Lapota Empire and Artillery of WWI. Lapotnaya Empire and Artillery of WWI Mass in combat position, kg

Did you know that the American Expeditionary Force in WWI was armed almost exclusively with French artillery?
And I'm not talking about the Italians, who tested carbide guns. Naturally, they haven’t sold normal guns yet ..
Well, the three-inch bast-bast empire, after some modifications, survived until the Second World War.
At the time of the start of WWII, there were about 4,500 three-inch models of the 1902/30 model in parts of the Red Army.
And if the mighty Soviet industry took care of the production of an armor-piercing projectile ...
But she had no time. Therefore, three-inch German tanks were fired with shrapnel.
In everything panima "sh, rotten tsarism is to blame, armor-piercing bastards did not prepare.
Yes, and the Mosin rifle served throughout the Second World War and was replaced only by Kalash.
But not a single three-inch, although it is recognized as the best divisional cannon PMV...

12 "" howitzer model 1915 in the workshop of the Petrograd Metal Plant

Original taken from kosmodesantnick in Artillery of the Great War. special power
It is quite possible that I am the first person to pay attention to the following very remarkable fact:

In total, during the entire Great War, the German Empire produced 15 mortar: 5 (five) 42 cm (420 mm) Gamma Mörser long-barreled mortars (aka kurze Marinekanone 12) and 10 (ten) 42 cm (420-mm) Minenwerfer Gerät short-barreled mortars (aka kurze Marinekanone 14); and 4 guns: 4 (four) 30.5 cm (305 mm) guns ("L / 30 Beta-M-Gerät"). Almost all the rest of the artillery of the special power of the German Imperial Army was either made before the war, or was originally intended not at all for use on the land front.

Total Germany during 1914-1918. 19 (nineteen) artillery systems of special power were re-manufactured.

And in the "backward" Russian Empire For the period from 08/13/1915 to 01/01/1917, the state-owned Obukhov steel plant manufactured 33 (thirty-three) 12 "" (305-mm) howitzers (siege) of the 1915 model.

In total, Russia during the 16 months of the war re-manufactured 33 (thirty-three) artillery systems of special power.

Some notes:

1. In total, from 1897 to 1914, 12 Beta devices and 7 Gamma devices were produced in Germany:

9 (nine) 30.5 cm (305 mm) coastal mortars of the 1897 model (Küstenmörser 97 or Beta Gerät)
2 (two) 30.5 cm (305 mm) heavy coastal mortars of the 1909 model of the year (schwere Küstenmörser 09 or Beta 09 Gerät)
1 (one) 30.5 cm (305 mm) Beta howitzer on an I.R. (Haubitze Beta in Räderlafette)
5 (five) 42 cm (420 mm) Gamma Mörser long-barreled mortars (aka kurze Marinekanone 12)
2 (two) 42 cm (420 mm) Minenwerfer Gerät short-barreled mortars (aka kurze Marinekanone 14)

2. Back to top great war, The German imperial army did not have a single mobile battery of special power, which were formed in a more or less improvised way.

3. In total, at the beginning of the war, the German Imperial Army received 8.5 (eight and a half) batteries of special power:

5 (five) heavy coastal mortar batteries (Schwere Küstenmörser Batterie)
3.5 (three and a half) batteries of short naval guns (Kurze Marine Kanone Batterie)

4. In addition, there were some 28 cm (280 mm) coastal howitzers (Küsten Haubitze) in Germany.

Remains of Fat Bertha. Most of these M-Gerät mortars were lost as a result of a rupture in the barrel of their own projectile.

PS. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the artillery of special power of the RVGK included 30 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model and25 280-mm Schneider mortars of the 1915 model of the year .. Another 24 mortars and four 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model of the year were in warehouses, factories and training grounds.

It should be noted that the shells for the 280-mm mortars of Schneider and Br-5 were the same, but the charges were different. The shells were only of the old type, that is, of a short-range form. By June 1941, there were about 7 thousand 280-mm shells and 7.5 thousand 305-mm shells for howitzers of the 1915 model.

Interestingly, the Navy also had 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model. They were armed with four-gun battery No. 911 near Vladivostok. For her, the fleet had 1788 high-explosive 305-mm howitzer shells.

It is impossible not to mention such a curious fact here. In the 20-30s, the army command conducted experimental firing from 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model with 305-mm shells ship cannons. As a result, Tables were created for firing naval shells of the 1907 model and the 1911 model of the year from a 305-mm howitzer.

305 mm howitzer Br-18

In 1937, a Soviet military delegation visited the Skoda factory in Czechoslovakia. The purpose of the visit was to acquire documentation and prototypes artillery systems of high power for their subsequent production at Soviet factories. The attention of the military was attracted by the projects of a 210-mm cannon and a 305-mm howitzer - both guns had separate-sleeve loading and a wedge horizontal shutter. The carriages were also the same. In principle, the systems differed only in barrels: the cannon had a lined one, and the howitzer had a fastened one.

The concluded agreement provided for some changes in the projects. In particular, at the request of the Soviet representatives, cap loading was introduced, and the shutters became piston. Instead of a bonded howitzer barrel, a lined one was used. The Czechoslovak company undertook to provide the USSR with two prototype guns in December 1939, but the drawings arrived much earlier. Therefore, in order not to waste time, it was decided to start the production of artillery systems without waiting for the delivery of prototypes. To simplify the production technology, the engineers of the Barrikady plant significantly revised the drawings. The 305-mm howitzer of domestic production, designated Br-18, entered the field tests in the fall of 1940 and showed generally satisfactory results. It was noted that the gun is capable of firing high-explosive shells weighing 330 kg at a range of 16,500 m, and concrete-piercing shells weighing 465 kg flew at a distance of 13,100 m. The mass production of howitzers was interrupted with the outbreak of World War II, and their exact number received by the Red Army units is unknown. But at least three 305-mm guns took part in the fighting as part of separate artillery battalions of special power of the RGK. Like all heavy artillery systems, they were used in the second period of the war. One of the Br-18 howitzers is currently in the artillery museum of the city on the Neva.

Tactical and technical data

Designation: Br-18

Type: RGK howitzer

Caliber, mm: 305

Weight in combat position, kg: 43000

Barrel length, calibers: 22

GN angle, deg: 90

HV angle, hail: -4; +70

Initial projectile speed, m/s: 530 (high-explosive)

rate of fire : 1 shot in 2.5 minutes

Max. firing range, m: 16500

400-mm railway howitzer The first attempts to create railway artillery mounts to defend the fortresses, the French undertook as early as the early 1880s. In 1910, the Schneider factory built a 200-mm howitzer for Peru, placed on a railway turntable.

150-mm howitzer sFH 18 Before the start of World War II, the artillery regiment of the infantry division of the Wehrmacht included a heavy artillery division equipped with 12 150-mm howitzers sFH 18. Separate divisions of the German RGK were also armed with guns of this type.

210-mm howitzer 210/22, model 35 On the eve of World War II, Italy, as well as Germany, the USSR, England, France and Czechoslovakia, decided to upgrade their fleet heavy guns to maintain the status of a military power. The 210 mm howitzer project was fully completed by 1935

152-mm howitzer-gun ML-20 By the mid-30s, a 152-mm gun mod. 1910/34, produced by the plant in Motovilikha, is already rather outdated and the GAU required the development of a new artillery system of a similar caliber. First of all, it was necessary to increase the elevation angle,

152 mm howitzer mod. 1943 (D-1) The accumulated experience of unification and standardization of various artillery systems allowed Soviet designers in the shortest possible time to create new types of guns necessary for arming the army. At the end of 1942, Soviet troops moved to

203-mm B-4 howitzer During the "winter war" with Finland in 1940, Soviet troops for the first time used large-caliber artillery to break through heavily fortified enemy defenses. The "Mannerheim Line" was a continuous row of reinforced concrete structures, in

305-mm howitzer Br-18 In 1937, the Soviet military delegation visited the Skoda factory in Czechoslovakia. The purpose of the visit was to acquire documentation and prototypes of high-capacity artillery systems for their subsequent production at Soviet factories. Attention

105-mm howitzer M2A1 Entering the First World War, the United States did not have its own artillery systems, but they learned a lot from their allies England and France. The French 75-mm gun of the 1897 model made a particularly strong impression on the US military.

203-mm howitzer M1 (M115) The United States entered the First World War under its curtain, in 1917. The American troops that arrived in France were heavily armed with British eight-inch howitzers Mk VII and Mk VIII, which at that time were being manufactured in America for British orders.

105-mm howitzer "type 91" In the early 30s, Japan lagged behind European countries in terms of the number of howitzers in infantry divisions. If in the French artillery regiment there were 40% of howitzers, then in the Japanese - only 23%. In 1931, in Manchuria, some divisions of Japan were

150-mm howitzer "TYPE 96" The Japanese Imperial Army began to equip modern views weapons at the beginning of the 20th century, and it was during this period that heavy artillery appeared in the country. In total, before the start of World War II, Japan had three types of 150 mm howitzers,

122-mm howitzer D-30 The 122-mm howitzer D-30 (2A18) for the first time in the USSR was equipped with a rotating upper machine carriage, providing horizontal guidance of the gun within 360 °. One of the frames was rigidly welded to the branch pipe of the lower machine, and the other two were hinged to it. IN

152-mm howitzer "Msta-B" In 1986, the 2A65 "Msta-B" towed howitzer, which was cheap to manufacture, simple and easy to operate, replaced the 152-mm D-20 cannon-howitzer of the 1954 model. "Msta-B" was developed in the design bureau of the production association "Barricades" simultaneously with the 152-mm

155-mm howitzer M198 The use of towed artillery in difficult climatic conditions Vietnam was the reason for the order for american army 155-mm howitzer, superior in range and rate of fire to the M114A-1 howitzer. The new weapon was intended for

122 mm howitzer mod. 1909/37 A little does not mean unimportantForewordDuring the Great Patriotic War, the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1909/37 was the third most important divisional howitzer after the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938 (M-30) and 122-mm howitzers mod. 1910/30.6 With the latter, she had

152-mm howitzer M-10 in battle Artillery regiment AKKUKS and its successors G.F. Odintsov, commander of the AP AKKUKS from June to October 1941. The history of the front-line service of howitzer artillery regiments rarely contains bright episodes. Shooting from closed positions, redeployment and losses in

The artillery of Russia and the world, along with other states, has introduced the most significant innovations - the transformation of a smooth-bore gun loaded from the muzzle into a rifled one loaded from the breech (lock). The use of streamlined projectiles and various types of fuses with an adjustable setting for the response time; more powerful gunpowders, such as cordite, which appeared in Britain before the First World War; the development of rolling systems, which made it possible to increase the rate of fire and relieved the gun crew from the hard work of rolling into the firing position after each shot; connection in one assembly of the projectile, propellant charge and fuse; the use of shrapnel shells, after the explosion, scattering small steel particles in all directions.

Russian artillery, capable of firing large projectiles, sharply highlighted the problem of weapon durability. In 1854, during the Crimean War, Sir William Armstrong, a British hydraulic engineer, proposed the wrought iron gun barrel method of first twisting iron bars and then welding them together by forging. The gun barrel was additionally strengthened with wrought iron rings. Armstrong set up a business that made guns of several sizes. One of the most famous was his 12-pounder rifled gun with a 7.6 cm (3 in) bore and a screw lock mechanism.

Artillery of the Second World War (WWII), in particular Soviet Union, probably had the largest potential among the European armies. At the same time, the Red Army experienced the purges of Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin and endured the difficult Winter War with Finland at the end of the decade. During this period, Soviet design bureaus took a conservative approach to technology.
The first modernization effort came with the improvement of the 76.2 mm M00/02 field gun in 1930, which included improved ammunition and the replacement of barrels for parts of the gun fleet, new version the guns were named M02/30. Six years later, the 76.2 mm M1936 field gun appeared, with a carriage from the 107 mm.

Heavy artilleryof all armies, and rather rare materials from the time of Hitler's blitzkrieg, whose army smoothly and without delay crossed the Polish border. german army was the most modern and best equipped army in the world. Wehrmacht artillery operated in close cooperation with infantry and aviation, trying to quickly occupy the territory and deprive the Polish army of communication lines. The world shuddered upon learning of a new armed conflict in Europe.

Artillery of the USSR in the positional conduct of hostilities on the Western Front in the last war and the horror in the trenches of the military leaders of some countries created new priorities in the tactics of using artillery. They believed that in the second global conflict of the 20th century, mobile firepower and accuracy of fire.

	A mixed battery of 305-mm howitzers on railway transporters is prepared for transfer to a new firing position

The Mk1 transporters, on which the 305-mm howitzers Mk1 and MkZ were installed, in principle allowed circular firing, but due to their insufficient stability when firing across the rail track, instructions on combat use 305-mm railway artillery installations were ordered to shoot along the railway track with a horizontal aiming angle of no more than 20 ° in both directions.

In practice, this meant the need in some cases to build additional railways, which was not always feasible in front-line conditions. Therefore, before the company Elswick Ordnance Co. the task was to create a 305-mm railway artillery mount, really capable of conducting circular fire in the entire range of gun elevation angles.
The company completed the task in 1917, submitting for testing a 305-mm Mk5 howitzer on the Mk3 railway transporter.
The Mk5 howitzer was developed on the basis of the Mk3 howitzer and had the same barrel length. In the bore of its barrel, a cut with a modified profile was made, which somewhat improved the ballistic characteristics.
In order to reduce the mass of the howitzer, its breech was reduced, and recoil devices of a new design were installed to more effectively dampen the recoil energy.
The MkZ railway transporter was in many ways similar to the Mk2 transporter for the Mk10 and Mk10 guns. To ensure circular firing on both sides, there were outriggers and folding supports with wide coulters, it was also envisaged to use rail grips and steel ropes to fix vehicles in a firing position.
However, the installation did not provide 360 ​​° firing - it was quite stable when firing with horizontal aiming angles of 120 ° on both sides of the longitudinal axis of the conveyor. As the experience of using the installation in real combat conditions showed, this aiming range turned out to be sufficient for solving most combat missions, and the military removed their requirement for a circular fire.
The range of vertical aiming angles, which ensures the stability of the installation, included angles from +20° to +60°. When using reduced charges, it was allowed to shoot with vertical aiming angles of less than + 20 °.

Shooting was carried out with high-explosive shells weighing 340.2 kg. At initial speed projectile 447 m / s, the firing range was 13120 m.
Elswick Ordnance Co. produced the Mk5 howitzer on the MkZ conveyor since 1917 instead of the MkZ howitzer on the Mk2 conveyor.
The total number of railway artillery installations was 35. They were used in the battles of the First World War, and during the Second World War they were used as coastal defense guns on east coast England.

During the assault on fortresses and in street battles, even aviation could not compete with them

Photo and film frames depicting the battles of the Great Patriotic War very often show Soviet large-caliber guns and howitzers hitting the enemy. That is why an ignorant person may get the impression that there is nothing to do with anything, and the Red Army had no problems with heavy artillery throughout the entire confrontation with the Wehrmacht. This, however, is far from being the case.

I have more than once had occasion to talk about a number of negative aspects in the activities of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. But nothing can be done, we will have to recall again one “innovation” supported by him, which entailed a very sad consequences for the Red Army.

PARADOXES REQUIRE EXPLANATION

In my opinion, if Finnish historians were objective in assessing the Winter War of 1939-1940, then a monument to Tukhachevsky with the inscription: "Savior of Finland" would have been erected in the center of Helsinki for a long time. But Suomi is still confident that the "empire of Stalin" could not defeat its northwestern neighbor thanks to the genius of the great commander Marshal Karl-Gustav Mannerheim and the exceptional courage of the Finnish soldiers.

But how then to explain the two phenomena? Firstly, three months before the start of the Winter War, the Red Army defeated the Japanese troops on the Khalkhin Gol River. The losses of our and Japanese troops amounted to 6515 and 25,000 people, respectively. But in the Winter War, the Red Army lost only 71,214 people killed, and the Finns - 48,243 people. I note that in the battles at Khalkhin Gol, Japanese aircraft and tanks took part one and a half times more than there were in the entire Finnish army in 1939-1940.

Moreover, the training and armament of the Finnish infantry were much worse than the Japanese. On the readiness for self-sacrifice and the ability to lead hand-to-hand combat and you don't have to speak. Finally, the Finns had not fought with anyone for 20 years, and most of the soldiers were called up from the reserve, and units that had fought in China for many years fought on Khalkhin Gol.

Other figures are even more paradoxical: in 1939-1940, Soviet divisions managed to advance from the border to Vyborg in 2.5 months, and in June 1944 - in 11 days! That is, our troops in the 44th moved seven times faster. At the same time, during the Winter War, Finland and the USSR fought one on one, and in June 1944 the Red Army fought on a 3,000-kilometer front from the Barents to the Black Sea. And almost simultaneously with the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, the grand operation "Bagration" began in Belarus.

How can such paradoxes be explained? No doubt, the command of the Red Army in the Winter War made a lot of mistakes. But definitely main reason The failures of the Red Army were the lack of artillery systems capable of coping with Finnish “millionaire” pillboxes (one million Finnish marks were spent on building one) on the Mannerheim line.

The 203-mm B-4 howitzer, the most powerful Soviet artillery system put into service at the beginning of the war between the USSR and Finland, could penetrate the wall of such a fort only if two of its shells hit the same point. True, the Red Army also had a 305-mm cannon of the 1915 model. The weight of her projectile was 377 kg versus 100 kg for the B-4. However, for completely incomprehensible reasons, 30 quite combat-ready 305-mm howitzers stood idle throughout the war in the Belarusian military district.

Why, then, in the USSR in the 20-30s it was not possible to create a single weapon of special power (OM)? To begin with, by January 1, 1918, the Obukhov plant produced the first batch of four 406-mm howitzers with a projectile weight of 883 kg. Their readiness ranged from 75 to 35 percent.

In the Archives of the National Economy, I studied a plump volume of correspondence from the beginning of the 1920s, devoted to one question: to finish howitzers or not. In the end, someone ordered them to be scrapped ...

In 1931, the Art Administration issued two tasks: KB-2, where German engineers from the Rheinmetall company worked, to design a 305-mm howitzer on a conventional carriage, and the Bolshevik plant - a triplex (400-mm mortars, 305-mm howitzers and 203-mm collapsible cannons, transported on tracked carts). In addition, the engineer of the Bolshevik plant Chernyavsky, on his own initiative, prepared a project for a triplex (400-mm mortar, 305-mm howitzer and 203-mm cannon on a conventional carriage). In 1932, the Art Administration reviewed all the projects, and at the AU plenum a decision was made to “approve the design of the combined system 400/305/203-mm of the Bolshevik plant for further development and production of a prototype, and reject the other two projects of KB-2 and engineer Chernyavsky.”

Needless to say, if in 1931-1932 full-scale work began on the project of the Art Administration or Chernyavsky, then by 1939 the Red Army would have received several dozen guns of special power. New 305-mm howitzers and 400-mm mortars would have smashed the Finnish “millionaires” pillboxes to smithereens in a week, the outcome of the Winter War would have been completely different both militarily and politically.

INCOMPETENCE PLUS FALSIFICATION

However, Tukhachevsky and Co., due to their incompetence, completely thwarted all plans for creating artillery of special power. At first, these figures demanded that the new guns fired beltless projectiles, that is, polygonal, rifled or sub-caliber. Dozens of the most exotic ammunition of all three types were tested in calibers from 203 to 368 mm.

It is easy to object: the development of science and technology is impossible without mistakes and delusions. Holy truth! But most of these errors and misconceptions are revealed at the stage of preliminary design, at various technical meetings and councils. However, Deputy People's Commissar for Armaments M.N. Tukhachevsky (education - infantry school), Deputy People's Commissar of Heavy Industry and Head of the Main Mobilization Directorate I.P. Pavlunovsky (three classes of the parochial school), People's Commissar of Heavy Industry S. Ordzhonikidze (a half-educated paramedic) patronized technical adventurers such as Kurchevsky and Bekauri.

If at councils and meetings honest experts pointed out the unreality and absurdity of the projects, then they were immediately labeled “enemy of the people”. The test results of prototype guns were falsified, often the tests were not carried out completely at all. So, at least 20 samples of the Kurchevsky dynamo-reactive gun were launched into a series without a full set of tests - factory, range and military.

A typical example: all types of beltless projectiles, which were continuously tested in the USSR from 1920 to 1938, were tested on the Volkovo field near St. Petersburg as early as 1865-1875. I have personally read hundreds of reports of such trials from both the 19th and 20th centuries. And if we discard falsifications, then the result is completely identical. Why was it necessary to spend hundreds of millions of people's rubles without first eliminating a single incurable disease of polygonal, sub-caliber, rifled and other beltless shells?

By the way, sub-caliber shells were intended for ultra-long range shooting, and no one even thought about anti-tank sub-caliber shells until the Germans at the end of 1941 used them at the front. And one more interesting fact: I was not the first to discover the identity of the tests of 1920-1938 and 1865-1875, but one smart artilleryman, who sent a detailed report on these amazing coincidences to the People's Commissar of Defense at the end of 1937, and a copy to the NKVD.

In 1934, Tukhachevsky and Co. demanded that all new weapons of special power be mounted on one self-propelled gun. Shooting was also to be carried out from it. The self-propelled gun itself existed only in the inflamed heads of the designers.

At the conference of the Artistic Directorate in December 1934, projects of a 203-mm cannon and a 305-mm self-propelled howitzer were considered. Two independent projects of the latter were developed by the Bolshevik plant and the experimental plant named after. Kirov.

In the end, it turned out that the weight of the system reached 106 tons, and the length exceeded 12 meters. Dimensions did not allow transporting the self-propelled gun along railway, the vast majority of bridges could not withstand its mass. If he was stuck off the road, there would be nothing to pull him out ...

Only after the elimination of Tukhachevsky, work on the creation of OM guns went in full swing, and in order to scare the bureaucrats and hacks, they were given the name "Stalin's Order".

In the summer of 1937, a commission of prominent Soviet artillerymen visited the Skoda plant in Czechoslovakia. There, she was presented with samples of a 210-mm cannon and a 305-mm howitzer. The gun barrel was lined, and the howitzers were fastened. The shutters of both systems are wedge horizontal, loading is separate-sleeve. I can’t resist the author’s remark: on the report of the commission, some fool from the Artillery Directorate emphasized “separate-sleeve loading” and wrote in a sweeping manner: “This is a minus - you need a cap.”

The fact is that all German artillery systems, including those of special power, even the 800-mm Dora gun, were case-loaded.

Because of these rag caps, the production of Soviet analogues - 210-mm Br-17 guns and 305-mm Br-18 howitzers was delayed for almost a year. Wedge gates had to be changed to piston ones, etc. I note that if the caps did give some penny savings, then the OM guns were obviously piecework - well, 20, well, 30 units and the funds spent on reworking the guns did not pay off in any way by savings in the production of caps.

At the end of 1939 - 1940, design began and purely domestic systems: 450 mm Br-23 howitzers and 500 mm howitzers with a shell weight of 1060-1500 kg. Both systems were collapsible: wagons weighing 20-26 tons were transported behind tractors at a speed of 25-30 km / h.

TO THE SUMMER OF 1941

But alas, the war wait did not wish. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the special power artillery of the RVGK included the 281st howitzer artillery regiment OM (30 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model), stationed in the Oryol Military District, 15 separate divisions and two separate batteries (305-mm howitzers, 280-mm mortars), as well as one (524th) heavy cannon artillery regiment (24 152-mm Br-2 cannons), 1st and 6th separate heavy cannon batteries (two 152-mm Br-2 cannons each). The RVGK also had at its disposal high-power artillery - 33 regiments armed with 792 203-mm B-4 howitzers.

On June 22, 1941, the Red Army had 25 280-mm Schneider mortars of the 1915 model and 47 280-mm Br-5 mortars. 280-mm 48 mortars were in service with eight separate artillery battalions of special power. Another 24 mortars and four 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model were in warehouses, factories and training grounds.

It should be noted that the shells for the 280-mm mortars of Schneider and Br-5 were the same, but the charges were different. The shells were only of the old type, that is, of a short-range form. By June 1941, there were about 7 thousand 280-mm shells and 7.5 thousand 305-mm shells for howitzers of the 1915 model.

By June 1941, almost all combat-ready artillery units of large and special power were concentrated in our western districts. In total, these units had 517 203-mm B-4 howitzers, 17 280-mm Schneider mortars and 39 280-mm B-5 mortars.

Interestingly, the Navy also had 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model. They were armed with four-gun battery No. 911 near Vladivostok. For her, the fleet had 1788 high-explosive 305-mm howitzer shells.

It is impossible not to mention such a curious fact here. In the 1920s and 1930s, the army command carried out experimental firing from 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model with shells from 305-mm ship cannons. As a result, Tables were created for firing naval shells of the 1907 model and the 1911 model of the year from a 305-mm howitzer. A special reduced charge was selected for it: for the 1907 sample projectile - 28.46 kg, and for the 1911 sample projectile - 24.3 kg of tape powder.

LIVING MYTH

The author does not accidentally give boring data on shells. Unfortunately, in the domestic military-historical literature, there has long been talk of a shortage of ammunition both in the Red Army and in the USSR Navy. In fact, during the entire war, the fleet did not fire even a third of shells from 130-mm to 406-mm caliber from shared resource and in the OM artillery there was always an excess of ammunition. Another thing is that they were not delivered on time to units due to the sloppiness of individual military leaders.

And let's be honest - we had a surplus of incompetent generals. Yes, in Finnish war orders were given to conduct "harassing fire" on the roads from 280-mm Schneider mortars, and to the Great Patriotic war- shoot from long-range guns: "Fire in the direction of the enemy until the shells are completely used up." And this is not a quote from Suvorov-Rezun, but from top secret documents.

The volume of the article does not allow talking about the lack of artillery tractors and their wretched technical condition. As a result, precisely because of the lack of vehicles and only in rare cases due to enemy influence during the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, 75 203-mm and nine 280-mm howitzers were lost. In this regard, in August 1941, a decision was made to send all OM guns to the deep rear. The production of guns of special power was practically stopped, and ammunition for them was significantly reduced.

REPLENISHMENTS

Information about the availability and production of tanks, aircraft and field guns ceased to be a secret back in the Brezhnev era, but data on OM artillery has not yet been published. Therefore, I venture to tire the reader with a table.

In August 1944, two artillery battalions of special power were formed as part of the RVGK artillery. Each of them was armed with four 211-mm captured mortars (21 cm Mrs.18). Unlike our 203-mm howitzers, they were not caterpillar, but wheeled and were much more mobile. However, the best assessment of the 21-cm mortar is that our generals attributed it to systems of special power, and B-4 - to systems of high power. In addition, Mrs.18 in combat position was much lighter than the B-4.

In December 1944, on the basis of four separate divisions of 152-mm Br-2 guns and four separate batteries of 210-mm Br-17 guns, three individual regiment special power (18th Guards, 1st and 2nd). Each of them consisted of three twin-gun batteries Br-2 and one twin-gun battery of 210-mm guns. By the end of 1944, these regiments left for the front.

In total, by 1944, the Red Army had nine 210-mm Br-17 guns. They were brought to combat readiness precisely in 1944. At the same time, the Firing Tables were published for them for the first time and 4.2 thousand 210-mm shells were produced. It is curious that in the first half of 1945, 210-mm shells were not produced.

Only three 305-mm howitzers of the 1939 model (Br-18) were manufactured. They went to the formation of the 233rd separate artillery division of special power, which was at the end of the war in the Moscow Military District. Apparently, these guns were incapacitated.

In 1944-1945, 16 captured 211-mm K.38 guns were included in the artillery of special power. (Perhaps this is what our generals called other types of 21-cm German guns.) These guns fired 120-kg projectiles at a range of 33.9 km. The weight of the K.38 in the stowed position is 25.3 tons. The system in the stowed position was transported on three wagons.

Four separate OM artillery battalions were armed with 211 mm K.38 guns. Each of them had four guns. Moreover, two OAD OM did not get to the front.

COMBAT EXAMPLES

The intensity of the use of weapons of special power in combat conditions is best evidenced by the consumption of shells. So, during the entire war, 39.4 thousand shells for Br-2 guns were used (including lost). Of these, 8.1 thousand - in 1943, 9.9 thousand - in 1944 and 6.4 thousand - in 1945.

The first thousand 280-mm shells were used up in 1943, another 4.7 thousand in 1944 and 8.45 thousand in 1945.

305-mm howitzers were used for the first time after 1917 in battles on the Karelian Isthmus in June 1944. Five divisions of OM were deployed there, armed with 280-mm Br-5 mortars and 305-mm howitzers. In June 1944, about five hundred 305-mm howitzer shells were used up on the Karelian Isthmus.

As a result, it took only 11 days to break through the Mannerheim Line and reach Vyborg. The case was decided by 305-mm howitzers and the fire of guns of the Baltic Fleet, as well as heavy tanks KV and Churchill.

OM artillery turned out to be extremely effective in the assault on cities converted by the Nazis into fortresses - Berlin, Poznan. Our superguns especially distinguished themselves during the capture of Koenigsberg, which, back in the First World War, was the most powerful fortress of the German Empire.

I note that the fortifications of the capital of East Prussia turned out to be so powerful that it was not always possible to penetrate them even with 280-mm and 305-mm shells. So, the OM division of Lieutenant Colonel S. S. Maltsev (six 280-mm Br-5 mortars) fired at Fort No. V. 73 280-mm concrete-piercing shells hit it, but there were only two through holes. Nevertheless, by 12 noon on April 6, the fort ceased return fire.

The action of the 203-mm B-4 howitzers and 122-mm A-19 guns on the forts turned out to be ineffective. Thus, 120 203-mm shells and 240 122-mm shells were fired at Fort No. IV. The result is potholes in brick and concrete walls.

For more than a day, the 329th OM artillery division (six 305-mm howitzers) fired at Fort No. VIII. 78 hits recorded. However, there were only five through holes. At the same time, only the right caponier of the fortification was completely destroyed.

The facts from the reports on the capture of Koenigsberg may raise doubts about the effectiveness of someone Soviet artillery OM. But here it is worth recalling that the same German artillery in 1941-1943 showed similar results.

So, for the entire siege of Leningrad, the 305-mm tower installations of the Krasnaya Gorka fort never failed, although the Germans fired hundreds of heavy shells at them. In Sevastopol, the tower installations of batteries No. 30 and No. 35 for eight months withstood the fire of German guns of all calibers and the blows of the Luftwaffe. The Germans managed to put the towers out of action with the help of two-ton shells of 615-mm mortars.

Needless to say, the very first shells of Soviet 450-500-mm howitzers would have destroyed the Königsberg forts. But alas, as already mentioned, all these howitzers remained in the project or in prototypes. Nevertheless, the available OM artillery made a huge contribution to the capture of Koenigsberg and saved the lives of thousands of Soviet soldiers.

During the Berlin operation, in the breakthrough areas, guns of large and special power of the RVGK were again successfully used. So, for example, in the 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front there was the 1st OM cannon regiment (two 210-mm Br-17 cannons and six 152-mm Br-5 cannons), the 34th OAD OM (six 280-mm mortars Br-5) and the 322nd OAD OM (six 305-mm howitzers).

Second World War confirmed that howitzers and mortars of special power are the most effective in assaulting reinforced concrete fortifications, as well as in street battles in cities with large stone houses. In this, even aviation could not compete with them, at least until the adoption of guided bombs.

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