Basic principles and ideas of the philosophy of J. Locke. Philosophical and legal views of J. Locke Locke and selected philosophical works

The younger contemporary of Hobbes was another representative of English moral and legal philosophy - John Locke (1632-1704). He was born into a lawyer's family. After graduating from Oxford University, Locke served as an educator and secretary in the family of Lord Ashley. Together with him, he emigrated to France, where he became acquainted with the teachings of the French philosopher Rene Descartes.

Locke's main works are "An Essay on the Human Mind", "Treatises on Government", "Thoughts on Education".

In the natural (before the state) state, according to Locke, the natural free law dominates, the law of nature, which differs from the Hobbesian theory of “war against all”. Unlike Hobbes, Locke considers the readiness of people to follow reasonable natural, natural laws as an expression of natural equality. Locke does not imagine that people could ever live without order and law. The law of nature determines by reason what is good and what is bad; if the law is broken, the culprit can be punished by everyone. According to this law, the offended judge himself in his case and himself executes the sentence. The law of nature, being an expression of the rationality of human nature, "Demands peace and security for all mankind." Locke D. Selected Philosophical Works. Moscow 1960.V.2. C.8. And a person, in accordance with the requirement of reason, also in the state of nature, pursuing his own interests and defending his own - his life, freedom and property, seeks not to harm another. V.S. Nersesyants. Philosophy of law. Norm. Moscow 2001.C.466

The state of nature is complete freedom of action and disposal of one's property and person. The protection of the law of nature and its implementation in the state of nature is ensured by the power of each person; punish lawbreakers and protect the innocent. The government cannot encroach on the inalienable rights of citizens.

Freedom of opinion, according to Locke, is an inalienable human right. He believed that in the realm of judgments, everyone is the highest and absolute authority. This principle also applies to religious beliefs, but freedom of belief, in his opinion, is not unlimited, it is limited by considerations of morality and order.

Locke designates the traditional requirement “to give to each his own, his own” as a fundamental right; the right to property (the right to one's own, one's own).

By property, Locke understands not only purely economic needs, but also "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Property and life act as the embodiment of freedom, and in them the choice of vocation is realized, goals are relied upon and achieved. Locke regards the freedom of the individual as the great foundation of property. Locke believed that people do not become owners because they take possession of the objects of nature, but they are able to appropriate the objects of nature through labor, because they are initially free, and already by virtue of this they are owners. So he notes that every person, according to the law of nature, has the right to defend "his property, that is, his life, freedom and property." Locke D. Selected Philosophical Works. Moscow 1960. T.2. P.50.

Locke's theory begins with the question: Is private property justified? Since everyone owns property in the form of himself, the fruits of the labor of his hands can be considered his property. Labor creates property. Thus, Locke justifies property not because it is protected by the law established by people, but because it corresponds to the highest law - "natural law".

Social contract and the State.

A reasonable overcoming of the shortcomings of the state of nature leads, according to Locke, to a social contract on the establishment of political power and the state. People tend to move from a state of nature to a politically organized society, not out of fear of death, but because they understand that they will be safer in an orderly society than in a state of nature. As a consequence, it is necessary to form a state, which is created by concluding a social contract.

The social contract is between the people and the state. “The main purpose of the entry of people into society is the desire to peacefully and safely enjoy their property, and the main tool and means for this are the laws established in this society; the first and fundamental positive law of all states is the establishment of a legislative power; in the same way, the first and fundamental natural law, to which the legislature itself must obey, is the preservation of society and every member of society” Locke. D. Selected Philosophical Works. Moscow 1960 T.2.S.76

However, “according to the social contract”, people do not renounce their natural rights, and the very law of nature continues to operate even in the state, thereby determining the goals, nature and limits of the powers of political power. The essential point of the Locke state is “the doctrine of the legitimacy of resistance to any illegal manifestation of power” Locke D. Selected Philosophical Works. Moscow 1960.T.2.C.116.. After the conclusion of the treaty, the people remain the judge deciding whether the authorities established and authorized by them fulfill the contractual obligations assigned to them or have begun to violate the treaty. If the government (ruler) acts contrary to the law in force and perverts the laws or does not take them into account at all, then the subjects have the right to terminate the agreement with the government and, using the right to self-defense, even rise to the revolution.

The social contract, according to Locke, is concluded more than once and for all, without the right to subsequently correct this contract. The people have the right to a complete rupture in cases of transition of political power to absolutism and despotism. The contractual relations of people with the state is a constantly renewing process.

In order for the natural rights of a person not to remain at the level of moral requirements, they, according to Locke, need legal recognition by the state. Providing rights and freedoms with legal guarantees was the main duty and task of any state.

The state is, according to Locke, a collection of people united under the auspices of the general law established by them and created a judicial authority competent to settle conflicts between them and punish criminals.

As a result of social agreement, the state became the guarantor of natural rights and freedoms. It was empowered to legislate with sanctions and to use the power of society to enforce those laws. However, the state should not encroach on these rights themselves, for the limit of its power in all forms of government is the natural rights of its citizens. State power, wrote Locke, cannot assume the right to command by means of arbitrary despotic decrees; on the contrary, it is obliged to do justice and determine the rights of citizens through the promulgation of permanent laws and authorized judges. Locke believed that the state power (government) itself must obey the laws established in society, otherwise citizens have every right to regain their original rights and transfer them to a new power (ruler).

Locke emphasizes that a person is not born a subject of this or that state. A person, having become of age, as a free man chooses under the authority of which government, which state he wants to become a citizen of. “Only the consent of free people makes them members of this state, and this consent is given separately in turn, as each comes of age, and not simultaneously by many people, therefore people do not notice this and believe that this does not happen at all or it is not necessary , and conclude that they are by nature subjects in the same way that they are people” Locke D. Selected Philosophical Works. Moscow 1960 V.2.C.68.

Thus, we are talking not only about the contractual origin of the state, but also about the form of contractual establishment of citizenship in relation to each person. Such a concept of contractual relations between the people as a whole and individuals, on the one hand, and the state, on the other, presupposes mutual rights and obligations of the contracting parties, and not the unilateral absolute right of the state and the lack of rights of subjects, as is the case in the Hobbesian interpretation of the contractual theory of the establishment of the state. V.S. Nersesyants. Philosophy of law. Norm. Moscow 2001.S468

The state differs from all other forms of collectivity (families, dominions) in that it alone embodies political power, that is, the right, in the name of the public good, to create laws to regulate and preserve property, as well as the right to use the force of society to enforce these laws and protect the state. from outside attack. In such a state, the law prevails, which ensures the natural inalienable rights of property, individual freedom and equality. The freedom of people under the rule of law, wrote Locke, “consists in having a permanent rule for life common to everyone in this society and established by the legislative power created in it; it is the freedom to follow my own will in all cases where it does not forbid the law, and not to be dependent on the constant, indefinite, unknown autocratic will of another person.” D. Locke. Selected Philosophical Works. Moscow 1960.T.2.C.16

The philosophical and legal teaching of Locke is permeated with the idea of ​​non-alienability of the natural fundamental rights and freedoms of a person in a civil state.

Locke sharply distinguished between the state and society, creating one of the main doctrines of liberalism, the Society is much more important than the state and will outlive it. The collapse of the state does not entail the collapse of society; usually the state perishes under the swords of conquerors. But if it collapses from internal causes, betraying the trust of the people, Locke does not foresee chaos, believing that society will create a new state. If society disappears, no state will surely survive.

Absolute monarchy for Locke is not a state at all, but something worse than a society of savages. There, at least everyone is a judge in his own case, and in an absolute monarchy only the king is free.

Equality

Tabularasa (blank slate), the initial equality of children in the sense of their lack of knowledge, serves as a prerequisite for initial natural equality, and the gradual development of their different and unequal abilities and inclinations, including diligence, is the reason that in subsequent history people act with a wide variety of perspectives. “Different degrees of diligence caused people to acquire property of various sizes ... the invention of money made it possible for them to accumulate and increase it.” Locke D. Selected Philosophical Works. T.2. Moscow.1960.C30 Some became rich and influential, and it was they who were most interested in creating statehood. The lot of the poor was to work for a piece of bread. This is how Locke looks at this question, in his own way consistently, but at the same time mixing conjectures and errors.

When speaking of a living subject of law and order, Locke always has in mind an isolated individual seeking private gain. Yes, and social life in general is drawn to him, first of all, as a network of exchange relations, into which simple commodity owners enter, personally free owners of their forces and property. The "state of nature" as depicted in Locke's second treatise on state government is, first of all, a state of "fair" competition based on mutual recognition. Accordingly, "natural law" (the rule of community) is understood by Locke as a requirement of equal partnership.

Equality, as Locke interprets it, does not at all mean the natural uniformity of individuals and does not contain a request for their primitive equalization in terms of abilities, forces and property. We are talking about equality of opportunities and claims, its essence boils down to the fact that not one of the individuals, no matter how scarce his natural wealth (his intellectual and physical strength, his skills and acquisitions), can be excluded from competition, torn away from free exchange of goods and services. Or: all people, regardless of their natural inequality, once and for all must be recognized as economically independent, being in a relationship of voluntary mutual use. The state must provide individuals with a certain legal, not economic and social equality.

Locke had very high hopes for law and legality. In the general law established by people, recognized by them and admitted by their common consent as a measure of good and evil to resolve all conflicts, he saw the first feature constituting the state. Law in the true sense is by no means any prescription emanating from civil society as a whole or from a legislature established by people. Only that act has the title of law, which directs a rational being to behave in accordance with his own interests and serve the common good. If a prescription does not contain such a norm-indication, it cannot be considered a law. In addition, the law must be inherent in the permanence and long-term action.

The “permanent laws” that Locke speaks of play the role of the original and main (constitutional) legal source for legislation. And the obligation of the legislator to be guided in his activity by the provisions of these “permanent laws” is an essential legal guarantee of the legality justified by Locke in general, especially the legality in legislative activity.

Freedom is a guarantee against arbitrariness, it is the basis of all other human rights, because, having lost freedom, a person endangers his property, well-being, and life. He no longer has the means to protect them.

Laws then contribute to the achievement of the “main and great goal” of the state, when everyone knows them and everyone fulfills them. The high prestige of the law stems from the fact that, according to Locke, it is a decisive instrument for preserving and expanding the freedom of the individual, which also guarantees the individual from the arbitrariness and despotic will of others. "Where there are no laws, there is no freedom." D. Locke. Selected Philosophical Works. Moscow.1960.T.2.C. 34.

According to Locke, only an act of a legislative body formed by the people has the force of law. At the same time, Locke understands legality not only in the formal sense, that is, as the observance of laws approved in accordance with the rules. He believed that the legislators themselves should not violate the laws of nature. The obligatory nature of civil law, including for all state authorities, stems from the fact that the law expresses the “will of society.” D. Locke. Selected Philosophical Works. Moscow. 1960 .T.2.S.87.

Separation of powers.

Locke provides a special constitutional mechanism that prevents the state from going beyond its powers, thereby becoming despotic. Its most important components are the principles of separation of powers and the rule of law. In order to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of the leadership, which would thereby have the opportunity to turn to its own advantage both the creation of laws and their implementation, Locke proposes not to combine the legislative and executive powers and to subordinate the legislators to the action of laws created by them, implemented by the executive power.

In addition to the legislative and executive, Locke singles out the federal branch of government, which represents the state as a whole in relations with other states.

To the legislative power, Locke assigned supreme, but not absolute, power, and in the interests of the people it should be limited. Locke lists four main conditions that limit the legislative power:

• 1. The law must be equal for everyone, for the rich and for the poor, for the favorite at court and for the peasant behind the plow.
• 2. The law is not created to suppress people, but for their good.
• 3. Taxes cannot be increased without the consent of the people.
• 4. Legislators cannot entrust their functions to anyone.

Most likely, the wise philosopher was much more afraid of the transformation into a tyranny of executive power, embodied in one person, than of a parliament consisting of many persons. The executive branch, according to Locke, is subordinate to the legislative branch. The head of the executive branch should perform the function of the supreme executor of the law. When he himself violates the law, he cannot claim the obedience of the members of society, he turns into a private person without power and without will. The sovereignty of the people is higher than both parliament and the king.

John Locke (1632-1704) is rightfully considered the classic of modern empiricism. His treatise "An Essay on the Human Mind" is perhaps the first major philosophical work entirely devoted to the problems of the theory of knowledge. Locke saw the main task of his epistemological research in clarifying the cognitive abilities of a person, establishing their limits, knowledge of which would make it possible to avoid fruitless disputes and corrosive skepticism, would serve as an incentive to productive mental activity. “Our task here,” writes Locke, “is not to know everything, but what is important for our behavior. If we can find the criteria by which a rational being, in the position in which man is placed in this world, can and should control his opinions and actions depending on them, we need not be embarrassed that some things elude our knowledge.

Like Descartes, Locke studied the origin and cognitive significance of the ideas of human thought. The new time radically landed the high concept of "idea", which in Plato's philosophy denoted a supranatural essence and a perfect, not associated with any empirical restrictions, sample of single things. The medieval scholastic tradition also attached the same ontological significance to ideas. Descartes, on the other hand, clearly distinguishing between the self-conscious subject and the physical reality cognized by him, interprets the idea as a subjective state of the thinking mind and at the same time as a kind of object of thought. Locke is in full agreement with Descartes here, calling an idea everything that the mind notices in itself and that is a direct object of perception, thought or understanding. Ideas are elements of the inner, mental world that the soul is occupied with in the process of thinking.

But Locke strongly disagrees with Descartes on the question of the origin of ideas. Descartes asserted the existence of innate ideas, the clarity and distinctness of which guarantees their conformity with physical reality. Locke completely denies the possibility of innate knowledge, and throughout the first book of his treatise he proves that experience is the only source of ideas; all our knowledge ultimately comes from experience. He is by no means convinced by the arguments of the supporters of rationalism regarding the alleged general agreement of people about certain ideas and postulates, for, for example, in small children nothing of the kind is imprinted in their minds. The moral principles of different peoples are not the same. There are tribes that are not even familiar with the idea of ​​God.

All the material of thinking is delivered to our mind by “observation directed either at external sensible objects, or at the internal actions of our soul, perceived and reflected by ourselves”2. From the experience of the senses turned to external objects, we get ideas of the various qualities of these objects. The internal perception of the activity of our mind supplies ideas of a different kind, which cannot be received from without.

Locke, D. Selected Philosophical Works. In 2 volumes / D. Locke. M., 1960. T. 1.S. 74. Ibid. S. 128.

These are the ideas of thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, desiring. The source of these ideas, although not directly related to external objects, is nevertheless similar to them, and Locke calls it "internal feeling", or reflection, understood as observation to which the mind subjects its activities and ways of its manifestation, as a result of which there arise in the mind ideas for this activity. The experience of reflection can arise only after receiving sensations from outside.

Thus, our ideas relating to external bodies have their source in the qualities of these bodies. Some of these qualities, according to Locke, cannot be separated from bodies, as well as from any particle of matter. This is the length, density, shape, mobility, quantity. Locke calls such qualities of bodies primary, or primary. Ideas of such qualities accurately reproduce the corresponding parameters of perceived objects. At the same time, qualities such as colors, sounds, tastes are subjective in nature and, being caused by various combinations of primary qualities, are human experiences that are unlike the causes that caused them. Locke calls this group of qualities secondary, emphasizing that in the bodies themselves there is nothing resembling the ideas of red, sweet, etc.

The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is by no means a discovery of Locke. It was encountered even among the ancient atomists and is generally characteristic of those philosophers who emphasize the decisive significance of the mechanical parameters of being. It is no coincidence that Galileo turned to the same distinction in modern times.

The human soul, according to Locke, receives from our senses simple and unmixed ideas. They are delivered only by sensation and reflection (thinking, self-observation). Simple ideas, according to Locke, cannot be created by the human mind, as well as arbitrarily destroyed by it, just as we cannot create any of the things of the material world from Nothing or, conversely, turn it into nothing. The mind can repeat, compare, combine these simple ideas, but it is not in its power to invent even one new simple idea. When perceiving them, the mind is passive. At the same time, the mind is able to be active, using such ideas as material for the construction of new, complex ideas, which can be either modes, or substances, or relations (mathematical or moral).

Modes are understood here as complex ideas dependent on substances or being their properties. The idea of ​​substance is such a combination of simple ideas, which is considered to represent separate, independently existing things. At the same time, an obscure, according to Locke, idea of ​​substance as such is always assumed. The last idea is an assumption about an unknown carrier of those qualities to which simple ideas correspond. The ideas of a material substance and a spiritual substance are possible, but both of them are not distinct, although we have no reason to assert the non-existence of the corresponding substances. Locke defines his position in relation to general concepts in the spirit of nominalism, recognizing the general as a product of the abstracting activity of the mind and arguing that only the singular exists in reality.

The human mind, according to Locke, cognizes things not directly, but through the ideas of these things that it has. Therefore knowledge is real only insofar as our ideas correspond to things. “But what will be the criterion here? How then does the mind, if it perceives only its own ideas, know about their correspondence with the things themselves? Although this is admittedly a difficult question, Locke argues that there are two kinds of ideas that we have a right to trust. First of all, these are all simple ideas that are not inventions of our imagination, but natural and regular products of the things around us. Secondly, these are all complex ideas, except for the ideas of substances. Non-substantial complex ideas are formed by the mind of its own free choice and are themselves prototypes with which we relate things. Hence - the specific reality of mathematical knowledge, as well as knowledge of the principles of morality. Ethical and mathematical statements do not become less true because we ourselves form the corresponding ideas. Here, only consistency, consistency of ideas is enough.

The ideas of substance have their prototypes outside of us, so their knowledge may not be real. "The reality of our knowledge of substances is based on the fact that all our complex ideas of substances must be composed of such, and only of such simple ideas as have been found coexisting in nature."

Locke, D. Selected Philosophical Works. In 2 volumes / D. Locke. T. 1.S. 549.

The most reliable is intuitive knowledge, in which the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas directly through themselves, without involving other ideas. Thus the mind perceives that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three is greater than two. From such an intuition, which leaves no room for hesitation or doubt, as Locke believed, the reliability and evidence of all our knowledge depends entirely.

Intuitive knowledge is derived from demonstrative or evidence-based knowledge, achieved indirectly, with the participation of other ideas involved in the process of reasoning. Each step in the implementation of the proof must have intuitive certainty. On the whole, our knowledge never reaches all that we would like to know. We have ideas of matter and thought, but it is not possible to know whether any material object thinks. Even God is just a complex idea formed by combining the idea of ​​infinity with the ideas of existence, power, knowledge, and so on. Thus, “we have an intuitive knowledge of our own being, a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of God, and for the being of other things we have only sensory knowledge, which extends only to objects that immediately appear to our senses”2.

Locke, like Descartes, considers ideas to be purely spiritual phenomena, so the transition from them to real external being is a kind of leap. But Locke does not consider, in contrast to Descartes, thinking to be substantial, and the conclusion suggests itself that the recognition of the reality of things makes ideas illusory, while the assumption of the reality of ideas would turn things themselves into products of our imagination.

The socio-philosophical concept of Locke deserves some attention. Like Hobbes, he asserts the contractual origin of the state; but if in Hobbes the "state of nature" of people, which preceded the state, is portrayed in very gloomy colors and interpreted as a senseless and cruel war of all against all, then Locke paints this early phase of history as a state of equality, in which power and competence are mutual, and freedom not accompanied by arbitrariness.

1 Locke, D. Selected Philosophical Works. In 2 volumes / D. Locke.

The freedom of man is governed by natural law, which forbids restricting another in his life, health, right, or property. Therefore, the power of the ruler, obtained on the basis of a contract, cannot encroach on the inalienable rights of every human person. Locke's views on religion are also moderate. Recognizing the proven existence of God, he at the same time advocates religious tolerance and considers state interference in religious life unacceptable. Such a prudent and cautious ideological attitude basically corresponded to the spirit of the time, which determined the popularity of Locke's philosophy among his contemporaries, as well as its significant influence on the ideological thought of the Enlightenment.

The practical application of the philosophical teachings of Locke was his pedagogical concept. If Ya.A. Comenius was concerned mainly with the effective organization of schoolchildren's education, then J. Locke "continued the ideas of" natural pedagogy "in the direction related to the education of the character of the emerging personality. The beginning of the Enlightenment was marked by increased attention to the problem of the natural, that is, corresponding to human nature , a worldview that would be built in accordance with experience.If experience in general is the source of our knowledge, then the formulation of the matter of education should open access for children to expedient experience that fills the soul with the knowledge necessary for life.The passions of the soul, as Descartes argued, and after him and Spinoza, cloud our mind. Therefore, Locke believed, in a person it is necessary to develop free will in such a way that it directs him to self-improvement. The child needs authority, and its source is, firstly, the divine will, supported by religious faith, firstly secondly, the state-legal will, based on a social contract, and, thirdly, society venerable morality and personal morality. The task of the educator is to provide an expedient pedagogical influence that forms the necessary, beneficial personal experience of the student. The educator must reveal his positive inclinations, develop his active forces, strengthen his physical and spiritual health.

Happiness is based on virtue, wisdom, good manners, and also on the possession of the knowledge necessary for life.

Locke's pedagogy is practical and even mundane. Thus, wisdom is understood by him as the art of prudently and skillfully conducting one's affairs; he associates virtue with internal discipline, the ability to obey the arguments of reason; all education should be based, apart from reasonable discipline, on knowledge of the work of our body and the human will, as well as on respect for other people and observance of moral standards.

Rationalism after Descartes became a cultural and normative form of thinking that determined the development of civilization for the entire subsequent period. Literally all the basic operations of thinking have been transformed. New abilities arose as a result of the differentiation of the psyche and the increase in the autonomy of the individual. For example, for a person who is able to think in a rationalistic paradigm, there can be no doubt about the truth of the syllogistic conclusion, even when it comes to things with which he had not previously dealt. In all respects, this is a different work of thought than the above examples of the thinking of the dekhans of the patriarchal community, described by A.R. Luria. The fundamental nature of neoplasms of this kind is obvious when comparing the two paradigms of thinking.

At the same time, and this is cardinally important, rationalistic thinking was the result of the natural progressive development of the psyche and was actually based on the same potentialities.

and deep mechanisms, as magical thinking. The principle of similarity/adjacency, which previously underlay the magical laws of participation immanent in the external world, was now realized as an associative principle of organizing subjective experience and internal images. The world, soldered by universal participation, turned out to be no less firmly bound by the universal causality and determinism of natural laws. The immediate certainty of feelings has been replaced by the immediate certainty of reason. The absoluteness of God appeared as the absoluteness of truth, and so on. The main categories of consciousness seem to have risen to the next level.

Thus, only having experienced the totality of magical involvement, a person was able to accept the absoluteness of logic, to submit to the necessity of a causal connection, to feel the beauty and universality of truth. Magical thinking - the first and necessary phase of the development of the intellect - initially contained all the deep mechanisms immanent in the psyche, which began to unfold into new structures and abilities. Due to such invariance, integrity, if you like, completeness, not only magical thinking, but in the same way all subsequent forms of thinking form complete and self-sufficient paradigms capable of ensuring the real adaptation of the individual at the appropriate level. And at its historical stage, the Cartesian paradigm of thinking, in essence, determined the nature of the development of society, its ethics, aesthetics, and even basic technologies.

Rationalism (from Latin ratio - mind) was a universal doctrine that explained the world and man in three aspects. Rationalism ontological (from the Greek ontos - being) proclaims

shal reasonableness, lawfulness of being, a clear determinism of the world. Rationalism epistemological (from the Greek. gnosis - knowledge) substantiated the ability of the human mind to master the truth, to fully know the world. Ethical rationalism (from the Greek ethos - custom, disposition, character) argued that reason is the basis of good, and therefore enlightenment changes a person and society for the better. And in all directions rationalism led to phenomenal results.

The ontological picture of this era delights with its logical clarity, mathematical precision, the promise of fundamental discoveries, and simply the genius of Descartes, Leibniz, Newton, Lomonosov and other giants of science. The theory of knowledge in this period was enriched by the doctrine of antinomies by I. Kant and the dialectical method of G. Hegel. Ethics found its highest expression in the idea of ​​a “social contract”, to which almost every major thinker of that time devoted a special work: T. Hobbes (1651), D. Locke (1690), J.-J. Rousseau (1762), D. Diderot (1770). According to enlightenment views, the "social contract" is not a covenant of God to man, but a nationwide agreement of equal, free and independent people who establish reasonable legal norms that protect their lives, freedom and private property. The goal of the "state of reason" (the expression of J.-J. Rousseau) is the highest good of people, the freedom and equality of everyone.

Social thought of the XVII - the first half of the XIX century. was imbued with an optimistic spirit of the reorganization of the world, confidence in the imminent triumph of reason, the ideals of universal equality and justice. And these were by no means abstract philosophical dreams. The thinkers, researchers and writers of the Enlightenment were people of action and success. They always, under any circumstances, worked very productively, although enlightenment in those days was a risky undertaking and, on a personal level, often ended tragically. The experimental virtuoso Antoine Lavoisier (1743-1794) proved the law of conservation of matter with precise experiments, how he cut off the theory of caloric with Occam's razor, made a number of discoveries that had a decisive influence on the entire subsequent development of chemistry. He constantly lacked money for endless experiments, a unique laboratory for those times, and especially precise instruments. And in order to finance his experiments himself, regardless of sponsors, the thinker had to take up “medieval business” - take tax collection at the mercy. In 1789, he finally published the Primary Chemistry Textbook, in which he outlined the system of knowledge he had developed and which became a reference book for chemists for centuries.

And in 1794, the revolutionary tribunal of the Jacobins at once sentenced the entire collegium of tax-farmers to death. Antoine Lavoisier was executed, as they say, for the company and two years later he was recognized as "innocently convicted." This happened to the scientist who made the glory of France. And in Russia, A.N. Radishchev (1749-1802), whose book Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow became a landmark in Russian classical literature.

And yet, despite personal tragedies, the Enlightenment man was a type of winner who, by force of mind and perseverance of will, advanced to great discoveries and historical achievements. Characteristic in this regard is the biography of Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790). He was not a hereditary intellectual. Born into a craftsman's family, he started working in a printing house at the age of 17. It can be said that he was lucky: he immediately found himself in the center of mass communications of the era, and the rest became a matter of self-education. Benjamin Franklin founded America's first public library (1731). This act should be considered typological. Eight years later, he founded the later famous Pennsylvania University (1740). Then he organized the first "American Philosophical Society" (1743). Then he plunged into scientific research for seven years. As a naturalist, he went down in history thanks to the development of a unitary theory of electricity. Among contemporaries he became famous for the invention of a lightning rod. When the war with England began, he participated in the preparation of the "Declaration of Independence" (1776), became one of the authors of the "US Constitution" (1787). An interesting detail: in 1789, Benjamin Franklin was elected a foreign honorary member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences.

The main thing in these people is that they approached the consideration of the fate of mankind from an optimistic point of view. There was a general idea of ​​progress as progressive development from the lowest to the highest, not only in the field of science and technology, but also in the growth of prosperity, freedom, civilization, even in human nature. The very name of the cultural-historical era: "Enlightenment" - emphasizes its communicative essence.

When they say: “Voltaire extinguished the fires of the Inquisition in Europe with an instrument of mockery,” they do not at all mean that the great wit was able to shame the obscurantists. The point is something else. The irresistible logic and brilliant play of the mind of the rationalist thinker became public property thanks to the pamphlet style of his creations: novels, articles, anecdotes, aphorisms ... And in the face of a new public opinion, medieval courts became

or simply impossible. The reality and power of rationalistic thinking was realized in the process of convincing the widest possible circle of people of the reliability of the conclusions and the correctness of the requirements of the geniuses of mankind. The new paradigm of thought became common property due to the amazing effectiveness of the special type of text that corresponded to it, which can rightly be defined as a persuasive text. Here is how A.I. Herzen impressions caused by P.Ya. Chaadaev (1794-1856), published by the Telescope magazine in 1836:

“It was a shot that rang out on a dark night; whether something was sinking and heralding its doom, whether it was a signal, a call for help, news of the morning, or that it would not be, - all the same, it was necessary to wake up ... Chaadaev's "letter" shocked all thinking Russia. .. I stopped twice to rest and let my thoughts and feelings settle down, and then I read and read again ... Then I reread the "Letter" to Vitberg, then Skvortsov, a young teacher of the Vyatka gymnasium, then again to myself. It is very likely that the same thing happened in different provinces and county towns, in capitals and manor houses. Everyone felt oppressed, everyone had something in their hearts, and yet everyone was silent; finally, a man came who, in his own way, said that ... for a minute everyone, even sleepy and downtrodden, recoiled, frightened by the ominous voice. Everyone was amazed, most were offended, ten people applauded the author loudly and fervently” 6 .

And there was nothing that could be done about it. For the seditious publication, the Telescope magazine was immediately closed, and the author was declared insane. But the state of consciousness of “all thinking Russia” has become different anyway. The development of social thought has changed its course, for human consciousness already differs from a machine in that it has no reverse gear.

In the description of A.J. Herzen (1812-1870), who himself entered the history of Russian journalism as an outstanding master of revolutionary propaganda, the key phrase is striking: “Everyone felt oppression, everyone had something in their hearts, and yet everyone was silent; finally, a man came who, in his own way, said that ... ". Here we are talking not about a crowd, not about a person drawn into the pralogical element of the collective unconscious, but about an audience, about people, each of whom experiences the general misfortune in a special way, but whose vague assumptions become conscious convictions precisely under the influence of an authoritative doctrine that causes most times-

6 Herzen A. Past and thoughts. M., 1958. S. 445-446.

various individual reactions - from amazement and insult ™ to admiration and active support. At the same time, one can see how people are trying to make sure that the doctrine is correct: they study thoughtfully, reread, discuss with comrades, reducing personal impressions into a collective, general, public opinion. The psychology of perception of a persuasive text consists precisely in comprehending one's own experience of an objective life situation under the integral of an ideal model of the world order or a program for the future. This is how the adjustment of the life plans of the individual to the collective project (in the terminology of Lifton-Ohlson) of the progressive development of society takes place (or does not occur), adjustment up to the formation of personal patterns of behavior. This is a comparison of the ideal with the ideal, one might say, the pure work of consciousness. But it ends with the formation of unbending convictions, mass movements, bloody revolutions, democratic constitutions and the emergence of ever new doctrines of the reorganization of the world. And any authoritative doctrine put on public display is, as it were, offered to everyone as a "major premise" of a universal syllogism, under which, as a "small premise," one can bring one's own impressions in order to correspond to the general opinion, accepted by all as undoubted truth. The logic of persuasion turns into the logic of beliefs (the internal structure of thinking).

It would seem that the process of perceiving a persuasive text remains entirely in the bright field of consciousness. But in the same description A.I. Herzen, hyperemotional images of a shocked imagination are no less striking, which characterize the comprehension of an authoritative doctrine as a collective “AGA-experience”, representing the specific psychosocial effects of creativity-in-process-communication: “it was a shot that rang out in a dark night; ...the news of the morning, or that it will not come...<...>... for a moment everyone, even sleepy and downtrodden, recoiled, frightened by the ominous voice. This once again confirms that the psyche is not reducible to consciousness, and consciousness does not work in isolation from the psyche.

But if “AGA-experience”, according to one branch of psychology, is a flash in the mind of a new holistic image, and according to another, the moment of the transition of the contents of the unconscious through the threshold of awareness, then it is most interesting how the analytical approach to topical problems is combined in a single text. and archaic patterns of thought, communication, and behavior.

A preliminary answer can be given by the structure of a religious sermon as a genre in which two ideas are formed at once: support, that is, setting out God-established norms of attitude to the world, and working, that is, recommending the best course of action in the real circumstances of worldly life. The fundamental role of the supporting idea is obvious. This is the absolute point of self-esteem and the universal criterion of truth. But where does this absoluteness and this universalism come from? Only from that creed, which, having comprehended and streamlined the mystical practice of society, itself could become an essential part of the mentality of the people. As J. Fraser established, the symbols and rituals of even theologically purified religions carry a trace of the original folklore images and magical rites 7 , that is, they retain direct contact with the collective unconscious, even if it is a contact of opposition. It turns out that the basic idea seems to pierce the barrier between the individual consciousness and the collective unconscious, and the intelligible working idea comes into direct contact with the inexpressible archetypes of the psyche. This is the impulse of a special kind of mental activity, in which logic and passion, thought and will are still quite rigidly connected, and which objectively manifests itself as a phenomenon of convinced behavior.

Religious beliefs in general have an extremely strong behavioral component. “What good is it, my brothers, if someone says that he has faith, but does not have works? can this faith save him?” - asks the apostle and, in reflection, comes to the conclusion: “Faith, if it does not have works, is dead in itself,” and then formulates the famous postulate: “Faith without works is dead” (James 2:14-20). But first, knowledge. “It would be better for them not to know the way of righteousness, than having known it, to turn back” (2 Pet. 2:21). And if knowledge is transmitted, a person cannot evade either a conscious choice or personal responsibility for his choice: “If I had not come and spoken, then they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin” (John 15:22).

We can talk about a universal model of a persuasive text, according to which a religious sermon, an advertising brochure, a newspaper article, and any other work of creativity-in-process-of-communication can be built. The psychological mechanism of convinced behavior is very plastic. It is able to include not only the dogmas of religion, but also the axioms of science, and the utopias of ideology, and the slogans of politics, and magic.

7 See: Frazier J. Folklore in the Old Testament. M., 1985.

sky rites. In this regard, any worldview knowledge is strong because it is a fixation of the collective unconscious at the level and in those forms that are available to a person of a given time. And a specific doctrine works as a supporting idea if it is itself based on some indisputable authority and opens up the prospect of personal salvation and the greater triumph of justice. As long as the Teaching itself, of which this particular doctrine is a significant part, is accepted by a person as the truth. Consequently, in the rationalist paradigm, convinced behavior is as solidly supported as scientific discoveries are fundamental, and as powerfully heated as democratic ideals are honest. And if scientific progress stalls, and democratic principles are neglected, then persuasive communication loses its effectiveness. Then propaganda automatically reverts to the crudest beliefs, seizes on esoteric theories, or creates some kind of quasi-religion. The famous aphorism of Voltaire: “If God did not exist, he would have to be invented” (1769), is already characteristic in itself, but acquires a fatal sound when compared with some statements of the late 20th century: “The corpse of Lenin, laid as if the main shrine , on the altar of communist ideology, turned the Bolshevik consciousness into a quasi-religious one. Atheism, which was spreading all over the world as a socially harmless version of freedom of conscience, was reborn among the communists into a kind of state corpse worship with its quasi-theology in the form of total propaganda and its ritual in the forms of total terror” 8 . But a sufficient resource for the persuasiveness of a text can only be found in its logical structure.

The programming power of the basic idea, strictly speaking, is not in itself, but in that logical procedure, thanks to which it is correlated with specific life circumstances. After all, in a persuasive text there should also be a ^working_idea that recommends a specific and practically effective course of action. And this working idea should be proven and, most importantly, proven rationalistically, that is, logically consciously: in strict adherence to reasoned judgments and complete clarity of conclusions. This is not so much a search for an unknown truth, but an explanation of the incomprehensible, a verification of reality with the Teaching, a justification of behavior and, therefore, ultimately, confirmation of the truth of the basic idea itself. The weaker the supporting idea, the more important it is to logically consistent, thoroughly, visually prove

working idea. The progressive development of the rationalistic paradigm of thinking led to the fact that an increasingly significant place in the persuasive text was occupied by a detailed analysis of the real circumstances of the case. The logical rigor of the author's reasoning has become the strongest means of influencing the reader. But there were pitfalls along the way, too.

Science distinguishes two indispensable qualities in any reasoning: correctness and truth. The first means compliance with the laws and rules of formal logic. The second is reality. “An argument can be correct,” writes the great modern mathematician and logician Alonzo Church, “despite the fact that the statements from which it is built are false” 9 . The logical correctness of a working idea can create the illusion of truth both in the reader's perception and in the author's intention. Moreover, the author can deliberately substitute sly figures and facts into logically correct reasoning. For example, under the business heading "On control - the quality of milk" the article "That's where the reserves" 10 is published. The author presents glaring facts about the collapse of agricultural production: “there is no veterinary and sanitary order on farms”; “they feed the cows once and only with straw”; "milkmaids are walking"; “dairy factory workers skillfully use the fact that fat is not accurately determined on farms” - as reserves (?!) for improving the quality of livestock products. A logically impeccable chain of judgments is built up that as soon as these absurdities are eliminated, milk will immediately become much better. But the more irrefutable the evidence is in form, the further the thought, in fact, moves away from the true causes of the failed state of affairs. And if you don't get hung up on manipulative propaganda, which, like any lie, is immoral and even subject to jurisdiction, it becomes clear that the logical harmony of reasoning is the quintessence of journalistic skill and a particularly insidious trap for the best minds of journalism. Fascinated by the correctness of his own thought, the publicist fails to see how contradictory, sometimes absurd, and, finally, antinomic real problems and events of life are. He confidently, with intellectual grace, brings everything under a ready-made answer. But this can turn into not just a propaganda failure, but a deep creative crisis.

Since the invention of printing by Johannes Gutenberg (1399-1468), the perception of a persuasive text has become a mass and public process in the most significant moments.

9 Church A. Introduction to mathematical logic. M., 1960. T. 1. S. 15.

Most people receive socially significant information broadcast, that is, centrally and publicly. Therefore, even in the circle of trusted and close people, in essence, social events are discussed. This is not yet a crowd, but already an audience whose behavior can be largely predicted and directed. And not without reason, in the stream of consciousness of the avant-garde writer James Joyce, as a paraphrase of the apostolic teaching “his wickedness is sufficient for the day” (Mat. 6, 34), the aphorism crystallized: “His newspaper is sufficient for the day” (1922). But with regard to the immediate environment, everyday affairs and personal interests, a person still trusts experience more than propaganda. And if journalistic attitudes diverge from the constant practice of people, journalistic texts do not convince them. Then journalism is on its own, and the audience is on its own. In essence, this is a communicative expression of a general spiritual crisis: "ideology is separate, and people are separate." For a classy journalist, this is a subjectively painful condition. His professional vanity cannot tolerate the fact that a persuasive text is separate, and convinced behavior is separate, and pursues the most precise arguments, the most unambiguous formulations. But life does not obey, and the best feathers of the editors go into filigree logic, like the righteous in a monastery.

In an article under the characteristic title "Journalistic text before and after 1985", a modern researcher examines in detail the logical structure of the correspondence of Anatoly Agranovsky "Initiative from the side" 11 , defining the system of argumentation for the material, the reason for which was the creation of a real life situation:

“...Two walkers from the Kuban went to Siberia for the forest. There they really saw useless, ownerless cut down trees, which, moreover, still had to be destroyed. They were ready to buy them, the owners - to sell, but it turned out that it was not there. None of them had the right to dispose of "state property". Where does Agranovsky see the problem here? The leaders found themselves in the position of "dogs in the manger" not because of their personal harmfulness. They acted strictly in accordance with the law (of course, unspoken), encouraging only the initiative from above. But is the law that breeds mismanagement good? After all, it is unacceptable, the author argues, that, for whatever reason, valuable cheese should be lost.

h Agranovsky L. Favorites. M., 1987. T. 1. S. 235-251.

rye. And any useful initiative, whether from below or from the side, should have the right to life.

What were the arguments put forward? Firstly, the so-called walkers did not come on their own, but had the appropriate permission from the party and Soviet authorities. Secondly, they did not try for themselves, that is, they did not want to build their own house ... Next. It is simply profitable for the state to sell the forest. Only 250 thousand rubles are spent annually on its burning. But from this forest you can build kindergartens, residential buildings, etc. And in general, the author writes, it's time for people who are entrusted with the fate of great construction projects to have the right to decide for themselves where and what to build a house on. And, finally, Agranovsky confirms his idea that it is necessary to support the people's initiative with a quote from Lenin's work "The Great Initiative" - ​​Soviet power is, according to Lenin, "the most complete, most consistent implementation of democracy, that is, the unprecedented scope of the initiative of the people" . The conversation is basically over. It is pointless to challenge the stated judgments. It is unlikely that anyone would dare to argue that it is better to burn than to build. Thus, the idea put forward by the author has been proved as a theorem. The non-stereotypic nature of judgments is supported by evidence that has undeniable value in society at that stage of its development: that is, the author was able to justify the proposed decision (to sell the forest to walkers and generally practice free sale) as the only correct one, only by bringing his judgments-evidence in line with social norms. Here, there is a reference to authorities, and the identification of one's point of view with socio-political and moral attitudes, this is also an appeal to a culturological image” 12 .

Characteristically, this example of a persuasive text proved to be both very effective and completely ineffective. Effective because the "Initiative from the Side" correspondence caused a noticeable public reaction. In numerous letters to the editor, readers unconditionally supported the position of the journalist, cited similar examples of mismanagement, and demanded administrative measures. A new turn in the assessment of this acute problem was widely used in other newspapers, central and local. The title "Initiative from the side" has become a common expression, along with other aphorisms of the times of developed socialism. Correspondence was discussed in economic instances and reported on some "measures taken." But all to no avail, because burning is useless.

12 Nevzorova T. Journalistic text before and after 1985 // Trends in the development of mass information processes. M., 1991. S. 20-21.

The production of domestic wood continued and reached gigantic proportions when the reservoir of the next super-great hydroelectric station on the Angara was filled.

Despite the new turn of the topic and the filigree of the argument, A. Agranovsky's text remained just a reminder of ideological dogmas that had long existed independently of life. (The Soviet man is the owner of great construction projects, he cares about public, not personal welfare, the state takes care of him, although negligent heads of small departments slow down this process, interfere with the common good.) After 1985, when social attitudes changed, no one of the arguments presented was no longer convincing. What difference does it make whether the walkers had petitions “signed” or not, whether they wanted to build a house or a state farm, burn the forest for free or spend 250 thousand rubles on it? And it makes absolutely no difference what Lenin would have said about this. The situation itself is absurd: they burn what can be sold. But Agranovsky just couldn’t say: “This is good, because it’s good, and this is bad, because it’s bad,” he had to prove why this is good or bad. For this, he needed references to authorities, identification of his point of view with official dogmas, appeal to cultural images. The stereotypes in the minds of people, as they say, worked for the journalist, helping him to convince the reader or opponent of his innocence. And he was able to substantiate the proposed decision only by bringing his judgments-evidence in line with accepted norms.

Obviously, this process is psychologically flawed, threatening the rebirth of a creative person. And for the admirers of the talent of Anatoly Agranovsky, it became a bitter experience that the remarkable master of logical combinatorics provided his pen in the service of a personally high official, wrote for L.I. Brezhnev's "Renaissance", one of those three pamphlets for which the General Secretary of the CPSU was later loyally awarded the Lenin Prize for Literature. Personally, this is perhaps the saddest page in the history of Soviet journalism.

And in social terms, this marked a general propaganda catastrophe. Anatoly Agranovsky brought his method to such simplicity of perfection that almost anyone could use it to prove almost any idea. During the stagnant period of socialism, propaganda became a form of self-lulling. Ideologists reveled in the Marxist accuracy of their logical constructions. Journalism worked on its own

and the political experience of the masses took shape on its own. Neither newspapers with millions of copies, nor monopoly television, nor the flow of mass literature could do anything to oppose the dissident samizdat and popular anecdote. The Soviet state collapsed first ideologically, and then world-historically, filling up the paths of Russia's spiritual rebirth with its debris. Under the influence of residual fears of the socialist past, even the Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993) was introduced an unprecedented provision for world lawmaking: "No ideology can be established as a state or mandatory" 13 .

As an addition, a retrospective look at the above analysis of the "Initiative from the side" correspondence is appropriate. What in it can excite the reader after the lapse of years, after the change of eras? The fact of senseless waste? The rigor of the evidence? Ideals of socialism? Both that, and another, and the third, and everything else that is still in the correspondence, merges in the symbolic phrase "Initiative from the Side", which is represented

I is, therefore, a concentrated expression of the meaning of public

lications. The overarching task of the text was to make the specific content of this figurative expression become a mass conviction. This is a typological unit of persuasive influence, the role of which in the rationalistic paradigm of thinking is similar to the functions of the mytheme in magical consciousness. This typological phenomenon has attracted the attention of various researchers. It was defined both as a “symbol”, and as a “stamp”, and as a “concept”, and as a “stereotype”, and as an “imperative”. Each approach had its own reasons and evidence, but there was always something more than that. And here the testimonies of the journalists themselves are important, who tried rationalistically, by

I kind of introspection, comprehend their own creative

tricks. There is an interesting example of this. “Ideals need to be verified by facts, reduced to facts,” V.I. Lenin, - if you do not reduce Thus ideals to facts, then these ideals will remain innocent wishes, without any chance of being accepted by the masses and, consequently, of their implementation. For this journalist, the main question was about "the construction of these ideals and the implementation of them" 14 . However, for journalists who do not seek manipulation at all, the key technique remains

13 Constitution [Basic Law] of the Russian Federation. Ch. 1. Art. 13.

14 Lenin V.I. Economic content of populism // Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T.I.C. 435-436.

the merging of opposite tendencies: the reduction of the ideal to the fact and the evaluation of the ideal by the fact. The typological unit of persuasive influence is an idealgemag merging a fact and an ideal into a single figurative representation. It turns out not a flat picture, but a logical spring compressed into a plate, ready to straighten out at any moment when the real situation and the image coincide. Then the evidence system comes to life, and current assessments, plans and actions are formed in accordance with them. Persuasion develops into persuasive behavior. Sociologists have even come up with a special term for this kind of cases: "sleeping effect of propaganda." But the ideology is not dormant. They help people comprehend events and predict their development, suggest a line of conduct, awaken feelings and stimulate the will, accumulating the spiritual experience of society. However, life is richer than ideology. And there are no such ideologemes that would not eventually disperse from reality. This is the objective law of persuasive influence. “Every slogan thrown by the party to the masses,” V.I. Lenin, “has the property of freezing, becoming dead, retaining its strength for many even when the conditions have changed that created the need for this slogan. This evil is inevitable, and without learning to fight it and defeat it, it is impossible to ensure the correct policy of the Party.

But if the content of ideologems becomes obsolete relatively quickly and is simply discarded from time to time, the generating method of persuading influence is only modified. In ancient religious parables, it is developed in a pure, one might say, distilled form. There are always two parts in a parable: a catchy, well-aimed in some detail and therefore a picturesque presentation of a purely everyday situation and a tough, instructive conclusion. But there is no connection in the form of detailed evidence. The everyday situation, all the more picturesquely presented, is self-evident, but extremely ambiguous. Everyone can understand it in their own way. Yes, and its objective meaning is fluid, changing depending on the general context of events. And the instructive conclusion is authoritative, but literalistically unambiguous. It seems to cross out all other shades of meaning, reducing the possibility of choosing actions to a sanctioned pattern. But due to the ambiguity and even indeterminacy of the everyday situation, the unambiguous judgment derived from it is, as it were, illuminated by the reverse light of evidence and is itself perceived in a broad sense as a kind of aphorism, authoritative for any vital

" Lenin V.I. Valuable confessions of Pitirim Sorokin // Ibid. T. 37. S. 194.

collisions. Everything rests on self-evidence and authority, and the two parts of the parable are spontaneously compressed into an ideologeme.

The logical mechanism of "parable thinking" has proved its constructiveness and vitality in the intellectual practice of mankind. It is almost literally reproduced in the fables of Aesop, Lafontaine, Krylov, laid the foundation for R. Bach's super-bestseller "The Seagull named Jonathan Levingston", gave rise to parabolic compositions of intellectual prose and dramaturgy of the second half of the 20th century. Mass socio-political journalism has also developed its own forms of persuasive text. “Since the main text-forming operations of journalistic creativity,” writes a modern researcher, comparing the structure of a newspaper publication with the plot of a work of art, “are understanding the real problem of social life (subject of publication) and putting forward a real program for resolving this particular problem situation (working idea), then the main compositional The nodes of the product are: "problem entry"(kind of equivalent to "exposure"); - "formulation of the problem", providing for a comparison of at least two opposite points of view on the event being described, i.e. the clash of "thesis" and "antithesis", which determines the further deployment of a persuasive thought (the equivalent of the "string"); - "argument", proving the truth of the "thesis" and refuting the "antithesis" (equivalent to the "development of the action"); - "recommendation" as a derivative of the comparison of "thesis" and "antithesis", a kind of "synthesis" (equivalent to "culmination"); - "figurative landmark", which makes it possible to broadly interpret the working idea and apply it to comprehend and evaluate other similar problem situations that arise in real social life (the equivalent of a "decoupling")” 16 . This, of course, is no longer pralogical, but rationalistic thinking. But a coherent system of sufficiently strict logical procedures is used in such a case in order to reduce the question to self-evidence and then raise it to authority. In itself, this does not mean either an indispensable fallacy of reasoning, or deliberate manipulation. As well as the ideologeme itself is not self-deception or fraud. After all, Rene Descartes' great "Cogito ergo sum" is also an ideologeme.

16 Problems of effectiveness of journalism / Ed. Ya. Zasursky, 3. Shumbers. M., 1990. S. 79.

The reality and power of an ideologeme is not in knowledge, which is always relative, and not in faith, which is fraught with doubts, but in the confidence with which a person acts. Of great importance here are the perseverance and skill of those who use it as a practical guide. It happens that a completely adequate ideologeme disappears in vain, and at the same time, an ideological mystification captivates millions of people, causes an ecstatic overstrain of mass behavior and materializes into a phantasmagoric reality. As the history of the Russian Revolution of 1917 shows, both have catastrophic consequences. But no less catastrophic is the absence of ideologems. Absolutely without them it is good only to steal. However, society cannot do without ideologemes. Characteristic in this regard is the word “lawlessness”, which entered the political life of Russia from the prison zone, when communist and democratic ideologemes “like two different poles” mutually excluded each other and when every politician, every party, every mafia group, and almost everyone people were ready to respond violently to force with force. And for 10 (!) years it was impossible to win or surrender to the mercy of the winner.

In the “lawlessness” mode, not a single problem can be solved. Neither social nor existential. Because this is a special kind of ideologeme, in which the place of the supporting idea is occupied by biological drives. The temptation of immediate and uncontrolled satisfaction of instincts erodes the transpersonal basic ideas of beliefs, individual behavior becomes asocial, the morality of marauders spreads in society. Sometimes such processes are even presented as very progressive for the complete overthrow of odious political systems, cultures or civilizations. But it is no coincidence that journalism, working for the old order, begins to operate with magical texts. This is enough to keep marauding impulses in check. And the prospect of progressive development of the individual and society opens up only in a rationalistic paradigm, when people are convinced that there are laws of life, that it is possible to know them and, following them, achieve personal freedom and general well-being, etc. Therefore, persuasive texts at all times, even in the most hopeless psychohistorical states of society, must be and must be in mass communications, at least as a light at the end.

Based on the socio-communicative functions of the ideologeme, noting what basic mental processes

From the standpoint of the emerging bourgeois liberalism, a wide range of political and legal problems, including questions of the relationship between law and law, was developed by John Locke (1632-1704). His activities took place in the era of the English bourgeois revolution of the 17th century. According to the apt description of F. Engels, “Locke was in religion, as in politics, the son of the class compromise of 1688” Iv.

In his political and legal doctrine, Locke proceeds from the concepts of natural law and the contractual origin of the state. In his interpretation, these concepts acquire a distinct anti-feudal orientation. In the spirit of bourgeois liberalism and the ideas of the rule of law, he solves the problem of the relationship between the individual and political power, subjects and the state. From these positions, he rejects the feudal views of subjects as the property of the monarch, as well as the ideas defended in the teachings of Hobbes about the absolute power of the state.

In the natural (pre-state) state, the natural law, the law of nature, dominates. This state in Locke's characterization differs significantly from the Hobbesian (and, in part, Spinoza's) picture of the war of all against all. The law of nature, being an expression of the rationality of human nature, “requires peace and security for all mankind.” strives not to harm others.

In the spirit of the traditional natural law requirement "to give to each his own, his own, to him

Yves Marx K., Engels F. Op. 2nd ed., Vol. 37, p. 419. 117 Locke D. Selected Philosophical Works. M., 1960, v. 2, p. 8.

belonging” Locke designates the totality of basic human rights as the right of ownership (i.e., the right to one’s own, one’s own). So, he notes that every person, according to the law of nature, has the right to defend "his property, that is, his life, freedom and property" I8.

The state of nature is marked, according to Locke, by “complete freedom in regard to action and disposition of one’s property and person” and such “equality in which every power and every right is mutual, no one has more than another” "9.

The protection of the law of nature and the enforcement of its requirements in the state of nature is ensured by the power of every person to punish the transgressors of this law and to protect the innocent. However, as Locke points out, these unorganized individual means of protection are not enough to ensure a calm and secure life, reliably guaranteed the inviolability of property, etc.

Reasonable overcoming of the shortcomings of the state of nature leads, according to Locke, to a social contract on the establishment of political power and the state, and "the great and main goal of uniting people in the state and placing themselves under the authority of the government" 12C is to ensure each of his natural rights to property - life , freedom and property. Self-defense by each person of his natural rights and requirements in the transition from the state of nature to the state is replaced by the public defense of the rights and freedoms of the individual by political power. However, according to the agreement on the establishment of the state, people do not renounce their basic natural rights, and the very law of nature (as the law of reason) continues to operate in the state state, thereby determining the goals, nature and limits of the powers and activities of political power.

In order for political power to correspond to its contractual purpose and not turn into an absolute and despotic force concentrated in the hands of one person or body, an appropriate separation of powers (into legislative, executive and federal) is necessary. Moreover, the legislative power

which has the exclusive right to issue laws binding on all, is, according to Locke, the supreme, and the rest of the authorities are subordinate to it. Especially persistently, he emphasizes the inadmissibility and danger of concentration in one body of the legislative and executive (which includes the judiciary) authorities.

An essential element of Locke's contractual conception of the state is "the doctrine of the legitimacy of resistance to all illegal manifestations of power." And after the conclusion of the contract, the people remain the judge, deciding whether the authorities established and authorized by them fulfill the contractual obligations assigned to them, or whether they have begun to violate the contract and the trust placed in them.

The social contract, according to Locke, therefore, is not concluded once and for all, without the right of subsequent popular control over its observance by the authorities, the right to adjust the terms of this contract and even completely break it in the event that political power degenerates into absolutism and despotism. The contractual relationship of people with the state is a constantly renewing process that proceeds on the basis of the principle of consent defended by Locke, which he contrasts with feudal ideas about innate citizenship - unconditional and independent of the person himself, his, as it were, natural connection with this power.

Locke emphasizes that a person is not born a subject of this or that government and country. Only when he reaches the age of majority does he, as a free man, choose which government he wants to be under and which state he wants to become a member of. “Only the consent of free people born under the rule of any government,” writes Locke, “makes them members of this state, and this consent is given separately in turn, as each comes of age, and not simultaneously by many people, therefore people do not notice this and believe that it does not happen at all or that it is not necessary, and conclude that they are by nature the subjects of exact

Ibid, p. 116.

but just as they are human beings. Moreover, not tacit, but only explicitly expressed consent makes a person a member of this state, and in this case, a person can no longer break his connection with it and enjoy the freedom of the state of nature.

Similar ideas about the contractual nature of the relationship between a citizen and the state, including the need for the consent of an adult person to become a member of this state, were defended, as you know, already by Socrates (Plato, Crito, 51).

In Locke's teaching, therefore, we are talking not only about the contractual origin of the state, but also about the contractually determined nature of its essence and activity, as well as the contractual form of establishing citizenship in relation to each individual person. Such a concept of contractual relations between the people as a whole and individuals, on the one hand, and the state as a whole and individual state authorities, on the other, implies mutual rights and obligations of the contracting parties, and not a unilateral absolute right for the state and an unconditional obligation for subjects, as it is takes place in the Hobbesian interpretation of the contractual theory of the establishment of the state.

The political and legal doctrine of Locke is permeated with the idea of ​​inalienability and irrevocability of the basic natural rights and freedoms of a person in a civil state. Absolute monarchy and any other kind of absolute power, which inevitably presuppose the initial lack of rights of subjects and the imposed nature of the limited rights and freedoms granted to them at the discretion of the authorities themselves, Locke does not consider at all a form of civil government and state structure. Absolute, despotic power, plunging people into slavery, is worse than the state of nature with its, albeit insufficiently guaranteed, equal rights and freedoms for all.

Emphasizing the need for freedom from absolute power, Locke notes that without such freedom, human life and safety are endangered.

The problem of freedom of an individual and subjects in general occupies a key place in all political law.

1M Ibid., p. 68.

the whole teaching of Locke. Moreover, as is clearly seen from what has been said, Locke not only declares the desirability of such freedom, but also seeks to theoretically substantiate its necessity and constructively specify the ways and forms of its provision in his concepts of inalienable and non-terminating natural rights, the social contract on the establishment of the state, individual consent to membership in a given state, the goals and limits of state powers, the separation of powers, the legitimacy of resistance to illegal actions of the authorities, etc.

This whole complex of ideas and ideas, connected with Locke's interpretation of freedom, also underlies his legal understanding. The great merit of Locke's teaching lies in the clarification of the necessary internal connection between freedom and law, freedom and law (natural and civil). Rejecting the understanding of freedom as arbitrary discretion and unbound by any law, Locke connects freedom with the law (of nature and the state) and the framework of legality, thereby endowing the concepts of law and legality with a necessary and definite value-content characteristic.

Locke rejects the concept of freedom and law as opposite, incompatible and mutually exclusive phenomena, the justification of which Hobbes devoted much effort to. Rejecting such ideas, Locke notes: “Despite all sorts of false interpretations, the purpose of the law is not the destruction and restriction, but the preservation and expansion of freedom. Indeed, in all states of living beings capable of having laws, where there are no laws, there is no freedom either.

Natural freedom, according to Locke, "consists in being bound by nothing but the law of nature." In the civil state, this freedom is not destroyed, but only modified and concretized, acquiring the necessary certainty, universal validity. Such a modification of freedom is due to the concretization of the provisions of the law of nature in civil laws and the changes in the means of protecting the requirements of the law associated with the civil status. In general, their ideas about freedom and law in the state

123 Ibid., p. 34. "* Ibid., p. 17.

state Locke aptly summarizes as follows; “The freedom of the people who are under government is to have a permanent rule for life, common to everyone in this society and established by the legislative power created in it; it is the freedom to follow my own desire in all cases where the law does not forbid it, and not to be dependent on the fickle, indefinite, unknown autocratic will of another person ”|25.

The guarantee of freedom in the state, according to Locke, is ensured by the presence of a specific and common civil law for all, competent and impartial justice, and, finally, an authoritative public force capable of implementing fair judicial decisions.

The laws issued in the state by the supreme (legislative) power must, according to the teachings of Locke, comply with the dictates of the natural law (the law of nature), the innate and inalienable rights and freedoms of man provided for by it. Such conformity of civil law with natural law, taking into account the requirements of the second in the first, acts as a criterion of fidelity and justice of the law established in the state.

This implies a number of requirements for the legislator himself, which outline the boundaries of his competence. “The law of nature,” he emphasizes, “acts as an eternal guide for all people, for legislators as well as for others. The laws that they create to guide the actions of other people must, like their own actions and the actions of other people, comply with the law of nature, i.e., God's will, of which he is a manifestation” i2S.

The obligatory nature of civil law, including for all state authorities, stems from the fact that the law, according to Locke, expresses the “will of society”, i.e. Officials (up to the king), acting as official representatives of society, have the same will and power that is represented in the zakope. When the activity of the king is determined

his personal will, it ceases to be a representation of the public will, turns into the actions of a private person and loses its binding character, since "members of society are obliged to obey only the will of society" 128. For no person, Locke emphasizes, an exception can be made from the laws of this society. Locke correctly notes that such an exception would place this or that individual, and even more so the bearer of state power, in a state of nature, in a state of war against the people, while everyone else continues to be guided by the rules of civil status. These arguments of Locke are directed against the teachings of Hobbes, according to which state power is above the law and essentially has natural rights in relation to subjects (“the right of war”).

The legislature is supreme among other state authorities, but in relation to society as a whole, it “represents only a trusted authority that must act for a specific purpose”129. When the legislature acts contrary to the confidence placed in it, the people have the right to use their remaining “supreme power to remove or change the composition of the legislature” 13 °. Here, as in the right of the people to revolt, the idea of ​​inalienable (in favor of the state) people's sovereignty, inherent in Locke's political and legal doctrine, is clearly manifested, which was further developed and developed by Rousseau.

In all forms of government, Locke emphasizes, the authority given by society, as well as the law of God and nature, set certain limits for the legislative power. Thus, due to the inalienability of natural human rights, the legislator cannot deprive a person of his property without his consent. According to the meaning of the social contract, which provides, in particular, such a guarantee against despotism as the separation of powers, the legislature "cannot transfer the right to legislate into someone else's hands", "cannot assume the right to command by means of arbitrary despotic decrees, on the contrary , she is obliged to send right

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid., p. 85.

130 Ibid., p. 86.

judgment to determine the rights of the subject by means of promulgated permanent laws and well-known, authorized judges.

The “permanent laws” that Locke speaks of play the role of the original and fundamental essentially constitutional positive-legal source for current legislation. And the obligation of the legislator to be guided in his activity by the provisions of these "permanent laws" is an essential legal guarantee of the legality defended by Locke in general, legality in legislative activity in particular.

In general, Locke, in contrast to the supporters of limited legality, legality against subjects (Hobbes, Spinoza, etc.), quite consistently develops and defends the concept of universal and complete legality, the requirements of which apply to everyone without exception - both citizens and state authorities.

Summarizing the meaning of Locke's approach to the problem of the relationship between law and law, we can say that in his teaching the formal legal characteristics of civil law (i.e., positive law) are based on its substantive characteristics and are their concretization in the legal and technical plane. The main (ideal) idea of ​​Locke is to ensure that the civil law embodies the requirements of natural law, giving them the necessary certainty and providing them with public authority protection. Locke, therefore, seeks to ensure the operation of the law of nature and the inalienable rights and freedoms of man indirectly - namely through civil laws. In the case of such a correspondence between natural and civil laws (the mediation of the content of the first in the form of the second and the adequacy of this form to its content), the decrees and rules of natural law become the content of civil law, are absorbed by it. Here we are dealing with the desired (ideal) construction of a legal law. Where there is no such correspondence between civil law and natural law, the never-ceasing action of the latter, also in the civil state, is already direct, determining despotism (injustice, illegality and illegality)

131 Ibid., p. 81-82.

legal (contrary to natural law and social contract) laws and the legitimacy of resistance to illegal actions of state authorities up to a popular uprising and the establishment of a new form of government.

Locke's provisions on the relationship between natural and civil laws, on the inalienable rights and freedoms of a person, on the relationship of freedom and law, on the people's right to revolt, separation of powers, etc., played a significant role in the subsequent history of political and legal thought, especially in terms of the formation and the development of bourgeois liberalism and individualism. They had a noticeable influence on the views of the leading French enlighteners (Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau) and the leaders of the American Revolution of the 18th century. (Jefferson, Madison, Franklin, etc.).

“The views of Locke,” K. Marx noted, “are all the more important because he is a classic exponent of the legal ideas of bourgeois society, as opposed to feudal society ...” 13g