03.11.2019

The Battle of Gaugamela brief description. The Battle of Gaugamela: description, history, interesting facts and consequences. Political changes in Greece

The Battle of Gaugamela became one of the stages on the path of Alexander the Great to the conquest of the then known part of the world. It put an end to the centuries-long confrontation between the Greeks and Persians: the Achaemenid power was replaced by the Hellenistic states that formed after the collapse of Alexander’s empire.

The Persian Empire on the eve of the war

The first kings of the Achaemenid dynasty transformed the Persians from an unknown people into the founders of one of the largest empires of antiquity. Having conquered Media, Lydia and a number of other states, the Persians encountered fierce resistance from the Greek city-states, who managed to defeat the hitherto invincible invaders. From that moment on, the power of Persia declined. The new kings were concerned not so much with new conquests as with retaining the already captured areas.

Political changes in Greece

During the time of the Greco-Persian troops, the Athenian symmachy, that is, the union of several policies under the leadership of Athens, came to the fore. They pursued a clearly expressed centralization policy, achieving deductions from the budget of their allies to strengthen the fleet. These actions of Athens displeased the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta. The war that broke out between them, although it ended in the victory of Sparta, but greatly weakened both policies.

Previously unnoticed Macedonia took advantage of the situation. King Philip V in a short time managed to subjugate most of the policies of Hellas. This success was developed during the reign of his son, Alexander the Great. Having dealt with the problems of continental Greece, Alexander turned his gaze to the east.

Beginning of the war with the Persians

In 334 BC. e. The Macedonian phalanx entered Asia. Alexander had an army of 30 thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry. In addition to the Macedonians, Greeks hired by him from other policies, as well as Thracians and Illyrians, fought on Alexander’s side.

Darius III, king of Persia, sent a 40,000-strong corps against Alexander. Both troops met at the Granik River. The Macedonian king again proved himself to be a talented commander. His army crossed the river right in front of the enemy and immediately fell upon the Persians. After a short battle, they fled, leaving almost half of their comrades killed on the battlefield.

In one year, Alexander conquered all of Asia Minor and moved south along the Mediterranean coast, capturing strategic Persian bases such as Tire and Gaza. This made it possible not to fear a possible attack from the sea during the campaign against Egypt. Having conquered this area, he turned around and headed deeper into the Persian possessions. A clash with Darius' main forces was inevitable.

Balance of power

On the eve of the Battle of Gaugamela, Alexander maintained 12 thousand foot soldiers under his banners, the vast majority of whom came from the policies of continental Greece. The cavalry was more diverse in its ethnic composition. There were a little more than a thousand Greeks in it, the rest were recruited in Thrace, Thessaly and other lands. 300 Asian archers also fought on Alexander's side.

Darius could not boast of heavily armed infantry. He was able to field only 4 thousand of these soldiers for the Battle of Gaugamela. But there were much more light infantry: about 50 thousand. Darius's striking force was cavalry. Not only was it equal in number to lightly armed infantry, but it also included elephants and chariots.

Tactics of Alexander the Great

The history of the Battle of Gaugamela shows that Alexander was a remarkable tactician. He understood perfectly well that in a battle it was necessary first of all to neutralize the cavalry. Since numbers were on the side of the Persians, it was necessary to invent tactics that would allow the weaker army in this regard to win. The necessary disposition of troops was soon found (as ancient historians testify, Darius’s plans were stolen) and for the united hand of Alexander of Ancient Greece, the Battle of Gaugamela became victorious.

The cavalry was sent to the flanks. On the right were the closest associates and friends of Alexander, and on the left were the Thessalians. The famous Macedonian phalanx was in the center. In case the Persian blow turned out to be too strong, Alexander divided the entire army into two lines in order to be able to replace weakened units. In general, the arrangement of the Macedonian troops resembled a horseshoe.

Progress of the battle

On October 1, 331, at the Battle of Gaugamela, the irreconcilable enemies finally crossed arms. Just before it began, Alexander was warned that the Persians had prepared a trap: iron spikes were buried in places where the Macedonian cavalry might attack. The commander had to urgently change tactics. He pulled the flanks back and ordered his soldiers to force the Persians to advance first in order to determine from the route of their movement where the traps were.

It turned out to be easy to do. The Battle of Gaugamela, described in many works, began with an attack on the Persian flanks. The level of command in Darius's army was not up to par: the cavalry was bogged down in protracted battles and constantly required reinforcements.

But the attack of the chariots initially brought success to the Persians. These combat vehicles were equipped with sharp sickles, which forced the Macedonians to cover themselves and thereby break the formation. But the success was temporary. Having allowed the chariots to break through to the rear, the Macedonians immediately attacked it from the sides. Having destroyed the deadly machines, the phalanx restored formation.

Alexander, meanwhile, stood at the head of the cavalry. Seeing that the left flank of the Persians was completely weakened, he launched his attack exactly between the flank and the center. The cavalry attack continued with brutal massacres. The stunned Persians did not even prepare to defend themselves. Alexander's real target was King Darius. From the battles that had happened before, he knew very well that nothing could demoralize the Persians more than the flight of a military leader.

While the best commanders of the Persian army went to the rear of the Macedonians, Darius was unable to establish command. The hastily returning Persian units were unable to find a place to form and therefore only intensified the confusion. After one of the Macedonians killed the charioteer Darius, the Persian king fled. The remnants of the Persian army followed him. The battlefield remained with Alexander.

Results of the battle

If the description of the Battle of Gaugamela in ancient sources generally coincides in its details, then the number of dead is indicated differently. But what is striking is not such “ignorance,” but the amazing unity in the maximum number of those killed: if we compare all the figures given by historians, it turns out that none of them exceeds 500 people. However, it is noted that there were an extremely large number of wounded: the attack of the chariots had an effect.

The defeat of the Persians was unconditional. One of the historians, in the heat of delight at the victory of Alexander the Great at the Battle of Gaugamela, stated that almost 100 thousand Persians were killed. However, this number is significantly higher total soldiers fielded by Darius on the battlefield is therefore clearly overestimated. According to more objective calculations, the Persians left no more than 40 thousand people on the battlefield.

Death of Darius

Alexander wanted to catch up with Darius at all costs. He was informed that the king first went towards Babylon, and not finding support there, tried to recruit a new army in Media. Perhaps he would have succeeded, but his authority suffered so much after such a stunning defeat that a satrap named Bess decided to kill the king. However, Alexander was outraged by such arbitrariness. When in 329 BC. e. The Persian Empire was finally defeated, and Bessus, who declared himself king under the name Artaxerxes V, tried to save his life by taking credit for the murder of Darius; Alexander first subjected him to painful torture and then executed him.

Significance of the Battle of Gaugamela

The subjugation of the entire territory of Persia after the defeat and death of Darius was only a matter of time. After the murder of Bessus, Alexander took the throne of the Persian kings, located in Susa. The Greek volunteer units were sent home. Thus, Alexander made it clear that revenge on the Persians for past inconveniences was over, and from that moment his personal war for the possession of all of Asia began.

If we talk briefly about the significance of the Battle of Gaugamela, its most important consequence was the creation of a huge empire that included the entire known ecumene. However, it turned out to be a rather fragile association, bound only by the figure of the conquering king. When in 323 BC. e. He died unexpectedly without leaving an heir; his closest associates immediately clashed in internecine wars. As a result, the empire of Alexander the Great was divided into three large parts: the powers of Ptolemy, Seleucus and Lysimachus.

Background and location of the battle

Unlike other battles of antiquity, the day of the battle is precisely determined thanks to an entry in the astronomical diary kept by the priests in Babylon. October 1, 331 BC e. The Battle of Gaugamela took place, ending more than 200 years of Persian power that stretched from Aegean Sea in the west to semi-fairy-tale India in the east.

Enemy forces

Fully armored horsemen from the northern Iranian tribes, called Scythians or Massagetae by ancient authors, at the Battle of Gaugamela

In the center of the Persian army was Darius himself with a detachment of “relatives” (noble horsemen) and a personal guard of Persian fellow tribesmen, Greek hoplite mercenaries, behind them stood lightly armed detachments of other peoples and Indians with 15 elephants, and in front were Mardi archers and 50 chariots . On the left wing, under the command of Orsinus, a heavy cavalry of 2 thousand Massagetae was concentrated (Arrian here calls the northern Iranian tribes Massagetae; their riders and horses were covered with armor), 9 thousand mounted Bactrians and 5 thousand other horsemen, infantry detachments and a hundred chariots. On the right wing, under the command of Mazeus, were lined up Cappadocian (region in Asia Minor) cavalry and 50 chariots, as well as Medes, Parthians, Syrians and other warriors from the central regions of the Persian Empire.

The formation of the first line of the Macedonian army did not differ much from previous battles. On the right wing, led by Alexander, there were 8 or 9 squadrons of hetairas and a corps of shield bearers. There were 6 phalanx regiments in the center. The left wing under the command of Parmenion consisted of Thessalian and Greek cavalry, qualitatively and quantitatively not inferior to the hetaira. Ahead of the first line, in loose formation, were archers and javelin throwers.

To counter the huge Persian army on the plain, Alexander built a second line of troops on both flanks with the task of covering the rear of the first line. In the second line he placed detachments of Thracians, Illyrians, Greeks and light mercenary cavalry. He assigned some of the Thracians to guard the convoy placed on a hill not far from the army. Alexander was ready to fight completely surrounded.

Progress of the battle

When the opposing armies met at a distance of about 6 km, Alexander rested his troops in a fortified camp. The Persians, fearing a sudden attack by Alexander, stood tensely day and night, fully armed in an open field, so that by the morning battle they were morally broken by fatigue and fear of the Macedonians.

The Persian cavalry was engaged in battle by cavalry from the 2nd line of the Macedonian army. According to Curtius, Darius sent part of the Bactrian cavalry from the wing opposing Alexander to help his own in the battle for the convoy. As a result of the concentration of the Persian horsemen on Alexander's right flank and the withdrawal of the Bactrians to the convoy, a gap formed in the front line of the Persian army, where Alexander directed the attack of his hetairas with part of the supporting infantry. The blow was aimed at King Darius.

In the battle, Darius's charioteer was killed with a dart, but the Persians mistook his death for the death of the Persian king. Panic gripped their ranks. The Persian left flank began to fall apart and retreat. Seeing this, Darius fled, after which his troops who were nearby also fled. Due to the cloud of dust and the large area of the battle, the Persians of the right wing did not see the flight of their king and continued to press Parmenion. Alexander turned the hetayrs and struck at the center of the Persian army to alleviate the situation of his commander. Soon, having learned about Darius, Mazeus retreated in order, and Alexander resumed his pursuit of the Persian king towards Arbel.

Results of the battle

According to Arrian, Alexander lost 100 people among the hetayrs alone and half of the horse cavalry of the hetayrs, a thousand horses. According to rumors, up to 30 thousand Persians fell, and even more were taken prisoner. Curtius increases the number of Persian deaths to 40 thousand and estimates Macedonian losses at 300 people

For having her. Established in Egypt internal management and having brilliantly celebrated his triumph, in the spring of 331 he set out from Memphis through Palestine and Phenicia to the Euphrates, crossed it unhindered at Thapsak, headed through upper Mesopotamia in a northeastern direction to the Tigris; He crossed it happily a few days' journey north of Nineveh at Bedzabd, despite its rapid current, and did not meet the enemy anywhere. Moon eclipse, which happened on the night after the crossing, from September 20 to 21, was interpreted by the army and the king’s fortuneteller, Aristander, as a favorable omen.

From here Alexander headed south and on September 24 came across the advanced enemy cavalry. He learned from the prisoners that Darius's main force was encamped about two miles south, in the plain near Gaugamela, to give him battle there. Darius, after his peace proposals were rejected, called for a new struggle of people from the huge eastern half of his kingdom and gathered terrible force. The ancient writers, apparently exaggerating, believe that the highest number of this people's army was: a million infantry, 40,000 horsemen, 200 war chariots and 15 elephants; the smaller ones - 290,000 infantry and 45,000 cavalry. With this power Darius from Babylon, where all these forces had gathered, advanced north into the Gaugamel plain, which lay a few miles west of Arbela and a few miles east of Mosul. On the cramped battlefield of Issus, he could not use his entire huge army, but the wide Gaugamel plain gave him the opportunity to deploy all his fighting forces, especially his numerous cavalry. He was confident of victory; he ordered in advance to level all the irregularities that could hinder the horses and chariots on the battlefield he had chosen.

Battle of Gaugamela

Having received news of the enemy's proximity, Alexander assigned his troops four days of rest in order to prepare them for a decisive battle. On the night of September 29-30, 331 BC, he broke camp and by dawn led his troops to a chain of hills, from which the masses of the enemy army were visible in the distance. Here they stopped and began to deliberate: whether they should immediately launch an attack, or, having strengthened themselves, first make a reconnaissance of the battlefield. Cautious Commander Parmenion was of the latter opinion, and it prevailed. The troops camped in sections of the battle formation in which they arrived. Darius expected an immediate attack and kept his soldiers ready for battle all day, and the next night everyone had to stand in ranks, because a night attack could be expected.

Thus, the Persians were tired even before the battle, while Alexander gave his army rest. In the evening he gathered his commanders and appointed a battle for the next day. When he was still in his tent with some of his friends, Parmenion came with a worried look and advised him to make an attack at night, because during the day it would hardly be possible to overcome the huge army of the enemy in an open field. Alexander answered him: “I don’t want to win on the sly.” In a fair, open battle, he wanted to show the world the superiority of his strength. At night he slept so calmly and soundly that, contrary to his custom, he did not wake up at dawn, and the commanders, having waited for a long time near his headquarters, themselves gave the order to the troops to take food and prepare for the move. Since further delay seemed unsafe, Parmenion finally entered the tent, approached Alexander’s bed and called the king by name three times until he woke up. “How can you, king, rest so calmly,” he said, “as if you had already won a victory, while you still have the most important and decisive battle ahead of you?” But Alexander objected to him: “What! Don’t you believe that we hold victory in our hands when we have already overcome the labor of a long journey through desert countries and overtook Darius, who fled from us?”

On the morning of October 1, 331, Alexander led his army from the camp to the battlefield of Gaugamela. He could oppose the countless masses of the enemy with only 40,000 infantry and 7,000 horsemen. In the center of the battle formation stood heavy infantry, on both flanks were light troops and cavalry. On the right wing the king himself commanded, who, with the Macedonian horsemen and shield-bearers and ipaspists, joined the middle phalanx; on the left wing is Parmenion. Since the Persians outnumbered the Macedonians on both flanks, Alexander placed a second line on these flanks, which was supposed to resist attacks from both sides.

At first, Alexander stood against a heavily furnished enemy center, at which Darius himself was located, but then he moved to the right, against the enemy’s left wing. While the cavalry on his right side was fighting with varying luck, he himself found himself directly in front of 100 chariots, which were placed on the enemy’s left wing and quickly rushed towards his line. A hail of arrows, stones and throwing spears greets them; some were taken, the horses were killed, the harness was cut, the drivers were thrown to the ground; others make their way unharmed through the easily opened gaps of the army and fall behind the Macedonian front into the hands of grooms and squires. With the main line constantly moving forward, the battle between the Macedonian cavalry and the enemy on the right side continues, where the Macedonians can barely hold on. Then from the left flank Parmenion sends to tell Alexander that during the rapid advance the line was separated from the phalanx, that Parthian, Indian and Persian horsemen, bursting into intervals, rushed to the camp to plunder it, that the enemy cavalry was threatening his left wing, and what if Alexander does not immediately send him reinforcements, then everything will be lost. Alexander sends the galloping horseman back with the elephants, saying that Parmenion is reckless in demanding help, that in his confusion he probably forgot that the winner gets everything that belongs to the enemy, and the vanquished should only care about dying honestly, with a sword in his hand.

He immediately rushes with the Macedonian cavalry and ipaspists to the left wing into the interval of the enemy’s left flank, close to the center, where Darius himself is located. His troops follow him to the right and left; with uncontrollable force he penetrates deeper and deeper into the crowds of enemies. Darius, suddenly finding himself in the midst of this confusion, flees in fear and despair; the troops closest to him follow him to protect him, and soon the whole center is fleeing in disorder. This sudden side attack by Alexander decides the fate of the battle. The entire left wing of the Persians is upset, and Alexander with his main forces now goes to his left flank, to the rescue of Parmenion. The enemy horsemen, who, with the help of prisoners, were plundering the Macedonian camp, as soon as they saw the unfavorable turn of the battle, turned back in disorder and tried with desperate fury to break through the Macedonian troops. Here again a hot, bloody battle took place, in which many Greeks were killed and many, including Alexander’s beloved friend, Hephaestion, were seriously wounded. Victory here did not remain doubtful for long, and soon a general persecution began, during which the Persians died in droves. Alexander used every effort to overtake the fleeing king. While Parmenion took possession of the enemy camp, camels, elephants and huge luggage, he himself hurried across the battlefield, in the midst of the ongoing battle in the direction in which Darius fled. The coming night put an end to the pursuit, but only for a few hours. At midnight, when the moon rose, the chase began again. They hoped to find Darius in Arbela; when they reached this place the next day, Darius was no longer there; They captured only his chariot, shield, bow, treasures and baggage.

According to the historian Arriana, who described Alexander’s campaign, the Macedonians lost only 100 people and more than 1000 horses during this great victory; according to other news, the number of fallen Macedonians is believed to be 500 people. More than a hundred thousand Persians are said to have been killed.

The battle of Gaugamela or Arbela dealt a mortal blow to the rule of Darius. With a small detachment he fled to the east, to Media, while Alexander turned to the south to reap the fruits of his great victory. Babylon, the great capital of the East, the center of the Persian kingdom, beyond it Susa, the magnificent residence of the Persian kings, surrendered to him with all their treasures. In Babylon, the troops were given a long rest and, after almost continuous labor and battles, they indulged in the luxurious pleasures of life.

Between the two cities of the parties now warring in Iraq - the capital of the Kurds, Erbil and the city of Mosul - thousands of years ago stood the village of Gavgamela, under which the two fought in battle. greatest armies of its time.

Alexander brought more than forty thousand soldiers onto the battlefield, and the Persians fielded an army, which, according to some estimates, could reach one hundred thousand people (ancient historians gave estimates of up to a million, but this is a clear exaggeration). The balance of forces was not in favor of the Macedonian, but it was Darius who suffered a crushing defeat. According to generalized data, for one killed Macedonian there were up to forty dead Persians. For the Persian army, these events became a real bloodbath.

This battle became key in the campaigns of Alexander the Great and put an end to the two-century history of the great Persian power of the Achaemenids.

Like any historical event, the Battle of Gaugamela can teach a lot even to those who do not intend to lead their phalanxes to conquer the world. RT compiled a short personal growth training based on the plot of the battle. The Doctor of Historical Sciences provided invaluable assistance in this regard. Chief Editor military-historical magazine Parabellum novum Alexander Nefedkin.

Use all your trump cards

Darius's army was armed with war elephants. This is noted in the sources, but what they did in battle is unknown; the chroniclers are silent about this. The veil of secrecy from the elephants falls only after the battle: the Macedonians caught them in the Persian convoy.

Elephants are not only useful animals, as the character in Bulgakov’s novel said, but also scary. The Indian elephant weighs 3-4 tons, it easily goes into a rage in battle, and what can you do with it without firearms or at least the experience of anti-elephant warfare is completely unclear. The Macedonians had no such experience.

Probably the elephants simply did not make it to the battle. Darius left them in the wagon train so that they would not frighten the horses. This explains the silence of the chroniclers. But the elephants could, if not turn the tide of the battle, then at least make the final loss count not so devastating for the Persians.

The threat does not have to be faced head on. You can pass her by

The battle began with the attack of Darius's sickle chariots. Sickle chariots are loved by directors of historical films and computer game developers. They look impressive: a two-wheeled cart drawn by four horses, on the axles of which were mounted combs facing the enemy with sharp teeth. And sickles were also attached to the edges of the scrapers. With a successful attack, this design could cut full-fledged clearings in the enemy’s formation.

And just meeting a chariot rushing head-on at a speed of 30-40 kilometers per hour is below average pleasure.

Therefore, during the chariot attack on the right flank of the Macedonian army, the famous Macedonian phalanx simply parted and let the terrible weapon pass by. Probably, the heavily armed warriors did not run from the chariots across the entire field, but simply stood up for each other and thereby, in seconds, taking just a couple of steps, cut the linear formation in half. And after the confused drivers they killed them with a side attack or throwing weapons.

Don't be distracted on the way to your goal

Horses are living creatures, and they can also be scared in war. Therefore, horses can be scared, as the Macedonians did. During the attack of the chariots on the left flank, the hoplites did not move aside, but began to loudly bang their weapons on their shields. Many horses got scared and ran back to cut those same clearings, only not in the ranks of the Macedonians, but among their own.

However, the Persian attack here turned out to be more successful than on the right flank, especially since the attack of the chariots was also supported by the cavalry. The Persians broke through the Macedonian defenses and broke into operational space. And in the operational space they were met by a Macedonian convoy.

What is a convoy in an army of several tens of thousands of people? It's practically small town, in which, in addition to supplies and everything else necessary for the army on the march, Persian prisoners captured before the battle were also kept.

And the Persians, instead of making a detour and hitting the Macedonians in the rear, rushed to free the prisoners and also plunder the convoy. If they had not spent time and effort on this, the situation could have turned out differently.

You should always watch your step

Darius was waiting for a cavalry strike from the right flank of the Macedonians. Therefore, he strengthened the left flank in order to deliver a decisive blow there, and tried to protect himself on the right: there, on his orders, special iron thorns were scattered, which were supposed to cripple the horses.

Alexander, who personally led the cavalry into battle, took notice of this trick and simply carried out an attack even further to the right in order to bypass the trap. The Macedonians bypassed the thorns and struck the weak part of the Persian formation.

Having broken through the flank, Alexander's horsemen struck the center of the Persian army and started a battle there.

Sometimes you have to give up your habits to win.

In the Persian army it was not customary for a commander to personally lead troops into an attack. As today, the commander-in-chief gave orders from headquarters. For example, 150 years before Gaugamela, the Persians invaded mainland Greece, and in the Thermopylae gorge they were given a decisive battle by the united armies of several Greek cities led by the king of Sparta, Leonidas. It was in this battle that the famous episode known as the feat of the three hundred Spartans took place.

Leonidas himself died in the battle, while the Persian king Xerxes, watching the battle from a special throne, was completely unharmed.

Darius was a brave man who was not afraid to participate in fights. At Gaugamela he personally went into battle in a chariot. This finally destroyed the Persians. The chariot driver died, and many Persians, thinking that they had killed the king, panicked and fled. If Darius had been sitting in the headquarters tent, there would have been no panic.

And so the matter ended in victory for the Macedonians. The Persian Empire fell. Darius himself fled to the east, thinking of gathering a new army, but died ingloriously at the hands of his own satrap.

And across most of the Middle East lies the short-lived but memorable empire of Alexander the Great for millennia.

Victor Mironov

Comments

Reviews (46) for Great Battles: Battle of Gaugamela”

Battle schedule of the army of Darius III:
I. In front of the left wing:
1) 2000 Massagetian horsemen (= “Scythians” by Arrian) (Arr. An., III.11.6; 13.2-3; Curt., IV.12.6).
2) about 1000 Bactrian horsemen (Arr. An., III.11.6; Curt., IV.12.6).
W. Tarn, however, considered that since Curtius mentions (Curt., IV.12.7) 2000 Saks, but says nothing (?!) about the Bactrians (of whom there were 1000 people - Arr. An., III.11.6; Curt ., IV.12.6), his figures obviously refer to this entire detachment - 1000 Sakas and 1000 Bactrians.
3) 100 sickle chariots (Arr. An., III.11.6; Curt., IV.12.6).

II. On the left flank (satrap of Bactria Bessus):
4) 8,000 mounted Bactrians (including, obviously, the Sogdians and Indians bordering the Bactrians) with their satrap Bes (Arr. An., III.8.3; 11.3; Curt., IV.12.6).
5) 1000 Saka horse archers (= dai/dahi) (Arr. An., III.11.3; Curt., IV.12.6).
6) Arachosian horsemen (and, undoubtedly, “mountain Indians”) with the satrap of Arachosia and Drangiana Barsaent (Barzaent; in the future one of the murderers of Darius) (Arr. An., III.8.4; 11.3; Curt., IV.12.6) .
7) Combined detachment of infantry and cavalry of the Persians (Arr. An., III.11.3; Curt., IV.12.7).
Probably 1,000 foot and 5,000 horse (there is less reason to agree with Marsden's hypothesis - 3,000 infantry and horsemen, interspersed). For their commander, see below, section no. 18. Cavalry, probably those horsemen who had elite/guard status (see above in the section on the guard). Curtius, as usual, losing the thread of the narrative, nevertheless writes clearly about the mixed detachments of cavalry and infantry of the Persians: “The infantrymen of most of these peoples did not mix (with the cavalry), but each kept with their compatriots.”
8) Susi horsemen (= Kissi) (Arr. An., III.8.5; 11.3; Curt., IV.12.6).
The Susians and Uxians at Gaugamela were commanded by Oxater, the son of the satrap Susiana Abulita (Arr. An., III.8.5). Presumably, Oksatr himself led the Kissiev, and one of his subordinates led the Uxii.
9) 2000 Cadusi cavalry (Arr. An., III.8.4; 11.3; Curt., IV.12.12 [on the right flank]; Diod., XVII.59.5 [on the right flank]).
A. Bosworth believes that Diodorus is right (in this case, what are the “chosen Scythian horsemen” doing on the right flank?) and Curtius (which, as usual, is contradictory, and also does not agree with the text of Diodorus; the manuscript gives Caucasiorum , not Cadusiorum), but Arrian is mistaken. However, there is no reason to follow his version. Curtius confuses the location even for the Bactrians - either they are on the left wing, or they leave the right flank to attack the Macedonian convoy (Curt., IV.12.6; 15.20). D. Atkinson's opinion: the Cadusian cavalry could be on the right flank, along with the Medes, and the Cadusian infantry fought on the left wing.

III. In the center (Darius):
10) foot Carian settlers (colonists of Mesopotamia) (Arr. An., III.8.5; 11.5; 13.1).
11) Greek mercenaries; Patron (Paron) Phocian (Arr. An., III.11.7).
The position of the Greeks is clear from Arrian's indication that they stood on both sides of Darius and his Persians (i.e., the guards). The names of the two commanders, however, are known only for the time after the battle in which both participated: Arr. An., III.16.2; Curt., V.9.15. It is not known whether the Hellenes had other leaders.
12) 1000 mounted Persians - “royal relatives”, or “royal squadron”, together with Darius himself (Arr. An., III.11.5; 16.1; Diod., XVII.59.2). This detachment was probably originally led by Satropat, who was subordinate to Mazeus and died shortly before the battle in a cavalry skirmish (Curt., IV.9.7; 25).
13) foot Persian guards (Persians-melophores) (Arr. An., III.11.5; 13.1; 16.1; Diod., XVII.59.3).
14) Other guard detachments of Darius (Diod., XVII.59.3).
15) Greek mercenaries; Glaucus is an Aetholian.
See text to No. 11 above.
16) selected Indians (probably horsemen, as U. Tarn believed) (Arr. An., III.11.5; 13.1).
A.M. Devine believes that this detachment was made up of two contingents previously mentioned by Arrian (Arr. An., III.8.3; 4) - Indian highlanders and Indians bordering Bactria, under the general command of Barsaent. However, the latter rather led both the Arachosians and the Highlanders in battle.
17) Mard archers (Arr. An., III.11.5; 13.1; Curt., IV.12.7; Diod., XVII.59.3).
Presumably the Mards, as the people of Persia, were subject to Ariobarzanes (see below). G. Berve and V. Hekel believed that the mards and tapurs formed a single detachment, but the latter were horsemen.
17a) Next to the Mards, Diodorus (Diod., XVII.59.3) mistakenly (?) places the Cossaeans, who were not subjects of the king.
Also see No. 34a.

IV. Behind the center “in depth” (second line infantry):
18) The tribes of the Red Sea (Persian Gulf) subject to the king (Arr. An., III.11.5).
According to Arrian (An., III.8.5), they were led by Ocondobats (i.e. Orontopates/Orondobats; satrap of Caria, who fled to Darius after the fall of Halicarnassus), Ariobarzanes and Orxinus (Orsinus). But three commanders of this rank are clearly too many for this contingent; we are faced with an inaccuracy. "Orionibate" (Orontobat) and Ariobarzan under common beginning Orksin was commanded by the Persians, Mards and “Sogdians” (Curt., IV.12.7-8). In the text of Arrian (Arr. An., III.8.5) there is an undoubted lacuna - the Persian national contingent, named further (Arr. An., III.11.5) in the battle schedule of the royal army, like the Mards, is omitted. Ariobarzanes was the satrap of Persia (Arr. An., III.18.2), so he undoubtedly commanded the Persian detachment in the first line. However, it cannot be ruled out that Orxin, like Achaemenid, may have been the satrap of Persia (and the leader of the Persian detachment), while Ariobarzanes ruled only part of this region and was his assistant. G. Berve's version (the inhabitants of the Persian Gulf islands included the Persians themselves) is unacceptable - the sources contrast both nationalities. According to A. Bosworth, the contingent from the Red Sea was commanded by Astasp, satrap of Carmania (but his position is known only due to his appointment by Alexander - it is believed that Astasp was confirmed in his previous post).
Curtius mistakenly places the tribes of the Red Sea (together with the Indians they stand behind the chariots and the detachment of “Phradata”) with the Babylonians on the left flank (Curt., IV.12.9; 10).
Subordinate to the three commanders listed above, the “Sogdians” (Curt., IV.12.7) are sometimes considered Sogdians (for example, the opinion of P. Brant and D. Atkinson), but in reality we have before us a certain people associated with the Mards - or Sagartii (A. Bosworth) from the northern border of Persia, or rather the Sudans. However, Dexippus (FGrH 100 F 8) mentions the “Sogdians”, who under Alexander were ruled as king by a certain Oropius, appointed by Alexander, and this is clearly not Susiana, no matter what G. Berve, W. Tarn and W. Heckel claim. Judging by the context, Dexippus is talking about a certain semi-independent people (and their native king) on the borders of Persia.
19) Babylonians (militia?); Bupar (he also commanded the Carians) (Arr. An., III.8.5; 11.5).
It was suggested (P. Briand) that Bupar, being the satrap of Babylonia (K.F. Lehmann-Haupt and G. Berve agree with this version of his position), fell at Gaugamela. His successor was Mazeus (satrap of Syria and Cilicia), who surrendered the city to Alexander. However, O. Leutze already suggested that Bupar was an assistant to the satrap, and the contingent of the Babylonian satrapy was divided between Bupar and the satrap of Syria Mazeus (see No. 29), who otherwise would have had to be content with the remnants of the troops that went with him to the king after the conquest Macedonians of the Levant. In any case, Mazeus’ connections with Babylon are beyond doubt, but Babylonia was not part of his satrapy before the Battle of Gaugamela.
20) Sittaken (military settlers from Babylonia?); Bupar (Arr. An., III.8.5; 11.5; Curt., IV.12.6).
21) Uxia (Arr. An., III.8.5; 11.5).
In the center, in front of the guard of “relatives” and the position of Darius himself, there were another 50 chariots (Arr. An., III.11.6), apparently not supported by anything. Curtius doubles this chariot detachment, first (Curt., IV.12.9) giving 50 chariots to the Caspian detachment of Fradates, and then (Curt., IV.12.10) allocating a place for several more chariots near the Greek mercenaries (quis peregrinum militem adiunxerat) .
As for Fradates, it is rightly believed that this name refers to Autofradates, the satrap of the Tapurs (who lived near the Caspian Sea), who led the Caspians on the right flank (Arr. An., III.23.7; Curt., IV.12.9; VI. 4.24-25), or Frataphernes (and the Caspians, accordingly, are the Hyrcanians). G. Berve suggests that Autophradates was subordinate to Frataphernes, and from Arrian (Arr. An., III.8.4; 11.4) it can be understood that the Tapurians, Hyrkanians and Parthians (all cavalry) were commanded together by Frataphernes, which does not exclude the presence of separate commanders for each of the three tribes under the general command of Frataphernes.

Elephants: A number of researchers (for example, G. Griffith and A. Bosworth) place them in front of the center of Darius, but see the above considerations about the non-participation of these animals in the battle. The hypothesis of the Indian numismatist researcher Dina Pandey that the elephants were brought to Darius by King Porus himself (Pandey “refers” (!) to “The Romance of Alexander” and “Shahname” by Ferdowsi), that the Indians with their elephants played a major role in the battle on the side Persians, and that Darius himself fought while riding an elephant is not at all confirmed by ancient sources. D. Cawkwell expressed an interesting opinion - perhaps the Persian plan was drawn up in advance, but the elephants arrived too late to actually bring them onto the field.

V. On the right flank (satrap of Cilicia and Zarechye Mazei, presumably acting chiliarch):
22) Alban horsemen near the center (Arr. An., III.8.4; 11.4).
23) Behind them are Sakesin horsemen (Arr. An., III.8.4; 11.4; presumably horse archers).
24) horse Hyrkanians; Frataphernes (satrap of Parthia and Hyrcania, later faithfully served Alexander) (Arr. An., III.8.4; 11.4).
25) Tapur horsemen; aka (Arr. An., III.8.4; 11.4).
26) Parthian horsemen (apparently mounted riflemen); Mavac (?) (Arr. An., III.8.4; 11.4; Curt., IV.12.11).
All three of the nations listed above, the Parthians, the Hyrkanians and the Tapurians, fielded only horsemen for Darius.
27) 1000 Saka horse archers; Mavac (Arr. An., III.8.3; 11.4).
According to A. Bosworth, 1000 selected Scythian horsemen in Diodorus on the right wing of Darius (Diod., XVII.59.5) are either Sakesins, or precisely these Sacas who were with the Parthias.
28) Mede horsemen (to the right of the Syrians, according to Arrian - but rather to their left); satrap of Media Atropat (Arr. An., III.8.4; 11.4; Curt., IV.12.12).
29) warriors from Mesopotamia (probably horsemen); satrap Mazeus (Arr. An., III.8.6; 11.4).
30) Syrians from Kelesyria (probably horsemen); aka (Arr. An., III.8.6; 11.4; Curt., IV.12.12).
31) Arias (?); with the satrap of Aria Satibarzan (Arr. An., III.8.4).
In the battle schedule at Gaugamela, the place of the Aryans is not indicated.

VI. In front of the right wing (since the advanced detachments on the flanks were obviously of equal numbers, it can be assumed that on the right flank there were also 3,000 horsemen standing next to the chariots - or 2,000, according to U. Tharn):
32) 50 sickle chariots (probably the same ones that Curtius places above next to a detachment of Hellenic mercenaries) (Arr. An., III.11.7).
33) Armenian horsemen; satrap of Armenia Orontes (Arr. An., III.8.5; 11.7; Curt., IV.12.12).
34) Cappadocian horsemen; Ariak (supposedly a corruption/abbreviation of "Ariarat", ruler of Pontic Cappadocia, but see above) (Arr. An., III.8.5; 11.7; Curt., IV.12.12).
G. Berve and A. Bosworth considered Ariak to be the successor of the satrap Mithrobuzanus killed at Granicus, but it is unlikely that Mithrobuzanus’s troops did not go home and were still operating as a single detachment three years later). For some reason, D. Atkinson includes 2000 Cadusians and 1000 Scythians, and not Armenians and Cappadocians, in the vanguard of the right wing.

Curtius additionally places on the left wing:
34a) Belites and Cossians, behind the Armenians (from Lesser Armenia - probably infantry, although the division into Lesser and Greater Armenia is an anachronism of imperial times) and the Babylonians (Curt., IV.12.10).
34b) behind the Belites were the Gortui from Euboea, and with them the Phrygians, Catonians and Parthians (Curt., IV.12.11).
However, the presence of five new national contingents does not change the overall picture at all. Undoubtedly, these few detachments were part of the second line of infantry.

The depth of the formation of Darius's army is supposedly 16 rows for infantry and 8 rows for cavalry.

In square brackets above are the figures established by E. Marsden and D. Head; other numerical data - mainly according to Curtius (Curt., IV.12.6-10). There were 4,000 Arachosians and Susians at Gaugamela, according to Curtius (Curt., IV.12.6; usually interpreted, following D. Atkinson, as 4,000 all together, and not 4,000 from each nation, as in G. Berve’s version), it can therefore be assumed that each contingent constituted half of this figure. According to Diodorus, the Cadusians (whom, however, he places on the right flank, and Curtius too - next to the Cappadocians) were 2000, and the Scythians on the right wing 1000 (Diod., XVII.59.5). Therefore, we consider it legitimate to correct Marsden’s estimates in this regard (2000 Saks and 1000 Cadusii, all conjectural).

About 2,000 or 4,000 Greek mercenaries (Arr. An., III.16.2; Curt., V.12.4) with both commanders survived after the battle, but it is unclear how many there were before the battle. From one remark of Arrian (Arr. An., III.7.1) we see that at least 2000 Hellenes (as part of a detachment of infantry and 3000 horsemen) were with Mazeus, guarding the crossings across the Euphrates. Marsden, Badian and Devine accept Arrian's figure for all participants in the battle, and Tarn believes that about 500 Hellenes fell in the battle. (cf.: Arr. An., III.23.9) and there were fifteen hundred of them left after Gaugamela. It is also unknown which strategist commanded which Greek detachment. One thing is clear - compared to Issus, the Great King had few Hellenes - Darius was now cut off from the sources of their recruitment. Curtius writes that after that battle 4,000 Greeks joined the king (Curt., IV.1.3; the rest left with Amyntas and Fimond), although according to Arrian, the same number of Greeks and Persians left with Darius after Issus (Arr. An., II.13.1). Therefore, in our opinion, it was about 4 thousand Hellenes loyal to Darius who fought and retreated at Gaugamela without any significant losses (obviously due to the almost exterminated melophors - Arr. An., III.16.1). Before the battle, they were placed opposite the Macedonian phalanx as the only troops (together with the Melophores) capable of resisting it in open confrontation (Arr. An., III.11.7). However, as far as can be judged from the descriptions of the battle, the Greeks did not play a special role in the battle.

Generally speaking, we do not have exact information about the size of the last army of the Achaemenid Empire, and the Greco-Macedonian tradition sharply exaggerates it, guided by a tendency to exaggerate the number of “barbarians”. According to the official version (Arrian’s Callisthenes and Ptolemy “say”), based on the testimony of captured horsemen and the trophy plan, there were 40,000 cavalry and up to 1 million infantry (Arr. An., III.8.6). In the “Description of Alexander’s Campaign” (Itin., 23) there are 40,000 horsemen and 1,200,000 infantry (1:30). Other sources also exaggerate the number of infantry: Diodorus Siculus - 800 thousand infantry and 200 thousand horsemen (Diod., XVII.53.3), Justin - 400 thousand and 100 thousand (as under Issus), respectively (Just., XI. 12.5), Ampelius - 300 thousand infantry and 50 thousand horsemen (Ampel. Lib. Memor., XVI.2), Plutarch - 1 million soldiers (Plut. Alex., XXXI), Orosius (Oros., III.17.1 ) - 404 thousand infantry. Sq. Curtius Rufus (whose estimate is accepted by F. Schachermayr) speaks of 200 thousand foot and 45,000 horsemen (Curt., IV.12.13); his sources were Clitarchus, Callisthenes, and an unknown author from circles close to Parmenion. All authors, except L. Ampelius (Ampel. Lib. Memor., XVI.2: 2000 chariots with sickles), agree with the figure of 200 sickle-bearing quadrigas among the Persians.

So, the general numerical data of the ancients has no meaning. However, where the figures for specific contingents are known (and, fortunately, several of them have survived), they do not exceed one or two thousand, much less often more. Therefore, we come to the conclusion that the last large field army of the Achaemenids slightly exceeded the figure that ancient authors like Curtius and Arrian give for the cavalry of Darius III.
From Diodorus and Curtius we see that the cavalry of the left wing numbered 18,000 people, not counting the Persian contingent. A comparison with Arrian shows that in front of us is the entire cavalry of the left flank. Darius clearly expected, based on the experience of Issa, that Alexander with the right wing would deliver the main blow. To do this, he strengthened his left flank as much as possible, placing most of the cavalry and half of the chariots there, and also allegedly scattered “garlic” in front of the front, having previously marked the place with a special sign so that his own horsemen would not fall there (Curt., IV.13.36; Polyaen., IV.3.17). True, the plot with the tribubulae is more reminiscent of the story with elephants - this was planned to be done on the battlefield, but was not carried out.

W. Tarn back in 1930 put forward the opinion that the Persians had up to 45,000-50,000 cavalry. His alternative method of counting is quite interesting. The British researcher relied on information (mainly from Hieronymus of Cardia) about the contingents collected in this region during the period of the Diadochi. Thus, in 323, the satrap of Media Python received 8,000 horsemen (barbarians) from the eastern satrapies to suppress the rebellion of the Greeks (Diod., XVIII.7.3). And later (317), Peucestes, having attracted the resources of Persia and the east of the empire, was, when absolutely necessary, able to gather only four thousand more native horse soldiers. Of these, 400 Persians (Pevkest also brought 10 thousand Persian infantrymen and another 3000 natives, equipped in the Macedonian style - the ratio of the number of foot soldiers to horsemen is very curious!), 700 Karmanii (and 1500 foot soldiers), 610 Arachotes (and 1000 foot soldiers ), 400 Paropamisadas (and 1200 infantry), 1000 from Aria, Zranka (Drangiana) and Bactria (and 1500 foot soldiers), 500 Indians (and 300 foot soldiers) (Diod., XIX.14.5-8). Actually, Diodorus gives the total figure - 4600 horsemen (Diod., XIX.14.8), but counting by contingents leads to a different total - 4210 people, including 600 Greeks and Thracians of Peucest, so Diodorus, notes A. Bosworth, seems to have missed from the list of its source, some insignificant continent - say, the Gedrosians and Euergetes, who lived southeast of Drangiana (the Parthias were left at home to protect the rear of the coalition from the Medians of the satrap Python).
So, writes Tarn, the regions east of the Tigris minus Media (which then supplied Antigonus with 2000 horsemen and, in addition, more than 1000 horses for the cavalry - Diod., XIX.20.3; 39.2), Parthia and, perhaps, Susiana, exhibited about 12 thousand people ., and this was the limit - Eumenes later could not “get hold of” anything here.
The number of Bactrian cavalry at Gaugamela in the sources is quite reliable. A century later, the Greco-Bactrian rulers collected ten thousand cavalry (Polyb., X.49.1), and this is clearly not all the mobilization capabilities of the kingdom. (Here Tarn, however, draws attention to the fact that it is necessary to take into account the losses during the campaigns of Alexander - both against the Macedonian conqueror and on his side.) Cappadocia with Pontus and Paphlagonia gave Eumenes 5000 horsemen in 321 (Diod., XVIII .30.1; 5). “The composition of the two cavalry wings at Gaugamela,” continues Tarn, “may indicate that Cappadocia, Armenia and Syria (including Mesopotamia) were considered the equivalent of the far eastern satrapies, without Persis; undoubtedly, 15,000 will be quite enough for these regions.” Total 35,000 horsemen. And taking into account the contribution of Media, Babylonia and western Asia Minor, Tarn received the desired figure of 45-50 thousand people, although this was rather a “regular” number, and the real one was less.

G. Delbrück, with his hypercriticism, believed that the Persians at Gaugamela had no more than 12,000 horsemen (cf.: 12,000-15,000 - in K.Yu. Beloch; but it was in the cavalry that the Achaemenids were much superior to Alexander!) and “a relatively insignificant amount of infantry " Considering that Alexander had 47,000 soldiers (Delbrück agrees with this figure), it is clear that the German historian believes, contrary to the unanimous opinion of ancient authors, that the Macedonians had a numerical superiority. Strange as it may seem, it is possible that it was here that Delbrück, contrary to usual, was not too mistaken. On the contrary, I.G. Droysen gives figures for the army of the Persian king of approximately 40,000 horsemen and many hundreds of thousands of infantry. No less fantastic data (about 56,000 infantry and 42,000 cavalry) are indicated by A.V. Venkov and S.V. Derkach. More carefully I.Sh. Shifman expresses the general opinion, suggesting that "Darius's army was (by the scale of the era) very large." The number of troops received by Major General G. Büschleb is 100 thousand people. (counting the transporters and families), of which 10,000 were Greek mercenaries and 40,000 horsemen, or 35,000 foot soldiers and 20,000 horsemen.

The calculations of E. Marsden are generally accepted (with which A.Sh. Shahbazi, P. Green, D. Head, D. Cokewell and others agree). Marsden concluded that 34,000 horsemen (15,000 in the center and right, 19,000 on the left) and an unknown number of infantry were involved in the battle.
As Marsden concludes, Alexander was directly opposite Darius, and his left flank was opposite the Persian right wing. From this we can conclude that half of the Persian army, from the center with Darius to the tip of the right flank, was approximately equal to the Macedonian front from the royal il to the Odrysians, i.e. approximately 3000 yards (2740 m). Taking into account further calculations, it can be assumed that the front of the left wing was about 2000 yards, and the total length of the Persian line was approximately 5300 yards (about 4850 m). Center: probably the following ratios - 130 yards for each detachment of Greek mercenaries, half this distance for the Melophorians, Carians and Mards (although the latter, like archers, could have been in a scattered formation, but it is unlikely that they were scattered in front of the infantry formation), total 450 yards (about 410 m). The rest of the place was mostly taken up by cavalry. The horseman probably occupied a couple of yards (1.8 m) in the formation, the infantryman - half as much space. Thus, there were 2,420 cavalry along the front, and in total (if we accept Polybius’ message about the depth of formation of the Persian cavalry rectangles in eight ranks) there could be up to 19,500 people in the main battle line. According to Marsden's estimates (he has 20 thousand horsemen), 12,000 on the right wing, 8,000 on the left. However, it seems that there were even more horsemen (if Curtius's words about Bessus's 8,000 Bactrians can be believed - perhaps there were that many horsemen on the left flank). This means that either the length of Darius’s battle line was greater than expected, or the depth of the formation was greater. Marsden therefore suggested that, like the infantry in the centre, the cavalry on the left flank became two lines (about 30 meters apart) of squadrons of eight ranks each.
The Asian second-line infantry is not mentioned at all in the descriptions of the battle, and it appears that Darius himself never brought them into battle. One can agree with Curtius that the Persians brought her with them “rather for the sake of numbers than for the sake of real help"(Curt., IV.12.9), "an illusion of strength" (E. Badian), which had "extraordinarily little significance" (E. Marsden), like the second line under Issus. In any case, these militias would be useless against the phalanx. According to the fair remark of W. Tarn, supported by sources, under Gaugamela the Persians focused on cavalry (and chariots) alone. The same Curtius reports that the king mounted a considerable part of the infantry on horses and used them as cavalry (Curt., IV.9.4) - this also explains the presence of a significant number of horsemen among Darius. Unless only the Carians and Melophores, interacting with the Greek mercenary hoplites, had to resist the Macedonian phalanx.

A.M. Devine believes that Marsden's calculations are too exaggerated (although he agrees with the figure of 40,000 people as the regular strength of the Persian cavalry), and Darius had 25,000 horsemen. (but if only on the left there were at least 18-20 thousand, then on the right there should have been no less of them!), infantry - up to 50,000 people. (Calculations for cavalry in Divine go back to G. Griffith, for infantry - to W. Tarn.) However, the number of Darius’ infantrymen is clearly overestimated. Of course, according to Curtius, in Ecbatana the defeated Darius managed to gather 30,000 foot soldiers, including 4,000 Hellenes, and not counting another 4,000 slingers and archers (Curt., V.8.3-4). But this, as E. Badian rightly notes, is fiction. Considering the huge losses of the Macedonian cavalry (up to 1/7 - about 1000 heads) and, of course, desertion, it is unlikely that at least several thousand infantrymen of the Persian army survived during the pursuit and retreat, who did not have the discipline and stamina of the Hellenic mercenaries.

In our opinion, we can assume with some degree of confidence that Darius III deployed 36-38 thousand cavalry and at least 10-12 thousand at Gaugamela, and taking into account the possible large number of second-line militias, perhaps up to 20-25 thousand infantry. Alexander brought to the battlefield an army almost equal (in terms of combat capability), 40,000 foot soldiers and 7,000 horse soldiers (Arr. An., III.12.5). However, thanks to the militias of the eastern Iranian provinces, Darius outnumbered Alexander in cavalry (an important factor given that the battle took place on the plain) by almost 5:1.

As we see, in the center, according to custom, stood the king himself with the guards and Greek mercenaries, followed by the militia infantry. On the flanks were mounted (usually) detachments, and in front of them were chariots and the cavalry attached to them. From this it can be seen that the cavalry flanks were intended to have an offensive task, while the fight against Alexander’s phalanx in the center (where the Greek mercenaries and guards, the best foot units of the Persians, stood) was supposed to be defensive in nature, pinning down the Macedonian infantry, while simultaneously maintaining the integrity of their own formation. Meanwhile, the chariots were supposed to make gaps in the enemy line, where the Persian cavalry would penetrate, thereby deciding the outcome of the battle.
Accordingly, the Macedonians lined up like this: the phalanx in the center, the hypaspists on the right, adjacent to the hetairai (and Alexander), and on the left also the cavalry (Thessalians and Hellenic allies). The second line (infantry) was built parallel to the first - mercenaries, allies, Balkan light armed forces. The space between the lines was covered special units from the flanks. Ahead of the flanks was a cavalry cover. So the formation of the Macedonian army resembled a rectangle, ready to repel an attack from any direction.

Well, you gave it away!))) He’s looking forward to a dissertation. We need to go into detail.
As for the elephants, in the article about the Persian army I indicated that they probably stood in the convoy “Parmenion captured the camp of the barbarians, their convoy, elephants and camels.”
So now, in all articles, in addition to the phrases “According to Marsden...”, “As Divine suggests...”, “According to Bosworth...” you can safely write “Sokolov’s point of view on participation in the battle of elephants is the following... At the same time, he refers to Arrian.” )))
Maxim, you and I can safely write a book, built in the form of a dialogue. We will mention everyone who thinks anything about the texts of the primary sources and express our own opinion, which is opposite to each other. Let's liven up boring texts with a fun twist. The book will go with a bang!)))
- Neither you nor I go after authorities. But Marsden, Divine, Bosworth are them. And therefore their opinion must be listened to. If only because: you read the sources purely in Russian translation; I read Greek sources in Western translations, check the necessary words and phrases in dictionaries, Latin ones are easier; but here they are - all sources are read immediately in the original.
  
  There's nothing about elephant versions. By the way, note that Darius left some of the elephants in Susa, and that the Persians had been familiar with war elephants since the time of Cyrus the Great.
  - Well, speaking jokingly, the main thing for you and me is to promote ourselves. Spam the book on all forums. They will go on sale!)) They buy Taratorin.))
    But seriously, of course the mentioned analysts are respected people. But even though they read Greek or Chinese, the state of the primary sources is such that a lot of versions can be built. If this were not so, then there would be a single version and it would not be disputed. And we see that people who read the original argue with each other. Well, yes, these are subtleties for pure historians. And for the wargaming lads, it is necessary to somehow formalize and structure in a simpler way the sea of contradictory information.
    - Well, look: you don’t know Greek, and you keep running after two carrots, confusing people. But if you were an authority and knew the language, you would immediately understand that domestic translators are the 8th wonder of the world, only negative...
      
      Here you go... Nefedkin is not from Mars))) Mishchenko and Dustunis seem to be respected too. How do you feel about Perevalov? I cited his excerpts from Arrian's Tactics.

Comparing Macedonian with Hannibal or Caesar is still incorrect, just as we would compare Tirennos or Savoy with Tamerlane or Napoleon.

Neither Hannibal nor Caesar can boast of organizing a state called an empire, the parameters of which would be measured in thousands of km, for some 10 years, being thus “simply” talented commanders; by the way, I still did not have the honor to know What innovative thing did Caesar accomplish in military affairs, or was his generalship glorified “only” by the seizure of a couple of barbarian provinces in favor of the republic and the fact that he brought the end of the latter closer?
Perhaps, the only people comparable to Macedonian are Tamerlane and Napoleon, and perhaps also Genghis, although it is not known whether he was a great commander or a great administrator.

Neither Hannibal nor Caesar had absolute power in the state at the time of their wars. Let's say that Alexander received regular reinforcements, but Hannibal had considerable problems with this, and the Senate interfered with Hannibal and Caesar in every possible way.
And their opponents were stronger than the Persians and Indians. They fell apart very quickly. And Rome fought as an enemy until the last soldier.
By the way, Caesar, in addition to “seizing a couple of barbarian provinces,” fought almost equal troops and generals. And he managed to defeat them. Will the reserve under Pharsal be counted as innovation? If suddenly not, maybe “trench warfare” will do? And the speed of operations with small forces on the verge of an adventure?
- It is hardly logical to say that the Persian cavalry was somehow weaker than the Roman cavalry, well, let’s say Pharsala, the cavalry that kicked the Romans themselves, and fought on equal terms with the best army in the world during the Parthian wars. Yes, for the sake of fairness, it must be said that Caesar won victories, starting in 49, his best victories were when the Senate was broken.
  Thank you for the Farsalian reserve.
  Well, lastly, the fact that Hannibal did not have absolute power to mobilize resources does not elevate him to the status of Macedonian by definition, since we cannot say for sure about the merits of the commander in this case, as well as his organizational abilities, which did not allow the Carthaginian to gain a foothold in the region, which cannot be blamed on Alexander, who was actively integrating in Western Asia.
  We should not forget about the social and cultural significance that enriched the region, whose name is Hellenism, neither Hannibal nor Caesar brought anything to the conquered lands except spears and swords in defiance of the Macedonian, who in ten years did more for the conquered than Rome in its entire history. my history.
  - I think it is basically inappropriate to compare talents. I love Alexander no less than Hannibal and Caesar. But in a situation where you pose the question in this way, for balance, I am forced to shift the emphasis towards Hannibal and Caesar. (I also add Scipio.)
    So, I did not claim that the Persian cavalry was weaker than the Roman cavalry of the time of Pharsalus. For, in the time of Caesar, there was no Roman cavalry as such, with the exception of detachments of aristocrats. But I don’t consider the Persian cavalry weak.
    I wrote quite clearly: “Weak opponents who quickly fell apart.” This is a characteristic of the army as a whole, including many components. Here there is discipline and management and the charisma of the commander and perseverance in battle. And they didn’t fight with cavalry alone.
    It would be interesting to look at Alexander if, after Gaugamela, the Persians held on in the same way as the Romans did after Cannae.
    And since 49, the Senate may have been broken, but the senators were not broken. Cato alone is worth something. And Dyrrachium, Pharsal, Alexandria, Thaps, Mund are serious achievements. And there was no scurrying Darius there.
    I don’t understand what socio-cultural significance has to do with discussing the talents of commanders.
    - Soio-cultural aspects are given to characterize the personality of the Macedonian, as distinguishing him from the Carthaginian and Roman, a more universal personality (in connection with the previous comment about the appearance of such personalities once every thousand years), famous as the creator of the Hellenistic state, in connection with whatever Neither Hannibal nor Caesar can be on the same level with him, being, as I already wrote, “simply” talented commanders
      Yes, and you directly stated that the opponents of the latter were “stronger than the Persians and Indians,” so you are disingenuous by claiming that you did not say that the Persian cavalry was weaker than the cavalry of the Romans at Pharsalus, formally using different terminology. But these are trifles.
      As for how Alexander would have behaved after Cannes, it is not difficult to guess, given his behavior after Gaugamela, well, I think you understand. Here, more than ever, Alexander’s talent as a manager would have come in handy, which cannot be said about Hannibal (here it is, the notorious universalism!).
      The question about the Senate is such that, despite the qualities of its members, the former could not interfere with Caesar’s policies, if only out of prudence, which freed the hands of the latter.
      Well, in order to see Darius scuttling, you had to at least make an effort (although Pompey, I remember, also scuttled in a slave's dress). Moreover, the art of a commander lies in defeating the enemy without resorting to his total physical destruction, do not allow all the enemy’s resources to be used against you, as Alexander III the Great demonstrated with success.

Now about bias (not to be confused with criticism, whether external or internal) towards historical documents, in this case fixed monuments of ancient times. Let us consider the attitude of researchers to the materials of the Battle of Gaugamela authored by such historical writers as Arrian, Diodorus, Plutarch, Curtius etc.
What, according to researchers, prevents, say, Darius from gathering an army of half a million people? Lack of population? Limited territory? Mobilization mechanism? (I must say, well-established over the centuries). For mercy! Everything is absolutely fine with this! And let’s turn to the sources, what do our valiant Greeks write about the Armed Forces of Persia? Exactly. As one, or at least the majority of them, operate with figures ranging from 200,000 to 1 million people, I agree that there can and should be exaggerations, but still, it seems to me, within the limits indicated by the authors of antiquity, it thus seems more It is logical to look for some average number from a number of those proposed, rather than to determine it, guided by the so-called common sense, to put it mildly, sucked out of thin air, they say several hundred thousand wars is unrealistic (by the way, why is this?), but several dozen are quite possible. By doing this, such researchers demonstrate their predisposition to sources, which is poorly justified and fueled solely by considerations of their attitude to this area, in other words, as it seems most convenient to them.
Another point, the authors’ provisions defining the number of troops corresponding to the PERSONAL ideas of the researchers, i.e. within, say, 50,000 people, are immediately recognized as trustworthy, while others similar, THE SAME
authors who record the size of armies of several hundred thousand people are automatically recognized as not real by definition, one gets the feeling that information from a source has been selected in a way that is acceptable (purely psychologically) for researchers.
Thus, against the obvious factors that determine the colossal number of armies as a very real phenomenon, and these include territorial and demographic factors (when, in the conditions of foreign aggression, the majority of those capable of carrying weapons become armed, and given the size of Persia, there will be very, very many of them , it is not for nothing that the same Greeks, describing the imperial mobilization, noted an unprecedented shortage of weapons for the militias, so great was their number, and certainly not 50 thousand.) and mobilization (the ability of the empire’s coercive apparatus to realize its armed potential in a timely manner and in full), and Equally, the reports of written monuments on this topic, researchers, for the purpose of “reasonable” as they consider data correction, can only contrast their PERSONAL attitude to this issue and how everything personal is quite controversial, based on a purely PSYCHOLOGICAL perception of acceptable or unacceptable information. The criterion of truth in In this case, it is the PSYCHOLOGICAL ability of the researcher to admit or not admit in his imagination the reality of active armies of antiquity of several hundred thousand people, which, as we understand, cannot be recognized as a scientific method.

If we talk not about exact numbers, but about estimates at the order of magnitude level, then we can always use analogies. This is very rude for the Roman Empire with its logistics, well-functioning bureaucracy and demography, which are at least no worse than the Persian ones. 30 legions of 5 thousand each plus the same number of auxiliary troops. Roughly 300,000. Well, it could be a little more at some times. But never all these forces gathered in one place. Maximum exertion of Philippa's strength. Roughly speaking, 100 thousand on each side. This is the estimated maximum.
- - Wow! We are dealing with an incredible psychologist! To give out characteristics for once, sorry, I didn’t know... But you could just notice that you don’t agree and this is your personal attitude.
    - He neighed and threw a bun with poppy seeds.
      Catch it, you deserve it.

If Alexander did not fight against 200,000, then what is the argument about? You proposed the thesis that Alexander was greater than Hannibal and Caesar because such forces opposed him.
And I’ll probably repeat it for the third time. Yes, at least Darius had a million. One Darius was enough for them. As soon as he ran, the whole herd ran.
Hannibal and Caesar had other opponents.

It would be nice to note that when the center of the Persians caved in and Darius began to retreat in view of the approaching danger, which Pompey himself would not have disdained, the left flank of the children of the east caved in the orders of Parmenion, if the Macedonian had not come to the rescue in time, it is unknown how it would have ended. So your maxims regarding total flight following the example of the tsar are, at the very least, inappropriate.
And as for escape, following your example, I will also repeat that in order to force Darius to scurry, it was necessary to make certain (and very ingenious) efforts for this, even though I don’t remember that in the entire history of the Persian conglomerate, any of his opponents forced the king of kings to scurry ,hehe.
It is unlikely that even Mr. Pompey himself or, for that matter, Publius Cornelius would have disdained to flee when the enemy’s swords were hanging over them. Oh, yes, I just forgot that neither the Carthaginian nor the Roman got close to the enemy to such an extent.
TO besides, to For example, the brave Pompey only had to see the defeat of his cavalry to consider himself defeated, but where is the battle until the last soldier? Or perhaps you would call Cannes a battle to the last soldier, when nothing depended on the Romans at the end of the battle?
Let it be known to you that the Persian battle formations were able to hold out no worse than the Romans (that is, within a few hours), thank God, or the devil, people knew how to fight long before the Roman legionnaires, who, the awareness of the presence of their military leader, the same Pompey, did not in the least prevent them from retreating in disorder in the most natural way, for example, under Pharsalus. So these statements of yours regarding the different nature of the opponents of Hannibal and Caesar, to put it mildly, are an exaggeration.
- 1. Parmenion was pressed not by the left, but by the right wing of the Persians. I understand that this is a technical error.
  2. Pompey did not flee at Pharsalus. He retired to camp. These are different things. Besides Pompey there were others who fought stubbornly at Thapsus or Munda. Under Munda, Caesar almost lost altogether. By the way, as with Dyrrachia. The Persians did not show anything like this. As an enemy - weaker. Let me put it more simply. The Romans conquered the world, but the Persians could not even conquer Greece. This is the level of Caesar and Sasha’s opponents.
  3. “Oh, yes, I just forgot that neither the Carthaginian nor the Roman got close to the enemy to such an extent.” – how do you know? Caesar personally risked his life on several occasions. For example, going to sea in a boat in anticipation of Antony's fleet from Brundisium. Yes, and near Alexandria. I can give you a quote from the Battle of Munda: “But the fear of the soldiers did not subside at all until Caesar himself, grabbing the shield of one of them and exclaiming to the standing commanders around him: “May this be the end of my life, and for you of the campaigns,” ran forward from the battle formation towards the enemies so far that he was at a distance of 10 feet from them. Up to 200 spears were thrown at him, but he deflected some, and repelled others with his shield.”
  Do you want a quote about Scipio or Hannibal: “Hannibal, when he restored order on the left wing, galloped towards the Ligurians and Celts, leading with him a second line of Carthaginians and Libyans. Seeing him, Scipio, in turn, came there with a second row of his soldiers. Thus, the two best commanders came together to fight; those who were under their command conducted this competition brilliantly, full of respect for their leaders...
  Since the battle was long and indecisive, the leaders, feeling sorry for their tired warriors, rushed at each other in order to hasten the end of the battle with personal combat. Both threw their spears at the same time, Scipio hit Hannibal’s shield, and Hannibal hit Scipio’s horse.”
  Yes, this is Appian. You may not believe it. But to claim that Caesar, Scipio or Hannibal did not personally fight is very presumptuous.
  
  I’ll even highlight this in a separate post: “Let it be known to you that the Persian battle formations were able to hold out no worse than the Roman ones (that is, within a few hours).”
  It doesn't matter what I know and what I don't. I see you want to enlighten me. This is done with quotations. In the meantime, it looks like your opinion.
  
  “So these statements of yours regarding the supposedly different nature of the opponents of Hannibal and Caesar, to put it mildly, are an exaggeration.”
  I repeat. Rome conquered the world, not the Persians. The Persians were unable to defeat the Greeks at Marathon, barely defeated them at Thermopylae, and finally could not destroy the departing 10,000 of Xenophon. These guys could not distinguish themselves either in the Seleucid army or in the army of Mithridates.
  And it’s not worth talking about Crassus, otherwise I’ll answer about Ventidius, and if further then about Belisarius, and if further then about Heraclius.

Without allowing a battle of 35,000 against 200,000, one should understand that it is not the lack of an army of 150-200 thousand warriors among the Persians, but the implementation of maneuvers, in this case Alexander, who did not allow these same two hundred thousand or so to be deployed against him, which for me is what distinguishes the latter (among other things) from the same Hannibal and Caesar for the better, because more talent and courage are required for an offensive operation, especially against superior forces (an important factor purely psychologically), while the gentlemen from the Western Mediterranean preferred defensive tactics (primarily), which does not at all detract from their talent, but still distinguishes them for the worse, as much as possible for such great men.
It is the offensive strategy of the Macedonian that can explain the phenomena of the flight of the Persian king in two battles with Alexander, and not the weakness of the spirit of the Persians and their leader, for if they were in such a situation, I repeat, neither Pompey, nor Scipio, nor all these consuls and leaders would have escaped this Gauls and Germans.

Is Marduk a Persian nickname? Isn't your name Oleg?
Look at the comments here:
The man is similar to you in style and conviction, but he is rooting for the Spartans.

“which, for me, distinguishes the latter (among other things) from the same Hannibal and Caesar for the better”
Use quotes often. For example like this:
Polybius, 2.24: “Thus, to defend the Roman possessions, a total of more than one hundred and fifty thousand infantry and about six thousand cavalry were deployed, and the total number of both Romans and allies capable of bearing arms exceeded seven hundred thousand infantry and up to seventy thousand cavalry. Hannibal attacked them during the invasion of Italy, not having the full twenty thousand troops.”
Otherwise, you are voicing exclusively your opinion. And I show you the military potential of Italy, against which Hannibal fought.

What distinguishes the Macedonian for the better, namely, offensive battle tactics, which requires greater courage and foresight, because it is associated with great risk, does not need to be quoted due to the obviousness.
Further, to argue that the Persians were not a world empire means to ignore the obvious - the considerable size of the conglomerate and the very numerous peoples who inhabited it. Then, the Persians faced the organized resistance of the united Greek city-states, while Rome won its victories without having a united front in front of it resistance and crushed enemies one by one.
And, by the way, the Macedonian, in one campaign, albeit a very long one, did what the valiant Quirites could not cope with for centuries - he conquered all of Western Asia, part of central and northern Hindustan, in defiance of the Italians, who were unable to gain a foothold further Lebanon.
And the strength of the Persian orders can be judged by the same battle of Gaugamela, which could hardly have lasted less than the same Pharsalus, in which, by the way, a certain Pompey left the army after the first failure, and it doesn’t matter whether he ran headlong or calmly( ?) went to the rear, where is the vaunted Roman tenacity or the battle to the last soldier? But this is not and cannot be, because the first major failure of any army in battle, the Roman one is no exception, and, as a consequence, the major success of its enemy, nullifies any persistence. Let us remember how the Romans fled, unconscious, under attack Spartacus, Mithridates, Hannibal, his own countryman Caesar (there is no need to mention battles here, I hope?), no worse than the Persians from the Macedonian.

“Where is the vaunted Roman tenacity or the battle to the last soldier? But this is not and cannot be, because the first major failure of any army in battle, the Roman one is no exception, and, as a consequence, the major success of its enemy, nullifies any persistence. Let us remember how the Romans fled, unconscious, under attack Spartacus, Mithridates, Hannibal, his own countryman Caesar (there is no need to mention battles here, I hope?), no worse than the Persians from the Macedonian.”

Did the Romans, after defeats by Pyrrhus, agree to make peace? No. They said that they would make peace only when Pyrrhus left Italy. Did the Romans make peace with Hannibal after Cannae? No. They called everyone, even the slaves. After the victories of Caesar and the death of Pompey, the Romans continued to fight at Thapsus and Munda. And Sextus Pompey fought even after. And Spartak and Mithridates are generally not the guys who can be used in some examples. Yes, the Romans ran often. But they came back and won.
Now let's compare it with the behavior of the Persians. After Issa, Darius begged Alexander for peace and was ready to give him half of the power. Although he still had enormous forces. And from your words, Darius still had a huge army.
And you compare such a cowardly king with the Romans? Yes, the Persians could not do anything without hired Greeks. Both at Granicus and at Issus the Greeks fought for the Persians. And Darius runs first.
The Persians were only able to fight against the same Asians. They are no rivals to European armies.
- It seems I have already explained why Darius ran, and in his place, anyone would have run.
  Further, the willingness to make concessions does not mean weakness of spirit, or do you think otherwise? In this case, we have every reason to consider this a tactical move that prevents an undesirable course of events, the most suitable means in this case, the benefits of which cannot be overestimated in case of success, that characterizes the Persian more as an intelligent strategist than as a cowardly ruler, especially if it is the east. After all, it will be difficult for you to deny that by making concessions now, the Persians will not try to return everything that they gave? That is, the effect is the same, no one has canceled the state of war, but unlike straightforward Rome, which apparently relied on its walls, and not without reason, to look for such a fortress in ancient times, it acted more resourcefully, diplomatically, but which for some reason looks like cowardice to you.
  Yes, and I dare to correct you, the huge army of the Persians was not according to my words, but according to the texts of the ancients, and some considerations of a geographical and demographic nature, which you had the honor to ignore, characterizing me as an inventor, apparently...
  But in your opinion, it turns out that only mercenaries fought, and the Persians and everyone else stood lazily, yawning, and then the Greeks trembled and everyone ran (by the way, mercenaries are quite equal opponents to the Macedonians, according to your criteria). Too naive, don’t you think?
  Yes, and I would like to add that the Romans, unlike the Persians, whom they were never able to conquer, did not fight with a commander of the rank of Iskender Zul Karnaina, and why, see the previous comment.
  - 1. If Darius’s flight or his desire to give half of the country to Alexander are diplomatic ploys, then maybe Gaugamela and the loss of the entire country is also a diplomatic ploy/tactical move? Was Darius a hero in life?
    Can any warrior running from the field be called a cunning diplomat who lures the enemy? Or was it only Darius who was like this?
    
    “Darius’s diplomatic tricks are all the more understandable when we consider in whose hands his family was…”
    Incomprehensible. Because, for example, Titus Manlius executed his son, who defeated the enemy, but violated the order.
    
    2. No. Not only mercenaries fought for the Persians. Many people fought. The mercenaries showed resilience on the field. Perhaps I would add to the good contingents the heavy cavalry, which showed itself well on the right flank both at Issus and at Gaugamela. But she could not attack the phalanx head-on. Only against Thessalian or Greek cavalry.
    
    3. “Yes, and I dare to correct you, the huge army of the Persians was not according to my words, but according to the texts of the ancients.”
    The ancients also had people with dog heads in their texts.
    Do you believe in these numbers?
    
    And a general question.
    Do you take on faith everything you see in literary sources? And if they differ in numbers or contradict each other, then what do you do?
    - Gaugamela happened after diplomatic moves, didn’t it? And then where did I say about luring the enemy? Besides, as was said earlier, anyone in Darius’ place would have acted and proved the opposite. The personalities of Titus Manlius and Darius are individual, as are their actions, and does not extol one over others. And if many more fought for the Persians, then this is only to the honor of the Macedonian.
      On what basis is the conclusion drawn about the supposed superiority of the Romans over the Persians? Based on the flight of their leader? This only proves the flight of a specific person, even a leader, and if he were in such a situation, wouldn’t even Pompey, even Caesar, even Hannibal, even His Majesty Iskander himself have fled in his place? And then Alexander fought with the Persians, which the proud Quirites cannot boast of .
      Well, we are not discussing dog people (besides, this may well be a metaphor), but we are discussing specific numbers (in themselves more obvious than dog people), and if they disagree with each other in specifics, then in one thing they are tendentious united in big the number of troops, and why not build on this trend, using additional considerations of geography, demographics, and the administrative structure of Persia to adjust, work with the proposed data, and not be guided by considerations of your bias (this is possible, this is not).
      And lastly, no matter how perfect an army stands in front of a commander, it is not something supernatural for him. Caesar, for example, fought against the military miracles of the Romans, but he himself used their capabilities, organization, etc. against them. undoubtedly equates his opponents with himself, and the matter is decided by the individual genius of the warrior and only he, for the Julians were children of their time, and they did not experience any other difficulties than the difficulties of a soldier in battle.
      In other words, no matter what time, against any army a warrior stands, he will not encounter any other difficulties other than the tasks of his military genius. And guided by your logic about the importance of a military leader, we will be forced to recognize both Alexander and Napoleon such geniuses (the latter fought, for example, with backward Euromonarchies) because we will consider their opponents, and not their military decisions.
      
      “And guided by your logic about the importance of a military leader, we will be forced to recognize both Alexander and Napoleon as not such geniuses (the latter fought, for example, with backward Euro-monarchies) because we will consider their opponents, and not their military decisions.”
      Don't make things up for me. For me, Alexander and Napoleon and Caesar and Hannibal are geniuses. You are trying to put Alexander above the rest.
      
      I place Alexander somewhat higher specifically than Hannibal and Caesar, firstly, due to his notorious universalism as a historical figure, and, secondly, his commitment to the offensive nature of military operations as a military leader, which certainly require greater foresight.

Dear Strategist, I do not have the honor of being a certain Oleg, may this information satisfy you. And regarding my nickname, I will take the liberty of correcting you a little, because it cannot possibly be Persian (as far as I know), since the etymology of its Sumerian-Babylonian origin, literally translated as “son of the pure mountain,” this name was borne by one of the gods of the ancient Mesopotamia (known to the Sumerians as the Anunnaki), also known to the Egyptians under the name Ra (according to the text of Sitchin’s “The Lost Book of Enki”, based on Sumerian and ancient Babylonian cosmogonic writings known in official science under the name of myths and nothing else).

The strategist agrees with you. Rome and Persia are completely different peoples, mentality, experience and skills of warfare. The Romans had great wars. The Persians, of course, won and controlled Asia. In terms of military skill, they were not close to the Romans. History itself chose the Romans for dominion over half of the ancient world. The Romans fought themselves, an army built on patriotism, unprecedented discipline and spirituality of the troops. As far as I know, not a single nation could recover

As far as I know, not a single people of antiquity could recover from catastrophic defeats except the Roman war with the Gauls, Pyrrhus, Hannibal, the latter almost plunged Rome to the brink after Cannae. But Rome did not kneel, won and exalted itself over the World.
Persia is a giant with feet of clay, a couple of blows from a serious enemy and their empire fell apart in less than 10 years of war with Alexander the Great.

No people you say? Here is a fairly large example - the ancient Egyptian state, after the invasion of the Hyksos, recovered from defeat and entered the zenith of its military-political power.

Greetings Marduk. With all the respect for the ancient Egyptians, they did not reach heights like the Romans. Rome ruled for 1200 years over most of the ancient world.
After the invasion of the Hyksos, on the contrary, they easily conquered Ancient Egypt almost no fighting and brutal treatment of the local population. The Hyksos even managed to form their own dynasty of rulers. Yes, the Egyptians threw them off after a certain time, but not immediately, but after repentance. The Romans were not punished by any people of antiquity; Hannibal was very close. There would be a similarity between ancient Egypt and the conquest of them by the Hyksos if the Carthaginians or Epiruses or Gauls managed to punish Ancient Rome and the Romans would overthrow their power. And so completely different historical events alas for you.

I greet you in the same way. But excuse me, my answer was dictated by your wording of the question in such a way as “not a single people of antiquity was sent away from catastrophic defeats,” and I pointed out in fairness that this is not so, while your last wording was significantly corrected as “the Romans did not benefit anyone.” managed to subdue “, you will agree that this is a slightly different formulation of the question. It should also be noted, unfortunately for you, that the Hyksos did not completely conquer Egypt and the fight against them was carried out by the pharaohs of Upper Egypt during the 17th-18th dynasties until complete victory. So the precedent is obvious still before the Romans.

Life

1 0 0

If you find an error, please select a piece of text and press Ctrl+Enter.

The Battle of Gaugamela brief description. The Battle of Gaugamela: description, history, interesting facts and consequences. Political changes in Greece

The Persian Empire on the eve of the war

Political changes in Greece

Beginning of the war with the Persians

Balance of power

Tactics of Alexander the Great

Progress of the battle

Results of the battle

Death of Darius

Significance of the Battle of Gaugamela

Background and location of the battle

Enemy forces

Progress of the battle

Results of the battle

Comments

Reviews (46) for Great Battles: Battle of Gaugamela”

Editor's Choice