Defense of the naval fortress Port Arthur. Fall of port arthur

A distant piece of land on the edge of the world, abundantly watered with the blood of Russian soldiers. Eleven centuries ago, the eyes of the whole world were riveted to this place. It was here that the main events of the Russian- Japanese war. Great feats were accomplished here and fatal, and sometimes contradictory decisions were made. The defense of Port Arthur is a vivid example of the military prowess of Russian soldiers.

Port Arthur, which served as the main base Russian fleet in this region, occupied a strategically advantageous position. From this bridgehead, the Russian squadron could strike in the direction of the Korean and Pechili bays. Thus threatening the most important operational lines of the Japanese army. But for all its strategically advantageous position, Port Arthur was not well equipped to serve as a reliable and safe naval base. The inner harbor, where the main forces of the fleet were located, was too cramped and shallow. With only one very narrow exit, it was a real mousetrap in the military-tactical aspect.

Not much more preferable in this regard was an external raid. Completely open, it represented an outright danger, as a parking lot for warships. In addition, the fortress did not have proper protection from either sea attack or land attack. In general, on the eve of the war, it was difficult to call this fortress an impregnable stronghold. Port Arthur was not able to withstand the massive attack of the army and navy of Japan. And he could not provide the Pacific squadron with a safe base. These are the basic premises of the tragedy of this war.

By the time the tight siege of Port Arthur began, only 116 out of the 552 guns of the fortress were in combat readiness. The garrison was not fully equipped with the fourth and seventh East Siberian rifle divisions. As for the fleet, the Port Arthur raid was the location of the first Pacific squadron and the Siberian flotilla.

The war, and, accordingly, the defense of Port Arthur, began on the night of January 27, 1904. The beginning of hostilities was initiated by an attack by 10 Japanese destroyers on a squadron stationed on the roadstead of Port Arthur. Immediately, Japanese torpedoes damaged two squadron battleships and one cruiser. These were the first losses of this dramatic and bloody war...

In the morning, the main forces of the Japanese squadron approached under the leadership of Admiral Heihachiro Togo. From that moment on, the defense of Port Arthur from the Japanese armada, which had a fourfold superiority, directly started. The daytime battle, which did not bring success to the squadron of Admiral H. Togo, culminated in a complete blockade of the fortress. In order to prevent Russian ships from leaving the harbor and disrupt the transportation of Japanese troops to

The valiant defense of Port Arthur lasted 329 days, but the fall of Port Arthur was inevitable. On the 329th day of heroic and fierce resistance, the fortress nevertheless fell. The protracted and exhausting defense of Port Arthur frustrated the plans of the Japanese command regarding the lightning defeat of the Russian troops in Manchuria. The price of 27 thousand Russian lives is the result of the defense of Port Arthur. The damage of the attackers was so great (112 thousand dead and wounded, fifteen sunk and sixteen damaged ships) that the commander-in-chief of the Japanese M. Nogi, who suffered for such monstrous and unjustified losses, was about to perform the hara-kiri rite. But the emperor of the Land of the Rising Sun forbade him this act. And only after the death of the monarch, the general carried out his intention ...

The defeat of the Russian army in the war with Japan in 1904-1905, the shameful peace concluded as a result of it, the first Russian revolution and the anti-patriotic moods that prevailed in the then Russian society left the war itself unattended, in particular, one of its most important and heroic episodes - the defense of Port Arthur.

The whole history of that distant, now forgotten by all, war still raises many questions, doubts and disputes among researchers, and simply lovers of military history.

It is known from various sources that Port Arthur did not have time to properly prepare for defense, main reason The current situation is associated with the lack of the necessary state funding, in those days, the Russian army was plagued by the same funding problems as it is now.

According to the plans of the military department, to complete all construction work and other measures to bring the fortress to full combat readiness it was planned only by 1909, however, the tsarist Ministry of Finance began to allocate money for construction work only with the outbreak of war, in total they managed to allocate about 4.5 million rubles out of 15 million planned, which was approximately less than one third of what was needed.

As a result, by the beginning of hostilities in the fortress, only a little more than half of all work had been completed, with the greatest attention being paid to the coastal front, that is, they were going to defend themselves from the enemy mainly from the sea, and not from the land.

Another miscalculation in the construction of Port Arthur is the fact that its defensive line adjoined the city and the harbor too closely, this gave the Japanese the opportunity to bombard most of the fortress in the future, almost from the very first days of the siege, including the sea harbor itself with warships of the fleet.

It turned out that in terms of military engineering, Port Arthur simply did not fit in terms of its engineering parameters to the standards of the then modern fortress such as Verdun or Brest-Litovsk, the so-called classical fortresses. Port Arthur was not a fortress, but most likely it was a complex of various defensive positions and structures. The Russian military command, perfectly aware of everything weak spots of the defense of Port Arthur, the entire system of the main fortifications was built, relying on the terrain that was quite favorable for defense.

Most of the fortifications were mainly built on the dominant heights, opposite which, to the north of the fortress, there was a relatively flat space, which, as it approached the fortifications, turned into an open sloping area, the entire area was turned by the defenders into a zone of continuous artillery and rifle fire. The rear slopes of the heights served as good cover for men and guns.

With the outbreak of hostilities, the construction of fortifications accelerated, work was carried out day and night. Echelons with troops, artillery, machine guns and ammunition continued to arrive in the fortress until the very last moment. But it was not possible to fully complete all the engineering and construction work in five months, which were calculated for five years.

It is also known from various sources that by July 1904, the Port Arthur fortress was armed with only 646 artillery pieces and 62 machine guns, of which 514 guns and 47 machine guns were installed on the land front.

There were about 400 shells for each gun. For the transportation of goods, materiel, combat stock, food, etc. there were over 4.5 thousand horses in the fortress.

By the beginning of the defensive battles, the garrison of Port Arthur was provided with food, incl. flour and sugar for six months, meat and canned food for only one month. Then they had to be content with horse meat, there were few green supplies, which is why during the siege there were a lot of cases of scurvy in the garrison.

The total strength of the fortress garrison consisted of 41,780 soldiers and 665 officers. In addition, 6 battleships, 6 cruisers, 2 mine cruisers, 4 gunboats, 19 destroyers and the Amur mine transport were stationed in Port Arthur Bay.

There were up to 8 thousand people in the squadron and the Kwantung naval crew, it was a truly well-trained, regular army, consisting of conscript soldiers, whose average age was no more than 30 years old, so the fighters from the Port Arthur garrison, unlike the soldiers of Kuropatkin's army, which consisted for the most part of the reserve, fought professionally, with minimal losses of their own, while inflicting maximum damage to the enemy.

The defense of Port Arthur was led by General A. M. Stessel, to whom all ground and engineering troops, as well as fortress artillery, were subordinate. However, what was interesting to note was that the fleet, which was based in the bay of the fortress, was not subordinate to Stessel, but to the commander-in-chief, who was in Manchuria and could not really control it.

Even in the absence of a sufficient number of long-term, well-fortified structures, Port Arthur met the enemy with an organized defense and, as subsequent events showed, became a real grave for the Japanese land army.

The Japanese sought to capture Port Arthur, primarily in order to destroy it as the main base of the Russian navy, that is land army acted in the interests of the fleet, the events of the war showed that the Japanese fleet fought much better than the ground forces. For the siege and capture of Port Arthur, the Japanese formed a special 3rd army, which consisted of three infantry divisions, two reserve brigades, one field artillery brigade, two detachments of naval artillery and a reserve engineer battalion.

On initial stage siege, not counting the special troops, the commander General Nogi had under his command over 50 thousand bayonets, more than 400 guns, of which 198 barrels of special siege artillery.

In the future, the siege grouping of the Japanese troops constantly increased and soon reached about 100 thousand soldiers, and this is not counting the reserves, with which the Japanese kept up to 200 thousand soldiers and officers near Port Arthur.

The fighting for Port Arthur began in the first half of May 1904. on the distant approaches to it, from the so-called battle of Panshan. This place was called the Jinzhou Isthmus, about 4 km wide (the narrowest point of the Kwantung Peninsula), the positions were defended by the reinforced 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division, which in total numbered about 3,800 people with 65 guns and 10 machine guns. For 13 hours, the regiment resisted parts of the Japanese 2nd Army, about 35 thousand people with 216 guns and 48 machine guns. The Japanese at first acted according to a pattern, tried to storm the heights head-on, walked literally over the corpses of their dead soldiers, 8 consecutive attacks were repulsed by the Russians without much difficulty.

In the end, not having received reinforcements, the regiment was forced to retreat from its tactically advantageous and well-fortified position. As a result of the first battle, the troops of Lieutenant General Yasukata Oku lost 4.5 thousand of the 30 thousand people who participated in the battle. The losses of the Russian troops amounted to about 1 thousand people. This was only the beginning, the main victims of the siege were still ahead of the Japanese.

Further, the assaults on the direct fortifications of Port Arthur were carried out by the Japanese in strict order, as if on schedule, for example,
the assault, carried out from August 19 to 24, ended in the complete defeat of the Japanese, one of the reasons for which was the remarkable accuracy of the night shooting of Russian artillery. The result of the assault - in two weeks of continuous fighting, the Japanese only killed more than 15 thousand of their soldiers, some units, or even entire parts of General Nogi, simply ceased to exist or were no longer combat-ready, Russian troops also suffered serious losses of about 3 thousand people.

Between September 15 and 30, General Nogi delivered his next dense massive frontal attack, this time successfully. The Japanese even managed to capture some secondary positions, but the key point of the entire defensive system - Hill 203 - repelled all attacks. The shock columns were swept down again and again until the hillsides were covered with the corpses of Japanese soldiers. In this battle, the Japanese lost 7,500 people, the Russians - about 1,500 people.

Units of Russian machine gunners acted especially successfully and effectively in repelling all these Japanese assaults, turn after turn they mowed down countless chains of Japanese, sending them in tens or even hundreds to heaven to their Japanese gods, the trunks were red-hot and did not have time to cool down, from intensive exploitation, machine guns failed, the carriers barely had time to bring cartridges with ribbons, there was a roar of battle around, bulk The corpses of the enemy lay there, the Japanese soldiers, like zombies, continued to move forward, and only death awaited them ahead.

In November, another so-called “fifth general” offensive of the Japanese took place, and again it was repulsed by the Russians in all positions and cost the Japanese more than 12 thousand lives.

And only, finally, on November 22 (December 5), the enemy completely occupied Hill 203 (Vysokaya Mountain). The total losses of the Japanese during the assault on the mountain amounted to about 10 thousand people. Russian troops lost 5 thousand. soldiers and officers, these were the largest one-time losses of Russian troops in the entire defense of Port Arthur.

From the captured mountain, the Japanese began to correct the fire of heavy siege guns on Russian ships. Soon, most of the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron were sunk in the Port Arthur raid. The fate of the fortress was sealed. The failure of the constant assaults, as well as the entire siege of the fortress as a whole, dramatically complicated the situation in the Japanese siege army. In many formations, the “limit of so-called stability” was surpassed, as a result of which the morale of the Japanese troops dropped sharply.

There were cases of disobedience and even an attempted rebellion, and this is among the always disciplined Japanese, who have their own philosophy of life and death, which is special from all peoples, who, as Japanese experts say, have never been afraid to die for their emperor, it is clear that not everything is like that - they were afraid and even how they were afraid. The behavior of the Japanese high command itself is also interesting, which threw tens of thousands of its soldiers right to the slaughter, one can directly say that the Japanese literally filled up the defenders of the fortress with the corpses of their soldiers.

According to various sources, it is known that during the siege of Port Arthur, the Japanese army lost from 90 to 110 thousand of its soldiers killed, wounded, died from wounds and diseases - these were truly horrific losses. Russian losses amounted to only 15 thousand dead, of which 7800 soldiers and officers were directly involved in combat.

On December 23, 1904 (January 5, 1905), a capitulation was concluded, according to which the garrison of 23 thousand people (including the sick) surrendered as prisoners of war with all stocks of combat equipment.

In those days, knightly traditions were still in effect and the Japanese allowed Russian officers to return to their homeland. Those who agreed to give their word of honor at the same time that they would not participate in hostilities.

The question still remains controversial, could Port Arthur continue to resist, or were the garrison's resistance forces really completely exhausted? Who is the head of the garrison, General Stessel - a criminal who surrendered the fortress to the enemy or a hostage of the circumstances. Some researchers argue that the further resistance of the fortress defenders was futile, completely blocked from the sea and land, without ammunition and sufficient food, Port Arthur was doomed, and Stessel's actions as a commander were justified, they made it possible to save the surviving defenders of the fortress. There is another opinion that Stessel committed a betrayal, as he handed over all the artillery to the Japanese, and this is at least 500 units. artillery pieces of various calibers and systems, large stocks of provisions and other material assets, which at the time of surrender continued to remain in the fortress.

Stessel nevertheless appeared before a military tribunal, which sentenced him to death for surrendering the fortress and port. The court found that during the entire period of defense, Stessel did not direct the actions of the garrison to protect the fortress, but, on the contrary, deliberately prepared it for surrender. However, the sentence was later replaced by a 10-year sentence, but already in May 1909 he was forgiven by the tsar. The society of the then Russia was not at all interested in the details of the lost war, students and female students were then more interested in bombers and revolutionaries of various stripes, and the heroic defense of Port Arthur, located already on the other side of the world, the war with some Japanese - all this was perceived for the most part society rather as exotic and nothing more.

For a long time and with curiosity, I studied the history of the defense of the Port Arthur fortress during the Russo-Japanese War. She eventually fell due to the betrayal of the head of the fortress, Stessel (for reference, a German surname with Polish-Lithuanian roots, buried in the Vinnitsa region after death) and Fock (German surname), who hurried to surrender it after the death of the actual head of defense Kondratenko, although the fortress could still hold the defense. There were supplies of provisions, and a garrison of 24,000 soldiers and sailors. Stoessel and Fok ended up being court-martialed for this surrender, but were ultimately pardoned.

While the Russian soldiers and sailors under the leadership of Makarov and Kondratenko were shedding blood for the fortress, they made plans to surrender behind their backs, which they did when the real defenders died.

I emphasized the origin of the traitors not with the aim of inciting nationalist sentiments, but with the aim of understanding people's motivations. In tsarist Russia, there was a dominance of foreign leaders who did not really associate themselves with Russia, and therefore were not going to fight to the end. For them, this is a common occurrence. What is there to walk in the mud under bullets. They handed over and left for St. Petersburg, besides, the Japanese guaranteed safety, they immediately released me. In St. Petersburg, for the sake of appearance, they scolded at the tribunal and pardoned. The same story was then in the first world war. Mass surrender of generals.

But I did not start my story because of these facts. This came to mind along the way. I have long noticed the dominance of German and Polish-Lithuanian surnames in the highest echelons of power in the empire. Yes, I think everyone who is interested in the topic sees this. Alexander Pyzhikov writes about this in detail.

Today I accidentally found out how we got the fortress:

"WITH. Yu. Witte protested against such a proposal: after the Russian-Chinese secret defense treaties, in which we “undertook to protect China from any encroachments of Japan to occupy any part of Chinese territory ... after all this, such a seizure would be an outrageous and highly insidious measure ... This measure is dangerous ... The occupation of Port Arthur or Da-lian-wang will undoubtedly excite China and from a country extremely located and friendly to us will make a country hating us, due to our cunning.»

“Dubasov quickly solved the problem of the landing of Russian troops in Port Arthur and the departure of the Chinese garrison from there. After the distribution of bribes to petty officials, General Song Qing received 100 thousand rubles, and General Ma Yukun - 50 thousand (not in banknotes, of course, but in gold and silver coins). After that, the local garrison of 20,000 left the fortress in less than a day, leaving the Russians with 59 guns along with ammunition. Some of them will then be used to defend Port Arthur.

« After big bribes to the dignitaries there (500,000 rubles for Li Hongzhang and 250,000 rubles for Chang Yinghuang), an agreement (Russian-Chinese Convention) was signed on March 15 (27), 1898 in Beijing.

How to buy and sell. Just washed with blood.

There is a very interesting book on this topic - Port Arthur, historical novel A. N. Stepanova.

A little about the heroism of our sailors on the Varyag and the assessment of their actions by foreign ships. For those who simply do not know what happened there, I will briefly retell below.

Exactly at the appointed time, the Varyag, accompanied by the Korean, moved off. Immediately, a combat alarm was sounded on both ships and topmast flags were raised on the masts. As if welcoming the Russians, it looked out from behind the clouds bright sun and illuminated the gloomy raid of Chemulpo. The city was immediately decorated with white and red spots of buildings, the sea turned blue, in which the ice floes that had not yet melted were floating.

Entire garlands of multicolored flags flew up on foreign ships, expressing greetings and best regards going to battle Russian ships. When the cruiser caught up with the Talbot, the Russian anthem sounded from the English ship, the crew lined up on deck took guard, saluting the Russian flag.

The same thing happened when passing by Pascal, Elbe and Vicksburg. The temperamental French could not stand it, with a cry they broke the line and began tossing up their berets with red pompoms, noisily expressing their delight.

“You might think that we are not going to battle, but to the parade,” Lyashenko said excitedly.

The solemn farewell had an encouraging effect on everyone. Bondarenko stopped frowning and busily fiddled around the gun. Having passed the fire tower and having reached the outer roadstead, the Russians saw in front of them six dark silhouettes of Japanese cruisers and eight destroyers clearly looming against the light blue background of the sky. They positioned themselves in a bearing formation in the direction of the entrance beacon in such a way that they closed both passages into the sea around the island of Idolmi. On the lead cruiser "Naniva" the flag of Admiral Uriu fluttered. Behind him in the wake column were five other cruisers. The end was "Asama".

The essence of the situation is that the Russian ships Varyag and Korean met the beginning of the war in the neutral port of Chemulpo. A Japanese landing force landed on the ground, the exit to the sea was blocked by the Japanese fleet. The ships were trapped. They were asked to surrender. At the same time, the captains of some foreign ships offered to take in all the sailors if they wished to leave the ships.

Captain Varyaga Rudnev made a suicidal decision to break through with a fight, which caused bewilderment and delight of the crews of foreign ships standing in the roadstead. They were aware of the hopelessness of the situation and the very unequal distribution of forces at sea. What happened next, I think most people know. The Varangian took an unequal battle, was badly damaged, returned to the port, where he was flooded.

The fortresses of Port Arthur from February 9 (January 27, old style) 1904 to January 2, 1905 (December 20, 1904, old style) during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).

In order to secure access to the Yellow Sea, in 1898 the tsarist government of Russia leased for 25 years part of the Liaodong Peninsula (Kwantung Peninsula) with Port Arthur (now Lushun). The construction of fortifications in Port Arthur, due to lack of funds, began only in 1901 (by January 1904, nine long-term and 12 temporary batteries out of 25 batteries were built in the coastal direction; only one fort, three fortifications and three batteries out of six fortifications, five fortifications and five long-term batteries were completed in the land direction). Of the 552 guns, 116 were on alert. The garrison of the Kwantung Peninsula consisted of the 4th and 7th East Siberian Rifle Divisions. The head of the Kwantung Fortified Region was Lieutenant General Anatoly Stessel, the commandant of the fortress was Lieutenant General Konstantin Smirnov, the head of the land defense was Lieutenant General Roman Kondratenko, who became the organizer and inspirer of the defense of Port Arthur. By the beginning of the war, the 1st Pacific Squadron was in Port Arthur under the command of Vice Admiral Oscar Stark (seven battleships, nine cruisers (including three old ones), 24 destroyers, four gunboats, two minelayers, two mine cruisers).

On the night of February 9, 1904, 10 Japanese destroyers suddenly, before the declaration of war, attacked the Russian squadron, which, due to the carelessness of the command, was on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur without proper security measures. The battleships "Tsesarevich", "Retvizan" and the cruiser "Pallada" were heavily damaged. But the enemy failed to destroy the Russian squadron with one sudden blow. In the morning, the main forces of the Japanese fleet appeared in front of Port Arthur (six battleships and 10 cruisers under the command of Vice Admiral Heihachiro Togo). A Russian squadron came out to meet them (five battleships and five cruisers). The fight lasted for about an hour. Under the fire of Russian ships, supported by coastal artillery, the enemy retreated and went to the open sea. His attempts to block the Russian squadron from entering the inner roadstead of Port Arthur were also unsuccessful.

On March 8, Vice Admiral Stepan Makarov took command of the Pacific Squadron, taking decisive measures to increase its combat activity. But on April 13, during one of the squadron's exits to the sea, the flagship battleship "Petropavlovsk" hit a mine and sank two minutes later. Makarov and most of the crew were killed. Rear Admiral Wilhelm Witgeft took command of the squadron.

The passivity of Rear Admiral Witgeft, who took command of the squadron, allowed the Japanese to unhinderedly begin on May 5 in the Bizwo area the landing of the 2nd Army of General Yasukata Oku, which, without meeting resistance, cut railway track on Port Arthur, on May 26, Japanese troops, thanks to a significant superiority in forces (about 35 thousand people against 3800 people from the Russians), captured Russian positions on the Jinzhou Isthmus, covering the distant approaches to Port Arthur. Russian troops retreated to positions along the line of the Lunaantan Bay. Fearing an attack by the main forces of the Russian army from the north, the enemy left one division against Port Arthur, and redeployed three to the north. Sent to support Port Arthur, the 1st Siberian Corps under the command of General Georgy Shtakelberg (about 30 thousand people) was defeated near Vafangou on June 14-15 due to inept leadership. To capture Port Arthur, the Japanese created the 3rd Army of General Maresuke Nogi, which launched an offensive on June 26 and reached the near approaches to the fortress by July 30, beginning its siege. By this time, its garrison consisted of about 50.5 thousand people (of which eight thousand sailors), 646 guns (including 350 serfs) and 62 machine guns. The enemy had about 70 thousand people, about 400 guns (including 198 siege guns) and 72 machine guns.

On August 10, Russian ships again made an attempt to break through to Vladivostok (the first attempt was made on June 23), but after an unsuccessful battle in the Yellow Sea, they returned to Port Arthur, where they actively supported the ground forces with their fire during the defense of the fortress, transferred artillery and personnel to the troops to strengthen the defense.

On August 19, the enemy launched an assault on Russian positions. In fierce battles that lasted until August 24, at the cost of heavy losses (about 15 thousand people; the Russians lost over six thousand people), he managed only in some places to wedge into the main line of defense of the fortress.

On September 19-22, Japanese troops launched the 2nd assault. Having suffered heavy losses (7.5 thousand people against 1.5 thousand people from the Russians), the enemy captured three fortifications - the Kumirnensky and Vodoprovodny redoubts and the Long height; the main object of their attack - the High mountain dominating the city - withstood.

On October 1, the shelling of Port Arthur from 11-inch howitzers began, destroying the concrete casemates of the fortress, not designed for such a caliber of guns. During the 3rd assault on October 30-31, the Japanese troops were able to occupy only a few secondary fortifications. Having received replenishment, the enemy resumed the assault on November 26, directing the main blow against Vysokaya Mountain, on December 5, despite the heroism of the defenders, took possession of it and began destroying the surviving ships of the squadron locked in the inner roadstead with artillery fire. The battleship Poltava was the first to die on December 5, the next day - the battleships Retvisan and Peresvet, on December 7 - the battleship Pobeda and the cruiser Pallada, on December 9 - the cruiser Bayan. Of the large ships, only the battleship "Sevastopol" (Captain 1st Rank Nikolai Essen) survived, which left the inner raid in a timely manner and took refuge in the White Wolf Bay. Here it was attacked by Japanese destroyers for six nights, but to no avail: two of them were destroyed by artillery fire from the battleship, and nine were seriously damaged. Until the very end of the defense of Port Arthur, "Sevastopol" continued to provide fire support to the ground forces.

On December 15, General Roman Kondratenko died with his closest assistants. General Anatoly Fok, a supporter of the surrender of the fortress, was appointed head of the land defense. On December 29, a meeting of the military council was held, the majority of the participants of which spoke in favor of continuing the defense. However, despite this, Anatoly Stessel signed the capitulation on January 2, 1905.

On January 2, 1905, the Port Arthur garrison numbered over 32 thousand people (including about six thousand sick and wounded), 610 guns, nine machine guns, about 208 thousand shells and up to three thousand horses.

The heroic defense of Port Arthur lasted 329 days, including 155 days of direct struggle for the fortress on the land front. She pinned down large enemy forces (up to 200 thousand people), frustrating his plan to quickly defeat the Manchurian army. In the struggle for Port Arthur, the Japanese lost over 110 thousand people and 15 warships, another 16 ships were heavily damaged and out of action for a long time. The losses of the Port Arthur garrison in killed and wounded amounted to about 27 thousand people.

Under the Portsmouth Peace Treaty (1905), lease rights to Port Arthur passed to Japan, and it became the main base of Japanese aggression in China. In 1923, the lease expired, but Japan did not return Port Arthur to China. During the 2nd World War (1939-1945), on August 14, 1945, an agreement was signed between the USSR and China on the joint use of Port Arthur as a naval base for 30 years. On August 23, 1945, Soviet troops liberated Port Arthur. In February 1950, an agreement was concluded between the USSR and the PRC on the joint use of the naval base of Port Arthur for three years, which was extended in 1952. After the end of the war in Vietnam and Korea in October 1954, an agreement was concluded on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Port Arthur, which was completed in May 1955, and all the facilities of the fortress and the naval base were transferred to the PRC.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources

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Subtitles

I wholeheartedly welcome you! Boris Vitalievich, good time of the year! Likewise. What did you brake on last time? Then we talked about the prelude to the Russo-Japanese War, i.e. how our countries came to the point of declaring war. Well, now it probably makes sense to talk about what they fought: the armed forces, weapons, and so on. Those. It would seem that you are looking at the globe, we are very fond of making history on the globe, and there is a huge Russian Empire, and tiny, tiny Japan. Well, as a matter of fact, it is really tiny, and in terms of population it was much smaller than the Russian Empire, although not in the way it looks on the map: Russian empire had 170 million inhabitants at that moment, the Japanese Empire had 42 million inhabitants, as far as I remember. Somewhere in the mid-80s, I remember, I somehow climbed into an atlas - there were such good-quality Soviet atlases - and was surprised to see that there were 117 million Russians and 117 million Japanese. This Japan near Russia is not even visible, but we are the same around now. Now yes. There are more Russians than Japanese, but there are fewer Russians, perhaps even narrower. Those. there are more than 120 million Japanese now. Well, even 40 is still good, i.e. it's a decent state. Quite, which at that time was developing quite rapidly. Those. after the Meiji revolution, Japan really grew there every year very solidly. As a matter of fact, like the Soviet Union under Stalin - somewhere like that, the same pace of development was. But the truth is, the Japanese had a very low start, i.e. from deep feudalism resolutely into capitalism. By this time they had already won the Sino-Japanese war, received a colossal contribution, received warships and, in fact, received international recognition as almost white people who have the right to own colonies, and not be a colony. Those. made their way into a number of leading world powers. Well, of course, the forces, if taken as a whole, of Russia and Japan were poorly comparable, after all, Russia was much larger, had a large economy and had more than a 4-fold superiority of the population. Those. there was a definite advantage. But we did not have a war between Russia and Japan, let's say that Japan is trying to seize Russia or Russia is trying to seize Japan. The war is colonial - i.e. who will rob the Chinese. And here Japan is nearby, Russia is generally far away, i.e. the main resources of the Russian Empire are located to the west of the Urals, and then to the east of the Urals, the devil knows how much to cut to this China, to Manchuria. So that's what the Russian army was like. Sorry, I'll interrupt you: but in those days BAM was already laid there, no? No, they laid the Trans-Siberian. Was there a railroad? Yes, but it was a single-track, i.e. on light ballast, with light rails, i.e. limited carrying capacity of trains, limited speed - no more than 30 miles per hour. And so, in fact, by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, the Trans-Siberian Railway had a capacity of 6 pairs of trains per day. Not rich. Well, the trains then had a much lower carrying capacity than now - the echelons were shorter, the locomotives were weaker. Well, accordingly, if on ships, then this is from the Baltic or from the Black Sea, or through Suez. .. Across 3 oceans. Or around Africa, where the hell. Far. Yes. Therefore, it turns out that the theater was largely isolated. True, there were also ... there was a certain Russian population, and there were Cossack troops located just along the border with China, i.e. certain human resources were. But of course, they cannot be compared with the Japanese 40 million. And so, in principle, the entire theater of military operations "hung" with us either at sea and on a single-track railway , or simply on a "single-track" if the Japanese dominate the sea. But this is precisely the alignment in terms of logistics. And now: what were the armed forces. The Russian Empire had the largest peacetime army at that time, i.e. the army itself was about 1 million 100 thousand people, and all the armed forces - about 1 million 350 thousand people. For comparison: the Japanese army consisted of 160 thousand people in peacetime. Incomparable, yes. The system, the organization of the armed forces was quite close: we had an all-class military service, not a universal one - we didn’t have enough economy for a universal one. At the same time, they served in military service for 4 years, then they were in the reserve, then they were assigned to the militia. So, those who were not called up for military service, they were immediately enrolled in the militia warriors. Those. this is how, in theory, the service should have been built. By the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, we had about 2 million trained reserves, to the army that we have. The Japanese have a peacetime army of 160 thousand people, according to Kuropatkin’s report, who carefully studied Japan and was considered, by the way, one of the brilliant strategists at that time, well, before the Russo-Japanese War, before the start, and so he estimated the mobilization abilities of the Japanese army, taking into account both reservists and territorial troops, as 375 thousand people. The picture was actually somewhat different: the Japanese took over the Prussian system, i.e. they have 3 years of military service, 4 years 4 months in reserve, and then transferred to the reserve. They also had an all-class military service, because they also did not pull the universal one, and they managed to mobilize 600 thousand people at the beginning of the war. Not bad! Their country was divided into 12 divisional districts, and, in fact, they created an army of 13 divisions - 12 infantry divisions and 1 guards, capital. And in each division, a reserve brigade was created from artillerymen. Those. here are 13 divisions - 13 brigades, not counting the cavalry units. These are the main parts. Further, here is what they had in reserve and in the militia, from which additional units were already recruited for territorial troops and ... reserve divisions. That is, the Japanese managed, let's say, to put under arms more than they had planned according to the regular mobilization scheme. And here we get a picture: we have 1 million 350 thousand, the Japanese have 160 thousand, but we have 98 thousand people in the Far East - this is in the troops and 24 thousand border guards, also, in principle, sometimes participated in battles, but they were subordinate to the Ministry of Finance. So, the Japanese get a clear superiority. Everything else we have is what we deliver by rail, and what we can supply by it. The Japanese army was well prepared; until 1901, not even - until 1902 it was prepared by German specialists, since 1902 it was prepared by English specialists, taking into account the experience of the Anglo-Boer War. Our army was preparing, in fact, according to its own developments and, in principle, they were a little outdated by this time. For example, the Japanese mastered such a thing as digging in on the battlefield, we did not include this in serious disciplines. Actions were practiced in loose formation, i.e., for example, if the Japanese have a 3-battalion regiment, then it has 6 companies deployed in rifle chains, 2 companies in platoon columns, so to speak, provide support, and 1 battalion is in reserve. If we deploy a regiment, then we had a rather stupid binary system there, or rather, a quaternary system - this is ... in short, we have 4 regiments in a division, 4 battalions in a regiment, 4 companies in a battalion. Those. Our regiment has 16 companies. So, of these, 2 companies were deployed in rifle chains. 2 more companies in platoon support, i.e. 4 companies - this is the first line. 4 companies - this is our second line in company columns, i.e. in fact, the reserve of those deployed units, and 2 battalions in reserve. Is this due to the lack of experience of the war, or was it somehow like that then? Reinsured, ie. they overestimated the role of the reserves and because of this they underestimated the role of those troops who are directly engaged in the battle. During the war, this practice began to be revised, i.e. they began to deploy from the regiment, for example, not 2 battalions, but only 1, but 3 battalions into battle formations. Well, because otherwise it was not really possible to fight at all - no matter what the forces were, it still fights a little. We had much better quality cavalry and much more numbers than the Japanese. Those. better horse composition, better dressage. But the cavalry did not particularly "ignite" this war. The Japanese cavalry was smaller in number, but it was essentially riding infantry, i.e. she was not noticed in dashing cavalry attacks; in any combat clash she immediately dismounted, lay down and fired back from her rifles. Did the horses lie down too? Driven to the rear. And so, if there was a horse cabin, of course, our cavalry would be much stronger. But there were no horse cuttings in this war. Those. among the Japanese, the main bet was made on the infantry. Of the advantages of our infantry over the Japanese, there was a clear advantage - we had a high march culture, i.e. Do you remember drill training in the army, right? The ability to march in step. Cheerfully enough goes, say, a company somewhere. The Japanese did not have time for this, therefore the troops marched almost in a crowd, i.e. a long stretched column without formation, out of step, nothing. Because of this, they got 1.5-2 times lower marching speed of the division than ours. How lovely! This, by the way, affected the speed of Japanese manners during the war. Yes. A well-known joke about: if you are so smart, why don’t you walk in formation - in general, it is not a joke. Well, yes, i.e. the Japanese didn’t march in formation, by the way, according to the experience of the Russo-Japanese war, they took this very seriously, and already by the next war with China, they seriously trained their troops in this regard - they began to move much more vigorously. On the topic of armament of this very infantry: our main infantry armament was the Mosin rifle: a magazine rifle of 1891, it was further improved, i.e., in principle, by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War we had several modifications in service, but they were all called exactly the same. And this rifle, we often write that it was the best in the world. Usually they forget to add: it was the best in the world in the year of its creation - in 1891. No, it really was the best in the world, at that time the Lebel magazine rifle, for example, which was the most common, was inferior to our Mosin rifle in most parameters. There is a Gra rifle and others - they were worse. The same Japanese Murata rifle is old, it was also worse. But in the future, newer rifles were created. What about Arisaka? "Arisaka" was newer, it was created with an eye on the German Mauser rifle of 1898. In principle, what were the differences between "Mosinka" and "Arisaka" - "Mosinka" we have a 3-line, i.e. caliber 7.62 mm. Japanese rifle 6.5 mm, i.e. smaller caliber. "Arisaka" is a little lighter than "mosquito", has a large initial speed , better ballistics at close and medium distances, well, due to the higher initial speed. At long distances, the "mosquito" hits a little better due to the corny heavier bullet. It has a better effect on the enemy's body, again, due to a heavier bullet. It has a greater return, due to the larger caliber. The Arisaka rifle has a special shield, for example, on the bolt, which closes the mechanism from dust and dirt. The "mosquito" does not have such charms, but the mechanism is made so, let's say, reasonable from the point of view of use in combat, that reliability is still high. Those. the Mosin rifle was very little afraid of pollution. But due to the fact that our rifle is still older, that is, there are several archaic shortcomings: a less comfortable butt stock, a bolt handle pushed forward, i.e. at Arisaki it is nearby, at Mosinka it is further away, which complicates ... not that it complicates - it knocks down the sight when reloading more. We have a protruding store, the Japanese have it drowned in the butt stock, i.e. it cannot be damaged by, say, an accidental blow. But all these moments, in fact, relate to taste, i.e. weapons can be considered virtually equivalent. Those. a company armed with Mosin rifles will be no worse in a firefight than a company armed with Arisak rifles, or practically no worse. And the shootout in this case will be quite equivalent to itself. Our militia units, which, for example, subsequently fought on Sakhalin, were armed with a Berdan rifle, this is our previous one. It is single-shot, it was magnificent at one time, but in the Russo-Japanese War it was already completely outdated. The Japanese, just like ours, only have enough Arisaka rifles for combat units and reservists. Those. their landwehr, such a militia, was also armed with obsolete rifles, i.e. then the reserve divisions fought with them. These are Murat rifles. The Murata rifle is worse than the Arisaka or Mosinka, but it is noticeably better than the Berdan rifle. But this, I say again, is part of, one might say, the second line. This is what concerns small arms. You can remember more machine guns, in fact. At the beginning of the war, there were no machine guns, practically none, neither we nor the Japanese, in the combat zone. Let's say we had 8 machine guns in the Manchurian army - that's about nothing. The Japanese also began fighting, in general, without machine guns. During the war, the saturation of machine guns grew greatly. We had the main machine gun - this is the Maxim machine gun, which we produced under license from the Vickers company. It has colossal firepower, i.e. it can fire continuously, it has water cooling, but we have it located on enough, and not just enough, but on a terribly bulky, gun-like carriage - with high wheels, with a large shield. This is good against the Papuans, against a well-armed enemy army, this is not very ... Not great, right? The Japanese used, moreover, from a tripod, usually a Hotchkiss machine gun of either the 1897 or 1900 model of the year. By the way, the Japanese have set up its production. This is a rather interesting design, in which not everyone immediately recognizes a machine gun. For example, they used the so-called. rigid tape, i.e. he only fired really reliably with a stiff tape. What it is? And this is a frame for 2.5 dozen rounds, which you insert from the side, shoot, insert the next one, shoot. Those. this machine gun, due to such loading, and also due to the fact that it had air cooling, could not lead ... to provide such a flurry of fire as the Maxim machine gun. But it was much lighter, more compact, and, sadly, the Japanese had many more of them. Those. for example, in the battle of Mukden, we had 56 machine guns, while the Japanese had 200. Wow! Except Vickers machine gun, but, by the way, the Vickers, in addition to its large dimensions and very heavy weight, the Vickers / Maxim, which we had in service, had another very big drawback: the fact is that ours bought a license in 1897 for the production of this machine gun, according to which the Vickers company was deducted 50 pounds sterling for each machine gun produced by us over 10 years - this is about 500 rubles in gold. Not bad! For every. The Vickers firm stood firm. Very. Those. right here, given that the production of machine guns was constantly growing, i.e. at first they aimed that a little would be produced, but here they hit the money very solidly. Bouncing to the side: but what was the machine gun of the Red Army soldier Sukhov? He had a "Lewis" - this is a World War I light machine gun, this is a much later machine. Yes, let's continue. But by the way, we also had a machine gun similar to this one. Well, i.e. how - outwardly not similar, but similar in method of use. It was purchased from us for fortresses, here are Privetninskaya and fortresses Far East , Madsen submachine gun. Those. it would seem that this is what the troops need, and he was purchased for fortresses. In fact, this is precisely a light machine gun, i.e. he is with a casing, with a bipod, a store on top - a classic of the genre. Here, in fact, there were two such machine guns - "Vikkres" / "Maxim" and this one here "Madsen", Danish. A good machine gun, but with all the shortcomings of a light machine gun - i.e. from it such a flurry of fire as from an easel one cannot be provided, and such accuracy of fire. This is a firearm. Those. it can be considered, in principle, equivalent. Regarding artillery: we had the main cannon - this is the cannon of the Obukhov factory of the 1902 model. The Japanese have a 75mm Arisaka cannon. The caliber is almost the same - 75 mm and 76.2 mm. But our cannon belonged to what is called a "quick-firing gun", i.e. rollback along the axis of the bore, high-speed shutter. Those. our cannon provided a rate of fire quite easily up to 15 rounds per minute. Solid! The Japanese cannon was more compact than ours, but refused to carry the entire carriage, i.e. had no recoil devices at all. Shutter access is rather inconvenient and separate charging, i.e. rate of fire 4-5 rounds per minute. Plus, our gun was superior in rate of fire, i.e. our cannon hit 10 miles, the Japanese - 7. Our shrapnel could shoot 6-7 miles, the Japanese - 4.5. Those. here our cannon in terms of firepower surpassed the Japanese, one might say, at times, so artillery can be considered much more, that's field, perfect. But the Japanese had a third of the artillery - these were mountain guns, i.e. the same Arisaka guns, slightly lightened, which could be disassembled and could be dragged on packs. The theater of operations was quite mountainous, especially when the action was in Korea and East Manchuria. We didn’t have mountain guns at all, and this, by the way, was a very big minus, as practice showed - i.e. The Japanese have mountain artillery, we don't. It was bad with howitzer artillery on both sides: the Japanese had good ones - Krupp guns, but there were quite a few of them. We had it, and not very good, and there was very little of it - these were Engelhardt's 6-inch mortars. Well, I reported the number of troops, yes, all in the Russian Empire? So they had about 6 dozen of these mortars. Not rich, yes. They simply underestimated howitzer artillery, they believed that field artillery could solve all problems. She could not solve all the problems. But in general, our field artillery, if on the plains, then ours is stronger, moreover, quite unequivocally, if in the mountains, Japanese is stronger, because it can operate there, but ours does not. Here, this is what concerns artillery weapons. In addition, we had fortress and coastal artillery in the theater of operations among the Japanese, i.e. in the fortresses of Port Arthur and Vladivostok, we had a fairly large number of guns. For example, in Vladivostok there are 169 coastal guns, in Port Arthur, in my opinion, 118, or something, at the beginning of the war. At the same time, the guns were both the latest designs and outdated. Outdated somewhere 3/4 were. The same applied, in general, to the fortress artillery. The Japanese were even worse in this respect, i.e., for example, they had part of the fortress siege artillery represented by bronze mortars, already breech-loading, in short, approximately the same artillery that ours fought in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877. Not bad, yes. But in what way the Japanese were lucky - their fortress artillery of the fortress never defended us from us during the entire war, and coastal artillery never fought back from our ships. Those. their artillery in this case was not tested for strength. Most likely, she would not have shown herself very well, but the fact is that she was not required. As for the fleet: The Russian Empire had a fleet much stronger than the Japanese one, but it was divided into 3 separate fleets. Those. we have the Baltic Fleet, we have the Black Sea Fleet and we have the Pacific Fleet. And the Japanese strike, in fact, was supposed to take the Pacific Fleet. He didn't outnumber the Japanese. The Black Sea Fleet, due to the status of the straits, could not come to the rescue at all, and the Baltic was to be sent as the Second Pacific Squadron, and new ships for it were mostly still being built, and outdated ones had just recently arrived from the Pacific Ocean and were undergoing modernization and repair current. What did the ships of the First Pacific Squadron look like in our country, i.e. who were supposed to fight the Japanese, i.e. Pacific Fleet, in fact? There we had 7 squadron battleships, of which 3 are somewhat outdated, but quite powerful battleships of the Petropavlovsk type, they have a displacement of about 11.5 thousand tons, armor, let's say, is still somewhat outdated Harvey's, armament: 4 305 mm guns and 12 152 mm guns, of which 8 are located in towers, well, main caliber all in towers. The speed of these battleships was 15-16 knots. These are "Petropavlovsk", "Poltava", "Sevastopol". 2 newer battleships, the so-called. battleships-cruisers, such as "Peresvet" - these are "Peresvet" and "Victory". They have a speed of 18 knots, i.e. they “ran” faster, they have new, more modern armor, but the thickness of the armor itself is reduced, i.e. 229 mm - 9 inches, and at the same time, in order to ensure good seaworthiness, long range and high speed for these ships, they went to reduce the main caliber. Those. if on "Petropavlovsk" there are 4 guns of 305 mm - the main caliber, then here there are 4 guns of 254 mm, i.e. from 12 to 10 inches "sagged". To make it clear what this means, we had a 12-inch shell weight of 331 kg, and 250 kg in a 10-inch gun. Significant difference, yes. Those. the ships greatly "sagged" in terms of firepower. And besides, because of the very high side, they had a lot of this unarmored side. Those. that on armadillos, in general, the main armor goes along the waterline and the armor of artillery and the conning tower. And we had 2 battleships built according to the new program, with weapons, like those of Petropavlovsk, in fact - 4 x 305 mm and 12 x 152 mm, but with a speed like that of Peresvet - 18 knots. These are the Retvizan built in America and the Tsesarevich built in France. For its time, i.e. at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, these are some of the best ships in the world in their class. Those. with a displacement of 12.5 thousand tons, well, the "Tsarevich" left a little over 13 thousand, they were well armored, i.e. a fairly large armor area, on the "Tsesarevich" and the thickness of the armor is also 250 mm maximum, fully armored medium-caliber artillery, decent travel speed - i.e. really great ships. For their displacement, they are just fine. And what is "Retvizan" in Russian? But the fact is that this name is not Russian, we inherited it from the Swedes. Those. at one time, our frigate captured the Swedish battleship "Retvizan" during one of the wars with the Swedes, a sailing one, and introduced it into our fleet, we introduced it into our fleet. And he distinguished himself in the fighting, as a result, the name began to be inherited. That's all. Does not translate? Yes, it’s translated somehow, probably, I just wasn’t even interested. So, "Retvizan" and "Tsesarevich" - these were excellent armadillos, but there were 2 excellent armadillos. What did the Japanese have against our 7 battleships: they had 2 battleships "Fuji" and "Yashima" built during the Sino-Japanese war, they are very close to our Petropavlovsk-class battleships in terms of the booking scheme, in terms of booking placement, i.e. the armor is a little thicker, they themselves are 1000 tons larger, the armament is even a little weaker: i.e. they have 4 x 305 mm and 10 152 mm guns. Plus, their artillery is worse placed, i.e. their main caliber were placed in barbettes, covered with armor caps. Those. not towers, like ours, normal, but a barbette installation. And after each volley to the side, it was necessary to return the tower to the diametrical plane for loading, and then turn again towards the enemy. This is with an equal rate of fire with us, and in general the theoretical rate of fire equal to other Japanese ones, the real rate of fire was chopped 4-5 times. Original design, right? No, well, how - it allowed to save weight, provide better protection, but you still have to pay for it, right? Well, the truth is, the advantages of these ships is that they had good seaworthiness, and most importantly, they developed speed: Fuji 18 knots, and Yashima 19 knots. Those. they "ran" faster than "Petropavlovsk" noticeably. And there were 4 battleships of the next generation, i.e. already with a different reservation system, with already normal artillery mounts that are loaded in any position to the horizon, i.e. no need to rotate the tower in the diametrical plane. So these are 3 armadillos almost identical in design - "Hatsuse", "Shikishima" and "Asahi", and one somewhat eye-catching, later one is "Mikasa", which became the flagship. They simply took into account what was done in the previous battleship and somewhat improved the reservation system and installed new artillery mounts. Those. if, for example, our battleships all had a maximum rate of fire of the order of 1 volley per minute, the Japanese, too, except for Fuji and Yashima, who had less, then Mikasa could fire 2 volleys per minute. Or rather, how - a little less, it has a reload time of 38 seconds. At the same time, Japanese battleships, especially new ones, also had more powerful anti-mine weapons, i.e. they had not 12, but 14 152 mm guns. This was achieved by the Japanese in a very simple way: their armadillos were larger. If, for example, our "Retvizan" is 12.5 thousand tons, then "Mikasa" is 14.5 thousand tons. Well, all Japanese battleships were built in England. Cool! I just thought that they developed technologies there. No, they developed it there, they just managed to develop it to a sufficient level before the Russo-Japanese War. And here we have 5 battleships of our own, one built in America and one in France. So here is just what was interesting: during this war, it was possible to compare 2 competing schools for a long time - French and English. And what did it show? Yes, it showed, in general, that the ships on both sides are worthy, i.e. fought against each other as equals. At the same time, our "Tsesarevich" was still smaller than the new Japanese battleships. The next class after the battleships, we had armored cruisers. Here the picture was much worse for us. Those. we had 4 armored cruisers at the beginning of the war, the Japanese had 6. The Japanese had 6 ships of approximately the same type, i.e. these are armored cruisers of the Asama type, there were few differences between them. The first two, the most such, they were built first for Chile during the arms race between Chile and Argentina. Since the countries reconciled, the Japanese "Asamu" and "Tokiva" outbid and ordered 2 more of the same ships, but with more advanced armor, not 2, but 3-pipe. Just in England, as "Osama" and "Tokiva" were built, and 2 were built, respectively, in France and in Germany - "Azuma" and "Yakumo". Those differed somewhat appearance, but the characteristics of all were approximately the same - i.e. speed 20-21 knots... Cheerful! Cheerful. 178 mm side armor, 152 mm casemate towers, and armament - 4 203 mm guns, 14 152 mm guns for English-built ships, and 4 by 203 and 12 by 152 mm for French and German-built ships. Those. it turned out such a rather homogeneous connection of 6 armored cruisers, in fact almost of the same type. Our oldest was the armored cruiser "Rurik", which was created as a destroyer of English trade, i.e. a huge, very seaworthy ship with a very long autonomy, much larger than the Japanese cruisers. In terms of displacement, by the way, it surpassed them not so much - by a couple of thousand tons, but in terms of visual dimensions it was much larger. Here he had a speed of 18.5 knots, i.e. much smaller than the Japanese, and armament: 4 guns 203 mm, 16 - 152 mm and 6 guns 120 mm. It would seem very powerful weapons , but the fact is that if the Japanese had 4 203 mm guns located on an armored cruiser - these are bow and stern 2-gun turrets, then on the same "Rurik" it's like on Aurora - behind the gun shields, which are located along the sides. Those. in broadside salvo I categorically welcome you! Boris Vitalievich, good time of the year! Likewise. What did you brake on last time? Then we talked about the prelude to the Russo-Japanese War, i.e. how our countries came to the point of declaring war. Well, now it probably makes sense to talk about what they fought: the armed forces, weapons, and so on. Those. It would seem that you are looking at the globe, we are very fond of making history on the globe, and there is a huge Russian Empire, and tiny, tiny Japan. Well, in fact, it is really tiny, it was also much smaller in population than the Russian Empire, although not in the way it looks on the map: the Russian Empire had 170 million inhabitants at that moment, the Japanese Empire had 42 million inhabitants, as far as I remember. Somewhere in the mid-80s, I remember, I somehow climbed into an atlas - there were such good-quality Soviet atlases - and was surprised to see that there were 117 million Russians and 117 million Japanese. This Japan near Russia is not even visible, but we are the same around now. Now yes. There are more Russians than Japanese, but there are fewer Russians, perhaps even narrower. Those. there are more than 120 million Japanese now. Well, even 40 is still good, i.e. it's a decent state. Quite, which at that time was developing quite rapidly. Those. after the Meiji revolution, Japan really grew there every year very solidly. As a matter of fact, like the Soviet Union under Stalin - somewhere like that, the same pace of development was. But the truth is, the Japanese had a very low start, i.e. from deep feudalism resolutely into capitalism. By this time they had already won the Sino-Japanese war, received a colossal contribution, received warships and, in fact, received international recognition as almost white people who have the right to own colonies, and not be a colony. Those. made their way into a number of leading world powers. Well, of course, the forces, if taken as a whole, of Russia and Japan were poorly comparable, after all, Russia was much larger, had a large economy and had more than a 4-fold superiority of the population. Those. there was a definite advantage. But we did not have a war between Russia and Japan, let's say that Japan is trying to seize Russia or Russia is trying to seize Japan. The war is colonial - i.e. who will rob the Chinese. And here Japan is nearby, Russia is generally far away, i.e. the main resources of the Russian Empire are located to the west of the Urals, and then to the east of the Urals, the devil knows how much to cut to this China, to Manchuria. So that's what the Russian army was like. Sorry, I'll interrupt you: but in those days BAM was already laid there, no? No, they laid the Trans-Siberian. Was there a railroad? Yes, but it was a single-track, i.e. on light ballast, with light rails, i.e. limited carrying capacity of trains, limited speed - no more than 30 miles per hour. And so, in fact, by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, the Trans-Siberian Railway had a capacity of 6 pairs of trains per day. Not rich. Well, the trains then had a much lower carrying capacity than now - the echelons were shorter, the locomotives were weaker. Well, accordingly, if on ships, then this is from the Baltic or from the Black Sea, or through Suez ... Through 3 oceans. Or around Africa, where the hell. Far. Yes. Therefore, it turns out that the theater was largely isolated. True, there were also ... there was a certain Russian population, and there were Cossack troops located just along the border with China, i.e. certain human resources were. But of course, they cannot be compared with the Japanese 40 million. And so, in principle, the entire theater of military operations with us "hung" either on the sea and on a single-track railway, or simply on a "single-track" if the Japanese dominate the sea. But this is precisely the alignment in terms of logistics. And now: what were the armed forces. The Russian Empire had the largest peacetime army at that time, i.e. the army itself was about 1 million 100 thousand people, and all the armed forces - about 1 million 350 thousand people. For comparison: the Japanese army consisted of 160 thousand people in peacetime. Incomparable, yes. The system, the organization of the armed forces was quite close: we had an all-class military service, not a universal one - we didn’t have enough economy for a universal one. At the same time, they served in military service for 4 years, then they were in the reserve, then they were assigned to the militia. So, those who were not called up for military service, they were immediately enrolled in the militia warriors. Those. this is how, in theory, the service should have been built. By the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, we had about 2 million trained reserves, to the army that we have. The Japanese have a peacetime army of 160 thousand people, according to Kuropatkin’s report, who carefully studied Japan and was considered, by the way, one of the brilliant strategists at that time, well, before the Russo-Japanese War, before the start, and so he estimated the mobilization abilities of the Japanese army, taking into account both reservists and territorial troops, as 375 thousand people. The picture was actually somewhat different: the Japanese took over the Prussian system, i.e. they have 3 years of military service, 4 years 4 months in reserve, and then transferred to the reserve. They also had an all-class military service, because they also did not pull the universal one, and they managed to mobilize 600 thousand people at the beginning of the war. Not bad! Their country was divided into 12 divisional districts, and, in fact, they created an army of 13 divisions - 12 infantry divisions and 1 guards, capital. And in each division, a reserve brigade was created from artillerymen. Those. here are 13 divisions - 13 brigades, not counting the cavalry units. These are the main parts. Further, here is what they had in reserve and in the militia, from which additional units were already recruited for territorial troops and ... reserve divisions. That is, the Japanese managed, let's say, to put under arms more than they had planned according to the standard mobilization scheme. And here we get a picture: we have 1 million 350 thousand, the Japanese have 160 thousand, but we have 98 thousand people in the Far East - this is in the troops and 24 thousand border guards, also, in principle, sometimes participated in battles, but they were subordinate to the Ministry of Finance. So, the Japanese get a clear superiority. Everything else we have is what we deliver by rail, and what we can supply by it. The Japanese army was well prepared; until 1901, not even - until 1902 it was prepared by German specialists, since 1902 it was prepared by English specialists, taking into account the experience of the Anglo-Boer War. Our army was preparing, in fact, according to its own developments and, in principle, they were a little outdated by this time. For example, the Japanese mastered such a thing as digging in on the battlefield, we did not include this in serious disciplines. Actions were practiced in loose formation, i.e., for example, if the Japanese have a 3-battalion regiment, then it has 6 companies deployed in rifle chains, 2 companies in platoon columns, so to speak, provide support, and 1 battalion is in reserve. If we deploy a regiment, then we had a rather stupid binary system there, or rather, a quaternary system - this is ... in short, we have 4 regiments in a division, 4 battalions in a regiment, 4 companies in a battalion. Those. Our regiment has 16 companies. So, of these, 2 companies were deployed in rifle chains. 2 more companies in platoon support, i.e. 4 companies - this is the first line. 4 companies - this is our second line in company columns, i.e. in fact, the reserve of those deployed units, and 2 battalions in reserve. Is this due to the lack of experience of the war, or was it somehow like that then? Reinsured, ie. they overestimated the role of the reserves and because of this they underestimated the role of those troops who are directly engaged in the battle. During the war, this practice began to be revised, i.e. they began to deploy from the regiment, for example, not 2 battalions, but only 1, but 3 battalions into battle formations. Well, because otherwise it was not really possible to fight at all - no matter what the forces were, it still fights a little. We had much better quality cavalry and much more numbers than the Japanese. Those. better horse composition, better dressage. But the cavalry did not particularly "ignite" this war. The Japanese cavalry was smaller in number, but it was essentially riding infantry, i.e. she was not noticed in dashing cavalry attacks; in any combat clash she immediately dismounted, lay down and fired back from her rifles. Did the horses lie down too? Driven to the rear. And so, if there was a horse cabin, of course, our cavalry would be much stronger. But there were no horse cuttings in this war. Those. among the Japanese, the main bet was made on the infantry. Of the advantages of our infantry over the Japanese, there was a clear advantage - we had a high march culture, i.e. Do you remember drill training in the army, right? The ability to march in step. Cheerfully enough goes, say, a company somewhere. The Japanese did not have time for this, therefore the troops marched almost in a crowd, i.e. a long stretched column without formation, out of step, nothing. Because of this, they got 1.5-2 times lower marching speed of the division than ours. How lovely! This, by the way, affected the speed of Japanese manners during the war. Yes. A well-known joke about: if you are so smart, why don’t you walk in formation - in general, it is not a joke. Well, yes, i.e. the Japanese didn’t march in formation, by the way, according to the experience of the Russo-Japanese war, they took this very seriously, and already by the next war with China, they seriously trained their troops in this regard - they began to move much more vigorously. On the topic of armament of this very infantry: our main infantry armament was the Mosin rifle: a magazine rifle of 1891, it was further improved, i.e., in principle, by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War we had several modifications in service, but they were all called exactly the same. And this rifle, we often write that it was the best in the world. Usually they forget to add: it was the best in the world in the year of its creation - in 1891. No, it really was the best in the world, at that time the Lebel magazine rifle, for example, which was the most common, was inferior to our Mosin rifle in most parameters. There is a Gra rifle and others - they were worse. The same Japanese Murata rifle is old, it was also worse. But in the future, newer rifles were created. What about Arisaka? "Arisaka" was newer, it was created with an eye on the German Mauser rifle of 1898. In principle, what were the differences between "Mosinka" and "Arisaka" - "Mosinka" we have a 3-line, i.e. caliber 7.62 mm. Japanese rifle 6.5 mm, i.e. smaller caliber. "Arisaka" is a little lighter than "mosquito", has a higher initial speed, better ballistics at close and medium distances, well, due to a higher initial speed. At long distances, the "mosquito" hits a little better due to the corny heavier bullet. It has a better effect on the enemy's body, again, due to a heavier bullet. It has a greater return, due to the larger caliber. The Arisaka rifle has a special shield, for example, on the bolt, which closes the mechanism from dust and dirt. The "mosquito" does not have such charms, but the mechanism is made so, let's say, reasonable from the point of view of use in combat, that reliability is still high. Those. the Mosin rifle was very little afraid of pollution. But due to the fact that our rifle is still older, that is, there are several archaic shortcomings: a less comfortable butt stock, a bolt handle pushed forward, i.e. at Arisaki it is nearby, at Mosinka it is further away, which complicates ... not that it complicates - it knocks down the sight when reloading more. We have a protruding store, the Japanese have it drowned in the butt stock, i.e. it cannot be damaged by, say, an accidental blow. But all these moments, in fact, relate to taste, i.e. weapons can be considered virtually equivalent. Those. a company armed with Mosin rifles will be no worse in a firefight than a company armed with Arisak rifles, or practically no worse. And the shootout in this case will be quite equivalent to itself. Our militia units, which, for example, subsequently fought on Sakhalin, were armed with a Berdan rifle, this is our previous one. It is single-shot, it was magnificent at one time, but in the Russo-Japanese War it was already completely outdated. The Japanese, just like ours, only have enough Arisaka rifles for combat units and reservists. Those. their landwehr, such a militia, was also armed with obsolete rifles, i.e. then the reserve divisions fought with them. These are Murat rifles. The Murata rifle is worse than the Arisaka or Mosinka, but it is noticeably better than the Berdan rifle. But this, I say again, is part of, one might say, the second line. This is what concerns small arms. You can remember more machine guns, in fact. At the beginning of the war, there were no machine guns, practically none, neither we nor the Japanese, in the combat zone. Let's say we had 8 machine guns in the Manchurian army - that's about nothing. The Japanese also began fighting, in general, without machine guns. During the war, the saturation of machine guns grew greatly. We had the main machine gun - this is the Maxim machine gun, which we produced under license from the Vickers company. It has colossal firepower, i.e. it can fire continuously, it has water cooling, but we have it located on enough, and not just enough, but on a terribly bulky, gun-like carriage - with high wheels, with a large shield. This is good against the Papuans, against good armed army the enemy is not very ... Not great, right? The Japanese used, moreover, from a tripod, usually a Hotchkiss machine gun of either the 1897 or 1900 model of the year. By the way, the Japanese have set up its production. This is a rather interesting design, in which not everyone immediately recognizes a machine gun. For example, they used the so-called. rigid tape, i.e. he only fired really reliably with a stiff tape. What it is? And this is a frame for 2.5 dozen rounds, which you insert from the side, shoot, insert the next one, shoot. Those. this machine gun, due to such loading, and also due to the fact that it had air cooling, could not lead ... to provide such a flurry of fire as the Maxim machine gun. But it was much lighter, more compact, and, sadly, the Japanese had many more of them. Those. for example, in the battle of Mukden, we had 56 machine guns, while the Japanese had 200. Wow! In addition to the Vickers machine gun, but, by the way, the Vickers, in addition to large dimensions and very heavy weight, the Vickers / Maxim, which we had in service, had another very big drawback: the fact is that ours bought a license in 1897 for the production of this machine gun, according to which the Vickers company was deducted 50 pounds sterling for each machine gun produced by us over 10 years - this is approximately 500 rubles in gold. Not bad! For every. The Vickers firm stood firm. Very. Those. right here, given that the production of machine guns was constantly growing, i.e. at first they aimed that a little would be produced, but here they hit the money very solidly. Bouncing to the side: but what was the machine gun of the Red Army soldier Sukhov? He had a "Lewis" - this is a World War I light machine gun, this is a much later machine. Yes, let's continue. But by the way, we also had a machine gun similar to this one. Well, i.e. how - outwardly not similar, but similar in method of use. We bought for the fortresses, here are the Privetninskiye and the fortresses of the Far East, the Madsen submachine gun. Those. it would seem that this is what the troops need, and he was purchased for fortresses. In fact, this is precisely a light machine gun, i.e. he is with a casing, with a bipod, a store on top - a classic of the genre. Here, in fact, there were two such machine guns - "Vikkres" / "Maxim" and this one here "Madsen", Danish. A good machine gun, but with all the shortcomings of a light machine gun - i.e. from it such a flurry of fire as from an easel one cannot be provided, and such accuracy of fire. This is a firearm. Those. it can be considered, in principle, equivalent. Regarding artillery: we had the main cannon - this is the cannon of the Obukhov factory of the 1902 model. The Japanese have a 75mm Arisaka cannon. The caliber is almost the same - 75 mm and 76.2 mm. But our cannon belonged to what is called a "quick-firing gun", i.e. rollback along the axis of the bore, high-speed shutter. Those. our cannon provided a rate of fire quite easily up to 15 rounds per minute. Solid! The Japanese cannon was more compact than ours, but refused to carry the entire carriage, i.e. had no recoil devices at all. Shutter access is rather inconvenient and separate charging, i.e. rate of fire 4-5 rounds per minute. Plus, our gun was superior in rate of fire, i.e. our cannon hit 10 miles, the Japanese - 7. Our shrapnel could shoot 6-7 miles, the Japanese - 4.5. Those. here our cannon in terms of firepower surpassed the Japanese, one might say, at times, so artillery can be considered much more, that's field, perfect. But the Japanese had a third of the artillery - these were mountain guns, i.e. the same Arisaka guns, slightly lightened, which could be disassembled and could be dragged on packs. The theater of operations was quite mountainous, especially when the action was in Korea and East Manchuria. We didn’t have mountain guns at all, and this, by the way, was a very big minus, as practice showed - i.e. The Japanese have mountain artillery, we don't. It was bad with howitzer artillery on both sides: the Japanese had good ones - Krupp guns, but there were quite a few of them. We had it, and not very good, and there was very little of it - these were Engelhardt's 6-inch mortars. Well, I reported the number of troops, yes, all in the Russian Empire? So they had about 6 dozen of these mortars. Not rich, yes. They simply underestimated howitzer artillery, they believed that field artillery could solve all problems. She could not solve all the problems. But in general, our field artillery, if on the plains, then ours is stronger, moreover, quite unequivocally, if in the mountains, Japanese is stronger, because it can operate there, but ours does not. Here, this is what concerns artillery weapons. In addition, we had fortress and coastal artillery in the theater of operations among the Japanese, i.e. in the fortresses of Port Arthur and Vladivostok, we had a fairly large number of guns. For example, in Vladivostok there are 169 coastal guns, in Port Arthur, in my opinion, 118, or something, at the beginning of the war. At the same time, the guns were both the latest designs and outdated. Outdated somewhere 3/4 were. The same applied, in general, to the fortress artillery. The Japanese were even worse in this respect, i.e., for example, they had part of the fortress siege artillery represented by bronze mortars, already breech-loading, in short, approximately the same artillery that ours fought in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877. Not bad, yes. But in what way the Japanese were lucky - their fortress artillery of the fortress never defended us from us during the entire war, and coastal artillery never fought back from our ships. Those. their artillery in this case was not tested for strength. Most likely, she would not have shown herself very well, but the fact is that she was not required. As for the fleet: The Russian Empire had a fleet much stronger than the Japanese one, but it was divided into 3 separate fleets. Those. we have the Baltic Fleet, we have the Black Sea Fleet and we have the Pacific Fleet. And the Japanese strike, in fact, was supposed to take the Pacific Fleet. He didn't outnumber the Japanese. The Black Sea Fleet, due to the status of the straits, could not come to the rescue at all, and the Baltic was to be sent as the Second Pacific Squadron, and new ships for it were mostly still being built, and outdated ones had just recently arrived from the Pacific Ocean and were undergoing modernization and repair current. What did the ships of the First Pacific Squadron look like in our country, i.e. who were supposed to fight the Japanese, i.e. Pacific Fleet, in fact? There we had 7 squadron battleships, of which 3 are somewhat outdated, but quite powerful battleships of the Petropavlovsk type, they have a displacement of about 11.5 thousand tons, armor, let's say, is still somewhat outdated Harvey's, armament: 4 305 mm guns and 12 152 mm guns, of which 8 are located in the towers, but the main caliber is all in the towers. The speed of these battleships was 15-16 knots. These are "Petropavlovsk", "Poltava", "Sevastopol". 2 newer battleships, the so-called. battleships-cruisers, such as "Peresvet" - these are "Peresvet" and "Victory". They have a speed of 18 knots, i.e. they “ran” faster, they have new, more modern armor, but the thickness of the armor itself is reduced, i.e. 229 mm - 9 inches, and at the same time, in order to ensure good seaworthiness, long range and high speed for these ships, they went to reduce the main caliber. Those. if on "Petropavlovsk" there are 4 guns of 305 mm - the main caliber, then here there are 4 guns of 254 mm, i.e. from 12 to 10 inches "sagged". To make it clear what this means, we had a 12-inch shell weight of 331 kg, and 250 kg in a 10-inch gun. Significant difference, yes. Those. the ships greatly "sagged" in terms of firepower. And besides, because of the very high side, they had a lot of this unarmored side. Those. that on armadillos, in general, the main armor goes along the waterline and the armor of artillery and the conning tower. And we had 2 battleships built according to the new program, with weapons, like those of Petropavlovsk, in fact - 4 x 305 mm and 12 x 152 mm, but with a speed like that of Peresvet - 18 knots. These are the Retvizan built in America and the Tsesarevich built in France. For its time, i.e. at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, these are some of the best ships in the world in their class. Those. with a displacement of 12.5 thousand tons, well, the "Tsarevich" left a little over 13 thousand, they were well armored, i.e. a fairly large armor area, on the "Tsesarevich" and the thickness of the armor is also 250 mm maximum, fully armored medium-caliber artillery, decent travel speed - i.e. really great ships. For their displacement, they are just fine. And what is "Retvizan" in Russian? But the fact is that this name is not Russian, we inherited it from the Swedes. Those. at one time, our frigate captured the Swedish battleship "Retvizan" during one of the wars with the Swedes, still sailing, and introduced it into our fleet, we introduced it into our fleet. And he distinguished himself in the fighting, as a result, the name began to be inherited. That's all. Does not translate? Yes, it’s translated somehow, probably, I just wasn’t even interested. So, "Retvizan" and "Tsesarevich" - these were excellent armadillos, but there were 2 excellent armadillos. What did the Japanese have against our 7 battleships: they had 2 battleships "Fuji" and "Yashima" built during the Sino-Japanese war, they are very close to our Petropavlovsk-class battleships in terms of the booking scheme, in terms of booking placement, i.e. the armor is a little thicker, they themselves are 1000 tons larger, the armament is even a little weaker: i.e. they have 4 x 305 mm and 10 152 mm guns. Plus, their artillery is worse placed, i.e. their main caliber were placed in barbettes, covered with armor caps. Those. not towers, like ours, normal, but a barbette installation. And after each volley to the side, it was necessary to return the tower to the diametrical plane for loading, and then turn again towards the enemy. This is with an equal rate of fire with us, and in general the theoretical rate of fire equal to other Japanese ones, the real rate of fire was chopped 4-5 times. Original design, right? No, well, how - it allowed to save weight, provide better protection, but you still have to pay for it, right? Well, the truth is, the advantages of these ships is that they had good seaworthiness, and most importantly, they developed speed: Fuji 18 knots, and Yashima 19 knots. Those. they "ran" faster than "Petropavlovsk" noticeably. And there were 4 battleships of the next generation, i.e. already with a different reservation system, with already normal artillery mounts that are loaded in any position to the horizon, i.e. no need to rotate the tower in the diametrical plane. So these are 3 armadillos almost identical in design - "Hatsuse", "Shikishima" and "Asahi", and one somewhat eye-catching, later one is "Mikasa", which became the flagship. They simply took into account what was done in the previous battleship and somewhat improved the reservation system and installed new artillery mounts. Those. if, for example, our battleships all had a maximum rate of fire of the order of 1 volley per minute, the Japanese, too, except for Fuji and Yashima, who had less, then Mikasa could fire 2 volleys per minute. Or rather, how - a little less, it has a reload time of 38 seconds. At the same time, Japanese battleships, especially new ones, also had more powerful anti-mine weapons, i.e. they had not 12, but 14 152 mm guns. This was achieved by the Japanese in a very simple way: their armadillos were larger. If, for example, our "Retvizan" is 12.5 thousand tons, then "Mikasa" is 14.5 thousand tons. Well, all Japanese battleships were built in England. Cool! I just thought that they developed technologies there. No, they developed it there, they just managed to develop it to a sufficient level before the Russo-Japanese War. And here we have 5 battleships of our own, one built in America and one in France. So here is just what was interesting: during this war, it was possible to compare 2 competing schools for a long time - French and English. And what did it show? Yes, it showed, in general, that the ships on both sides are worthy, i.e. fought against each other as equals. At the same time, our "Tsesarevich" was still smaller than the new Japanese battleships. The next class after the battleships, we had armored cruisers. Here the picture was much worse for us. Those. we had 4 armored cruisers at the beginning of the war, the Japanese had 6. The Japanese had 6 ships of approximately the same type, i.e. these are armored cruisers of the Asama type, there were few differences between them. The first two, the most such, they were built first for Chile during the arms race between Chile and Argentina. Since the countries reconciled, the Japanese "Asamu" and "Tokiva" outbid and ordered 2 more of the same ships, but with more advanced armor, not 2, but 3-pipe. Just in England, as "Osama" and "Tokiva" were built, and 2 were built, respectively, in France and in Germany - "Azuma" and "Yakumo". Those were somewhat different in appearance, but the characteristics of all were approximately the same - i.e. speed 20-21 knots... Cheerful! Cheerful. 178 mm side armor, 152 mm casemate towers, and armament - 4 203 mm guns, 14 152 mm guns for English-built ships, and 4 by 203 and 12 by 152 mm for French and German-built ships. Those. it turned out such a rather homogeneous connection of 6 armored cruisers, in fact almost of the same type. Our oldest was the armored cruiser "Rurik", which was created as a destroyer of English trade, i.e. a huge, very seaworthy ship with a very long autonomy, much larger than the Japanese cruisers. In terms of displacement, by the way, it surpassed them not so much - by a couple of thousand tons, but in terms of visual dimensions it was much larger. Here he had a speed of 18.5 knots, i.e. much smaller than the Japanese, and armament: 4 guns 203 mm, 16 - 152 mm and 6 guns 120 mm. It would seem that very powerful weapons, but the fact is that if the Japanese had 4 203 mm guns located on an armored cruiser - these are bow and stern 2-gun turrets, then on the same "Rurik" it's like on Aurora - behind the gun shields, which are located along the sides. Those. in a side salvo, the Japanese had 4 guns of 203 mm, we had 2. Our next newer cruiser, the Rossiya, had already reached speeds of 19 knots, and even a half, and had approximately the same armament - i.e. 4 by 203 mm and 16 by 152 mm. But again, there were no towers; artillery was located in casemates and behind shields. The last cruiser of this series, "Gromoboy", has the same armament as the "Rossiya", the speed has increased to 20 knots. Newer, thinner, but larger armor, but at the same time, again, artillery in casemates, i.e. there are no towers. Accordingly, all of our cruisers were doomed to a side salvo of 2 203 mm weapons in the presence of 4 guns. These ships were precisely all ocean hunters, they were healthy. Those. let's say if "Osama", for example, has a displacement of 9.5 thousand tons, or rather, 9800, then "Gromoboy" - it has 12.5 thousand tons, it is like an armadillo in size. Those. we have huge high-speed ocean raiders, while the Japanese get smaller, more compact and more nimble armadillos. Those. in artillery combat, Japanese ships are stronger. On communications, of course, the picture is different there - i.e. where seaworthiness and cruising range comes to one of the first places, then our cruisers were out of competition. And we had one cruiser of a new generation - the French-built cruiser "Bayan" - good name , By the way. So it was smaller than the Japanese and than our other cruisers, had a speed of 21 knots, had 203 mm armor, i.e. was well armored, but he had only 2 guns - 203 mm and 8 x 152 mm. True, this time the 203 mm guns were in armored single-gun turrets, i.e. well placed, but in terms of the weight of a volley, it was almost 2 times inferior to the Japanese armored cruisers. And besides, he was, of course, quite perfect, but he was alone. And if we had 7 battleships in Port Arthur and the armored cruiser "Bayan" with them, then the armored cruisers "Rurik", "Russia" and "Gromoboi" were in Vladivostok, i.e. they were separately based, because they were not intended to act together with the squadron in the same formation. Well, because of the large size and not very successful placement of artillery. Further, the picture becomes even more interesting: armored cruisers. We had 7 armored cruisers in the Pacific Ocean, of which 5 belong to the 1st rank and 2 to the 2nd rank. Well, what was the difference, in fact - we had 1st rank cruisers with 6-inch guns, i.e. 152 mm. Our most famous cruiser of the 1st rank of that time is the Aurora. By the way, there were 2 cruisers of the same type with her - "Diana" and "Pallada", i.e. from the same series. And 2 rank cruisers had a caliber of 120 mm, i.e. this is 2 times lighter projectile. What did this collection represent? "Diana" and "Pallada", even our sailors mocked them to some extent, i.e. firstly, they were called "Dashka" and "Palashka", and secondly, the officers laughed that they differ from the usual transatlantic packet boat of the Diana-type cruiser by a certain number of 6-inch guns and relative slowness. Those. these cruisers had a speed of 19 knots, armament - 8 152 mm guns, while they were healthy. Well, that's just even a comparison, last time he even mentioned it, right? If we compare the Varyag and the Aurora, the Aurora has 19 knots, the Varyag has 23 knots; 8 152 mm guns for the Aurora, 12 152 mm guns for the Varyag; 3700 miles cruising range at the "Aurora", 6000 miles cruising range at the "Varyag". At the same time, the displacement of the Aurora is slightly larger than that of the Varyag. And they are the same age in construction. Cool. Well, this is how much drawdown our shipbuilding gave purely because of the lag in technology. So, 2 cruisers of the 1st rank were not very good with us. 3 others were great, i.e. they were built according to the new program, 12 guns of 152 mm, all developed a speed of 23-24 knots, all were quite well protected, with a long cruising range, i.e. great ships. One was built in Germany by the Krupp company - this is Askold. By the way, it stood out very characteristically - it is a 5-pipe. One was built by the Kramp company - a 4-pipe "Varyag". And the best of them was the Bogatyr cruiser, built by the German company Shihau, it was 3-pipe. He even had some artillery in armored casemates, and some in armored towers, i.e. not like the Aurora and the Varyag. So, we have 5 ships of the 1st rank. In rank 2 we had 2 ships. One of them is the Novik cruiser, which had rather weak armor, as, in general, all cruisers of the 2nd rank, rather weak armament - 6 120 mm guns, but it was the fastest cruiser in the world at that time - it developed a speed of 25 knots. Wow! And it was supposed to serve as a squadron reconnaissance. world - this is the fastest cruiser in the world. The second we built purely for dynastic ties - the cruiser "Boyarin". It is slightly larger than the "Novik", also 6 120 mm guns, was created for the same tasks, but the speed had 22 knots. It was built by such well-known shipbuilders as the Danes, i.e. I didn’t hear anything seriously about Danish ships for export, but there it’s just that the Russian Empire decided to help Denmark, Dat to the kingdom due to the fact that the queen, or rather, the empress-mother, is a Dane, a Danish princess. The cruiser "Varyag" cost 6 million rubles. The destroyer at that time cost from 300 to 500 thousand rubles. Those. here are the prices. Expensive. Expensive. And if you consider that the ammunition of this ship costs as much as a third of the ship, plus the operation is expensive. Expensive entertainment - war. Not cheap. Well, the cruiser "Rurik", for example, cost us, in my opinion, 10 million rubles, which is large armored. The Japanese armored cruisers had as many as 12 pieces. In truth, they did not have a single cruiser of the 1st rank, i.e. all of their armored cruisers were small. Or rather, like - one of them was even armored, but it was the smallest Japanese cruiser. But he had an armored belt. That was where his dignity ended. Often they had quite old ships, but they diligently modernized them all, replacing artillery with new ones. Their old one was "Izumi", which was built for Chile back in 1883, i.e. older than our "Rurik", then "Naniva" and "Takachiho" were also built a very long time ago, but they were re-equipped. "Chiodo" was re-equipped, the boilers of the machines were changed, i.e. all the "stuffing" was changed in the ship. The best among the Japanese were the Yoshina cruiser built in England, which took part in the Sino-Japanese War, but at the same time had a speed of 23 knots. Those. it has 4 152 mm guns and 8 120 mm guns. And then the Japanese built the Tokosaga cruiser in England again. They practically built all the cruisers according to ... projects, in fact, of the Armstrong company in England: i.e. the ships are small, compact, but "run" very quickly, with very powerful weapons. True, they had to pay for this with habitability, seaworthiness, and cruising range, but just like artillery platforms, they were quite peppy. And here is the cruiser "Tokosaga", which was the best armored cruiser of the Japanese fleet at the beginning of the war, it has a displacement of 4200 tons, i.e. it is 1.5 times smaller than the Varyag with a displacement, and the armament is 2 guns of 203 mm, i.e. as on armored cruisers, and 10 120 mm guns. Pretty thick armored deck with thick bevels and a speed of 23 knots. And they had approximately the same characteristics, but were a little larger - it was built in America according to the same terms of reference at the same, by the way, the very company Kramp, where the Varyag was built, the cruisers Chitose and Kasagi. That is, there were more Japanese cruisers, but they were smaller, and such ships as our best armored cruisers of the Askold, Varyag, Bogatyr types - they have such we had an absolute superiority in quality, because we have a whole class of ships, while the Japanese don’t have it. Then we go ... And the ships, please tell me, for dummies, ships - what are they for? In order to sink each other, or to beat along the shore? It depends on the class. Well, let's say we had the Crimean War.After our fleet was flooded in Sevastopol, the British and French where they wanted - they came, what they wanted - fired, where they wanted - they landed troops. Right? And we had to defend the coast, build coastal fortifications everywhere, try to somehow fight back. Plus, they conduct their maritime trade, but we do not. Those. the navy provides enormous advantages to the country that has a stronger navy, from which the navy seizes dominance at sea. But what specific classes of ships do: battleships are needed primarily to destroy any classes of enemy ships in artillery combat, so they have thick armor, very powerful artillery, but they are the most expensive, the largest, and there are not so many of them. Cruisers are multi-purpose ships, i.e. they must also destroy all classes of ships, except armadillos, a cruiser usually cannot compete with an armadillo, in artillery combat, plus they must conduct reconnaissance with a squadron, long-range reconnaissance, raid enemy shores, go to communications and sink enemy transports, protect their communications. Those. this is a multi-purpose ship. Usually cruisers "run" a little faster than armadillos, much worse, but still powerfully protected and much worse, but still powerfully armed, and usually have somewhat greater autonomy. The next class is destroyers. And, by the way, cruisers due to the fact that there is a specialization for different tasks, for which more, they are just armored cruisers and cruisers of the 1st rank - they are in order to "wet" the enemy more, therefore the largest and most powerful, but they can solve other tasks, 2 and 3 ranks - they are just to "run" as scouts, drive enemy destroyers - for such tasks. Therefore, they are smaller, weaker and cheaper. Further destroyers and destroyers. Strictly speaking, a destroyer is a destroyer, just a larger one. These are ships named after their main armament - in honor of the torpedo, i.e. self-propelled mine. All the time I thought - what is it, fir-trees? So, they were distinguished by a small silhouette, so that it was more difficult to hit, high speed - well, as far as it turned out, a complete lack of armor, little seaworthiness, little autonomy. Destroyers could still operate on the high seas, and small destroyers - they are so, strictly for coastal operations. Why is he called squadron - he can accompany the squadron at sea. So, their main armament is just torpedoes. Those. a destroyer, let's say our standard ... had torpedoes and a couple of small rapid-fire cannons, and a speed of about 20-24 knots. And our destroyers no longer had a displacement of 100-150 tons, like destroyers, but from 250 to 350 tons and a speed of 24-26 knots, and were armed with one 75 mm cannon, 3-5 small-caliber guns and usually had 2-3 torpedo tubes, moreover, heavier ones with larger-caliber torpedoes. Those. already a pretty serious threat to enemy ships. We had 24 destroyers at the beginning of the war, the Japanese had 19. We had 10 destroyers, the Japanese had a dozen 3, i.e. quite a bit of. Well, there are minelayers, auxiliary cruisers, and so on - this, in principle, no longer affects the power of the fleets. Those. that is why destroyers, destroyers, cruisers and battleships at that time belonged to the so-called. main classes, by which the balance of power was measured. And here it turns out what a picture: that we had approximate equality with the Japanese in terms of armored forces, well, that is. The Japanese have more armored ships, but mainly due to armored cruisers, and squadron battleships by 1 less. In terms of armored cruisers, the Japanese already have a rather noticeable numerical superiority, and in terms of light forces, in terms of mine forces, their superiority is already almost double. Considering that Japan is located next to our fortresses in the Far East, the superiority in light forces was rather unpleasant. But something else was much more unpleasant here: Most of our forces were in Port Arthur, in the Yellow Sea, and a smaller part in Vladivostok, in the Sea of ​​Japan. And between them was Korea, which acted as such a huge cape between these two bases, i.e. our fleet forces practically could not interact. The Japanese main base was clearly opposite the southern extremity of Korea - Shimonoseki. Rather, two bases - Shimonoseki and Sasebo, the main one was Sasebo, but they were nearby, and both were opposite the southern tip of Korea, i.e. it was convenient for them to act both against Port Arthur and against Vladivostok, and it was completely unnecessary for them to share their forces. This is what concerns the balance of forces at sea. Well, since we did not fight in Japan, we can not mention the Japanese fortresses, but we had 2 first-class fortresses in the Far East. First-class - this is not a figurative and beautiful name, but these are simply 1st class fortresses, officially, they were called that. These are Port Arthur and Vladivostok. Vladivostok was already fully completed, Port Arthur seemed to be in a fairly high degree of readiness, but in terms of the main newest fortifications - forts and external fortifications - it was rather poorly prepared. Those. Kuropatkin in 1903 reported that the fortress was completely ready, it could repel any assault, but at the moment when he reported, out of 6 forts, we had 1 completely ready and 2 partially ready, and out of 5 long-term fortifications, which are such - a little underfortified, 0 fully ready, 2 partially ready. For example, fort No. 6 at that time was not even marked on the ground, it was simply known on the map where it would stand. Those. here is such a moment. And for example, at the beginning of hostilities in Port Arthur on the land front, there were 8 guns out of almost 400. Vladivostok was much more well prepared in this regard, but also not 100%. But there were fortresses, the fortresses were quite powerful, and then the Japanese had to tinker with Port Arthur. That, in fact, with what the parties approached the war. For some reason, we didn’t rob the Chinese very actively - we couldn’t put up a normal fortress. What it is? No, they could have put it on, but the picture is like - here is this stadium "Zenith ... ... Arena". Technologies do not allow to build? Billion upon billion, yes. Here in Port Arthur the same thing - they steal. Those. according to reports, everything is fine - there is no place. I immediately remember: in Cuba, in Havana, there some kind of super-duper Spanish fortress cost such money that when King Philip was told in Spain what time it was, he shouted: "Give me a spyglass - for such grandmas it should be visible from here!" To a large extent, it was the same with Port Arthur, moreover, theft there was amazing in what respect - there, for example, they constantly stole cement, because of this there was little cement in the solution, there was a lot of sand, i.e. moments were noted that hands can break off the corner of a concrete casemate. Those. that was enough. At the same time, theft was not only during the construction of the fortress, theft was, in principle, everywhere. In addition, a strange assessment was how it was necessary to approach the preparations for the war. For example, Kuropatkin noted that the Japanese are poorly prepared because they are unspiritual, i.e. they learn to love their homeland, the emperor and fight, but it is necessary that they also have ... highly spiritual support, and therefore, with the money of the military department, which, in general, was constantly back to back, we slowed down the construction of fortresses, and the construction of roads, and the construction of ships, lack of financial constant. Here Kuropatkin built 52 churches with the money of the military department, not with the money of the Synod. Well done! Well, you have to. Those. it is quite obvious that all were Orthodox, all were honest people, everything was as it should be. Yes, well, Kuropatkin took this very seriously. And the last point that I would like to note is about explosives and shells. The fact is that there are many interesting myths that the Japanese had a wonderful shimoza. So, shimose is just a Japanese version of liddite - it is picric acid, i.e. one of the variants of high-bristle explosives. It is not so different from the wet pyroxylin used in the Russian army and navy, which is also a high-bristle explosive. In this regard, our situation was no worse than that of the Japanese, to some extent even better, the Japanese used black powder ammunition more often than we did. Those. we had enough pyroxin, it seems, for everything. And the second point, this is then serious, so to speak, in our country, almost the reason for the defeat in the war was declared by many - we had lighter shells than the Japanese. i.e., for example, a 12-inch projectile on a Japanese battleship weighed 380 kg. Solid! And ours weighed 330 kg. In fact, what it was connected with - it was connected precisely with the fact that Admiral Makarov struck at one time when he was the head of the Artillery Directorate of the Fleet. He proceeded from a short distance of the battle and proposed to lighten the shells in order to provide a greater initial speed and a more flat trajectory at short distances, i.e. to be more likely to hit the target and better penetrate armor. But since the battle distances for the Russo-Japanese War increased, then it turned out sideways, because the lighter projectile no longer hits the target more accurately, and it brings less destruction. So, but actually it was not fatal enough. And what was the problem with the explosions, why do we like to tell how cool the Japanese shimosa is - the fact is that we had, in fact, only armor-piercing and semi-armor-piercing shells in the fleet, i.e. our shells were all calculated to explode, breaking through the barrier. This is what our fuses were designed for. And among the Japanese, fuses were often used instantaneously, i.e. we had a Brink fuse, they have a fuse .... So their fuse often worked even when it hit the water, so it's cool, everything explodes, special effects, like in a Hollywood movie. And at the same time, the Japanese have shells with thin walls and thicker walls, i.e. high-explosive and semi-armor-piercing, and we have thicker walls and very thick walls, i.e. semi-armor-piercing and armor-piercing. Therefore, the effect of our explosions is much less, but the impact on the target, in principle, everything depends on the target, anyhow, our shells were, in general, no less effective than the Japanese ones. Those. here is the legend that we lost because of bad shells, it ... to put it mildly, we had to find some kind of justification. Because then ours made very long and very heavy shells in the First World War, but it still didn’t help to win. It's not about the shells, apparently. No, well, how - our shells were not bad, we just had to use them correctly, like any weapon. Well, in fact, here is the picture: we have a huge army, more numerous than the Japanese fleet, but in the Pacific Ocean our ground forces are several times smaller than the Japanese ones, and the fleet is approximately equal to the Japanese one. We have a more diverse fleet and with a large percentage of slow-moving ships, the Japanese have a better picture in this regard, well, if you do not take their Chinese trophies, and most importantly, the Japanese have almost the same type and with approximately the same speed, rather high battleships and armored cruisers. We have a lot more diversity here. And in the ground forces, we have a qualitative lag behind the Japanese only in the fact that we do not have mountain artillery. The Japanese are lagging behind in that they have a much worse field gun. Here, this is what, in terms of the balance of forces and in terms of weapons, we came to the Russo-Japanese War. About what's next - is the beginning of the war already and how did it go? Yes, I also thought that in one or two videos we would talk about the course of the war itself, i.e. how the war went. Clear. Thanks, Boris Vitalievich. And that's all for today, until we meet again.

Before the war

The Russian-Chinese convention, concluded on March 15 (27), 1898, leased Port Arthur to Russia for 25 years with the right to extend this period. The main forces of the Russian naval forces in the Pacific received an ice-free base on the coast of the Yellow Sea. The 9th East Siberian Rifle Regiment was the first to land here. On March 16 (28), 1898, over the Golden Mountain, to the thunder of a salutatory salute and a booming “Hurrah!” St. Andrew's flag hoisted. Port Arthur was made the main base of the Russian navy in the Pacific.

During its occupation by the Russians, Port Arthur was only a small, uncomfortable village with a population of about four thousand people, which later received the name of the Old City. In May 1901, the new owners began cutting and selling plots in the New City, and it began to be built up quickly. In the New City for the military administration, the buildings of the headquarters and the Engineering Department were built, then the building of the Russian-Chinese Bank, a real school and many solid residential buildings were erected. The western part of the city was occupied by one-story soldiers' barracks and a huge naval crew building. Each ship brought new military units and employees, property, goods and building materials. From the interior provinces of China, a flow of labor force poured into the Kwantung region, and by January 1, 1904, 51,906 inhabitants (except for the troops) lived in Port Arthur: 15,388 of them were Russians and 35,000 were Chinese.

The Chinese began to deepen the shallow harbor of Port Arthur, but even by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, this work had not been completed. It consisted of an artificial Eastern and more spacious Western basins. Both of them were connected to the outer roadstead by a passage 900 m long and 300 m wide. The Russians managed to increase the old dock for cruisers inherited from the Chinese, restore and improve the small shipyard and arsenal destroyed by the Japanese in 1895, port workshops, a small dock for destroyers. In the area of ​​the Eastern Basin there were workshops and coal depots - by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, all the coal reserves of Port Arthur were estimated at 207,200 tons of coal, including 124,900 tons of the best cardif. The territory of the port itself and the whole city were illuminated from the central port power station.

According to the recollections of people who were in Port Arthur, from the sea he seemed very unfriendly. The gaze of a passenger on a steamboat approaching the city first saw a long mountain range, abruptly dropping into the sea. From the gloomy yellow-gray rocks, devoid of any vegetation, it blew longing and cold. The sea beat against the high shore with a dull noise. From the top of the Golden Mountain, a beautiful view of the city opened up. Directly below you could see the Eastern Basin, behind it at the foot of the Quail Mountain stretched itself Old city, behind which stretched uneven hilly terrain up to Mount Bolshoi, dominating all of Port Arthur, at its base was the New Chinese City. To the right of the small pool was the Freshwater Lake, around which the barracks and buildings of the Engineering Department were scattered in disorder. Between this lake, the Zolotaya and Krestovaya mountains and the sea, there were summer cottages built up with cottages for Russian naval officers. Looking to the left, first, an exit to the outer road opened, and then - a rather extensive Western basin, on the opposite side of which the New European City was spread; The Western Basin was separated from the sea by the long and narrow peninsula Tiger's Tail. All this panorama was closed by the sea and a chain of high steep mountains, on which there was a ring of fortifications that protected Port Arthur from a possible enemy attack. However, Russian military engineers did not have time to complete the construction of the city's defensive fortifications by the beginning of the war.

In accordance with the "Plan of military operations of naval forces in the Pacific for 1903", developed by the chief of staff of the commander of the naval forces of the Pacific Ocean, Rear Admiral V.K. Vitgeft, supplemented by the "Distribution of naval forces in the Pacific Ocean in wartime in 1903", by 1904 all Russian naval forces were divided between Port Arthur and Vladivostok. Based in Port Arthur: a combat squadron (battleships, new cruisers, 1st detachment of destroyers) and a defensive detachment (obsolete cruisers, 2nd detachment of destroyers, gunboats and mine transports) - a total of 7 squadron battleships, 6 cruisers, 3 old sail-screw clippers, 4 gunboats, including 2 armored, 2 mine transports, 2 mine cruisers and 25 destroyers.

It was precisely the destruction of this formation of the Russian naval forces, apparently, that was the main goal of the Japanese army at the first stage of the Russo-Japanese War. Operations against the Port Arthur fortress were not in the interests of the Japanese army. They were needed by the Japanese Navy. “The siege of Port Arthur was necessary,” wrote the official work of the German General Staff. - The Japanese could complete their operations on land only by having dominance at sea. It is for this reason that the Russian fleet in East Asia had to be destroyed, and since most of it hid from the attack of the Japanese ... in the harbor of Port Arthur, the fortress had to be attacked from land. “The Japanese fleet had to wait for the arrival of the Baltic squadron, and for Japan it was a vital issue to create for itself ... favorable conditions for the future sea ​​battle [with the Russian 2nd Pacific squadron - approx.], that is, take Port Arthur first. The attack on Liaoyang, where the main forces of the Russian Manchurian army were concentrated, was originally planned by the Japanese to begin after the fall of Port Arthur, when the liberated siege army would be transferred to Manchuria near Liaoyang.

In the plans worked out by the Russian military command on the eve of the war, one can detect a curious evolution of views on the role of Port Arthur in this war. The plan drawn up at the Provisional Headquarters of the Viceroy E. I. Alekseev was based on the assumption that “since sufficient forces are concentrated at Liaoyang in a timely manner, then the Japanese army’s offensive to Port Arthur is unthinkable, why only its garrison with the most insignificant additions can be assigned to the defense of Port Arthur.” On the contrary, the Minister of War A.N. Kuropatkin, in his Most Submissive Note dated July 24, 1903, recognized the “most desirable and possible plan of action for the Japanese” as one in which they would try to immediately occupy Korea and capture Port Arthur. According to A. N. Kuropatkin, sufficient forces to fight Japan could be deployed in South Manchuria only in the second half of the year after the announcement of mobilization. Until that time, Kwantung will be cut off from Russia, and therefore the number of Russian troops there must be increased. And at first, Kuropatkin managed to convince the viceroy Alekseev of this, who on February 12 (25), 1904 reported to the tsar that a possible Japanese attack on Port Arthur "for our common interests in the entire theater of war can be recognized as rather beneficial," since the fortress already has a 20,000-strong garrison. But Kuropatkin demanded and achieved an even greater strengthening of the fortress garrison, since he believed that “if the besieged Port Arthur does not have a sufficient garrison, then the army commander, worrying about the fate of the fortress, may be forced to go on the offensive with unconcentrated forces, and this will inevitably lead to defeat.” Appointed commander of the Manchurian army, he “believed that 45 thousand [people] would be enough to repel the assault. On the contrary, the forces of the Manchurian army, concentrated near Liaoyang, seemed to him insufficient to launch a counteroffensive. He considered Port Arthur only a fortress, designed only to "rive as many enemy forces as possible to itself." Until he achieved numerical superiority over the enemy, he considered it both harmful and dangerous to defend any remote points. Convinced that the outcome of the war with Japan would be decided on the fields of Manchuria, Kuropatkin from the very beginning decided to allow the Japanese to besiege Port Arthur, which, as he assumed at the time, could hold out for several months, diverting a significant part of the forces of the Japanese army. The commander of the Russian army deliberately refused active operations at the beginning of the war, giving the initiative to the enemy, who took advantage of this to deploy his armies and prepare for the offensive. The small detachments that Kuropatkin had instructed to hold back the enemy's advance at this first stage of the war could not do this. Landing armies in turn, in parts, the Japanese thereby gave the Russians certain advantages that they did not even think of taking advantage of. Kuropatkin's orders to "attack, but without determination" and "do not engage in battle with superior forces" had a depressing effect on the troops, killed in commanders the desire to grapple with the enemy and defeat him. And when the troops are ordered "not to engage in battle with superior forces," every now and then they always end up being afraid to touch the enemy's patrol.

Summing up the above, we can say that the "great siege" of Port Arthur began for two reasons. Firstly, because the Japanese command considered it necessary to destroy the Russian fleet, which was based there, as soon as possible. To achieve this important goal, it was ready to make any sacrifices: after all, the dead soldiers of the 3rd Army of the Foot could be replaced, and the United Fleet of Togo had to win with the same ships with which it started the war. Secondly, due to the fact that the Russian land command decided not to interfere with the beginning of this siege, considering it beneficial for itself that Port Arthur divert the enemy troops.

Port Arthur was cut off from land communications with the Manchurian army from April 23 (May 6), 1904 (after the landing of the 2nd Oku Army in Bidzuvo) and from sea communications through the Chinese port of Yingkou from July 11 (24), 1904 (after the battle at Tashichao). On May 13 (26), 1904, the Japanese 2nd Oku Army broke through the Russian defenses on the Jinzhou Isthmus, which blocked the approaches to Port Arthur in the narrowest part of the Liaodong Peninsula. As a result of this victory, the Japanese occupied the port of Dalniy on May 19 (June 1), 1904, which became the place of concentration of the 3rd Noga Army, intended for operations against Port Arthur. Already on July 13-15 (26-28), 1904, this army attacked after a stubborn battle that cost it 6,000 people. killed and wounded, broke through the last fortified positions of the Russians on the Green Mountains, blocking the nearest approaches to the fortress. The actual siege of Port Arthur began when, on July 17 (30), the Japanese approached the city at a distance of a shot from the main caliber of battleships, and Russian ships fired at the enemy from the harbor for the first time. On July 25 (August 7), 1904, Japanese artillery carried out the first bombardment of the city and port.

Fortifications of the fortress

In the hands of the Chinese, Port Arthur was a military base, suitably fortified. There were four coastal batteries and several high earthworks that surrounded the city from the east and north and were interconnected by an earthen rampart, which later received the name of the Chinese wall. In addition, more than two dozen inpans were scattered around the immediate vicinity of the city, surrounded by an adobe wall, but most of them were destroyed, so these fortifications of Port Arthur, when transferred by the Chinese in 1898, were no longer of great combat value. Having occupied the city and wishing to have a military port and a base for the fleet in it, Russia had to create a new fortress here, the drafting of which was started on the spot in the same 1898, when the city was occupied.

The local commission proposed to improve and re-equip the old Chinese coastal batteries, and then replace these batteries with new ones. The line of forts on the land front of the projected fortress was recognized as necessary to move to the Wolf Mountains, about 8 km from the outskirts of the Old City. The next project, drawn up by a special commission that arrived in Port Arthur in October 1898, differed from the first project mainly in that the line of forts did not reach the Wolf Mountains, but went about 4.5 km from the city along the line Dagushan - Dragon Range - Panlongshan - Corner Mountains - High Mountain and White Wolf Height. This land defense line was 70 km long and required a 70,000-strong garrison and 528 ground weapons alone.

The interdepartmental meeting, to which this project fell, sought to save the cost of Kwantung in terms of people and money. It expressed the wish that the Kwantung garrison should not exceed the number of bayonets and cavalry available there at that time, namely 11,300 people, so that "the organization of the protection of the peninsula would not be excessively expensive and politically dangerous."

The military department, having accepted this directive, sent Professor K. I. Velichko to Port Arthur, who at that time held the position of a member of the Engineering and Fortress Committees, and gave him guidelines for drafting the fortress. In accordance with these instructions, the final design of the fortress was drawn up, according to which the length of the land line of defense, passing through the heights of the Dragon Range, the hill in front of the Cemetery Mountain, the Jagged Mountain, the hill near the village of Sanshugou, Woodcock Hill, the heights at the southern corner of the Western Basin and Mount White Wolf, was 19 km. The center of the arc, along which all the forts of the land line were located, was the entrance to the inner raid at the tip of the so-called Tiger's Tail, and the radius of this arc was 4 km; it was closed by an approximately 8.5 km coastal position in the form of an obtuse reentrant angle of about 12º.

In addition to the main defensive line, which consisted of six forts and five intermediate fortifications, the project also provided for the encirclement of the Old City and the Eastern Basin with a continuous central fence of temporary strongholds and lines connecting them in the form of a rampart with a moat with a sheer counterscarp and flank defenses. And although the construction of the main defensive line was planned in the first place, but since this line had shortcomings caused by economic considerations, various advanced buildings and positions were also envisaged in the second place (for example, on Mount Dagushan). The Primorsky Front was supposed to consist of 25 coastal batteries, located in three groups: on the Tigris Peninsula, Zolotaya and Krestovaya mountains. All these batteries were assigned 124 guns, including 254- and 152-mm guns, 280- and 229-mm mortars, 57-mm coastal guns, field battery guns and old 152-mm three-ton guns.

The cost of engineering work was calculated in the amount of 7.5 million rubles; almost the same amount had to cost all artillery weapons. In total, about 15 million rubles were to be allocated for the construction of the Port Arthur fortress. This amount does not seem excessive, if we recall that all three serial battleships of the Poltava type (built in 1892-1900) at once cost the Russian treasury only one third more (7-8 million rubles each).

In this form, the project of the fortress was approved in 1900, work began a little earlier. But due to small financial holidays, these works were not carried out immediately, but were divided into three stages, with the expectation that the construction of the fortress would be completed in 1909. And until January 27 (February 9), 1904, when the Russo-Japanese War had already begun, only 4.5 million rubles were allocated for defensive work, that is, less than one third of what was needed. Therefore, by the indicated date, only a little more than half of all the work was done in the fortress, with the greatest attention being paid to the coastal front, which turned out to be in the highest degree of readiness: 21 batteries were erected on it, including 9 long-term types and another 12 temporary, and 2 powder magazines. On the land front, only fort No. IV, fortifications No. 4 and 5, batteries lit. A, B and C and 2 nutrient cellars. The rest of the buildings were either not yet completed, or just begun construction, or even not started at all. Forts No. II and III and temporary fortification No. 3 were among such unfinished, but of paramount importance in the defense of the fortress (since they were subsequently attacked by land). rudy instead of 542 according to the report card.

After the outbreak of hostilities, the construction of fortifications accelerated according to the well-developed plan of engineer-lieutenant colonel S. A. Rashevsky and under the able leadership of the commander of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division, Major General R. I. Kondratenko. The latter was the soul of the entire defense: largely thanks to him, the garrison did everything possible to increase the defenses of Port Arthur. Work was carried out day and night. Echelons with troops, artillery, machine guns and ammunition arrived in the city. But to do in five months, moreover, in the order of improvisation, the work that was designed for five years, was, unfortunately, still beyond the limits of human possibility.

By the beginning of the close siege of Port Arthur by the Japanese troops on July 17 (30), 1904, the fortifications of the fortress consisted of five forts (No. I-V), three fortifications (No. 3 - 5) and four separate artillery batteries (letters A, B, C and D). In the intervals between them, rifle trenches were dug, covered with barbed wire and, in the most dangerous directions, with land mines buried in the ground. On the flanks, advanced field-type positions were also equipped on the Syagushan, Dagushan, High and Corner mountains. The Kumirnensky, Vodoprovodny and Skalisty redoubts were moved towards the Shuishin valley. Behind the belt of the main fortifications, between them, as well as on the coastal front, batteries and separate firing points of dagger action were installed: of these, the most famous in the history of defense are the Big and Small Eagle's Nests, Zaredutnaya battery, coastal numbered batteries, redoubts No. 1 and 2, Kurgan battery, Quail Mountain, Dragon's Back, etc.

The system of fortifications relied on the terrain, which was quite favorable for defense. All fortifications were built on mountains, opposite which, to the north, there was a relatively flat area. As it approached the fortifications, it turned into an open sloping area, which was under fire from artillery and rifle fire from the defenders. Everywhere there were observation posts to correct artillery fire. The rear slopes of the heights served as good cover for men and guns.

Organizationally, the land defense of Port Arthur was divided into two sectors. The first, under the command of the commander of the 1st Brigade of the 7th Infantry Division, Major General V.N. Gorbatovsky, included the territory from Krestovaya Gora to Fort No. V, the second, under the command of the commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 7th Infantry Division, Major General Tserpitsky, started from Fort No. V and ended with the White Wolf redoubt. The first of the sectors included the Eastern and Northern fronts, the second - the least ready for battles, the Western Front. The commander of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division, Major General R. I. Kondratenko, was appointed head of the land defense of the fortress. All reserves were led by the commander of the 4th Infantry Division, Major General A. V. Fok. The general leadership of the defense of the fortress was formally supposed to be carried out by the commandant of the fortress, Lieutenant General Smirnov, but in fact, the supreme command from the very beginning was in the hands of the head of the former Kwantung Fortified Region, Lieutenant General A. M. Stessel.

One of significant shortcomings Port Arthur fortress was the fact that its defensive line adjoined the city and harbor too closely, which gave the Japanese the opportunity to bring the guns to those positions from which the city began to be fired from the very first days of the siege. Ultimately, Port Arthur itself did not satisfy the theoretical conditions of the then normal fortress. Some fortifications of the outer contour were separated from the city at a distance less than the normal limit - 4 km. So, fort No. III was 2.5 km away from the city, and forts No. IV and V were only 1.5 km from the outskirts of the New City. And even if we consider only the Eastern Basin, where the Russian squadron was hiding, as a protected area, then it turns out that the line of land forts was only 3 km away from the border. The besieged Port Arthur could not serve as a reliable base for the fleet: the main line of defense passed at a distance less than the firing range of the Japanese army and siege artillery. It is clear that such a proximity of the fortifications to the city caused the bombing of the latter and the port from the very first shots, and ships, warehouses and hospitals suffered, and not only shells, but also rifle bullets flew through the streets. Such a narrowing of the bypass was caused solely by considerations of economy and the desire to drive the length of the bypass in accordance with the manpower strictly allocated for the city. "Due to the unavailability of the fortress and the lack of equipment of its port ... the correct idea of" the existence of Arthur for the fleet "was nullified: the fortress could not provide the squadron from the fire of Japanese land batteries."

As B. Norigaard, a journalist for the English newspaper Daily Mail, wrote, Port Arthur would be an impregnable fortress in the full sense of the word, “if the Russians had enough time to strengthen the outer defense line as well ... along the Fenghoanshan and Dagushan ridges.” This outer line, which dominated the Russian forts and fortifications for a long distance, became the starting point of the Japanese offensive, it well covered the deployment of Japanese troops, their field camps and siege weapons.

There were also shortcomings in the fortification system itself: too few long-term fortifications, which, moreover, were not camouflaged on the ground, their location on the same line with large "dead" (non-shootable) zones, the absence of good roads for maneuvering troops and artillery, lack of air surveillance equipment (balloons), unreliable communications. Only one Eastern Front of Defense could be considered to be in any way completed. The northern front was only half completed. The western front was barely marked, meanwhile, there was the key of the fortress - Mount High (or height 203) - the Malakhov Kurgan of Port Arthur, from which the whole city and the raid were clearly visible and with the occupation of which the entire Russian squadron was doomed to death by the Japanese. These shortcomings in the fortification system of the fortress had to be filled by the garrison of the fortress itself, fortunately, consisting mostly of young conscripts under the age of 30, who were distinguished by good health and high morale.

By July 17 (30), 1904, the Port Arthur fortress was armed with only 646 artillery pieces and 62 machine guns, of which 514 guns and 47 machine guns were installed on the land front. For protection from the sea, there were: 5 10-inch guns (10 according to the report card), 12 9-inch guns, 20 modern 6-inch Canet guns, 12 old 6-inch guns of 190 pounds (4 according to the report card), 12 battery 120-mm guns, 28 57-mm guns (24 according to the report card), as well as 10 11-inch and 32 9-inch mortars. There were only 274,558 shells (of which heavy: 2004 11-inch, 790 10-inch and 7819 9-inch), an average of about 400 for each gun. Almost from the very beginning of the war, the uselessness of mortars against ships became clear and they began to be used for defense on the land front (as well as most of the guns were either moved there or got the possibility of circular firing). However, extremely small (compared to 35,000 11-inch charges expended by the Japanese army during the siege) for this stocks of shells affected here. There were 4472 horses in the fortress for the transportation of goods, materiel, ammunition, food, etc. By the day of the close imposition of the fortress, the garrison was provided with food: flour and sugar for half a year, meat and canned food for only one month. Then I had to be content with horsemeat. There were few reserves of greenery, which is why during the siege there were a lot of cases of scurvy in the garrison) the Japanese captured the advanced positions of the Russians - the Vodoprovodny and Kumirnensky redoubts and the Long Mountain. On September 8-9 (September 21-22) there was a stubborn battle for the High Mountain, in which the Japanese saw the key to Arthur. However, the Japanese failed to take the High Mountain - the Russian army owes its preservation as a result of the fighting on September 9 to the eye and resourcefulness of Colonel Irman, the decisiveness of Lieutenant Podgursky and the heroism of the shooters of the 5th regiment. Podgursky with three hunters knocked out three companies of Japanese with pyroxylin checkers, who were about to occupy the lunettes. The losses of the Russians amounted to 1500 people, the Japanese - 6000.

Continuation of the siege and the third assault

After another failure, the Japanese deployed excavation on an even larger scale. The sappers, having reached the front line, dug day and night, drawing parallels, trenches and communication passages to the forts and other fortifications of Port Arthur.

The value of the defense of Port Arthur

Port Arthur cost the enemy colossal casualties. The Japanese army, operating on the Kwantung Peninsula against the Russian fortress, lost over 110 thousand people during the siege, of which up to 10 thousand officers.

Port Arthur fell on the 329th day after the start of the war, during which he played an outstanding role. On the outskirts of the fortress, a hundred thousand Japanese army was crushed; the Russian fleet and garrison chained almost the entire fleet of the enemy. The defense of Port Arthur made it possible for Kuropatkin to concentrate an army in Manchuria and organize defense.

The English correspondent Ellis Bartlett, who was with Noga's army and observed the siege of Port Arthur throughout its entire period, wrote:

The story of the siege of Port Arthur is, from beginning to end, a tragedy of Japanese arms; ... neither in the field of strategy nor in the field of military art was anything outstanding or especially remarkable shown by the Japanese. Everything was limited to the fact that thousands of people were placed as close as possible to enemy positions and rushed into continuous attacks.. donations were collected to award the heroes of the defense with medals. However,

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