATO or PLA light armored vehicles.

So the mass of the ZSU-23-2 would become an important help for Soviet motorized riflemen, paratroopers, and marines. By the way, in the Bundeswehr divisions there were from 50 to 144 20-mm twin anti-aircraft guns, and the illogical ZU-23 (Rh202 system). I think that a similar approach would not hurt the Soviet army.

Conclusions.

It should be objectively recognized that Soviet post-war self-propelled artillery has reached a very high level, first anti-aircraft, then the rest, being the best in the world in a number of parameters.

Even 24 years after the collapse of the USSR, Soviet self-propelled artillery serves and fights in many countries around the world, remaining very widespread. Well, TOSs are experiencing a real flourishing.

It is clear that there were shortcomings that were both objective and subjective. The objective disadvantages include the focus of the SA on maintaining global war with the massive use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, therefore the army was not prepared for local conflicts, the fight against partisans or rebels.

Another drawback was the bias in favor of the production of tanks; until the 70s, the rest of the armored vehicles were produced on a residual basis, which slowed down the equipping of the SA with self-propelled artillery and armored vehicles.

Subjective factors include the decision of Khrushchev and his entourage to stop the development of self-propelled artillery, which slowed down its development for long years. Although even earlier, the Soviet military did not bother to correctly evaluate the experience of the Wehrmacht and its allies in creating self-propelled artillery systems and self-propelled guns.

It is very difficult to explain the refusal to adopt the Object 268 heavy assault gun to replace the ISU-152, or the inability to expand the production of combined guns on different chassis, in the hope that a new generation combined weapon will be created.

As a result, only in the 2010s did our army receive what it could have had already in the 80s. Similarly, only subjective factors can explain the neglect of light ZSU or the refusal to modernize the ZSU-57-2.

And finally, there is no justification for the delay in adopting the TOS-1, which was already ready for production at the very beginning of the Afghan war.

All that remains is to throw up our hands and be sad that our army did not receive so many interesting examples of self-propelled artillery, or received it very late, or these weapons were created by more backward allies of the USSR, and the superpower used primitive or weaker models.

For hundreds of years, artillery was an important component of the Russian army. However, she reached her power and prosperity during the Second World War - it is no coincidence that she was called the “god of war.” An analysis of a long-term military campaign made it possible to determine the most promising areas of this type of troops for decades to come. As a result, today modern Russian artillery has the necessary power both to effectively conduct combat operations in local conflicts and to repel massive aggression.

Legacy of the past

New models of Russian weapons trace their origins back to the 60s of the 20th century, when the Soviet army leadership set a course for high-quality rearmament. Dozens of leading design bureaus, where outstanding engineers and designers worked, laid the theoretical and technical basis for the creation of the latest weapons.

The experience of previous wars and analysis of the potential of foreign armies have clearly shown that it is necessary to rely on mobile self-propelled artillery and mortar launchers. Thanks to decisions made half a century ago, Russian artillery has acquired a substantial fleet of tracked and wheeled missile and artillery weapons, the basis of which is the “flower collection”: from the nimble 122-mm Gvozdika howitzer to the formidable 240-mm Tulip.

Barrel field artillery

Russian barrel artillery has a huge number of guns. They are in service with artillery units, units and formations of the Ground Forces and represent the basis of the firepower of marine units and internal troops. Barrel artillery combines high firepower, accuracy and accuracy of fire with simplicity of design and use, mobility, increased reliability, flexibility of fire, and is also economical.

Many samples of towed guns were designed taking into account the experience of the Second World War. In the Russian army, they are gradually being replaced by self-propelled artillery pieces developed in 1971-1975, optimized for performing fire missions even in conditions of a nuclear conflict. Towed guns are supposed to be used in fortified areas and in secondary theaters of military operations.

Samples of weapons

Currently, Russian cannon artillery has the following types of self-propelled guns:

• Floating howitzer 2S1 “Gvozdika” (122 mm).
• Howitzer 2SZ "Akatsia" (152 mm).
• Howitzer 2S19 "Msta-S" (152 mm).
• 2S5 "Gyacinth" gun (152 mm).
• 2S7 “Pion” gun (203 mm).

A self-propelled howitzer with unique characteristics and the ability to fire in the “burst of fire” mode 2S35 “Coalition-SV” (152 mm) is undergoing active testing.

The 120-mm self-propelled guns 2S23 Nona-SVK, 2S9 Nona-S, 2S31 Vena and their towed counterpart 2B16 Nona-K are intended for fire support of combined arms units. The peculiarity of these guns is that they can serve as a mortar, mortar, howitzer or anti-tank gun.

Anti-tank artillery

Along with the creation of highly effective anti-tank missile systems, significant attention is paid to the development of anti-tank artillery guns. Their advantages over anti-tank missiles lie primarily in their relative cheapness, simplicity of design and use, and the ability to fire around the clock in any weather.

Russian anti-tank artillery is moving along the path of increasing power and caliber, improving ammunition and sighting devices. The pinnacle of this development was the 100-mm MT-12 (2A29) “Rapier” anti-tank smoothbore gun with an increased muzzle velocity and an effective firing range of up to 1,500 m. The gun can fire the 9M117 “Kastet” anti-tank missile, capable of penetrating armor up to thick behind dynamic protection. 660 mm.

The towed PT 2A45M Sprut-B, which is in service with the Russian Federation, also has even greater armor penetration. Behind dynamic protection, it is capable of hitting armor up to 770 mm thick. Russian self-propelled artillery in this segment is represented by the 2S25 Sprut-SD self-propelled gun, which has recently entered service with paratroopers.

Mortars

Modern Russian artillery is unthinkable without mortars of various purposes and calibers. Russian models of this class of weapons are extremely effective means of suppression, destruction and fire support. The troops have the following types of mortar weapons:

• Automatic 2B9M "Cornflower" (82 mm).
• 2B14-1 “Tray” (82 mm).
• Mortar complex 2S12 “Sani” (120 mm).
• Self-propelled 2S4 “Tulpan” (240 mm).
• M-160 (160 mm) and M-240 (240 mm).

Characteristics and Features

If the “Tray” and “Sleigh” mortars repeat the designs of the models of the Great Patriotic War, then the “Cornflower” is a fundamentally new system. It is equipped with automatic reloading mechanisms, allowing it to fire at an excellent rate of fire of 100-120 rounds per minute (compared to 24 rounds per minute for the Tray mortar).

The Russian artillery can rightfully be proud of the Tulip self-propelled mortar, which is also an original system. In the stowed position, its 240-mm barrel is mounted on the roof of an armored tracked chassis; in the combat position, it rests on a special plate resting on the ground. In this case, all operations are performed using a hydraulic system.

Coastal troops in the Russian Federation as a branch of independent forces of the Navy were formed in 1989. The basis of its firepower is made up of mobile missile and artillery systems:

• "Redoubt" (rocket).
• 4K51 "Rubezh" (missile).
• 3K55 "Bastion" (missile).
• 3K60 "Bal" (rocket).
• A-222 "Bereg" (artillery 130 mm).

These complexes are truly unique and pose a real threat to any enemy fleet. The newest "Bastion" has been in combat duty since 2010, equipped with Onyx/Yakhont hypersonic missiles. During the Crimean events, several “Bastions”, demonstratively placed on the peninsula, thwarted plans for a “show of force” by the NATO fleet.

Russia's newest coastal defense artillery, the A-222 Bereg, operates effectively against small-sized high-speed vessels moving at a speed of 100 knots (180 km/h), medium surface ships (within 23 km from the complex), and ground targets.

Heavy artillery as part of the Coastal Forces is always ready to support powerful complexes: the Giatsint-S self-propelled gun, the Giatsint-B howitzer gun, the Msta-B howitzer gun, D-20 and D-30 howitzers, and MLRS.

Multiple launch rocket systems

Since the Second World War, Russian rocket artillery, as the legal successor of the USSR, has a powerful group of MLRS. In the 50s, the 122 mm 40-barrel BM-21 Grad system was created. The Russian Ground Forces have 4,500 such systems.

The BM-21 Grad became the prototype of the Grad-1 system, created in 1975 to equip tank and motorized rifle regiments, as well as the more powerful 220-mm Uragan system for army artillery units. This line of development was continued by the long-range Smerch system with 300-mm projectiles and the new Prima divisional MLRS with an increased number of guides and increased-power rockets with a detachable warhead.

Procurement is underway for a new Tornado MLRS, a bi-caliber system mounted on the MAZ-543M chassis. In the Tornado-G variant, it fires 122-mm rockets from the Grad MLRS, being three times more effective than the latter. In the Tornado-S version, designed to fire 300-mm rockets, its combat effectiveness coefficient is 3-4 times higher than that of the Smerch. The Tornado hits targets with a salvo and single high-precision rockets.

Flak

Russian anti-aircraft artillery is represented by the following self-propelled small-caliber systems:

• Quadruple self-propelled gun"Shilka" (23 mm).
• Self-propelled twin installation "Tunguska" (30 mm).
• Self-propelled twin launcher "Pantsir" (30 mm).
• Towed twin unit ZU-23 (2A13) (23 mm).

The self-propelled guns are equipped with a radio instrument system that provides target acquisition and automatic tracking and generation of guidance data. Automatic aiming of guns is carried out using hydraulic drives. "Shilka" is exclusively an artillery system, while "Tunguska" and "Pantsir" are also armed with anti-aircraft missiles.

“Artillery is the god of war,” J.V. Stalin once said, speaking about one of the most significant branches of the military. With these words, he tried to emphasize the enormous importance that this weapon had during the Second World War. And this expression is true, since the merits of artillery are difficult to overestimate. Its power allowed Soviet troops to mercilessly crush enemies and bring the much-desired Great Victory closer.

Later in this article, we will look at the artillery of World War II, which was then in service with Nazi Germany and the USSR, starting with light anti-tank guns and ending with super-heavy monster guns.

Anti-tank guns

As the history of the Second World War has shown, light guns, by and large, turned out to be practically useless against armored vehicles. The fact is that they were usually developed in the interwar years and could only withstand the weak protection of the first armored vehicles. But before World War II, technology began to rapidly modernize. The armor of tanks became much thicker, so many types of guns turned out to be hopelessly outdated.

Mortars

Perhaps the most accessible and effective infantry support weapon was mortars. They perfectly combined properties such as range and firepower, therefore, their use could turn the tide of the entire enemy offensive.

German troops most often used the 80mm Granatwerfer-34. This weapon earned a dark reputation among the Allied forces for high speed and extreme firing accuracy. In addition, its firing range was 2400 m.

The Red Army used the 120mm M1938, which entered service in 1939, for fire support of its infantrymen. It was the very first mortar of this caliber ever produced and used in world practice. When German troops encountered this weapon on the battlefield, they appreciated its power, after which they put a copy into production and designated it “Granatwerfer-42”. The M1932 weighed 285 kg and was the heaviest type of mortar that infantrymen had to carry with them. To do this, it was either disassembled into several parts or pulled on a special trolley. Its firing range was 400 m less than that of the German Granatwerfer-34.

Self-propelled units

In the very first weeks of the war, it became clear that the infantry was in dire need of reliable fire support. The German armed forces encountered an obstacle in the form of well-fortified positions and a large concentration of enemy troops. Then they decided to strengthen their mobile fire support with a 105-mm Vespe self-propelled artillery mount mounted on a PzKpfw II tank chassis. Other similar weapons- "Hummel" - was part of the motorized and tank divisions since 1942.

During the same period, the SU-76 self-propelled gun with a 76.2 mm cannon appeared in service with the Red Army. It was installed on a modified chassis of the T-70 light tank. Initially, the SU-76 was intended to be used as a tank destroyer, but during its use it was realized that it had too little firepower for this.

In the spring of 1943, Soviet troops received new car- ISU-152. It was equipped with a 152.4 mm howitzer and was intended both for the destruction of tanks and mobile artillery, and for supporting infantry with fire. First, the gun was installed on the KV-1 tank chassis, and then on the IS. In battle, this weapon proved to be so effective that it remained in service with the Warsaw Pact countries until the 70s of the last century.

This type of weapon was of great importance during combat operations throughout the Second World War. The heaviest artillery then available in service with the Red Army was the M1931 B-4 howitzer with a caliber of 203 mm. When Soviet troops began to slow down the rapid advance of the German invaders across their territory and the war on the Eastern Front became more static, heavy artillery was, as they say, in its place.

But the developers were always looking for the best option. Their task was to create a weapon that would, as harmoniously as possible, combine such characteristics as low weight, good firing range and the heaviest projectiles. And such a weapon was created. It was the 152-mm howitzer ML-20. A little later, a more modernized M1943 gun with the same caliber, but with a heavier barrel and a larger muzzle brake, entered service with the Soviet troops.

Defense enterprises of the Soviet Union then produced huge batches of such howitzers, which fired massive fire at the enemy. The artillery literally devastated German positions and thereby thwarted enemy offensive plans. An example of this is Operation Hurricane, which was successfully carried out in 1942. Its result was the encirclement of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad. To carry it out, more than 13 thousand guns of various types were used. Artillery preparation of unprecedented power preceded this offensive. It was she who greatly contributed to the rapid advancement of Soviet tank troops and infantry.

German heavy weapons

According to after the First World War, Germany was prohibited from having guns with a caliber of 150 mm or more. Therefore, Krupp specialists who were developing a new gun had to create a heavy field howitzer sFH 18 with a 149.1 mm barrel, consisting of a pipe, breech and casing.

At the beginning of the war, the German heavy howitzer was moved by horse traction. But later, its modernized version was pulled by a half-track tractor, which made it much more mobile. The German army successfully used it on the Eastern Front. By the end of the war, sFH 18 howitzers were installed on tank chassis. Thus, the Hummel self-propelled artillery mount was created.

The Rocket Forces and Artillery are one of the divisions of the ground armed forces. The use of missiles during WWII was mainly associated with large-scale combat operations on the Eastern Front. Powerful rockets covered large areas with their fire, which compensated for some of the inaccuracy of these unguided guns. Compared to conventional projectiles, the cost of the missiles was much lower, and they were produced very quickly. Another advantage was the relative ease of their operation.

Soviet rocket artillery used 132mm M-13 shells during the war. They were created in the 1930s and by the time Nazi Germany attacked the USSR, they were available in very small quantities. These missiles are perhaps the most famous of all such missiles used during the Second World War. Gradually, their production was established, and by the end of 1941, the M-13 was used in battles against the Nazis.

It must be said that the rocket troops and artillery of the Red Army plunged the Germans into a real shock, which was caused by the unprecedented power and deadly effect of the new weapon. The BM-13-16 launchers were placed on trucks and had rails for 16 shells. Later these missile systems will be known as "Katyusha". Over time, they were modernized several times and were in service with the Soviet army until the 80s of the last century. With the advent of the expression “Artillery is the god of war” began to be perceived as truth.

German rocket launchers

The new type of weapon made it possible to deliver combat explosive parts over both long and short distances. Thus, short-range projectiles concentrated their firepower on targets located on the front line, while long-range missiles struck targets located in the enemy rear.

The Germans also had their own rocket artillery. “Wurframen-40” is a German rocket launcher, which was mounted on the Sd.Kfz.251 half-track vehicle. The missile was aimed at the target by turning the vehicle itself. Sometimes these systems were introduced into battle as towed artillery.

Most often, the Germans used the Nebelwerfer-41 rocket launcher, which had a honeycomb design. It consisted of six tubular guides and was mounted on a two-wheeled carriage. But during the battle, this weapon was extremely dangerous not only for the enemy, but also for its own crew due to the nozzle flame escaping from the pipes.

The weight of the shells had a huge impact on their flight range. Therefore, the army whose artillery could hit targets located far behind the enemy line had a significant military advantage. Heavy German rockets were useful only for overhead fire, when it was necessary to destroy well-fortified objects, such as bunkers, armored vehicles or various defensive structures.

It is worth noting that the firing range of the German artillery was much inferior in range to the Katyusha rocket launcher due to the excessive weight of the shells.

Super heavy weapons

Artillery played a very important role in Hitler's armed forces. This is all the more surprising since it was almost the most important element of the fascist military machine, and for some reason modern researchers prefer to focus their attention on studying the history of the Luftwaffe (air force).

Even at the end of the war, German engineers continued to work on a new grandiose armored vehicle - the prototype of a huge tank that would dwarf all other military equipment. The P1500 “Monster” project was never implemented. It is only known that the tank was supposed to weigh 1.5 tons. It was planned that it would be armed with an 80-centimeter Gustav cannon from Krupp. It is worth noting that its developers always thought big, and artillery was no exception. This weapon entered service with the Nazi army during the siege of the city of Sevastopol. The cannon fired only 48 shots, after which its barrel wore out.

The K-12 railway guns were in service with the 701st artillery battery, stationed on the English Channel coast. According to some reports, their shells, which weighed 107.5 kg, hit several targets in southern England. These artillery monsters had their own T-shaped track sections necessary for mounting and aiming at the target.

Statistics

As previously noted, the armies of the countries that participated in the hostilities of 1939-1945 entered the fight with outdated or partially modernized guns. All their ineffectiveness was fully revealed by the Second World War. The artillery urgently needed not only updating, but also increasing its number.

From 1941 to 1944, Germany produced more than 102 thousand guns of different calibers and up to 70 thousand mortars. By the time of the attack on the USSR, the Germans already had about 47 thousand artillery barrels, and this does not include assault guns. If we take the United States as an example, they produced about 150 thousand guns over the same period. Great Britain managed to produce only 70 thousand weapons of this class. But the record holder in this race was the Soviet Union: during the war years, more than 480 thousand guns and about 350 thousand mortars were fired here. Before this, the USSR already had 67 thousand guns in service. This figure does not include 50mm mortars, naval artillery and anti-aircraft guns.

During the years of World War II, the artillery of the warring countries underwent great changes. The armies constantly received either modernized or completely new guns. Anti-tank and self-propelled artillery developed at a particularly rapid pace (photos from that time demonstrate its power). According to experts from different countries, about half of all ground force losses are due to the use of mortars during battle.

After the end of the war, the USSR's anti-tank artillery armament included: 37-mm airborne guns of the 1944 model, 45-mm anti-tank guns mod. 1937 and arr. 1942, 57-mm anti-tank guns ZiS-2, divisional 76-mm ZiS-3, 100-mm field guns 1944 BS-3. Captured German 75-mm anti-tank guns Pak 40 were also used. They were purposefully collected, stored and repaired if necessary.

In mid-1944 it was officially adopted for service. 37-mm airborne gun ChK-M1.

It was specially designed to arm parachute battalions and motorcycle regiments. The gun weighed 209 kg in firing position and could be transported by air and parachuted. It had good armor penetration for its caliber, allowing it to hit medium and heavy side armor with a sub-caliber projectile at short range. The shells were interchangeable with the 37 mm 61-K anti-aircraft gun. The gun was transported in Willys and GAZ-64 cars (one gun per car), as well as in Dodge and GAZ-AA cars (two guns per car).

The crew of the gun consisted of four people - a commander, a gunner, a loader and a carrier. When firing, the crew takes a prone position. The technical rate of fire reached 25-30 rounds per minute.
Thanks to the original design of recoil devices, the 37-mm airborne gun model 1944 combined powerful ballistics for its caliber anti-aircraft gun with small dimensions and weight. With armor penetration values ​​close to those of the 45-mm M-42, the CheK-M1 is three times lighter and significantly smaller in size (much lower line of fire), which greatly facilitated the movement of the gun by crew forces and its camouflage. At the same time, the M-42 also has a number of advantages - the presence of a full-fledged wheel drive, allowing the gun to be towed by a car, the absence of a muzzle brake that unmasks when firing, a more effective fragmentation projectile and a better armor-piercing effect of armor-piercing projectiles.
The 37mm ChK-M1 gun was about 5 years late and was adopted and put into production when the war came to an end. Apparently she did not take part in the hostilities. A total of 472 guns were produced.

By the time the hostilities ended, 45-mm anti-tank guns were hopelessly outdated, even if they were included in the ammunition load 45 mm M-42 guns a sub-caliber projectile with normal armor penetration at a distance of 500 meters - 81 mm homogeneous armor could not correct the situation. Modern heavy and medium tanks were hit only when fired at the side, from extremely short distances. The active use of these guns until the very last days of the war can be explained by their high maneuverability, ease of transportation and camouflage, huge accumulated reserves of ammunition of this caliber, as well as the inability of Soviet industry to provide troops in the required quantity with anti-tank guns with higher characteristics.
One way or another, in active army“forty-fives” were extremely popular; only they could move with crew forces in the battle formations of the advancing infantry, supporting them with fire.

At the end of the 40s, “forty-fives” began to be actively removed from parts and transferred for storage. However, for quite a long period of time they continued to remain in service with the Airborne Forces and were used as training weapons.
A significant number of 45 mm M-42s were transferred to the then allies.

American soldiers from the 5th Cavalry Regiment study an M-42 captured in Korea

"Sorokapyatka" was actively used in the Korean War. In Albania, these guns were in service until the early 90s.

Mass production 57 mm anti-tank gunZiS-2 became possible in 1943, after the necessary metalworking machines were received from the USA. The restoration of serial production was difficult - technological problems with the manufacture of barrels again arose, in addition, the plant was heavily loaded with the production program of 76-mm divisional and tank guns, which had a number of common components with the ZIS-2; under these conditions, increasing the production of ZIS-2 using existing equipment could only be achieved by reducing the production volume of these weapons, which was unacceptable. As a result, the first batch of ZIS-2 for state and military tests was released in May 1943, and in the production of these guns, the reserve stock mothballed at the plant since 1941 was widely used. Mass production of the ZIS-2 was organized by October - November 1943, after the commissioning of new production facilities provided with equipment supplied under Lend-Lease.

Production of the ZiS-2 continued until 1949 inclusive; in the post-war period, about 3,500 guns were produced. From 1950 to 1951, only ZIS-2 barrels were produced. Since 1957, the previously produced ZIS-2s have been upgraded into the ZIS-2N variant with the ability to fight at night through the use of special night sights
In the 1950s, new sub-caliber projectiles with increased armor penetration were developed for the gun.

In the post-war period, the ZIS-2 was in service with the Soviet Army at least until the 1970s, the last time combat use recorded in 1968, during the conflict with the PRC on Damansky Island.
ZIS-2s were supplied to a number of countries and took part in several armed conflicts, the first of which was the Korean War.
There is information about the successful use of the ZIS-2 by Egypt in 1956 in battles with the Israelis. Guns of this type were in service with the Chinese army and were produced under license under the designation Type 55. As of 2007, ZIS-2 was still in service with the armies of Algeria, Guinea, Cuba and Nicaragua.

In the second half of the war, the anti-tank destroyer units were armed with captured German 75 mm anti-tank guns Rak 40. During the offensive operations of 1943-1944, a large number of guns and ammunition were captured. Our military appreciated the high performance of these anti-tank guns. At a distance of 500 meters, the sub-caliber projectile normally penetrated 154 mm armor.

In 1944, firing tables and operating instructions were issued for the Pak 40 in the USSR.
After the war, the guns were transferred to storage, where they remained at least until the mid-60s. Subsequently, some of them were “utilized”, and some were transferred to the allies.

A photograph of the RaK-40 guns was taken at a parade in Hanoi in 1960.

In fear of an invasion from the South, several anti-tank artillery divisions were formed within the North Vietnamese army, armed with German 75-mm PaK-40 anti-tank guns from World War II. Such guns were captured in large quantities by the Red Army in 1945, and now the Soviet Union provided them to the Vietnamese people for protection against possible aggression from the South.

Soviet divisional 76-mm guns were intended to solve a wide range of tasks, primarily fire support for infantry units, suppression of firing points, and destruction of light field shelters. However, during the war, divisional artillery guns had to fire at enemy tanks, perhaps even more often than specialized anti-tank guns.

Since 1944, due to a decrease in the production rate of 45 mm guns and a shortage of 57 mm ZIS-2 guns, despite insufficient armor penetration for that time divisional 76-mm ZiS-3 became the main anti-tank gun of the Red Army.
In many ways, this was a necessary measure. The armor-piercing ability of an armor-piercing projectile, which penetrated 75 mm armor at a distance of 300 meters, was not enough to combat medium German Pz.IV tanks.
As of 1943, the armor of the heavy tank PzKpfW VI "Tiger" was invulnerable to the ZIS-3 in the frontal projection and weakly vulnerable at distances closer than 300 m in the side projection. The new German tank PzKpfW V "Panther", as well as the modernized PzKpfW IV Ausf H and PzKpfW III Ausf M or N, were also weakly vulnerable in the frontal projection to the ZIS-3; however, all these vehicles were confidently hit on the side by the ZIS-3.
The introduction of a sub-caliber projectile since 1943 improved the anti-tank capabilities of the ZIS-3, allowing it to confidently hit vertical 80 mm armor at distances closer than 500 m, but 100 mm vertical armor remained too strong for it.
The relative weakness of the ZIS-3's anti-tank capabilities was recognized by the Soviet military leadership, but until the end of the war it was not possible to replace the ZIS-3 in anti-tank fighter units. The situation could be corrected by introducing a cumulative projectile into the ammunition load. But such a projectile was adopted by the ZiS-3 only in the post-war period.

Shortly after the end of the war and the production of over 103,000 guns, production of the ZiS-3 was discontinued. The gun remained in service for a long time, but by the end of the 40s, it was almost completely withdrawn from anti-tank artillery. This did not prevent the ZiS-3 from spreading very widely throughout the world and taking part in many local conflicts, including in the territory former USSR.

In the modern Russian army, the remaining serviceable ZIS-3s are often used as salute guns or in theatrical performances based on the battles of the Great Patriotic War. In particular, these guns are in service with the Separate Fireworks Division at the Moscow commandant’s office, which conducts fireworks on the holidays of February 23 and May 9.

In 1946, the design created under the leadership of chief designer F.F. Petrov was put into service. 85-mm anti-tank gun D-44. This weapon would have been in great demand during the war, but its development was delayed for a number of reasons.
Externally, the D-44 strongly resembled the German 75-mm anti-tank Pak 40.

From 1946 to 1954, 10,918 guns were manufactured at Plant No. 9 (Uralmash).
The D-44s were in service with a separate anti-tank artillery division of a motorized rifle or tank regiment (two anti-tank artillery batteries consisting of two fire platoons), 6 pieces per battery (12 in the division).

The ammunition used is unitary cartridges with high-explosive fragmentation grenades, coil-shaped sub-caliber projectiles, cumulative and smoke projectiles. The range of a direct shot of the BTS BR-367 at a target 2 m high is 1100 m. At a distance of 500 m, this projectile penetrates an armor plate 135 mm thick at an angle of 90°. The initial speed of the BR-365P BPS is 1050 m/s, armor penetration is 110 mm from a distance of 1000 m.

In 1957, night sights were installed on some of the guns, and a self-propelled modification was also developed. SD-44, which could move on the battlefield without a tractor.

The barrel and carriage of the SD-44 were taken from the D-44 with minor changes. Thus, an M-72 engine from the Irbit Motorcycle Plant with a power of 14 hp, covered with a casing, was installed on one of the cannon frames. (4000 rpm) providing self-propulsion speeds of up to 25 km/h. Power transmission from the engine was provided through the driveshaft, differential and axle shafts to both wheels of the gun. The gearbox included in the transmission provided six forward gears and two reverse gears. The frame also has a seat for one of the crew numbers, which performs the functions of a driver. He has at his disposal a steering mechanism that controls an additional, third, gun wheel, mounted on the end of one of the frames. A headlight is installed to illuminate the road at night.

Subsequently, it was decided to use the 85-mm D-44 as a divisional one to replace the ZiS-3, and to entrust the fight against tanks to more powerful artillery systems and ATGMs.

In this capacity, the weapon was used in many conflicts, including in the CIS. An extreme case of combat use was noted in the North Caucasus, during the “counter-terrorist operation”.

The D-44 is still formally in service in the Russian Federation; a number of these guns are in the internal troops and in storage.

On the basis of D-44, under the leadership of chief designer F. F. Petrov, a anti-tank 85-mm gun D-48. The main feature of the D-48 anti-tank gun was its exceptionally long barrel. To ensure the maximum initial velocity of the projectile, the barrel length was increased to 74 calibers (6 m, 29 cm).
New unitary shots were created especially for this gun. An armor-piercing projectile at a distance of 1,000 m penetrated armor 150-185 mm thick at an angle of 60°. A sub-caliber projectile at a distance of 1000 m penetrates homogeneous armor 180–220 mm thick at an angle of 60°. The maximum firing range of high-explosive fragmentation projectiles weighing 9.66 kg. - 19 km.
From 1955 to 1957, 819 copies of the D-48 and D-48N were produced (with an APN2-77 or APN3-77 night sight).

The guns entered service with individual anti-tank artillery divisions of a tank or motorized rifle regiment. As an anti-tank weapon, the D-48 gun quickly became outdated. In the early 60s of the 20th century, tanks with more powerful armor protection appeared in NATO countries. Negative trait The D-48 became an “exclusive” ammunition, unsuitable for other 85-mm guns. For firing from the D-48, the use of shots from the D-44, KS-1, 85-mm tank and self-propelled guns is also prohibited; this significantly narrowed the scope of use of the gun.

In the spring of 1943, V.G. Grabin, in his memorandum addressed to Stalin, proposed, along with the resumption of production of the 57-mm ZIS-2, to begin designing a 100-mm cannon with a unitary shot, which was used in naval guns.

A year later, in the spring of 1944 100-mm field gun model 1944 BS-3 was put into production. Due to the presence of a wedge bolt with a vertically moving wedge with semi-automatic operation, the location of the vertical and horizontal aiming mechanisms on one side of the gun, as well as the use of unitary shots, the gun’s rate of fire is 8-10 rounds per minute. The cannon fired unitary cartridges with armor-piercing tracer shells and high-explosive fragmentation grenades. An armor-piercing tracer projectile with an initial speed of 895 m/s at a distance of 500 m at an impact angle of 90° penetrated armor 160 mm thick. The direct shot range was 1080 m.
However, the role of this weapon in the fight against enemy tanks is greatly exaggerated. By the time of its appearance, the Germans practically did not use tanks on a massive scale.

During the war, BS-3 was produced in small quantities and could not play a big role. At the final stage of the war, 98 BS-3s were assigned as a means of strengthening five tank armies. The gun was in service with light artillery brigades of 3 regiments.

As of January 1, 1945, the RGK artillery had 87 BS-3 guns. At the beginning of 1945, in the 9th Guards Army, one cannon artillery regiment of 20 BS-3s was formed in three rifle corps.

Mainly, thanks to its long firing range - 20,650 m and a fairly effective high-explosive fragmentation grenade weighing 15.6 kg, the gun was used as a hull gun to combat enemy artillery and suppress long-range targets.

BS-3 had a number of disadvantages that made it difficult to use as an anti-tank weapon. When firing, the gun jumped strongly, which made the gunner’s work unsafe and confused the sighting mounts, which, in turn, led to a decrease in the practical rate of aimed fire - a very important quality for a field anti-tank gun.

The presence of a powerful muzzle brake with a low height of the line of fire and flat trajectories characteristic of firing at armored targets led to the formation of a significant smoke and dust cloud, which unmasked the position and blinded the crew. The mobility of a gun with a mass of more than 3500 kg left much to be desired; transportation by crews to the battlefield was practically impossible.

After the war, the gun was in production until 1951 inclusive; a total of 3,816 BS-3 field guns were produced. In the 60s, the guns underwent modernization, this primarily concerned sights and ammunition. Until the early 60s, the BS-3 could penetrate the armor of any Western tank. But with the advent of: M-48A2, Chieftain, M-60 - the situation has changed. New sub-caliber and cumulative projectiles were urgently developed. The next modernization took place in the mid-80s, when the 9M117 Bastion anti-tank guided projectile was added to the BS-3 ammunition load.

This weapon was also supplied to other countries and took part in many local conflicts in Asia, Africa and the Middle East; in some of them it is still in service. In Russia, until recently, BS-3 guns were used as a coastal defense weapon in service with the 18th Machine Gun and Artillery Division stationed on the Kuril Islands, and quite a significant number of them are in storage.

Until the late 60s and early 70s of the last century, anti-tank guns were the main means of fighting tanks. However, with the advent of ATGMs with a semi-automatic guidance system, which only requires keeping the target in the sight's field of view, the situation has largely changed. The military leadership of many countries considered metal-intensive, bulky and expensive anti-tank guns an anachronism. But not in the USSR. In our country, the development and production of anti-tank guns continued in significant quantities. And at a qualitatively new level.

In 1961 it entered service 100 mm smoothbore anti-tank gun T-12, developed at the design bureau of the Yurga Machine-Building Plant No. 75 under the leadership of V.Ya. Afanasyev and L.V. Korneeva.

The decision to make a smoothbore gun at first glance may seem quite strange; the time of such guns ended almost a hundred years ago. But the creators of the T-12 did not think so.

In a smooth channel, you can make the gas pressure much higher than in a rifled channel, and accordingly increase the initial speed of the projectile.
In a rifled barrel, the rotation of the projectile reduces the armor-piercing effect of the jet of gases and metal during the explosion of the cumulative projectile.
For a smoothbore gun, the survivability of the barrel is significantly increased - you don’t have to worry about the so-called “washing out” of the rifling fields.

The gun channel consists of a chamber and a cylindrical smooth-walled guide part. The chamber is formed by two long and one short (between them) cones. The transition from the chamber to the cylindrical section is a conical slope. The shutter is a vertical wedge with a semi-automatic spring. Loading is unitary. The carriage for the T-12 was taken from the 85-mm D-48 anti-tank rifled gun.

In the 60s, a more convenient carriage was designed for the T-12 cannon. The new system received an index MT-12 (2A29), and in some sources it is called “Rapier”. The MT-12 went into mass production in 1970. The anti-tank artillery battalions of the motorized rifle divisions of the USSR Armed Forces included two anti-tank artillery batteries consisting of six 100-mm T-12 anti-tank guns (MT-12).

The T-12 and MT-12 guns have the same warhead - a long, thin barrel 60 calibers long with a “salt shaker” muzzle brake. The sliding beds are equipped with an additional retractable wheel installed at the openers. The main difference of the modernized MT-12 model is that it is equipped with a torsion bar suspension, which is locked when firing to ensure stability.

When rolling the gun manually, a roller is placed under the trunk part of the frame, which is secured with a stopper on the left frame. Transportation of T-12 and MT-12 guns is carried out by a standard MT-L or MT-LB tractor. For movement on snow, the LO-7 ski mount was used, which made it possible to fire from skis at elevation angles of up to +16° with a rotation angle of up to 54°, and at an elevation angle of 20° with a rotation angle of up to 40°.

A smooth barrel is much more convenient for firing guided projectiles, although this was most likely not yet thought about in 1961. To combat armored targets, an armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile is used with a swept warhead, which has high kinetic energy and is capable of penetrating 215 mm thick armor at a distance of 1000 meters. The ammunition load includes several types of sub-caliber, cumulative and high-explosive fragmentation shells.

ZUBM-10 shot with an armor-piercing sabot projectile

ZUBK8 shot with a cumulative projectile

When a special guidance device is installed on the gun, shots with the Kastet anti-tank missile can be used. The missile is controlled semi-automatically by a laser beam, the firing range is from 100 to 4000 m. The missile penetrates armor behind dynamic protection (“reactive armor”) up to 660 mm thick.

9M117 missile and ZUBK10-1 shot

For direct fire, the T-12 cannon is equipped with a day sight and night sights. With a panoramic sight it can be used as a field weapon from closed positions. There is a modification of the MT-12R cannon with a mounted 1A31 “Ruta” guidance radar.

MT-12R with 1A31 "Ruta" radar

The gun was widely used by the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries and was supplied to Algeria, Iraq and Yugoslavia. They took part in hostilities in Afghanistan, in the Iran-Iraq War, and in armed conflicts in the territories of the former USSR and Yugoslavia. During these armed conflicts, 100 mm anti-tank guns are mainly used not against tanks, but as ordinary divisional or corps guns.

The MT-12 anti-tank guns continue to be in service in Russia.
According to the press center of the Ministry of Defense on August 26, 2013, with the help of accurate shot A fire at well No. P23 ​​U1 near Novy Urengoy was extinguished with a UBK-8 cumulative projectile from the MT-12 "Rapier" cannon of the Yekaterinburg separate motorized rifle brigade of the Central Military District.

The fire began on August 19 and quickly turned into an uncontrollable combustion of natural gas escaping through faulty fittings. The artillery crew was transferred to Novy Urengoy by a military transport plane taking off from Orenburg. At the Shagol airfield, equipment and ammunition were loaded, after which the artillerymen under the command of the officer of the missile forces and artillery department of the Central Military District, Colonel Gennady Mandrichenko, were delivered to the scene. The gun was set for direct fire from the minimum permissible distance of 70 m. The target diameter was 20 cm. The target was successfully hit.

In 1967, Soviet experts came to the conclusion that the T-12 gun “does not provide reliable destruction of the Chieftain tanks and the promising MVT-70. Therefore, in January 1968, OKB-9 (now part of Spetstekhnika JSC) was ordered to develop a new, more powerful anti-tank gun with the ballistics of the 125-mm D-81 smoothbore tank gun. The task was difficult to complete, since the D-81, having excellent ballistics, gave strong recoil, which was still tolerable for a tank weighing 40 tons. But during field tests, the D-81 fired a 203-mm B-4 howitzer from a tracked carriage. It is clear that such an anti-tank gun weighing 17 tons and a maximum speed of 10 km/h was out of the question. Therefore, the recoil in the 125 mm gun was increased from 340 mm (limited by the dimensions of the tank) to 970 mm and a powerful muzzle brake was introduced. This made it possible to install a 125-mm cannon on a three-frame carriage from the serial 122-mm D-30 howitzer, which allowed all-round firing.

The new 125-mm gun was designed by OKB-9 in two versions: the towed D-13 and the self-propelled SD-13 (“D” is the index of artillery systems designed by V.F. Petrov). The development of SD-13 was 125-mm smoothbore anti-tank gun "Sprut-B" (2A-45M). The ballistic data and ammunition of the D-81 tank gun and the 2A-45M anti-tank gun were the same.

"Sprut-B" is towed by a "Ural-4320" vehicle or an MT-LB tractor. In addition, for self-propulsion on the battlefield, the gun has a special power unit based on the MeMZ-967A engine with hydraulic drive. The engine is located on the right side of the gun under the casing. On the left side of the frame, the driver's seats and the gun control system for self-propulsion are installed. The maximum speed on dry dirt roads is 10 km/h, and the transportable ammunition is 6 rounds; Fuel range is up to 50 km.

With special guidance equipment, the 9S53 Sprut can fire ZUB K-14 rounds with 9M119 anti-tank missiles, which are controlled semi-automatically by a laser beam, the firing range is from 100 to 4000 m. The mass of the shot is about 24 kg, the missiles are 17.2 kg, it penetrates armor behind dynamic protection with a thickness of 700–770 mm.

Currently, towed anti-tank guns (100- and 125-mm smoothbore) are in service with countries - former republics of the USSR, as well as a number developing countries. The armies of leading Western countries have long abandoned special anti-tank guns, both towed and self-propelled. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that towed anti-tank guns have a future. Ballistics and ammunition of the 125-mm Sprut-B cannon, unified with the guns of modern main tanks, are capable of hitting any serial tanks peace. An important advantage of anti-tank guns over ATGMs is a wider selection of means of destroying tanks and the ability to hit them at point-blank range. In addition, Sprut-B can also be used as a non-anti-tank weapon. Its OF-26 high-explosive fragmentation projectile is close in ballistic data and explosive mass to the OF-471 projectile of the 122-mm A-19 hull gun, which became famous in the Great Patriotic War.

Based on materials:
http://gods-of-war.pp.ua
http://russkaya-sila.rf/guide/army/ar/d44.shtml
Shirokorad A. B. Encyclopedia of domestic artillery. - Minsk: Harvest, 2000.
Shunkov V.N. Weapons of the Red Army. - Minsk: Harvest, 1999.