Small arms of the Second World War. Soviet cumulative anti-tank ammunition during the war, mm rifle grenade launcher and ammunition for it

Everyone is familiar with the popular print image of the Soviet “soldier-liberator.” In the minds of Soviet people, the Red Army soldiers of the Great Patriotic War are emaciated people in dirty greatcoats who run in a crowd to attack after tanks, or tired elderly men smoking rolled-up cigarettes on the parapet of a trench. After all, it was precisely such footage that was mainly captured by military newsreels. At the end of the 1980s, film directors and post-Soviet historians put the “victim of repression” on a cart, handed him a “three-line gun” without cartridges, sending him towards the armored hordes of fascists - under the supervision of barrage detachments.

Now I propose to look at what actually happened. We can responsibly declare that our weapons were in no way inferior to foreign ones, while being more suitable for local conditions of use. For example, a three-line rifle had larger clearances and tolerances than foreign ones, but this “flaw” was a forced feature - the weapon’s lubricant, which thickened in the cold, did not remove the weapon from combat.

Nagan- a revolver developed by the Belgian gunsmiths brothers Emil (1830-1902) and Leon (1833-1900) Nagan, which was in service and produced in a number of countries in the late 19th - mid-20th centuries.


TK(Tula, Korovina) - the first Soviet serial self-loading pistol. In 1925, the Dynamo sports society ordered the Tula Arms Plant to develop a compact pistol chambered for 6.35x15 mm Browning for sporting and civilian needs.

Work on creating the pistol took place in the design bureau of the Tula Arms Plant. In the fall of 1926, gunsmith designer S.A. Korovin completed the development of a pistol, which was named the TK pistol (Tula Korovin).

At the end of 1926, TOZ began producing the pistol; the following year the pistol was approved for use, receiving the official name “Tula Pistol, Korovin, Model 1926.”

TK pistols entered service with the NKVD of the USSR, middle and senior command staff of the Red Army, civil servants and party workers.

The TK was also used as a gift or award weapon (for example, there are known cases of awarding Stakhanovites with it). Between the autumn of 1926 and 1935, several tens of thousands of Korovins were produced. In the period after the Great Patriotic War TK pistols were kept in savings banks for some time as a backup weapon for employees and cash collectors.


Pistol arr. 1933 TT(Tula, Tokarev) - the first army self-loading pistol of the USSR, developed in 1930 by Soviet designer Fedor Vasilyevich Tokarev. The TT pistol was developed for the 1929 competition for a new army pistol, announced to replace the Nagan revolver and several models of foreign-made revolvers and pistols that were in service with the Red Army by the mid-1920s. The German 7.63×25 mm Mauser cartridge was adopted as a standard cartridge, which was purchased in significant quantities for the Mauser S-96 pistols in service.

Mosin rifle. The 7.62 mm (3-line) rifle of the 1891 model (Mosin rifle, three-line) is a repeating rifle adopted by the Russian Imperial Army in 1891.

It was actively used in the period from 1891 to the end of the Great Patriotic War, and was modernized many times during this period.

The name three-ruler comes from the caliber of the rifle barrel, which is equal to three Russian lines (the old measure of length was equal to one tenth of an inch, or 2.54 mm - respectively, three lines are equal to 7.62 mm).

Based on the 1891 model rifle and its modifications, a number of models of sporting and hunting weapons, both rifled and smooth-bore, were created.

Simonov automatic rifle. The 7.62 mm automatic rifle of the Simonov system, model 1936, ABC-36 is a Soviet automatic rifle developed by gunsmith Sergei Simonov.

It was originally developed as a self-loading rifle, but during improvements an automatic fire mode was added for use in an emergency. The first automatic rifle developed in the USSR and put into service.

Tokarev self-loading rifle. 7.62-mm self-loading rifles of the Tokarev system of the 1938 and 1940 models (SVT-38, SVT-40), as well as the Tokarev automatic rifle of the 1940 model - a modification of the Soviet self-loading rifle, developed by F.V. Tokarev.

The SVT-38 was developed as a replacement for the Simonov automatic rifle and was adopted by the Red Army on February 26, 1939. First SVT arr. 1938 was released on July 16, 1939. On October 1, 1939, gross production began at the Tula, and from 1940 - at the Izhevsk arms plant.

Simonov self-loading carbine. The 7.62 mm Simonov self-loading carbine (also known abroad as SKS-45) is a Soviet self-loading carbine designed by Sergei Simonov, adopted for service in 1949.

The first copies began to arrive in active units at the beginning of 1945 - this was the only case of the use of the 7.62x39 mm cartridge in World War II

Tokarev submachine gun, or the original name - the Tokarev light carbine - an experimental model of automatic weapon created in 1927 for a modified Nagan revolver cartridge, the first submachine gun developed in the USSR. It was not adopted for service; it was produced in a small experimental batch and was used to a limited extent in the Great Patriotic War.

P Degtyarev submachine gun. 7.62 mm submachine guns of the 1934, 1934/38 and 1940 models of the Degtyarev system are various modifications of the submachine gun developed by the Soviet gunsmith Vasily Degtyarev in the early 1930s. The first submachine gun adopted by the Red Army.

The Degtyarev submachine gun was a fairly typical representative of the first generation of this type of weapon. Used in the Finnish campaign of 1939-40, as well as at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War.

Shpagin submachine gun. The 7.62-mm submachine gun of the 1941 model of the Shpagin system (PPSh) is a Soviet submachine gun developed in 1940 by designer G. S. Shpagin and adopted by the Red Army on December 21, 1940. PPSh was the main Soviet submachine gun armed forces in the Great Patriotic War.

After the end of the war, in the early 1950s, the PPSh was removed from service with the Soviet Army and gradually replaced by the Kalashnikov assault rifle; for a little longer it remained in service with rear and auxiliary units, units of internal troops and railway troops. It was in service with paramilitary security units at least until the mid-1980s.

Also, in the post-war period, PPSh was supplied in significant quantities to countries friendly to the USSR, was in service with the armies of various states for a long time, was used by irregular forces and was used in armed conflicts around the world throughout the twentieth century.

Sudaev's submachine gun. 7.62 mm submachine guns of the 1942 and 1943 models of the Sudaev system (PPS) are variants of the submachine gun developed by the Soviet designer Alexei Sudaev in 1942. Used by Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War.

The PPS is often considered the best submachine gun of World War II.

P machine gun "Maxim" model 1910. The Model 1910 Maxim machine gun is a heavy machine gun, a variant of the British Maxim machine gun, widely used by the Russian and Soviet armies during World War I and World War II. The Maxim machine gun was used to destroy open group targets and enemy fire weapons at a distance of up to 1000 m.

Anti-aircraft variant
- 7.62-mm quad machine gun "Maxim" on the U-431 anti-aircraft gun
- 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun "Maxim" on the U-432 anti-aircraft gun

P machine gun Maxim-Tokarev- Soviet light machine gun designed by F.V. Tokarev, created in 1924 on the basis of the Maxim machine gun.

DP(Degtyarev Infantry) - a light machine gun developed by V. A. Degtyarev. The first ten serial DP machine guns were manufactured at the Kovrov plant on November 12, 1927, then a batch of 100 machine guns was transferred for military testing, as a result of which on December 21, 1927 the machine gun was adopted by the Red Army. DP became one of the first samples small arms created in the USSR. The machine gun was widely used as the main fire support weapon for infantry at the platoon-company level until the end of the Great Patriotic War.

DT(Degtyarev tank) - a tank machine gun developed by V. A. Degtyarev in 1929. Entered service with the Red Army in 1929 under the designation “7.62-mm tank machine gun of the Degtyarev system mod. 1929" (DT-29)

DS-39(7.62 mm Degtyarev heavy machine gun, model 1939).

SG-43. The 7.62 mm Goryunov machine gun (SG-43) is a Soviet heavy machine gun. It was developed by gunsmith P. M. Goryunov with the participation of M. M. Goryunov and V. E. Voronkov at the Kovrov Mechanical Plant. Entered service on May 15, 1943. The SG-43 began to enter service with the troops in the second half of 1943.

DShK And DShKM- large-caliber heavy machine guns chambered for 12.7×108 mm. The result of modernization of the large-caliber heavy machine gun DK (Degtyarev Large-caliber). The DShK was adopted by the Red Army in 1938 under the designation “12.7 mm Degtyarev-Shpagin heavy machine gun model 1938”

In 1946, under the designation DShKM(Degtyarev, Shpagin, large-caliber modernized) machine gun was adopted by the Soviet Army.

PTRD. Anti-tank single-shot rifle mod. 1941 Degtyarev system, adopted for service on August 29, 1941. It was intended to combat medium and light tanks and armored vehicles at distances of up to 500 m. The gun could also fire at pillboxes/bunkers and firing points covered by armor at distances up to 800 m and at aircraft at distances up to 500 m.

PTRS. Anti-tank self-loading rifle mod. 1941 Simonov system) is a Soviet self-loading anti-tank rifle, adopted for service on August 29, 1941. It was intended to combat medium and light tanks and armored vehicles at distances of up to 500 m. The gun could also fire at pillboxes/bunkers and firing points covered by armor at distances up to 800 m and at aircraft at distances up to 500 m. During the war some of the guns were captured and used by the Germans. The guns were named Panzerbüchse 784 (R) or PzB 784 (R).

Dyakonov grenade launcher. The Dyakonov system rifle grenade launcher is designed to use fragmentation grenades to destroy living, mostly hidden, targets that are inaccessible to flat fire weapons.

Widely used in pre-war conflicts, during the Soviet-Finnish War and at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War. According to the staff of the rifle regiment in 1939, each rifle squad was armed with a rifle grenade launcher of the Dyakonov system. In documents of that time it was called a hand-held mortar for throwing rifle grenades.

125-mm ampoule gun model 1941- the only ampoule gun model mass-produced in the USSR. Widely used with varying success by the Red Army at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War, it was often made in semi-handicraft conditions.

The projectile most often used was a glass or tin ball filled with flammable liquid "KS", but the range of ammunition included mines, a smoke bomb and even homemade "propaganda shells". Using a blank 12-gauge rifle cartridge, the projectile was fired at 250-500 meters, thereby being effective means against some fortifications and many types of armored vehicles, including tanks. However, difficulties in use and maintenance led to the ampoule gun being withdrawn from service in 1942.

ROKS-3(Klyuev-Sergeev Backpack Flamethrower) - Soviet infantry backpack flamethrower from the Great Patriotic War. The first model of the ROKS-1 backpack flamethrower was developed in the USSR in the early 1930s. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the rifle regiments of the Red Army had flamethrower teams consisting of two sections, armed with 20 backpack flamethrowers ROKS-2. Based on the experience of using these flamethrowers at the beginning of 1942, the designer of the Chemical Engineering Research Institute M.P. Sergeev and designer of military plant No. 846 V.N. Klyuev developed a more advanced backpack flamethrower ROKS-3, which was in service with individual companies and battalions of backpack flamethrowers of the Red Army throughout the war.

Bottles with a flammable mixture ("Molotov cocktail").

At the beginning of the war, the State Defense Committee decided to use combustible bottles in the fight against tanks. Already on July 7, 1941, the State Defense Committee adopted a special resolution “On anti-tank incendiary grenades (bottles)”, which obliged the People’s Commissariat Food Industry to organize, from July 10, 1941, the equipment of liter glass bottles with a fire mixture according to the recipe of the Research Institute 6 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition. And the head of the Military Chemical Defense Directorate of the Red Army (later the Main Military Chemical Directorate) was ordered to begin “supplying military units with hand incendiary grenades” from July 14.

Dozens of distilleries and beer factories throughout the USSR quickly turned into military enterprises. Moreover, the “Molotov Cocktail” (named after the then deputy of I.V. Stalin for the State Committee for Defense) was prepared directly on the old factory lines, where just yesterday they bottled citre, port wines and fizzy “Abrau-Durso”. From the first batches of such bottles, they often did not even have time to remove the “peaceful” alcohol labels. In addition to the liter bottles specified in the legendary Molotov decree, the “cocktail” was also made in beer and wine-cognac containers with a volume of 0.5 and 0.7 liters.

Two types of incendiary bottles were adopted by the Red Army: with self-igniting liquid KS (a mixture of phosphorus and sulfur) and with flammable mixtures No. 1 and No. 3, which are a mixture of aviation gasoline, kerosene, naphtha, thickened with oils or a special hardening powder OP- 2, developed in 1939 under the leadership of A.P. Ionov, - in fact, it was the prototype of modern napalm. The abbreviation “KS” is deciphered in different ways: “Koshkin mixture” - after the name of the inventor N.V. Koshkin, and “Old Cognac”, and “Kachugin-Maltovnik” - after the name of other inventors of liquid grenades.

A bottle with self-igniting liquid KS, falling on a solid body, broke, the liquid spilled and burned with a bright flame for up to 3 minutes, developing a temperature of up to 1000°C. At the same time, being sticky, it stuck to the armor or covered inspection slits, glass, and observation devices, blinded the crew with smoke, smoking them out of the tank and burning everything inside the tank. A drop of burning liquid falling on the body caused severe, difficult-to-heal burns.

Combustible mixtures No. 1 and No. 3 burned for up to 60 seconds with temperatures up to 800 ° C and emitting a lot of black smoke. Bottles with gasoline were used as a cheaper option, and thin glass tube ampoules with CS liquid, which were attached to the bottle with apothecary rubber bands, served as an incendiary agent. Sometimes ampoules were placed inside bottles before throwing.

Used bulletproof vest PZ-ZIF-20(protective shell, Frunze Plant). It is also CH-38 Cuirass type (CH-1, steel breastplate). It can be called the first mass-produced Soviet body armor, although it was called a steel breastplate, which does not change its purpose.

The body armor provided protection against German submachine guns and pistols. The body armor also provided protection against fragments of grenades and mines. Bulletproof vests were recommended to be worn by assault groups, signalmen (during the laying and repair of cables) and when performing other operations at the discretion of the commander.

Information often comes across that the PZ-ZIF-20 is not the SP-38 (SN-1) body armor, which is incorrect, since the PZ-ZIF-20 was created according to documentation from 1938, and industrial production was established in 1943. The second point is that they are 100% similar in appearance. Among the military search teams it is called “Volkhovsky”, “Leningradsky”, “five-sectional”.
Photos of reconstruction:

Steel bibs CH-42

Soviet assault engineering and sapper guards brigade in steel breastplates SN-42 and with machine guns DP-27. 1st ShISBr. 1st Belorussian Front, summer 1944

ROG-43 hand grenade

The ROG-43 (index 57-G-722) remote-action fragmentation hand grenade is designed to destroy enemy personnel in offensive and defensive combat. The new grenade was developed in the first half of the Great Patriotic War at the plant named after. Kalinin and had the factory designation RGK-42. After being put into service in 1943, the grenade received the designation ROG-43.

RDG hand smoke grenade.

RDG device

Smoke grenades were used to provide screens measuring 8 - 10 m and were used mainly to “blind” the enemy located in shelters, to create local screens to camouflage crews leaving armored vehicles, as well as to simulate the burning of armored vehicles. Under favorable conditions, one RDG grenade created an invisible cloud 25 - 30 m long.

Burning grenades did not sink in water, so they could be used when crossing water barriers. The grenade could smoke from 1 to 1.5 minutes, producing, depending on the composition of the smoke mixture, thick gray-black or white smoke.

RPG-6 grenade.


The RPG-6 exploded instantly upon impact with a hard barrier, destroyed armor, hit the crew of an armored target, its weapons and equipment, and could also ignite fuel and explode ammunition. Military tests of the RPG-6 grenade took place in September 1943. The target used was a captured Ferdinand assault gun, which had frontal armor up to 200 mm and side armor up to 85 mm. Tests showed that the RPG-6 grenade, when the head part hit the target, could penetrate armor up to 120 mm.

Anti-tank hand grenade mod. 1943 RPG-43

RPG-41 impact hand anti-tank grenade, model 1941

RPG-41 was intended to combat armored vehicles and light tanks, having armor up to 20 - 25 mm thick, and could also be used to combat bunkers and field-type shelters. The RPG-41 could also be used to destroy medium and heavy tanks when hitting vulnerable areas of the vehicle (roof, tracks, chassis, etc.)

Chemical grenade model 1917


According to the “Temporary Rifle Regulations of the Red Army. Part 1. Small arms. Rifle and hand grenades”, published by the head of the People's Commissariat of Military Commissariat and the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR in 1927, the hand chemical grenade mod. 1917 from the reserve stockpiled during the First World War.

VKG-40 grenade

In the 1920s-1930s, the Red Army was armed with the muzzle-loading “Dyakonov grenade launcher,” created at the end of the First World War and subsequently modernized.

The grenade launcher consisted of a mortar, a bipod and a quadrant sight and was used to destroy manpower with a fragmentation grenade. The mortar barrel had a caliber of 41 mm, three screw grooves, and was rigidly attached to a cup that was screwed onto the neck, which was put on the rifle barrel, fixed on the front sight with a cutout.

RG-42 hand grenade

RG-42 model 1942 with UZRG fuse. After being put into service, the grenade was given the index RG-42 (hand grenade of 1942). The new UZRG fuse used in the grenade has become the same for both the RG-42 and the F-1.

The RG-42 grenade was used both offensively and defensively. In appearance, it resembled an RGD-33 grenade, only without a handle. The RG-42 with a UZRG fuse belonged to the type of remote-action fragmentation offensive grenades. It was intended to defeat enemy personnel.

Rifle anti-tank grenade VPGS-41



VPGS-41 when used

Characteristic distinctive feature ramrod grenades had a “tail” (ramrod), inserted into the bore of the rifle and serving as a stabilizer. The grenade was fired with a blank cartridge.

Soviet hand grenade mod. 1914/30 with protective cover

Soviet hand grenade mod. 1914/30 refers to double-type anti-personnel fragmentation hand grenades. This means that it is designed to destroy enemy personnel with hull fragments when it explodes. Remote action means that the grenade will explode after a certain period of time, regardless of other conditions, after the soldier releases it from his hands.

Double type - means that the grenade can be used as an offensive one, i.e. grenade fragments have a small mass and fly at a distance shorter than the possible throwing range; or as a defensive one, i.e. fragments fly to a distance exceeding the throwing range.

The double action of the grenade is achieved by putting on the grenade a so-called “shirt” - a cover made of thick metal, which ensures that during an explosion, fragments of greater mass fly over a greater distance.

RGD-33 hand grenade

An explosive charge is placed inside the case - up to 140 grams of TNT. A steel tape with a square notch is placed between the explosive charge and the body to produce fragments during an explosion, rolled into three or four layers.


The grenade was equipped with a defensive case, which was used only when throwing a grenade from a trench or shelter. In other cases, the protective cover was removed.

And of course, F-1 grenade

Initially, the F-1 grenade used a fuse designed by F.V. Koveshnikov, which was much more reliable and easier to use than the French fuse. The deceleration time of Koveshnikov's fuse was 3.5-4.5 seconds.

In 1941, designers E.M. Viceni and A.A. Poednyakov developed and put into service to replace Koveshnikov's fuse a new, safer and simpler in design fuse for the F-1 hand grenade.

In 1942, the new fuse became common for the F-1 and RG-42 hand grenades; it was called UZRG - “unified fuse for hand grenades.”

* * *
After the above, it cannot be said that only rusty three-ruler rifles without cartridges were in service.
About chemical weapons during the Second World War is a separate and special conversation...

Many letters

The female name Katyusha entered the history of Russia and world history as the name of one of the most scary views weapons of the Second World War.
At the same time, not a single type of weapon was surrounded by such a veil of secrecy and misinformation...

PAGES OF HISTORY

No matter how much our father-commanders kept the Katyusha materiel secret, just a few weeks after its first combat use it fell into the hands of the Germans and ceased to be a secret. And here is the history of the creation of "Katyusha" long years was kept “closed sealed” both because of ideological principles and because of the ambitions of the designers.

Question one: why was rocket artillery used only in 1941? After all, gunpowder rockets were used by the Chinese a thousand years ago. In the first half of the 19th century, missiles were used quite widely in European armies (missiles by V. Kongrev, A. Zasyadko, K. Konstantinov and others).

Rocket launchers of the early 19th century. V. Kongrev (a) and I. Kosinsky (b)

Alas, the combat use of missiles was limited by their enormous dispersion. At first, long poles made of wood or iron – “tails” – were used to stabilize them. But such missiles were effective only for hitting area targets. So, for example, in 1854, the Anglo-French fired missiles at Odessa from rowing barges, and the Russians fired missiles at Central Asian cities in the 50s–70s of the 19th century.

But with the introduction of rifled guns, gunpowder rockets became an anachronism, and between 1860–1880 they were removed from service in all European armies (in Austria in 1866, in England in 1885, in Russia in 1879). In 1914, only signal flares remained in the armies and navies of all countries. Nevertheless, Russian inventors constantly turned to the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) with projects for military missiles. So, in September 1905, the Artillery Committee rejected the high-explosive rocket project. The warhead of this rocket was stuffed with pyroxylin, and smokeless gunpowder rather than black gunpowder was used as fuel. Moreover, the fellows from the State Agrarian University did not even try to work interesting project, and sweep it away from the threshold. It is curious that the designer was... Hieromonk Kirik.

It was only during the First World War that interest in rockets was revived. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, slow-burning gunpowder was created, which made it possible to dramatically increase flight speed and firing range. Accordingly, with an increase in flight speed, it became possible to effectively use wing stabilizers and improve the accuracy of fire.

The second reason: the need to create powerful weapons for airplanes of the First World War - “flying whatnots”.

And finally, the most main reason– the rocket was best suited as a means of delivering chemical weapons.


CHEMICAL PROJECTILE

Back on June 15, 1936, the head of the chemical department of the Red Army, corps engineer Y. Fishman, was presented with a report from the director of the RNII, military engineer 1st rank I. Kleimenov, and the head of the 1st department, military engineer 2nd rank K. Glukharev, on preliminary tests of 132/82-mm short-range chemical rocket mines . This ammunition complemented the 250/132 mm short-range chemical mine, testing of which was completed by May 1936.

M-13 rocket.
The M-13 projectile consists of a head and a body. The head has a shell and a combat charge. A fuse is attached to the front of the head. The body ensures the flight of a rocket projectile and consists of a casing, a combustion chamber, a nozzle and stabilizers. In front of the combustion chamber there are two electric powder igniters. On the outer surface of the combustion chamber shell there are two threaded guide pins, which serve to hold the missile projectile in the guide mounts. 1 - fuse retaining ring, 2 - GVMZ fuse, 3 - detonator block, 4 - explosive charge, 5 - warhead, 6 - igniter, 7 - chamber bottom, 8 - guide pin, 9 - powder rocket charge, 10 - rocket part, 11 - grate, 12 - critical section of the nozzle, 13 - nozzle, 14 - stabilizer, 15 - remote fuse pin, 16 - AGDT remote fuse, 17 - igniter.

Thus, “RNII has completed all preliminary development of the issue of creating a powerful means of short-range chemical attack, and expects from you a general conclusion on the tests and instructions on the need for further work in this direction. For its part, RNII considers it necessary to now issue a pilot order for the production of RKhM-250 (300 pieces) and RKhM-132 (300 pieces) for the purpose of conducting field and military tests. The five pieces of RKhM-250 remaining from the preliminary tests, of which three are at the Central Chemical Test Site (Prichernavskaya station) and three RKhM-132 can be used for additional tests according to your instructions.”

Experimental installation of M-8 on a tank

According to the RNII report on the main activities for 1936 on topic No. 1, samples of 132-mm and 250-mm chemical rockets with a warhead capacity of 6 and 30 liters of chemical agent were manufactured and tested. The tests, carried out in the presence of the head of the VOKHIMU RKKA, gave satisfactory results and received a positive assessment. But VOKHIMU did nothing to introduce these shells into the Red Army and gave RNII new assignments for shells with a longer range.

The Katyusha prototype (BM-13) was first mentioned on January 3, 1939 in a letter from the People's Commissar of Defense Industry Mikhail Kaganovich to his brother, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lazar Kaganovich: “In October 1938, a mechanized automobile rocket launcher to organize a surprise chemical attack on the enemy, it basically passed factory tests by shooting at the Sofrinsky control and testing artillery range and is currently undergoing field tests at the Central Military Chemical Test Site in Prichernavskaya.”

Experimental installation of M-13 on a trailer

Please note that the customers of the future Katyusha are military chemists. The work was also financed through the Chemical Administration and, finally, the missile warheads were exclusively chemical.

132-mm chemical shells RHS-132 were tested by firing at the Pavlograd artillery range on August 1, 1938. The fire was carried out with single shells and series of 6 and 12 shells. The duration of firing in a series with full ammunition did not exceed 4 seconds. During this time, the target area reached 156 liters of explosive agent, which, in terms of an artillery caliber of 152 mm, was equivalent to 63 artillery shells when firing in a salvo from 21 three-gun batteries or 1.3 artillery regiments, provided that the fire was carried out with unstable explosive agents. The tests focused on the fact that the metal consumption per 156 liters of explosive agent when firing rocket projectiles was 550 kg, while when firing 152-mm chemical projectiles, the weight of the metal was 2370 kg, that is, 4.3 times more.

The test report stated: “The vehicle-mounted mechanized chemical attack missile launcher was tested to show significant advantages over artillery systems. The three-ton vehicle is equipped with a system capable of firing both a single fire and a series of 24 shots within 3 seconds. Travel speed is normal for a truck. Transferring from traveling to combat position takes 3–4 minutes. Firing - from the driver's cabin or from cover.

The first experimental installation of M-13 on a car chassis

The warhead of one RCS (reactive chemical projectile - “NVO”) holds 8 liters of agent, and in artillery shells of a similar caliber - only 2 liters. To create a dead zone on an area of ​​12 hectares, one salvo from three trucks is enough, which replaces 150 howitzers or 3 artillery regiments. At a distance of 6 km, the area of ​​contamination with chemical agents in one salvo is 6–8 hectares.”

I note that the Germans also prepared their multiple rocket launchers exclusively for chemical warfare. Thus, in the late 1930s, the German engineer Nebel designed a 15-cm rocket and a six-barrel tubular installation, which the Germans called a six-barrel mortar. Testing of the mortar began in 1937. The system was named “15-cm smoke mortar type “D”. In 1941, it was renamed 15 cm Nb.W 41 (Nebelwerfer), that is, a 15-cm smoke mortar mod. 41. Naturally, their main purpose was not to set up smoke screens, but to fire rockets filled with toxic substances. I wonder what soviet soldiers called 15 cm Nb.W 41 “Vanyusha”, by analogy with the M-13, called “Katyusha”.

Nb.W 41

The first launch of the Katyusha prototype (designed by Tikhomirov and Artemyev) took place in the USSR on March 3, 1928. The flight range of the 22.7 kg rocket was 1300 m, and a Van Deren system mortar was used as a launcher.

The caliber of our missiles during the Great Patriotic War - 82 mm and 132 mm - was determined by nothing more than the diameter of the engine's powder bombs. Seven 24-mm powder bombs, tightly packed into the combustion chamber, give a diameter of 72 mm, the thickness of the chamber walls is 5 mm, hence the diameter (caliber) of the rocket is 82 mm. Seven thicker (40 mm) pieces in the same way give a caliber of 132 mm.

The most important issue in the design of rockets was the method of stabilization. Soviet designers preferred finned rockets and adhered to this principle until the end of the war.

In the 1930s, rockets with a ring stabilizer that did not exceed the dimensions of the projectile were tested. Such projectiles could be fired from tubular guides. But tests have shown that it is impossible to achieve stable flight using a ring stabilizer.

Then they fired 82-mm rockets with a four-blade tail span of 200, 180, 160, 140 and 120 mm. The results were quite definite - with a decrease in the span of the tail, flight stability and accuracy decreased. The tail, with a span of more than 200 mm, shifted the center of gravity of the projectile back, which also worsened flight stability. Lightening the tail by reducing the thickness of the stabilizer blades caused strong vibrations of the blades until they were destroyed.

Grooved guides were adopted as launchers for finned missiles. Experiments have shown that the longer they are, the higher the accuracy of the projectiles. The length of 5 m for the RS-132 became the maximum due to restrictions on railway dimensions.

I note that the Germans stabilized their rockets until 1942 exclusively by rotation. The USSR also tested turbojet missiles, but they did not go into mass production. As often happens with us, the reason for failures during testing was explained not by poor execution, but by the irrationality of the concept.

FIRST SALLOS

Whether we like it or not, the Germans used multiple launch rocket systems for the first time in the Great Patriotic War on June 22, 1941 near Brest. “And then the arrows showed 03.15, the command “Fire!” was sounded, and the devil’s dance began. The earth began to shake. Nine batteries of the 4th Mortar Regiment special purpose also contributed to the infernal symphony. In half an hour, 2880 shells whistled over the Bug and fell on the city and fortress on the eastern bank of the river. Heavy 600-mm mortars and 210-mm guns of the 98th artillery regiment rained down their volleys on the fortifications of the citadel and hit point targets - Soviet artillery positions. It seemed that the strength of the fortress would not leave one stone unturned.”

This is how historian Paul Karel described the first use of 15-cm rocket launchers. In addition, the Germans in 1941 used heavy 28 cm high-explosive and 32 cm incendiary turbojet shells. The projectiles were over-caliber and had one powder engine (the diameter of the engine part was 140 mm).

28 cm high explosive mine at direct hit the stone house completely destroyed it. The mine successfully destroyed field-type shelters. Living targets within a radius of several tens of meters were hit by the blast wave. Mine fragments flew at a distance of up to 800 m. The warhead contained 50 kg of liquid TNT or ammatol grade 40/60. It is curious that both 28 cm and 32 cm German mines (missiles) were transported and launched from a simple wooden closure such as a box.

The first use of Katyushas took place on July 14, 1941. The battery of captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov fired two salvos from seven launchers at the Orsha railway station. The appearance of the Katyusha came as a complete surprise to the leadership of the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht. On August 14, the High Command of the German Ground Forces notified its troops: “The Russians have an automatic multi-barrel flamethrower cannon... The shot is fired by electricity. When fired, smoke is generated... If such guns are captured, report immediately.” Two weeks later, a directive appeared entitled “Russian gun throwing rocket-like projectiles.” It said: “...The troops are reporting that the Russians are using a new type of weapon that fires rockets. A large number of shots can be fired from one installation within 3-5 seconds... Each appearance of these guns must be reported to the general commander of the chemical forces at the high command on the same day.”

Where the name “Katyusha” came from is not known for certain. Pyotr Guk’s version is interesting: “Both at the front and then, after the war, when I got acquainted with the archives, talked with veterans, read their speeches in the press, I came across a variety of explanations for how the formidable weapon received a maiden name. Some believed that the beginning was made by the letter “K”, which the Voronezh Comintern members put on their products. There was a legend among the troops that the Guards mortars were named after the dashing partisan girl who destroyed many Nazis.”

When, at a firing range, soldiers and commanders asked a GAU representative to name the “true” name of the combat installation, he advised: “Call the installation as an ordinary artillery piece. This is important for maintaining secrecy."

Soon, Katyusha had a younger brother named Luka. In May 1942, a group of officers from the Main Directorate of Armaments developed the M-30 projectile, in which a powerful over-caliber warhead, made in the shape of an ellipsoid, with a maximum diameter of 300 mm, was attached to the rocket engine from the M-13.

Installation of M-30 "Luka"

After successful field tests, on June 8, 1942, the State Defense Committee (GKO) issued a decree on the adoption of the M-30 and the start of its mass production. In Stalin's times, all important problems were resolved quickly, and by July 10, 1942, the first 20 M-30 guards mortar divisions were created. Each of them had a three-battery composition, the battery consisted of 32 four-charge single-tier launchers. The divisional salvo accordingly amounted to 384 shells.

The first combat use of the M-30 took place in the 61st Army of the Western Front near the city of Beleva. On the afternoon of June 5, two regimental salvoes fell on German positions in Annino and Upper Doltsy with a thunderous roar. Both villages were razed to the ground, after which the infantry occupied them without loss.

The power of Luka shells (M-30 and its modification M-31) produced great impression both on the enemy and on our soldiers. There were many different assumptions and fabrications about “Luka” at the front. One of the legends was that the warhead of the rocket was filled with some kind of special, especially powerful explosive, capable of burning everything in the area of ​​the explosion. In fact, the warheads used conventional explosives. The exceptional effect of the Luka shells was achieved through salvo firing. With the simultaneous or almost simultaneous explosion of an entire group of shells, the law of addition of impulses from shock waves came into force.

Installation of the M-30 Luka on the Studebaker chassis

M-30 shells had high-explosive, chemical and incendiary warheads. However, the high-explosive warhead was mainly used. For the characteristic shape of the M-30's head section, front-line soldiers called it “Luka Mudishchev” (the hero of Barkov’s poem of the same name). Naturally, the official press preferred not to mention this nickname, unlike the widely circulated “Katyusha”. The Luka, like the German 28 cm and 30 cm shells, was launched from the wooden sealed box in which it was delivered from the factory. Four, and later eight, of these boxes were placed on a special frame, resulting in a simple launcher.

Needless to say, after the war the journalistic and literary fraternity appropriately and inappropriately remembered “Katyusha”, but chose to forget her much more formidable brother “Luka”. In the 1970s–1980s, at the first mention of “Luka,” veterans asked me in surprise: “How do you know? You didn’t fight.”

ANTI-TANK MYTH

"Katyusha" was a first-class weapon. As often happens, the father-commanders wanted it to become a universal weapon, including an anti-tank weapon.

An order is an order, and reports of victory rushed to headquarters. If you believe the secret publication “Field Rocket Artillery in the Great Patriotic War” (Moscow, 1955), then on the Kursk Bulge in two days in three episodes, 95 enemy tanks were destroyed by Katyushas! If this were true, then the anti-tank artillery should be disbanded and replaced with multiple rocket launchers.

In some ways, the huge numbers of destroyed tanks were influenced by the fact that for each damaged tank the crew of the combat vehicle received 2,000 rubles, of which 500 rubles. - commander, 500 rubles. - to the gunner, the rest - to the rest.

Unfortunately, due to the huge dispersion, shooting at tanks is ineffective. Here I am picking up the most boring brochure “Tables for firing M-13 rocket projectiles,” published in 1942. It follows from it that with a firing range of 3000 m, the range deviation was 257 m, and the lateral deviation was 51 m. For shorter distances, the range deviation was not given at all, since the dispersion of projectiles could not be calculated. It is not difficult to imagine the likelihood of a missile hitting a tank at such a distance. If we theoretically imagine that a combat vehicle somehow managed to shoot at a tank at point-blank range, then even here the muzzle velocity of a 132-mm projectile was only 70 m/s, which is clearly not enough to penetrate the armor of a Tiger or Panther.

It is not for nothing that the year of publication of the shooting tables is specified here. According to the TS-13 firing tables of the same M-13 missile, the average deviation in range in 1944 is 105 m, and in 1957 - 135 m, and the lateral deviation is 200 and 300 m, respectively. Obviously, the 1957 table is more correct, in which the dispersion increased almost 1.5 times, so that in the 1944 tables there are errors in calculations or, most likely, deliberate falsification for raising morale personnel.

There is no doubt that if an M-13 shell hits a medium or light tank, it will be disabled. The M-13 shell is not able to penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger. But in order to be guaranteed to hit a single tank from a distance of the same 3 thousand m, it is necessary to fire from 300 to 900 M-13 shells due to their enormous dispersion; at shorter distances an even larger number of missiles will be required.

Here is another example told by veteran Dmitry Loza. During the Uman-Botoshan offensive operation on March 15, 1944, two Shermans from the 45th mechanized brigade of the 5th mechanized corps got stuck in the mud. The landing party from the tanks jumped off and retreated. German soldiers surrounded the stuck tanks, “covered the viewing slots with mud, covered the sighting holes in the turret with black soil, completely blinding the crew. They knocked on the hatches and tried to open them with rifle bayonets. And everyone shouted: “Rus, kaput! Give up!” But then two left combat vehicles BM-13. The Katyushas quickly descended into the ditch with their front wheels and fired a direct fire salvo. Bright fiery arrows, hissing and whistling, rushed into the ravine. A moment later, blinding flames danced around. When the smoke from the rocket explosions cleared, the tanks stood seemingly unharmed, only the hulls and turrets were covered with thick soot...

Having repaired the damage to the tracks and throwing out the burnt tarpaulins, the Emcha left for Mogilev-Podolsky.” So, thirty-two 132-mm M-13 shells were fired at two Shermans at point-blank range, and they... only had their tarpaulin burnt.

WAR STATISTICS

The first installations for firing the M-13 had the index BM-13-16 and were mounted on the chassis of a ZIS-6 vehicle. The 82-mm BM-8-36 launcher was also mounted on the same chassis. There were only a few hundred ZIS-6 cars, and at the beginning of 1942 their production was stopped.

Launchers for M-8 and M-13 missiles in 1941–1942 were mounted on anything. Thus, six M-8 guide shells were installed on machines from the Maxim machine gun, 12 M-8 guide shells were installed on a motorcycle, sled and snowmobile (M-8 and M-13), T-40 and T-60 tanks, armored railway vehicles platforms (BM-8-48, BM-8-72, BM-13-16), river and sea boats, etc. But basically, launchers in 1942–1944 were mounted on cars received under Lend-Lease: Austin, Dodge, Ford Marmont, Bedford, etc.

Over the 5 years of the war, out of 3374 chassis used for combat vehicles, the ZIS-6 accounted for 372 (11%), Studebaker - 1845 (54.7%), the remaining 17 types of chassis (except for the Willys with mountain launchers) – 1157 (34.3%). Finally, it was decided to standardize combat vehicles based on the Studebaker car. In April 1943, such a system was put into service under the designation BM-13N (normalized). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for the M-13 was adopted on the Studebaker BM-31-12 chassis.

But in the post-war years, Studebakers were ordered to be forgotten, although combat vehicles on its chassis were in service until the early 1960s. In secret instructions, the Studebaker was called an “all-terrain vehicle.” Mutant Katyushas on the ZIS-5 chassis or post-war types of vehicles, which are stubbornly passed off as genuine military relics, were erected on numerous pedestals, but the genuine BM-13-16 on the ZIS-6 chassis was preserved only in the Artillery Museum in St. Petersburg.

As already mentioned, the Germans captured several launchers and hundreds of 132 mm M-13 and 82 mm M-8 shells back in 1941. The Wehrmacht command believed that their turbojet shells and tubular launchers with revolver-type guides were better than Soviet wing-stabilized shells. But the SS took up the M-8 and M-13 and ordered the Skoda company to copy them.

In 1942, based on the 82-mm Soviet M-8 projectile, 8 cm R.Sprgr rockets were created in Zbroevka. In fact, it was a new projectile, and not a copy of the M-8, although externally the German projectile was very similar to the M-8.

Unlike the Soviet projectile, the stabilizer feathers were set obliquely at an angle of 1.5 degrees to the longitudinal axis. Due to this, the projectile rotated in flight. The rotation speed was many times less than that of a turbojet projectile, and did not play any role in stabilizing the projectile, but it eliminated the eccentricity of the thrust of a single-nozzle rocket engine. But eccentricity, that is, a displacement of the engine thrust vector due to uneven burning of gunpowder in the bombs, was the main reason for the low accuracy of Soviet missiles of the M-8 and M-13 types.

German installation for firing prototypes of Soviet missiles

Based on the Soviet M-13, the Skoda company created a whole series of 15-cm missiles with oblique wings for the SS and Luftwaffe, but they were produced in small series. Our troops captured several samples of German 8-cm shells, and our designers made their own samples based on them. The M-13 and M-31 missiles with oblique tails were adopted by the Red Army in 1944, they were assigned special ballistic indices - TS-46 and TS-47.

R.Sprgr projectile

The apotheosis of the combat use of “Katyusha” and “Luka” was the storming of Berlin. In total, more than 44 thousand guns and mortars, as well as 1,785 M-30 and M-31 launchers, 1,620 rocket artillery combat vehicles (219 divisions) were involved in the Berlin operation. In the battles for Berlin, rocket artillery units used the wealth of experience they acquired in the battles for Poznan, which consisted of direct fire with single M-31, M-20 and even M-13 projectiles.

At first glance, this method of firing may seem primitive, but its results turned out to be very significant. Firing single rockets during battles in such a huge city as Berlin has found the widest application.

To conduct such fire, assault groups of approximately the following composition were created in the guards mortar units: an officer - group commander, an electrical engineer, 25 sergeants and soldiers for the M-31 assault group and 8-10 for the M-13 assault group.

The intensity of the battles and the fire missions performed by rocket artillery in the battles for Berlin can be judged by the number of rockets expended in these battles. In the offensive zone of the 3rd Shock Army the following were expended: M-13 shells - 6270; M-31 shells – 3674; M-20 shells – 600; M-8 shells - 1878.

Of this amount, the rocket artillery assault groups expended: M-8 shells - 1638; M-13 shells – 3353; M-20 shells – 191; M-31 shells – 479.

These groups in Berlin destroyed 120 buildings that were strong centers of enemy resistance, destroyed three 75-mm guns, suppressed dozens of firing points, and killed over 1,000 enemy soldiers and officers.

So, our glorious “Katyusha” and her unjustly offended brother “Luka” became a weapon of victory in the full sense of the word!

The information used in writing this material is, in principle, generally known. But maybe at least someone will learn something new for themselves

We often find shell casings from the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars in the ground. Almost all of them have some kind of their own difference. Today we will look at the markings of cartridges, which are located on the cartridge capsule, regardless of the brand and caliber of the weapon.

Let's look at some types and markings of Austro-Hungarian types of cartridges from 1905-1916. For this type of cartridge case, the primer is divided into four parts using dashes, the inscriptions are embossed. The left and right cells are the year of production, the top is the month, and the bottom is the plant designation.

• In Fig. 1. – G. Roth, Vienna.
• Fig. 2. – Bello and Selye, Prague.
• Figure 3. - Wöllersdorf plant.
• Figure 4. - Hartenberg factory.
• Fig. 5. - the same Hartenberg, but the Kellery Co. plant.

Later Hungarian ones from the 1930s and 40s have some differences. Figure 6. - Chapel Arsenal, year of manufacture below. Fig. 7. – Budapest. Fig. 8. – Veszprem military plant.

Germany, imperialist war.

The German marking of cartridge cases from the imperialist war has two types with a clear division (Fig. 9) using dashes into four equal parts of the primer and with a conditional one (Fig. 10). The inscription is extruded; in the second version, the letters and numbers of the designation are directed towards the capsule.

At the top there is the marking S 67, in different versions: together, separately, with a dot, without numbers. The lower part is the month of production, on the left is the year, and on the right is the plant. In some cases, the year and plant are reversed, or the arrangement of all divisions is completely reversed.

Fascist Germany.

Cases and their markings in Nazi Germany (Mauser type) have many options, because cartridges were produced in almost all factories of the occupied countries Western Europe: Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Italy.

Consider Fig. 11-14, this sleeve is made in Denmark. The capsule is divided into four parts: at the top is the letter P with numbers, at the bottom is the week, on the left side is the year, on the right is the letter S and a star (five-pointed or six-pointed). In Figures 15-17 we see some more types of cartridges produced in Denmark.

In Fig. 18 we see capsules presumably of Czechoslovak and Polish production. The capsule is divided into four parts: at the top – Z, at the bottom the month of manufacture, on the left and right – the year. There is an option where “SMS” is written at the top, and the caliber at the bottom is 7.92.

• In Fig. 19-23 German cartridges G. Genshov and Co. in Durlya;
• Fig. 24. - RVS, Browning, caliber 7.65, Nuremberg;
• Figure 25 and 26 - DVM, Karlsruhe.

More options for Polish-made cartridges.

• Fig. 27 - Skarzysko-Kamienna;
• Figure 28 and 29 - "Pochinsk", Warsaw.

The marks on the Mosin rifle cartridges are not depressed, but convex. At the top there is usually the letter of the manufacturer, at the bottom - the numbers of the year of manufacture.

• Figure 30 – Lugansk plant;
• Fig 31 - plant from Russia;
• Figure 32 – Tula plant.

Some more capsule options:

• Figure 33 – Tula plant;
• Figure 34 – Russian plant;
• Fig 35 – Moscow;
• Rice 36 – Russian-Belgian;
• Figure 37 – Riga;
• Figure 38 – Leningradsky;
• Figure 39, 40, 41, 42 – different factories in Russia.

The cumulative effect of a directed explosion became known in the 19th century, shortly after the start of mass production of high explosives. The first scientific work devoted to this issue was published in 1915 in Great Britain.

This effect is achieved by giving explosive charges a special shape. Typically, for this purpose, charges are made with a recess in the part opposite to its detonator. When an explosion is initiated, a converging stream of detonation products is formed into a high-speed cumulative jet, and the cumulative effect increases when the recess is lined with a layer of metal (1-2 mm thick). The speed of the metal jet reaches 10 km/s. Compared to the expanding detonation products of conventional charges, in the converging flow of shaped charge products, the pressure and density of matter and energy are much higher, which ensures the directional effect of the explosion and the high penetrating force of the shaped charge jet.

When the conical shell collapses, the velocities of individual parts of the jet turn out to be somewhat different, as a result of which the jet stretches in flight. Therefore, a slight increase in the gap between the charge and the target increases the penetration depth due to the elongation of the jet. The thickness of the armor penetrated by cumulative shells does not depend on the firing range and is approximately equal to their caliber. At significant distances between the charge and the target, the jet breaks into pieces, and the penetration effect is reduced.

In the 30s of the 20th century, there was a massive saturation of troops with armored vehicles. In addition to traditional means of combating them, in the pre-war period development was carried out in some countries cumulative shells.
What was especially tempting was that the armor penetration of such ammunition did not depend on the speed of contact with the armor. This made it possible to successfully use them to destroy tanks in artillery systems that were not originally intended for this purpose, as well as to create highly effective anti-tank mines and grenades. Germany had advanced the most in the creation of cumulative anti-tank ammunition; by the time of the attack on the USSR, cumulative artillery shells of 75-105 mm caliber had been created and adopted there.

Unfortunately, in the Soviet Union before the war, due attention was not paid to this area. In our country, the improvement of anti-tank weapons proceeded by increasing the caliber of anti-tank guns and increasing the initial velocities of armor-piercing shells. To be fair, it should be said that in the USSR in the late 30s, an experimental batch of 76-mm cumulative shells was fired and tested. During the tests, it turned out that cumulative shells equipped with standard fuses from fragmentation shells, as a rule, do not penetrate armor and ricochet. Obviously, the problem was in the fuses, but the military, which already did not show much interest in such shells, finally abandoned them after unsuccessful firing.

At the same time, a significant number of recoilless (dynamo-reactive) Kurchevsky guns were manufactured in the USSR.

76-mm Kurchevsky recoilless rifle on a truck chassis

The advantage of such systems is their light weight and lower cost compared to “classic” guns. Recoilless rifles in combination with cumulative projectiles could quite successfully prove themselves as an anti-tank weapon.

With the outbreak of hostilities, reports began to arrive from the fronts that German artillery was using previously unknown so-called “armor-burning” shells that effectively hit tanks. When inspecting the damaged tanks, we noticed the characteristic appearance of holes with melted edges. At first, it was suggested that the unknown shells used “fast-burning thermite,” accelerated by powder gases. However, this assumption was soon refuted experimentally. It was found that the processes of combustion of thermite incendiary compositions and the interaction of the slag jet with the metal of the tank armor proceed too slowly and cannot be realized in a very short time for the shell to penetrate the armor. At this time, samples of “armor-burning” shells captured from the Germans were delivered from the front. It turned out that their design is based on the use of the cumulative effect of an explosion.

At the beginning of 1942, designers M.Ya. Vasiliev, Z.V. Vladimirov and N.S. Zhitkikh designed a 76-mm cumulative projectile with a conical cumulative recess lined with a steel shell. An artillery shell body with bottom equipment was used, the chamber of which was additionally bored into a cone in its head part. The projectile used a powerful explosive - an alloy of TNT and hexogen. The bottom hole and plug served to install an additional detonator and a beam detonator capsule. A big problem was the lack of a suitable fuse in production. After a series of experiments, the AM-6 aviation instantaneous fuse was chosen.

HEAT shells, which had armor penetration of about 70-75 mm, appeared in the ammunition load of regimental guns in 1943, and were mass-produced throughout the war.

Regimental 76-mm gun mod. 1927

The industry supplied the front with about 1.1 million 76-mm cumulative anti-tank shells. Unfortunately, their use in tank and divisional 76-mm guns was prohibited due to the unreliable operation of the fuse and the danger of an explosion in the barrel. Fuzes for cumulative artillery shells, meeting safety requirements when firing from long-barreled guns, were created only at the end of 1944.

In 1942, a group of designers including I.P. Dzyuba, N.P. Kazeikina, I.P. Kucherenko, V.Ya. Matyushkina and A.A. Greenberg developed cumulative anti-tank shells for 122-mm howitzers.

The 122-mm cumulative projectile for the howitzer of the 1938 model had a body made of steel cast iron, was equipped with an effective explosive composition based on hexogen and a powerful PETN detonator. The 122-mm cumulative projectile was equipped with the B-229 instantaneous fuse, which was developed in a very short time at TsKB-22, headed by A.Ya. Karpov.

122-mm howitzer M-30 mod. 1938

The projectile was put into service and put into mass production at the beginning of 1943, and managed to take part in the Battle of Kursk. Until the end of the war, more than 100 thousand 122-mm cumulative shells were produced. The projectile penetrated armor up to 150 mm thick along the normal line, ensuring the defeat of heavy German Tiger and Panther tanks. However, the effective firing range of howitzers at maneuvering tanks was suicidal - 400 meters.

The creation of cumulative shells opened up great opportunities for the use of artillery guns with relatively low initial velocities - 76-mm regimental guns of the 1927 and 1943 models. and 122-mm howitzers of the 1938 model, which were available in large quantities in the army. The presence of cumulative shells in the ammunition loads of these guns significantly increased the effectiveness of their anti-tank fire. This significantly strengthened the anti-tank defense of Soviet rifle divisions.

One of the main tasks of the Il-2 armored attack aircraft, which entered service at the beginning of 1941, was to fight armored vehicles.
However, the cannon armament available to the attack aircraft could only effectively hit lightly armored vehicles.
82-132 mm rocket projectiles did not have the required firing accuracy. However, in 1942, cumulative RBSK-82 were developed to arm the Il-2.

The head of the RBSK-82 missile consisted of a steel cylinder with a wall thickness of 8 mm. A cone made of sheet iron was rolled into the front part of the cylinder, creating a recess in the explosive substance poured into the cylinder of the projectile head. A tube ran through the center of the cylinder, which served “to transmit a beam of fire from the pin cap to the TAT-1 detonator cap.” The shells were tested in two versions of explosive equipment: TNT and alloy 70/30 (TNT with hexogen). The shells with TNT were fitted with an AM-A fuse, and the shells with the 70/30 alloy were fitted with an M-50 fuse. The fuses had a pin-type capsule of the APUV type. The RBSK-82 missile unit is standard, from M-8 missile shells filled with pyroxylin gunpowder.

A total of 40 RBSK-82s were used up during the tests, 18 of them by firing in the air, the rest by firing on the ground. Captured German Pz tanks were fired upon. III, StuG III and the Czech tank Pz.38(t) with reinforced armor. Firing in the air was carried out at the StuG III tank from a dive at an angle of 30° with salvoes of 2-4 shells in one pass. The firing distance was 200 m. The shells showed good stability along the flight path, but it was not possible to get a single drop into the tank.

The RBSK-82 cumulative action armor-piercing rocket-propelled projectile, filled with 70/30 alloy, penetrated 30 mm thick armor at any impact angle, and pierced 50 mm thick armor at a right angle, but did not penetrate it at a 30° impact angle. Apparently, the low armor penetration is a consequence of the delay in the firing of the fuse “from the ricochet and the cumulative jet is formed with a deformed cone.”

RBSK-82 shells loaded with TNT penetrated 30 mm thick armor only at impact angles of at least 30°, and did not penetrate 50 mm armor under any impact conditions. The holes produced by penetrating armor had a diameter of up to 35 mm. In most cases, penetration of the armor was accompanied by spalling of the metal around the exit hole.

HEAT missiles were not accepted for service due to the lack of a clear advantage over standard rockets. A new, much more powerful weapon was already on the way - PTABs.

Priority in the development of small cumulative aviation bombs belongs to domestic scientists and designers. In mid-1942, the famous fuze developer I.A. Larionov, proposed the design of a light anti-tank bomb with cumulative action. The Air Force command showed interest in implementing the proposal. TsKB-22 quickly carried out design work and testing of the new bomb began at the end of 1942. The final version was PTAB-2.5-1.5, i.e. an anti-tank aviation bomb with a cumulative effect weighing 1.5 kg in the dimensions of a 2.5 kg aviation fragmentation bomb. The State Defense Committee urgently decided to adopt the PTAB-2.5-1.5 and organize its mass production.

The first PTAB-2.5-1.5 housings and riveted pinnate-cylindrical stabilizers were made from sheet steel 0.6 mm thick. To increase the fragmentation effect, a 1.5-mm steel jacket was additionally put on the cylindrical part of the bomb. The PTAB combat charge consisted of a mixed BB of the TGA type, equipped through the bottom point. To protect the AD-A fuse impeller from spontaneous collapse, a special fuse made of a square-shaped tin plate with a fork of two wire mustaches attached to it, passing between the blades, was put on the bomb stabilizer. After the PTAB was dropped from the aircraft, it was torn off the bomb by the oncoming air flow.

Upon impact with the tank's armor, a fuse was triggered, which, through a tetryl detonator block, caused the detonation of the explosive charge. When the charge detonated, due to the presence of a cumulative funnel and a metal cone in it, a cumulative jet was created, which, as field tests showed, pierced armor up to 60 mm thick at an impact angle of 30° with a subsequent destructive effect behind the armor: defeating the tank crew, initiating detonation of ammunition , as well as ignition of fuel or its vapors.

The bomb load of the Il-2 aircraft included up to 192 PTAB-2.5-1.5 bombs in 4 cassettes of small bombs (48 pieces each) or up to 220 pieces when they were rationally placed in bulk in 4 bomb bays.

The adoption of PTABs was kept secret for some time; their use without the permission of the high command was prohibited. This made it possible to use the effect of surprise and effectively use new weapons in the battle of Kursk.

The massive use of PTAB had a stunning effect of tactical surprise and had a strong moral impact on the enemy. German tank crews, however, like Soviet ones, by the third year of the war had already become accustomed to the relatively low effectiveness of bomb assault strikes. At the initial stage of the battle, the Germans did not use dispersed marching and pre-battle formations at all, that is, on the routes of movement in columns, in places of concentration and in initial positions, for which they were severely punished - the PTAB flight line was blocked by 2-3 tanks, one distant from the other at 60-75 m, as a result of which the latter suffered significant losses, even in the absence of massive use of IL-2. One IL-2 from a height of 75-100 meters could cover an area of ​​15x75 meters, destroying all enemy equipment there.
On average, during the war, irretrievable tank losses from aviation did not exceed 5%; after the use of PTAB in certain sectors of the front, this figure exceeded 20%.

Having recovered from the shock, the German tank crews soon moved exclusively to dispersed marching and pre-battle formations. Naturally, this greatly complicated the management of tank units and subunits, increased the time for their deployment, concentration and redeployment, and complicated the interaction between them. In parking lots, German tank crews began to place their vehicles under trees, light mesh canopies, and install light metal meshes over the roof of the turret and hull. The effectiveness of IL-2 strikes using PTAB decreased by approximately 4-4.5 times, remaining, however, on average 2-3 times higher than when using high-explosive and high-explosive fragmentation bombs.

In 1944, a more powerful anti-tank bomb PTAB-10-2.5, with the dimensions of a 10-kg aircraft bomb, was adopted. It provided penetration of armor up to 160 mm thick. According to the principle of operation and purpose of the main components and elements, PTAB-10-2.5 was similar to PTAB-2.5-1.5 and differed from it only in shape and dimensions.

In the 1920s-1930s, the Red Army was armed with the muzzle-loading “Dyakonov grenade launcher,” created at the end of the First World War and subsequently modernized.

It was a 41-mm caliber mortar, which was put on the barrel of a rifle, fixed on the front sight with a cutout. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, every rifle and cavalry squad had a grenade launcher. Then the question arose about giving the rifle grenade launcher “anti-tank” properties.

During the Second World War, in 1944, the VKG-40 cumulative grenade entered service with the Red Army. The grenade was fired with a special blank cartridge containing 2.75 g of VP or P-45 gunpowder. The reduced charge of the blank cartridge made it possible to fire a grenade at direct fire with the butt resting on the shoulder, at a range of up to 150 meters.

The cumulative rifle grenade is designed to combat lightly armored vehicles and enemy mobile vehicles not protected by armor, as well as firing points. The VKG-40 was used very limitedly, which is explained by the low accuracy of fire and poor armor penetration.

During the war, the USSR produced a significant number of hand-held anti-tank grenades. Initially these were high-explosive grenades; as the thickness of the armor increased, the weight of anti-tank grenades also increased. However, this still did not ensure penetration of the armor of medium tanks, so the RPG-41 grenade, with an explosive weight of 1400 g, could penetrate 25 mm armor.

Needless to say, what a danger this anti-tank weapon posed to those who used it.

In mid-1943, the Red Army adopted a fundamentally new cumulative action grenade, RPG-43, developed by N.P. Belyakov. This was the first cumulative hand grenade developed in the USSR.

Sectional view of the RPG-43 hand-held cumulative grenade

The RPG-43 had a body with a flat bottom and a conical lid, a wooden handle with a safety mechanism, a belt stabilizer and an impact-ignition mechanism with a fuse. Inside the case is placed a bursting charge with a cumulative conical recess lined with a thin layer of metal, and a cup with a safety spring and a sting fixed in its bottom.

At its front end of the handle there is a metal sleeve, inside of which there is a fuse holder and a pin holding it in the rearmost position. On the outside, a spring is put on the bushing and fabric tapes are laid, attached to the stabilizer cap. The safety mechanism consists of a folding bar and a pin. The hinged bar serves to hold the stabilizer cap on the grenade handle before it is thrown, preventing it from sliding or turning in place.

When throwing a grenade, the hinged bar separates and releases the stabilizer cap, which, under the action of a spring, slides off the handle and pulls the tapes behind it. The safety pin falls out under its own weight, releasing the fuse holder. Thanks to the presence of a stabilizer, the grenade flew head-first, which is necessary for optimal use of the energy of the grenade's cumulative charge. When a grenade hits an obstacle with the bottom of the body, the fuse, overcoming the resistance of the safety spring, is impaled on the sting by a detonator cap, which causes the explosive charge to detonate. The RPG-43's shaped charge penetrated armor up to 75 mm thick.

With the advent of German heavy tanks on the battlefield, an anti-tank hand grenade with greater armor penetration was required. A group of designers consisting of M.Z. Polevanova, L.B. Ioffe and N.S. Zhitkikh developed the RPG-6 cumulative grenade. In October 1943, the grenade was adopted by the Red Army. The RPG-6 grenade is in many ways similar to the German PWM-1.

German PWM-1 anti-tank hand grenade

The RPG-6 had a teardrop-shaped body with a charge and an additional detonator and a handle with an inertial fuse, a detonator capsule and a tape stabilizer.

The fuse firing pin was blocked by a pin. The stabilizer bands were placed in the handle and held in place by a safety bar. The safety pin was removed before throwing. After the throw, the safety bar flew off, the stabilizer was pulled out, the firing pin was pulled out - the fuse was cocked.

Thus, the RPG-6’s safety system was three-stage (the RPG-43’s was two-stage). In terms of technology, a significant feature of the RLG-6 was the absence of turned and threaded parts, the widespread use of stamping and knurling. Compared to the RPG-43, the RPG-6 was more technologically advanced in production and somewhat safer to use. RPG-43 and RPG-6 were thrown at 15-20 m, after the throw the fighter had to take cover.

During the war years, hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers were never created in the USSR, although work was carried out in this direction. The main anti-tank weapons of the infantry were still anti-tank rifles and hand anti-tank grenades. This was partly offset by a significant increase in the second half of the war in the number anti-tank artillery. But on the offensive anti-tank guns they could not always accompany the infantry, and in the event of the sudden appearance of enemy tanks, this often led to large and unjustified losses.

I I - period before 1941

In December 1917, the Council of People's Commissars announced the demobilization of military factories, but by this time the production of ammunition in the country had practically ceased. By 1918, all the main stocks of weapons and ammunition remaining from the World War had already been exhausted. However, by the beginning of 1919, only the Tula Cartridge Plant remained operational. Lugansk cartridge in 1918 was initially captured by the Germans, then it was occupied by Krasnov’s White Guard army.

For the newly created plant in Taganrog, the White Guards took from the Lugansk plant 4 machines from each development, 500 pounds of gunpowder, non-ferrous metals, as well as some finished cartridges.
So Ataman Krasnov resumed production at RUSSIAN - BALTIC Rus.-Balt plant acc. association of shipbuilding and mechanical plants. (Founded in 1913 in Revel, in 1915 evacuated to Taganrog, in Soviet times the Taganrog Combine Plant.) and by November 1918, the productivity of this plant increased to 300,000 rifle cartridges per day (Kakurin N E. "How the Revolution Fought")

“On January 3 (1919), the allies saw the Russian-Baltic plant in Taganrog already revived and put into operation, where they made cartridges, cast bullets, inserted them into a cupronickel silver shell, filled cartridges with gunpowder - in a word, the plant was already in full operation. (Peter Nikolaevich Krasnov “The Great Don Army”) In Krasnodar region and in the Urals they find cartridges marked D.Z.
Most likely this marking means “Donskoy Plant” in Taganrog

Simbirsk, which was under construction, was under threat of capture. In the spring of 1918 The evacuation of the St. Petersburg Cartridge Plant to Simbirsk began. To establish the production of cartridges, about 1,500 workers from Petrograd arrived in Simbirsk in July 1919.
In 1919, the plant began production, and in 1922, the Ulyanovsk plant was renamed “Plant named after Volodarsky.”

In addition, the Soviet government is building a new cartridge factory in Podolsk. A part of the shell plant, located in the premises of the former Singer plant, was allocated for it. The remains of equipment from Petrograd were sent there. Since the fall of 1919, the Podolsk plant began to remake foreign cartridges, and in November 1920 the first batch of rifle cartridges was produced.

Since 1924 The production of cartridges is carried out by the State Association “Main Directorate of Military Industry of the USSR”, which includes Tula, Lugansk, Podolsk, Ulyanovsk factories.

Since 1928, cartridge factories, except Tula, received numbers: Ulyanovsk - 3, Podolsk - 17, Lugansk - 60. (But Ulyanovsk retained its ZV marking until 1941)
Since 1934, new workshops were built south of Podolsk. Soon they began to be called the Novopodolsk plant, and from 1940 the Klimovsky plant No. 188.
In 1939 cartridge factories were reassigned to the 3rd Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Armaments. It included the following plants: Ulyanovsk No. 3, Podolsk No. 17, Tula No. 38, Experienced Patr. plant (Maryina Roshcha, Moscow) No. 44, Kuntsevsky (Red Equipment) No. 46, Lugansky No. 60 and Klimovsky No. 188.

The markings of Soviet-made cartridges remain mainly with a protruding imprint.

At the top is the number or name of the plant, at the bottom is the year of manufacture.

Cartridges from the Tula plant in 1919-20. the quarter is indicated, possibly in 1923-24. only the last digit of the year of manufacture is indicated, and the Lugansk plant in 1920-1927. indicates the period (1,2,3) in which they were manufactured. The Ulyanovsk plant in 1919 -30 puts the name of the plant (S, U, ZV) below.

In 1930, the spherical bottom of the sleeve was replaced with a flat one with a chamfer. The replacement was caused by problems that arose when firing the Maxim machine gun. The protruding marking is located along the edge of the bottom of the cartridge case. It was only in the 1970s that cartridges began to be marked with an embossed imprint on a flat surface closer to the center.

*Note. The table is not complete, there may be other options

It is very rare to find shells from the Lugansk plant with the additional designation +. Most likely, these are technological designations and the cartridges were intended only for test firing.

There is an opinion that in 1928-1936 the Penza plant produced cartridges marked No. 50, but it is more likely that this is a vague mark No. 60

Perhaps, at the end of the thirties, cartridges or cartridges were produced at the Moscow Shot Foundry No. 58, which then produced tail cartridges for mortar mines.

In 1940-41 in Novosibirsk, plant No. 179 NKB (People's Commissariat of Ammunition) produced rifle cartridges.

The case for the ShKAS machine gun, unlike an ordinary rifle case, has, in addition to the factory number and year of manufacture, an additional stamp - the letter "Ш".
Cartridges with a ShKAS case and a red primer were used for firing only from synchronized aircraft machine guns.

R. Chumak K. Soloviev Cartridges for a supermachine gun Kalashnikov Magazine No. 1 2001

Notes:
Finland, which used the Mosin rifle, produced and also purchased from the USA and other countries 7.62x54 cartridges, which are found on the battlefields of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939 and the Second World War. It is likely that pre-revolutionary Russian-made cartridges were also used.

In the 1920-30s, the United States used Mosin rifles left over from the Russian order for training purposes and sold them for private use, producing cartridges for this. Deliveries were made to Finland in 1940

During World War I, Germany used a captured Mosin rifle to arm auxiliary and rear units.

During the civil war, Spain received a large number of various, mostly outdated, weapons from the USSR. Including the Mosin rifle. The production of cartridges was established. It is possible that at first Soviet-made cartridges were used, which were reloaded and new markings were applied to them.

The English company Kynoch supplied cartridges to Finland and Estonia. According to the data providedGOST from "P.Labbett &F.A.Brown.Foreignrifle-caliberammunition manufactured in Britain.London, 1994." Kynoch signed contracts for the supply of 7.62x54 cartridges:

1929 Estonia (with tracer bullet)
1932 Estonia (with a heavy bullet weighing 12.12g.)
1938 Estonia (with tracer bullet)
1929 Finland (with tracer bullet, armor-piercing bullet)
1939 Finland (with tracer bullet)

The 7.62x54 cartridge was produced in the 20-40s in other countries for commercial purposes:

It is possible that some of the foreign ammunition listed above could have ended up in Soviet warehouses in small quantities as a result of the annexation of the western territories and the Finnish War, and were most likely used by parts of the “people's militia” in the initial period of the Second World War. Also now often found during archaeological research of WWII battle sites in Soviet positions are casings and cartridges produced in the USA and England, ordered by Russia for World War I. The order was not completed on time and was already supplied to the White Army during the Civil War. After the end of the civil war, the remains of this ammunition ended up in warehouses, probably used by security units and OSOAVIAKHIM, but they turned out to be in demand with the beginning of the Second World War.
Sometimes, at battlefields, cartridge cases of a 7.7mm English rifle cartridge (.303 British) are found, which are mistaken for 7.62x54R ammunition. These cartridges were used, in particular, by the armies of the Baltic states and in 1940 were used for the Red Army. Near Leningrad there are such cartridges marked V - Riga plant "Vairogs" (VAIROGS, formerly Sellier & Bellot)
.
Later, such cartridges of English and Canadian production were supplied under Lend-Lease.

I I I - period 1942-1945

In 1941, all factories, except Ulyanovsk, were partially or completely evacuated, and the old factory numbers were retained in the new location. For example, the Barnaul plant, transported from Podolsk, produced its first products on November 24, 1941. Some plants were re-established. The numbering of all cartridge production is given, since there is no accurate data on the range of products they produce.

According to B. Davydov, during the war, rifle cartridges were produced in factories 17 ,38 (1943), 44 (1941-42),46 ,60 ,179 (1940-41),188 ,304 (1942),529 ,539 (1942-43),540 ,541 (1942-43), 543 ,544 ,545 ,710 (1942-43),711 (1942).

When restored in 1942-1944, the factories received new designations.

This mark is probably a product produced by the Podolsk plant during the period of its resumption of work.
There may be other designations. For example, No. 10 in 1944 (found on TT cartridges), but the location of production is unknown, perhaps it is the Perm plant or the poorly readable mark of the Podolsk plant.

Since 1944, it has been possible to designate the month of manufacture of the cartridge.
For example, a 1946 training cartridge has this marking.

IV - Post-war period

In the post-war years in the USSR, the factories in cartridge production remained in Klimovsk-No. 711, Tula-No. 539, Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk)-No. 270, Ulyanovsk-No. 3, Yuryuzan-No. 38, Novosibirsk-No. 188, Barnaul-No. 17 and Frunze -No. 60.

The markings of rifle cartridges from this period of production remain primarily with a raised imprint. At the top is the plant number, at the bottom is the year of manufacture.

In 1952-1956, the following designations are used to indicate the year of manufacture:

G = 1952, D = 1953, E = 1954, I = 1955, K = 1956.

After WWII, the 7.62 caliber cartridge was also produced in the Warsaw Pact countries, China, Iraq and Egypt, and other countries. Designation options are possible

This cartridge is still produced at Russian factories in combat and hunting versions.

Modern names and some of the commercial markings on Russian cartridges since 1990

The designs and characteristics of various bullets for 7.62 caliber cartridges are quite well presented in modern literature on weapons and therefore only the color designations of bullets are given according to the “Handbook of Cartridges...” of 1946.

Most of the above information was provided by the director of the local history museum of the Lomonosov district of the Leningrad region
Vladimir Andreevich Golovatyuk , who has been studying the history of small arms and ammunition for many years.
The museum contains a lot of materials and exhibits on the history of the area, military operations in the area during the Second World War. Excursions are regularly held for schoolchildren and anyone interested. T museum phone 8 812 423 05 66

In addition, I provide the information I have on rifle cartridges of an earlier period:
Cartridge for the Krnka, Baranova rifle
Produced at the St. Petersburg plant (and some workshops without designations)

Probably L is the name of the St. Petersburg Foundry.

Probably VGO - Vasileostrovsky cartridge case department of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant.

The designation of the third year of manufacture appears

Petersburg plant

Unfortunately, I have no information on the designations before 1880, most likely the letter B denotes the Vasileostrovsky cartridge case department of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant, and the upper sign is the name of the brass manufacturer.

Made by Keller & Co., Hirtenberg Austria, probably commissioned by Bulgaria for the Serbo-Bulgarian War.