Hegel's "Science of Logic": a summary: being, existing being, finiteness. Hegel. Present existence. Quality Determinate Being

In becoming, being and nothingness are but vanishing moments. The transition of being into nothingness is disappearance, nothingness into beingness is emergence. "Thanks to its internal contradiction, becoming falls into a unity in which both moments are sublated. The result of becoming is, therefore, existence" (227). In the main text, therefore, Hegel used the concept of contradiction, which, as a category, should appear in him only in the doctrine of essence.

Definite being is the resolution of the contradiction between pure being and nothing; it is already a determined being. In becoming, the result of the contradiction of being and nothing becomes one of them - being, containing the negation of nothing, i.e. becoming life.

In the movement from being through nothingness and becoming to a certain becoming being, the direction of development is revealed from the simple, indefinite to more and more definite, complex, from the lower to the higher, richer content. However, Hegel does not yet explicitly formulate the idea of ​​directionality. The idea of ​​orientation is carried through the sequence of categories chosen by the philosopher. This idea acts as a fundamental in the hidden foundation of building a system of categories.

Development from being through nothingness and becoming to a certain being is the result of the movement of contradiction. In the notes, Hegel once again gives a vivid characterization of the dialectical way of thinking. "... There is absolutely nothing in general in which we could not and would not be forced to discover a contradiction, i.e. opposite definitions" (227). Reasoning thinking is unable to grasp both opposites; faced with a contradiction, it usually concludes: "Therefore, this contradiction is nothing" (227). Thus, Zeno in his aporias initially showed that the movement "contradicts itself, and then concluded that it therefore does not exist" (227).

Reason stops only on the negative side of the result and does not reach the positive, the truth. He does not see that nothing "contains being in itself, and in exactly the same way being...contains nothing" (227). At the same time, the contradiction is resolved in a positive concept - in a certain being.

Becoming does not always remain only becoming. It is an unrestrained movement in which being and nothingness completely pass into each other and cancel each other out. Becoming "is itself something that disappears, a fire that goes out in itself, having consumed all its material" (228). The result of becoming is not an empty nothing, but an existing, definite being.

"Determinate being is a being that has a determinateness, which is an immediate or existent determinateness, is a quality" (228).

Quality is a certainty identical with being. Reflected into itself, i.e. reflected into itself, in relation to itself, determinate existence is something.

Hegel argues that quality, as the immediate determinateness of being, exists only in logic and in the realm of nature. In the realm of the spirit, it occurs only in the form of something subordinate, for example, it is found in a diseased state of the spirit. The exclusion of quality from the sphere of the spirit looks artificial.

Quality, as a certainty, acts as a negation, but not in the form of the former abstract nothingness, but in the form of other being, another. In contrast to what is contained as negation, quality appears as reality. Hegel, thus, arbitrarily fixes the concept of reality, which is extremely important in philosophy, behind the immediacy of being, quality.

In relation to oneself, i.e. in its reality, the quality appears as being-in-itself, in relation to the other, i.e. in its negativity, as being-for-the-other. For the first time in philosophical thought, Hegel introduces well-conditioned and meaningful concepts of relation to oneself and relation to another, which are an essential acquisition of the human intellect. The concept of relation to oneself (not in its ordinary sense) in its original form arose long before Hegel. Thus, the definition of substance introduced by Spinoza as "the cause of itself" should be considered a great achievement of thought. However, the concept of a relationship to oneself, a relationship with oneself acquires true strength and content only in the dialectical philosophy of Hegel. In Hegel, the relation to oneself turns out to be the expression and mechanism of the internal activity of the logical idea, its self-movement. Pure being, in relation to itself, turns out to be nothing. Nothing in relation to itself means being. Being in relation to itself as nothing is a becoming being, which itself determines itself as a determinate being. The latter defines itself as other, and therefore as being-in-itself and being-for-other. The active, creative relation of any being to itself is one of the true discoveries of Hegel's dialectic.

Determinate being, posited as negation, is a boundary, a limit. Something, due to its quality, is finite and changeable. The boundary contains a contradiction, because, on the one hand, it constitutes the reality of existing being, and on the other, its negation. The boundary is not an abstract nothing in general, but a definite nothing, another. The thought of one thing entails the thought of another. "... Something is in itself the other of itself, and in the other its own limit is objectified for it." Something and another "are one and the same" (231).

Something is finite, changeable, passes into another due to the obligation.

In the concepts of reality, negation, finitude, boundary, variability, transition, obligation, the concept of development, introduced in stages by Hegel, which does not yet exist in its full definition, but which, according to the construction of his philosophy adopted by the philosopher, actually acts latently, more and more shines through. Let us recall that, according to Hegel, the movement of being into itself is at the same time the unfolding, the revelation of a concept, together with its inherent development.

Being, according to Hegel, is a "concept in itself". The movement of being into itself, which is carried out by means of self-determination and consists in transitions from one to the other, is at the same time the self-unfolding of the concept.

If becoming is the truth of being, then change is the truth of existence, quality.

Definite being, as a determinate being, appears as a kind of whole, which then determines itself as something and another, another of another, and so on ad infinitum. On the basis of a series of concepts of the level of existence, or quality, Hegel introduces a very deep concept of infinity. Infinity initially appears as the negation of every finite, every finitude. Hegel defines such an understanding of infinity as rational. Infinite is a series of finite, which has no end. But such an understanding of infinity - as the incessant change of the finite - is a superficial idea, "which never leaves the region of the finite" (233). There is nothing here but fruitless repetition and boredom. Infinite is understood in this case as something purely negative. Between the finite and the infinite is "an abyss, an impenetrable abyss; the infinite remains on one side, and the finite on the other" (235). Hegel profoundly notes that such an infinity, which is compared with the finite as another, is itself understood at the level of the finite, the particular.

Calling rational infinity bad, Hegel put forward a deep understanding of true infinity as a result of the dialectical negation of negation, leading to a positive result, to infinity, understood positively. Returning to the dialectic of something and the other, from which, at its first consideration, the "bad" infinity followed, Hegel shows that in the transition from one to another, to another of another, etc. not only negation as such, but also positive affirmation is revealed. “Since that into which something passes is the same thing as that which passes itself (both of them have the same definition, namely, to be different), in its passage something merges with itself, and this relation with itself itself in the transition and in the other is true infinity" (234).

Infinity is the negation of any finite, including all finite. If we keep in mind the pure meaning of such an understanding of infinity, purified from Hegelian idealism, then it should be recognized that the philosopher created a completely scientific definition of infinity, beyond which modern science, including philosophy, has not gone. Hegel contrasted his understanding of infinity with Spinoza's infinity, which absorbs and destroys everything finite in itself, instead of generating it from itself.

Evil infinity meant a fruitless dead end of thought, the true infinity of Hegel allowed thought to move on, constructing from itself ever more complex and rich forms of being.

Being defined as infinite, which appears as including everything finite, is being-for-itself. In the concept of being-for-itself, Hegel further introduces the concept of ideality, which actually appears as a specific characteristic of thought, of a logical idea. The introduction of this concept is an important moment of Hegelian philosophy, containing the key to understanding its advantages and disadvantages. Ideality, according to Hegel, is a way of existence of the finite in the infinite. Determinate being, as immediate or affirmative, has reality. In the infinite, the finite exists in a canceled or sublated form, i.e. perfect. Ideality is the truth of the finite. Hegel considers the question of the ideal as the most important question of philosophy, its main question. "This ideality of the finite," he writes, "is the basic tenet of philosophy" (236). Therefore, Hegel assures, only idealism can be true philosophy.

Hegel's definition of the ideal is, in our opinion, very weak and of little substance. In essence, ideality acts as a subordinate existence of parts in the whole (let it be in an infinite whole), as a "sublation" of parts in the whole. What the philosopher understands as "removal" is not too complicated - "removed" remains to exist, but already in a form dependent on the whole, infinite. To call it ideal is a simple and preconceived idea. In scientific philosophy, the ideal will be defined incomparably more complex and meaningful. Hegel introduces his understanding of the ideal without any substantiation and empirical material. However, since we have accepted his "rules of the game", we must go further to see what happens.

- (empirical) presence of a thing or person, as opposed to the certainty of being (property) and (metaphysical) being. From the point of view of ontology, a property is as present as a thing. There is no determinate being without determinate being, and there is no determinate being without determinate being. Every determinate being of something "is" also the determinate being of something, and every determinate being of something "is" also the determinate being of something. The only difference here is that "something" is not the same thing. For example: the actual being of a tree is in itself also the determinate being of a forest, because without it the forest would be different, and therefore would have other properties; the existence of a bough on a tree is the definite existence of a tree; the determinate being of a branch on a bough is the determinate being of a bough, and so on. One is always the determinate being of the other. This row can be extended in both directions, as well as turned over. The term has acquired a new meaning - existence - in the modern philosophy of existence, in existentialism. , human existence, since it is the most accessible to our knowledge, is used through the analytics of existence in order to reveal the essence and meaning (of human existence) of being (philosophy of existence = fundamental ontology). See also Essentia, World, Existence.

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§44. When moving the lens from one extreme point of the focal length to another (from one gray spot to another), we find that in the course of this, something flickers in the frame: either the outlines of some objects appear, then disappear again, merging into a gray blurred spot .

Consequently, in the course of becoming, something concrete arises and immediately disappears, passes away. This is something that prompts us to gradually slow down the run of thought from pure being to nothingness and concentrate our attention on that, the outlines of which flicker in the course of becoming.

§45. By focusing the image in the frame, we eventually get a stable image of the objects we contemplate. This stage of cognition corresponds to the category of existence, which is the unity of the definitions of emergence and passing. (Very successful is Heidegger's use of the term annihilation, which harmonizes well in tandem with emergence).

That which constantly arose and annihilated, now appeared on the screen of our consciousness with what is available. What exactly is there, we do not yet know at this stage, since the matter has not yet reached such a formulation of the question. But we already know that there is not only the whole world as such in its absolute indistinguishability, but also all those concrete objects that fill it with themselves and constitute its actual existence, its existence.

§46. At this point, many commentators on Hegel's "Science of Logic" make a gross mistake. The triads of categories already considered are:

pure being is nothing

becoming

emergence - passing

existence

they try to interpret not logically, but historically, i.e. not in terms of describing the logical sequence of the process of cognition of the world around us, but in terms of applying these categories to describing the real process of the development of the world.

Such a substitution of meaning leads to that monstrous abracadabra, where, on the one hand, they (the commentators) defame Hegel, accusing him of panlogism and other nonsense, trying to forcibly interpret his doctrine of being in the spirit of his alleged understanding of the origin of the world from nothing. On the other hand, they themselves are forced to compose something similar, explaining to the reader about becoming as about the origin of the existence of the world from nothing, and the triad of categories of emergence - existence - passing is explained by the wrong formula: birth - life - death. Appearance is presented as the birth of something new, existence is presented as the time of its existence (its life), and the passage is interpreted as the disappearance of its being, as its death. As a result of such a mistake, their thought already at this initial point of Hegel's logic goes astray and goes somewhere downhill, where it is forced to move along ditches and gullies, always being somewhere nearby, but, nevertheless, already outside the semantic ruts of his logic.

§47. Having received a well-established picture of the world around us in the frame of consciousness, we find that it consists of many single objects. Each of these objects we can define as something or as something else. Something is the subject that interests us directly, and something else is everything else that is different from it. So, for example, if in the foreground of our consciousness there are: a vase, a book and a fountain pen, then each of them can be defined both as something and as something else.

If we are interested in a book, then it will be something that interests us, and everything else - a vase and a fountain pen - is different. If we are interested in a fountain pen, then, consequently, it will be something, and everything remaining outside of it will be different.

In the background of our consciousness is always the whole world as such. With its most general division, we find in it three qualitatively specific areas: the Universe, the biosphere and humanity. We can also define each of them as something or as something else. If we are interested in the biosphere, then it will be defined as something, and the Universe and humanity as something else. If we are directly interested in humanity, then it will be that something that we will talk about, and the Universe and the biosphere are different in relation to it.

§48. The categories something and other allow us to find its various parts in the world around us. But at the same time both something and the other belong to the one-in-itself existence. From this point of view, they are not indifferent to each other. They are blood relatives in being: the other is opposed to something, as the otherness of its being. Like goat and hay. Hay is not a goat, it is its other, but it is that other out of which the being of a goat emerges. Hay, therefore, is the otherness of the goat, thanks to which we have its existence available. The same is true at the level of totalities. The energy of the Sun coming to the Earth, together with the substance of our planet, is a form of the otherness of the biosphere and humanity. The biosphere produces itself from the inorganic (inert - according to V.I. Vernadsky) substance of the planet and due to this it has its own existence. In turn, the biosphere is a form of other being of mankind, from which its being continuously becomes. Mankind, without interrupting for a second, absorbs plant and animal organic matter, thanks to which it has itself available.

§49. Both something and the other belong, therefore, to the one-in-itself being. And this means that all the things of the world constitute a single being, or, in other words, exist in one dimension, in one space-time continuum. Each individual thing does not have a personal being, it (being) is the same for all objects of the world!

Once upon a time, this topic was fruitfully discussed by the ancient Greek thinkers Parmenides and Zeno. The famous aporias of Zeno are based on the assumption of the idea of ​​a plurality of being, or, in other words, of the existence of a plurality of dimensions of being, where each thing resides in its own space-time continuum. However, the solution to these aporias can be found only if the unity of being is recognized, that all individual things exist in one being, in one dimension. Only in this case, Achilles will catch up and overtake the tortoise, and the flying arrow will be recognized as moving relative to the surface of the earth, and not resting relative to itself. If we admit that each of these objects - Achilles, and the tortoise, and the arrow, and the earth - exist in their own being, then Achilles will not only not catch up with the tortoise, but will never meet it at all on its way, and the flying arrow , as, indeed, and all other things, should be considered as motionless, and the movement itself as non-existent.

§50. The existence of each individual something (concrete object) has its own limit, its own boundary, which is determined through its inherent attribute of quality. In other words, something differs from another (from something else) by its quality. Quality is not in the sense of the degree of perfection of the consumer properties of goods and services, for which the expressions are used: "high-quality goods" or "quality mark", but in the sense of a specific difference between the content of some things from others.

§51. Quality is an integral feature of the objects of the present world, which makes it possible to distinguish them from each other, as something else. In the very word quality, pronounced in syllables, one hears the phrase as-what-is (nature). For example, the inorganic matter of the planet is one quality (nature), the living organisms of the biosphere are another quality (nature), intelligent beings (people) and all their objectified activities are the third quality (nature).

§52. Considering something that interests us within its quality, we negate everything else and, as a result, leave only one given something in the focus of our attention. This stage of cognition corresponds to the category of being-for-itself. Being-for-itself is a simple relation of something to itself. But this is such a ratio, which is achieved through the negation of everything else from it. If I say: “I am for myself,” then I not only “am”, but I also deny everything else from myself, exclude it from myself, since it already appears as external in relation to me. For example, if we are interested in humanity, then, being at this stage of knowledge, we simply leave the universe and the biosphere out of our attention and focus only on humanity.

§53. The category of being-for-itself differs from the previous categories in that it is ideal. On the steps of pure being and present being, we fixed reality in its, so to speak, untouched form. When we rise to the level of the category of being-for-itself, then here we leave within the limits of our attention only one part of the world that interests us. Thus, we mentally, as it were, isolate it from the context of the world around us. Such an artificial isolation of one object from the rest is already a conscious violation of the unity of being.

By singling out an object with our thought, we, as it were, isolate it from other objects. But in the real world itself, objects do not exist like that: there is no goat without hay, there is no humanity without the biosphere, there is no biosphere without the universe. If, nevertheless, we consider these objects separately, which in logic corresponds to the category of being-for-itself, then we do it only ideally. On the steps of pure being and present being, our thought developed without violating the unity of the real world. Now, on the level of being-for-itself, we enter the sphere of definitions that run counter to its unity. But this ideality of the isolation of real objects is a necessary condition for the further development of thought, therefore any philosophical doctrine based on the independent work of thought is idealistic only because of this circumstance.

Available existence

(Dasein) - (empirical) presence (Vorhandensein) of a thing or person, as opposed to the certainty of being (property, Was-Sein) and (metaphysical) being. But from an ontological point of view, a property is just as present as a thing. There is no determinate being (Sosein) without determinate being (Dasein), and there is no determinate being without determinate being. Every determinate being of something "is" also the determinate being of something, and every determinate being of something "is" also the determinate being of something. Only "something" is not the same. For example: the present existence of a tree in its place is in itself also a definite existence of a forest, for without it the forest would be different, and therefore would have other properties; the existence of a bough on a tree is the definite existence of a tree; the determinate being of a branch on a bough is the determinate being of a bough, and so on.

The determinate being of the one is always at the same time the determinate being of the other. This row can be extended in both directions, as well as turned over. The term "Dasein" has taken on a new meaning in contemporary existential philosophy. The present being of a person, since it is the most accessible to our knowledge, is used through the analytics of the present being to reveal the essence and meaning (existing in the human being) of being (existential philosophy = fundamental ontology); see also Existence; Essentia; World.

Determinate being is a determinate being; its definiteness is an essential definiteness, a quality. Through its quality, something exists along with some other, it is changeable (veranderlich) [more precisely, capable of becoming different. - Transl.] and, of course, unconditionally negatively determined, not only in relation to some other, but also in it. This is his negation in relation to the finite, something is infinite; the abstract opposition in which these determinations appear resolves itself into an infinity that has no opposite, into being-for-itself.

Thus, consideration of the existence of being is divided into the following three sections: A) Determination as such, B) Something else, finitude, C) Qualitative infinity.

A. Determinate being as such In determinate being a) as such, one must first of all distinguish its determinateness b) as a quality. The latter, however, must be taken both in one and in the other definition of determinate being, as a reality and as a negation. But in these determinatenesses, determinate being is also reflected into itself, and posited as such, it is (c) something, presence, being.

a) Determinate being in general Determinate being comes from becoming. Determinate being is the simple unity of being and nothingness. Because of this simplicity, the opo has the form of a kind of immediate.

Its mediation, becoming, lies behind it; it has superseded itself, and determinate being appears therefore as a kind of first from which one proceeds. It appears primarily in the one-sided definition of being; the other determination contained in it, nothingness, will likewise appear in it, will appear in opposition to the first.

It is not bare being, but present being; taken etymologically, Dasein means being in a certain place; but the notion of space is not applicable here.

In general, determinate being is, in its becoming, being with a certain non-being, so that this non-being is accepted into a simple unity with being. Non-being, taken into being, in such a way that the concrete whole has the form of being, of immediacy, constitutes determinateness as such.

This whole also has a form, i.e.

determinateness of being, for being likewise revealed itself in becoming having the character of a mere moment, representing

which is a kind of sublated, negative-definite [&*); but such is it for us, in our reflection; it is not yet posited in itself. The determinateness of determinate being as such is a posited determinateness, which is also indicated by the expression "determinant being." - One should always strictly distinguish between what is for us and what is supposed to be; only what is posited in a certain concept enters into its unfolding consideration, into the composition of its content. The determinateness, however, not yet posited in itself, whether it concerns the nature of the concept itself or whether it is an external comparison, belongs to our reflection; drawing the reader's attention to the latter kind of definiteness can only serve to clarify the path that will present itself to us in the very course of the development of the concept, or else be a preliminary hint at this path.

That the whole, the unity of being and nothing, has a one-sided determinateness of being, is an external reflection.

In negation, however, in something and another, etc., this one-sided determinateness will come to the point of appearing as posited. - We were here to pay attention to this difference; but one should not give an account of everything that reflection can afford to notice, because this would lead to a lengthy exposition, to an anticipation of what should happen in the subject itself. If reflections of this kind can serve to facilitate observation and thus understanding, they, however, also entail the disadvantage that they look like unjustified assertions, grounds and grounds for what follows. Therefore, they should not be given more importance than they should have, and they should be distinguished from what constitutes a moment in the further course of the development of the subject itself.

Determinate being corresponds to the being of the previous sphere; however, being is indeterminate; as a result, no determinations are obtained in it. Determinate being, on the other hand, is a certain determinate being, a certain concrete; therefore several definitions, various relations of its moments, are immediately revealed in it.

b) Quality Due to the immediacy in which being and nothingness are one in being, they do not go beyond each other; As far as being is as far away as being, so far is it non-being, determined. Being is not universal, determinateness is not particular. Determination has not yet separated from being; it is true that it is no longer and will not be separated from it, for the true which now lies at the foundation is the unity of non-being with being; on it, as on the basis, all further definitions are obtained. But here the relation in which determinateness stands with being is the immediate unity of both, so that no distinction has yet been made between them.

Definiteness, so self-sufficiently (fur sich) isolated, like an existent certainty, is a quality - something completely simple, immediate. Definiteness in general is the more general, which can equally be quantitative as well as further determinate. In view of this simplicity, there is nothing more to say about quality as such.

But determinate being, in which both nothing and being are contained, is itself the standard for the one-sidedness of quality as merely an immediate or essential determinateness. A quality must also be posited in the determination of nothing, whereby the immediate or essential determinateness is posited as a distinct, reflected determinateness, and thus nothing, as the determinateness of a determinateness, is also a reflective, negation. Quality, taken from the side that, being distinguished, it is recognized as being, is reality; but it, burdened with a certain negation, is a negation in general; this is also a certain quality, but one that is recognized as a disadvantage and will be defined in the future as a border, a limit.

Both are present existence; but in reality as a quality, with the emphasis on the fact that it is being, the circumstance is hidden that it contains determinateness and, consequently, negation as well; reality recognizes-

therefore, something only positive, from which negation, limitation, lack are excluded. Negation, taken as a naked lack, would be the same as nothing; but it is a certain existence, a certain quality, only with an emphasis on non-being.

Note [Reality and Negation] Reality” may seem like a word with multiple meanings, as it is used to express different and even opposite definitions. In a philosophical sense, one speaks, for example, of an exclusively empirical reality, as a valueless existence (Dasein). But when they talk about thoughts, concepts, theories, that they are devoid of reality, this means that they do not have reality, although in itself or in the concept, the idea, for example, of the Platonic Republic can, they say, be true. Here its value is not denied behind the idea, and it is also left to stand along with reality. But in comparison with the so-called bare ideas, with bare concepts, the real is recognized as the only true one. - The sense in which the solution of the question of the truth of a certain content is attributed to external existence is just as one-sided as those who imagine that external existence (Dasein) is indifferent to the idea, essence, or even internal feeling, and which even they think that they are the more excellent, the more they are removed from reality.

With regard to the expression "reality", we must touch on the former "metaphysical concept of God, which was mainly placed at the basis of the so-called ontological proof of the existence of God. God was defined as the totality of all realities, and this totality was said to contain no contradiction, that none of the realities cancels out the other; for reality should be understood only as a kind of perfection, as a kind of affirmative, not containing any

whom denial. Realities, therefore, are not opposite and do not contradict each other.

Those who put forward this concept of reality assume that it remains even after we have thought out all negation; but, having thought out negation, we thereby abolish all certainty of reality. Reality is quality, existence; thus it contains in itself the moment of the negative, and only because of this is it the determinate that it is. In the so-called eminent (25) sense, or as infinite - in the usual sense of the word - that is, in the sense in which it is supposed to be understood, it expands to indefiniteness and loses its meaning. Divine goodness, they argued, is not goodness in the usual sense, but in the eminent one; it is not different from justice, but is moderated (Leibniz's conciliatory expression), by it, just as, conversely, justice is moderated by goodness; thus goodness already ceases to be goodness and justice ceases to be justice. The power of God is said to be tempered by his wisdom, but thus it is no longer power as such, for it is subject to wisdom; the wisdom of god, it is argued, expands to power, but thus disappears as the determining purpose and measure of wisdom. The true concept of the infinite and its absolute unity - the concept to which we will come later - cannot be understood as moderation, mutual limitation or confusion; it is a superficial relationship that remains indefinitely vague, which can only be satisfied by a representation that is alien to the concept.

Reality, as it is taken in the above definition of God, i.e.

reality as a certain quality, taken beyond the limits of its certainty, ceases to be a reality; it turns into an abstract being; God, as the purely real in everything real, or as the totality of all realities, is the same, devoid of definition and content, as the empty absolute, in which everything is one.

If, on the contrary, we take reality in its determinateness, then in view of the fact that it essentially contains moments of the negative, the totality of all realities turns out to be

is also called the totality of all negations, the totality of all contradictions; it, let's say approximately, turns into absolute power, in which everything determined is absorbed; but since it itself exists only insofar as it has something beside it that has not yet been abolished by it, when it is thought of as extended to a realized, limitless power, it becomes an abstract nothingness. That real in every real, being in every present being, which allegedly expresses the concept of God, is nothing but abstract being, is the same as nothing.

Definiteness is negation posited as affirmative—this is Spinoza's proposition: Omnis determinatioest negatio (every determination is negation) (26). This position is of infinite importance; only it must be said that negation as such is a formless abstraction. But one should not accuse speculative philosophy of having negation or nothing as the last word for it; it is for her just as little the last word as reality is the last truth.

The necessary conclusion from the proposition that certainty is negation is the unity of Spinoza's substance, or the existence of only one substance. Thought and being or extension, these two determinations, which Spinoza precisely has before him, he had to merge into one (in Eins setzen) in this unity, otherwise, as definite realities, they are negations, the infinity of which is their unity; according to the definition given by Spinoza, which will be discussed later, the infinity of something is its assertion. He therefore understood them as attributes, i.e., as those that do not have a special existence, being in and for themselves, but have former ones only as sublated, as moments; or, more correctly, they are not even moments for him, for substance is completely undetermined in itself, and attributes, as well as modes, are distinctions made by the external understanding. - This position also does not allow the substantiality of individuals. The individual is a relationship with himself

due to the fact that he puts limits on everything else; but these limits are thus also the limits of himself, are relations with the other; he does not have his present being in himself. The individual, it is true, is something more than just an all-round limitation, but this "big" belongs to another sphere of the concept; in the metaphysics of being, he is something wholly determined; and against something like that, for the finite as such to exist in and for itself, the determinateness appears, asserting its rights precisely as negation, and draws it into the same negative movement of the understanding, which makes everything disappear into abstract unity, into substance.

Denial is directly opposed to reality; later on, in the realm of properly reflected definitions, it is opposed to the positive, which is a reality that reflects on negation, a reality in which, as it were, the negative shines, which in reality as such is still hidden.

Quality is predominantly a property only from the side with which, in some external relation, it shows itself as an immanent determination. By properties, for example, of herbs, we understand definitions that are not only characteristic of a certain something in general, but are characteristic of it just insofar as this something through them preserves itself in a peculiar way in relation to other something, does not give free rein to other people's influences posited in it, and it itself shows in the other the power of its own determinations, although it does not exclude this other from itself.

On the contrary, such more resting certainties, such as, for example, a figure, appearance, are not called properties, however, not qualities, since they are imagined as changeable, not identical with being.

Qualierung (quality) or Inqualierung (quality) - a specific expression of the philosophy of Jacob Boehme, a philosophy that penetrates deep, but into a vague depth - means the movement of a certain quality (sour, tart, fiery quality, etc.) in itself, since it in your negative nature (in your Qual (27), flour) you-

is divided from another and strengthened, insofar as it is in general its own restlessness in itself, in accordance with which it generates and preserves itself only in the struggle.

c) Something In determinate being we discerned its determinateness as a quality; in the latter, as existing, there is a difference, a difference between reality and negation. Insofar as these differences are present in existence, they are at the same time insignificant and sublated. Reality itself contains negation, it is a present, and not an indefinite, abstract being. And in the same way, negation is a determinate being; it is not a nothing that had to remain abstract, but it is posited here as it is in itself, as a being that belongs to determinate being.

Thus, quality is not at all separated from determinate being, which is only a definite, qualitative being.

This removal of distinction is more than a bare rejection of it and an outward recasting of it, or a simple return to the simple beginning, to existence as such.

The difference cannot be dropped, for it is there.

Consequently, what actually exists is existence in general, the difference in it, and the sublation of this difference; not determinate being, devoid of differences, as at the beginning, but determinate being as again equal to itself through the sublation of difference, as the simplicity of determinate being, mediated by this sublation. This sublimation of difference is the determinateness of determinate being. Thus it is being-within-itself; determinate being is a determinate being, something.

Something is the first negation of negation as a simple, existent relation with itself. Determinate being, life, thinking, etc., are essentially determined into being, living, thinking (in the "I"), etc. life, thinking, etc.; they also do not stop at a deity (instead of a god).

Representation rightly considers something to be some real. However, something is still a very superficial determination, just as reality and negation, determinate being and its determinateness, although they are no longer empty being and nothing, are still completely abstract determinations. As a result, they are the most current expressions, and philosophically uneducated reflection most often uses them, pours into them its distinctions and imagines that it has something quite well and firmly defined in them. - The negation of the negation is, as something, only the beginning of the subject, - being within-itself, so far only completely indeterminate. It determines itself in the future, first of all, as being for itself, then continues to determine itself and further until it receives for the first time in the concept the concrete intensity of the subject. All these definitions are based on negative unity with oneself. But at the same time, one must distinguish between negation as the first, as negation in general, and the second, the negation of negation, which is concrete, absolute negativity, just as the first negation is, on the contrary, only abstract negativity.

Something is being as the negation of the negation; for the latter is the restoration of a simple relationship with oneself; but in this way something is just as much the mediation of itself with itself. Already in the simplicity [of the category] something, and then even more definitely in being-for-itself, the subject, etc.

there is a mediation of oneself with oneself; it is already present in becoming, but in it it is only a completely abstract mediation. Mediation with itself is posited in something, inasmuch as something is defined as simple identical. - One can draw the reader's attention to the presence of mediation in general, as opposed to the assertion of the supposedly bare immediacy of knowledge, in which there is supposedly no mediation at all; but in what follows there is no need to draw the reader's special attention to the moment of mediation, for it is everywhere and everywhere, in every concept.

But this mediation with itself, which something is in itself, taken only as the negation of the negation, has no concrete determinations for its sides; thus it shrinks into the simple unity that is being. There is something, and indeed it is also the existent; furthermore, it is also in itself becoming, which, however, no longer has only being and nothing as its moments. One of them - being - is now being, and, further, being; the second is also a certain existent, but defined as the negation of something (Negatives des Etwas) - as another. Something as becoming is a transition, the moments of which are themselves something, and which is therefore change, is a becoming that has already become concrete. - But something changes at first only in its concept; it is thus not yet posited as mediating and mediated; for the time being, it is posited as simply preserving itself in its relation to itself/, and, its negation, as something also qualitative, as soon as something else in general.

B. Finiteness a) Something else; they are most indifferent to each other; the other is also some immediately present existent, some something; negation thus takes place outside of both. Something is in itself in opposition to its being-for-other. But determinateness also belongs to its “in itself” and is b) its determination, which also passes into character (Beschaffenheit), which, being identical with the first, constitutes an immanent and at the same time negated being-for-other, constitutes the boundary something which c) is the immanent determination of something itself, and the latter is therefore finite.

In the first section, in which we considered existence in general, the latter as taken in the initial herd and consideration, had the definition of being. The moments of its development, quality and something, are therefore also affirmative determinations. On the contrary, in this section, the negative determination, which is contained in determinate being, develops, which there was still only negation in general, the first negation, but now it has been further determined up to something within-itself, up to the negation of negation.

a) Something and something else 1. Something and something else are, first of all, both existent or something.

Secondly, each of them is also some other. It doesn't matter which of them we name first and only because of this we name something (in Latin, when they "are found together in a sentence, both are called aliud, or" one another "- alius alium, and when it comes to the relationship of reciprocity, the analogous expression is alter alterum).

If we call a certain existence A and another B, then B is determined in the nearest way as another. But A is also the other of this B. Both are equally different. To fix the difference and that something that should be taken as affirmative, the word "this" is used. But "this" expresses precisely that this distinction and singling out of one something is a subjective designation that takes place outside the something itself. In this external indication lies all certainty; even the expression "this" does not contain any distinction; every something is as much "it" as the other. We think that by the word "this" we express something quite definite; but we lose sight of the fact that language, as a product of the understanding, expresses only the universal; the only exception is the name of some single object, but the individual name is something meaningless in the sense that it is not an expression of the universal, and for the same reason it seems to be something only posited, arbitrary, just as in fact proper names can be arbitrary accepted, given or also replaced by others.

Thus, other-being appears as a determination alien to the determinate being thus defined, or, in other words, the other appears outside the given determinate being.

being; It is conceived in such a way that in part a determinate being is determined by us as other only through a comparison made by some third party, but in part this determinate being is determined by us as other only because of the other outside it, but in itself it is not such. At the same time, as we have already noted, each determinate being is also determined for representation equally and as some other determinate being, so that not a single determinate being remains, which would be determined only as a determinate being, would not be outside some determinate being, and consequently would not itself be some other.

Both are defined both as something and as something else; they are, therefore, one and the same, and there is still no difference between them. But this uniqueness (Dieselbigkeit) of definitions also takes place only in external reflection, in comparing them with each other; but in the form in which the other is so far posited, it is in itself, indeed, in relation to something, but at the same time it is also in itself outside the latter.

Thirdly, one should therefore take the other as isolated, in relation to the cathedral itself, take it abstractly as the other (????????) of Plato, who opposes it to the one as one of the moments of the totality and, thus, ascribes to the other a proper his own nature. Thus, the other, understood solely as such, is not the other of some something, but the other in itself, i.e., the other of itself*. Physical nature is, by its definition, the other; it is another spirit. This definition of nature is thus, for the time being, bare relativity, which expresses not the quality of nature itself, but only its external relation. But since the spirit is a true something, and therefore nature is in itself only what it is in relation to the spirit, then its quality, insofar as it is taken in itself, consists precisely in the fact that it is in itself. to itself another, existing outside of itself (in the definitions of space, time, matter).

The other in itself is the other in itself, and, consequently, the other of itself is, thus, the other of the other, and therefore entirely unequal within itself, negating itself, changing. at the same time it also remains identical with itself, for that into which it has changed is another, which, apart from this, has no other further determinations. And that which changes is determined to be different, not in any other way, but in the same way; it therefore merges in the other into which it passes, only with itself.

Thus, it is posited as reflected into itself with the removal of otherness; it is something identical with itself, in relation to which, consequently, otherness, which at the same time constitutes its moment, is something different from it, not belonging to itself as such something.

2. Something is preserved in its lack of existence (Nichtdasein), it is essentially one with it and essentially not one with it. It, therefore, is in relation to its otherness; it is not simply its otherness. Otherness is at the same time both contained in it and yet separated from it. It is being for another.

Determinate being as such is immediate, irrelevant; or, in other words, it is in the determination of being. But determinate being, as including non-being, is a determinate being that has undergone negation within itself, and then, in the closest way, another; but since it is at the same time also preserved in its subjection to negation, it is only being for the other.

It persists in its lack of existence and is being; but not being in general, but as a relationship with oneself in contrast to its relationship with another, as equality with oneself in contrast to its inequality.

> Such being is in-itself-being.

Being-for-other and being-in-itself constitute two moments of something. Here we have before us two pairs of definitions: 1) something and another; 2) being for another? Hegel, The V, The Science of Logic

and in-itself-being. In the first there is an irrelevance of their certainty: something and another are not connected with each other; But their truth is the relation between them; being-for-other and being-in-itself are therefore the indicated determinations, posited as moments of the same thing, as determinations that are correlations and remain in their unity, in the unity of determinate being. Each of them, therefore, contains in itself, at the same time, its own moment, which differs from it.

Being and nothing in their unity, which is existence, are no longer being and nothing. They are such only outside their unity. In their restless unity, in becoming, they are arising and passing. - Being in something is being-in-itself. Being, relation to oneself, equality with oneself, is now no longer immediate, but is relation to oneself only as the non-being of other being (as a determinate being reflected into itself). And in exactly the same way, non-being, as a moment of something in this unity of being and non-being, is not the absence of determinate being in general, but something else, and, more specifically, in distinguishing being from it, it is at the same time a correlation with its own lack of determinate being, being- for another.

Thus being-in-itself is, firstly, a negative relationship with the absence of a determinate being, it has other being outside itself and is opposed to it; insofar as something is in itself, it is withdrawn from otherness and being for another.

But, secondly, it also has otherness in itself, for it is itself the non-being of being-for-other.

But being-for-other is, firstly, the negation of the simple relation of being to itself, the relation which, in the first place, must be a determinate being and something; insofar as something exists in some other or for some other, it is devoid of its own being. But, secondly, it is not the lack of existence (Nichtdasein), as pure nothingness. It is the non-being of determinate being (Nichtdasein), pointing to being-in-itself as its being reflected into itself, just as vice versa, being-in-itself points to being-for-the-other.

3. Both moments are determinations of the same thing, namely, determinations of something. Something is in itself, in so far as it has gone out of being-for-other, has returned into itself. Something also has a certain determination or circumstance in itself (here the emphasis falls on "in") or in it, insofar as this circumstance is in it externally, there is being-for-other.

This leads to some further definition. Being-in-itself and being-for-others are immediately different, but the circumstance that something has the same thing as it is? yourself, also it, and that, conversely, what it is as being-for-other is also in itself - this is the identity of being-in-itself and being-for-other, according to the definition that something itself is the identity (ein und dasselbe) of both moments, and that they are therefore inseparable in it. - Formally, this identity is obtained already in the sphere of determinate being, but it will receive a more definite expression when considering the "essence" and then - the relationship between the internal (der Innerlichkeit) and the external (Ausserlichkeit), and most definitely it will come to light when considering the idea as the unity of the concept and reality. - It is usually thought that by the words "in itself" we express something lofty, just as by the word "internal"; but in fact, that something is only in itself, is also only in it; "in itself" is only abstract and therefore external definition.

The expressions: “there is nothing in it”, “there is something in it”, contain, albeit vaguely, the meaning that what is what? man is (an einem), belongs also to his being-in-itself, to his inner true value.

It can be pointed out that here the meaning of the thing-in-itself is clarified, which is a very simple abstraction, but for a long time was known as a very important definition, as if something aristocratic, just like the proposition that we do not know what things are in themselves, was recognized by significant wisdom. - Things are called things-in-themselves, insofar as we abstract from all being-for-others, insofar as we think them without any

definitions as being nothing. In this sense, one cannot, of course, know what the thing-in-itself is.

For the question is, what is it? requires definitions to be specified; but since those things about which it is required that definitions be given must at the same time be things-in-themselves, i.e., precisely not have any definitions, the impossibility of answering it is senselessly embedded in the question, or else ( if they still try to answer it) they give only an absurd answer. - The thing-in-itself is the same as that absolute, of which one knows only that everything in it is one. We therefore know very well what these things-in-themselves are; as such they are nothing but truthless, empty abstractions. But what truly is the thing-in-itself, what truly is in itself - the exposition of this is logic, and, however, by "in-itself" is meant something better than abstraction, namely, that something is in its concept; but the latter is concrete within itself, as a concept in general, is comprehensible, and, as the determinate and the connection of its determinations, is cognizable within itself.

Being-in-itself has, first of all, being-for-others as its counterpoint; but positedness is also opposed to being in-itself. This expression, it is true, also implies being-for-others, but it definitively means the reversal that has already taken place of what is not in itself, into what is its in-itself-being, in which it is positive. Being-in-itself must usually be understood as an abstract way of expressing a concept; positing, properly speaking, already belongs to the sphere of essence, objective reflection; the foundation presupposes that which it substantiates; the cause, moreover, produces an effect, a determinate being, the independence of which is directly denied and the meaning of which lies in the fact that it has its essence (Sache), its being in some other. In the realm of being, the present being, pouring out, proceeds from becoming, or, together with something else, something else is posited, together with the finite, the infinite, but the finite does not produce the infinite, does not posit it.

In the realm of being, the self-determination of the concept is itself only in itself - and accordingly, with this, it is called a transition.

Reflective determinations of being, such as, for example, something and another, or finite and infinite, although they essentially point to each other, or essence as being-for-other, are also considered as qualitatively existing separately: the other is, the finite is also considered to be immediately existing. and firmly standing apart, like the infinite; their meaning seems complete also without their other.

On the other hand, the positive and the negative, the cause and the effect, although they are also taken as existing in isolation, nevertheless have no meaning without each other; they themselves have a reflection of their other, each of them, as it were, shines in its other. - In the various circles of definition, and especially in the progressive movement of the exposition, or, more precisely, in the progressive movement of the concept towards its exposition, the main thing is to always fully distinguish between what is still in itself and what is posited. what are the determinations, how they are in the concept, and what they are, as posited or existing for others. This is a distinction that belongs only to dialectical development, a distinction that metaphysical philosophizing does not know - to which critical philosophy also belongs; the definitions of metaphysics, as well as its presuppositions, distinctions, and consequences, are meant to make statements and conclusions only about beings and, moreover, about beings in-itself.

In the unity of something with itself, being-for-other is identical with its "in itself"; being-for-other is thus something in [itself]. The determinateness thus reflected into itself is thus again a simple being, is therefore again a quality, a determination.

b) The definition, the character (Beschaffenheit) and the limit of the "In-itself", into which something is reflected within itself from its being-for-other, is no longer the abstract "in-itself", but as the negation of its being-for-other, is mediated the latter, which thus constitutes

his moment. It is, however, only the immediate identity of something with itself, but that identity through which something is also in it what it is in itself; being-for-the-other is in it, because "in itself" is its sublation, there is an exit from it into itself; but it is also present in it because it is abstract, hence essentially burdened with negation, being-for-the-other. Here there is not only quality and reality, an essential determinateness, but also an in-itself determinateness, and its unfolding consists in positing it as this determinateness reflected into itself.

1. The quality that is “in itself” (das Ansich) in a simple something, which is essentially in unity with another moment of the latter, with being-in-it, can be called its definition, since this word is distinguished in its exact meaning from determinateness at all. Determination is affirmative determinateness as being-in-itself to which something in its determinate being, struggling with its intertwining with that other by which it could be determined, remains corresponding, holding itself in its equality with itself and manifesting this latter in its being-for. -other.

Something fulfills its definition (destination) *, because further determinateness, growing in a variety of ways on the basis of its relation to another, becomes corresponding to its in-itself-being, becomes its fullness.

The definition implies that what something is in itself is also in it.

The definition of man is the thinking mind; thinking in general is its simple determinateness, by which it differs from the animal; he is thought-in-itself, insofar as it also differs from his being-for-other, from his own naturalness and sensibility, by which he is immediately connected with another. But thinking is also in him: man himself is thinking, he exists as a thinker, it is his existence and reality; and further: because thinking is in its present being and its * The German word Bestimmung means both determination and purpose. - Perev.

existence exists in thinking, then it is concrete, it must be taken with content and fulfillment, it is the thinking mind, and thus it is the definition of man. But even this determination is, again, only in itself as an ought, i.e., together with the fulfillment incorporated in its being-in-itself, it is given in the form "in itself" in general, in contrast to the determinate being not incorporated in it, which at the same time, there is still externally opposing sensuality and nature.

2. The filling of being-in-itself with determinateness is also different from that determinateness, which is only being-for-other and remains outside the definition. For in the realm [of categories] of quality, differences retain, even in their sublation, a direct qualitative being in relation to each other. What something has in it is thus divided, and it is, on this side, an external determinate being, something whose determinate being is also its determinate being, but does not belong to its being-in-itself.

Definiteness, then, is character.

Bearing this or that character, something is exposed to external influences and circumstances. It is an external relation on which the character depends, and being determined by some other seems to be something accidental.

But the quality of a something consists in being given this appearance and possessing a certain character.

Because something changes, the change takes place in the character; the latter is in something that becomes some other. Something itself preserves itself in a change that affects only this impermanent surface of its otherness, and not its definition.

Definition and character are thus different from each other; from the point of view of its definition, something is indifferent to its character. But what something has in it is the middle term of this syllogism that connects them. But being-into-something (Am-Etwas-Sein) turned out, on the contrary, to fall apart into the indicated two extreme terms. The simple middle term is the determinateness as such; to her identity

belongs both to the definition and to the character. But determination passes by itself into character, and character by itself into determination. This follows from the previous one; the connection of thoughts, more precisely, is this: because what something is in itself is also in it, it is burdened with being-for-others; the determination as such is therefore open to relation to the other. Determinateness is at the same time a moment, but at the same time it contains a qualitative difference, consisting in the fact that it differs from being in-itself, it is the negation of something, some other existing being. The determinateness, which thus includes the other connected with the in-itself, introduces otherness into the in-itself, or, in other words, into the determination, which is thus reduced to a character. On the contrary, being-for-other, isolated and posited in itself in the form of character, is in it (into something) the same as the other as such, the other in it (in the other) itself, i.e., the other of itself. myself; but thus it is a determinate being that relates to itself, it is thus a being-in-itself with a certain determinateness, and therefore a determination. - Therefore, since both must at the same time be held apart from each other, the character, which is grounded in some external, in some other in general, also depends on determination, and the process of determination proceeding from someone else is determined at the same time by the own immanent determinateness of the given something. . But, further, character belongs to that which something is in itself; something changes along with its character.

This change of something is no longer the first change of something, a change exclusively in its being-for-other; that first change was existing only in itself, belonging to the inner concept; but now change is also posited in something. - Something itself is further defined, and negation is posited as immanent to it, as its developed being-within-itself.

The transition of determination and character into each other is, in the first instance, the sublation of their difference; thus, determinate being, or something in general, is posited, and since it is

the result of what has been said has distinguished, which also embraces qualitative otherness, then there are two things, but not only others in general in relation to each other, so that this negation would then turn out to be abstract and would find a place only in our comparison of them with each other, and this negation is now present as nothing immanent in it. They are indifferent to each other as if they exist. But now this assertion of theirs is no longer immediate, each of them is related to itself through the sublation of that otherness, which in the determination is reflected into being-in-itself.

Thus, something relates to another out of itself [spontaneously], for otherness is posited in it as its own moment; its being-within-itself embraces negation, through which it now possesses its affirmative determinate being in general. But this other is also qualitatively different from the latter and is therefore posited outside of something. The negation of its other is only the quality of the something given, for it is something precisely as this sublation of its other. So, strictly speaking, only now the other in a real way itself opposes itself to some determinate being; something else is opposed to the first only in an external way, or, in other words, since they are in fact mutually connected unconditionally, that is, according to their concept, this connection consists in the fact that the existing being has passed into other being, something has passed into another , lies in the fact that something, like another, is another.

Insofar as being-within-itself is the non-being of otherness, which is contained in it, but at the same time, as being, is different from it, insofar as something itself is a negation, the cessation in it of some other; it is posited as being negatively related to it and thereby preserving itself; this other, within-itself-being of something given, as the negation of negation, is its being-in-itself, and, at the same time, this sublation is in it as simple negation, namely, as the negation by him of something external to him. Their one and the same single determinateness, on the one hand, is identical with the in-self-existence of these somethings as the negation of the negation, and, on the other hand,

on the other hand, instead of this, insofar as these negations are opposed to each other like others, something, from themselves, joins them and also separates them from each other, since each of them negates the other; this is the border.

3. Being-for-other is an indefinite, affirmative community of something with its other; in the boundary, non-being-for-the-other, the qualitative negation of the other, which (the other) thanks to this is not admitted to something reflected into itself, is brought forward. We must take a closer look at the development of this concept, which development, however, rather turns out to be confusion and contradiction.

The latter is immediately apparent in the fact that the boundary, as the negation of the given something reflected into itself, contains in itself the idealized moments of something and the other, and they, as distinct moments, are at the same time posited in the sphere of determinate being as real, qualitatively different.

A. Something, therefore, is immediate determinate being in relation to itself, and has a limit in the immediate way as a limit in relation to the other; it is the non-being of the other, and not of the something itself; the latter limits its other in it. But the other is itself something in general; therefore, the limit that something has in relation to another is also the limit of the other as something, the limit of this something, by which it does not admit the first something as its other, or, in other words, it is the non-being of this first something; thus, it is not only the non-existence of the other, but is the non-existence of both one and the other something, and, therefore, the non-existence of [every] something in general.

But it is also essentially the non-being of the other; thus something is at the same time due to its boundary. Being limiting, it is true that something is lowered to the point that it itself turns out to be limited, but its limit, as the cessation of the other in it, is itself only the being of this something; the latter is because of it what it is, has its quality in it. - This relation is an external manifestation of the fact that the boundary is a simple or first negation

the other is at the same time the negation of the negation, the being-within-itself of the given something.

Something as immediate, present being is, therefore, a limit in relation to another something, but it has it in itself and is something through its mediation, which is also its non-being. It is that mediation through which something and the other are as much as they are not.

Insofar as something both is and is not within its boundary, and these “moments are some immediate, qualitative difference, insofar as the lack of determinate being (Nicht-dasein) of our something and its determinate being turn out to be outside each other. Something has its determinate being outside (or, as it is also thought of, inside) its boundary; and in the same way the other is outside it, since it is something. It is the middle between them, in which they cease. He" have their own being on the other side of each other and their boundaries; the boundary, as the non-being of each of them, is the other in relation to both.

Because of this difference between something and its boundary, a line appears as a line only outside its boundary, the point; the plane is represented by a plane outside the line; the body is represented by the body only outside the plane limiting it. - This is the aspect in which the boundary is first of all perceived by the representation, this being-out-of-itself of the concept, and in the same aspect it is taken predominantly in spatial objects.

But, further, something, as it is outside the boundary, is an unlimited something, only a determinate being in general. Thus, it is not different from its other; it is only a determinate being, and therefore has the same determination with its other; each of them is only something in general, or, in other words, each is the other; both are thus one and the same. But this at first only their immediate, present being is now posited with definiteness as a boundary in which both are what they are, in distinction from one another. But just like physical being, it is a difference common to both of them, their

unity and difference. This twofold identity of both, determinate being and boundary, implies that something has its determinate being only in the boundary, and that, since both the boundary and the immediate determinate being are instead negations of each other, something that is only in its border, to the same extent separates itself from itself, points beyond itself, to its non-being, and expresses the latter as its own being, thus passing into the latter. To apply this to the previous example, it must be said that one definition of our something is that something is what it is, only in its boundary; consequently, the point is the boundary of the line, not only in such a way that the latter only stops at the point, and that the line, as a determinate being, is outside the point; the line is the boundary of the plane, not only in such a way that the latter only terminates in the line (this is just as applicable to the plane as to the boundary of the body).

And at the point the line also begins; the point is the absolute origin of the line. Even in the case when a line is imagined to be infinitely extended in both directions, or, as is usually expressed, infinitely, the point is its element, just as the line is the element of the plane, and the plane is the element of the body. These boundaries are the principle of what they limit, just as one, for example, as a hundredth, is a boundary, but at the same time also an element of the whole hundred.

Another definition is the restlessness of our something - the restlessness, which consists in the fact that it, in its border, in which it abides, is a contradiction, forcing it to go beyond itself.

Thus, for example, a point is a dialectic of itself that makes it become a line; the line is a dialectic that makes it become a plane, the plane is a dialectic that makes it become an integral space. The second definition given to lines, planes, and all space, therefore, is that through the movement of a point a line arises, through the movement of a line a plane arises, etc. But this movement of a point, lines, etc., is regarded as something accidental.

tea or as something that we can only imagine. However, this view is actually abandoned when it is recognized that the definitions from which, according to this definition, lines, etc. arise, are their elements and principles, and the latter are nothing but at the same time and their boundaries; emergence is thus not seen as accidental or merely imagined. That a point, a line, a surface, in themselves, contradicting themselves, are principles that themselves repel themselves, and that the point, therefore, by itself, through its concept, passes into a line, moves in itself and causes a line to arise, etc. ., - this lies in the concept of a boundary immanent to the given something. However, the application itself should not be considered here, but where we will treat about space; in order here only to hint at this application, let us say that the point is a completely abstract boundary, but in some determinate being; the latter is taken here still quite indefinitely; it is the so-called absolute, i.e., abstract space, unreservedly continuous outsideness. By the very fact that the boundary is not an abstract negation, but is a negation in this determinate being, by the very fact that it is a spatial determinateness, the point is spatial and represents the contradiction between abstract negation and etc., just as in fact [in the real world] there is no point, no line, no surface.

Something, together with its immanent boundary, posited as a contradiction of itself, by virtue of which it is deduced and pursued outside itself, is finite.

c) Finiteness Definite being is determined; something has a certain quality, and in the latter it is not only defined, but also limited; its quality is its limit, burdened with which it first remains an affirmative, calm, present being. But when this negation is developed in such a way that

the opposition between its determinate being and the negation as its immanent boundary is itself the being-within-itself of this something, and the latter is thus only becoming in itself—when this negation is so developed, it constitutes its (this something) finitude.

When we say about things that they are finite, we mean by this that they not only have some certainty, that quality is not only a reality and a determination that is-in-itself, that they are not only limited, but as such they are also have a determinate being outside their boundaries, but that, on the contrary, non-being constitutes their nature, their being. Finite things are, but their relation to themselves consists in the fact that they are related to themselves as negative, that it is precisely in this relation to themselves that they drive themselves beyond themselves, beyond their being. They are, but the truth of this being is their end. The finite not only changes, like something in general, but passes; and it is not only possible that it passes, so that it could be without passing, but the being of finite things as such consists in the fact that they bear in themselves the germ of passing, as their being-within-themselves, that the hour of their birth is the hour of their death.

A. The immediacy of finiteness The thought of the finiteness of things entails this sorrow for the reason that this finiteness is a qualitative negation brought to the last sharpening, and that in the simplicity of such a definition, no affirmative being is left to them, other than their determination to death. Owing to this qualitative simplicity of negation, which has returned to the abstract opposition of nothingness and transience, on the one hand, and being, on the other, finitude is the most stubborn category of the understanding; negation in general, character, boundary coexist with their other, with existing being; even the abstract nothing, taken in itself as an abstraction, is ready to be abandoned; but finiteness is negation fixed in itself, and therefore sharply opposed to its affirmative. The finite, it is true, does not resist being set in motion, it itself consists in the fact that it is destined to its end, but only to its end; it is a stubborn refusal: not to be brought affirmatively to its affirmative, to the infinite, not to be brought into connection with the latter. It is, therefore, posited as inseparable from its nothingness, and this cuts off the path to any reconciliation of it with its other, with the affirmative. The definition of finite things does not extend beyond their end. Reason does not want to give up this sorrow for finiteness, making non-existence the definition of things and at the same time imperishable and absolute.

Their perishability could only perish in their other, in the affirmative; then their limb would separate from them.

But it is their immutable quality, that is, it does not pass into its other, that is, into its affirmative; thus, it is eternal.

This is a very important consideration; but that the finite is absolute is a point of view which, of course, hardly any philosophical doctrine, or any view or understanding, will allow itself to be imposed; it can be said that, on the contrary, the statement about the finite definitely contains the opposite view: the finite is the limited transient; the finite is only the finite, and not the imperishable; it lies directly in its definition and expressions. But it is important to know whether this view insists that we go no further than the being of finitude and regard transience as remaining in existence, or does it recognize that transience and transience pass? That the latter is not the case is actually affirmed by that view of the finite, which makes passing the final word about the finite. It definitely affirms that the finite is irreconcilable and incompatible with the infinite, that the finite is unconditionally opposed to the infinite. To the Infinite this view ascribes being, absolute being; the finite thus remains fixed in relation to it as its negative; incompatible with demon

finite, it remains absolute on its own side; it could receive affirmativeness from the affirmative, from the infinite, and thus it would pass away; but the connection with the latter precisely and · is declared impossible. If it is true that it does not abide in the presence of the infinite, but passes away, then, as we said before, the last word about it is passing, and not affirmative, which could only be the passing of passing. But if the finite does not pass into the affirmative, but its end is understood as nothingness, then we again find ourselves at that first, abstract nothingness, which itself has long since passed away.

However, in this nothing, which must be only nothing, and to which at the same time a certain existence is attributed, namely, existence in thinking, representation or speech, we encounter the same contradiction that was just indicated in the finite, with the only difference that in abstract nothingness this contradiction only occurs, while in finitude it is decisively expressed. There it is presented as subjective, but here it is asserted that the finite is opposed to the infinite forever and ever, that there is nothingness in itself and there is nothingness in itself. This has to be realized; and the unfolding of the finite shows that it in itself, like this internal contradiction, collapses within itself, but at the same time it really resolves the indicated contradiction, revealing that it is not only transient and transient, but that passing, nothing is something final, but just passes.

Limit and ought Although abstractly this contradiction is immediately contained in the fact that something is finite, or, in other words, that there is a finite, yet something or being is no longer abstractly posited, but is reflected into itself and developed as being-within-itself. which has a certain definition and character in itself, and, still more definitely, it is developed in such a way that it has a boundary in itself, which, being immanent to this something and constituting the quality of its being-within-itself, is

limb. We must see what moments are contained in this concept of a finite something.

Definition and character turned out to be sides for external reflection. But the first already contained otherness, as belonging to the “in itself” of the given something. The externality of otherness is, on the one hand, something in its own interiority, and, on the other hand, as externality it remains different from the latter, it is still externality as such, but in (an) something. But since, further, other-being as a boundary is itself determined as the negation of negation, then the other-being immanent to ours is posited as the ratio of both sides, and the unity of our something with itself, to which (something) belongs both the definition and the character, turns out to be turned against itself. itself as a relation that denies in it its immanent limit by correlating its in-itself determination with this limit.

Being identical with itself within-itself is thus related to itself as to its own non-being, but as the negation of negation, as negating this non-being of its own, which at the same time preserves in it a determinate being, for it is the quality of its own non-being. self-being.

The proper limit of the given something, thus posited by it as such a negative, which at the same time essentially exists, is not only a limit as such, but a limit. But the limit is not only what is posited as negated. Negation is double-edged, because what it posits as negated is the limit.

Namely, the latter is in general something that is common to a given something and its other; it is also the determinateness of the being-in-itself of determination as such. This being-in-itself, therefore, as a negative relation with its own boundary, which is also distinct from it, with itself as a limit, is an obligation.

In order for the limit, which is in general in something, to be a limit, it must at the same time, within itself, cross it, in itself relate to it as to some non-existent. The actual being of our something lies calmly, indifferently, as if beside its own 9 Hegel, Volume V. The Science of Logic

borders. But something transcends its boundary only in so far as it is its sublation, the in-itself negative in relation to it. And since in its very determination it has being as a limit, something thereby transcends itself.

The duty contains, therefore, a twofold determination: firstly, it contains, as an in-itself, a determination opposed to negation, but, secondly, it contains the same determination as a kind of non-being, which, as a limit, is different from it, but together with thus it is itself an in-itself determination.

Thus, the finite has been defined as the relation of its determination to the boundary, the first being the obligation in this relation, and the latter the limit. Both are thus moments of the finite; thus both the ought and the limit are themselves finite. But only the limit is posited as finite; obligation is limited only in itself, therefore, only for us. Owing to its relationship with itself, it is already limited by an immanent boundary, but this limitation of it is wrapped up in being-in-itself, for according to its determinate being, i.e., according to its determinateness, which is opposed to the limit, the ought is posited as being-in-itself.

What should be is, and at the same time, is not.

If it were, then it would not only have to be. Therefore, the obligation has, in its essence, a certain limit. This limit is not something alien; that which should only be is determination, which is now posited as it really is, namely, as that which is at the same time only a determinateness.

The being-in-itself, which belongs to our something in its determination, therefore reduces itself to the level of an ought, by the fact that the very thing that constitutes its being-in-itself is given (ist) in the same respect as non-being, and moreover in such a way that in being-in-itself, in the negation of negation, signified being-in-itself as one negation (negating) is a unity with another negation, which, as qualitatively different, is at the same time a boundary, thanks to

to which the indicated unity is given as a relation with it.

The limit of the finite but is something external, and its own determination is also its limit; and the latter is both he himself and the obligation; it is common to both, or rather, that in which both are identical.

But, further, how the finite must go beyond its limit; the same determinateness which is its negation is also sublated and is thus its in-itself; its boundary is also not its boundary.

As an obligation, therefore, something is above its limit, but vice versa, only as an obligation it has its limit; both are inseparable. Something has a limit insofar as it has a negation in its definition, and the definition is also the sublation of the limit.

Note [The ought] The ought has recently played a large role in philosophy, especially as regards morality, but also in metaphysics in general, as the final and absolute concept of the identity of the in-itself or relation to itself and the determinateness or limit.

“You can because you must (28) is an expression that must have told the mind a lot, contained in the concept of obligation. For the duty is the way out of the limit; the boundary is removed in it, the in-itself-being of the ought is thus an identical relation with itself, and, consequently, there is an abstraction of representation: “to be able, to be able” (Abstraktion des Konnens). - But the converse statement is just as true: you can't just because you have to. For in the duty there is also a limit as a limit; the above formalism of possibility has, in this limit, a certain reality that opposes it, a certain qualitative otherness, and their mutual relationship is a contradiction, which means, therefore, not to be able, or rather, an impossibility.

In duty, one begins to go beyond finiteness, infinity. The ought is that which, in the further [logical] development, turns out to be a progress towards infinity from the point of view of the above impossibility.

We can here more closely criticize two prejudices concerning the form of the limit and the ought.

First, they usually attach great importance to the limits of thinking, reason, etc., and assert that our reason, our thinking, is incapable of going beyond these limits.

In this statement there is an unawareness that, by defining something as a limit, we have already gone beyond it. For a determinateness, a limit, is defined as a limit only in opposition to its other in general, as to its unlimited; the other of some limit is precisely the exit beyond it. Stone, metal do not go beyond their limit, because for them it is not a limit.