But the main thing is that Napoleon lost as a result. Small "Great Army". Why didn't Napoleon win Borodino? Bonaparte had no allies in the war against Russia

Let's talk today about such a topic as the size of Napoleon's army. I will not give any special calculations. I'll just look at everything known facts from point of view common sense. All quotes will be from Wiki. The numbers are approximate, because historians themselves are still arguing about them. The main thing is their order.

So: Napoleon concentrated his main forces in 3 groups, which, according to the plan, were supposed to encircle and destroy piece by piece the armies of Barclay and Bagration. The left (218 thousand people) was headed by Napoleon himself, the central (82 thousand people) - his stepson, Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais, the right (78 thousand people) - younger brother in the Bonaparte family, King of Westphalia Jerome Bonaparte. In addition to the main forces, Jacques MacDonald's corps of 32.5 thousand people was positioned against Wittgenstein on the left flank. , and in the south - on the right flank - the allied corps of Karl Schwarzenberg, numbering 34 thousand people.

In total, the main military operations against our army were carried out by 3 groups with a total number of 378 thousand people.

Our strengths: The blow of Napoleon's army was taken upon the troops stationed on western border: 1st Army of Barclay de Tolly and 2nd Army of Bagration, a total of 153 thousand soldiers and 758 guns. Even further south in Volyn (northwest of present-day Ukraine) was located the 3rd Army of Tormasov (up to 45 thousand, 168 guns), which served as a barrier from Austria. In Moldova, the Danube Army of Admiral Chichagov (55 thousand, 202 guns) stood against Turkey. In Finland, the corps of the Russian General Shteingel (19 thousand, 102 guns) stood against Sweden. In the Riga area there was a separate Essen corps (up to 18 thousand), up to 4 reserve corps were located further from the border. According to the lists, the irregular Cossack troops numbered 117 thousand light cavalry, but in reality 20–25 thousand Cossacks took part in the war.

On our side, there were about 153 thousand people at the forefront of the main attack.

Let's not get distracted by minor skirmishes and go straight to Borodino: On August 26 (September 7) the largest battle took place near the village of Borodino (125 km west of Moscow). Patriotic War 1812 between the Russian and French armies. The numbers of the armies were comparable - 130–135 thousand for Napoleon versus 110–130 thousand for Kutuzov.

And here there are immediate mismatches. Everything is fine on our side. There were 153 left, 110-130 left, plus or minus back and forth, a trip from the border, small battles with the French, sick people, stragglers, accidents and all that. Everything is within the limits of logic.

But with the French it’s not like that. At first there were 378, but only 135 arrived in Moscow. No, of course, the French also had losses, and not small ones. And they had nowhere to get replacements from. And garrisons had to be left in the cities. But somehow this doesn’t fit into the 243 thousand people, there’s a difference.

Moreover, it was the decisive battle in this war. Napoleon himself craved it as much as he could. The French should have attacked by default. And now any schoolchild knows that this requires, first of all, numerical superiority. But it was practically not there. Despite the fact that an extra 50 thousand would solve all the problems of the French without question.

Go ahead. We all know that during the battle Napoleon never brought his last reserve into battle - the old guard. But this could decide the course of the battle and the entire war. What was he afraid of? After all, even according to the most pessimistic calculations, he still had at least 100 thousand people in his reserves. Or maybe, in fact, the old guard was his last reserve? Napoleon failed to win at Borodino.

After a bloody 12-hour battle, the French, at the cost of 30 - 34 thousand killed and wounded, pushed back the left flank and center of the Russian positions, but were unable to develop the offensive. The Russian army also suffered heavy losses (40 - 45 thousand killed and wounded). There were almost no prisoners on either side. On September 8, Kutuzov ordered a retreat to Mozhaisk with the firm intention of preserving the army.

And here the numbers don’t add up. Logically, the losses of the attacking side should be at least equal to the losses of the defending side. And taking into account the fact that Napoleon failed to defeat the Russian army, his losses should be greater than ours.

Go ahead. Ours left Moscow and retreated to the south. Napoleon stayed in Moscow for more than a month. Why didn’t any reinforcements come to him during this time? Again, where are these 243 thousand people who could decide the course of the war?

The French army was literally melting before our eyes. It got to the point that they simply couldn’t even overthrow Miloradovich near Tarutino. They no longer had the strength to do so. This is evidenced by the very fact of retreat from Moscow. In the end, it was possible to make a breakthrough to the North. Moreover, back in September, when the weather was relatively good and the French still had strength. And there, in the north, there are many rich cities that were practically not covered by troops. After all, there is St. Petersburg, the capital of the Empire. A rich city with large supplies of food. But apparently there was no strength at all.

According to the Prussian official Auerswald, by December 21, 1812, 255 generals, 5,111 officers, 26,950 lower ranks had passed through East Prussia from the Great Army, “all in a very pitiful condition.” To these 30 thousand must be added approximately 6 thousand soldiers (returned to the French army) from the corps of General Rainier and Marshal MacDonald, operating in the northern and southern directions. Many of those who returned to Königsberg, according to Count Segur, died of illness upon reaching safe territory.

If you take out the 243 thousand difference that I mentioned above, then everything fits together. 135 thousand at Borodino, minus losses of 40-45 thousand, minus deserters, minus those killed in battles during the retreat from Moscow, minus those who simply froze and died of hunger, prisoners, minus secret weapon in the form of Russian partisans, this is how these 36 thousand people turn out. All in all general forces At first, Napoleon probably numbered no more than 200 thousand people. Moreover, in all directions, when joining Russia. This is evidenced by Napoleon’s persistent desire to win the war during one general battle and, preferably, on the border. He didn’t have the strength for a protracted company, he didn’t. And his entire campaign is essentially an adventure.

There is nothing complicated in these calculations. Everything is within the limits of common sense.

In fact, the same thing is written on Wiki: There is evidence (in particular, General Berthesen (French) Russian) that the actual strength of the 1st line of the Grand Army was only about half of its payroll, that is, no more than 235 thousand people, and that the commanders when submitting reports hid the true composition of their units. It is noteworthy that the Russian intelligence data of that time also gave this number.

So I essentially didn’t write anything new.

The size of the Napoleonic army when moving into Russia (beige) and back ( black stripes). The width of the stripes reflects the size of the army. The bottom of the graph shows the behavior of air temperature on the Reaumur scale after the exit of the Grand Army from Moscow (from right to left), Charles Minard, 1869

If you look at this diagram of the decrease in the number of Napoleon’s “Grand Army” as it moves from the border towards Moscow and back, then with great surprise it is not difficult to notice that such a great event as battle of Borodino did not greatly affect its quantity! It turns out that most of Napoleonic soldiers and officers of the “twelve pagans” really disappeared somewhere on the road to Moscow, which came during the warm and nourishing summer months, and this happened even before the Battle of Smolensk, on the territory of present-day Lithuania and Belarus, in the very first weeks of the war. Let us note one more interesting thing for investigators: historical mysteries moment: on the way back of Napoleon’s army, already from Moscow towards the border, the battle for Maloyaroslavets had almost no effect on the size of Napoleon’s army (in contrast to the clearly visible real defeat on the Berezina), but most of the remnants of the “Great Army” were somewhere “ disappeared” on the way from Maloyaroslavets to Smolensk, when the winter cold was not yet so severe and the air temperature was only slightly below (or even above) zero.

“The RUSSIANS HAVE THE GLORY OF BEING UNDEFEATED”

After the battle of Smolensk, the retreat of the Russian army continued. This caused open discontent in the country. Under pressure public opinion, Alexander I appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian army. Kutuzov’s task was not only to stop Napoleon’s further advance, but also to expel him from Russian borders. He also adhered to retreat tactics, but the army and the whole country expected a decisive battle from him. Therefore, he gave the order to look for a position for a general battle, which was found near the village. Borodino, 124 kilometers from Moscow.

The Russian army approached the village of Borodino on August 22, where, at the suggestion of Colonel K.F. Tolya, a flat position with a length of up to 8 km was chosen. On the left flank, the Borodino field was covered by the impenetrable Utitsky forest, and on the right, which ran along the bank of the river. Kolochi, Maslovsky flashes were erected - arrow-shaped earthen fortifications. In the center of the position, fortifications were also built, which received different names: Central, Kurgan Heights, or Raevsky’s battery. Semenov's (Bagration's) flushes were erected on the left flank. Ahead of the entire position, on the left flank, near the village of Shevardino, a redoubt also began to be built, which was supposed to play the role of a forward fortification. However, the approaching army of Napoleon, after a fierce battle on August 24, managed to take possession of it.

Disposition of Russian troops. The right flank was occupied battle formations 1st Western Army of General M.B. Barclay de Tolly, on the left flank there were units of the 2nd Western Army under the command of P.I. Bagration, and the Old Smolensk Road near the village of Utitsa was covered by the 3rd Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General N.A. Tuchkova. Russian troops occupied a defensive position and were deployed in the shape of the letter "G". This situation was explained by the fact that the Russian command sought to control the Old and New Smolensk roads leading to Moscow, especially since there was a serious fear of the enemy’s outflanking movement from the right. That is why a significant part of the corps of the 1st Army was in this direction. Napoleon decided to deliver his main blow to the left flank of the Russian army, for which on the night of August 26 (September 7), 1812, he transferred the main forces across the river. I pound, leaving only a few cavalry and infantry units to cover my own left flank.

The battle begins. The battle began at five o'clock in the morning with an attack by units of the corps of the Viceroy of Italy E. Beauharnais on the position of the Life Guards Jaeger Regiment near the village. Borodin. The French took possession of this point, but this was their diversionary maneuver. Napoleon launched his main blow against Bagration's army. Marshal Corps L.N. Davout, M. Ney, I. Murat and General A. Junot were attacked several times by Semenov flushes. Units of the 2nd Army fought heroically against an enemy superior in numbers. The French repeatedly rushed into flushes, but each time they abandoned them after a counterattack. Only by nine o'clock did Napoleon's armies finally capture the fortifications of the Russian left flank, and Bagration, who at that time tried to organize another counterattack, was mortally wounded. “The soul seemed to fly away from the entire left flank after the death of this man,” witnesses tell us. Furious rage and a thirst for revenge took possession of those soldiers who were directly in his environment. When the general was already being carried away, cuirassier Adrianov, who served him during the battle (giving him a telescope, etc.), ran up to the stretcher and said: “Your Excellency, they are taking you to treatment, you no longer need me!” Then, eyewitnesses report, “Adrianov, in sight of thousands, took off like an arrow, instantly crashed into the ranks of the enemy and, having hit many, fell dead.”

The fight for Raevsky's battery. After the capture of the flushes, the main struggle unfolded for the center of the Russian position - the Raevsky battery, which at 9 and 11 a.m. was subjected to two strong enemy attacks. During the second attack, E. Beauharnais' troops managed to capture the heights, but soon the French were driven out of there as a result of a successful counterattack by several Russian battalions led by Major General A.P. Ermolov.

At noon, Kutuzov sent the Cossacks cavalry general M.I. Platov and the cavalry corps of Adjutant General F.P. Uvarov to the rear of Napoleon's left flank. The Russian cavalry raid made it possible to divert Napoleon's attention and delayed a new French assault on the weakened Russian center for several hours. Taking advantage of the respite, Barclay de Tolly regrouped his forces and sent fresh troops to the front line. Only at two o'clock in the afternoon did Napoleonic units make a third attempt to capture Raevsky's battery. The actions of Napoleonic infantry and cavalry led to success, and soon the French finally captured this fortification. The wounded Major General P.G., who led the defense, was captured by them. Likhachev. The Russian troops retreated, but the enemy was unable to break through the new front of their defense, despite all the efforts of two cavalry corps.

Results of the battle. The French were able to achieve tactical successes in all main directions - the Russian armies were forced to leave their original positions and retreat about 1 km. But Napoleonic units failed to break through the defenses of the Russian troops. The thinned Russian regiments stood to the death, ready to repel new attacks. Napoleon, despite the urgent requests of his marshals, did not dare to throw in his last reserve - the twenty thousandth Old Guard - for the final blow. Intense artillery fire continued until the evening, and then the French units were withdrawn to their original lines. It was not possible to defeat the Russian army. This is what the domestic historian E.V. wrote. Tarle: “The feeling of victory was absolutely not felt by anyone. The marshals were talking among themselves and were unhappy. Murat said that he did not recognize the emperor all day, Ney said that the emperor had forgotten his craft. On both sides, artillery thundered until the evening and bloodshed continued, but the Russians did not think not only of fleeing, but also of retreating. It was already getting very dark. A light rain began to fall. “What are the Russians?” - asked Napoleon. - “They are standing still, Your Majesty.” “Increase the fire, it means they still want it,” the emperor ordered. - Give them more!

Gloomy, not talking to anyone, accompanied by his retinue and generals who did not dare to interrupt his silence, Napoleon drove around the battlefield in the evening, looking with sore eyes at the endless piles of corpses. The emperor did not yet know in the evening that the Russians had lost not 30 thousand, but about 58 thousand people out of their 112 thousand; He also did not know that he himself had lost more than 50 thousand of the 130 thousand that he led to the Borodino field. But that he had killed and seriously wounded 47 (not 43, as they sometimes write, but 47) of his best generals, he learned this in the evening. French and Russian corpses covered the ground so thickly that the imperial horse had to look for a place to put its hoof between the mountains of bodies of people and horses. The groans and cries of the wounded came from all over the field. The Russian wounded amazed the retinue: “They did not emit a single groan,” writes one of the retinue, Count Segur, “perhaps, away from their own, they counted less on mercy. But it is true that they seemed more steadfast in enduring pain than the French.”

The literature contains the most contradictory facts about the losses of the parties; the question of the winner is still controversial. In this regard, it should be noted that none of the opponents solved the tasks set for themselves: Napoleon failed to defeat the Russian army, Kutuzov failed to defend Moscow. However, the enormous efforts made by the French army were ultimately fruitless. Borodino brought Napoleon bitter disappointment - the outcome of this battle was in no way reminiscent of Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland. The bloodless French army was unable to pursue the enemy. The Russian army, fighting on its territory, was able to restore the size of its ranks in a short time. Therefore, in assessing this battle, Napoleon himself was most accurate, saying: “Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory. And the Russians have gained the glory of being undefeated.”

RESCRIPT OF ALEXANDER I

“Mikhail Illarionovich! The current state of military circumstances of our active armies, although it was preceded by initial successes, the consequences of these do not reveal to me the rapid activity with which it would be necessary to act to defeat the enemy.

Considering these consequences and extracting the true reasons for this, I find it necessary to appoint over all active armies one general commander-in-chief, whose election, in addition to military talents, would be based on seniority itself.

Your well-known merits, love for the fatherland and repeated experiences of excellent feats acquire you a true right to this power of attorney of mine.

In choosing you for this important task, I ask almighty God to bless your deeds to glory Russian weapons and may the happy hopes that the fatherland places on you be justified.”

KUTUZOV'S REPORT

“The battle of the 26th was the bloodiest of all those in modern times known. We completely won the battlefield, and the enemy then retreated to the position where he came to attack us; but an extraordinary loss on our part, especially due to the fact that the most necessary generals were wounded, forced me to retreat along the Moscow road. Today I am in the village of Nara and must retreat further to meet the troops coming to me from Moscow for reinforcements. The prisoners say that the enemy loss is very great and that the general opinion in the French army is that they lost 40,000 people wounded and killed. In addition to Divisional General Bonami, who was captured, there were others killed. By the way, Davoust is wounded. Rearguard action occurs daily. Now, I learned that the corps of the Viceroy of Italy is located near Ruza, and for this purpose the detachment of the Adjutant General Wintzingerode went to Zvenigorod in order to close Moscow along that road.”

FROM CAULAINCUR'S MEMOIRS

“Never before have we lost so many generals and officers in one battle... There were few prisoners. The Russians showed great courage; the fortifications and territory which they were forced to cede to us were evacuated in order. Their ranks were not disorganized... they faced death bravely and only slowly succumbed to our brave attacks. There has never been a case where enemy positions were subjected to such furious and systematic attacks and that they were defended with such tenacity. The Emperor repeated many times that he could not understand how the redoubts and positions that were captured with such courage and which we defended so tenaciously gave us only a small number of prisoners... These successes without prisoners, without trophies did not satisfy him... »

FROM THE REPORT OF GENERAL RAEVSKY

“The enemy, having arranged his entire army in our eyes, so to speak, in one column, walked straight to our front; Having approached it, strong columns separated from its left flank, went straight to the redoubt and, despite the strong grapeshot fire of my guns, climbed over the parapet without firing their heads. At the same time, from my right flank, Major General Paskevich with his regiments attacked with bayonets into the left flank of the enemy, located behind the redoubt. Major General Vasilchikov did the same thing to their right flank, and Major General Ermolov, taking a battalion of rangers from the regiments brought by Colonel Vuich, struck with bayonets directly at the redoubt, where, having destroyed everyone in it, he took the general leading the columns prisoner . Major Generals Vasilchikov and Paskevich overturned the enemy columns in the blink of an eye and drove them into the bushes so hard that hardly any of them escaped. More than the action of my corps, it remains for me to describe in a nutshell that after the destruction of the enemy, returning again to their places, they held out in them until against repeated attacks of the enemy, until the killed and wounded were reduced to complete insignificance and my redoubt was already occupied by the General. -Major Likhachev. Your Excellency himself knows that Major General Vasilchikov gathered the scattered remnants of the 12th and 27th divisions and, with the Lithuanian Guards Regiment, held until the evening an important height, located on the left limb of our entire line ... "

GOVERNMENT NOTICE ABOUT LEAVING MOSCOW

“With extreme and crushing heart of every son of the Fatherland, this sadness announces that the enemy entered Moscow on September 3rd. But let the Russian people not lose heart. On the contrary, let each and every one swear to be inflamed with a new spirit of courage, firmness and undoubted hope that all the evil and harm inflicted on us by our enemies will ultimately turn on their head. The enemy occupied Moscow not because he overcame our forces or weakened them. The commander-in-chief, in consultation with the leading generals, decided that it would be useful and necessary to give in for the time of necessity, in order to use the most reliable and best methods to turn the short-term triumph of the enemy into his inevitable destruction. No matter how painful it is for every Russian to hear that the capital city of Moscow contains within itself the enemies of its fatherland; but it contains them empty, naked of all treasures and inhabitants. The proud conqueror hoped, having entered it, to become the ruler of the entire Russian kingdom and prescribe to it such peace as he saw fit; but he will be deceived in his hope and will not find in this capital not only ways to dominate, but also ways to exist. Our forces gathered and now increasingly accumulating around Moscow will not cease to block all his paths and the detachments sent from him for food were exterminated daily, until he sees that his hope of defeating the minds of the capture of Moscow was in vain and that, willy-nilly, he will have to open a path for himself from her by force of arms..."

Two hundred years ago, Napoleon began a war with Russia, which ended in his - for many unexpected - defeat. What happened main reason defeats: people, winter or Russian god?

In the year of the bicentenary of Napoleon’s Russian campaign, which ended in the defeat of the “grand army,” many books telling about this campaign are being published in Germany. These include monographs by German historians, translations, reprints, multi-page scientific works and popular publications. Their authors ask the same question as Pushkin in Eugene Onegin:

Thunderstorm of the twelfth year
It has arrived - who helped us here?
The frenzy of the people
Barclay, winter or Russian god?
A bone thrown to Napoleon

What was the reason for the defeat of Napoleon’s “great army”? No one gives a definite answer. Some believe that main role Poor preparation for the Russian campaign, Napoleon’s excessive self-confidence and the severity of the Russian climate (“winter”) played a role. Other historians particularly highlight the bravery of Russian soldiers and the unprecedented patriotic upsurge (“the frenzy of the people”). Still others write with admiration about the brilliant tactics of Barclay de Tolly and later Kutuzov, who did not engage in the decisive battle and exhausted the enemy right up to Borodin. Thus, Adam Zamoyski calls the decision to “throw a bone” to Napoleon, giving him Moscow, “brilliant.” The fourth object, as they say, on all points, except for the steadfastness of the Russian army (no one disputes this).

The cold in 1812 actually began earlier than usual - in October. But the fate of Napoleonic army was decided by that time. Its remnants were already retreating in complete disorder from Moscow. The catastrophe broke out much earlier - in fact, even before the Battle of Borodino. When preparing his campaign in Russia, Napoleon, of course, took into account some Russian characteristics, but not all.

Neither the same population density as in Central and Western Europe, nor was there a standard of living as high as there in Russia. Poor peasants and a few, also not very rich, landowners could not feed hundreds of thousands of Napoleonic soldiers. As soon as they settled down for the night, they immediately went in search of provisions, fleecing the local population to the bone and causing self-hatred, which soon came back to haunt them with the “club of the people’s war.”

Fools and roads?

Bad roads and vast distances led to the fact that the convoys prepared in advance were left far behind the “great army”. Many of them are stuck in Poland and Lithuania. Suffice it to say that at the beginning of 1813, the Russian army, already advancing and chasing the French, captured four million portions of bread and crackers, almost the same amount of meat, alcohol, wine, thousands of tons of uniforms and various military equipment in Vilna alone. All this was prepared by the French for the Russian campaign, but never reached the combat units.

The death toll of cavalry and artillery horses, which, like people, had to rely only on pasture, was on a colossal scale. Several tens of thousands of horses did not even reach Smolensk, which significantly weakened Napoleonic army.

In addition, typhus and various infectious diseases. Morale fell already in the first weeks of the campaign, the number of sick people was in the tens of thousands. Shortly before the Battle of Borodino, it was established that of the 400,000-strong army, only 225,000 people remained in the ranks. The light cavalry, for example, lost half of its strength. And according to the calculations of French lodgers, which Dominic Lieven cites in his book “Russia against Napoleon,” 50 thousand people deserted from Napoleon’s army in the first month and a half alone.

One of the reasons for the mass desertion was that the French army was only half French. Many battle-hardened veterans retired at the end of 1811, they were replaced by voluntarily-compulsorily mobilized Italians, Dutch, Germans, Swiss, Belgians... However, as historian Daniel Furrer writes, many of these “allies” fought very brave. Of the 27 thousand Italians, only about a thousand returned home after the Russian campaign. And out of 1,300 Swiss soldiers, about a thousand died covering the crossing of the Berezina during the retreat of the “great army.”

Germans against Germans

The Germans fought on both sides. The German kingdoms and principalities were partially occupied by the French, and partially - like Prussia - were forced under pressure from Napoleon and the threat of occupation to become his allies. 30 thousand Bavarians, 27 thousand soldiers and officers from the Kingdom of Westphalia, 20 thousand Saxons and the same number of Prussians took part in the Russian campaign. Bonaparte especially did not trust the “allies” from Prussia, which had recently been an ally of Russia, and, just in case, gave the Prussian division under the command of a French marshal.

As for the Russian army, it included a special Russian-German Legion, which was formed, in particular, from hussars and infantrymen who defected to Russia after Napoleon’s invasion. By the end of the campaign, the legion numbered almost 10 thousand people: two hussar regiments, two infantry brigades, a company of rangers and a horse artillery company. The units were commanded by Prussian officers, and the entire legion was commanded by Count Ludwig Georg Wallmoden-Gimborn.

Another topic that especially interests German historians is: who is to blame for the fire of Moscow? Who set it on fire when Napoleon's army entered Moscow: French soldiers, Governor General Count Rostopchin, Russian spies? For Anka Muhlstein, author of the book “Moscow Fire. Napoleon in Russia,” there is no doubt: Moscow was set on fire on the orders of Fyodor Rostopchin, than he himself for a long time boasted. Tsar Alexander, by the way, was very dissatisfied. Still would! In Moscow, almost six and a half thousand houses out of nine thousand, more than eight thousand shops and warehouses, and more than a third of churches burned down. Two thousand wounded Russian soldiers died in the fire, whom the retreating soldiers did not have time to take with them...

A significant part of the book “Moscow Fire”, like other works telling about the war of 1812, is devoted to the Battle of Borodino. And here the number one question is: the losses of the parties. According to the latest data, the French lost 30 thousand people (about one in five), the Russians - about 44 thousand (one in three). Unfortunately, there are pseudo-historians in Russia who do their best to downplay Russian losses and exaggerate French ones. Besides the fact that this is not true, it should be said that it is completely unnecessary. The statistics of losses in no way detracts from the heroism of the participants in the Battle of Borodino, nor does the fact that it was formally won by Napoleon, who eventually occupied Moscow. But this victory was pyrrhic...

Napoleon was a genius and everyone knows how he achieved his victories: he turned on his genius and won. But how did he achieve defeats with all his genius?
The question was not idle either in the 19th century, every enlightened person asked it then, nor in the 20th century. Both Hitler and Stalin tried to take his mistakes into account; this issue is still important in the 21st century. The cost of mistakes is more and more, and the time to accept the right decision sometimes it's not enough.
There was a period in Napoleon's epic when all his mistakes became visible as if under a magnifying glass. The history of the War of 1812 allows us to see from our distance the mistakes of a genius in order not to repeat them. We will give an opinion about the mistakes of Napoleon V.V. Vereshchagin with our own comments.

1. Neglecting the little things.
"(On the attack on Moscow) Soon disorder began to take its toll in the huge army: fords across streams and rivers were knocked down, damaged, the regiments passed where and as they pleased, no one cared about this, since General base I neglected such little things. Nobody pointed out dangerous places or better road if there were several of them; each individual corps acted at its own peril... All these unrest were all the more striking because Barclay de Tolly was retreating from his positions in in perfect order: no abandoned carts, no dead horses, at least one backward soldier or defector."*
There are no small things in a big new business. Particularly offensive are those little things that not only could, but should have been foreseen.
If we transfer similar circumstances to our time: “Different moods reigned in Nikolai’s office, some were sitting on stockpiles of paper, some were friends with the drivers, and some knew how to approach the authorities. Therefore, any question (send a request, print a report, gather executors) it was necessary to decide not directly, but at your own peril and risk, or for a long time to collect information on how to solve it. New boss Quite quickly he ordered the departments to introduce clear rules, post them in a single place, and punish for non-compliance. Work immediately became easier."

2. Neglecting intuitive signals.
"Murat, -said the Emperor of the French,...in Vitebsk, - the first Russian campaign is over; Let's plant our banners here. The year 1813 will see us in Moscow, 1814 - in St. Petersburg. The war with Russia is a three-year war!” - This is what Napoleon's genius said, his intuition. However, he did not listen to his own genius. When a person refuses his own intuition, he suffers a crushing defeat.
An example from the life of office workers: “Andrey felt, even in his chest, something was trembling, that he should not stick his head out that day with his report. Before the start, he decided to sit in the corner. However, at the meeting, something came over him, he went to the podium , began to speak, puzzled exclamations and questions were heard, he was laughed at, ... it’s better not to remember further. After that, Andrei introduced a clear rule - everything public performance prepare carefully. And if he felt trembling in his chest, he changed tactics and prepared especially carefully or canceled the performance."

3. Disregard for group opinion.
“But the more decisively the emperor wants to act, the more pronounced is the cooling and discontent around him... Berthier,... allowed himself to present a reasoned conclusion in this sense to the emperor, but he received it very poorly: “Go away,” he told him,-I don't need you. Go home, I'm not holding anyone by force"* .
Group opinion - horrible power. And if everyone around is not in favor of the commander’s decision, but the main person insists, then when the decision is carried out, people will willingly and unwittingly sabotage it. It’s even worse if, as a result of developments, people consider themselves right and the boss an idiot. Now, if the boss spends some time discussing, teaching, persuading, even training, listens to people’s opinions on many points and changes the rules, adapting to some points, then his decisions will be eagerly awaited.

4. No negative outcome is presented.
Before the decisive campaign against Moscow, Napoleon thinks about victory and does not consider the negative scenario at all: " Here we will lack everything,… in Moscow we will get everything for free. After all, if you always expect the confluence of all favorable circumstances, then you can never do anything; to finish something you have to start first… - following a rule does not ensure success, but success, on the contrary, creates a rule, and if… If the campaign succeeds, then from these new successes a new leadership for the future will probably be created.".
An incident from the present time: “I’ll borrow money and buy a car,” thought Ivan Petrovich. In his thoughts, he clocked steep kilometers, traveled to Kyiv and Lvov. A month later, he crashed the car he bought on credit, and paid off the money for another three years. A month of driving a car cost him twice as much as the car itself.

5 . The opponent’s behavior is depicted from a convenient perspective.
"Suppose, however, that Alexander(emperor)and after that he becomes stubborn - well, then I will enter into relations with the residents of the capital, with the boyars, they will understand their benefits and appreciate freedom."...Napoleon reasoned in 1912 and added, “that Moscow hates St. Petersburg, and he will be able to take advantage of this rivalry - the results of this envy between the capitals can be innumerable...”
“And as soon as I go to the authorities, as soon as I tell them that I know everything about them, they will give me everything that I don’t ask for,” the mechanic has been dreaming for many years now. Once I even started a conversation, but they almost transferred me to a worse point.

6. Doubts make even a bad plan worse.
“However, Napoleon’s doubts and hesitations during the attack on Moscow were reflected in the movement of the French army, and the well-conceived plan - crashing between the Russian armies and defeating each separately - was not carried out.”*
Doubts prevented Napoleon from immediately defeating the Russian armies, and seriously worsened the marital relationship of one engineer. Mikhail couldn’t decide what to give his wife for her birthday. As a result, having doubted the whole day, in the evening he stood at the door without at least some gift.

7. Having been deceived once, you should be deceived again.
“Napoleon himself understood that he was being “lured,” as he put it, but, as said, if not from Moscow, then from Smolensk, he could not refuse yet and moved to the latter city, continuing to gain “victories” of his ballots (messages to Paris It was all the easier to win these victories because the Russian plan of retreat helped make them more credible: the French kept advancing, and the Russians kept retreating - which means that the former all won victories over the latter."* Captivated by blindness, the ghost of success was mistaken for success.
It happens that a person is deceived and, realizing the detrimental nature of the situation, sees a way out only in continuing the deception. So, having lost in a casino, a player uses any means, using lies, borrows money to recoup and, finally, loses everything.

8. Uncertainty about the correctness of a decision gives rise to funny behavior.
“Napoleon takes the first opportunity that seems convenient to him and talks about his peaceful feelings and intentions with the captured General Tuchkov, whom he asks to write about them to his brother, also a general of the Russian army. “I didn’t start the war!” he said, “Why are you retreating?” ? Why did they give me Smolensk? I want nothing more than to make peace.” He asks Tuchkov to also write that the commander-in-chief is acting badly by taking all the authorities with him. He makes Tuchkov a proposal to form a kind of arbitration court to decide which side is more likely to win - if they decide that it’s on the Russian side, then let them appoint a place for the battle, and if it’s on the French side, then why continue to shed blood in vain, “let’s enter into negotiations and let's make peace."*
When Zina realized that her husband was cheating on her, out of complete confusion, she went to the homewrecker and began to explain to her that she should be ashamed to break up their union. “Let’s be friends with you,” said Zina, “and my husband will live with me.”
Then there was a divorce, but her humiliating behavior was the worst thing for her to remember.

9. Hypnosis of target proximity.
Having firmly decided to go forward, Napoleon again completely controlled himself, became cheerful and calm... He says: “We have climbed too far to retreat; The world is before us - and we are eight days away from it - is it possible to reason, being so close away from the target? Let's go to Moscow!"
After courting the girl for a long time, the guy finally invited her to his place. At home, despite the inviting atmosphere, the girl again refused intimacy. The guy finally decided to achieve his goal and tried to take it by force. The girl did not communicate with him anymore.

10. Yield to circumstances, but no more (which Napoleon did not do).
The military council of Emperor Alexander decided on the offensive, but the commander-in-chief invariably made a decision that was contrary to the general enthusiasm, at first pretending to share it, and his reputation suffered greatly from this. The new commander-in-chief Kutuzov did not dare to risk his very great popularity and decided to accept the battle, which, as clever man, also hardly approved."*
However, Kutuzov, realizing the destructiveness of a further battle, refused to continue the Battle of Borodino, which many expected, and withdrew the troops the next day.

11. Powers are not delegated, competition within the team is allowed.
Before the Battle of Borodino, Marshal Davout came to Napoleon with a proposal “give him Poniatowski, at night before dawn he will move with him and with his five divisions, with a force of 35,000, under the cover of the forest in which the Russians rest, will bypass them along the old Smolensk road and quickly attack the left flank from the rear and will finish off the Russian army here, and with it the war".
With this proposal, Davout once again proved that he was the best tactician of all the marshals of the Napoleonic school. But Napoleon, having listened carefully to the marshal, after several minutes of silent reflection, answered:"No! This is too peculiar a movement; it will take me far away from my direct goal and make me waste a lot of time..."
The marshals sent General Belliard to him for help, who explained that from their position they could see how the entire space of the Mozhaisk road was covered with retreating carts and fugitives... that only one more good blow was needed to finish off the enemy army!
The emperor hesitates, doubts and orders the general to go take another look and then report to him: "that the matter has not yet become clear, that before deciding to give the last reserves, he wants to understand his chessboard more clearly!” Disgruntled marshals: " What is this, finally! Did we come here for the pleasure of occupying the fields? What is the emperor doing back there? He only sees the other side of things. If he doesn’t want to fight the war himself, has ceased to be a general and is pretending to be the emperor, let him go... to the Tuileries and hand the matter over to us!”...
The Napoleons of our time act in the same way. Headmistress of one educational institution endlessly ran around the institution, doing a bunch of other people's work and many reprimands. As a result, everyone was afraid to take action in order not to get reprimanded, and the necessary things were not done.

12. Fantastic plans.
"Meanwhile, it became clear that Alexander did not deign Napoleon with an answer - it was a blood grudge and he became terribly angry. "October 3 after sleepless night he calls the marshals: " listen to the new plan I made. Prince Eugene, read: burn the rest of Moscow, go through Tver to St. Petersburg, where MacDonald will come to join us! Murat and Davout will form the rearguard.Has a higher military feat ever been imagined?... What kind of glory will we be covered with and what will the world say when it finds out that in three months we conquered both great capitals of the north?
But Davout and Daru counter his passion with the time of year, the lack of provisions, the bare, hungry, and moreover imaginary, road from Tver to St. Petersburg, going through the swamps, and which three hundred peasants will make impassable in a few hours."*

13. Cruelty.
"Shortly before leaving Moscow, a very strange order was given. All corps commanders had to provide numerical data on the number of patients who could recover 1) in a week, 2) in two weeks, 3) in a month, 4) the number of people who were supposed to die in two weeks, 5) in three weeks; It was ordered that only those designated under No. 1 be transported; all the rest were supposed to be left behind."* The Russian company was constantly marked by unnecessary cruelty: soldiers looted and destroyed villages on the way to Moscow, getting food and fodder for themselves; “arsonists” in Moscow were shot without trial or investigation, although it was not clear who set the fire; prisoners (and among them there were many civilians) were shot if anyone fell behind the column due to illness; the carts were overloaded with stolen goods, and their wounded rushed to die.
Sometimes events at the enterprise resemble Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. A month after the start of the new directorship, layoffs began. Psychologists were dispersed, pensioners were fired. The more mobile youth decided to follow their elders and put their applications on the table themselves. What remained were the short-sighted and “our own people” who did not like to work and did not take responsibility. The numbers have dropped.

14. Condition is the enemy of intuition.
"IN Lately Stay in Moscow again, as during the great fire, Napoleon's depressed state began to show up in outbreaks. This happened during receptions in the morning, when, surrounded by the commanders of the army, under their inquisitive glances, which seemed reproachful to him, he seemed to challenge everyone with his stern appearance; the sharp, abrupt voice and pallor of his face showed that he understood the truth and that it did not give him peace. Here sometimes his heart poured out on those around him in cruel, sharp reprimands, which did not alleviate, but rather increased his torture with the consciousness of his injustice."*
Many said that in the campaign of 1812 Napoleon did not look like himself. He first had to spend enormous energy on improving his own condition, since the success of the company directly depended on this. If the situation is difficult, start with yourself, cheer yourself up, improve your condition.

15. In negotiations, you hear what you want to hear.
The “old fox” Kutuzov well understood the need to give Napoleon time to “fry in Moscow in his own juice”; she lulled Lauriston (the ambassador) with such skill that the poor ambassador largely succumbed to the hope of a quick peace, and most importantly, inspired it in his master, who decided to wait!
However, in anticipation of this desired peace, the position of the French army began to become critical: guerrilla warfare began to flare up. It was necessary to send detachments for foraging under strong cover not only of cavalry, but also infantry, even artillery; Every measure of oats, every bale of hay had to be taken from the battle."*
Every time Maria Ivanovna fought for half the lesson to maintain iron discipline, although, of course, she understood that her goal as a teacher was, first of all, to teach mathematics. As a result, there was perfect silence in her lessons, Maria Ivanovna triumphed, but half the class failed the ministerial test and was sorted out at the teachers' council.

16. Inaction is the worst of actions.
“And yet Napoleon still did not dare to openly announce his intention to leave. Everything seemed lost to him if a surprised Europe saw him retreating, and everything would be saved if he managed to out-argue Alexander with persistence; almost already defeated, he postponed public recognition from day to day of his defeat.
Among the military and political clouds that gathered around him, always previously feverishly active, Napoleon was in the full sense inactive: he spent his days talking about the merits of certain odes and messages received recently from France, samples of which were given, or editing rules for managing the French comedy in Paris, which he spent three whole evenings on.
One cannot think that Napoleon himself completely trusted his optimism; the main driver of his actions was obviously indecision. Everyone around him was surprised at the complete absence in him of his former lively, quick, demand-driven determination; they saw that his genius had forgotten how to adapt to circumstances, as happened during his rise."*
If the situation is unstable, going from bad to worse, then inaction leads to complete defeat.
* Vereshchagin Vasily Vasilievich. Napoleon I in Russia, 1812.