What is solipsist and solipsism? Solipsism and skepticism - Intellectual tricks. Criticism of modern postmodern philosophy Consciousness as a subjective reality solipsism

This theory is connected, on the one hand, with the position of the previous theory taken to an extreme, and on the other hand, with the theories of infancy developed in the psychoanalytic school (3. Bernfeld). The theory under consideration is, as it were, a synthesis of these two concepts. In the most complete and consistent form, it is developed by J. Piaget, who says that the consciousness of an infant is a mystery to us. One of the ways of penetrating into his consciousness is the regressive way. It is known, says Piaget, that the most significant feature that distinguishes the behavior and thinking of a child from those of an adult is egocentrism. It intensifies as you go down the age ladder. In a person at 18, egocentrism is expressed differently than at 10 years of age, and at 6 years of age even differently, etc. At 4 years of age, egocentrism fills almost all the thoughts of a child. If we consider this egocentrism to the limit, then we can assume, Piaget believes, that the infant is inherent in absolute egocentrism, which can be defined as the solipsism of the first year.

Logical thought, according to Piaget, develops late in a child. It always contains something social. It is related to speech. Without words, we would think as in a dream: images united by feeling and possessing a vague, completely individual and affective meaning. This thought, in contrast to the socialized logically mature thought, we observe in dreams, as well as in some patients. It is commonly called autistic thought. Autism and logical thinking are two poles: one is purely individual, the other is purely social. Our normal mature thought constantly fluctuates between these poles. In dreams and in certain mental illnesses, a person loses all interest in objective reality. He is immersed in the world of his own affects, which find their expression in figurative, emotionally colored thinking.

The baby, according to this theory, also lives as if in a dream. 3. Freud speaks of the infant's narcissism as if he had no interest in anything other than himself. The baby takes everything around him for himself, like a solipsist who identifies the world with his idea of ​​it. The further development of the child consists in the gradual decrease of solipsism and the gradual socialization of the thinking and consciousness of the child, turning to external reality. The egocentrism of the later child is a compromise between initial solipsism and the gradual socialization of thought. The degree of egocentrism can therefore be used to measure the child's progress along the path of development. From this point of view, Piaget interprets a number of children's reactions that he observed in the experiment and are close in type to frequently manifested forms of behavior in infancy, for example, a magical attitude towards things.

Even from a simple exposition of the theory it is easy to see that it is an attempt to depict development in infancy in an inverted form. This theory is a direct and polar opposite of the concept of infant development that we have cited. We have seen that its initial moment is characterized by the fact that all the vital manifestations of the infant are interwoven and woven into the social, that through long development the consciousness of the “primordial we” arises in the child, that the consciousness of an inseparable mental community, the absence of the possibility of self-singling out, constitute the most distinctive properties of the infant’s consciousness. . The theory of solipsism asserts that the child is a presocial being wholly immersed in the world of dream thinking and subject to an affective interest in himself. The error underlying this theory, as well as Freud's, lies in the incorrect opposition of two tendencies: 1) to satisfy needs and 2) to adapt to reality, i.e., the pleasure principle and the reality principle, autistic and logical thinking. In fact, both are not polar opposites, but are closely related to each other. The tendency to satisfy needs is, in essence, only the other side of the tendency to adapt. Pleasure also does not contradict reality. Not only do they not exclude each other, but in infancy they almost coincide.

In the same way, logical and autistic thinking, affect and intellect are not two mutually exclusive poles, but two closely related and inseparable mental functions that act at each age stage as an indivisible unity, although it contains all new and new relations between affective and intellectual functions. Genetically, the issue is resolved from the point of view of how autistic thinking can be taken as primary and primitive. Freud, as we know, defended this point of view. In contrast, E. Bleiler showed that autistic thinking is a late developing function. He objects to Freud's idea that in the course of development the mechanisms of pleasure are primary, that the child is separated by a shell from the outside world, lives an autistic life and hallucinates about the satisfaction of his internal needs. Bleuler says that he does not see hallucinatory satisfaction in an infant, he sees satisfaction only after a real meal. Observing an older child, he also does not see that the child prefers an imaginary apple to a real one.

The newborn responds in all its strivings to reality and in the spirit of reality. Nowhere can one find or even imagine a viable being that would not react first of all to reality, that would not act, absolutely no matter what low stage of development it is on.

E. Bleuler shows that the autistic function requires the maturation of complex prerequisites in the form of speech, concepts, and the ability to remember. Autistic function is not as primitive as simple forms of real function.

Thus, the psychology of animals, like the psychology of the infant, knows only the real function. The child's autistic thinking makes the greatest progress after the development of speech and the most important steps in the development of concepts.

Thus, autistic thinking not only does not coincide with the unconscious and wordless, but is itself based on the development of speech. It turns out not to be the original, but a derivative form. Autistic thinking is not a primitive form of thinking, it could develop only after thinking, working with the help of memory pictures alone, takes precedence over the immediate mental reaction to actual external situations. Ordinary thinking - a function of the real - is primary and just as necessary for any viable creature endowed with a psyche, as are actions corresponding to reality.

Attempts have been made to limit the theory of solipsism to application only to the neonatal period. Supporters of this view explained that the stage of solipsism does not last long in an infant and already at the 2nd month loses its absolute character. The first gap is formed at the moment when the child begins to respond to the voice or smile of an adult with a general animation or an answering smile. In general, in the light of known data on the sociality of infancy, it is difficult to subscribe to the concept of solipsism regarding a child older than 2 months. It is applicable, according to our definitions, in full measure only to children who are profoundly mentally retarded and idiots.

Piaget's second statement about infantile autism also applies more to the oligophrenic than to the normal child. This compromise point of view, in essence, does not refute, but confirms Piaget, reinforcing his idea of ​​the primacy of autistic thinking. Meanwhile, one cannot but agree with Bleuler, who showed that it is at the primitive stages of development that any possibility of unrealistic thinking is ruled out. Starting from a certain stage of development, the autistic function joins the original realistic function and from then on develops along with it. The imbecile, Bleuler says, is a real real politician. His autistic thinking is simplified in the same way as the realistic one. Recently, K. Levin has shown that imagination - one of the most striking manifestations of autistic thinking - is extremely underdeveloped in mentally retarded children.

It is known from the development of a normal child that in him this function begins to develop to any noticeable extent only from preschool age.

We think, therefore, that the theory of solipsism should not only be limited, but replaced by the opposite, since all the facts cited in its defense receive a true explanation from the opposite point of view.

So, V. Peters showed that the basis of the child's egocentric speech and egocentric thinking is not autism and not intentional isolation from communication, but something opposite to this in mental structure. Piaget, who, according to Peters, emphasizes the egocentrism of children and makes it the cornerstone of explaining the uniqueness of the child's psyche, must still establish that children talk to each other and that one does not listen to the other. Of course, outwardly, they do not seem to take this other into account, but precisely because they have retained to a certain extent traces of that immediate generality that once characterized their consciousness as a dominant feature.

In conclusion, we would only like to show that the facts cited by Piaget receive a true explanation in the light of the above teaching about the basic neoplasm of infancy. Piaget, analyzing the logical actions of an infant, foresees the objection that his theory may raise. One would think, he writes, that the infant uses any action to get any result, since he simply believes that his parents fulfill his desire. According to this hypothesis, the device used by the child in order to influence things is simply a kind of language used by him in communication with people close to him. It will not be magic, but a request. So, we can state that a child of 1.5-2 years old turns to his parents when he needs something, and simply says “please”, not caring about clarifying what he wants; he is so convinced that all his wishes are known to his parents. But if this hypothesis becomes plausible for a child who is already beginning to speak, then until that time it is completely untenable, according to Piaget. One of the main arguments against this hypothesis, the best proof that primitive behavior is not social, that the behavior of the first year cannot be considered social, Piaget considers the following circumstance: the child does not yet distinguish people from things. Therefore, according to Piaget, at this age one can speak only of soliptic, but not of social behavior.

However, as we have seen, as early as the 2nd month, the child develops further developing and becoming more complex specific reactions of a social nature (to a human voice, to the expression of a human face), an active search for contact with another person, and other symptoms that undoubtedly show that already V. In infancy, a child distinguishes people from things.

We have seen from Faience's experiments that the child's attitude to an object is entirely determined by the social content of the situation in which this object is given. Can it be said of the child's behavior in these experiments that he does not distinguish between man and thing? The only true idea of ​​Piaget is that for the infant the social and objective content of the situation is not yet differentiated. Unlike a 2-year-old child who is fluent in speech, an infant is unable to differentiate a request to an adult for help from a direct impact on an object. As we have seen in experiments with moving an object away, a child who has already given up reaching for an unattainable goal resumes his attempts again with the same vivacity as soon as a person appears near the goal. True, the child here does not turn to the experimenter for help, but continues to reach out directly to the object, which creates the appearance of magical behavior. But the experiment shows with undoubted clarity that these apparently magical actions occur in the child only under the influence of the fact that in a situation with an unattainable goal, the path usual for the child through another person suddenly becomes possible. The child is not yet aware of this path and does not know how to use it intentionally, but only in the presence of this path are his quasi-magical actions actualized. A careful analysis of Piaget's experiments would also show that the child reacts with magical actions not to the situation with the object that has disappeared, but to the situation, the center of which is the path to the object, which runs through relations to another person. Thus, the infant's soliptic behavior turns out to be in fact social behavior characteristic of the infantile consciousness of the "great-we".

SOLIPSISM(from Latin solus - the only one and ipse - itself) - a philosophical position, according to which only one's own subjective experience, the data of individual consciousness, is undoubtedly given, and everything that is considered to exist independently of it (including the body, the world of physical things external to the consciousness, other people) is really only a part of this experience. The point of view of solipsism expresses the logic of the subject-centric attitude that was adopted in the classical Western philosophy of the New Age after Descartes (see. subjective , Theory of knowledge , I ). At the same time, the obvious contradiction of the position with the facts of everyday common sense and the postulates of scientific knowledge did not allow the majority of philosophers who adhered to the subject-centric attitude to draw conclusions in the spirit of solipsism. Thus, Descartes, who put forward the thesis that the only self-evident truth is the statement “I think, therefore I am”, with the help of ontological proof, asserted the existence of God, who cannot be a deceiver and therefore guarantees the reality of the external world and other people. Berkeley, who identifies physical things with a set of sensations, believed that the continuity of the existence of things, i.e. the impossibility of their disappearance when they are not perceived by anyone is ensured by their constant perception by God. From Hume's point of view, although it is purely theoretically impossible to prove the existence of the external world and other people, it is necessary to believe in their reality, because without such faith, practical life and knowledge are impossible. According to Kant, experience is a construction of the I. But this is not an empirical I, but a transcendental I, in which, in essence, the distinction between me and others is erased. As for the I of an empirical individual, his inner experience (the awareness of the states of his own consciousness) presupposes an external experience (the consciousness of physical objects and objective events independent of the individual I).

There are two ways to understand the meaning of solipsism. According to the first, the affirmation as the only real personal experience of mine entails also the affirmation of the I to which this experience belongs. Such an understanding is compatible with the theses of Descartes and Berkeley. According to another understanding, although my personal experience is the only undoubted one, there is no Self to which this experience refers, for I am nothing but the totality of the elements of this same experience. The paradoxical nature of such an understanding of solipsism was well expressed by L. Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, linking this understanding, however, not with the undoubted givenness of my sensory experience in the form of sensations (as was the case with Hume and Mach), but with the givenness of my language and facts described by this language. On the one hand, Wittgenstein emphasizes, I am my world, on the other hand, “the subject does not belong to the world, but represents a certain boundary of the world” ( Wittgenstein L. Philosophical works, part 1. M., 1994, p. 56). “What solipsism implies is quite correct,” he believes, “only it cannot be said, but it reveals itself” (ibid.). Therefore, “... strictly carried out solipsism coincides with pure realism. The “I” of solipsism shrinks to an unextended point, but the reality correlated with it remains” (ibid., p. 57). In fact, the consistently held point of view of solipsism, which identifies with the real only what is directly given in my experience, does not allow even the past facts of my consciousness to be considered real, i.e. also makes the continuity of my consciousness impossible (cf. Russell b. Human knowledge. M., 1957, p. 208-214).

Some representatives of modern cognitive psychology (J. Fodor and others) believe that the so-called. methodological solipsism should be the main research strategy in this science. This refers to the point of view according to which the study of psychological processes involves their analysis without regard to the events of the external world and other people. This, of course, is not solipsism in its classical philosophical understanding, because the existence of the external world is not denied, but mental processes, the facts of consciousness are associated with the activity of the brain, which exists as a material formation in space and time. Many philosophers and psychologists (for example, H. Putnam, D. Dennett, etc.) believe that the point of view of methodological solipsism is a dead end, because it is impossible to understand consciousness and psyche outside of relation to the external world and the world of interpersonal interactions.

In modern philosophy, the point of view is increasingly asserted, according to which the inner world of individual consciousness, including the Self, is possible only as a result of communications of the subject with other people in the real physical world. The position of solipsism could seem logically possible only within the framework of the subject-centric attitude of classical philosophy, which modern philosophy refuses. L. Wittgenstein wrote about the impossibility of a purely internal experience and the inconsistency of the position of solipsism in his later works. M.M. Bakhtin since the 1920s. showed that if a person considers himself outside of relation to others, then from the point of view of self-experience, solipsism may seem convincing, but we cannot, in principle, agree with the same solipsism proposed on behalf of another person. It is the relation to the other that constitutes the real experience of the Self, and not the one from which the philosophical tradition proceeded. See Art. Consciousness , self-awareness , I And lit. to them.

V.A. Lektorsky

SOLIPSISM

SOLIPSISM

(from lat. solus - one, only and ipse -) - a kind of idealism, stating that only the thinker is an undoubted reality, and all other individuals and objects exist only in his mind. A. Schopenhauer noted that only an insane person can be an extreme solipsist, recognizing only his own Self. More realistic is moderate S., who recognizes in some form a supra-individual self, which is the carrier of consciousness. Thus, J. Berkeley argued that all things exist as "ideas" in the divine mind, which brings sensations into a person. I.G. Fichte ultimately identified the ego not with individual consciousness, but with the self-consciousness of all mankind.
In epistemological terms, S. means the doctrine that considers the individual I and its only possible or only correct starting point for building a theory of knowledge.
In an ethical sense, S. sometimes means extreme, egocentrism.

Philosophy: Encyclopedic Dictionary. - M.: Gardariki. Edited by A.A. Ivina. 2004 .

SOLIPSISM

(from lat. solus - one, only and ipse - self), the extreme of subjective idealism, in which only the thinking subject is recognized as an undoubted reality, and everything else is declared to exist only in the mind of the individual. S. is in conflict with all life experience, with the data of science and practical. activity. In the next the form of S. is extremely rare, in some thinkers (e.g. French philosopher and physician 17 V. K. Brunet).

Proponents of this trend seek to avoid consistent S. by synthesizing subjective and objective idealism, thereby testifying to the failure of their fundamentals. Thus, the idealist Berkeley, trying to avoid accusations of S., declared that all things exist as "ideas" in deities. mind, which "implants" in the minds of people; He, T. O., moved to the position of objective idealism of the Platonic type. Fichte also led to S., although he himself emphasized that the absolute “I”, which was the basis of his science of science, is not an individual “I”, but ultimately coincides with the self-consciousness of all mankind. It was clearly manifested to S. in the philosophy of Machism (empirio-criticism) (cm. V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and", in book.: PSS, T. 18, With. 92-96) . Even more clearly than in empirio-criticism, S. led to (Schuppe, R. Schubert-Soldern).

The term "S." sometimes used in ethics. sense as extreme egoism, egocentrism (so-called. practical S., in the terminology of the existentialist Marcel). A prominent representative of this form of S. was Stirner. , Russian religious philosopher, poet, publicist and critic. Son of S. M. Solovyov. After a speech against the death penalty in March 1881 (in connection with the assassination of Alexander II by Narodnaya Volya) S. was forced to leave teaching. work. In the 80s gg. spoke preim. as a publicist, preaching the unification of the "East" and "West" through the reunification of churches, fighting for freedom of conscience, against national religions. discrimination. In the 90s gg. was engaged philosophy And lit. work; translated Plato, led philosophy section in the encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron.

In his philosophy, which rejects the revolutionary-lyuts.-democratic. , S. undertook the most mean. in history Russian idealism attempt to unite in a "great synthesis" Christ. platonism, German classical (ch. arr. Schelling) And scientific empiricism. This obviously contradictory metaphysical , undergoing continuous restructuring, was supposed to serve as a contemplative. "justification" of vital morals. searches and mythopoetic. dreams S. Believing that "the moral element ... not only can, but must be the basis of theoretical philosophy" (Coll. op., T. 9, St. Petersburg, 1913 , With. 97) , S. tied philosophy creativity with a positive resolution of the vital question "to be or not to be true on earth", understanding the truth as a realization Christ. ideal (for socialist teachings, S. recognized only relative socio-historical truth). IN con. 70s and 80s gg. In the context of the search for ways to transform Russia, S., in contrast to both the radical democratic, and the late Slavophil and official protective directions, came out with social positions close to liberal populism. Moderately reformist politicians. his views were combined with the mystical-maximalist preaching of "theurgic work", called to "deliverance" of the material world from destruction. the impact of time and space, transforming it into "imperishable" beauty, and with the historiosophical theory Christ."the divine-human process" as the total salvation of mankind (“Readings on God-manhood”, 1877-81). Looking for a practical ways to solve this "universal" problem, S. later comes to theocratic. utopias, politics which results in an alliance between the pope and Russian king as a legal guarantee of the “God-human cause” (cm., e.g., "History and Future of Theocracy", 1887). The collapse of this utopia is captured in philosophy confessions of S. "The Life Drama of Plato" (1898) and in "Three Conversations ..." (1900). The end of S.'s life is marked by a surge of catastrophic forebodings and a departure from the former philosophy constructions towards Christian eschatology.

Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary. 2010 .

SOLIPSISM

(from Latin solus - the only one and ipse - itself) - an extreme form of subjective idealism, in which only the thinking subject is recognized as an undoubted reality, and everything else is declared to exist only in the mind of the individual. S. is in conflict with life experience and everyday human. activity. In the next the form of S. is extremely rare, in otd. thinkers (for example, the philosopher and physician of the 17th century K. Brunet). According to Schopenhauer, complete solipsists can only be found among the inhabitants of an insane asylum.

Supporters of this trend tend, as a rule, to avoid explicit S. by synthesizing subjective and objective idealism, thereby testifying to the failure of their fundamentals. So, Berkeley, trying to avoid accusations in S., stated that all things exist as "ideas" in deities. mind, to-ry "introduces" sensation into the minds of people, and so on. moved to the position of idealism of the Platonic type. Fichte's subjective idealism also led to S., although he himself emphasized that the absolute I, which was the basis of his science of science, is not an individual I, but ultimately coincides with the self-consciousness of all mankind. The tendency towards S. was clearly manifested in the philosophy of empirio-criticism (see V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism). Even more clearly than in empirio-criticism, the immanent led to S.. Schubert-Soldern, for example, declared in the spirit of Fichte that "cognitive-theoretic" S. is irrefutable (see R. von Schubert-Soldern, Grundlagen einer Erkenntnißtheorie, Lpz., 1884). From epistemological Schuppe also served as a justification for S. (W. Schuppe, Der Solipsismus, in the journal Zeitschrift für immanente Philosophie, 1898, n. 3). The tendency to S. is shown in different forms of subjectivism.

The term "S." also used in ethics. sense, as extreme egoism, egocentrism (the so-called practical. S., in the terminology of the existentialist Marcel). A prominent representative of this form of S. was Stirner. To "practical. S." gravitate and many others. representatives of modern bourgeois "egotism".

B. Meerovsky. Moscow.

Philosophical Encyclopedia. In 5 volumes - M .: Soviet Encyclopedia. Edited by F. V. Konstantinov. 1960-1970 .

SOLIPSISM

SOLIPSISM (from Latin solus - the only one and ipses - itself) - philosophical, according to which only one's own subjective, data of individual consciousness, is undoubtedly given, and everything that is considered to exist independently of it (including, the world external to the consciousness of physical things, other people) , in fact - only part of this experience. The point of view of solipsism expresses the logic of the subject-centric attitude that was adopted in the classical Western philosophy of the New Age after Descartes (see Subjective ^ Theory of Knowledge

nia, I). At the same time, the contradiction of the position with the facts of everyday common sense and the postulates of scientific knowledge did not allow the majority of philosophers who adhered to the subject-centric attitude to draw conclusions in the spirit of solipsism. So, Descartes, who put forward that the only self-evident truth is “I think, therefore I am”, with the help of ontological proof, asserted God, who cannot be a deceiver and therefore guarantees the reality of the external world and other people. Berkeley, who identifies physical things with the totality of sensations, believed that the existence of things, that is, their disappearance when they are not perceived by anyone, is ensured by their constant perception by God. From Hume's point of view, although it is purely theoretically impossible to prove the existence of the external world and other people, it is necessary to believe in their reality, because without such faith, practical knowledge and knowledge are impossible. According to Kant, experience is a construction of the I. But this is not an empirical I, but I, in which, in essence, it is erased between me and others. As for the I of an empirical individual, his inner experience (states of his own consciousness) presupposes external experience (consciousness of physical objects and objective events independent of the individual I).

There are two ways to understand the meaning of solipsism. According to the first, the affirmation as the only real personal experience of mine entails also the affirmation of the I to which this experience belongs. This is compatible with the theses of Descartes and Berkeley. According to another understanding, although my personal experience is the only one certain; there is no I to which this experience refers, for I am nothing, as a set of elements of this same experience. The paradoxical nature of such an understanding of solipsism was well expressed by L. Wittgenstein in his “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”, linking this understanding, however, not with the undoubted givenness of my sensory experience in the form of sensations (as was the case with Hume and Mach), but with the givenness of my language to me. and facts described by this language. On the one hand, Wittgenstein emphasizes, I am my world, on the other hand, “the subject does not belong to the world, but represents a certain boundary of the world” (Wittgenstein L. Philosophical works, part l. M., 1994, p. 56). “What solipsism implies is quite correct,” he believes, “only it cannot be said, but reveals itself” (ibid.). Therefore, “... strictly carried out solipsism coincides with pure realism. The “I” of solipsism shrinks to an unextended point, but the reality correlated with it remains” (ibid., p. 57). In fact, consistently carried out solipsism, which identifies with the real only what is directly given in my experience, does not allow even the past facts of my consciousness to be considered real, that is, it also makes the continuity of my consciousness impossible (see Russell B. Human Cognition. M. , 1957, pp. 208-214).

Some representatives of modern cognitive psychology (J. Fodor and others) believe; what t n. methodological solipsism should be the main research strategy in this science. This refers to the point of view according to which the study of psychological processes assumes that they are independent of the events of the external world and other people. This, of course, is not solipsism in its classical philosophical understanding, because the existence of the external world is not denied, but mental processes, the facts of consciousness are associated with the activity of the brain, which exists as a formation in space and time. Many philosophers and psychologists (for example, H. Putnam, D. Dennett, and others) believe that the point of view of methodological solipsism is a dead end, since it is impossible to understand consciousness and the psyche outside of relation to the outside world and the world of interpersonal interactions.

In modern philosophy, the point of view is increasingly asserted, according to which individual consciousness, including the Self, is possible only as a result of communications of the subject with other people in the real physical world. The position of solipsism could seem logically possible only within the framework of the subject-centric attitude of classical philosophy, which modern philosophy refuses. L. Wittgenstein wrote about the impossibility of a purely internal experience and the inconsistency of the position of solipsism in his later works. M. M. Bakhtin since the 1920s. showed that if he considers himself outside of relation to others, then from the point of view of self-experience, solipsism may seem convincing, but we cannot, in principle, agree with the same solipsism proposed on behalf of another person. It is to the other that the real I constitutes, and not the one from which the philosophical one proceeded. See Art. Consciousness, Self-consciousness, I to lit. to them.

V. A. Lektorsky

SOLIPSISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. In the Indian religious and philosophical theory, two teachings came close to the ideas of solipsism, in which the concept of “pure consciousness” plays a special role: among the unorthodox teachings, the Buddhist Vijnana Vada, among the orthodox ones, the Advaita Vedanta. According to Vijnana-vada, of all the skandhas, or elements of the universe, only vnjnana (consciousness) is real, while all others are derived from it. Since it itself produces not only representations and ideas, but also sensory data, we can assume that the world is generated by the activity of consciousness. Nevertheless, the vijnana-vada is kept from extreme solipsistic conclusions by postulating some kind of common "receptacle of consciousness" (alatyajyana). In other words, from the point of view of Vijnanavadin Buddhists, this is not my own, subjective consciousness, but the general dream of Alayavijnana, to which consciousness is only able to connect from time to time. According to the ideas of Advaita Vedanta, only the highest Brahman is real, which is understood as pure consciousness (jinn), or pure (chit, upalabdhi). The whole world owes its existence to the temporary clouding of this perception (therefore, it is essentially defined as, or ignorance), or, which is the same, to the deployment of “cosmic illusion” (beckoning). In some areas of Advaita Vedanta, the existence of the empirical world is directly reduced to its perceptibility (such is Drishti-Srishti-Vada, or the doctrine of vision, which is equivalent to creation, by Advaist Prakasananda (16th-early 17th century). However, even before the formation of this doctrine, in compendium , attributed to the Advaist Shankara, expounds the concept of “eka-jiva-vada”, a peculiar

AGNOSTICISM (from the Greek ἄγνωστος - unknowable) is a philosophical concept according to which we cannot know anything about God and in general about any ultimate and absolute foundations of reality, since that is unknowable, knowledge of which, in principle, cannot be convincingly confirmed by the evidence of experimental science. The ideas of agnosticism became widespread in the 19th century. among English naturalists.

SOLIPSISM

(from lat. solus - one, only and ipse - itself) - a kind of idealism, stating that only a thinking subject is an undoubted reality, and all other individuals and objects exist only in his mind.

George Berkeley - English philosopher, bishop (1685-1753).

“Everything that exists is singular,” he states in his treatise “On the Principles of Human Knowledge.” The general exists only as a generalized visual image of the individual.

An abstract, abstract understanding is impossible because the qualities of objects are inseparably united in an object.

The concept of representative (representative) thinking. According to this concept, there cannot be abstract general ideas, but there can be particular ideas, which are similar ideas of a given kind. So, any particular triangle that replaces or represents all right-angled triangles can be called general, but a triangle in general is absolutely impossible.

As "the most abstract and incomprehensible of all ideas" Berkeley considered the idea of ​​matter or bodily substance. “The denial of it does no harm to the rest of the human race, which will never notice its absence. The atheist really needs this ghost of an empty name in order to justify his godlessness, and philosophers will find, perhaps, that they have lost a strong reason for idle talk.

Berkeley's doctrine is subjective idealism. "To exist is to be perceived." The direct objects of our cognition are not external objects, but only our sensations and ideas; in the process of cognition, we are not able to perceive anything but our own sensations.

Materialistic epistemology, recognizing that our sensations are direct objects of cognition, assumes at the same time that sensations nevertheless give us knowledge of the external world, which generates these sensations by its influence on our sense organs. Berkeley, defending subjective-idealistic attitudes, argues that the cognizing subject deals only with his own sensations, which not only do not reflect external objects, but actually constitute these objects. In A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley comes to two conclusions. First, we know nothing but our sensations. Secondly, the totality of sensations or "collection of ideas" is what is objectively called things. Things or single products are nothing but a modification of our consciousness.

Solipsism is a doctrine that makes the existence of the objective world dependent on its perception in the consciousness of the individual "I".

Such a point of view, if adhered to to the end, leads to the transformation of the world into an illusion of the perceiving subject. D. Berkeley understood the vulnerability of such a position and tried to overcome the extremes of subjectivism. To this end, he was forced to admit the existence of "thinking things" or "spirits", the perception of which determines the continuity of the existence of "unthinkable things". For example, when I close my eyes, or leave the room, the things that I saw there may exist, but only in the perception of another person. But in this case, the question naturally arises, what about the existence before the human arose. After all, even according to the teachings of Christianity, of which Bishop Berkeley was an adherent, the real world arose before man. And Berkeley was forced to retreat from his subjectivism and, in fact, to take the position of objective idealism. According to Berkeley, God is the creator of the entire surrounding world and the guarantor of its existence in the mind of the subject.

Traditional theology, according to Berkeley, argues as follows: "God exists, therefore he perceives things." One should reason thus: “Sensible things really exist, and if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite spirit, therefore an infinite spirit or God exists.”

7. Skepticism D. Hume

The English philosopher David Hume (1711-1766), the author of "Treatise on Human Nature", "Studies on Human Knowledge", in his creative activity paid attention to many problems of history, ethics, economics, philosophy, religion. But the central place in his research was occupied by questions of the theory of knowledge.

Hume reduces the task of philosophy to the study of the subjective world of man, his images, perception, the definition of those relations that develop between them in the human mind.

The main elements of experience are perceptions (perceptions), which consist of two forms of knowledge: perceptions and ideas. The difference between perceptions and ideas is established by the degree of vivacity and vividness with which they strike our mind. Impressions are those perceptions that enter the consciousness with the greatest force and irresistibility and cover all our sensations, affects and emotions at their first manifestation in the soul. Ideas mean "weak images of these impressions in thinking and reasoning."

The reason for the appearance of impressions and sensations, according to Hume, is unknown. It should be revealed not by philosophers, but by anatomists and physiologists. It is they who can and should determine which of the sense organs give a person the greatest and most reliable information about the world. Philosophy is interested in the impressions of reflection. According to Hume, they arise as a result of the action on the mind of some ideas of sensations (ie, copies of impressions, sensations). The order of the succession of ideas preserves the memory, and the imagination freely moves them. However, the activity of the mind, according to Hume, does not bring anything new to the source material. The entire creative power of the mind, according to him, is reduced only to the ability to connect, mix, increase or decrease the material delivered to us by external senses and experience.

Since Hume separates the content of consciousness from the external world, the question of the connection between ideas and things disappears for him. An essential issue for further study of the cognitive process becomes for him the question of the connection between different ideas.

Three types of idea associations are found:

The first type is association by similarity. By this type of association, we cognize similar things as if we saw a portrait of a person, then we immediately revive the image of this person in our memory.

The second type is associations by contiguity in space and time. Hume believes that if you are close to home, then the thought of loved ones is much brighter and more alive than if you were at a considerable distance from home.

The third type is causality associations. The relationship of space and time, as well as causal dependence for Hume, is not an objectively existing reality, but only the result of a causal relationship of perception.

Hume extends skepticism to the spiritual, including the divine substance. In his opinion, with the help of experience it is impossible to detect a special perception of spiritual substance. Individual impressions are themselves substances and need no support from anything else. If there were a spiritual substance, then it would be permanent. But no impression is permanent.

Hume's skepticism, connected with his refusal to reduce perception, on the one hand, to the external world, and, on the other hand, to the spiritual substance of God, is one of the forms of agnosticism.