History of Empire "Gulag"History of Empire "Gulag". The secret currency of the gulag Decree "On forced labor camps"

I am fully aware of how difficult and responsible any topic relating to Soviet Russia is. The difficulty of this topic is complicated by the extraordinary inconsistency of all kinds of “witness testimony” and the even greater inconsistency of the conclusions that are drawn on the basis of this testimony.

The reading public has the right to somewhat mistrust the witnesses who came out of Soviet Russia, suspecting them, and not without some psychological basis, of excessively thickening the colors. Witnesses who come to Russia from the outside, even with their most honest desire, are technically unable to see anything significant, not to mention the fact that the overwhelming majority of them are not looking for verification in Soviet observations, but only confirmation of their previous views. And the seeker, of course, finds...

In addition, a significant part of foreign observers is trying - and not without success - to find the positive aspects of the harsh communist experience, paid for and paid for not at their expense. The price of individual achievements of power - and these achievements, of course, exist - do not interest them: they are not the ones who pay this price. For them, this experience is more or less free. Vivisection is not performed on their living body. Why not take advantage of its results?

The “factual material” thus obtained is then subjected to further processing depending on the urgent and already formed needs of individual political groupings. The final product of this entire “production process” is paintings or scraps of paintings that have very little in common with the “original product” - Soviet reality: the due receives an overwhelming preponderance over the “existent”.

The fact of my flight from the USSR to some extent predetermines the tone of my “witness testimony.” But if the reader takes into account the fact that I ended up in a concentration camp precisely for attempting to escape from the USSR, then this tone receives a slightly different, not too banal explanation: it was not the camp, but all-Russian experiences that pushed me abroad.

The three of us, that is I, my brother and son, chose to seriously risk our lives rather than continue to exist in a socialist country. We took this risk without any immediate outside pressure. In material terms, I was much better off than the overwhelming majority of the qualified Russian intelligentsia, and even my brother, who during our first escape attempts was still serving his “administrative exile” after Solovki, maintained a standard of living that was much higher than that of, say, a Russian worker . I urge the reader to take into account the relativity of these scales: the standard of living of a Soviet engineer is much lower than the standard of living of a Finnish worker, and a Russian worker generally leads a half-starved existence.

Consequently, the tone of my essays is not at all determined by the feeling of some special, personal insult. The revolution did not take away any capital from me - neither movable nor immovable - for the simple reason that I did not have this capital. I can’t even have any special and personal complaints against the GPU: we were put in a concentration camp not for living well, as probably eighty percent of camp inmates end up, but for a very specific “crime” and a crime from the point of view of the Soviet government that was especially reprehensible: attempt leave the socialist paradise. Six months after our arrest, the law of June 7, 1934 was passed, punishing escape abroad with the death penalty. Even a Soviet-minded reader should, it seems to me, understand that the sweets of this paradise are not very great if the exits from it have to be guarded more harshly than the exits from any prison.

The range of my experiences in Soviet Russia is determined by the fact that I lived in it for 17 years and over these years, with and without a notebook, with and without a camera, I traveled all over it. What I experienced during these Soviet years and what I saw in the spaces of Soviet territories determined for me the impossibility of remaining in Russia. My personal experiences, as a consumer of bread, meat and jackets, played absolutely no role in this regard. What exactly determined these experiences will be clear from my essays; this cannot be said in two lines.

If we try to preliminary and, so to speak, outline the process that is now taking place in Russia, then we can say approximately the following.

The process is extremely contradictory and complex. The authorities have created a coercive apparatus of such power that history has never seen before. This compulsion is opposed by resistance of almost the same power. Two monstrous forces grappled with each other, in a struggle unparalleled in its intensity and tragedy. The authorities are suffocating from the overwhelming tasks; the country is suffocating from the unbearable oppression.

The government's goal is world revolution. In view of the fact that hopes for the imminent achievement of this goal have collapsed, the country must be turned into a moral, political and military springboard that would preserve revolutionary cadres, revolutionary experience and a revolutionary army until a convenient moment.

The people who make up this “country” do not want to serve the world revolution and do not want to give up their property and their lives. Power is stronger than “people”, but there are more “people”. The dividing line between power and “people” is drawn with such sharpness, with which this usually happens only in eras of foreign conquest. The struggle takes the form of medieval cruelty.

Neither this struggle nor these cruelties can be seen either on Nevsky or Kuznetsky Bridge. Here is territory already firmly conquered by the authorities. The struggle is taking place in factories and factories, in the steppes of Ukraine and Central Asia, in the Caucasus mountains, in the forests of Siberia and the North. It has become much more cruel than it was even during the years of war communism - hence the monstrous numbers of the “camp population” and the ongoing starvation of the country.

But in the conquered territories of the capitals, largest industrial centers, and railways, relative external order was achieved: the “enemy” was either driven out or destroyed. Terror in cities, resonating throughout the world, has become unnecessary and even harmful. He moved to the lower classes, to the masses, from the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia - to workers and peasants, from cabinets - to the plow and the machine. And for an outside observer he became almost invisible.

CONCENTRATION CAMPS

The topic of concentration camps in Soviet Russia has already been used enough. But it was used mainly as a theme of “horror” and as a theme of personal experiences of people who ended up in a concentration camp more or less innocently. I am interested in the concentration camp not as a territory of “horrors”, not as a place of suffering and death of millions of masses, including not as the background of my personal experiences, whatever they may be. I am not writing a sentimental novel and I do not intend to evoke feelings of sympathy or regret in the reader. It's not a matter of regret, but of understanding.

And it is here, in the concentration camp, that it is easiest and simplest to understand the main content and basic “rules” of the struggle that is being waged throughout the entire socialist republic.

I want to warn the reader: camp is no different from “freedom” in any significant way. If it’s worse in the camp than in the wild, it’s not much worse - of course, for the bulk of the camp inmates, workers and peasants. Everything that happens in the camp happens in the wild. And vice versa. But only in the camp is all this clearer, simpler, clearer. There is no advertising, no ideological superstructures, false and ostentatious public, white gloves and an eye for a foreign observer that exist in the wild. In the camp, the foundations of Soviet power are presented with the clarity of an algebraic formula.

The history of my life in the camp and escape, if not proves, then at least shows that I understood this formula correctly. By substituting into it, instead of abstract algebraic quantities, the living and concrete bearers of Soviet power in the camp, the living and concrete relationships between the authorities and the population, I received the solution I needed, which, under extremely difficult objective conditions, ensured the success of our very technically complex escape.

It is possible that some pages of my essays will seem cynical to the reader... Of course, I am very far from the idea of ​​​​posing as an innocent lamb; in that cruel daily struggle for life that goes on throughout Russia, there are no such lambs left at all, they have become extinct. But I ask you not to forget that this was a very real matter of life and death, and not just mine.

In that general life-and-death struggle that I just spoke about, one cannot imagine the matter in such a way that on one side there are merciless executioners, and on the other there are only unrequited victims. One cannot think that over the years of this struggle the country has not developed millions of methods of open resistance and “application to the terrain” and all sorts of twists that are not always approved by evangelical morality. And there is no need to imagine suffering necessarily in an aura of holiness. I will paint Soviet life to the best of my abilities as I saw it. If the reader does not like some pages of this life, it is not my fault.

GULAG EMPIRE

The era of collectivization brought the number of camps and camp population to unheard of numbers. It was in this regard that the camp ceased to be a place of imprisonment and extermination of several tens of thousands of counter-revolutionaries, as Solovki was, and turned into a gigantic enterprise for the exploitation of free labor, administered by the Main Directorate of the GPU Camps - the Gulag. The boundaries between camp and freedom are becoming more and more blurred. In the camp there is a process of relative emancipation of the camp inmates; in the wild there is a process of absolute enslavement of the masses. The camp is not at all the wrong side, some kind of Unterwelt from the will, but simply a separate and not even very original piece of Soviet life. If we imagine a camp somewhat less hungry, better dressed and less intensively shot than now, then this will be a piece of the future Russia, subject to its further “peaceful evolution”. I put the word “peaceful” in quotation marks, because this bad peace is much worse than a thorough war... And today’s Russia is still very little better than today’s concentration camp.

The camp we ended up in - the White Sea-Baltic Combine (BBK) - is a whole kingdom with a territory from Petrozavodsk to Murmansk, with its own logging operations, quarries, factories, factories, railway lines and even with its own shipyards and shipping company. It has nine departments: Murmansk, Tuloma, Kem, Soro, Segezh, Sosnovets, Watershed, Povenets and Medgorskoe. In each such department there are from five to twenty-seven camp points (lagpunkts) with a population of from five hundred people to twenty-five thousand. Most camps also have their own “business trips” - all kinds of small enterprises scattered throughout the territory of the camp.

At the station Bear Mountain (Medgora) is where the camp administration is located - it is also the actual government of the so-called “Karelian Republic”; the camp swallowed up the republic, seized its territory and - according to Stalin's well-known order on the organization of the Baltic-White Sea Combine - usurped all economic and administrative functions of the government. This government has only “representation” left, running errands on Medgora’s orders and the role of decoration for the national autonomy of Karelia.

In June 1934, the “camp population” of the BBK was estimated at 286 thousand people, although the camp was already in a state of some decline: work on the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal had already been completed, and a huge number of prisoners - I don’t know exactly how many - were sent on the BAM (Baikal-Amur Mainline). At the beginning of March of the same year, I had to work in the planning department of the Svirsky camp - this is one of the relatively small camps; it then had a “population” of 78,000.

For some time I worked in the accounting and distribution department (RDC) of the LBC and in this work I encountered all kinds of transfers from camp to camp. This gave me the opportunity, with a very rough approximation, to determine the number of prisoners in all camps in the USSR. In this calculation, I proceeded on the one hand - from the exactly known figures of the “camp population” of Svirlag and BBK, and on the other - from, so to speak, “relative values” of the remaining more or less known to me camps. Some of them are larger than BBK (BAM, Siblag, Dmitlag); most - less. There are a completely indefinite number of small and tiny camps - in individual state farms, even in cities. For example, in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the construction of GPU houses and Dynamo stadiums was carried out by local camp inmates. There are a dozen or two medium-sized camps - for example, between BBK and Svirlag. I do not think that the total number of all prisoners in these camps was less than five million people. Probably somewhat more. But, of course, there can be no talk of any accuracy of calculation. Moreover, I know the systems of grassroots counting in the camp itself and therefore I strongly doubt that the GPU itself knew about the number of camp inmates with an accuracy of at least hundreds of thousands.

Here we are talking about camp prisoners in the strict sense of the word. Besides them, there are all sorts of other more or less imprisoned elephant populations. So, for example, in the BBK during my stay there were 28,000 families of so-called “special settlers” - these are peasants from the Voronezh province, sent to Karelia by entire villages to settle under the supervision of the BBK. They were in a much worse situation than the camp prisoners, because they were with their families and were not given rations. Next comes the category of administrative exiles, expelled on an individual basis; This is a variant of pre-war exile, only without any support from the state - live whatever you want. Next are the “freely exiled” peasants, usually deported by entire villages to all sorts of “undevelopable lands”, but not under the direct jurisdiction of the GPU.

I don’t even have an approximate idea of ​​the number of all these categories, not to mention the number of prisoners in prisons. It must be borne in mind that all these prisoners and semi-prisoners are all the flower of the nation, especially the peasants. I think that at least one tenth of the adult male population of the country is either in camps or somewhere near them.

This, of course, is not on a European scale. The systems of Soviet exile somehow resemble the Novgorod “withdrawal” under Grozny, and even more so - the Assyrian methods and scale.

The Assyrians, writes Kautsky, came up with a system that promised their conquests greater strength: where they encountered stubborn resistance or repeated uprisings; they paralyzed the forces of the defeated people in such a way that they took their heads; that is, they took away the ruling classes from him - the most noble, educated and combat-ready elements and sent them to a remote area, where they, cut off from their subsoil, were completely powerless. The peasants and small artisans who remained in their homeland represented a poorly connected mass, unable to offer any resistance to the conquerors.”

The Soviet government everywhere “encountered stubborn resistance and repeated uprisings” and has every reason to fear, in the event of external complications, such a rise in “resistance and uprisings” that even the long-suffering Russian land has never seen. Hence the Assyrian methods and Assyrian scale. Everything that is more or less economically stable, capable of more or less independent thinking and acting, in short, everything that offers even the slightest resistance to general leveling is subject to “withdrawal, eradication, expulsion.

As you can see, these figures are very far from both “peaceful” evolution and the “elimination of terror.” I am afraid that in all kinds of evolutionary theories, the Russian emigration has become too carried away by the tendency to see what is expected as if it were real. In Russia, absolutely nothing has been heard about these theories, and for all three of us, these emigration theories came as a complete surprise, out of the blue. Of course, the current maneuver of the authorities “defense of the homeland” is also being discussed in Russia, but in all my very multilateral Soviet practice, I have not heard a single case where this maneuver was discussed, so to speak, seriously, as it is being discussed here, abroad.

Under NEP, the authorities used the instinct of property and, having used it, sent tens and hundreds of thousands of their temporary NEP “helpers” to Nightingales and to be shot. The first five-year plan used the instinct of construction and led the country to a famine never seen before even in the history of the socialist paradise. Now the authorities are trying to use the national instinct in order to provide at least their rear during military trials.

The history of all sorts of assistants, fellow travelers, Smenovekhites and others, used to the last hair and then thrown out to be shot, could fill entire volumes. In emigration and abroad, it is permissible to forget about this history from time to time; it was not emigration and not abroad that paid with their own skins for the tendency to see “the expected as if it were.” Professor Ustryalov, who greatly missed the mark on his NEP prophecies, has absolutely no problem in the quiet of his Harbin office, changing his milestones one more time (or more than once) and concocting his prophecy. In Russia, people who were mistaken in their assessment and trusted the authorities paid for their mistakes with their lives. And therefore, a person who in Russia would begin to talk seriously about the evolution of power would simply be laughed at.

But no matter how one evaluates the chances of “peaceful evolution”, the peaceful growth of socialism into the kulaks (one can argue that one can see better from a distance), one fact remains for me absolutely beyond any doubt. Trenin briefly talked about this, colorfully, in “Last News”: the country is waiting for a war for an uprising. There can be no talk of any defense of the “socialist fatherland” on the part of the masses. On the contrary, no matter with whom the wars are waged, no matter what the consequences of military defeat, all the bayonets and all the pitchforks that can be stuck in the back of the Red Army will definitely be stuck. Every man knows this just as every communist knows it! Every man knows that at the very first shots of the war he will first of all slaughter his closest chairman of the village council, the chairman of the collective farm, etc., and these latter know quite clearly that in the very first days of the war they will be slaughtered like rams.

I cannot say that the questions of the attitude of the masses to religion, monarchy, republic, etc. were completely clear to me. But the question of the attitude towards the war stands out with such obviousness that there can be no mistakes here. I don’t think this is a particularly rosy prospect, but there aren’t particularly rosy prospects to be seen at all. Knowing Russian reality quite well, I can quite clearly imagine what will happen in Russia on the second day after the declaration of war: war communism will seem like a children's play. I have already seen some rehearsals of this performance in Kyrgyzstan, the North Caucasus and Chechnya. Communism knows this for sure, and that is why it is trying to grab hold of that straw of trust that, as it seems to it, still remains among the masses. Of course, the donkey with an armful of hay in front of its nose is one of the most brilliant inventions in world history, or so Woodworth claims, but even this invention wears out. You can deceive people sitting in Paris or Harbin one more time, just one more time, but you can’t deceive people sitting in a concentration camp or on a collective farm one more time (oh God!). For them now ibi bene is ibi patria, and they still won’t be anywhere worse than in their Soviet homeland. This, as you can see, is very prosaic, not very funny, but still a fact.

Taking this fact into account, Bolshevism builds its military plans with great expectation of uprisings - both at home and at the enemy. Or, as one of the military commanders told me, the question is: “Where will mass uprisings break out first - with us or with the enemy? They will flare up first in the rear of the retreating side. That’s why we must attack, and that’s why we will attack.”

I don’t know what this offensive might lead to. But it is possible that as a result of his world revolution may become, so to speak, a pressing issue. And then Messrs. Ustryalov, Bloom, Bernard Shaw and many others, patronizingly stroking the Bolshevik dog or trying to snatch a scrap of dollars from its wool through trade agreements, will have to revise their milestones no longer in their offices, but in Solovki and LBCs, as many are revised, there are a lot of people who believed in evolution while sitting not in Harbin, but in Russia.

In this case, which is still not completely excluded, the inaccessible expanses of remote Russian places will undoubtedly be kindly placed at the disposal of the corresponding fraternal revolutionary committees for the settlement of many, now safely believing people - where can these open spaces be obtained from, if not in the Russian north?

And for this case, my essays can serve as a guide and self-teacher.

GULAG EMPIRE

The era of collectivization brought the number of camps and camp population to unheard of numbers. It was in this regard that the camp ceased to be a place of imprisonment and extermination of several tens of thousands of counter-revolutionaries, as Solovki was, and turned into a gigantic enterprise for the exploitation of free labor, administered by the Main Directorate of the GPU Camps - the Gulag. The boundaries between camp and freedom are becoming more and more blurred. In the camp there is a process of relative emancipation of the camp inmates; in the wild there is a process of absolute enslavement of the masses. The camp is not at all the wrong side, some kind of Unterwelt from the will, but simply a separate and not even very original piece of Soviet life. If we imagine a camp somewhat less hungry, better dressed and less intensively shot than now, then this will be a piece of the future Russia, subject to its further “peaceful evolution”. I put the word “peaceful” in quotation marks, because this bad peace is much worse than a thorough war... And today’s Russia is still very little better than today’s concentration camp.

The camp we ended up in - the White Sea-Baltic Combine (BBK) - is a whole kingdom with a territory from Petrozavodsk to Murmansk, with its own logging operations, quarries, factories, factories, railway lines and even with its own shipyards and shipping company. It has nine departments: Murmansk, Tuloma, Kem, Soro, Segezh, Sosnovets, Watershed, Povenets and Medgorskoe. In each such department there are from five to twenty-seven camp points (lagpunkts) with a population of from five hundred people to twenty-five thousand. Most camps also have their own “business trips” - all kinds of small enterprises scattered throughout the territory of the camp.

At the station Bear Mountain (Medgora) is where the camp administration is located - it is also the actual government of the so-called “Karelian Republic”; the camp absorbed the republic, seized its territory and - according to Stalin’s well-known order on the organization of the Baltic-White Sea Combine - usurped all economic and administrative functions of the government. This government has only “representation” left, running errands on Medgora’s orders and the role of decoration for the national autonomy of Karelia.

In June 1934, the “camp population” of the BBK was estimated at 286 thousand people, although the camp was already in a state of some decline: work on the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal had already been completed, and a huge number of prisoners - I don’t know exactly how many - were sent on the BAM (Baikal-Amur Mainline). At the beginning of March of the same year, I had to work in the planning department of the Svirsky camp - this is one of the relatively small camps; it then had a “population” of 78,000.

For some time I worked in the accounting and distribution department (RDC) of the LBC and in this work I encountered all kinds of transfers from camp to camp. This gave me the opportunity, with a very rough approximation, to determine the number of prisoners in all camps in the USSR. In this calculation, I proceeded on the one hand - from the exactly known figures of the “camp population” of Svirlag and BBK, and on the other - from, so to speak, “relative values” of the remaining more or less known to me camps. Some of them are larger than BBK (BAM, Siblag, Dmitlag); most are less. There are a completely indefinite number of small and tiny camps - on individual state farms, even in cities. For example, in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the construction of GPU houses and Dynamo stadiums was carried out by local camp inmates. There are a dozen or two medium-sized camps - for example, between BBK and Svirlag. I do not think that the total number of all prisoners in these camps was less than five million people. Probably somewhat more. But, of course, there can be no talk of any accuracy of calculation. Moreover, I know the systems of grassroots counting in the camp itself and therefore I strongly doubt that the GPU itself knew about the number of camp inmates with an accuracy of at least hundreds of thousands.

Here we are talking about camp prisoners in the strict sense of the word. Besides them, there are all sorts of other more or less imprisoned elephant populations. So, for example, in the BBK during my stay there were 28,000 families of so-called “special settlers” - these are peasants from the Voronezh province, sent to Karelia by entire villages to settle under the supervision of the BBK. They were in a much worse situation than the camp prisoners, because they were with their families and were not given rations. Next comes the category of administrative exiles, expelled on an individual basis; This is a variant of pre-war exile, only without any support from the state - live whatever you want. Next are the “freely exiled” peasants, usually deported by entire villages to all sorts of “undevelopable lands”, but not under the direct jurisdiction of the GPU.

I don’t even have an approximate idea of ​​the number of all these categories, not to mention the number of prisoners in prisons. It must be borne in mind that all these prisoners and semi-prisoners are all the flower of the nation, especially the peasants. I think that at least one tenth of the adult male population of the country is either in camps or somewhere near them.

This, of course, is not on a European scale. The Soviet exile systems somehow resemble the Novgorod “withdrawal” under Grozny, and even more so the Assyrian methods and scale.

The Assyrians, writes Kautsky, came up with a system that promised their conquests greater strength: where they encountered stubborn resistance or repeated uprisings; they paralyzed the forces of the defeated people in such a way that they took their heads; that is, they took away the ruling classes from him - the most noble, educated and combat-ready elements and sent them to a remote area, where they, cut off from their subsoil, were completely powerless. The peasants and small artisans who remained in their homeland represented a poorly connected mass, unable to offer any resistance to the conquerors.”

The Soviet government everywhere “encountered stubborn resistance and repeated uprisings” and has every reason to fear, in the event of external complications, such a rise in “resistance and uprisings” that even the long-suffering Russian land has never seen. Hence the Assyrian methods and Assyrian scale. Everything that is more or less economically stable, capable of more or less independent thinking and acting, in short, everything that offers even the slightest resistance to general leveling is subject to “withdrawal, eradication, expulsion.

As you can see, these figures are very far from both “peaceful” evolution and the “elimination of terror.” I am afraid that in all kinds of evolutionary theories, the Russian emigration has become too carried away by the tendency to see what is expected as if it were real. In Russia, absolutely nothing has been heard about these theories, and for all three of us, these emigration theories came as a complete surprise, out of the blue. Of course, the current maneuver of the authorities “defense of the homeland” is also being discussed in Russia, but in all my very multilateral Soviet practice, I have not heard a single case where this maneuver was discussed, so to speak, seriously, as it is being discussed here, abroad.

Under NEP, the authorities used the instinct of property and, having used it, sent tens and hundreds of thousands of their temporary NEP “helpers” to Nightingales and to be shot. The first five-year plan used the instinct of construction and led the country to a famine never seen before even in the history of the socialist paradise. Now the authorities are trying to use the national instinct in order to provide at least their rear during military trials.

The history of all sorts of assistants, fellow travelers, Smenovekhites and others, used to the last hair and then thrown out to be shot, could fill entire volumes. In emigration and abroad, it is permissible to forget about this history from time to time; it was not emigration and not abroad that paid with their own skins for the tendency to see “the expected as if it were.” Professor Ustryalov, who greatly missed the mark on his NEP prophecies, has absolutely no problem in the quiet of his Harbin office, changing his milestones one more time (or more than once) and concocting his prophecy. In Russia, people who were mistaken in their assessment and trusted the authorities paid for their mistakes with their lives. And therefore, a person who in Russia would begin to talk seriously about the evolution of power would simply be laughed at.

But no matter how one evaluates the chances of “peaceful evolution”, the peaceful growth of socialism into the kulaks (one can argue that one can see better from a distance), one fact remains for me absolutely beyond any doubt. Trenin briefly talked about this, colorfully, in “Last News”: the country is waiting for a war for an uprising. There can be no talk of any defense of the “socialist fatherland” on the part of the masses. On the contrary, no matter with whom the wars are waged, no matter what the consequences of military defeat, all the bayonets and all the pitchforks that can be stuck in the back of the Red Army will definitely be stuck. Every man knows this just as every communist knows it! Every man knows that at the very first shots of the war he will first of all slaughter his closest chairman of the village council, the chairman of the collective farm, etc., and these latter know quite clearly that in the very first days of the war they will be slaughtered like sheep.

I cannot say that the questions of the attitude of the masses to religion, monarchy, republic, etc. were completely clear to me. But the question of the attitude towards the war stands out with such obviousness that there can be no mistakes here. I don’t think this is a particularly rosy prospect, but there aren’t particularly rosy prospects to be seen at all. Knowing Russian reality quite well, I can quite clearly imagine what will happen in Russia on the second day after the declaration of war: war communism will seem like a children's play. I have already seen some rehearsals of this performance in Kyrgyzstan, the North Caucasus and Chechnya. Communism knows this for sure, and that is why it is trying to grab hold of that straw of trust that, as it seems to it, still remains among the masses. Of course, the donkey with an armful of hay in front of its nose is one of the most brilliant inventions in world history, or so Woodworth claims, but even this invention wears out. You can deceive people sitting in Paris or Harbin one more time, just one more time, but you can’t deceive people sitting in a concentration camp or on a collective farm one more time (oh God!). For them now ibi bene is ibi patria, and they still won’t be anywhere worse than in their Soviet homeland. This, as you can see, is very prosaic, not very funny, but still a fact.

Taking this fact into account, Bolshevism builds its military plans with great expectation of uprisings - both at home and at the enemy. Or, as one of the military commanders told me, the question is: “Where will mass uprisings break out first - with us or with the enemy? They will flare up first in the rear of the retreating side. That’s why we must attack, and that’s why we will attack.”

I don’t know what this offensive might lead to. But it is possible that as a result of his world revolution may become, so to speak, a pressing issue. And then Messrs. Ustryalov, Bloom, Bernard Shaw and many others, patronizingly stroking the Bolshevik dog or trying to snatch a scrap of dollars from its wool through trade agreements, will have to revise their milestones no longer in their offices, but in Solovki and LBCs, as many are revised, there are a lot of people who believed in evolution while sitting not in Harbin, but in Russia.

In this case, which is still not completely excluded, the intractable expanses of remote Russian places will undoubtedly be kindly placed at the disposal of the corresponding fraternal revolutionary committees for the settlement there of many, now safely believing people - where to get these open spaces if not in the Russian north?

And for this case, my essays can serve as a guide and self-teacher.

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List of abbreviations

Introduction

1. The role of the Gulag in the system of political power

1 Creation of GALAG. Decree “On forced labor camps”

2 Organizational structure of the Gulag

3 The scale of the Gulag

The economic role of the Gulag

Conclusion


LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

GULAG is the main directorate of forced labor camps, labor settlements and places of detention in the USSR.

NKVD - People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

ITL - forced labor camp.

GubChK - provincial emergency commissions.

VTsIK - All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

RCP(b) - Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

UN - United Nations Organization.

OGPU - United State Political Administration.

INTRODUCTION

The political, economic and military realities of the second half of the 20th century made it difficult to study many key problems of Soviet history, and in particular, did not allow us to objectively and reliably study the problem of forced labor and political repression in the USSR.

In scientific and scientific-journalistic literature, a wide range of opinions has emerged about the very nature and about the place and role in the Soviet state system of the Main Directorate of Forced Labor Camps, Labor Settlements and Places of Detention (GULAG).

Main Directorate of forced labor camps, labor settlements and places of detention in the USSR in 1934-56. a division of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), which managed the system of forced labor camps (ITL). Special departments of the Gulag united many ITL in different regions of the country: Karaganda ITL (Karlag), Solovetsky ITL (USLON), White Sea-Baltic ITL and the NKVD plant, Vorkuta ITL, Norilsk ITL, etc.

The inconsistency of assessments and judgments on the Gulag problem was determined, first of all, by the narrowness and insufficient source base, which consisted mainly of memories of participants in the events and eyewitness accounts, as well as official Soviet materials. Studying the Gulag at a qualitatively new level became possible only at the turn of the 1980s and 90s, when researchers gained access to the necessary archival materials.

1. The role of the Gulag in the system of political power

The role of the Gulag in the system of political power was enormous. Carrying out the will of the totalitarian regime, he mercilessly suppressed all dissent, kept all citizens of the country in psychological tension, so that no one would doubt the correctness of the “wise” policies of the party and the state. The very existence of the Gulag gave rise to dissidence in the country, emigration, and the flight of people of different beliefs and views from the nightmare of the situation that reigned in the country. [6, 9].

The totalitarian regime did everything to hide from the people and the world community what was happening in the camps, labor settlements, Gulag prisons and among millions of relatives, friends and colleagues of repressed citizens. The Gulag system became such an element of power in the USSR that it turned the lives of millions of Soviet people into a tragedy.

1.1 Creation of the Gulag. Decree “On forced labor camps”

April 1919 All-Russian Central Executive Committee signed by Chairman M.I. Kalinin issued a decree “On forced labor camps.” This decree legalized two provisions that accompanied the 18-month existence of the Soviet Republic, namely: the establishment of the camp system and the establishment of forced labor [1-6, 7].

How widely these provisions were implemented is evident from the fact that the decree provided for the organization of forced labor camps “at the Branches of the Administration of the Provincial Executive Committees,” i.e. This obligated all provincial committees to create camps. The organization and management of the camps was entrusted to Gubchek (Provincial Extraordinary Commissions); camps in the counties were opened with the permission of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

Already in this first decree on the camps it was stipulated that escaping from them “is subject to the most severe punishments.” But the text of the decree of April 15, 1919, apparently, turned out to be insufficient, and on May 17, 1919, signed by the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee V. Avanesov, a new expanded decree “On forced labor camps” was published, developed in great detail and has the following sections [5, 9]:

a) organization of camps and management of camps,

c) guard team,

d) sanitary and medical supervision,

e) about prisoners,

e) premises.

It should be noted that for the first time escaping, the term of imprisonment was increased tenfold, and for the second time the Revolutionary Tribunal had the right to use execution. This decree laid down all the basic provisions of forced labor, which became an integral element of the state life of the Soviet Union and gradually transformed into the current system of slave labor.

The fundamentals of corrective labor policy were included in the new party program at the VIII Congress of the RCP (b) (March 1919). The full organizational development of the camp network in Soviet Russia strictly coincided with the first communist subbotniks (April 12 - May 17, 1919): decisions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on forced labor camps took place on April 15 and May 17, 1919. According to them, forced labor camps were created (through the efforts of the GubChK) in every provincial city (if convenient - within the city, or in a monastery or in a nearby estate) and in some counties (not yet in all). The camps were supposed to contain at least three hundred people each (so that the labor of prisoners would pay for both the guards and the administration) and be under the jurisdiction of the Provincial Punitive Departments [3, 7, 9].

Thus, already at the very beginning of the communist revolution, more than 100 forced labor camps were opened in all provincial (97) and some district cities for at least 300 people each, that is, for a total of 30,000 prisoners.

The exact number of camps and people imprisoned in them during a given period of communist construction is unknown. But in the early fifties, a joint UN commission interviewed a large number of people who found themselves in the West during the Second World War, and based on carefully documented evidence, came to the following conclusion: “... there are at least 10,000,000 people in concentration camps in the European and Asian parts of the Soviet Union prisoners; This is, however, a minimum figure, derived with all conceivable caution of statistical rigor. In reality, the number of prisoners reaches 15,000,000 people.” [11].

The figure of 15 million people is mentioned in many sources concerning forced labor in the USSR [11, 12].

But this figure is, of course, arbitrary; it is possible that it is unwittingly exaggerated. Out of caution, we should count not 15, but 10 million prisoners. However, 10 million is a colossal value, exceeding the population of many European countries [12].

Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets on the creation of forced labor camps [7-10].

) Forced labor camps are formed under the Management Departments of the Provincial Executive Committees:

A. The initial organization and management of forced labor camps is entrusted to the Provincial Extraordinary Commissions, which transfer them to the Departments of the Administration upon notification from the center.

b. Forced labor camps in counties are opened with the permission of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

) Those persons and categories of persons in relation to whom decisions have been made by the Departments of Administration, Extraordinary Commissions, Revolutionary Tribunals, People's Courts and other Soviet Bodies, who have been granted this right by decrees and orders, are subject to imprisonment in forced labor camps.

) All prisoners in the camps are immediately involved in work at the request of Soviet Institutions.

) Those who escaped from camps or from work are subject to the most severe punishments.

) To manage all forced labor camps throughout the entire territory of the RSFSR, a Central Camp Administration is established under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, in agreement with the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission.

) The heads of forced labor camps are elected by local Provincial Executive Committees and approved by the Central Administration of the camps.

) Loans for equipment and maintenance of camps are issued by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs on an estimated basis through the Provincial Executive Committee.

) Medical and sanitary supervision of the camps is entrusted to the local Health Departments.

) Detailed provisions and instructions are proposed to be developed by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs within 2 weeks from the date of publication of this resolution. Signed by: Chairman of the All-Russian Central Committee M. KALININ, Secretary L. Serebryakov. Published in No. 81 of the News of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets dated April 15, 1919.

1.2 Organizational structure of the Gulag

From the very beginning of the existence of Soviet power, the management of most places of detention was entrusted to the punitive department of the People's Commissariat of Justice, formed in May 1918. The Main Directorate of Compulsory Labor under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was partially involved in these same issues. [4-6].

July 1922, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution to concentrate the management of the main places of detention (except for general prisons) in one department and a little later, in October of the same year, a single body was created in the NKVD system - the Main Directorate of Places of Detention [7, 8].

In subsequent decades, the structure of government bodies in charge of places of deprivation of liberty changed repeatedly, although fundamental changes did not occur.

On April 1930, by order of the United State Political Administration (OGPU) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Administration of Camps was formed. The first mention of the GULAG itself (the Main Directorate of OGPU camps) can be found in the OGPU order of February 15, 1931 [2, 4, 5].

On June 1934, according to the Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, during the formation of the new Union-Republican NKVD, the Main Directorate of Forced Labor Camps and Labor Settlements was formed within its composition. In October of the same year, this department was renamed the Main Directorate of Camps, Labor Settlements and Places of Detention.

Subsequently, this department was renamed twice more and in February 1941 received the name Main Directorate of Corrective Labor Camps and Colonies of the NKVD of the USSR. After the end of the Great Patriotic War, in connection with the reorganization of the People's Commissariats into ministries, the Main Directorate of Forced Labor Camps and Colonies in March 1946 became part of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [2-9].

The next organizational change in the penitentiary system in the USSR was the creation in October 1956 of the Main Directorate of Correctional Labor Colonies, which in March 1959 was renamed the Main Directorate of Prisons [4, 5, 7].

The departmental affiliation of the Gulag changed only once after 1934 - in March 1953 the Gulag was transferred to the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Justice, but in January 1954 it was again returned to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

After October 1917 and until 1934. general prisons were administered by the Republican People's Commissariats of Justice and were part of the system of the Main Directorate of Correctional Labor Institutions. In 1934, general prisons were transferred to the Gulag of the NKVD of the USSR, and in September 1938, an independent Main Prison Directorate was formed within the NKVD [8, 9 ].

When the NKVD was divided into two independent people's commissariats - the NKVD and the NKGB - this department was renamed the NKVD Prison Department. In 1954, by decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Prison Department was transformed into the Prison Department of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In March 1959, the Prison Department was reorganized and included in the system of the Main Directorate of Prisons of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The most difficult conditions were established in the camps, basic human rights were not respected, and severe punishments were applied for the slightest violation of the regime. Prisoners worked for free on the construction of canals, roads, industrial and other facilities in the Far North, Far East and other regions. Mortality from hunger, disease and overwork was extremely high [7, 8, 12].

1.3 The scale of the Gulag

Since perestroika, the question has constantly arisen about the real number of those repressed during the years of the existence of the Gulag. [2, 4, 9]. According to available data, more than forty domestic and foreign authors have studied and are studying the problems of the criminal legal policy of the USSR in the 1920-1950s of the last century.

Book by A.I. Solzhenitsyn "The Gulag Archipelago" [10], which, despite the fact that it was first published in the West in 1973, was very widely distributed in samizdat. The first volume of "Archipelago" contained a detailed study of everything that preceded the appearance of millions of Soviet people in Stalin's concentration camps: the system of arrests and various types of imprisonment, torture investigations, judicial and extrajudicial reprisals, stages and transfers. In the second volume of his book, A. Solzhenitsyn examines the main and main part of the Gulag empire - “extermination labor camps” [10]. Nothing here escapes the attention of the author. The history of the camps, the economy of forced labor, the management structure, categories of prisoners and the daily life of camp inmates, the situation of women and children, the relationship between ordinary prisoners, criminal and political, security, convoy, information service, recruitment of informers, the system of punishments and rewards, the work of hospitals and medical posts, various forms of killing, murder and the simple procedure for burying prisoners - all this is reflected in Solzhenitsyn’s book.The author describes various types of hard labor for prisoners, their starvation rations, he studies not only the camp, but also the immediate camp world, the features of psychology and behavior of prisoners and their jailers (in Solzhenitsyn's terminology, "camp workers"). This thorough artistic study is based on reliable facts [10].

Based on authentic archival documents [2, 11, 12], which are stored in leading Russian archives, primarily in the State Archives of the Russian Federation (formerly TsGAOR USSR) and the Russian Center for Socio-Political History (formerly TsPA IML), many authors conclude with a sufficient degree of certainty that for 1930-1953 in correctional 6.5 million people visited labor colonies, of which about 1.3 million were for political reasons, through forced labor camps in 1937-1950. About two million people were convicted of political charges.

Objective data about prisoners in the Gulag in 1943-1953.

During 1946, 228.0 thousand repatriates were checked in screening and filtration camps.

Of these, by January 1, 1947, 199.1 thousand were transferred to a special settlement, transferred to industrial cadres (in “work battalions”) and sent to their place of residence. The rest continued to be subject to inspection.

Total number of prisoners in NKVD camps (annual average):

city ​​- 697,258 people;

city ​​- 700,712 people;

city ​​- 1,048,127 people.

city ​​- 5,698 people;

city ​​- 2,197 people;

city ​​- 1,014 people.

Special settlers in 1953 - 2,753,356 people, of which 1,224,931 were Germans, including those evicted by government decision - 855,674, mobilized - 48,582, repatriated - 208,388 and locals - 111,324 people.

Evicted from the North Caucasus in 1943-1944. - 498,452, incl. Ingush - 83,518; Chechens - 316,717; Karachais - 63,327; Balkars - 33,214; others - 1,676 people.

Those evicted from Crimea in 1944 - 204,698, incl. Crimean Tatars - 165,259; Greeks - 14,760; Bulgarians - 12,465; Armenians - 8,570; others - 3,644.

Evicted from the Baltic states in 1945-1946. - 139,957.

Those evicted from Georgia in 1944 - 86,663, incl. Meskhetian Turks - 46,790; Kurds - 8,843; hemshils - 1,397.

Evicted in 1943-1944: Kalmyks - 81,475.

Evicted in 1949 from the Black Sea coast - 57,142, incl. Greeks 37,353; Dashnaks - 15,486; Meskhetian Turks - 1,794; others - 2,510.

Those evicted from the Moldavian SSR in 1949 - 35,838.

The eviction of OUN members along with their families took place during 1944-1952. - 175,063; Vlasovites - 56,746.

Thus, based on the given archival data of the OGPU-NKVD-MVD of the USSR, we can draw an intermediate, but apparently very reliable conclusion: during the years of Stalinism, 3.4-3.7 million people were sent to camps and colonies for political reasons .

It is known that the archives do not contain ready-made statistical data (or they were destroyed). However, according to various estimates, for the period from 1930 to 1953. about 52 million people were convicted, of whom about 20 million went through the camps. The scale of the victims is not diminished even by the caveat that these figures include those convicted for the second time. A huge number of people were shot - about 1 million people, excluding those who died from torture or committed suicide. At least 6 million people have clicked through the links.

forced labor camp

2. The economic role of the Gulag

An important aspect of the history of the Gulag is its “economic” side.

One of the most important areas of economic activity of ITL was the construction of communication routes [1, 5, 9, 11]. In the 1920s, a number of major problems arose in the field of transport communications, which negatively affected the defense capability of the state. The transport system could not cope with the ever-increasing growth of freight traffic, and this jeopardized the implementation of not only programs for economic development, but also to improve its safety. The state did not have the ability to quickly transfer significant material, demographic resources, and troops (this problem existed even in the Russian Empire and became one of the prerequisites that led to defeat in the Russo-Japanese War).

That is why, during the years of the first five-year plan, large transport projects were implemented, especially railways, which had economic and military-strategic significance. Four railways and two trackless roads were built. In 1930, the construction of a 29-kilometer branch to Khibiny Apatity was completed, and work began on the construction of a 275-kilometer Syktyvkar-Pinega railway. In the Far Eastern Territory, the OGPU organized the construction of an 82-kilometer railway line from Pashennaya to Bukachachi, and on the Trans-Baikal Railway in Eastern Siberia - a 120-kilometer section of the Tomsk-Yeniseisk railway. Syktyvkar, Kem and Ukhta were connected by tracts 313 and 208 km long. Prisoner labor was used in areas where the local population was practically absent or could not be involved in basic work. These construction projects were aimed at creating an economic base in the outlying, undeveloped and strategically important regions of the country (the main area of ​​ITL activity) [1,7].

The most popular construction project among various whistleblowers of the Stalin era was the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal, which was built between 1931 and 1933. However, the implementation of this project was directly related to the security of the Soviet Union. For the first time, the question of building a canal in Soviet Russia was raised after the October 1917 coup. The idea arose much earlier; the plan for the construction of a shipping canal belonged to Tsar Peter and appeared during the Northern War with Sweden. In the 19th century, four canal construction projects were developed: in 1800 - the project of F.P. Devolan, 1835 - the project of Count A.H. Benckendorf, 1857 - the adjutant wing of Loshkarev and 1900 - Professor Timanov (they were not implemented due to high cost). In 1918, the Council of the National Economy of the North created a plan for the development of the region's transport system. This plan included the construction of the White Sea-Ob railway and the Onega-White Sea canal. These communications were supposed to provide economic ties between the Northwestern industrial region and Siberia and become the basis for the development of the Ukhta-Pechersk oil-bearing and Kola mining regions. However, during the Civil War and the intervention, and then the restoration of the country, these plans were postponed.

In 1930, the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR returned to the issue of building the canal, which was related to the problem of the country's security - neighboring Finland was then pursuing an anti-Soviet policy and counting on the support of other Western states in the fight against Soviet Russia.

If in the pre-war years the Gulag contingent was an important means of solving economic problems, then the outbreak of war, interrupting the implementation of the “socialist construction program”, subordinated all its activities to the interests of the armed struggle, then in the post-war years, Gulag prisoners were used as free labor to raise the destroyed industry and cities and sat down. Given the significant replenishment of the camps, due to repatriated prisoners of war, a huge army of prisoners appeared.

Camp labor contingents were used at that time in all sectors of the national economy, and especially where there was a chronic shortage of hired labor. [2, 4, 9]. For example, in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, when the Allies began transporting their Lend-Lease caravans along the Northern Sea Route, Nordvikstroy was formed, where some of the prisoners from Norillag were transferred. Nordvikstroy is a major labor front facility, which flourished in 1944. At this time, the Allies bunkered ships here with local coal going with Lend-Lease cargo to Murmansk. Miners cut coal for steamships in Nordvik. Here, ships battered by the ice of the northern seas were repaired, and fresh water supplies were replenished. Nordvika had its own salt mine, and at that time salt was worth its weight in gold or even ammunition. Allied ships also stood in Nordvik Bay in anticipation of normal ice conditions in the Velkitsky Strait.

At the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Plant, the number of prisoners working at the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Plant increased every year, as the plant was developing rapidly at that time. And if in 1941 20.5 thousand prisoners worked there, then in 1943 their number approached 31 thousand, and already in 1944 it amounted to almost 35 thousand. Moreover, in Norillag the scope of use of prisoner labor gradually expanded. For example, in 1941, they built 175 km of railway tracks. Thanks to all this, already in 1941 the plant produced 48 thousand tons of ore and cut 324 thousand tons of coal (compared to 228 thousand tons in 1940). The production and processing of platinoids in Norilsk made it possible to repay the USSR's debt to the allies for deliveries under Lend-Lease.

Of particular interest, however, is the use of prison labor in the defense industry. [3, 5, 8, 12].

In total, over 60 thousand people were transferred to the defense industry enterprises of the region during the war years, of which 3.5 thousand were in the coal industry; 7.2 thousand worked in the ammunition and weapons industry; in non-ferrous metallurgy - 9.2 thousand people.

After prisoners were assigned to industrial enterprises, they were covered by the food supply system used by civilian workers. This made it possible not only to save the lives of many prisoners, but also to make their contribution to the overall victory of the people real.

Another feature of the Gulag system Shevchenko notes is the following: from the beginning of the war, by orders of the NKVD, certain categories of prisoners were released with the transfer of persons of military age to the Red Army. Some of the prisoners released from custody remained in the camps as civilian workers without the right to leave the work areas until the end of the war. Only completely disabled people, old people and women with children were released - as the most reliable reserve of labor. Former prisoners, for the most part, sought to consolidate the freedom granted to them, because any violation of production regimes by them or independent departure from the enterprise could cost them their lives.

Another traditional idea that various types of enterprises in the country needed labor, which the Gulag provided, does not correspond to reality. The connection was just the opposite. The NKVD simply did not know what to do with the incredibly increased number of prisoners, who in connection with this they tried to use in accordance with the tasks of the socialist economy [1]. This explains the mind-boggling number of citizens shot in the prime of their lives and many of the notorious voluntaristic decisions of the party leadership in the field of the national economy (the Dead Road is just one example of many similar ones).

Gradually, with the abandonment of manual labor in favor of machine labor, the GULAG turned out to be unprofitable, because complex and expensive machines, machines, etc. were entrusted. prisoners the state could not [4, 8].

Therefore, in 1956, the Gulag “ceased to exist”... but the camps and prisoners remained, and the government still continued to exploit the forced labor of prisoners.

Conclusion

The Main Directorate of the Camps (GULAG) was a typical state-bureaucratic institution in form. It was an important part of the Soviet penitentiary system. During the thirty-year period (from 1930 to 1960) of the existence of this head office, its departmental affiliation and full name changed several times. Over the years, the Gulag was under the jurisdiction of the OPTU of the USSR, the NKVD of the USSR, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and the Ministry of Justice of the USSR.

The GULAG was actively involved in the implementation of projects to restore the national economy and projects related to the development of the country's defense complex. Forced labor became an important element in the mechanism for the Soviet state to build up its military-industrial potential.

To summarize, we note that the creation of an entire system of correctional institutions-camps was one of the most cruel mistakes of Stalinism. It is difficult to accurately define their purpose: to present it as an improvement in the prison system is cynical; as an “innovative” form of punishment - historically ignorant; as an “ideal” system of intimidation, intimidation and maintenance of the cult of Stalin - most likely, at the same time, the Gulag - it was an inexhaustible source of free labor, as the height of impunity.

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The “running start” of our construction, its brilliant start, was Istra. She gave the first heroes to the Dmitlag canal army, opened the book of the history of Moscow-Volgostroy...”, wrote the camp magazine in 1936. As you know, the Istra Reservoir is located in a completely different area of ​​the Moscow region than the current Moscow Canal. The fact is that initially several options for the Moscow-Volga canal route were considered, and the Gulag did not get involved in its construction immediately, but only after the inability of the “civilian” departments to cope with such a large-scale task became obvious to the country’s leadership.
Dmitlag, which served the construction of the canal, formally had the status of one of the local departments of the ITL OGPU. However, the importance of the construction and proximity to Moscow placed Dmitlag in a special position. The work on the construction of the canal was closely monitored by both the highest KGB authorities and higher authorities.
It is therefore worth considering the history of this camp in more detail (especially since the Dmitlag documents are stored in the same place as the records management of the Gulag itself - a unique case for the archives of camp administrations).
On June 16, 1931, the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to build the Moscow-Volga canal, initially entrusted to the People's Commissariat of Water Resources of the USSR. At the same time, various options for the canal route continued to be discussed: Staritsky (from the village of Rodnya a few kilometers above the city of Staritsa through Volokolamsk with access to the Istra River); Shoshinsky (from the city of Korcheva along the Gorodishche-Klin-Istra line); finally, Dmitrovsky.
Based on the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 758 of September 1, 1931, by orders of the People's Commissariat of Water of the USSR No. 142 of September 8, 1931 and by the Moscow-Volga Canal Construction Department No. 1a of September 1, P.Ya. was appointed head of canal construction. Bovin (formerly deputy head of the Central Administration of River Transport of the USSR People's Commissariat of Water Resources).
By order of the Chairman of the Moscow City Council N.A. Bulganin dated October 3 and by order of the Canal Construction Administration No. 17 dated October 20, Alexander Ivanovich Fidman was appointed chief engineer of the Directorate from September 1 and with a monthly salary of 1,200 rubles.
But only by the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on October 10, the “Regulations on state construction for the construction of the Moscow-Volga canal and the Moscow port “Moskanalstroy” were approved. Moskanalstroy (MKS), which was under the authority of the Presidium of the Moscow City Executive Committee, was entrusted with the construction of structures to ensure water supply to Moscow, the establishment of a port in Moscow and the creation of a waterway connecting Moscow with the Volga. The head and chief engineer of the Construction Department were to be appointed by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
On October 17, the ISS design sector was headed by A. N. Komarovsky (previously the head of the design and survey bureau of Gidrotekhstroy).
As of October 26, the structure of the ISS looked like this: control; secretariat; general accounting; sectors: administrative and economic, personnel, labor economics, economic research, supply, information and technical propaganda, survey and scientific research, design, hydrological, hydropower, control and accounting, auxiliary enterprises.
On December 28, by order of the head of the ISS, P. Ya. Bovin, “in order to more fully cover the issues of our construction in the press,” all sector heads were asked “every 5 days to submit brief information on the progress of the sectors to the information sector comrade. Insarova.”

For work on the Istra River, by order of the ISS No. 6 of January 11, 1932, the Istra Construction Department was formed with a location in the city of Istra (formerly Voskresensk). Engineer A. A. Belokonev was appointed its chief from January 1.

On February 27, by a resolution of the Council of Labor and Defense, the construction of the canal was included among the “impact objects.” On March 31, this was announced in the order for the ISS No. 64.
On May 27, an order for ISS No. 94 appeared, interesting in that the contours of the future Dmitlag first appeared here; with the construction of the Istrinsky reservoir, as can be seen from here, things were going badly at that time:

Ҥ 1. Work on the construction of the Volga - Dmitrov - Moscow canal, in administrative and technical terms, is divided into 5 districts, headed by the Chiefs of Work. The department uniting all districts is located in Dmitrov.
The work supervisors' offices are located in the following cities:

1st district - Volzhsky: embracing the buildings of the Volzhsky dam, lock and hydroelectric station - in the city of Kalyazin.
2nd district - Northern: embracing the construction of the canal from the Volga to kilometer 55, with all artificial structures, the head structure on the Volga and locks No. 1 and 2 - in the city of Dmitrov.
3rd district - Vodorazdelny: hugging the canal from 56 to 103 kilometers, with all artificial structures and locks No. 3, 4 and 5 - in the city of Iksha.
4th district - Southern: hugging the canal from 104 to 127 kilometers, with all artificial structures, Klyazminskoye and Mytishchi reservoirs and locks No. 6, 7 and 8 - in the city of Mytishchi.
5th district - Moscow: covering the construction of the Moscow port, artificial structures attached to it, the construction of 4 dams on the river. Moscow with locks next to them, straightening the river. Yauza and the construction of the embankment - in Moscow.
§ 2. The staff of the districts is established by special Instructions.
§ 3. An engineer is appointed as the head of the Southern (4th) district. I. I. Makarov. He is appointed acting. Head of Works of the 5th Moscow District.
§ 4. In other areas, the positions of Work Managers remain temporarily unfilled. The fulfillment of the duties of N-kov districts is assigned to the senior. prod. works assigned to:
for the Northern (2nd) district: engineer. A. E. Kostrov,
according to Vodorazd. (3rd): Eng. E. A. Bazhanov.
§ 5. In connection with the above, N-ku Istrinsky Str-va engineer. Makarov must, after eliminating the work in Zelenkovo, begin no later than May 25th to organize the office of the 4th district in the city of Mytishchi and begin work according to the instructions.
§ 6. Art. the work foreman engineer Kostrov and engineer. Bazhanov to organize offices and carry out preparatory work on their sites, in accordance with the instructions given to them.
§ 7. B. Beginning. Istrinsky Str-va engineer. Makarov and senior for the work manager, engineer Kostrov, to distribute the staff of Istrinsky Str. between the Southern and Northern regions and, as the staff in Zelenkovo ​​becomes free, transfer workers to the place of new service, satisfying them when moving under the Labor Code.
§ 8. B. The head of the Istra Str., engineer Makarov, is to leave part of the staff to draw up a technical and monetary report on the Istra Str. with an explanatory note to it, which must be submitted within a month.
§ 9. The materials and equipment remaining on the Istra Str. are subject to delivery to the Supply Sector of Moskanalstroy for their division between districts.”
The project for a dam near the village of Zelenkovo, which, if implemented, would have formed a colossal reservoir with a branch into the Nakhabinka valley before its connection with the Skhodnya River, remained on paper. As a result, a dam was built on Istra, but much higher, near the village of Rakova, while the canal route ran far to the side.
On June 1, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, by resolution No. 859, ordered “to immediately begin the construction of the Volga-Moscow water canal, approving the Dmitrovsky option for the direction of this canal,” in order to complete all work “by November 1934,” “the construction of the canal is included in a special list of large industrial construction sites; oblige the People's Commissariat of Labor of the USSR to allocate construction areas for labor recruitment; allow the use in construction of part of the workforce, technical personnel and equipment released from work on the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal.”
But the People's Commissariat of Labor did not have to engage in recruiting civilian personnel.
On June 8, the ISS ordered “no information, materials or interviews to be given to newspaper and magazine correspondents without the knowledge of the boss and chief engineer.”

This is not surprising: on May 28, the former head of the Gulag, L.I. Kogan, became the head of the construction of the canal, who also retained the position of head of Belomorstroy.

Kogan’s signature as the construction manager is under Order No. 105 on the ISS of June 8, which announced “a new scheme for dividing the Construction of the Moscow-Volga Canal into construction sections”:

“FIRST SITE - Savelovo-Fedorovka; The office of this section is temporarily located in Savelovo.
SECOND SECTION - From 0 to 18 kilometers; office in the village Ivantsovo.
THIRD SECTION - From 19 to 35 kilometers; office in the village Dam.
FOURTH SECTION - From 36 to 55 kilometers; office in Dmitrov.
FIFTH SECTION - From 56 to 69 kilometers; office in Vlaherna.
SIXTH SECTION - From 70 to 80 kilometers; office in Iksha.
SEVENTH SECTION - From 81 to 97 kilometers; office in the village Drachevo.
EIGHTH SECTION - In charge of the construction of a dam on the river. Klyazma near the village of Pirogovo and the dam near the city of Mytishchi; The office of this site is located in the city of Mytishchi.
NINTH SECTION - From 98 to 110 kilometers; office in the village Khlebnikovo.
TENTH SECTION - From 111 to 120 kilometers; office in the village Khimki.
ELEVENTH SECTION - From 121 to 127 kilometers; office in the village Ivankov (or Pokrovsky-Streshnevo).
TWELFTH SECTION - Construction on the river. Moscow, near the village. Trinity-Lykovo, with an office at the work site.
THIRTEENTH SECTION - Construction on the river. Moscow, near the village. Shelepikha, with an office at the work site.
FOURTEENTH SECTION - Construction on the river. Moscow, near the village. Breaks, with the office at the work site.”

The same order ordered the assistant chief engineer - work manager K.K. Radetsky “with his subordinate staff” to “leave for permanent work in the city of Dmitrov” by June 15.
On August 19, by order of the ISS No. 148, the entire Moscow-Volga Canal Construction Department was transferred to Dmitrov (by September 1).
On August 23, the ISS design sector was transformed into the Design Department (PRO), headed by the same A. N. Komarovsky.
On September 14, by order of the OGPU No. 889c, the Dmitrov forced labor camp of the OGPU was organized “on the territory of the Moscow region with the headquarters located in the city of Dmitrov,” and the Personnel Department of the OGPU was instructed to “staff” Dmitlag.
On September 16, A.E. Sorokin was appointed head of Dmitlag (from the post of head of the 5th (supply) department of the Gulag).
On October 9, paragraph 1 of order No. 10 for the Dmitrovsky ITL (DITLAG, DITL) announced the “internal rules of camp life”:

“1) Rise 5 hours. 30 min.
2) Breakfast from 5-45 to 6-30.
3) Divorce for work from 6-30 to 7 o’clock.
When going to work in batches, set the salary strictly to 5 people. closed rows.
4) The working day is counted from 7 o'clock. until 17 o'clock During this time s/k. h/c. [apparently, by this time the abbreviation z/k - prisoner - was used only in the singular] fulfill the labor standards assigned to them, upon completion of work they line up in orderly rows of 5 in a row and follow in that order to the camp.
5) Lunch from 17 to 19 hours, during lunch s/c. h/c. They observe the full order of the queue to receive it in the kitchen without allowing any fuss, jostling or swearing.
6) Evening point from 19 to 22 hours, which is presented for the work of the EHF.
7) Lights out for bed at 22:50. After lights out, all movement around the camp is suspended. z/k with the exception of exit for the exercise of natural needs. Z/k.z/k must always be undressed and sleep without allowing negotiations with neighbors. Outerwear should be neatly folded.
The head of the camp point should determine the prohibited area for walking. z/k., which is prohibited especially at night; simultaneously explain to everyone the s/k. s/k., that when a s/k appears at night. h/c. in the line of fire outside the restricted area will be considered an attempt to escape, and therefore the sentries at their posts will use their weapons without warning.
8) Lighting fires after lights out is not permitted.”

The second paragraph of the same order included “on the lists and all types of allowances according to the list” prisoners who arrived from the following OGPU camps: Belbaltlag - 12 people (arrived from October 8), Svirlag - 144 people (from October 5), Temlaga - 1 (from October 5), Balakhninsky ITL - 5 people (from October 5). Paragraph three ordered the five “hidden prisoners from the OGPU DITLAG... to be excluded from the lists of the camp and all types of allowances..., and the taken uniforms, according to the reinforcement list, to be written off.”
On October 13, by order of Dmitlag No. 12, prisoners arriving from other camps - from “Belbaltlag in the amount of 1 person and Vishlag in the amount of 26 people” - were enrolled from October 9 “for all types of allowances,” and the following was said about one of the five above-mentioned fugitives: “Detained Aleksey Guryev’s salary is supposed to be available and enlisted in all types of allowance from October 9.”
In the same order, it seems, one of the first canal builders who was released was named: “N.I. Borisov, who was released after serving his sentence, will be excluded from the lists and all types of allowances from October 6, 1932, and the issued uniforms will be in accordance with the army list.” .
On October 13, by order of the OGPU No. 965c “On the transfer of personnel records of the Dmitrov camp to the PP OGPU MO” “in development of the OGPU order No. 889s, the recruitment and registration of personnel” of Dmitlag was entrusted to the “Authorized Representative of the OGPU of the Moscow Region.”
On October 15, by order No. 11 on the “Construction of the Volga-Moscow River Canal” and the Directorate of the Dmitrov ITL OGPU, “in order to save money and eliminate parallelism,” the apparatuses of the Construction Directorate and the Dmitlag were merged “for the following types of work” (by the same order some of their superiors were appointed) :
- United Financial Department (head of the camp’s financial department and deputy head of the construction financial department - A. R. Dorfman);
- United General Administrative Department (head - A. R. Dorfman part-time; deputy head - I. B. Yavits part-time);
- United Dmitrovskoe foreman;
- United Transport Department;
- United Communications Department;
- United General Supply Department (head - “Comrade Filippov”);
- United Technical Supply Department (head of the department - “Comrade Pershin part-time”);
- United Work Supply Department “ZRK”;
- United Sanitary Department;
- United Cultural and Educational Department;
- United Forestry Department;
- United Department of Ancillary Production and Economic Enterprises.

“All types of construction production both in the camp and in Moskanalstroy” were now united under the jurisdiction of the Work Supervisor Department; the Construction personnel sector was abolished, its functions were transferred to the Bureau for the Recruitment of Labor and Technical Personnel (headed by Morozov) of the General Administrative Department; to replace the disbanded sector of labor economics, a Bureau for Technical Standards was created under the Department of the Work Supervisor.
On October 25, by order of Dmitlag No. 23, S.I. Auerbach (who was mentioned in this position at the beginning of the month) was appointed head of the Cultural and Educational Department (CED).
On October 25, the “iron deputy chairman” (the wording of the camp magazine “To storm the highway”) Yagoda signed OGPU order No. 995c “On measures taken by the OGPU PP, the OGPU Transport Authorities and the RKM [Workers’ and Peasants’ Militia] Directorates to combat escapes from the Dmitrov camp OGPU":

“The construction of the Volga-Moscow canal is entrusted to the OGPU and is carried out by the newly organized Dmitrovsky OGPU camp.
The special working conditions of the Dmitrovsky OGPU camp, several tens of thousands of prisoners of which work in close proximity to Moscow, pose especially acute issues of intelligence and operational services for prisoners and require all possible assistance from all bodies of the OGPU and RKM to the Dmitrovsky camp in this regard.
I have assigned the task of completely eliminating escapees from the Dmitrov camp to the PP OGPU MO and the GULAG OGPU.
In this work, the clear assistance of all OGPU bodies, both territorial, transport, and police, is especially important. I order:
To all OGPU PP, all OGPU transport bodies and all RK police bodies, tasks of the OGPU GULAG, OGPU Dmitrov camp and OGPU MO PP in relation to requests, installations, searches, arrests, ambushes, etc., regarding fugitives from the Dmitrov camp - to carry out at 24 hours and immediately report the results of the task.
The head of the GULAG OGPU and the PP OGPU MO report to me on the effectiveness of the activities of the OGPU and RKM bodies on this issue.”

On October 28, in the next, No. 1652/342, resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR “On the construction of the Volga-Moscow canal” it was written: “1. Do not object to the use of the workers and technical forces of Belomorstroy for the construction of the Volga-Moscow canal and the Istra dam, entrusting the organization and management of this matter to the OGPU. 2. Construction to be completed by August 1934.”

On October 31, by order of the OGPU No. 1005, the “management staff for the construction of the Volga-Moscow canal” was appointed:
- Head of Canal Construction - L.I. Kogan, concurrently holding the position of Head of Belomorstroy;
- Deputy Head of Construction - Ya. D. Rapoport, concurrently with the positions of deputy. beginning GULAG and deputy. beginning Belomorstroy;
- assistant to the head of Construction - N.A. Frenkel, concurrently with the position of head of works at Belomorstroy (in fact, this appointment remained on paper);
- Head of the Financial Department of Construction - L.I. Berenzon, concurrently with the position of Head of the Financial Department of the OGPU;
- Chief Engineer of Construction - A.I. Fidman;
- deputy Chief Engineer of Construction - S. Ya. Zhuk, concurrently holding the position of Deputy. chief engineer of Belomorstroy;
- deputy Chief Engineer of Construction - N.F. Shaposhnikov.

November 4 V.D. Zhurin (recently from the Belomorsk plant) replaced A. N. Komarovsky at the head of the ISS Design Department.
On November 7, an order on Canal Construction and the Dmitlag Administration No. 34 appeared, timed to coincide with the “fifteen-year anniversary of the existence of Soviet power,” which called for “to connect the Volga River with the Moscow River by canal within a year and a half, to give the proletarian capital water and to allow large Volga steamships to pass through the HEART OF THE SOVIET UNION , TO MOSCOW. Today, on the day when the CANAL ARMY MEMBERS of “BELMORSTROY” hand over the basically completed “BELMORSTROY” to the country, the prisoners of the Dmitrov OGPU camp must declare themselves “CANAL ARMY MEMBERS” of the new waterway “Volga-Moscow” river... You must all, as one, join the shock, assault columns CHANNEL ARMY OF DMITLAG OGPU and under the victorious banners of “Belmorstroy” become the undefeated army of the “Volga-Moscow” channel. The order was signed by the head of canal construction L.I. Kogan and the head of Dmitlag A.E. Sorokin.

On November 25, the order on Dmitlag No. 55 prescribed, “in accordance with the order of the OGPU No. 993 / C, dated 23/XI-this year, and the GULAG OGPU Circular No. 565430, dated 10/XI-32 - Information and Investigation Department and Parts of the Paramilitary Security of the DMITLAG OGPU - MERGED and henceforth called the “THIRD DEPARTMENT”; the head of the Paramilitary Security was concurrently assigned the position of assistant to the head of the 3rd department for military maintenance; the heads of the information and investigative units of the Dmitlag departments were renamed operational commissioners of the 3rd department; commanders of VOHR units in departments and camps became concurrently authorized by the 3rd department for combating escapes and were operationally subordinate to the detectives of the 3rd departments of departments and camps (l/p) of Dmitlag.

On December 2, the order of the head of Dmitlag No. 62 appeared, sealed also with the signature of the head of the General Administrative Department of Bovshover:

“There are cases of absentees from work. h/c. based on undressing, while the Departments and military personnel are supplied with uniforms and shoes in sufficient quantities.
While investigating a case of absenteeism from work, 6 people were employed. h/c. ..., allegedly due to the lack of shoes, it turned out that these convicts had boots. h/c. were hidden under the bedding.
I attribute this kind of action to negligence on the part of the headman and the Accounting and Distribution Department.
To avoid the recurrence of this kind of abnormal phenomena, I ORDER:
1. Report to the headman in writing to the Household Unit the night before about the availability of a s/k. z/k., who, due to undress, cannot go to work.
2. Household units immediately check the information of the headman and, in cases of real need for the issuance of uniforms, shoes or repairs, satisfy them without delay.
3. In cases where, according to the reinforcement books, uniforms and shoes are listed as issued by the contractor. and those are squandered, draw up acts in 3 copies, of which one is transferred to the ISO [Information and Investigation Department, which by that time had already become the 3rd department], the second to the Write-off Commission and the third remains in the affairs of l./p.

Promoters are issued uniforms and shoes for the second term.

4. All cases of non-responsibility for work. h/c. due to the lack of management of the heads of l/p., URCh and Household units - the Finance Department should attribute ordinary labor at the expense of the persons personally guilty of this.”

On December 20, by order of Dmitlag No. 79 “in commemoration of the 15th Anniversary of the Bodies of the Cheka-OGPU on December 20 this year. G." All those held in the camp isolator (IZO) were released early “for misdemeanors and offenses..., except for those under investigation.”
On December 25, by order No. 83 of Dmitlag, it was announced that from January 1, 1933, the Dmitrov regional printing house of Mospoligraf was “transferred under the Agreement” to Dmitlag; A. M. Shkurin was appointed head of the printing house. The camp magazine “On the Assault on the Route” (with color illustrations), the newspaper “Reforging” and book supplements to it (at least 50 books, many of which have not survived even in a single copy) began to be published here.
On December 29, the first paragraph of the order from the Construction Department No. 112 severely reprimanded the former head of the X section of the ISS, engineer I.V. Marchenko, for “unjustifiable expenses for the production of six personalized albums of photographs of the work carried out at the X section”; his offense was assessed “as a relic of servility to his superiors,” and Marchenko was charged “the cost of the album he took, the rest of the albums should be taken to the inventory of the ISS”; the second paragraph no. beginning Dmitrovsky camp for PTC (production and technical unit) Marchenko “from this date” was dismissed from service “as not corresponding to his purpose, and, in addition, as being brought to justice” for a “civil suit for payment of debt to Construction”. In addition to the head of Construction Kogan, the order was signed by the head of the General Administrative Department Sinyavsky.

By OGPU Order No. 071 of February 11, 1933, Ya. D. Rapoport became the new head of Dmitlag (and at the same time deputy head of Construction while retaining the position of deputy head of the Gulag). A.E. Sorokin, who handed over the cases to him, returned to his former position as head of the 5th department of the Gulag. At the same time, the position of deputy chief of Dmitlag was taken by V. T. Radetsky, who had previously headed the border guard at the OGPU PO for the North Caucasus region.

Order for the Construction of the Canal and the Management of Camp No. 19 dated February 17 is devoted to “careful attitude” towards the “horse stock” and, among other things, demands “to take immediate and decisive measures to stop the record-breaking of carters (especially in logging) who make 200 or more on their horses percent of the required daily norms for exhausting horses. It is not difficult for a driver to set records on the back of a horse when he himself takes very little part in this and when the horse, as a rule, after these records is out of action for a long time or forever.”

The order was signed by the construction manager Kogan and the deputy. head of the UDMITLAG OGPU V.T. Radetsky and sent, according to a handwritten note, to the heads of all departments and camps of the Dmitlag, the heads of the Transport and Forestry construction departments, as well as to the editorial office of the newspaper “reforging”, to the central apparatus of the GULAG, to the Personnel Department of the OGPU PP for the Moscow Region ” and personally - to the employee of the OGPU PP for the Moscow Region A. S. Slavatinsky (see more about him: “Free Thought”, 1998, No. 8, p. 114). Once the head of the “literary” division of the Secret Department of the OGPU, Slavatinsky was transferred from the Central Office to the Moscow PP in 1931. Copies of the most important Dmitlag orders were sent to Slavatinsky at least until the end of May 1933.

The same recipients were sent an order by Dmitlag No. 45 of February 28 on the organization “at the KVO Directorate of DITL” of a special Communications Commission, whose tasks included: “a) establishing written communication with all released prisoners; b) providing assistance to all those being released.” The head of the KVO, S.I. Auerbakh, was appointed Chairman of the Commission; the members were the secretary of the Central Attestation Commission of the camp, Prokopyuk, and the representative of the camp party committee, inspector KVO, Nesterov. All departments of Dmitlag were ordered to “widely notify the campers about this through the KVCH [cultural and educational units] and its workers in the field and explain to those being released from prison, especially women who are being released, that in all cases when they encounter difficulties on the ground in finding work for themselves, they you should immediately seek help and assistance from the Communications Commission of the KVO Directorate.” In the “Instructions on the Communications Commissions of the O.G.P.U. camps” attached to the order. it was clarified that we were talking about “organizing written communication with released socially close prisoners”, and “letters of interest from the point of view of educational value” were proposed to be “transferred for widespread use through the cultural and hospital apparatus among prisoners, as visual propaganda material that should influence difficult-to-correct prisoners, provided that this material is correctly brought to the consciousness of each of them.”

On February 25, by order of DITL No. 42, the bandmaster of the Dmitlag Administration, Max Avelyevich Kyuss (author of the famous waltz “Amur Waves”), was appointed from March 1 “to the position of VOKhR shooter with the duties of a bandmaster” (the position of bandmaster itself, apparently, was considered unnecessary).

On March 1, by joint order of the ISS and DITL No. 24, “the untimely payment of bonuses to workers” was regarded “as a disruption of the System of rewarding conscientiously working camp workers and the ongoing measures to increase labor productivity with the holding of heads of departments, heads of production and technical units and heads of financial units to personal responsibility "

March 2 signed by Kogan and deputy. The head of the Department of Dmitlag Radetsky issued order No. 25 on Construction and the camp:

“The system of Correctional Labor Camps of the OGPU provides an opportunity for people who committed crimes against Soviet power to reform and return to the working family.
The correctional labor practice of the OGPU camps is based, first of all, on labor processes and on the initiative of prisoners, which is the only reason why in the OGPU camps the admission of prisoners to economic and even administrative positions is practiced and encouraged.
People who strive for correction value this. They learn to work honestly and selflessly, take care of the state penny and state property.
They treat the property entrusted to them as they should treat SACRED PUBLIC PROPERTY.
But there are prisoners who do not want to reform, there are scoundrels, criminals who do not want to become honest people.
They continue to be enemies of Soviet Power in the camps, fight against it and plunder public property.
Prisoners: BEZFAMILNY, Ivan Vasilievich,
Polyakov, Vladimir Ivanovich,
TROFIMOV, Semyon Nikitich,
STOKLITSKY, Zundel Izrailevich,
Using their official position, they engaged in thefts and self-supply, for which the OGPU Collegium sentenced them to 10 years each, with the sentence to be served on Solovetsky Island.
B/hired citizen of the mountains. Dmitrova MIRONOV, Nikolai Emelyanovich, for communication with prisoners, expressed [so] in complicity, by selling stolen products to the above-mentioned prisoners, the OGPU Collegium sentenced to 10 years in forced labor camps.
Announcing this resolution of the OGPU Collegium, I WARN that the social measure. protection in relation to the above-mentioned thieves is a measure that warns all other workers of the Dmitrov camps, and if this warning does not give real results, then from now on the most severe measures will be applied for thefts, up to and including the application of the death penalty - execution.
This order should be read to the entire camp population, and the EHF should be worked through through the teachers at regular conversations with camp inmates.”

An order dated back to the beginning of March, signed but not yet numbered, on the organization of the “Volga-Moscow Construction Museum” for comprehensive coverage of exhibits: a) the general significance of the Construction, b) its history, c) the conditions and environment in which it takes place, d) techniques for carrying out survey, design and construction work, e) work on labor re-education of prisoners. To make full use of the experience in the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Waterway, put exhibits b. “Museum of Construction of B.B.V.P.”. The heads of the Construction and Camp departments: Survey and Topographical, Hydrological, Geological, Design, Production, Mechanization, Planning and Economic, KVO and Hydraulic Engineering Laboratory were instructed to take measures to provide the museum being organized with exhibits. According to the temporary staff of the museum, subordinate to the head of Construction, engineer E. E. Skornyakov was appointed its director “in conjunction with his position of Chief. Model and Layout Workshop”, caretaker - R.V. Voloshchak.

On March 7, an order signed by Radetzky followed: “In commemoration of International Women’s Day - the day of workers and peasant women who received the opportunity in the Land of Soviets to build socialism with the entire working class and collective farm peasantry - ... on the day of March 8 for all women to finish work two hours earlier ; Give local instructions to the supply department to improve food for women on this day.”
On March 13, by order of the MKS and DITL No. 36, the procedure for submitting applications for labor to the Gulag was approved, according to which the PEO (production and economic department) under the NSTR (the head of Construction) by the 10th day of each month must establish “the size of the required labor force for the coming month and the size of the required replenishments”, and the submission of applications to the GULAG is carried out through the URO (accounting and distribution department).
On March 25, by order of the ISS No. 40, VOKhR shooter M.A. Kyuss was appointed acting. conductor of the Dmitlag music team.
On April 1, an order was issued to the Camp Administration No. 70 based on the results of an inspection of the 1st camp point of the 7th department of Dmitlag:

“The inspection of the camp established that the living conditions of the prisoners still remain unsatisfactory and this issue was not given due attention by the Head of the Camp, Comrade. Bugasher, nor from the rest of the Laga administration.
The barracks are dirty and overcrowded; the barracks are not equipped - instead of bunks, boards of different sizes are placed without any adjustment. The floors are washed very rarely, the bunks are dirty.
The shock brigades were not provided with better living conditions and were housed in the same dirty and underequipped barracks.
Food preparation is bad - in the kitchen there is a complete theft of food, which is covered by the fact that if the kitchen capacity is sufficient, food is prepared in two steps, with the meat being cooked separately, in cauldrons, then the soup is mixed, the meat is given out not in portions, but in chunks; In addition, in one of the boilers it was discovered that a special dish (jellied meat) was being prepared, apparently exclusively for the camp administration and cooks from the products allocated for the boiler allowance of the z/k z/k. ...
There is dirt, garbage and human excrement in the Lagpunkt courtyard. Weak camp inmates, freed from heavy work, are not used to clean the camp site of debris and dirt.
This situation cannot be tolerated in the future.
I ORDER:
1. Head of the 1st Lagpunkt comrade. Bugasher should be removed from his job and brought before the OGPU Collegium Court.
2. The caretaker of the farm IVANOV was arrested for 15 days with performance of duties for negligence and connivance.
3. The head of the kitchen and all the kitchen staff should be removed and sent to general work, replacing them with female prisoners.
4. In the case of the theft of food in the kitchen and in the storeroom, carry out an investigation and, if facts of abuse by anyone are established, arrest the perpetrators and bring them before the Court of the OGPU Collegium...
7. The Head of the Supply Department should strengthen supervision and inspection of the kitchens, mercilessly holding them accountable for the slightest omissions and thefts.
Soup meat must be given to workers in portions. Indicate to Departments and L/P what percentage of waste may be for broth and bones to determine the weight of portions. Persons checking the kitchen should weigh the portion weight and, if underweight is detected, hold the Manager accountable. Household, Head kitchen, st. cook and kitchen attendant.

POM. HEAD OF THE OGPU DMITLAG DEPARTMENT (K.I. Weiss).”

As we have seen (see “Free Thought”, 1998, No. 7, p. 123), in 1926 the commandant of the OGPU K.I. Weiss was sentenced “to 10 years in strict isolation” and actually began to serve his sentence. However, already on October 18, 1929, he was appointed head of the 3rd department of USLON, from June 10, 1930, Weiss led the 5th department of the Solovetsky camp, from September 11, 1931, he served as assistant to the chief of Svirlag for production work, and, finally, on February 11, 1933 K.I. Weiss was appointed assistant chief of Dmitlag.
On March 31, the camp newspaper “Perekovka” explained that the Istra reservoir was being built “to help the Moscow water pipeline” in order to “regulate the flow of water from the Istra River basin to the Moscow River.”
On April 1, the 3rd department of Dmitlag was headed by V. A. Barabanov (previously deputy head of the OGPU Troops Directorate of the Moscow Region).
On April 3, 1933, the order for camp No. 72 regulated the “Procedure for granting visits,” according to which “meeting prisoners [sic] with relatives is the highest form of encouragement for a camp inmate for impeccable and exemplary behavior and good, conscientious work,” and is granted “only to those prisoners who ... have proven themselves to be exceptionally conscientious shock workers,” and “gives the right to live together with family or relatives in a private apartment or in a specially designated room in the “House for Visitors.”
On April 5, an announcement appeared in “reforging”: “We ask literary workers of newspapers and magazines who worked in periodicals to report themselves through the EHF to the KVO editorial office of “reforging.”
On April 13, by order of Construction No. 50, in order to eliminate its “various names,” its official names were announced: full - “Construction of the Moscow-Volga Canal”, abbreviated - “Moscow-Volgostroy”, in connection with which all previous seals and stamps were declared invalid, and the General Administrative Department of Dmitlag was ordered to “provide the Branches with timely replacement of seals, stamps, forms, etc.” Thus, the abbreviation “ISS”, which had actually gone out of circulation, was replaced by a new one - “MVS”, which lasted until the very end of the canal’s construction.
The typewritten order for the MVS and camp No. 50 dated April 15, signed by Kogan and Radetsky, read:

“Individual words of criminal jargon in the camps are beginning to take on the rights of citizenship. Words such as “bullshit”, “blat”, “philon”, etc. become words in common use, not expelled even from official correspondence, reports, etc.
Clogging the language with words taken from the jargon of the criminal element poses an enormous danger, which, unfortunately, even responsible construction and camp workers do not understand. They do not understand that the introduction into practice of such words as “bullshit”, “blat”, etc. is a consequence of the fact that the phenomena they define have become commonplace.
The most disgusting types of sabotage, the fight against which with all measures should have been carried out not only by the security officers, but also by all conscientious camp inmates, due to the fact that these types of sabotage are qualified by new words that do not mobilize attention, did not become the subject of immediate suppression.
There is no doubt that with the correct qualification of phenomena, with qualification, for example, “bullshit” as “fraud”, “giving knowingly false information”, etc., “crime” - as “bribe”, “use of official position” and etc., the necessary attention would be immediately paid to them and appropriate measures of influence, both administrative and public, would be taken.
...I propose, through the KVO, to carry out a campaign to expel, first of all, the words “bullshit” and “blat” from the camp vocabulary.
The reasons for this must be explained to the campers. It must be suggested that by the mere admission of these words they are engaged in concealing a number of sabotage acts, with all the ensuing consequences. Responsible workers must keep in mind that if the above is required of an ordinary camp worker, this applies even more so to them. They must understand that the expulsion of these words from everyday life is necessary so that the very phenomena they define cannot take place in the camp.
In particular, the unjustified difference that will be obtained between the daily operational data on earthworks and the data from control instrumental measurements should in the future be classified as deliberately false information.”

On April 28, on the basis of the order for camp No. 104, S.I. Auerbach handed over the affairs of the KVO to the new head of this department, N.V. Mikhailov (formerly the chairman of the trade union committee of the Central Office of the OGPU).
By the day of the “international proletarian holiday” on May 1, it was planned to release early all prisoners, “military” (civilian) and military personnel punished under disciplinary measures for up to 20 days. However, in the process of editing the relevant document, the mention of “military”, VOKhR and guardhouse was crossed out for them: the mini-amnesty affected only prisoners.
On May 6, by order of the MBC and camp No. 64, everyone except “specially authorized persons” was categorically prohibited from “photography of the canal route, sites of buildings, structures, works of all types, settlements and persons from among the camp population... From persons who violated the specified rules, cameras will be confiscated and those responsible will be fired from their jobs” (this practice on the canal route far outlived Dmitlag and lasted until the mid-1980s).
On May 10, an order for camp No. 116 announced punishments for guilty prisoners. In particular, head. the saddlery warehouse of the Dmitrovsky camp of I. I. Besprozvanny “for violations of the regulations on Corrective Labor Camps, expressed in an illegal meeting with his wife for a month and placing a child in a prisoner’s barracks” was ordered “to be imprisoned in a penal cell for a period of 6 months”; the head of the Lagpunkt 70 kilometer Ponomarev “for organizing repeated drinking bouts among prisoners” - “transfer to a penal prison for a period of 3 months..., with use for general work”; driver of the Avtobaza z/k Kinko “for drunken brawling, disobedience to the shooter and hitting the shooter in the face” - “subject to detention in a penal cell for a period of 4 months with use exclusively for heavy work,” etc.

On May 16, Gulag Order No. 50, filed with the Dmitlag cases, was dated “On the prohibition of the use of prisoners convicted of criminal offenses in administrative, cultural and educational work.” crimes." As an examination of a number of camps showed, the “indicated contingent” occupied the positions of chiefs and assistant chiefs of camps, worked in the apparatus of certification commissions, etc. Henceforth, it was categorically forbidden to allow political prisoners “to do any work in the 3rd departments of the camp administrations and their branches”, to administrative positions above the head of business trips, “to work on the communications line as radio operators and telegraph operators”, “in the URO above the position contractor”, etc.
On May 18, the new chief of Dmitrovsky camp, Ya. D. Rapoport, signed an order for camp No. 127. “When personally familiarizing himself with the condition of the sub-camp point 69 kilometers of the separate Dmitrov camp camp,” he discovered “the unsanitary condition of the camp” and “the disgraceful maintenance of weapons in the 2nd platoon of the 3rd VOKhR team.” In particular, those “shooters from the military... whose rifle barrels were found to have dirt and rust”, as well as a civilian VOKhR shooter - “for giving me a report while not dressed in uniform and for lack of discipline” - were ordered to be arrested each for five days with detention in a guardhouse.

Order No. 129, similar in content, appeared under the impression of Ya. D. Rapoport’s “personal acquaintance with the state of the Fominsky 1st camp of the 7th Division” of Dmitlag.
On May 20, by order No. 133, “in order to actively combat intra-camp crime, isolate the negative and decomposed element and prisoners prone to escape, the 2nd Camp Point of the 3rd Department (Midday Guardhouse)” was reorganized into a Separate High Security Camp Point with a fine isolator (ShIZO ) in its composition. The Regulations on this camp attached to the order were signed by the head of the 3rd department of the Dmitlag, V. A. Barabanov.
On May 22, Order No. 141 ordered to “concentrate nationalities, especially eastern nationalities, into separate brigades, collectives, artels and camps,” providing them with national literature, special boilers in the kitchens (it was implied to prepare food for Muslims), etc. ; it was noted that “the population of the camp includes a large number of Ukrainians, ... various nationalities of the North Caucasus and nationalities of the East. So, for example: the 3rd and 8th departments are almost entirely staffed by Ukrainians, the 13th department has a large composition of Tatars and Bashkirs, etc. Almost all departments do not take this into account... Cases of manifestations of “great power Russian” chauvinism were observed and occurred on the part of irresponsible camp inmates (in March at the 69th kilometer of the Dmitrovsky point).”
On May 30, by order No. 165, 16 prisoners “who were noticed in sabotage and simulation at work” were subjected to three-month imprisonment in a penal cell, namely in self-harm by creating “artificial diseases for themselves by consuming salt, oats, raw coffee and various garbage, vinegar essence and other poisonous substances.” and substances that have a harmful effect on the body, thereby causing malignant tumors and swelling of the limbs.”

“Reconnaissance work of a scientific expedition of the State Academy of the History of Material Culture identified monuments of the historical past (remains of ancient settlements, settlements, mounds, burial grounds, etc.) in the Construction zone.
because These monuments are of great scientific importance, I propose:
All cases of discovery of any ancient monuments during survey and construction work, as well as accidental finds of ancient objects (items made of stone, bone, horn, iron, bronze, silver, fragments of pottery, etc.) should be immediately reported to the Museum of Construction in Dmitrov, or local representatives of the SAIMC.
The head of the Museum of Construction, upon receipt of information about finds of an archaeological nature, immediately, together with representatives of GAIMK, should find out which of the found objects should be placed in the Museum of Construction, and which should be transferred to other special Museums and repositories for study.
Attaching importance to the enrichment of the Museum with exhibits of an archaeological nature that are only indirectly related to the tasks of Moscow-Volgostroy, I hereby remind the heads of Construction departments of the need to quickly replenish the Museum with exhibits illustrating the modern progress and achievements of Moscow-Volgostroy Construction within each department.”

On June 14, by order of the MBC and camp No. 83, the “canal army men” were notified that “two hundred and twenty-seven kilometers of rocks, forests and swamps of Karelia, which for millions of years lay as an insurmountable barrier between two seas - the Baltic and White - were blown up by your enthusiasm... Canal army men of Moscow-Volgostroy , appreciating the trust of the authorities who located the Dmitrovsky camp near the proletarian capital - Moscow, following the fabulous successes of their fellow Belomorsk residents, they began construction of a canal designed to connect two great rivers - Moscow and the Volga... Echelons of Red Banner Belmorstroevites are already approaching to help the Moscow Volga construction workers in their difficult task... Let’s make the Volga flow past the Kremlin!”

On July 8, L.I. Kogan wrote an open “Letter from the Chief of Construction to the Canal Army Men,” published in three thousand copies, where he called for “the removal and placement of up to 100 million cubic meters of earth in embankments. At Belmorstroy there were 20 million cubic meters of such work. This means there is 5 times more work here than at Belmorstroy. Although the time given to us to complete the entire channel is sufficient, we cannot lose at least one day from it. You can’t lose because the Bolshevik deadlines are set without any reserves; the Bolshevik deadlines are designed for shock workers, not rogues. The Bolsheviks do everything quickly, the Bolsheviks strive to build socialism as quickly as possible. Moscow-Volgastroy is also socialism. It's July, the best month of summer. At Belmorstroy, the canal army workers achieved the highest production indicators in July. We are obliged to achieve the same thing at Moscow-Volgostroy... I tell you how much excavation work you must do per month and do it in one day... Read carefully: “

On July 9, by order No. 22 of the OJSC (General Administrative Department) of Dmitlag, an “archive with a breakdown into camp and construction, similar to that established in the Gulag, was organized: a camp archive from the day the camp was founded; archive on construction from the date of transfer to the disposal of the OGPU.”

On August 5, order for camp No. 270 announced the Gulag directive on the fight against criminal jargon dated July 2, condemning the tendency to introduce criminal jargon “into the colloquial use of civilian and even security personnel, up to the use in the camp press, large-circulation and especially wall newspapers” in the repertoire of propaganda brigades . On the basis of this directive, the Dmitlag once again prohibited the use of “criminal jargon, which is a relic of social and everyday mutilation that interferes with and delays the radical reforging of man.”
August 20, signed by the deputy. The head of the Dmitlag Department, V.T. Radetsky, issued an order for camp No. 291:

“N-to 3 of part 3 of the KRASHENINNIKOV Department in the presence and active participation of the Authorized Person of the same part GOLIKOV, Asst. Beginning 2 l/p. 3 Departments of MIDI, drunk and beat up a prisoner. z/k., staged the execution of the latter, carried out fist reprisals against everyone who answered them “wrongly”. KRASHENINNIKOV drank regularly during his work and was not in charge of the business.
The board of the OGPU sentenced KRASHENINNIKOV to 5 years Correctional-Trud. Camps, GOLIKOV and MIDI - three years each.
The authorized representatives of the 3rd part of the 8th Division of the Camp, DAEN and MARTYNOV, used their official positions for personal purposes for a long time and forced prisoners. h/c. women to have sexual intercourse, everyone who had a relationship with them was given illegal benefits, and they systematically drank with the prisoners.
The OGPU board sentenced DAEN and MARTYNOV to 5 years Correctional-Trud. Each camp.
The order is to be announced against signature to all employees of the Third Parts, to all persons in the military camp. administration."

By OGPU Order No. 140 of August 23, Ya. D. Rapoport was relieved from August 11 from the leadership of Dmitlag in connection with his appointment as head of the White Sea-Baltic Combine; the acting head of Dmitlag from August 11 was V. T. Radetsky.

S. G. Firin became the new head of Dmitlag and at the same time the deputy head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs “with the remaining deputy head of the Gulag” by OGPU order No. 0107 of September 23, 1933. Under his leadership, Dmitlag will work almost until the finished channel is delivered; and when the canal was put into operation, Firin (arrested on April 28, 1937) was shot.

The book “The White Sea-Baltic Canal named after Stalin” describes the story of Firin, worthy of an adventure novel, who carried out either party assignments or military intelligence assignments in some Eastern countries and ended up in prison there, from where he managed to escape. Returning to Moscow, Firin was initially hired to work in the Central Office of the OGPU (see “Svobodnaya Mysl”, 1998, No. 7, pp. 108-109 for more details). However, his foreign vicissitudes apparently continued to arouse suspicion (although the certificate of rehabilitation succinctly noted: “Firin’s work in the Main Intelligence Directorate [of the General Staff] is highly valued”) and as a result, Firin was appointed to the Gulag and soon put in charge of Dmitlag. Although both operatives and Gulag officers served in the same department, and both were called security officers, in reality, already from the late 1920s, two different castes had developed, and operatives easily fell into the Gulag System, but their return back to the territorial bodies of the OGPU-NKVD, not not to mention the Central Office, it was very problematic.

The most important reason for this situation can be conventionally called geographical, and it stemmed from the main task of the Gulag - the colonization of sparsely populated and economically undeveloped areas. There were no big problems with sending prisoners there, but how to force the security officers to change their relatively comfortable conditions and send them to remote points of the Union? Initially, the OGPU leadership relied on romantic enthusiasm, backing it up with some material incentives. As we remember, OGPU Order No. 131 of April 25, 1930 announced the registration of volunteer security officers for leadership work in the newly organized camps: “...The OGPU is entrusted with the task of developing the economic life of the least accessible, most difficult to develop and at the same time possessing enormous natural wealth outskirts of our union, by using the labor of isolated socially dangerous elements, their colonization of sparsely populated areas...

Chekists have more than once shown themselves to be enthusiasts of any new cause. The enthusiasm and energy of the security officers created and strengthened the Solovetsky camps, which play a large positive role in the industrial and cultural development of the far North of the European part of our Union. New camps under the leadership of security officers, just like the Solovetsky camps, should play a transformative role in the economy and culture of the distant outskirts. For this responsible, leadership work in the new camps, in the specific conditions of work in them, there is a need for strong security officers who voluntarily want to work.” Volunteers were required to serve for three years in the camps, after which they could be transferred to operational work in any locality of their choice. The following were also established: a salary increase (up to 50 percent), depending on the remoteness of the place of new service, two months of annual leave, cash remuneration in the amount of three months’ salary after three years of service and an additional leave of 3 months, as well as benefits when moving around the country for the security officers themselves and their family members.

However, these seemingly attractive conditions did not generate a large influx of volunteers. The camps were replenished by guilty or even convicted OGPU workers. However, staffing the camp administration became a serious problem only in 1929, when, with the advent of new ITL Directorates, many vacancies opened up. Before that, in the OGPU there was only the Solovetsky camp, a considerable part of the leading workers of which were selected from the security officers who had committed crimes. True, this principle from time to time gave serious failures: in conditions of remoteness from the center and, as a result, weak control, arbitrariness, abuse of prisoners and even their murder reigned in the Solovetsky camp. In May-June 1930, based on the results of the work of the Special Commission of the OGPU, which examined Solovki, two cases were considered accusing camp personnel of abuses and crimes.

Twelve of the accused were shot, among them I. Kurilko, a former employee of the Orenburg GPU, sentenced to 5 years and sent to Solovki, where he was promoted to a leading position in the internal security of the camp.

In the early 1930s, there were many examples when not even security officers, but ordinary prisoners occupied leadership positions in the camp administration. Only 37 OGPU personnel worked on the construction of the White Sea Canal, and almost all administrative, technical and similar positions were occupied by prisoners. In the future, they too could “go out into public.” This is how N. Frenkel began his career, convicted of fraud and smuggling in the early 1920s. On Solovki, he headed the production department, showing miracles in his work. Upon his release, Frenkel was accepted into the service of the OGPU and in 1931-1933 was one of the leaders of the construction of the White Sea Canal, for which he received the Order of Lenin.

In 1933, Frenkel was already in an independent leadership position - the head of Bamlag (and later he was a lieutenant general of the engineering and technical service, head of the Main Directorate of railway construction camps).

In 1929-1931, the trend of filling camp vacancies with convicted security officers continued. In July 1931, Y. Moroz, a former employee of the Azerbaijani GPU, was appointed head of the Ukhta-Pechora camp, convicted in 1929 for abuse of power (illegal execution) to seven years and already in November headed the Ukhta expedition of the Northern Camps Administration. After his appointment as head of the Ukhta-Pechora camp in September 1931, Moroz’s case was reviewed by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, he was “released early” and officially restored to the right to work in the OGPU.

But other biographical facts could provide the security officer with a transfer to work in the Gulag. Thus, on June 28, 1929, V. Boksha, who had previously been removed from the post of deputy plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU for Kazakhstan and was deprived of the right to work in judicial, investigative and punitive bodies, was appointed head of the newly formed Northern Special Purpose Camps “for concealing his service in the party and the OGPU.” Police in 1908-12.” Nevertheless, Boksha was assigned to work in the camp, although only later, in 1931, the leaders of the OGPU, who themselves did not resolve such issues, filed a petition with the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) to grant Boksha the right to work in the police: greater political trust he no longer deserved it. Boksha survived all the repressions of the 1930s and, as of 1944, worked as the head of the administrative and economic department of the Main Directorate of Railway Construction Camps.

Of course, there were many more such security officers, deprived of political trust, than those convicted. This category became the main supplier of personnel for the Gulag in the 1930s. But unlike the case with Boksha, such distrust, as a rule, was not formally recorded anywhere: simply some aspects of the security officer’s biography - for example, social origin from an “alien environment” or connections with relatives abroad - could ensure that he was transferred to work in the camp system. From the beginning of the 1930s, former intelligence workers also began to be transferred to the Gulag if the circumstances of their stay behind the cordon raised doubts (failure to complete a task, failure, being in prison). These doubts were not enough to punish or dismiss from the authorities, but quite enough to keep such a person away from the secret “kitchen” of the Central Apparatus. So it was with Firin; Later, the legendary security officer, GB Commissar 3rd Rank S.V. Puzitsky (see “Free Thought”, 1998, No. 8, p. 113) also came to work in Dmitlag. In the 1920s, he was one of the organizers of the famous “Trust” operations. and the “Syndicate”, which in 1930 led the “dekulakization”, arrests and eviction of peasants (heading the operational headquarters of this operation), and from 1931 - assistant to the head of the INO. Since 1935, Puzitsky headed the 3rd (operational security) department of Dmitlag, in 1937 he was arrested and executed (since the mid-1930s, sending former intelligence officers to work in the Gulag or in the prison sphere has generally ceased to be a rarity).

On October 14, 1933, Firin signed Dmitlag’s order No. 35: “Without the knowledge of Kogan and mine, it is prohibited for anyone to allow living in private apartments in the city (Dmitrov).”
On October 15, by order of the OGPU No. 399, V. A. Barabanov replaces V. T. Radetsky as deputy chief of Dmitlag; The 3rd department of Dmitlag was now headed by A.V. Kalachnikov (from the position of assistant to the head of the secret political department of the OGPU Moscow Region). At the same time, the head of the camp had another (in addition to K.I. Weiss) assistant - he became M.P. Kostandoglo (formerly assistant to the head of Siblag OGPU).
On October 25, there was an order for the camp No. 362, in which Firin ordered to reorganize the brass bands that existed in the departments of Dmitlag into “Special Liberated Musical Teams”, to enroll the prisoners-musicians who arrived from Vishlag into the central orchestra of the KVO and to prepare “instructions on the procedure for using brass bands, with with a focus on maintaining the route first.”

On October 28, by order No. 365, insignia were established for the heads of individual lagnuks - one diamond in the buttonholes.
On November 2, order for camp No. 376 announced the appointment of “the prosecutor of the camp, who arrived from the Moscow Regional Prosecutor’s Office, Comrade Vladimir Pavlovich DYAKONOV, from October 17 this year. G."
On November 15, by order No. 402, due to the increase in the volume of work on the canal, the URO staff increased to 117 people, not counting 20 people to process the arriving stages.
On November 26, Order No. 433 ordered the Dmitlag Sanitary Department to immediately begin organizing special sanitary towns “in order to quickly restore the strength and health of those groups of camp inmates who, for some reason, represent an inferior workforce.” In the IV department of the Dmitlag at the Orevsky point, a sanitary town for 1500 people was created (“with further development up to 2500 people”), headed by the head of the medical unit of the V department A. Ya. Dolgoborodov, in the VIII department at the 4th (Rakhmanovsky) camp - for 600 people ( acting head - doctor of the Rakhmanovsky infirmary S. Ya. Kolyadko), in the XII department at the Andreevsky camp - for 500 people, headed by the head of the medical unit of this department Dobronravov. It was indicated that “sanatoriums of VIII and XII departments serve only these departments. The Orevsky town should be considered the town of the administration of the DMITLAG OGPU.”
On November 27, by order No. 434, the heads of the camp management departments and the heads of its departments and individual camp points were charged with the responsibility of personally monitoring the notes published in the camp newspaper “Perekovka”, revealing “all kinds of negative phenomena,” and within three days reporting to Firin “about those adopted on the merits.” notes on measures.” The order was brought to the attention of all camp inmates.

On December 2, “due to the absence of camp prisoners from going to work due to frost,” Firin’s telephone message established “a temporary order under which work could be stopped only when the frost is 30 degrees Celsius for the entire camp mass and 25 degrees for the national people. Even in the case of such frosts, work can be suspended only with the permission of the Head of Construction and my... Once again, the Heads of the Departments and the Heads of the camps should personally check the availability of grease and other anti-freezing agents, first of all establishing the supply of these products to the camp workers working on the route.”

On December 3, by resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 2620, the chief engineer for the construction of the Moscow-Volga canal A.I. Fidman was relieved of this position, which was now occupied by S.Ya. Zhuk.
On December 7, the USSR Council of People's Commissars issued a resolution No. 2640, which prescribed: “In view of the increase in the dimensions of the Volga-Moscow canal and the structures on it, as well as in view of the significant increase in the volume of work in connection with this, the construction completion date will be extended until the end of 1935 so that the operation the canal will enter into service from the beginning of navigation in 1936; in view of the poor capacity of the Savelovskaya railway line in its current state and the inability to provide transportation for Moskvolgostroy, it is recognized as necessary during 1934, no later than August-September, to lay second tracks on the Khlebnikovo-Dmitrov section (45 km).”
On December 12, Firin approved the “Menu layout of the premble for the month” compiled by the head of the Dmitlag Supply Department M.A. Greisher, which included: pies with fish and potatoes (as well as cabbage, cereals, pumpkin), boiled pasta, pasta casserole, porridge from various cereals, cutlets and casseroles from cereals, vegetable stew, vinaigrette; Animal fats were used to prepare prembludes; meat is not included in this list.
On December 12, the Sanitary Department of Dmitlag issued a “Sanitary minimum for the barracks”: each camp inmate was entitled to at least 3 square meters. meters of living space with an average air cubic capacity of at least 6 cubic meters. meters; the temperature of the barracks in winter had to be at least 14 degrees Celsius, and in the evening - at least 18 degrees; for ventilation there was supposed to be at least one window for every two windows, for washing - a bright and heated room with washbasins “at the rate of 1 nipple per 10 people”, etc.
On December 14, by order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 159, a Photo and Film Service Department was formed within its composition (headed by S. F. Boldyrev), photo posts were formed at the construction departments, all photographic materials, equipment and staff available in the departments of the Construction Administration were transferred to the Central Photographic Laboratory.
“In commemoration of the 16th anniversary of the existence of the Cheka-OGPU bodies,” civilian officers and VOKhR riflemen held in the guardhouse were released early, punished for up to 20 days.

“Petr Leontievich Zharov, having been appointed to the position of Head of the 13th Department of the DMITLAG OGPU, upon arrival at his place of work declared himself sick. When checking this circumstance, it turned out that Comrade. Zharov did not go to work due to drunkenness.
Comrade Zharov was immediately removed from his position and brought to justice.
The OGPU Collegium, having considered on December 13 this year. g. this case, decided: Pyotr Leontyevich Zharov - ARRESTED FOR 30 DAYS and DISMISSED FROM THE OGPU BODIES.”

The Dmitlag contingent at this time was steadily increasing: on January 1, 1933 - 10,400 prisoners, on April 1 - 39,328, on July 1 - 53,116, on October 1 - 86,914, on January 1, 1934 - 88,534.

The death rate of camp inmates in 1933 was 8,873 people, or 16.1 percent of their average annual number.

A film about how to live in hell, Founders of the Gulag On August 9, 1918, Lenin sends instructions to the Penza Provincial Executive Committee. It is necessary to carry out merciless mass terror against the kulaks, priests and White Guards; those who are dubious will be locked up in a concentration camp outside the city. We will draw an analogy with fascist criminals - Gestapo men, SS men, concentration camp guards. They, too, were just cogs in the criminal regime. But they were caught all over the world and destroyed. The security officers had a choice, but they curried their favor by walking over corpses like they were on sleepers, until they themselves fell under a train rushing towards a bright future. We will never know how many people became victims of the construction of communism during the period between the October Revolution of 1917 and the death of Stalin in March 1953. Some historians say the death toll was 20 million, others 50. Millions worked as slaves in the Gulag camps, the systems of mines, factories and construction sites that underpinned the great Soviet industrial leap. Significantly more people died in Stalin's Gulag than under Hitler. Naftaliy Aronovich Frenkel Frenkel constantly put forward projects to expand “prison production”, shared plans on how to earn big money from free prison labor. It was Frenkel who came up with the idea of ​​how to optimize the work of camp prisoners, making it as productive as possible and minimally costly. In 1931−1933 - he worked on the White Sea-Baltic Canal of the OGPU: from 1931 - the head of the work of the White Sea Construction of the OGPU, in 1933 - assistant chief. In 1933, he received the Order of Lenin. FRANKEL'S FORMULA: “Take everything from a prisoner in the first three months, and then we don’t need him. It was Frenkel who figured out how to optimize the work of camp prisoners, making it as productive as possible and minimally costly. Let me remind you that under the “Frenkel method” "in the issuance of food it is implied that it is specific to the 1930-1950s. The 20th century differentiated ration scale - the amount of food a camp inmate received per day was made dependent on the production norm he fulfilled. The more a prisoner works, the more food he receives. Doesn't meet the quota, soldering is cut. It would seem that what is special about this scheme? The fact is that it was unprecedented, both in essence and in consequences. NKVD Many years before the arrival of Hitler, Isai Davidovich Berg. Lieutenant of State Security Jew Isai Davidovich Berg (1905, Moscow - March 7, 1939, Moscow) - head of the Administration of the NKVD in the Moscow region, according to Solzhenitsyn Berg was the inventor of machines for asphyxiating those sentenced to death with exhaust gases “A person could turn into a goner in literally two weeks . Where there were no gas chambers, cold, hunger, disease and overwork killed. - insignificant rations; - lack of camp clothing; - absolutely impossible production standards; - a distance to the place of work of 8-9 kilometers on snow-covered virgin soil; - terrible frosts of 35 degrees - work without days off. - hordes of bedbugs, and often lice; - cold in the barracks... Two weeks - a month of such work was quite enough to completely incapacitate a person. After this period, the prisoner lost the rest of his strength and could no longer reach the plot, and more often than not, even withstand the divorce. After that he died a slow death. This is a way of killing people, during which they only stretch out the torment for months. Death from a bullet cannot be compared with what the many millions who died from starvation had to endure. Such an execution is the height of sadism, cannibalism, hypocrisy...”Matvey Davydovich Berman (1898 -1939) From June 9, 1932, head of the Main Directorate of Camps (GULAG) of the OGPU (later NKVD) of the USSR. It was Berman who became the creator of a huge “state” of prisoners and turned the Gulag into an industrial enterprise based on the use of slave labor. Firin Semyon Grigorievich (1898-1937) (real name - Pupko).yn a small merchant from Vilno. He graduated from a local two-year school. He worked as an assistant at a shoe factory, then was drafted into the tsarist army, deserter...



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